

Hair, Christopher N

From: Shortley, Timothy R
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2009 12:01 PM
To: Flacks, Marti A
Subject: Fw: Sudan Policy Review Vision doc

RELEASE IN PART
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Archie Bolster, Senior Reviewer

Deputy to SE Gration
Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Department of State

From: Pratt, Jonathan G
To: Fernandez, Alberto M (Khartoum); Shortley, Timothy R; Asquino, Mark L
Sent: Mon Apr 27 03:58:42 2009
Subject: RE: Sudan Policy Review Vision doc

On point two, just to add that it's tough as well for the political section when TDYers receive phone calls in the field directly from Washington and have the authority to report informally and engage directly with actors in Sudan without discussing it first with the embassy. It essentially cuts the political section and front office out of the policy process, as well as the reporting process. In many cases it leads to a skewed view and poor info and analysis – TDYers with very little time on the ground sharing views directly with Washington that have not been vetted with or analyzed by the embassy. So I hope the beefed-up presence will be fully integrated into the embassy as permanent employees rather than TDYs. If they are TDYs, their instructions should be to work within the embassy chain of command, and information sharing should continue to flow from the front office to USSES. Like the CDA, I also won't be here when this is fully implemented, but leave it as a recommendation based on what I've observed over the last two years.

On the DDR plans that Cameron mentions in the document, do we have a plan for specific DDR support, and an idea of how much/when/where this will start?

Finally, the use of the word genocide in this document seems out of date and inaccurate. Given current realities on the ground, it could simply say 'definitive end to the conflict.'

From: Fernandez, Alberto M (Khartoum)
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2009 10:17 AM
To: Shortley, Timothy R; Asquino, Mark L; Pratt, Jonathan G
Subject: RE: Sudan Policy Review Vision doc

This is fine as far as it goes and, of course, tracks with much of what we have written and said. I do have three major quibbles:

Under "Desired Endstate" assumptions:

A vote for secession in 2011 does not necessarily require immediate independence: while this may be technically true, nothing I have heard from either the NCP or SPLM would lead me to believe that we have that luxury. We just don't know enough of the processes that would be unleashed by a succession vote so while this assumption may be technically true we may not have any sort of grace period after such a vote.

A larger U.S. Government presence in Washington and Sudan will be required to carry out and meet all of our strategic objectives: This may be true (especially in Washington) but is fraught with problems, if you have people in Sudan who are not under clearly established lines of command and well established rules of the game. You risk creating a two tier system of empowered TDYers and disgruntled permanent staff which would be a bureaucratic and morale nightmare. Also the security rules and lines of authority for people in Darfur are not going to be conducive to an enhanced

presence there unless you have a very permissive COM. None of this is my problem since I am out of here in 19 days but there are a lot of ambiguities here. One rule of thumb: what Khartoum and the Sudan effort need is not necessarily more bodies but more of the right kind of people and those are often in short supply. For example, with my departure in May, there will be NO Arabic speaking FSOs at post.

Under strategic objectives, the third point: **Conclude a political agreement that addresses the underlying grievances of the Darfuri people and provides them with more effective representation in government** – this sounds nice and is certainly the laudable goal we should be aiming at but fails to answer the underlying question: **which** Darfuri people and who is **“them”**? Somebody and some community is going to lose here. And with the overwhelming majority of rebel armed movements representing a small ethnic minority and the majority of IDPs belonging to another, we have some basic decisions here we are going to have to eventually confront – who actually rules Darfur and speaks for it and what happens to the “losers”? How do you reconcile, for example, the Zaghawa to a situation where they could be the big losers (especially if their cousins still rule in Ndjamená)? And if the basis for a new polity in Darfur is – as many would say – based on the recreation of a Fur-Darfur Arab agreement, which Fur and which Arabs and how does the Khartoum Government fit in? Who is **“our guy”** who can pull this off? Zoellick at Abuja attempted to anoint Minni in this capacity but it didn't work out that way.

Thanks,

Alberto

From: Shortley, Timothy R
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2009 12:44 AM
To: Fernandez, Alberto M (Khartoum); Asquino, Mark L; Pratt, Jonathan G
Subject: FW: Sudan Policy Review Vision doc

Per email on the other side. For discussion when we arrive.
Tim

From: Hudson, Cameron C. [mailto:Cameron_C._Hudson@]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2009 2:30 PM
To: Shortley, Timothy R
Subject: Sudan Policy Review Vision doc

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Gratton said he agrees with 98% of this document. Its unclass so you guys can take it with you. This needs to become the basis of what we give the president—it doesn't have to be the only thing we give, however. Call me and I'll read out the Donilon meeting.