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SUBJECT: SCYLLA III-73 Quick Look (U)	ACTION		
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
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354721 (SCYLLA) III - 7399 - 7300 (RWS) (Rec'd NSI) Jan 1974

REMARKS

The SCYLLA III-73 simulation Quick Look Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense for his information is attached.

Attachment a/s

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 25 2011

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ACTION OFFICER LTC Kott PMD, SAGA Ext. 53705	COORDINATION/PROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
	C/SAGA	BGen Strack	59162			
DATE OF PREPARATION						

R-3

WORKING DATE 7/30/74

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SCYLLA III-73 Quick Look (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ SCYLLA III-73, an interagency politico-military simulation, was conducted in the Pentagon facilities of the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency from 26 November through 14 December 1973. SCYLLA was designed to create and evaluate nuclear options for use in military conflicts short of strategic engagement. Following is a Quick Look summary of the simulation. Distribution is limited pending further evaluation, at which time a more analytical summary will be forwarded to appropriate agencies.

2. ~~(S)~~ Initial Scenario: World scene 1973-1976 depicted detente, further disintegration of NATO, contracting US commitment overseas, US domestic problems and continuing Soviet expansion worldwide with emphasis on strengthened influence in Middle East. Dawn of 1976 portrayed gathering storm in the Middle East. Friction between Iraq and Iran grows. King Faisal assassinated and Saudi junta declares hostility to the United States and Iran. Soviets abet deteriorating scene by increasing aid to Iraq; United States increases aid to Iran. In June 1976, Iraqis attempt to seize disputed territory from Kuwait by force. Iran pledges support to Kuwait and invades Iraq. As fall of Baghdad becomes imminent, USSR intervenes. Soviet military elements join Iraqis as two Soviet divisions cross USSR-Iranian border south of Caucasus. US intervention considered vital to save Teheran, but insufficient conventional strength immediately available. US President directs options be prepared for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Iran.

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3. ~~(TS)~~ Move I:

a. Blue Team (United States) assessed world leadership in balance. If USSR exploited opportunity, Soviet primacy -- and control of Middle East -- would be assured. To counter Moscow's move, Blue selected strong military response/lesser diplomatic actions to accomplish political objectives as opposed to stronger diplomatic/weaker military actions which might not guarantee end of conflict. Blue objectives were to terminate conflict at lowest level and preserve stability (status quo) in Middle East, unilaterally if necessary, but preferably with NATO Allies' support. Military option selected was strike against Soviet ground forces and LOCs in Iran with 85 nucs authorized, 47 air delivered, 30 artillery and 8 ADMs. Of these, 54 weapons were expended. Concomitant US alerts and DEFCON 1 ordered. NATO allies/Japan advised in advance of Blue plan; USSR advised, on launch, and informed strike was manifestation of US resolve/intent to preserve Iran. Blue assumed strikes would cause serious international/domestic concern; USSR reaction would be surprise at US "first use" and indecision on US readiness to escalate further. OSD 3.3(b)(4)

b. Red Team (USSR) response to US nuclear attack and resultant casualties was reasoned and deliberate. Moscow understood US signals/intentions. Recognizing struggle was political -- contest for world supremacy -- Red reacted for maximum political gain using conventional military force. Two-phase course of action was:

(1) Pause in Iran, continue worldwide mobilization, and conduct intensive anti-US propaganda campaign.

(2) After 48 hours press attack against Iran including coordinated airborne/ground seizure of Teheran. Red rationale was to deceive United States with non-provocative buildup then spring politically decisive conventional move. Hope was United States would sense victory during Red Phase I and not press attack; Phase II would present fait accompli making US use of nuclear weapons difficult. If United States did use nuclear weapons again, USSR contingency was forceful nuclear response -- avoiding strategic exchange.

4. ~~(TS)~~ Move II:

a. USSR pause and conventional response to US nuclear strike, assessed by Blue Team as successful "reading" of

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Soviet "game plan." Blue Team concluded Red Team decision not to respond with nuclear weapons was consistent with historical Russian backdown in face of unequivocal firmness. Blue Team evaluated renewed Soviet conventional advance as confirmation of Moscow's determination to control Middle East oil and achieve superpower primacy as well as modest probe to test continued US resolve without risk of strategic -- and possibly further tactical -- nuclear exchange. Accordingly, Blue determined to maintain pressure on Red and pre-serve Iran by continued reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. Course of action selected directed use of 118 weapons against Soviet troops/LOCs in Iran; 72 air delivered, 30 artillery, 12 PERSHINGs and 4 ADMs. Of these, all but one ADM were expended.

[REDACTED] deployed TACAIR to control and suppress Soviet airborne landing near Teheran; and, replenished expended US/Iranian resources. Simultaneous political actions informed Moscow of American determination/intentions and elicited NATO/world support for United States. Contin-gency planning considered USSR tactical nuclear response and provided for [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(4),(5),(6)

b. Red Team was dismayed by apparent failure of conventional attack to seize Teheran and extent of the US nuclear response. The Team believed situation left USSR no face saving out or satisfactory option in battle area. Consequently, Red Team resolve to achieve original objectives hardened. Nuclear retaliation planned to indicate to the United States that Washington's brinkmanship had brought USSR to limit of its options/restraint. Soviet strikes would be large but non-strategic and would place onus on the United States to initiate major escalation of war/signify willingness to engage in possible strategic exchange. Accordingly, USSR struck five US aircraft carrier task groups, (two in Med; two in Pacific; one in Gulf of Oman) and naval and air facilities on Guam with nuclear weapons launched from LRA and SSBNs. In Iran, Soviet forces took up nuclear defensive positions to re-group and replace losses. Iranian field forces were struck with nuclear weapons sufficient to inflict 40% casualties; all Iranian jet capable airfields were incapacitated by nuclear strikes. Turkey was issued ultimatum indicating future use of Turkish territory by US aggressor forces would generate attack on Turkish soil by USSR strategic

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rocket forces. In addition, PRC was warned that US/Chinese interference would be dealt with harshly; NATO allies were warned to deny facilities to US forces. At the same time, as an adjunct to worldwide politico-diplomatic overtures, Moscow offered to join the United States in cessation of hostilities and opening of negotiations on disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran. Pending US reply, Soviet forces ordered to refrain from further attacks and remain in a maximum state of readiness.

5. ~~(TS)~~ Move III:

a. Blue Team reaction to Soviet strikes was dichotomous. On the one hand, Blue believed that it had met Soviet challenge and recognized necessity to cease hostilities; consequently, Washington indicated to USSR that it was prepared to negotiate. On the other hand, Blue concluded they could best maintain a bargaining chip during negotiations, demonstrate resolve, and reestablish US/USSR naval balance by initiating mining/blockade of selected international straits, Soviet ports, channels, and passages and ordering conventional offensive attacks against USSR/Warsaw Pact merchant/military shipping in international waters. Blue Team was reasonably certain that USSR would perceive military actions as deescalatory since attacks were conventional (although military commanders were authorized to use nuclear weapons for self-defense against nuclear counterattack), not on Soviet soil, and limited to shipping. In addition, Kremlin would realize that negotiations would only affect their short-term goals in Middle East without jeopardizing long-term aims. On balance, Blue believed that combined political-military action was required to end the war at once and stimulate negotiations in which both sides would accept positions of relative parity. In related attempt to bolster US position, Blue Team took firm stand against NATO allies reluctant to support the United States in conflict. Allies advised that unless NATO mobilized for own defense in deterring subsequent USSR aggression, US forces earmarked for Europe might be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense.

b. The Red Team, in responding to Blue's strikes concluded that the USSR had, in effect, at this point achieved its objectives, i.e., had not "lost face" as a superpower; in addition USSR possessing a portion of Iran, had access

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to the Persian Gulf through Iraq. (The latter would ultimately lead to Soviet control of the Middle East.) Consequently, Moscow offered to cease fire and negotiate -- with Iran, not the United States. As incentive it began withdrawing troops from Northeastern Iran. Meanwhile, Soviet forces in Northwestern Iran secured/consolidated occupied areas which Moscow intended to retain under its tutelage. Consonant with their desire to cease hostilities, no offensive action was taken against the United States. Instead Soviet shipping was ordered to the nearest ports; military ships assumed defensive postures; missile boats were deployed to areas likely to be mined/blockaded; and, Soviet submarines made their presence known near US and allied merchant ships. Simultaneously, the United States and its Allies were advised of Moscow's actions and warned that any further offensive attacks would cause renewed Soviet retaliation.

6. ~~(TS)~~ Preliminary observations.

a. Both teams:

(1) Exercised judicious behavior to avoid general/strategic war.

(2) Determined not to relinquish superpower influence/prestige.

(3) Recognized that the use of nuclear weapons required them to reassess the relationship between their political/military objectives.

(4) Agreed to cease-fire/negotiate when they thought they had "won," or at least not "lost."

(5) Accepted shifts in geographic location and change in types of targets as well as an increase in numbers of weapons as valid courses of action.

(6) Considered strikes against sea forces and Guam as distinct from strikes against the "homeland."

(7) Regarded "tit-for-tat" exchanges as not necessary to convey signals/intentions.

(8) Anticipated little willingness on the part of NATO to become involved.

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(9) Accepted use of nuclear weapons when recourse to conventional alternatives was either infeasible or had not succeeded previously.

(10) Were subject to some misassessment of the exact intentions and the meaning of overtures of the other side.

(11) Were unable to precisely predict the options and response of their adversary within the relatively limited range of candidate courses of action.

(12) Developed and executed ad hoc nuclear options as required to achieve objectives.

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