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2. [redacted] interrupted at this point and said he wanted to tell Sam that he was to [redacted] Tehran to have nothing to do with the CIA rep in the group. [redacted] said that [redacted] indicate that there is some danger in his meeting with Sam.

3. [redacted] is very much concerned about the Gorbaniyar-Khashoggi-Israeli connection. He said that their intelligence people had taken a hard look at these connections and concluded that Gorbaniyar is an Israeli agent. They are uncertain as to what to do about it and are open to suggestions from us. He said that they had decided not to try to bring him back to Tehran. In order to appease him and keep him quiet they intend to continue to buy some items from him. (note; he said all this before the [redacted] spread revelations began so there may be a change). He would like to discuss the Gorbaniyar problem at the next meeting. Sam pointed out that Gorbaniyar was [redacted] that we should not make

meeting. Sam pointed out that Gorbaniar [redacted] stated that we should not make things too tough for Gorbaniar. He asked if we could do something via the Israelis?

5. [redacted] wanted us to know that the Shera newspaper in Beirut was under Syrian control. This has led some in Tehran to conclude that the U.S. might have had a hand in the expose. Sam pointed out to him that we had considerable information which clearly indicates that Hizbullah is involved in the newspaper. We had concluded that Mehdi Beshemi may have used [redacted] means of channelling his leak.

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6. Later on 8 November, [redacted] gave a kind of pep speech to the American delegation in which he emphasized the need to forget the past and move on to a new relationship. He said that because of the nature of the government in Tehran, we should look at things as if we are dealing with a corporate structure. He also said that they were somewhat disappointed in the Frankfurt meetings as they had hoped to move ahead faster on the intel exchange. He also complained about the Israelis and said that we should have moved to [redacted] them and Gorbaniyar. He argued that the Gorbaniyar problem was one that we should have solved. He also tried to argue that the leaks had started in the west. He even suggested that some of their people thought that the leaks were engineered by CIA for some undefined purpose and this convinced them that CIA did not know what they were doing. In short he tried in the best Iranian fashion to fault our side for everything that had gone wrong. He added that the current situation in Tehran is very flimsy and is such that we must understand that it was a near miracle that they have been able to avoid a serious confrontation with the leftists during the celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of the taking of the embassy. He summed up by saying that this was the most difficult task ever undertaken. He was under impossible pressure. We must understand that he is the only true friend that we have. We should be sincere with him and develop mutual trust between us. He emphasized teamwork and we should now work together.

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8. On 9 Nov., North began by saying discuss certain things with [redacted] on in Kuwait and views on how we proceed describing the situation in Washington best to protect Rafsenjani and the two countries. Press commentary based on we are maintaining a no comment posture is at one time to find ways to protect find ways to move it along. We must on in Iran so that we are confronted with photographic copies of the [redacted] passports, if these are published we will be in deep trouble. [redacted] comment on this was "are you sure that photographs were actually taken?" He said not to worry that he would make sure that no photos were turned over to anyone. We said fine but if all else fails, give us some prior warning.

he had specific instructions to release of Jacobsen, the 17 prisoners ly. North spent some time in emphasized that we were doing our relationship between our two Rafsenjani's speech has hurt. Although pressures are mounting. Our problem relationship and at the same time better information on what is going up surprises. One example is the

9. North stated that we were anxious to go ahead as soon as the hostage issue is behind us. We have a commo package, and have also identified a technician. We definitely do not want any of this to appear on television as we do not wish to endanger the technician when and if we send him. North added that he wishes to emphasize that he is here at the order of the President and we still have the same objectives as explained in Frankfurt. Our problem as we now see it is that we must get in order to get the press off our backs.

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10. This led into a long, 4 or 5 hours discussion of the Kuwaiti seventeen. [redacted] problem is that he was holding discussions with us based on a very restricted brief. He insisted that they could not send a senior government official to talk to the Kuwaitis unless they were sure that it would result in the release of the Dawa prisoners. We pointed out that we had done all that was humanly possible by talking directly to the Kuwaitis [redacted]

[redacted] We were as sure as we could possibly be that any overture [redacted] would be warmly received by the Kuwaitis. [redacted] continued [redacted] the need for guarantees, but at the end of the discussion [redacted] strongly recommend that Iran go ahead and dispatch a senior official to [redacted] the Kuwaitis. [redacted] ended his comment on the Kuwaitis by saying that in their discussions with the Hizbullah about the Kuwaitis, they had been hopeful of their early release. [redacted] thought that what we do we must serve this hope of the Hizbullah. What it boils down to now is a tit for [redacted] situation between the Kuwaiti 17 and the rest of the hostages. [redacted] one point [redacted] said that if the 17 Dawa prisoners were freed there [redacted] with the other two hostages.

11. [redacted] discussion, we assured [redacted] that we would do our best to insure [redacted] was said publicly in Washington that would hurt Rafsenjani. On his part, [redacted] tried to explain some of their problem in Lebanon. He pointed out that the Hizbullah was the only real organizational structure. He stated some of the other organizations, like Jihad-i-Islami are in reality a loose knit combination of factions who disagree on different issues. They are also a polyglot group in that Iraqi shi'as and even some chariks are involved. What control over the Jihad-i-Islami that exists, is exercised by the Syrians. [redacted] said that the Dawa helped them in getting Jacobson released. [redacted]

12. On Nov. 10 Sam held a final [redacted] that they were in a very precarious [redacted] raising money to pay for future shipments. He wondered aloud if we could not do something to alleviate their financial crunch. he also is extremely worried about the Israeli connection. He described [redacted]

[redacted] problem and said that while it is true [redacted] he also owes them 1,000 tons and [redacted] this problem. He urged Sam to do all [redacted]

[redacted] in which [redacted] stated [redacted] situation and were having trouble [redacted] He wondered aloud if we could not [redacted] crunch. he also is extremely worried [redacted] it as a bomb ready to explode. [redacted]

[redacted] He reviewed the Gorbanifar [redacted] they owe him 10 million dollars, [redacted] not know how we are going to solve [redacted] to keep him quiet. [redacted]

[redacted] said that one of the reasons Tehran decided to proceed with this contact is that we differed in our approach to the hostage question. They know that we have been far more honorable [redacted] and this is appreciated in Tehran.

13. [redacted] reviewed his intel requirements. [redacted]

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1 [REDACTED] made a final appeal on getting rid of Saddam Hussein. He wanted us to understand that there was no way the war could end with Saddam in power. The [REDACTED] up of the 1955 agreement on TV must be avenged.

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