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October 20, 2014

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

Re: FOI Appeal, in reply refer to Archive# 201402331BRI001/ FOI319810)

Dear Commissioner:

This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act requesting a review of the July 23 Decision by the Cabinet Office, and September 15, 2014, affirmation, to deny FOI319810, which sought the 23 March 1984 Joint Intelligence Committee report, reference JIC(84)(N)45, entitled, "Soviet Union: Concern About a Surprise NATO Attack," which was written in response to NATO military exercise Able Archer 83.

When considering this appeal please note that while this request was denied under Freedom of Information exemption sections 23, 24, and 27, in this particular case those exemptions should not apply.

Exemptions 23, 24, and 27 should not be used to deny the entirety of this document under the Freedom of Information Act because of the extreme pubic interest the release of the information in this document will serve. Moreover, this record should also not be withheld in its entirety because of the multitude of British, American, Russian, and other documents already declassified and released on the topic.

Records to which the absolute exemption does not apply, which includes those denied under section 24 and section 27, are listed by the Ministry of Justice as subject to a public interest test. Based on this record's historical value, the release of the requested records is in the best interest of the general community due to an intense and pressing public interest to understand the events that occurred during the Cold War.

Even if some information must remain withheld, it is entirely likely that the document holds much information that can be segregated and released with great benefit to the public interest.

In your review of my appeal, please take note of the abundance of documents already released by the US and UK governments on the 1983 Soviet "War Scare" referencing information on the Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky and British and US intelligence – including human intelligence and signals intelligence. Along with a copy of the denials, I have attached examples of relevant documents released under British and U.S. Freedom of Information laws. These include:

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- Photographs and records of Oleg Gordievsky meeting and debriefing President Reagan.
- British Ministry of Defence documents confirming the "unprecedented Soviet reaction" as well as intelligence sharing between US and the UK.
- A classified CIA 1996 Studies in Intelligence article "The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations" by Ben B. Fischer, a History Fellow at the CIA's Center for the Study in Intelligence.
- A Department of State document confirming a British source alerted the US to the danger.
- A US Air Force After Action Report of the NATO Command Post Exercise Able Archer 83

Furthermore, please note that Michael Herman, head of the Soviet Division at Government Communications Headquarters from 1977 to 1982, has recently discussed the contents of this document at length. He also strongly recommended its declassification as it benefits the public interest. A summary of his recent comments is attached.

If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000 or email me at foiamail@gwu.edu.

Sincerely,

Nate Jones
FOIA Coordinator

Cabinet Office

1 Horse Guards Road
London
SW1A 2HQ

T +44 (0)20 7276 2294
E foi.team@cabinet-office.gsi.gov.uk
www.cabinet.office.gov.uk

Nate Jones
Email: foiadesk@gwu.edu

15 September 2014

Dear Mr Jones,

REVIEW OF REQUEST UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000
Cabinet Office Internal Review Reference: IR 319810
(Original Case Reference: FoI 319810)

Thank you for your email of 6 August 2014. You asked for an internal review of our response of 23 July 2014 to your request for information. In your request you asked for the 23 March 1984 Joint Intelligence Committee report, reference JIC(84)(N)45, entitled, 'Soviet Union: Concern about a Surprise NATO Attack,' which was written in response to the NATO military exercise codenamed Able Archer 83.

I have carefully reviewed the handling of your request and I consider that the exemptions at section 23(1), 24(1) and 27(1)(a),(b),(c) and (d) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 were properly applied. I believe that, where applicable, the balance of the public interest was fully considered for the reasons set out in our letter of 23 July 2014. I have therefore concluded that I should uphold the decision given in that letter.

I have considered the points you make about documents already released by the US and UK governments on Able Archer. It is Cabinet Office's responsibility to consider the public interest test in respect of the information it holds. Other states and UK Government departments are entitled to make their own judgments as to what of the information they hold on a subject it is appropriate to make public.

Cabinet Office reviewed the information held on Able Archer as part of the annual transfer of records to the National Archives. All of the information you seek has been retained by the department under the terms of section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958.

I also note your point on application of the absolute exemption at section 23. The section 23 exemption applies to all records, regardless of their age. It is only when historical records have been transferred to the National Archives that section 23 ceases to be an absolute exemption and is subject to a public interest test. As mentioned above JIC(84)(N)45 is retained by the Cabinet Office, section 23 continues to operate as an absolute exemption in respect of the information within scope.

If you are unhappy with the handling of your request for information you, have the right to apply directly to the Information Commissioner for a decision. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at:

Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

Yours sincerely

Roger Smethurst
Deputy Director and Head of Knowledge and Information Management Unit


C 4 18 35
FACKELMAN
21 JULY 1987
Oleg Gordievsky (KGB defector)

CHRON FILE
~~NOT FOR SYSTEM~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91139

27314

~~SECRET~~

October 30, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the highest policy making levels.

His observations and assessments are in general accord with my own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.

I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They know that they would under no circumstances share such information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.

Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however, are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia" "by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However, he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in these areas.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex technologies).

I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable -- though not likely -- that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is not the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms reduction would be much improved.

I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least half believing them. Therefore, I agree that you need to be very clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful) in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we see them as a threat.

Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role in World War II.

Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be "sold" as improving Soviet ability to cope with their economic problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real arms reduction.

George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Summary of Gordievskiy's Points

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

27315

SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS

1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic strain.

2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick. They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the Soviet economy.

3. The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.

4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on reducing offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defence. This would avoid the need for an overall increase in military expenditure.

5. But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people by means of a greatly stepped up prcpaganda campaign against the Untied States.

6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.

7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.

8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United States relations. Everything else is secondary.

9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United States relations will be to gain better access to ~~Soviet~~ U.S. technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success. It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel that they are the equal of the United States. United States/ Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.

10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the United States.

11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.

12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people. The military complex is a real power: and the military are increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.

SYSTEM II: 91139
~~NOT FOR SYSTEM~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~ October 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

As you requested in your PROFs note, I have prepared a Memorandum (TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points

dlh 8/7/04

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE: CHRON FILE

Withdrawer DLB 8/28/2006

File Folder 8591139

FOIA F97-013/3 NICK CULL

Box Number 70

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
27314	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #7938; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: GRODIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS *R 11/29/2011 F1997-013/3*	3	10/30/1985	B1
27315	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #7944; SUMMARY OF GORIEVSKIY'S POINTS *R 11/29/2011 F1997-013/3*	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Berlin2014-04

Conference on the Able Archer crisis, 1983, Berlin May 2014

I was the head of the Soviet Division at GCHQ for five years, from 1977 to 1982, but by the time of Able Archer I had moved to do something else, so my knowledge of it is second-hand, based on conversations with Harry Burke who died some years ago. Harry was a member of GCHQ who was seconded to become a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee's Assessments Staff in London and who in a sense 'discovered' the whole Able Archer crisis.

His family – then Burkovitch – had come to Britain before the war as Jewish émigrés from what was then Yugoslavia He went to a good London school, served in the RAF at the end of the war, and read Serbo-Croat and Russian at Cambridge. He joined GCHQ as an analyst in the early 1950s and had a successful career, mainly though not entirely on Soviet targets. He had considerable presence in a British public school-Oxbridge style, allied with a determined, disputatious Slav temperament; he was not easily put down. With his background it is not surprising that he was suspicious of Soviet moves and motives.

He had worked for me in the past, and I eventually managed to get him made my deputy, effectively as the chief Soviet analyst. He was a great strength in the period 1980-81, of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact preparations for military moves against Poland that were eventually abandoned in favour of Polish martial law. In 1982 the JIC considered the Nicoll report with its criticisms of the committee's earlier warning record, plus thr lessons of the Falklands invasion, and Sir Antony Duff, its Chairman and Intelligence Coordinator, had Harry appointed to the Assessments Staff with special responsibility for warning.

That was the background to Able Archer as Harry subsequently related it to me. He was aware of Gordievsky's reports on RYAN, but his moving force as described to me was the unusual activity described in some of the Sigint reports. Apparently this had not been highlighted by the Sigint agencies. He put this together with Gordievsky's evidence to argue for the evidence of Soviet fears of Able Archer. He then fought single-handed against almost everyone to get this set out as a JIC report some time later. If my memory is correct Harry also told me that the JIC produced another more general report on Soviet views of the West, and that the two reports went to high levels in Washington. On his final visit to Washington in 1990 Harry was invited to discuss Able Archer with the PFIAB (the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), presumably in connection with the Board's re-examination of Able Archer, and its conclusion that intelligence's previous confidence about Soviet posturing had been misplaced.

I have only one other piece of evidence. Some years ago I was shown a redacted copy of the JIC's Able Archer report by the then GCHQ historian. My recollection is that it was much more tentative than I expected from Harry's account; but the weakness was consistent with his account of the scepticism within the committee, presumably leasing to compromise wording. I have tried to get a sight of this and the other JIC report under the Freedom of Information Act, but failed.

My own comments include the following

1.The most surprising thing about the whole episode was that Burke, usually the arch-hawk in his Soviet judgments, was arguing for Soviet fears. It is a striking example of professional conscience. There are morals here for the staffing of the top-level assessment units.

2. It is surprising that Gordievsky's evidence of RYAN, plus the Soviet speeches from 1981, did not lead to an earlier assessment of Soviet fears. The UK view of the Soviet Union had got into a rut: the JIC machinery had only one Soviet expert, and it had perhaps become preoccupied with Afghanistan and Poland. A weakness in the UK was that the assessors didn't know the extent of US confrontation/provocation in Reagan's first administration. The Russians were quite right to be frightened!

3. But how big was the crisis? Until all the evidence is declassified how do we judge? Gates's listing of military actions (p272 of his softback edition) is impressive; but in reviewing Cold War crises there was always a risk of sweeping quite innocent activities into the picture. On the other hand the patterns of valid Soviet indicators could have a patchiness about them. I recall a complete stand-down in Soviet flying in August 1969 that was part of preparations for military action against China, but there were none of the other military indicators one might expect. Perhaps the Soviet military system was less closely orchestrated than we sometimes think.

Michael Herman

16 May 2014

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E14

SOVIET UNION: CONCERN ABOUT A SURPRISE NATO ATTACK

I INTRODUCTION

1. This paper considers whether specific options exist for minimising the risk of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO Command Post Exercises (CPXs), particularly nuclear ones. Although it has been prepared in the context of an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack (JIC(84)(N)45), the paper examines the inherent advantages and disadvantages of prior notification of nuclear CPXs as an overall Confidence Building Measure (CBM).

2. [redacted]

3. Although the JIC reached no firm conclusion, we cannot discount the possibility that at least some Soviet officials/ officers may have misinterpreted Able Archer 83 and possibly other nuclear CPXs as posing a real threat. Quite apart from their reaction to Able Archer and [redacted] If their response involves the taking of actual precautions against what

/they

they judge to be threatening and ambiguous warning indicators, should we seek to establish a system which makes the holding of high level nuclear CPXs subject to an obligation to notify in advance? Should the practice of promoting military transparency through Confidence Building Measures be extended from field exercises and the movement of actual forces to CPXs themselves? Provided a proposal can be assembled which does not constrain nuclear CPX activity, (which is militarily vital for the training of commanders and their staffs in extremely complicated procedures), could there be advantage in exploring this with the Russians? [redacted]

II SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION

4. While an element of uncertainty is implicit in the concept of deterrence, it is assumed that there is mutual benefit in ensuring that each side does not misconstrue the other's CPXs as posing a real threat. Since certain notification measures relating to test ICBM launches already exist for reducing the possibility of misinterpretation (SALT II, Chapter XVI) there seems no inherent reason why similar procedures could not be devised which extended to certain nuclear CPXs as well. Prior warning of field exercises has become an accepted feature of the conventional arms control process, and as such, could be capable

of expansion, although not perhaps within existing fora (see paragraph 7 below). It is for discussion whether notification of nuclear CPXs would have to be balanced (the reciprocal nature of conventional notification is an important factor which needs to be taken into account) or whether notification might be asymmetric or even unilateral.

5. It is also for discussion what CPXs might be notified and the extent of information which might be provided. It may for example be asked whether awareness of the existence of a nuclear CPX would of itself generate confidence. In our view simple notification could indeed be effective in reassuring the other side if it was given sufficiently far in advance to make it clear that such exercises formed a normal pattern of activity and took place in relative isolation from the changing temperature of political relationships between the major powers. It might prove possible to construct notification in such a way as to avoid giving details of particular scenarios or inhibit in any way US or NATO exercises.

6. Although the Russians appear to have reacted in an unprecedented way to the NATO exercise Able Archer 83, [redacted] This, coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union is the only nuclear power in the Warsaw Pact, indicates that super-power nuclear CPXs should form the centrepiece of any notification procedure, supplemented perhaps on the West's side with notification of NATO-wide exercises involving a substantial American nuclear role. We do not consider that every exercise

/involving

involving simulated nuclear release would require notification [redacted] In the immediate future it might be enough to attempt early discussions with the Russians, [redacted]

III FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION

7. [redacted] There may be a requirement for speed [redacted] This effectively rules out most of the existing arms control negotiations as suitable fora since discussion of CBMs in any of these is likely to be unduly prolonged (MBFR), complicated by an involvement of extraneous participants (CDE, CSCE) or indefinitely delayed (START). A number of existing bilateral US/USSR agreements theoretically provide a framework ('hotline' agreements 1963/71, Article XVI of SALT II or Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement 1973), but none of them seem easily adaptable to current requirements.

8. An ad hoc forum may therefore be required. A special contact between the US and the USSR seems the most practical

option in terms of speed, simplicity and security. Although it was a NATO CPX about which the Soviets appear to have been concerned, prior consultation within a NATO forum, [redacted]. Although we could fully justify attempts to increase confidence about nuclear matters and anticipate considerable support for such efforts, on balance the search for CBMs is likely to be more effectively pursued [redacted]

However recent experience suggests that a bilateral discussion involving possible notification of NATO and US national nuclear CPXs is unlikely to cause problems within the Alliance [redacted] strengthen the case for discussion of CBMs relating to Command Post Exercises, specifically nuclear ones, to be conducted bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. [redacted]

9. The President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Report, 21 March 1984) proposes a bilateral exchange

/of

information between US and Soviet Defence officials about steps which could be misconstrued as indications of an attack. The Report proposes that a variety of measures should be constructed to improve communication and predictability which would 'contribute to stability by improving mutual understanding and reducing surprise and misinterpretation'. It is our view that [redacted] should be acted upon as soon as possible.

Interview with former [redacted] hand, at Madison, May 22, 1990

SNIE's of May and August 1984, essentially reached conclusion that the war scare of 1983-4 was part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed the intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved weapons, arouse opposition in US and Western Europe to US foreign policy objectives. If this so, not of crucial significance.

Another potential conclusion partially adopted is that the war scare also reflected an internal Sov power struggle between conservatives and pragmatists or an effort to avert blame for economic failures by pointing to military threats. If so, events could not be ignored but would not imply a fundamental shift in strategy.

Third conclusion, not adopted at the time but closer to the retrospective view of PFIAB, that war scare was an expression of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing Sov military to prepare for this eventuality, for example by readying forces for a Sov preemptive strike. If so, war scare a cause for concern.

In SNIE's, intell comty believed Sov actions were not inspired by and Sov leaders did not perceive a genuine danger of imminent conflict with US. Sov statements to the contrary were judged to be propaganda.

But PFIAB said 2/90 that Sovs perceived "correllation of forces" turned toward USA, and were convinced that US was seeking military superiority, and thus chances were growing for US prparedness to mount a preemptive 1st strike vs USSR.

Gordievsky info was very closely held at the time but there was some consciousness at top of the general upshot of it.

US intel knew that Sovs had mounted a huge collection effort to find out what Amers were actually doing. They were taking actions to be able to sustain a surprise attack, especially increased protection for their leadership in view of reduced warning time of P2s etc. Improved bunkers, special communications etc.

Gordievsky said they had set up a large computer model in the Min of Defense to calculate and monitor the correllation of forces, including mil, econ, psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.

At time US saw:

Evidence of Sov collection effort.

Placing of Soviet aircraft in Germany and Poland on a higher alert status, readying nuclear strike forces, in period of 2-11 Nov. 83.

In 1984, (JUNE) failue to send the trucks as usual from military to help with the harvest. 85 send them but not from forward areas.

An ominous list of indicators in early 1984. Some from warning people in Pentagon. David McManis, one of thse in charge. Also psb see Gen. Peroots, was DIA director; John McMahon, was DDI and later deputy director CIA.

28 March 2013

Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83: Information from SHAPE Historical Files

Exercise ABLE ARCHER was held from 7-11 November 1983. It was an annual Command Post Exercise (thus involving only headquarters, not troops on the ground) of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE), and it was designed to practise command and staff procedures, with particular emphasis on the transition from conventional to non-conventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons. Overall responsibility for the exercise lay with the Supreme Command Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR). The participants in the exercise were SACEUR's own headquarters SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe), its immediate subordinate headquarters known as Major Subordinate Commands, their subordinates known as Principal Subordinate Commands, and other lower-level War Headquarters throughout ACE.

One of the goals of Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83 was to practice new nuclear weapons release procedures, which had been revised as a result of ABLE ARCHER 82. The exercise scenario provided for less nuclear exercising than in the previous ten years and was designed to concentrate on decision-making processes. However, this was a purely military exercise and NATO Headquarters – thus the Alliance's political authorities - did not participate in ABLE ARCHER 83. Instead the exercise's Directing Staff (DISTAFF) simulated the NATO political authorities. There was also no involvement of national leaders in the exercise, and no such involvement was ever planned, despite some recent allegations to this effect. National involvement was limited to two small Response Cells at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Ministry of Defence in London, whose role was to simulate the nuclear powers' political authorities. Thus all participants in the exercise were military personnel, some of whom simulated the political authorities at NATO headquarters and in the national capitals.

The exercise scenario began with Orange (the hypothetical opponent) opening hostilities in all regions of ACE on 4 November (three days before the start of the exercise) and Blue (NATO) declaring a general alert. Orange initiated the use of chemical weapons on 6 November and by the end of that day had used such weapons throughout ACE. All of these events had taken place prior to the start of the exercise and were thus simply part of the written scenario. There had thus been three days of fighting and a deteriorating situation prior to the start of the exercise. This was desired because – as previously stated – the purpose of the exercise was to test procedures for transitioning from conventional to nuclear operations. As a result of Orange advances, its persistent use of chemical weapons, and its clear intentions to rapidly commit second echelon forces, SACEUR requested political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons early on Day 1 of the exercise (7 November 1983).

By the evening of 7 November the situation of the Blue forces had deteriorated further, particularly in the northern region, and increased Orange use of chemical weapons had been reported. On the morning of 8 November SACEUR requested initial use of nuclear weapons against fixed targets in Orange satellite countries. SACEUR's request was agreed late on 8 November and the weapons were fired/delivered on the morning of 9 November.

Blue's use of nuclear weapons did not stop Orange's aggression. Therefore, SACEUR requested follow-on use of nuclear weapons late on 9 November. This request was approved in the afternoon of 10 November and follow-on use of nuclear weapons was executed on the morning of 11 November. That was the final day of the exercise, which ended in accordance with the long-planned schedule, not early as has sometimes been alleged. An after action report noted that because the exercise scenario began at a low crisis level, there was actually less nuclear play than in previous years.

In 2006 the SHAPE Historian interviewed a number of senior participants in Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83. None of them recalled any "war scare" or even any unusual Soviet reaction to the exercise. Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, the Deputy SACEUR who played the role of SACEUR during ABLE ARCHER 83, stated quite categorically that "no such scare arose at that time."

Gregory Pedlow

Dr. Gregory Pedlow
SHAPE Historian

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Ex 287

SEVENTH AIR DIVISION

EXERCISE THUNDERBOLT

SAC ADVON

ARMED ACTION AURORA (U)

HEADQUARTERS

7th AIR DIVISION (SAC)

RAMSTEIN AB, GERMANY

OPR:

AU/DOO

1 December 1983

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

Ex 28

~~SECRET~~

SACEUR Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83 (U)

After Action Report (U)

I. (U) General.

A. (S) ABLE ARCHER (AA) is an annual SACEUR-sponsored Allied Command Europe CPX to practice command and control procedures with particular emphasis on the transition from purely conventional operations to chemical, nuclear and conventional operations. It is the culmination of SACEUR's annual AUTUMN FORGE exercise series.

B. (S) ABLE ARCHER 83 was conducted 7-11 Nov 83 with three days of "low spectrum" conventional play followed by two days of "high spectrum" nuclear warfare. Due to the low spectrum lead-in for AA 83, SAC was invited to provide liaison officers/advisors to observe and comment on operation of B-52 and KC-135 assets in accordance with SACEUR OPLANs 10604, FANCY GIRL and 10605, GOLDEN EAGLE.

C. (U) SAC Participation (Background)

1. (S) SAC participated in a previous AA with two observers. Due to the nature of the exercise and the possible political implications or inferences of B-52 involvement, future SAC participation was discouraged.

2. (S) SHAPE announced that AA 83 scenario had been changed to include three days of low spectrum activity and requested that SAC take an active part in the exercise. SAC proposed sending a team of two observers to each MSC, SHAPE and UK RAOC. SHAPE accepted this proposal, with the understanding that personnel were to act as observers/advisors to the staff at each level. A description of ADVON activities at these locations is contained in Section II.

D. (U) SAC objectives for ABLE ARCHER 83 were to:

1. (S) Observe NATO play of B-52 and KC-135 employment in accordance with SACEUR OPLANs.

2. (U) Determine if future participation is warranted, and if so, to what extent.

3. (U) Interface with SACEUR and MSC War Headquarters' staffs for mutual education.

4. (U) Update location guides.

E. (U) SAC ADVON composition for ABLE ARCHER 83 was as follows:

1. (U) AFNORTH:

Maj Paul J. Erbacher, 7AD/DOO, Bomber Planner
Maj Arunas Siulte, 7AD/DO8, Tanker Planner

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2. (U) AFCENT:

Lt Col Arthur J. Lindemer, HQ SAC/DOO, Bomber Planner
Maj Ronald J. Valentine, HQ SAC/XOO, Tanker Planner

3. (U) AFSOUTH:

Lt Col Michael J. DePaul, 8AF/DOX, Bomber Planner
Lt Col John P. Bateman, 8AF/DOX, Tanker Planner

4. (U) SHAPE:

Lt Col William N. Maxwell, 7AD/DOX, Bomber Planner
Maj Peter W. Hardin, 8AF/DOO, Tanker Planner

5. (U) UK RAOC:

Maj Geoffrey C. Wenke, 15AF/DOXX, Tanker Planner

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II. (U) ADVON OBSERVATIONS

A. (U) SHAPE

1. (U) GENERAL. ABLE ARCHER is too short for ADVON training or participation. The level of play PSC to MSC only dilutes the B-52 targeting process and the allocation of support packages. The level of SAC procedures training is almost nonexistent. Since ABLE ARCHER is primarily a nuclear procedures exercise, the viability of SAC play also comes into question. The AA Ops Order excepted SAC as players and stated they would act as observers (TAB C to APP III to Annex C). SAC observers at SHAPE were forced into playing SAC ADVON roles because there was no coordinated starting position for SAC assets. Each PSC was directed by SHAPE Op Order to develop unique Air Directives prior to SAC observer arrival. SHAPE started with full SAC force of bombers and tankers. Since the PSCs had developed their Air Directives for the first exercise day and published day two Air Directive at exercise initiation there were no requirements for B-52 allocation requests for days one and two. The underlying reason for the delay was a SACEUR B-52 allocation message for real-world tasking that had exercise information as the last paragraph. The last para (in summary) stated "Allocation from SACEUR was good for 48 hours." Thus, there were no requests from the PSCs for 7 and 8 Nov. However, CS SHAPE (Gen Dalton) wanted B-52 play. So the observers became ADVON players by default.

2. (U) ADVON OBSERVATIONS. Because of the level of play and the individual PSC scenarios only the bomber monitor had activity. The tanker planner at SHAPE had almost no activity due to use of SACEUR OPLAN, GOLDEN EAGLE, preallocations and no SACEUR direction to reallocate. The bomber observer acted as an advisor to the Air Operations Officer. Slides reflecting bomber beddown were initiated and updated with aircraft available daily. Since the USAFE OSC was not playing and units were not playing, a "Best Estimate" on bomber availability was made daily by the bomber observer. Attrition was neither planned for nor expected to be played, however, Southern Region reported one loss. During nuclear strikes SACEUR would only deconflict B-52s and strike assets plus or minus two hours of the TOT. The bomber planner also had to review B-52 targets for deconfliction with strike targets. SHAPE is the only place this can be done totally. PSCs can deconflict targets in their regions but a bomber strike near the border between two regions cannot be deconflicted at the PSC level. SACEUR bomber allocation messages were drafted and finalized for the Air Ops Officer. One mining request was received from AFNORTH but time lines would have made the mission occur after ENDEX. The request was denied because the TOT requested was far ahead of mine availability. An AFCENT request to disperse KC-135s to other UK bases was not acted upon due to SHAPE scenario inputs for chemical attacks and airfield attacks on the requested bases.

3. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. SAC ADVON participation is not recommended for future AA exercises because the duration of play is too short for training; the exercise is primarily designed to exercise nuclear release procedures; the level of play does not allow the full target request allocation process to be exercised; the OSC does not play for logistics support; response cell and unit reports are not available and each region designs its own scenario.

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4. ~~(S)~~ OTHER COMMENTS. An interesting sidelight was a request by SACEUR's Action Cell to provide a real-world type answer to a scenario situation. The problem was to relieve pressure on northern Norway. B-52 capabilities and F-111 capabilities were briefed to the team for their knowledge and consideration. The area to be targeted would have been the Kola Peninsula. Based on the scenario, the massed troops and mobile defenses coupled with static defenses made high altitude attacks highly questionable and low altitude better. However, the F-111 with 24 bombs and hard TFR would be the optimum air delivery vehicle. (My opinion).

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B. (U) AFCENT.

1. (U) GENERAL. NATO was heavily engaged in conventional warfare at STARTEX. In the Central Region (CR), ORANGE (OR) forces were attacking along the entire German border with air attacks against BLUE (BL) airfields in Germany. OR attacks on UK airfields disrupted B-52 and KC-135 operations as well as destroying some aircraft. OR conducted chemical attacks through out the exercise. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. ADVON observer activities during AA 83 included:

(a) (U) Inputing correct data into the CCIS data base.

(b) (U) Observe the exercise and provide assistance. ERWIN desired 24-hour bomber and tanker coverage but it was impossible with two players. The 0600 to 1800L time frame was covered. We performed ADVON functions of drafting bomber request/allocation messages, tanker FCE allocation requests and coordinated on Air Directive inputs.

(c) (U) On E+1, we were directed to go to the Alternate War HQ (CREST-HIGH) which was located, for this exercise, at Heinrich Hertz Kaserne in Birkenfeld. The alternate staff desired SAC force expertise while they were in charge of OR operations which lasted all day E+1.

(d) (U) Helmets, gas masks and chemical suits were required. Gas masks were used by players at CREST HIGH for several hours after an OR chemical attack.

(e) (U) ERWIN was sealed for several hours during the evening of E+2.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) (U) Bomber Operations. SHAPE MSG 040900Z Nov established the initial CR bomber allocation at nine sorties per day along with tactical control for use against mobile targets. Nine sorties were also allocated for 8-10 Nov. The 11-12 Nov allocation was 18 sorties. B-52s were allocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF to apply almost exclusively against mobile troop concentrations by using the target change tactic. There was incomplete information at AAFCE to determine the exact targets or the results of the attacks.

(1) (U) The B-52s were not included in the initial AAFCE data base and were added 7 Nov.

(2) (U) AAFCE did not receive any bomber request messages from 2 and 4ATAF even though they were requested several times. The ATAFs were addressed on the SHAPE message providing the initial allocation and new

procedures. As a result, the AAFCE players examined the battle situation and made the bomber request to SACEUR as well as the subsequent suballocation to 2/4ATAF. The ADVON observer assisted with the process. Bombers were included in the Air Directive.

(3) (~~S~~) It is extremely difficult for the ATAFs to identify a mobile target in the detail requested by SHAPE for them to base the B-52 allocation. This may be the reason the ATAFs did not submit request messages.

(4) (~~S~~) A major BL counterattack was planned and conducted by 2ATAF. They requested 30 B-52s to provide support of their objectives. SACEUR denied the request because of heavy commitment of B-52s to the Northern Region. Nine sorties previously allocated were employed in the counterattack.

(b) (~~S~~) Tanker Operations. In the STARTEX AAFCE Air Directive the KC-135 force was suballocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF by base. The status of the allocated force, with pre-exercise scenario attrition, was as follows:

BEDFORD	13	2ATAF
GREENHAM COMMON	26	2ATAF
BRIZE NORTON	12	4ATAF
FAIRFORD	17	4ATAF
TOTAL	68	AAFCE

Tankers were employed at an average sortie rate of 1.0 due to sortie generation degrade at all tanker bases IAW exercise scenario, high daily first-wave sortie requirements, and DISTAFF OPSTAT inputs. On E+2 AAFCE planners realized that the remaining allocated tankers would not meet their planned air refueling requirements on E+3 and 4. The refueling requirements increased due to increased effort given to air defense and OCA. AAFCE requested from SACEUR allocation of FCE assets from Mildenhall to provide 20 additional sorties for the next two days. SACEUR allocated 15 aircraft from Mildenhall to satisfy this urgent requirement. On E+3 AAFCE sent request to SACEUR/ USCINCEUR/USAFE/3AF for authorization to use civilian UK airports Gatwick and Stanstead for gas and go operations. This request was prompted to increase survivability and sortie offload capability. By ENDEX this proposal was not approved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. Future CR SAC ADVON participation in ABLE ARCHER is recommended only with the following stipulations:

(a) (U) Scenario must include at least three days of conventional activity.

(b) (U) Two bomber and two tanker planners participate at ERWIN/2ATAF/4ATAF (six personnel) for 24-hour coverage.

(c) (U) No B-52 fragging of sorties.

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(d) (U) Two DISTAFF representatives (24-hour coverage) are provided to input unit reports.

(e) (U) SAC ADVON bags are complete and available at 7 AD so minimum preparation is required.

(f) (U) ADVON players must be experienced.

(g) (U) ADVON support is strongly desired by COMAAFCE/SACEUR.

5. (U) OTHER COMMENTS. This exercise again reinforced the need to improve the SAC ADVON capability to conduct wartime operations. Emphasis must be placed on completing the following:

-- CINCSAC OPLAN 4102

-- SAC ADVON bags built/maintained and in readiness for real-world crisis situations.

-- SACR 55-7 Vol VII/VIII (staff conventional directive)

-- Integration of B-52/KC-135 reporting procedures into the NATO system.

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C. (U) AFNORTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) The AFNORTH staff received the SAC ADVON with great enthusiasm but were somewhat disappointed when we were unable to provide 24-hour coverage. It was finally agreed that we would cover the day shift, since it would provide the majority of our activity.

(b) (U) The tanker representative took up a position in the RAOC (Regional Air Operations Center). The bomber representative was asked to divide his presence between the Targets Division and the RAOC, since his expertise and coordination would be required in both areas.

(c) (b)(5) The target staff at AFNORTH appeared to be perfectly willing to manage the bomber allocation, select targets, and make request to SHAPE, in accordance with SHAPE message. They were relieved to have the SAC ADVON, since they were unsure of the mechanics to make such a request. Had the SAC Reporting Guide been available to them, they could have accomplished necessary messages.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITIES.

(a) (b)(5) The bomber representative was involved in the Target Action Group Meeting, as an observer, since this dealt primarily with the deconfliction of NATO nuclear strikes and B-52/other aircraft conventional attacks. Both representatives attended Shift Changeover/Update Briefing, and Air Resources meeting. Level of questions for ADVON could have easily been answered by AFNORTH target staff.

(b) (b)(5) With PSCs at COMNON, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAP at minimal manning levels, requests from AFNORTH staff for B-52 target nominations went unanswered. COMBALTAP did make one request for attacks and implementation of "EBB HORN" mining in COMLAND ZEELAND area.

(c) (U) Overall activity for the ADVON in the exercise was extremely limited.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) (U) BOMBER

(b)(5)

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and execution time, and lack of escort on a heavily defended target, support could not be provided.

(b) (U) TANKER

(1) (S) AFNORTH was allocated 20 tankers to support operations in the Northern European Command (NEC). These were all used at a sortie rate of 1.5 each day. On 8 Nov AFNORTH requested that five KC-135s be positioned at Sola Airfield in Norway. These were used to provide more responsive refueling to marine and air defense aircraft in region. They also became an integral part of massed raid to extend range of F-111, F-4 and F-16 aircraft involved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION.

(a) (S) With PSCs at COMNON, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAP operating at minimum manning levels, requests from AFNORTH for target nominations for all aircraft went, for the most part, unanswered. What did filter up was oriented to the nuclear/chemical aspect of the exercise. The low play level at these locations did not allow for the feedback that should be available. Without increased NATO and US manning at all levels, we cannot justify expanded SAC ADVON participation.

(b) (S) As cited in paragraph 1c, the AFNORTH staff was willing to try operating without the SAC ADVON. Since in an actual conflict, the SAC ADVON may be delayed in arrival at locations, ABLE ARCHER would give NATO staffs an opportunity to at least become familiar with operations without SAC ADVON assistance. A small ADVON DISTAFF Cell at SHAPE could monitor inputs and act on them accordingly.

(c) (S) The presence of the SAC ADVON, especially in large numbers for an exercise of this nature, raises a sensitive, political issue concerning the role of the B-52. One may see an implication or make the inference that if B-52 aircraft are present in a nuclear scenario exercise, are they being used to perform strike missions? Numerous times during the exercise, the word "strike" was used in reference to B-52 sorties. While this is an obvious slip of the tongue and was quickly corrected, in most cases, it does serve to fuel any inference should a remark be made in a nonsecure environment. A large, if not fully manned, ADVON team which would be required to properly support ABLE ARCHER, being deployed to the many locations would only again give rise to speculation about the B-52 role.

Ex 287

D. (U) AFSOUTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) MG Brown (AIRSOUTH C/S) (USAF) was briefed on the capabilities and tactics for the B-52 and KC-135. The briefing was based on the WINTEX 83 briefing in the "RED BOOK" updated for B-52G only operations. The briefing was then given to LG Brown (COMAIRSOUTH) (USAF) who later offered the briefing to Admiral Small (AFSOUTH) (USN) and his C/S LG Blont (USA).

(b) (S) Due to the numerous new personnel in AIRSOUTH, the published timelines were modified to gain maximum training to all personnel involved in B-52 operations. MG Brown was particularly helpful in guiding the AIRSOUTH planners to select targets that not only provided optimum utilization of the B-52, but also had significant impact on the overall war plan.

(c) (S) We worked with AIRSOUTH personnel to encourage composite attack profiles for maximum disruption of enemy air and mutual support for Allied aircraft. A coordinated attack against Verna and Burgas Harbors (B-52s), airfields in the harbor areas (fighters) and F-111 airfield attacks on the Crimean Peninsula were planned providing maximum mutual defense. Support packages utilizing F-4Gs, EA-6Bs and fighter cap were included in the attack. NOTE: The harbor attacks were planned three days earlier. Unconventional warfare personnel were inserted into the area two days prior to pass the updated DMPI to the planners for maximum effectiveness of the sortie. Beacon bombing was also discussed, but not used.

(d) (S) The level of play required us to be more than advisors and observers. To provide the coordination required we split into two shifts shortly after arrival. We had to press people to get the required data. This was an artificialty created since the ATAFs did not have SAC ADVON representation. AFSOUTH is extremely interested in B-52 operations and the added capability it presents. Personnel participating in Dense Crop need to aggressively justify B-52 allocation requests to insure AFSOUTH has proper representation during the allocation cycle.

(e) (S) AFSOUTH needs data to update DIRE JUMBO. Recommend aircraft location and timelines be sent from HQ SAC to Maj Richard M. Meeboer, AIRSOUTH Plans and Policy (AIRSOUTH/PPPL). Also need a remark about E-3A refueling support, i.e., SHAPE will allocate E-3s and direct PSC/MSC to support.

(f) (S) Recommend "Red Book" be sent to US plans shops, PSCs and MSCs. The "Red Book" needs to be releasable to NATO (Print on cover). Also NATO Reporting Guide needs to be sent to PSCs and MSCs.

(g) (S) There is no set procedure for the AIRSOUTH/AFSOUTH staffs (OPS, IN, TGTS, ADVON) to get together to review the ATAF bomber requests, to have a coordinated, prioritized listing to send to SHAPE NLT 1100Z. There is little collective memory in the AIRSOUTH staff, even from the last WINTEX, hence it's been an education process to attempt to try to get the staffs together. The appearance is that the ATAFs sent their priority

lists to AFSOUTH, who passes it to AIRSOUTH and it comes down to the AIRSOUTH Intel, Ops and SAC ADVON to select the targets. The targets are then selected by the Ops Chief who was at the AFSOUTH briefing (in most cases the targeting philosophy is different). As a result target nomination lists are late or not sent and the only request sent is the BOMREQ, which does not provide SACEUR with the required data to make proper allocations.

(h) (U) A complete review of COMAIRSOUTH OPLAN 45604, "DIRE JUMBO" was completed. The COMM, Restricted areas, ECM, safe passage, emergency fields, procedures, etc. should be reviewed for possible inclusion in SAC 4102 or a SACR. This also applies to review of all MSC/PSC/SACEUR plans impacting SAC 4102. 45604 also requires backup targets from the ATAFs. It was explained that this should be removed from their plan.

(i) (U) We received only one written answer to the BOMREQ during the exercise. This mission was coordinated requiring all aircraft in the same time block. As it turned out half of the aircraft were in a different time block, and during daylight hours (SHAPE MSG 081315Z Nov for 10 Nov allocation). For staff training, to keep from destroying the combined, coordinated attack on Vara and Burgan we flew as planned.

(j) (U) No message allocation for 11 Nov was received. Telecon received on morning of 10th from Col Brown (SHAPE) cut the precoordinated number with LTC Hass from 15 to 9.

(k) (U) E-3A refueling were coordinated at the AFSOUTH level. I feel the refueling should be handled at the ATAF level to afford the tanker scheduler the opportunity to manage his scarce refueling assets. Each E-3 is using one and one half tankers (three sorties) each per day. We consistently had one in FIVE ATAF and one in SIX ATAF. At one point we had one in each ATAF, which would be a heavy load on the AFSOUTH tankers.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY.

(a) (U) Attend TGT selection meeting (held one in AIRSOUTH last day).

(b) (U) Prepare slides for AIRSOUTH update briefing 1900L/0900L.

(1) (U) BDA (yesterday's missions).

(2) (U) Bomber activity (Today--actually next morning).

(3) (U) Bomber activity (Tomorrow--actually two days away).

(4) (U) Tanker activity.

(c) (U) Prepare TGTs message.

(d) (U) Prepare BOMREQ.

(e) (U) Prepare SUBALL.

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(f) (U) Prepare TFG tasking to ATAFs (artificial due to exercise).

(g) (U) Tanker messages to support E-3 (artificial due to exercise).

(h) (U) Input to COMAIRSOUTH ASSESSREP due by 1700L.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) (S) Bomber. A total of 71 sorties were requested, 59 scheduled (based on final allocation) 50 of the 59 were flown by ENDEX. A total of four aircraft were lost due to ground and shipborne SAMs. Targets attacked included massed troops, soft armor, choke points and supply routes. One three-ship sortie was against a helicopter landing area prior to ADVON arrival (a total of on three helos were destroyed on that mission).

(b) (S) Tanker. The only tanker involvement was with E-3A refueling. We received sporadic tanker inputs from ATAFs due to no SAC participation at that level.

4. (S) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. With only a few locations with a SAC ADVON, too many simulations are required. It is confusing to the MSCs because they expect it to work like WINTEX. Recommend SHAPE allocate the B-52s and KC-135s to the MSCs at start of exercise and the MSCs work the exercise without the SAC ADVON.

Ex 287

E. (U) UK RAOC

1. (U) GENERAL. I was in place at exercise location at STARTEX. I visited 3 AF Liaison Cell, DISTAFF, and RAF tanker personnel to determine level of exercise play. Although the Master Scenario Events List indicated a significant requirement for KC-135 air refueling support of UK Air Defense operations and multiple vertical dispersals, UK AIR staff personnel viewed ABLE ARCHER as a "nuclear procedures" exercise and chose not to play actively from the ADOC and SOCS during the conventional phase (7-9 Nov). The first KC-135 air refueling missions took place at 0600Z on 9 Nov. Since the ADOC and SOCS are the prime employers of air refueling and direct vertical dispersals their lack of participation left little requirement for SAC participation in this exercise.

(U) I spent the majority of my time learning how to use the Air Staff Management Aid (ASMA) computer system, becoming familiar with the RAOC layout and what each cell does, and discussing present and future concepts with RAF and 3 AF liaision personnel.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. The following represents Tanker ADVON duties based on my WINTEX 83 participation at UK RAOC:

(a) (U) Coordinate KC-135 allocation to the SOCS with the ADOC.

(b) (U) Prepare ATOs for TPW. (NOTE: This is only done for planned missions such as E-3A support or fighter deployments. OPCON of UK tanker assets supporting Air Defense rests with the SOCS and they launch the tankers unless sufficient warning is available, then the tanker cell will direct the launch by telecon. In lieu of an ATO for Air Defense we pass an alert response condition (60 min, 30 min, or 15 min) for the required number of KC-135s for a time block and the controlling SOCs.

(c) (U) Coordinate dispersal bases for all U.K. based airborne KC-135s and vertically dispersed KC-135s with 3 AF Liaison Cell, Ground Defense Cell, Contingency Plans Cell, and the Operations Support Cell when under air attack.

(d) (U) Coordinate air refueling requirements with the Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) Cell.

(e) (U) Provide backup to 3 AF Liaison Cell in notifying TPW response cells of airborne dispersal when directed by ADOC.

(f) (U) Provide 3 AF Liaison Cell with a daily operations summary for CINCUKAIR's daily briefing.

As noted in para 1f only a limited amount of item 1 was played during ABLE ARCHER 83 due to reduced play by UKRAOC cells.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(U) KC-135 Activity

DAY	NO. OF SORTIES	TOTAL FLY TIME	NO. RCVRs	TOTAL OFFLOAD
7 Nov	0	0	0	0

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DAY	NO. OF SORTIES	TOTAL FLY TIME	NO. RCVRs	TOTAL OFFLOAD
8 Nov	0	0	0	0
9 Nov	8	24.0	32 F-4	192.0M
10 Nov	11*	39.0	12 F-4	72.0M
11 Nov	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	19	63.0	44	264.0M

*Eight KC-135s launched for survival.

4. (S) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. The CINCUKAIR Staff's decisions not to man all RAOC cells or actively respond to exercise events during ABLE ARCHER 83 made it non cost effective for SAC ADVON participation. CINCUKAIR personnel view this exercise as strictly a nuclear procedures CPX. A SACEUR decision (sometime between EXORD development and STARTEX) to reduce the level of nuclear exchange between Blue and Orange cancelled most of the British interest in ABLE ARCHER. The British also view that if Blue is resorting to the use of nuclear weapons to stop the Orange advance, then most of their Air Defense assets have been lost (fighter and tanker) and there is no requirement for air refueling. Also, the lack of unit response cell play (BOTH US TFWs, and RAF SOCS and tanker bases) makes SAC ADVON play unrealistic. The tanker advisor is reduced to simulating all coordination required between TFWs, SOCs and the UKRAOC cells on ATOs, airborne dispersal, and daily Ops summaries. This is not a good exercise for SAC ADVON training if procedural play by participants does not change for future exercises.

(U) SAC ADVON participation at UKRAOC for future ABLE ARCHERs should be eliminated unless the following conditions can be met:

(a) (S) Full manning and active participation by UKRAOC cells in ADOC, Ground Defense, Tanker, USAFE, and contingency plans.

(b) (U) Active response cell play from the SOCs and a TFW for UKAIR allocated KC-135s.

(c) (U) 7 AD, 306 SW or 11 SG provide the tanker advisor to reduce the cost of sending CONUS-based ADVON personnel and provide flexibility if UKAIR reduces its enthusiasm during future exercises.

5. (U) OTHER

(a) (U) Tanker beddown in UK.

(1) (S) Discussion: I was briefed we would use the CRESTED EAGLE 84 tanker beddown for ABLE ARCHER. The MSEL called for a beddown based on the ENDEX position for WINTEX 83 which was based on FY 82 UK beddown. This caused concern among several strike command personnel over (1) the use of Scampton by both RAF Victors and US KC-135s (they claim Scampton can't

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support both); (2) The ability of Cottesmore to support KC-135s presently (they are delighted that UKAIR-allocated KC-135s are not collocated with other MSCs' assets) and (3) that the 84 position was not officially sanctioned or approved. I had a long discussion with SQ LDR John Ward, CINCUKAIR/ Contingency Plans about future initiatives for US COBs in UK. Basically they are as follows: (1) Replace Scampton with Elvington, (2) move US A-7s from Finningly to Manston opening up Finningly for KC-135s, (3) reduce the base loading at Fairford, Greenham Common, and Mildenhall by using other UK airfields not specifically identified for KC-135. NOTE: SQ LDR Ward's views, however, may only be Strike Command's position and not that of MODUKAIR or USAFE.

(2) (U) Recommendations: (1) More preexercise coordination between SAC and 7 AD and UKAIR ADVON players on tanker beddown to be used. It would also be helpful if RAOC ADVON players were given as much background information as possible on the actual tanker beddown status of negotiations to preclude future embarrassment. (2) None. SQ LDR Ward's comments are provided for your information.

(b) (U) Status of CINCUKAIR Air Refueling Plan.

(1) (U) Discussion: The CINCUKAIR Air Refueling Plan is still in the conceptual stage. SQD LDR Graham Lanchbury has been the only tanker planner assigned to Strike Command/Plans since March 1983. His daily involvement with the Ascension Island to Falkland Islands refueling missions has precluded any work on the MSC plan. FLT LT Paul McKernan has recently been assigned to Strike/Plans on a temporary basis until a permanent second position is filled (in about three months). He has been given the MSC refueling plan as his top priority. I spent an entire day with him over GOLDEN EAGLE, COTTON CURE and AFNORTH's BENT BOOM (Draft), providing recommendation on plan format and content, and providing points of contact at 11 SG and 7 AD to get assistance in plan development. I recommended he use BENT BOOM as a model since operations to be conducted in AFNORTH are the most similar to UKAIR. The unique procedures used by UKAIR in Command control, airborne dispersal/survival scramble, enroute communications, and air refueling during hostilities required they be formulated into a written plan for use by our TPWs and all MSC tasking UK-based KC-135s as soon as possible.

(2) (U) Recommendation: That 7 AD actively monitor the progress of CINCUKAIR's air refueling plan and provide any expertise in tanker operations/command control required by Strike Command to expedite plan completion.

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III. FUTURE PARTICIPATION

A. (U) The preceding section contained the critiques written by the ADVON representatives. Due to travel restrictions, only an informal meeting was held at 7 AD, which not all members were able to attend. The comments and observations are printed virtually verbatim--only editorial changes made--from the reports received. The critiques were prepared in isolation, yet the same themes occur in all. These themes are: short duration of exercise does not allow for real allocation cycle to be played; time lines are unrealistically reduced; short duration demands experienced personnel since there is no time for training; low level of play at most headquarters does not allow for realistic play or appraisal; and the sensitive issue of B-52 operations being conducted in conjunction with an exercise primarily designed to test nuclear release procedures.

B. (U) Based on above comments and our participation in ABLE ARCHER 83, 7AD recommends no further SAC ADVON participation in the ABLE ARCHER series of exercises.

GARY G. DURKEE, Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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15AF	DOX-1	
OFFUTT AFB, NE 68113		2
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Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm?

The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations

Ben B. Fischer

> **"Reagan was repeatedly compared to Hitler and accused of "fanning the flames of war"—a more sinister image than Andropov as a Red Darth Vader."**

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Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as explosive, and hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.

Mikhail Gorbachev, February 1986

US-Soviet relations had come full circle in 1983. Europeans were declaring the outbreak of a Cold War II, and President Mitterrand compared the situation to the 1962 Cuban crisis and the 1948 Berlin blockade. Such fears were exaggerated. Nowhere in the world were the superpowers squared off in a conflict likely to erupt into war. But a modern-day Rip Van Winkle waking up that year would not have noticed much change in the international political landscape or realized that a substantial period of détente had come and gone while he slept.

The second Cold War was mainly a war of words. In March, President Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil in the world," as an "evil empire." General Secretary Andropov suggested Reagan was insane and a liar. Then things got nasty. Following Andropov's lead and no doubt his direction, the Soviet media launched a verbal offensive of a kind not seen since Stalin that far surpassed Reagan's broadsides. Reagan was repeatedly compared to Hitler and accused of "fanning the flames of war"—a more sinister image than Andropov as a Red Darth Vader.

The Soviet War Scare

Such rhetoric was the consequence rather than the cause of tension, but frightening words masked real fears. The Hitler analogy was more than an insult and may have been a Freudian slip, because war was on the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow was in the midst of a "war scare" that had two distinct phases and two different dimensions—one concealed in the world of clandestine intelligence operations since 1981, and the other revealed in the Soviet media two years later.

The KGB assessment was more of a storm warning than a hurricane alert. But Politburo forecasters reached a stark political judgment: the chances of a nuclear war, including a US surprise nuclear attack, were higher than at any time during the entire Cold War. In May 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev and then KGB chief Andropov briefed the Politburo assessment to a closed KGB conference. Then Andropov took the podium to tell the assembled intelligence managers and officers that the KGB and the GRU were being placed on a permanent intelligence watch to monitor indications and warning of US war-planning and preparations. Codenamed RYAN, this alert was the largest Soviet peacetime intelligence effort

During 1982, KGB Center assigned RYAN a high, but not overriding, priority. Then, on 17 February 1983, KGB residents already on alert received "eyes only" cables telling them that it had "acquired an especial degree of urgency" and was "now of particularly grave importance." They were ordered to organize a permanent watch using their entire operational staff, recruit new agents, and redirect existing ones to RYAN requirements. A circular message from the Moscow Center to all KGB residencies put on alert status stated:

> *Therefore one of the chief directions for the activity of the KGB's foreign service is to organize detection and assessment of signs of preparation for RYAN in all possible areas, i.e., political, economic, and military sectors, civil defense and the activity of special services. Our military neighbors [the GRU] are actively engaged in similar work in relation to the activity of the adversary's armed forces.*

"And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust."

Moscow's urgency was linked to the impending US deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in West Germany. Very accurate and with a flight time under 10 minutes, these missiles could destroy hard targets, including Soviet command and control bunkers and missile silos, with little or no warning. Guidance cables referred to RYAN's critical importance to Soviet military strategy and the need for advance warning "to take retaliatory measures." But Soviet leaders were less interested in retaliation than in preemption and needed RYAN data as strategic warning to launch an attack on the new US missile sites.

The overt war scare erupted two years later. On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced a program to develop a ground- and space-based, laser-armed, anti-ballistic-missile shield designated Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) but quickly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. Four days later—and in direct response—Andropov lashed out. He accused the United States of preparing a first-strike attack on the USSR and asserted that Reagan was "inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it." The war scare had joined the intelligence alert

Andropov's remarks were unprecedented. He violated a longstanding taboo by describing US nuclear weapons' numbers and capabilities in the mass media. He referred to Soviet weapons and capabilities—also highly unusual—and said explicitly that the USSR had, at best, only parity with the United States in strategic weaponry. And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust. If candor is a sign of sincerity, Moscow was worried

The War Scare as an Intelligence Issue

The Soviet war scare posed two questions for the Intelligence Community: was it genuine, that is, did the Soviet leadership actually believe that the United States might attack? If so, why had the Kremlin reached that conclusion? If the alarm was not genuine, then what purpose did it serve?

By and large, the Community played down both the intelligence alert and the war-scare propaganda as evidence of an authentic threat perception. It did so in part because the information reaching it about the alert came primarily from British intelligence and was fragmentary, incomplete, and ambiguous. Moreover, the British protected the identity of the source—KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, number two in the London residency— and his bona fides could not be independently established. US intelligence did have partially corroborating information from a Czechoslovak intelligence officer, but apparently it was not detailed enough or considered reliable enough to confirm what was coming from Gordievsky

The Intelligence Community continued to scoff at the war scare even after Gordievsky defected—actually, after MI6 exfiltrated him from the USSR—and was made available for debriefing.[2] But intelligence analysts were not alone in their skepticism. For example, one critic who attributes many of the problems in US-Soviet relations to the Reagan administration concluded *10 years later* and with the benefit of hindsight: "Above all, the idea that the new American administration might actually attack the Soviet Union seems too far out of touch with reality to have been given credence."[3] A Soviet émigré scholar who wrote the most perceptive article on Soviet war-scare propaganda found the analytic task so daunting that he refused to speculate on *why* the Kremlin had adopted this line or *to whom* the message was directed—West European governments, the US electorate, or the Soviet people.[4]

Searching for an explanation of the war scare, intelligence analysts and other interested observers offered three answers: propaganda, paranoia, and politics.

The consensus view regarded RYAN and the war scare as grist for the KGB disinformation mill—a sophisticated political-psychological scare tactic operation. Who was the KGB trying to scare? Answers differed. Most agreed that the Soviets wanted to frighten the West Europeans and above all the nervous West Germans into backing out of an agreement to deploy US intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles on their territory. Besides, Moscow was engaged in an all-out, go-for-broke propaganda and covert action program that was flagging and needed a boost.

"Searching for an explanation of the war scare, intelligence analysts and other interested observers offered three answers: propaganda, paranoia, and politics."

Some observers, however, believed that the campaign was inwardly, not outwardly, directed toward the Soviet people. There was evidence to support this interpretation. Andropov had launched an anticorruption and discipline campaign to get the long-suffering proletariat to work harder, drink less, and sacrifice more while cutting down on the theft of state property. War scares had been used in the past to prepare people for bad times, and, with ideology dead and consumer goods in short supply, the Kremlin was trotting out a tried and true mobilization gimmick.

A second explanation argued that the war scare was clearly bogus but potentially dangerous because it was rooted in Soviet leadership paranoia. Paranoia is a catchall explanation for Russian/Soviet external behavior that goes back to early tsarist times. But it was given credence. This was how Gordievsky explained the war scare, and the advanced age and poor health of Andropov and the rest of the gerontocracy suggested that the leadership's debilitation might be mental as well as physical.

The third explanation held that the war scare was rooted in internal bureaucratic or succession politics. The military and intelligence services might be using it as a form of bureaucratic turfbuilder to make their budgets and missions grow at a time when the competition for resources was fierce. Or the war scare might have been connected in some way—a debate over foreign and defense policy?—to a succession struggle that was continuing despite, or because of, Andropov's poor health. Explanations were plentiful, but evidence was scarce.

Although quite different, these explanations had much in common. Each started from the premise, whether articulated or not, that there was no objective threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR; therefore, the war scare was all smoke and mirrors, a false alarm being used for some other purpose. In most instances, outside observers did not give the war scare credence, refusing to imagine that the Soviet leadership could view the United States as the potential aggressor in an unprovoked nuclear war, because they themselves could not imagine the United States in that role. This idea was "too far out of touch with reality." Reagan was not Hitler, and America does not do Pearl Harbors.

US perceptions of the US-Soviet balance of strategic power also weighed against the idea that the war scare could indicate genuine, even if greatly exaggerated, concern on Moscow's part. The United States was in the midst of the largest military buildup in its history whose aim was to close a perceived "window of vulnerability" in the mid-1980s created by US loss of superiority in delivery vehicles and then counterforce capabilities. The buildup had begun during the previous administration, but was greatly accelerated during Reagan's first term in the belief that the USSR might exploit a temporary advantage—appropriately called a

window of opportunity—to engage in adventuresome behavior, use nuclear blackmail, or even perhaps attack the United States. Moreover, Soviet claims about the "irreversibility" of changes in the "correlation of forces" in the 1970s—a reference to both Soviet gains in the Third World and achievement of "robust parity" in strategic power with the US—did little to allay US concerns.

US observers were half right in dismissing the war scare as groundless, but also half wrong in viewing it as artificially contrived. Moscow apparently was worried about something.

Evidence From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

For a long time, Gordievsky was the only publicly acknowledged source of information on RYAN.

Meanwhile, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin and ex-KGB officers Oleg Kalugin and Yuriy Shvets have published memoirs that dovetail with Gordievsky's account. We know a lot more than we did about the war scare, even though a complete understanding is still elusive.

Gordievsky, the original source, is also the most prolific. Almost a decade after he arrived in London, he and British coauthor Christopher Andrew published a sheaf of KGB cables that describe the alert and collection requirements. No one in the US, British, or Soviet/Russian intelligence communities has questioned these documents, so silence is tantamount to authentication.

Spooking the Russians

During the first Reagan administration, US policy toward the Soviet Union was conducted on two tracks. The first encompassed normal diplomatic relations and arms control negotiations. The second was a covert political-psychological effort to attack Soviet vulnerabilities and undermine the system. According to a recent account based on interviews with Reagan-era policymakers, it was a "secret offensive on economic, geostrategic, and psychological fronts designed to roll back and weaken Soviet power."[5] For most of 1981-83, there were more trains running on the second track than on the first.

RYAN may have been a response to the first in a series of US military probes along Soviet borders initiated in the Reagan administration's first months. These probes—called psychological warfare operations, or PSYOP, in Pentagon jargon—aimed at exploiting Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and deterring Soviet actions. The administration's "silent campaign" was also practically invisible, except to a small circle of White House and Pentagon aides—and, of course, the Kremlin. "It was very sensitive," recalls former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle. "Nothing was written down about [redacted] would be no paper trail."[6]

The PSYOP was calculated to play on what the White House perceived as a Soviet image of the President as a "cowboy" and reckless practitioner of nuclear politics. US purpose was not to signal intentions so much as keep the Soviets guessing what might happen next:

> *"Sometimes we would send bombers over the North Pole, and their radars would click on," recalls Gen. Jack Chain the former Strategic Air Command commander. "Other times fighter-bombers would probe their Asian or European periphery." During peak times, the operation would include several maneuvers a week. They would come at irregular intervals to make the effect all the more unsettling. Then, as quickly as the unannounced flights began, they would stop, only to begin a few weeks later.*[7]

Another participant echoes this assessment:

> *"It really got to them," recalls Dr. William Schneider, Undersecretary of State for Military Assistance and Technology, who saw classified "after-action reports" that indicated US flight activity. "They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would*

light up and units would go on alert. Then, at the last minute, the squadron would peel off and return home."[8]

The Navy played an even bigger role than SAC after President Reagan authorized it in March 1981 to operate and exercise in areas where the US fleet had rarely—or never—gone before. Major exercises in 1981 and 1983 in the Soviet far northern and far eastern maritime approaches demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial areas without being detected or challenged.[9] Using sophisticated and carefully rehearsed deception and denial techniques, the Navy eluded the USSR's massive ocean reconnaissance system and early-warning systems.[10] Some naval exercises included "classified" operations in which carrier-launched aircraft managed to penetrate Soviet shore-based radar and air-defense systems and simulate "attacks" on Soviet targets. Summing up a 1983 Pacific Fleet exercise, the US chief of naval operations noted that the Soviets "are as naked as jaybird there [on the Kamchatka Peninsula], and they know it."[11] His remark applied equally to the Kola Peninsula in the far north.

Was there a connection between PSYOP and RYAN? There clearly was a temporal correlation. The first US missions began in mid-February 1981; Andropov briefed RYAN to the KGB the following May. Moreover, when top officials first learned of RYAN, they reportedly connected it to the Soviet border probes, noting that the Soviets were "increasingly frightened by the Reagan administration."

"Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI."

The Intelligence Community, not clued in to the PSYOP program, could be forgiven for not understanding the cause-and-effect relationship. This is a reminder of a perennial problem in preparing estimates that assess another country's behavior in terms of its interaction with the United States and in response to US actions. The impact of the action-reaction-interaction dynamic is often overlooked or neglected, not because of analytic failure or conceptual inadequacy, but for the simple reason that the intelligence left hand does not always know what the policy right hand is doing.

There may have been another problem in perception that affected policymakers as well as intelligence analysts. While the US probes caught the Kremlin by surprise, they were not unprecedented. There was a Cold War antecedent that Soviet leaders may have found troubling. From 1950 to 1969, the Strategic Air Command conducted similar operations, both intelligence-gathering and "ferret" missions aimed at detecting the location, reaction, and gaps in radar and air-defense installations along the USSR's Eurasian periphery in preparation for nuclear war.[13] It is possible, though not provable, that the Soviets remembered something the American side had already forgotten

1983 Through the War-Scare Prism

Despite their private assessment, Soviet leaders maintained a public posture of relative calm during 1981-82. Even Reagan's erstwhile Secretary of State Alexander Haig gave them credit, saying "[t]he Soviets stayed very, very moderate, very, very responsible during the first three years of this administration. I was mind-boggled with their patience." But that patience wore thin as 1983 wore on. In September, Andropov would officially close off an internal debate over the causes and consequences of the collapse of détente in an unusual foreign policy "declaration." In it, he limned the outline of the war scare:

> *The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining the policy of states, of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current United States administration. In brief, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace.... If anyone had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present American administration, recent events have dispelled them once and for all.* [emphasis added]

What were those "recent events"?

SDI. The SDI announcement came out of the blue for the Kremlin—and most of the Cabinet. Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI. He denounced it as a "bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face

of the US nuclear threat." Space-based defense, he added,

> *... would open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real significance, the seamy side of, so to say, of Washington's 'defensive conception'.... The Soviet Union will never be caught defenseless by any threat.... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.... Washington's actions are putting the entire world in jeopardy.*

SDI had obviously touched a sensitive nerve. The Soviets seemed to treat it more seriously than many US scientists and even some White House aides did at the time. There were two reasons. First, the Soviets, despite their boasting in the 1970s, had practically unlimited faith in US technical capability. Second, SDI had a profound psychological impact that reinforced the trend predicted by the computer-based "correlation of forces" model. In a remarkable tête-à-tête with a US journalist and former arms control official, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff, assessed the symbolic significance of SDI:

> *... We cannot equal the quality of United States arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology, and technology is based on computers.*
>
> *In the United States, small children...play with computers.... Here, we don't even have computers in every office of the Defense Ministry. And, for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society.*
>
> *... We will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a political revolution.*

Ogarkov's private rumination is all the more remarkable because in his public statements he was a hawk's hawk, frequently comparing the United States to Nazi Germany and warning of the advent of new weapon systems based on entirely "new physical principles." The duality, even dichotomy, between Ogarkov's public stance calling for continuation of the Cold War and his private acknowledgment that the USSR could not compete may have been typical of other Soviet leaders and contributed to their frustration and anxiety.

KAL 007. At 3:26 a.m. Tokyo time on 1 September 1983, a Soviet Su-15 interceptor fired two air-to-air missiles at a Korean Boeing 747 airliner, destroying the aircraft and killing all 269 crew and passengers. Soviet air-defense units had been tracking KAL Flight 007 for more than an hour as it first entered and then left Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The order to destroy the aircraft was given as the airliner was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time after overflying Sakhalin Island. The ill-fated Boeing 747 was probably downed in international airspace.

[redacted] the White House learned about the shootdown within a few hours of the event and, with Secretary of State Shultz taking the lead, denounced the Soviet act as one of deliberate mass murder of innocent civilians. President Reagan called it "an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations."

Air Force intelligence dissented at the time of the incident, and eventually US intelligence reached a consensus view that the Soviets probably did not know they were destroying a civilian airliner. The charge should have been criminally negligent manslaughter, not premeditated murder. But the official US position never deviated from the initial assessment. The incident was used to keep up a noisy campaign in the UN and to spur worldwide efforts to punish the USSR with commercial boycotts, law suits, and denial of landing rights for Aeroflot airliners. These various efforts focused on indicting the Soviet system itself and the top leadership as being ultimately responsible.

Moscow's public response to the incident came more than a week later on 9 September in the form of an unprecedented two-hour live press conference conducted by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov with support from Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornienko and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department. The five-star spin-doctor's goal was to prove—despite 269 bodies to the contrary—that the Soviet Union had behaved rationally in

deciding to destroy Flight 007. At first, Ustinov said the regional Soviet air defense unit had identified the aircraft as a US intelligence platform, an RC-135 of the type that routinely performed intelligence collection operations along a similar flightpath. In any event, Ogarkov asserted, whether an RC-135 or a 747, the plane was unquestionably on a US or joint US-Japanese intelligence mission, and the local Soviet commander had carried out the correct order. The real blame for the tragedy, he argued, lay with the United States, not the USSR.

Remarkably, a classified memorandum coordinated by the Ministry of Defense and the KGB shows that privately the Soviet leadership took pretty much the same view as their public pronouncement on KAL 007. Released in 1992, the secret memorandum was sent to Andropov by Ustinov and KGB Chairman Chebrikov. It claimed that:

> *... We are dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organized by the US special [intelligence] services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favorable situation for the gathering of defense data on our air-defense system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems, including the Ferret reconnaissance satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us, using that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union*

Soviet angst was reflected in the rapid and harsh propaganda reaction, with Andropov once again taking the lead rather than remaining silent. He moved quickly to exploit KAL 007, like SDI before it, for US-baiting propaganda. Asserting that an "outrageous military psychosis" had overtaken the United States, he declared that:

> *The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop.*
> [emphasis added]

the Soviet air-defense commander made an honest, though serious, error because the entire air-defense system was on high alert and in a state of anxiety. He claims this was a result of incursions by US aircraft from the Pacific Fleet in recent months during a joint fleet exercise with the Japanese. He could not provide details, but he did know that there was concern about both military and military reconnaissance aircraft.

The specific incident to which he almost certainly was referring occurred on or about 4 April, when at least six US Navy planes from the carriers Midway and Enterprise flew simulated bombing runs over a heavily fortified Soviet island in the Kuril chain called Zeleny. The two carriers were part of a 40-ship armada that was patrolling in the largest-ever exercise in the north Pacific. According to the Soviet démarche protesting the incursion, the Navy aircraft flew 20 miles inside Soviet airspace and remained there for up to 20 minutes each time.[14] As a result, the Soviet air-defense organization was put on alert for the rest of the spring and summer—and perhaps longer—and some senior officers were transferred, reprimanded, or dismissed.

Andropov himself issued a "draconian" order that readiness be increased and that any aircraft discovered in Soviet airspace be shot down. Air-defense commanders were warned that if they refused to execute Andropov's order, they would be dismissed. There is corroborating information for this from a curious source—an apparent KGB disinformation project executed in Japan and then fed back into the USSR. A *Novosti* news agency pamphlet entitled *President's Crime: Who Ordered the Espionage Flight of KAL 007?* revealed that two important changes—one in Article 53 of the Soviet Air Code on 24 November 1982 and the other in Article 36 of the Soviet Law on State Borders on 11 May 1993—in effect had closed Soviet borders to all intruders and made Andropov's shoot-to-kill order a matter of law, changing the Soviet (and internationally recognized) rules of engagement.[1]

This incident raised Soviet fears of a possible US attack and made Moscow more suspicious that US military exercises might conceal preparations for an actual attack. Within weeks, Soviet intelligence would react in exactly that way to a US-NATO exercise in Western Europe—with potentially dangerous consequences.

Able Archer 83. The second significant incident of 1983 occurred during an annual NATO command post exercise codenamed Able Archer 83.

The Soviets were familiar with Able Archer from previous years, but the 1983 version included several changes. First, in the original scenario that was later changed, the exercise was to involve high-level officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in major roles with cameo appearances by the President and Vice President. Second, the exercise included a practice drill that took NATO forces from the use of conventional forces through a full-scale mock release of nuclear weapons.

The story of Able Archer has been told many times, growing and changing with each retelling. The original version came from Gordievsky, who claims that on the night of 8 or 9 November—he cannot remember which—Moscow sent a flash cable from the Center advising, incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had been put on alert and that troops at some US bases were being mobilized. The cable reportedly said that the alert may have been in response to the recent bombing attack on a US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, or related to impending US Army maneuvers, or the US may have begun the countdown to a surprise nuclear war. Recipients were asked to evaluate these hypotheses. At two airbases in East Germany and Poland, Soviet fighters were put on alert—for the first and last time during the Cold War. As Gordievsky described it:

> *In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past few months, the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert—and might even have begun the countdown to war.... The world did not quite reach the edge of the nuclear abyss during Operation RYAN. But during Able Archer 83 it had, without realizing it, come frighteningly close—certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.* [emphasis added]

British and US journalists with inside access to Whitehall and the White House have repeated the same story.[16] Three themes run through it. The United States and USSR came close to war as a result of Kremlin overreaction; only Gordievsky's timely warning to Washington via MI6 kept things from going too far; and Gordievsky's information was an epiphany for President Reagan, who was shaken by the idea that the Soviet Union was fearful of a US surprise attack. According to US journalist Don Oberdorfer:

> *Within a few weeks after...Able Archer 83, the London CIA station reported, presumably on the basis of information obtained by the British from Gordievsky, that the Soviets had been alarmed about the real possibility that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack against them. A similar report came from a well-connected American who had heard it from senior officials in an East European country closely allied to Moscow. McFarlane, who received the reports at the White House, initially discounted them as Soviet scare tactics rather than evidence of real concern about American intentions, and told Reagan of his view in presenting them to the President. But a more extensive survey of Soviet attitudes sent to the White House early in 1984 by CIA Director William Casey, based in part on reports from the double agent Gordievsky, had a more sobering effect. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked McFarlane, "Do you suppose they really believe that?"... I don't see how they could believe that—but it's something to think about," Reagan replied. In a meeting that same day, Reagan spoke about the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, a final world-ending battle between good and evil, a topic that fascinated the President. McFarlane though it was not accidental that Armageddon was on Reagan's mind.*[17]

For all its drama, however, Able Archer seems to have made more of an impression on the White House than on the Kremlin. A senior Soviet affairs expert who queried Soviet political and military leaders reported that none had heard of Able Archer, and all denied that it had reached the Politburo or even the upper levels of the defense ministry.[18] The GRU officer cited above said that watch officers were concerned over the exercise. Tensions were high as a result of the KAL 007 incident, and Soviet intelligence always worried that US military movements might indicate war, especially when conducted during major holidays.[19] Other than that, he saw nothing unusual about Able Archer.

The Iron Lady and the Great Communicator

Did Gordievsky's reporting, especially his account of the KGB Center's reaction to Able Archer,

influence US attitudes toward the Soviet Union? Gordievsky and coauthor Andrew believe so and have repeated the story dozens of times in books, articles, and interviews. The British agent's information, Andrew noted, "was of enormous importance in providing warning of the almost paranoid fear within some sections of the Reagan leadership that President Reagan was planning a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union."[20]

But did the British go further and put their own spin on the reporting in an effort to influence Reagan? Analysts who worked with the Gordievsky file during the war scare think so, and their suspicions are supported, if not confirmed, in British accounts. Prime Minister Thatcher was engaged in an effort to moderate US policy toward the USSR, convinced that the US hard line had become counterproductive, even risky, and was threatening to undermine the NATO consensus on INF deployments. She also was mindful of the growing strength of the peace movement in Britain and especially in West Germany.

Thatcher launched her campaign to modify US policy, appropriately enough, in Washington at the annual dinner of the Churchill Foundation Award on 29 September, where her remarks were certain to reach the White House and attract US media coverage. Her theme—"we live on the same planet and must go on sharing it"—was a plea for a more accommodating alliance policy that she repeated in subsequent addressees. As her biographer notes, Thatcher did not make an urgent plea or sudden flight to Washington to press her views, rather:

"Stalin's heirs decided that it is better to look through a glass darkly than through rose-colored glasses."

... the essence of the [Thatcher-Reagan] partnership at this stage was that the two governments were basing their decisions on much the same evidence and on shared assessments at professional [sic] level. In particular, both governments would have had the same intelligence. A critical contribution in this field was made over a period of years by Oleg Gordievski [sic]....[21]

British intelligence sources confided to a US journalist that London used the Gordievsky material to influence Reagan, because his hardline policy was strengthening Soviet hawks:

Since KGB reporting is thought to be aimed at confirming views already held in Moscow—to bolster the current line—the British worried that the impact on Moscow of the bluster in Washington would be enlarged by the KGB itself. They had cause to worry.[22]

The question is: how much spin did MI6 use? Unfortunately, Gordievsky did not include the KGB Center's flash message on Able Archer in his otherwise comprehensive collection of cables published in 1992. Gordievsky's claim to fame for influencing White House perceptions of Soviet "paranoia" is probably justified, but his assertion that a paranoid Kremlin almost went to war by overreacting to Able Archer is questionable.

RYAN and the Soviet Pearl Harbor

A Czechoslovak intelligence officer who worked closely with the KGB on RYAN noted that his counterparts were obsessed with the historical parallel between 1941 and 1983. He believed this feeling was almost visceral, not intellectual, and deeply affected Soviet thinking.

The German invasion was the Soviet Union's greatest military disaster, similar to—but much more traumatic than—Pearl Harbor. It began with a surprise attack that could have been anticipated and countered, but was not because of an intelligence failure. The connection between surprise attack and inadequate warning was never forgotten.

The historical example of Operation Barbarossa may account for the urgency, even alarm, that field intelligence officers like Gordievsky and Shvets attributed to Kremlin paranoia. This gap in perceptions may have reflected a generation gap. The Brezhnev–Andropov generation had experienced the war firsthand as the formative experience of their political lives; for younger Soviets, it was history rather than living memory.

The intelligence "failure" of 1941 was a failure of analysis, not collection.[23] Stalin received multiple detailed and timely warnings of the impending attack from a variety of open and clandestine sources. But he gave the data a best case or not-so-bad case interpretation, assuming—incorrectly—that Hitler would not attack without issuing an ultimatum or fight a two-front war while still engaged in the West. Stalin erred in part because he deceived himself and in part because German counterintelligence also deceived him. Stalin's heirs decided

that it is better to look through a glass darkly than through rose-colored glasses. This was probably one reason why RYAN employed an explicit worst case methodology.

RYAN appears to have incorporated—or misappropriated—another lesson from 1941. Despite the prowess of his intelligence services, the ever-suspicious Stalin ironically distrusted clandestinely acquired intelligence, including agent reporting and even communications and signals intercepts. He did so because he believed that all sources could be controlled by the enemy and corrupted by disinformation, leading him to reject both accurate and inaccurate information. As a corrective, he insisted that Soviet intelligence select indirect indicators of war planning that could not be concealed or manipulated. His chief of military intelligence had the idea of surveying mutton prices in Nazi-occupied Europe, arguing that the Germans would need sheepskin coats for winter campaigning in Russia, and, by buying up available livestock supplies for skins, they would flood the market with cheap mutton.[24] This deceptively simple indicator turned out to be simply deceptive. Hitler believed he could defeat the Red Army by fall and did not prepare for wintertime operations.

RYAN requirements reveal the same kind of unorthodox thinking. For example, the KGB residency in London was instructed to monitor prices paid for blood at urban donor banks. The Center assumed that prices would increase on the eve of war as the banks scurried to stockpile supplies. But there was a problem: British donor banks do not pay donors, all of whom are volunteers. Another example: the London

> **"What the Soviets feared most was that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US."**

residency was told to visit meat-packing plants, looking for signs of "mass slaughter of cattle and putting of meat into long cold storage" in preparation for RYAN. The parallel with 1941 is so close as to suggest that some of the RYAN requirements were dug out of the NKVD and GRU files.

Finally, there is another plausible, but unprovable, lesson learned from 1941. The prewar intelligence failure was Stalin's, but he blamed the intelligence services. This left an indelible stain on Soviet intelligence that Andropov, as KGB chief and later party chief, may have been determined not to let happen again. Soviet intelligence certainly had a vested interest in promoting a dire threat assessment of US intentions, but bureaucratic self-interest may not have been as important as professional, not to say hurt, pride.

Conclusion

RYAN was for real. Skeptics should consider Dobrynin's response to a doubting Thomas TV interviewer: "Make your conclusions from what he [Andropov] said in telegrams to his residents." The KGB-GRU—or more appropriately the joint Warsaw Pact—alert was a crash effort to build a strategic warning system by substituting manpower for technology, HUMINT for satellites and sensors. Soviet actions were panicky, but not paranoid or unprecedented.

As one historian noted, even under the tsars Russian strategists were often quite fearful when confronted by superior Western military technology, but their fears, while exaggerated, were scarcely insane.[25] Dobrynin claims that Andropov worried because President Reagan was "unpredictable." But this places too much weight on a single personality. What the Soviets feared most was what their "correlation of forces" calculations told them—that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US.

The real war scare almost certainly was not the one the Kremlin envisioned. The presumed threat of a US surprise nuclear attack was nonexistent. The possibility of Soviet preemptive strike may have been more likely. Well-informed observers like Gyula Horn, the last Communist foreign minister and current Prime Minister of Hungary, revealed in his memoirs that Soviet marshals, fortified with a little vodka, openly advocated an attack on the West "before the imperialists gain superiority in every sphere." The information is anecdotal, but there is a certain grim logic to it.

The war scare was the last paroxysm of the Cold War. It was a fitting end.

NOTES

1. This was a reference to the 1973 overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende.

2. According to interviews conducted by Murray Marder, "[m]any senior administration officials scoff now, as they did then, at the suggestion that the Soviet Union was genuinely alarmed by US military moves or

public statements, or that Moscow had any justification for feeling vulnerable. The "war scare" in the Soviet Union in 1982-83 was deliberately engineered for propaganda purposes, these officials maintain—a pretext to create a siege mentality in the Soviet Union and to frighten the outside world about US intentions. ("Defector Told of Soviet Alert; KGB Station Reportedly Warned US Would Attack," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1986, p. A1.)

3. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 60. Garthoff carefully considers all the details surrounding Gordievsky's recruitment and espionage for British intelligence, his bona fides, and his defection, but still questions whether the Soviets could have really believed in the war-scare scenario. Garthoff states, wrongly, that Gordievsky's information on RYAN was given to US intelligence only after his defection in May 1985. The British shared the information—in sanitized form to conceal the source—contemporaneously with the United States. Garthoff speculates that the British had some doubts about Gordievsky's reporting and did not want to offend the Reagan administration with intelligence that might suggest that its hardline policies were raising Soviet anxiety to an unusually high level. In fact, one reason the British pressed Gordievsky's information on US intelligence was precisely to influence Reagan's views on the USSR.

4. Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 33 (September-October 1983), p. 88.

5. Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. xvi.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. See Gregory L. Vistica, *Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 105-108, 116-118, and 129-135, *passim.*

10. Equally important, the Navy was able to offset the Soviets' ability to track the fleet by reading naval communications, which the KGB had been able to decrypt since the late 1960s, thanks to ex-sailor John Walker and his spy ring. The FBI arrested Walker in 1985.

11. As cited in Seymour Hersh, *"The Target is Destroyed": What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What Americans Really Knew About It* (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 18.

12. Schweizer, *Victory*, p. 190.

13. In 1970, the United States abandoned the risky practice of flying into Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean airspace to provoke reactions by radar and air-defense installations. For recently declassified information on the US overflight program, see "Secrets of the Cold War," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 114, No. 10 (15 March 1993), pp. 30-50.

14. This incident is recounted in Seymour Hersh, *"The Target is Destroyed"*, chapter 2, *passim.* The Soviets saw both political and military machinations in the overflight, because Zeleny is one of several islands that comprise the so-called northern territories that have been in dispute between Moscow and Tokyo since the Soviets seized them in 1945. The United States does not recognize the Soviet claim to the islands and supports Japan. The Soviets viewed the overflight as provocative and a challenge to their sovereignty over the islands. Hersh notes on p. 18 that the "Navy never publicly acknowledged either the overflight or its error; it also chose to say nothing further inside the government."

15. This strange pamphlet was issued by a one-room Japanese "publishing" firm in editions of 1,000 each in English and Japanese. However, *Novosti* "reprinted" 100,000 copies in Russian. This suggests two things: the pamphlet was intended primarily for the internal Soviet audience, and the Soviet people did not believe their government's explanation of the KAL 007 tragedy. See Murray Sayle, "Closing the File on Flight 007," *The New Yorker*, Vol. LXIX, No. 42 (13 December 1993), pp. 90-101, especially 94-95.

16. The two British accounts of Gordievsky's role and how British intelligence used him to influence President Reagan's thinking on Soviet policy are: Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: The Dramatic Stories of the Top Soviet Spies Who Have Defected Since World War II* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), chapter 18, *passim;* and Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 122-23. See also Nicholas Bethell, *Spies and Other Secrets: Memoirs from the Second Cold War* (New York: Viking, 1994), p. 191. Brooke-Shepard received assistance from British and US intelligence. Smith's book is an "authorized" inside account of its subject. Bethell is a Tory MP and friend and fan of Gordievsky's. The US version, which is identical in many respects, is Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 67.

17. Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, p. 67.

18. Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 139, n. 160.

19. Able Archer coincided with October Revolution Day, the USSR's national holiday. Holidays turned into national drinking binges that incapacitated practically the entire country. This is an interesting bit of mirror-imaging, because NATO military planners almost certainly did not factor the holiday into Allied war plans.

20. Christopher Andrew, "We Will Always Need Spies," *The London Times*, 3 March 1994, Features, p. 1

21. Smith, *Thatcher and Reagan*, p. 122.

22. John Newhouse, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 338.

23. For a discussion of the wealth of accurate information that was available to Stalin, see John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993), pp. 85-90. This analysis is based on declassified Soviet intelligence reports from the KGB archive. See also Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1973), which details more than 80 indications and warnings received by Soviet intelligence.

24. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker: Who Started World War II?* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), pp. 320-321.

25. William J. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 12.

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SACKED

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 28, 1984

~~SECRET~~ '84 MAY 28 A11:09

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Hugh Montgomery

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-10-84

GPS

You will recall that in response to British concerns, the Intelligence Community undertook a detailed review of recent Soviet military and political moves, beginning with exercise "Able Archer 83." The result was a Special National Intelligence Estimate addressing these developments.

When the National Foreign Intelligence Board approved the SNIE earlier this month, INR requested that a sanitized version be prepared for discussion with, and ultimate release to, the British authorities. This has been done. In addition, INR also sought a further sanitized version at the NATO "SECRET" level, which you might wish to use with your NATO ministerial colleagues in your bilateral sessions with them. I have included ten copies of this paper, in the event that you decide that it would be worthwhile to give copies to your interlocutors.

I hope you will find this study useful in your discussion of recent Soviet developments.

Attachment: SNIE 11-10-84

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3 NARA, Date

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 By

Wang No. 3838B

~~SECRET~~
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Director of Central Intelligence

Top Secret

[redacted]

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities

C00972743

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SNIE 11-10-84

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

— We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.

— We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

— The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

— Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

— In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1983.

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events:

— *INF response:* Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation in late December of patrols by E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast; first-ever forward deployment in mid-January 1984 of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start of deployment also in mid-January of 925-km range SS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.

— *Response to NATO exercise:* Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland from November 1983 of high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted "Able Archer-83," a nuclear release command post exercise.

— *Soviet exercises:* Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 which has stressed integrated strategic strike operations, featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivability training including the dispersal of operational Northern Fleet SSBNs supported by a large number of ships; and the use of survivable command, control, and communications platforms, possibly in a transattack scenario.

— *Berlin air corridors:* Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.

— *Afghanistan:* Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panjsher Valley, and initiation on 21 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.

— *East Asia:* Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first time; positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.

— *Caribbean:* A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.

— *Troop rotation:* Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities listed above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals.

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we address five explanatory hypotheses:

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated

across the board to achieve political effects through posturing and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies; to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by "peace" groups on Western governments; and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan's reelection prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington's rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventuality.

c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military action in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to alarm, but to desensitize the United States to higher levels of Soviet military activity—thus masking intended future moves and reducing US warning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership have lessened policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities.

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

— To create a tense international climate that fosters "peace" activism in the West and public pressure on Western governments to backtrack on INF deployment, reduce commitments to NATO, and distance themselves from US foreign policy objectives.

— To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.

— To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states.

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been supplemented with the boycott of the Olympic Games.

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society. This message is also being disseminated within the Soviet and East European bureaucracies,

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions.

8. First, we believe that there *is* a serious concern with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and momentum of the US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow condemns INF deployment as a telling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at "regaining military superiority." *The threat here is not immediate, but longer term.* However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort.

9. Secondly, in our judgment *the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military.* There is a healthy respect for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime's ability to manage competing military and

civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future.

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcefully than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past half year.

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

— The Soviets have not initiated the military readiness moves they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.

— In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.

— Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within regime circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.

— In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitriy Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be "overdramatized" (although Ustinov's recent Victory Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unleash nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives.

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. ***Intimidation?*** It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences:

— The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of strike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.

— The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgency but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

— In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences.

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world *is* a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own.

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort contin-

ues. In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam. (s)

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets avoiding threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

- Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to evade a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had come for emergency repairs.
- Warned Soviet ships in late January to stay away from US ships in the eastern Mediterranean.
- Took no tangible action in March when one of their merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.
- Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of "good will."

16. ***Reaction to US actions?*** The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them—although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack.

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a "reactive" element. They frequently incorporate Western operational concepts and weapon systems into exercise scenarios, including projected US/NATO weapons and systems well before these systems are actually deployed. On occasion there is real- or near-real-time counterexercising, in which US/NATO exercise activity is incorporated into "Red" scenarios, thereby sensitizing Soviet forces to the US/NATO opponent. A key issue is whether this counterexercising takes on the character of actual preparation for response to a perceived threat of possible US attack.

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to "Able Archer-83." This was a NATO command post exercise held in November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises and included new command, control, and communications procedures for authorizing use of nuclear weapons. The elaborate Soviet reaction to this recent exercise included

increased intelligence collection flights, and the placing of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness in what was declared to be a threat of possible aggression against the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries. Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert,

Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the trends they may display, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what novelty or possible military objectives the Soviets may have read into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not charged a US intent to prepare for imminent war.

20. ***Preparation for surprise military action?*** There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and manning practices or the introduction of new airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator—a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degradation of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms.

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military

District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force is clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the force could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without forewarning or precursor political pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely.

22. Soviet military exercises display and contribute to steadily growing Soviet force capabilities. These exercises have become increasingly complex as Moscow has deployed more capable and sophisticated weapons and command and control systems. The exercises have stressed the ability to assume a wartime posture rapidly and respond flexibly to a variety of contingencies. We know that this activity is planned and scheduled months or years in advance. Typically, these plans have not been significantly affected by concurrent US or NATO exercise activity. We see no evidence that this program is now being driven by some sort of target date or deadline. Rather, it appears to respond—in annual and five-year plan increments—to new problems and operational considerations that constantly arise with ongoing force modernization. Thus, we interpret the accelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity as a reflection of the learning curve inherent in the exercise process itself and of long-term Soviet military objectives, rather than of preparations for, or masking of, surprise Soviet military actions.

23. ***Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism?*** The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This uncertain political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it could were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in the regime and military priorities remain high for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here.

24. ***A comprehensive pattern?*** In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own military rationales and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet force development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiating various activities argue against orchestration for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time.

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States.

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF "counterdeployments," the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia).

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military activities indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigning have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that none of the military activities discussed in this Estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack.

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this Estimate would

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not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target.

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undercuts the Soviet power position in the world.

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term Western arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the military challenge posed by the United States. Warning of such actions could be ambiguous.

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

a. The current mind-set of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.

b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.

c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington D.C 20505

ER 84-2648

CR - NIC 03508-84

memo
chrono

19 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: US/Soviet Tension

1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.

2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United States.

3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus far, pulled together in any systematic way.

/s/

William J. Casey

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U.S./Soviet Tension

The recent SNIE-11-10-84 JX examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that are influenced by Soviet perceptions or a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy. Each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a "get-tough" policy to counter the current U.S. stance.

This summary will consider some longer term events that may cause some reflections about the kinds of actions the Soviets could orchestrate that would create a political embarrassment for the U.S. in the wake of deployment of INF in Europe. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater than it was before the INF decision, that Soviet vulnerability is greater and will grow with additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building U.S. defense budget, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in force readiness, and a potentially massive space defense program may be propelling the USSR to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace. There is a certain consistency and coherence in the symptoms of measures being taken that suggests central decisionmaking. Some of "civilian to wartime-type" of activity suggest a broad-based plan. These activities may all be prudent precautions in a period of anxiety and uncertainty on the part of the Soviets. Some of the measures we perceive follow.

A. Media

Soviet media have portrayed the environment as dangerous to the domestic populace. The risks involved have been recognized in that in December 1983, the Soviets carefully modulated the tone to allay what appeared to be brewing hysteria. A message has been that the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations is comparable to those between Nazi Germany and the USSR prior to WWII and that the Soviets will not be surprised again.

C. Security Procedures

--Leningrad has become a closed city to Western attaches. U.S., UK, French and Canadian attaches in Moscow have been denied travel to Leningrad on numerous occasions in 1984. The Soviets prevented attache travel by international visas from Helsinki to Leningrad to Helsinki in May 1984. Their willingness to ignore the international portion of that trip to prevent attache travel indicates high-interest activity in the Leningrad area and/or a critical time-frame.

--In May 1984, valid visas for 58 Americans planning tour travel of USSR were cancelled. Apparently, the decision was made by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The trip included a flight from Naples to Leningrad and it appears that those with defense security clearances were denied visas.

--According to the DAO Moscow, there has been an important change in the "political atmospherics" surrounding attache operations.

The publication of an article in Red Star, 25 May 1984, against U.S. Naval Attaches suggests the Soviet campaign will be generalized and expanded.

--The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly issued a directive in late 1983 that officials abroad should terminate contact with U.S. British and West German officials.

--In June 1984, for the first time since 1972 a portion of the City of Potsdam was included in a TRA.

--The Soviets continue to declare multiple TRA's in addition to the PRAs.

--There have also been other travel restrictions. In Poland, there has been a perceptible increase in surveillance of attaches in the southwest corner of the country (Wroclaw, Zegnia, Swietoszow, Zagan), but not elsewhere. There has also been an increase in instances of surveillance since late 1983.

--Three recent incidents occurred in Poland where army and security personnel detained NATO attaches and then forced them to drive through a military restricted area for posed photography. In each case, the attaches were detained on public roads in an apparently well-planned effort at intimidation.

--In the Soviet Union, Pravda articles in June called for greater vigilance of Westerners and Soviet dissenters. Other reporting indicates that harrassment of Western reporters has increased. Soviet border guards are conducting more intensive searches of Western visitors.

there has been a steady increase in civilian companies apparently enforcing discipline and improving "piece rates." The greater presence of guards and security people at defense-related production plants is also reported.

D. Political Harrassment

--On 20 February 1984, the Soviets imposed new restrictions on Allied flights in the three corridors linking Berling to West Germany. Basically, altitude restrictions apply to the entire length of the corridors, rather than the central portions as had been the practice. New traffic-identification demands have also been made and met by the Allies.

--On 22 March 1984, an East German military vehicle rammed a French MLM vehicle killing the driver and injuring two others.

--On 18 April 1984, the Soviets briefly detained an eight-vehicle French Army convoy at an Autobahn Checkpoint.

--On 2 May 1984, a U.S. military train bound for Berlin was delayed by East German railroad officials.

--On 16 May, East Germans refused to pull a French military train to Berlin until the French protested to the Soviet Embassy.

--On 8 June, the U.S. Consul General in Leningrad was called to a Soviet review of the assault on Ronald Harms on 17 April accusing the press coverage of being an exaggerated claim in a U.S. Government anti-Soviet campaign.

E. Logistics

The 1983 study of Soviet railroads concluded that the industry must improve its performance. The need for attention to the railroads is beyond question, but the new campaign which features early completion of the BALCOM line adds a sense of urgency to transportation improvements.

F. The Economy

--There has been a significant reduction in production of commercial aircraft in favor of military transport production since about June 1982. DIA studies show commercial aircraft production down 14 percent in 1983. Not only are traditional Soviet aircraft customers not adding new aircraft of Soviet make to their fleets, but the Soviets are buying back civil aircraft from Eastern European airlines. The increased allocation of resources for military aircraft production is supported by DIA production data.

--Other changes under way in selected segments of the economy point toward shifts to military needs. The termination of military support to the harvest, by directive of March 1984, may say that the success of the harvest is less important than the maintenance of military capabilities at high readiness. Such a decision is consistent with a leadership perception that danger is present, but inconsistent with the alleged priority of the food program and stated Soviet concerns about internal security problems owing to shortages and consumer dissatisfaction.

--The increases in production are complemented by developments in the factors of production, especially labor and management. These have been subjected to one of the most strenuous and long-lasting campaigns to improve performance and expand output ever undertaken by Soviet authorities.

--At the same time, there has been a cutback in Soviet support for the East European economies, Soviet demands for better quality products from them, and higher prices for Soviet exports. These trends became evident in the fall of 1980 during the Polish crisis and have persisted. Although there are many sound reasons for the trends, they complement those already mentioned.

--Rationing of key products may be affecting commercial interests. State-owned trucking companies in Czechoslovakia are reported operating far below capacity due to insufficient fuel rations allotted as of 1 January 1984.

--In Poland, Jaruzelski apparently has formally agreed with the USSR to give up civilian production capacity to supply the Soviets with more military hardware.

--In a Magdeburg, East Germany metal processing cooperative, there are resource allocation shortages and increased target plans for 1984. While the imbalance could be blamed on poor management, the situation was exacerbated by a new bank law that prevents using state financial reserves since 1 January 1984.

G. Military Activity

--In June, DAO Moscow reported that rail movement in support of Soviet troop rotation, although with a slightly reduced volume, was continuing. (This extension also occurred during the last two rotation periods.) Extending the rotation seems to conflict with other Soviet efforts to minimize the impact of rotation, and the flow of personnel over three months would seem to disrupt programmed training.

I. Political Activity

--In external relations, Soviet activity has been intense. A series of relatively low-level harrassments concerning Berlin air corridors and ground access to Berlin fall into this category and have the potential to become more escalatory. The Soviets have recently cancelled a long-standing commercial accord with the U.S. The level of official harrassment of Western attaches is high throughout the Warsaw Pact, even including a shooting incident in Bulgaria. New travel restrictions have been placed on Western diplomats in the USSR.

--A message of dissatisfaction in U.S.-Soviet relations is clear, but more than the message the Soviets may actually be paying costs--surrendering commercial contacts and their own freedom of access. Activity resembles a calculated and careful withdrawal on multiple fronts; a limitation of exposure and vulnerability.

J. Military Behavior

The behavior of the armed forces is perhaps the most disturbing. From the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking some risks. It is important to distinguish in this category those acts which are political blustering and those which may be, but also carry large costs. The point of blustering is to do something that makes the opponent pay

high costs while the blusterer pays none or little. The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. None of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.