

UNCLASSIFIED



PSI OC 38-1924

8401722X
Under Seal of the
United States Department of State.
DATE: JAN 20 1984
Washington, D. C. 20520

JAN 18 1984

E5

f

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

TO: P - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
FROM: EUR - John H. Kelly, Acting *JK*
SUBJECT: Gromyko's Speech at Stockholm

Judging by Gromyko's speech and the instant commentary from TASS on his meeting with the Secretary, the Soviets have decided that a renewed anti-American propaganda offensive is the best public antidote to our more conciliatory line on East-West relations. For Moscow to have conceded openly that the Kremlin attaches even the slightest credence to U.S. professions of interest in improved relations would have undercut the goal of raising West European anxieties and thereby pressuring us into unilateral concessions.

But while pursuing with a vengeance the goal of putting the worst possible face on US-Soviet relations, the Soviets are being studiously vague on the substance of the live issues on the US-Soviet agenda. Thus in his speech Gromyko was careful not to exclude the possibility of dealing constructively with Washington or to slam the door shut on renewed START and MBFR negotiations.

Gromyko's Address at the CDE

The first half of Gromyko's vituperative address was largely a regurgitation of Andropov's even more blistering statement on US-Soviet relations of last September 28. Like the Andropov statement, Gromyko's central theme was U.S. "militarism." He alleged that the Administration is one that is "thinking in categories of war and acting accordingly," seeking to achieve military superiority over the USSR and to impose its will on the rest of the world. He indirectly dismissed the President's Monday speech as a "trick" inspired by "short-term considerations." And not surprisingly, Gromyko rebutted our charges of arms control violations, charging that our accusations are an effort to conceal the "greatest violations" by the U.S. of unspecified treaties and agreements.

Unlike Andropov, however, Gromyko did not write off the possibility of a change in U.S. policy, and reaffirmed Soviet

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9303777 IS/FFC/CDR Date 10/4/96

(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>) RELEASE	(<input type="checkbox"/>) DECLASSIFY	MR Case# Only
(<input type="checkbox"/>) EXCISE	(<input type="checkbox"/>) DECLASSIFY	EU Citation# <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>
(<input type="checkbox"/>) DENY	(<input type="checkbox"/>) PART	DECL: <u>CDR</u>
(<input type="checkbox"/>) DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to
FOIA Exemptions		(<input type="checkbox"/>) S or (<input type="checkbox"/>) C OADR
PA		(<input type="checkbox"/>) S or (<input type="checkbox"/>) C OADR

MICROFILMED
BY S/S-I

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

commitment to a dialogue between East and West. Andropov, you will recall, stated:

"If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all."

Gromyko, in contrast, said:

"I would like to believe that in the leading circles of the United States, the upper hand will be taken by the understanding of the balefulness of the course based on the replacement of cooperation with confrontation."

Moreover, while reiterating Soviet preconditions for resumption of the INF talks, Gromyko avoided any mention of START or MBFR -- perhaps to signal Moscow's readiness to pursue serious negotiations in these areas in the near future. (Gromyko reportedly told the Swedish Foreign Minister that the Vienna negotiations could be resumed "if this is so desired.")

The second half of Gromyko's address was devoted to the CDE. As expected, he made clear that Moscow does not intend to accept the Western focus on measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and will instead concentrate on declaratory proposals like nuclear no-first-use, non-use of force and the like. He threw cold water on Western proposals aimed at increasing the "transparency" of military activities by ruling out attempts to "look for a crack in the fence to peep at one's neighbors."

TASS on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

As if Gromyko's speech were not enough to dampen expectations for his meeting with the Secretary, TASS followed up by issuing a short dispatch on the meeting just an hour after the five-hour session had begun (most likely before Gromyko had even spoken, assuming that the Secretary, as guest, went first). The TASS account summarizes Gromyko's supposed presentation to the Secretary on the threat posed by U.S. militarism, in which he asserted that U.S. actions do not square with our professed goal of greater international stability. The Soviets treated Ambassador Hartman to a similar "instant analysis" following his November 25 meeting with Gromyko on the Mideast; the purpose then as now was to squelch any perception of productive US-Soviet dialogue.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: Avershbow
1/18/84 632-8040 2964m

Cleared: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
EUR/RPM: SKPifer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**UNCLASSIFIED**