


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PART 4 OF 7

TEXT

SUBJ: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FOR CUSTOMERS OF DIA NADA INTSUM. (U)

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31. ~~(S)~~ SOON THEREAFTER, IN WUHAN, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS OF YANG'S MEETING, DENG CALLED ANOTHER MEETING OF MR COMMANDERS. A FEW MR COMMANDERS ON THE FIRST DAY FELL IN BEHIND DENG. AFTER WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE PERSUASION, ALL THE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS FINALLY AGREED TO SEND TROOPS TO BEIJING. THOSE IN STRONG SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN WERE LI

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JIULONG OF JINAN, XIANG SHOZHUI OF NANJING, AND FU QUANYOU OF CHENGDU. RELUCTANT SUPPORTERS WERE ZHOU YIBING OF BEIJING, ZHANG WANNIAN OF GUANGZHOU, LIU JINGSONG OF SHENYANG, AND ZHAO XIANSHUN OF LANZHOU.

32. ~~(S)~~ ON 18 OR 19 MAY, REFLECTING THE OPINION OF THE PARTY ELDERS, THE POLITBURO'S STANDING COMMITTEE VOTED, WITH ZHAO THE ONLY VOICE OPPOSING, TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE STUDENTS. ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, THE DEGREE OF MILITARY FORCE TO BE USED WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED. WHILE THIS VOTE INDICATED A CONSENSUS OF SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS, THE ACTUAL ORDER TO EMPLOY THE PLA WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION.

33. ~~(S)~~ THE NEXT FEW DAYS WERE SPENT CONSOLIDATING THIS DECISION AMONG THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. TROOPS FROM MILITARY REGIONS OUTSIDE OF BEIJING BEGAN TO DEPLOY TO THE CAPITAL.

34. (U) BY LATE 18 MAY, ZHAO PROBABLY HAD REALIZED THAT HIS CALLS FOR MODERATION IN DEALING WITH THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN DEFEATED. EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 19 MAY, ZHAO, FOLLOWED BY LI PENG, WENT INTO TIANANMEN SQUARE TO MEET WITH THE STUDENTS AND HUNGER STRIKERS. HIS WORDS, "WE HAVE COME TOO LATE," HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS AN EXPRESSION OF FATALISM AND AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF THE CRACKDOWN THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY COME. ON 19 MAY, THE HUNGER STRIKERS DECLARED THEIR STRIKE OVER.

35. ~~(S)~~ ALSO BY 19 MAY, DENG, AND A GROUP OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY ELDERS, HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE ZHAO ZIYANG FROM HIS POSITION OF PARTY SECRETARY. THEY BLAMED ZHAO FOR THE UNREST THAT HAD DEVELOPED BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPORT OF THE DEMONSTRATORS. EVENTUALLY, HU QILI, AS A SUPPORTER OF ZHAO, WOULD ALSO BE REMOVED.

36. (U) FINALLY, ON THE EVENING OF 19 MAY, AT A MEETING OF HIGH-LEVEL PARTY LEADERS, LI PENG MADE ANOTHER TELEVISED HARDLINE SPEECH ANNOUNCING THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO QUELL THE DISORDERS. ZHAO'S ABSENCE INDICATES THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED.

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V. WHY MARTIAL LAW WAS SLOW TO BE ENFORCED

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37. (U) ON 20 MAY, MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED IN BEIJING. HOWEVER, THE PROTESTS CONTINUED.

38. ~~(S)~~ WE BELIEVE THAT PLA EFFORTS TO ENFORCE MARTIAL LAW WERE HINDERED BY SEVERAL FACTORS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE ABSENCE OF A CLEARLY DEFINED MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

39. ~~(S)~~ PLA OPERATIONS AFTER THE MARTIAL LAW DECLARATION INDICATE THAT THE AUTHORITIES HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS BY A SHOW OF FORCE. HOWEVER, THE PIECEMEAL TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS WAS INEFFECTIVE. AS A RESULT, THE SHOW OF FORCE FAILED TO INTIMIDATE EITHER THE DEMONSTRATORS OR THE CITIZENS OF BEIJING. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY MOUNTED AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE.

40. ~~(S)~~ BY THIS TIME THE STUDENTS THEMSELVES HAD PROVED TO BE MUCH MORE ORGANIZED THAN EXPECTED. BEGINNING IN THE EARLY WEEKS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS THEY USED BICYCLES AND MOTORCYCLES TO COMMUNICATE AMONG CAMPUSES. GRADUALLY THEY ALSO DEVELOPED AN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK REPORTING ON TROOP MOVEMENTS AND PLANS. NEWER FORMS OF COMMUNICATIONS WERE ALSO WIDELY USED. THEIR EXCELLENT COMMUNICATIONS ALLOWED THE STUDENTS TO COORDINATE MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE CITY. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THE STUDENTS AND DEMONSTRATORS STOPPED AND SURROUNDED CONVOYS OF TROOPS USING OBVIOUSLY CHOREOGRAPHED MANEUVERS. THE STUDENTS ALSO EFFECTIVELY

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UTILIZED PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES TO "EDUCATE" THE SOLDIERS TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW. IN SPITE OF THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE DEMONSTRATORS SEEMED TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND. IGNORANT AS THEY WERE OF EVENTS IN OTHER QUARTERS, THE STUDENTS STILL SEEMED TO HOPE THAT ZHAO ZIYANG AND THE MODERATES WOULD PREVAIL IN THE PARTY INFIGHTING.

41. (U) THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS WAS ALSO AN INHIBITING FACTOR ON THE PLA AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS. MEDIA COVERAGE CONTINUED AS IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS EXCEPT THAT LIVE-SATELLITE BROADCASTS WERE PROHIBITED.

42. (U) INTERNAL CHINESE MEDIA COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN THE CAPITAL ALSO WAS A MODERATING INFLUENCE.

43. (U) THE STUDENTS ERECTED THEIR "GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY" STATUE ON THE NIGHT OF 29 MAY. THE FOLLOWING DAY AT ITS UNVEILING THEY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD STAY IN THE SQUARE UNTIL 20 JUNE. HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNAWARE OF THE DECISION THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE IN THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION.

44. ~~(S)~~ SOMETIME BETWEEN THE 24 AND 31 MAY, YANG SHANGKUN HIMSELF OR IN DENG'S NAME, SPEAKING FOR THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION, GAVE THE ORDER TO USE FORCE TO REMOVE THE STUDENTS FROM THE SQUARE. BY THIS TIME, THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE PLA HAD PLEDGED LOYALTY TO DENG AND HIS IMMEDIATE GOAL OF RESTORING ORDER. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF GENUINE SUPPORT DENG HAD FOR THE CRACKDOWN PERSIST. AT VARIOUS TIMES IT WAS REPORTED THAT QIN JIWEI, CHI HAOTIAN, HONG XUEZHI, AND WANG HAI, IN ADDITION TO THE MR COMMANDERS ALREADY MENTIONED, WERE OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE.  
END PART 4 OF 7 ~~(DECL OADR)~~

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END OF MESSAGE

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