

## Message Text

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TAGS: NATO, CSCE, MPOL

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBM'S: BACKGROUND PAPER ON SOVIET  
COM POLICY

1. THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING INR BACKGROUND PAPER ON SOVIET

CBM POLICY SHOULD BE SHARED WITH THE ALLIES:

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2. BEGIN SUMMARY. SOVIET POLICY ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
MEASURES (CBMS) UNDERWENT A CAUTIOUS, ALBEIT STEADY, DEVELOP-  
MENT UNTIL RECENTLY. A FEW MONTHS AGO, HOWEVER, THE  
USSR ADOPTED A MORE VIGOROUS APPROACH, WHICH MAY PORTEND  
A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE ON CBMS AT THE  
FOLLOW-UP CSCE CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE LATER THIS YEAR. THE  
SOVIETS APPARENTLY REEVALUATED THEIR POSITION IN ORDER TO  
PREEMPT POSSIBLE WESTERN CBM MOVES THERE AND TO MAKE THEIR  
CBM TACTICS HARMONIOUS WITH LARGER SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR  
THE MEETING.

3. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF SOVIET CBM ACTIVITY SINCE THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE A YEAR AND A HALF AGO SUGGESTS THAT:

(A)--THE USSR SIGNED THE FINAL ACT BEFORE ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUCRACY WAS PREPARED TO HANDLE CBMS.

(B)--CONSEQUENTLY, THE MILITARY (WHICH WAS APPARENTLY CUT OUT OF THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LAST MINUTE) WAS ABLE TO DRAG ITS FEET FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS UNTIL A COMPROMISE ON COMPLIANCE COULD BE REACHED WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

(C)--EVEN SO, IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE TWO EXERCISES WHICH THE USSR NOTIFIED THAT THE MILITARY HAS BEEN RUNNING THE ENTIRE SHOW AS FAR AS ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN CONCERNED.

(D)--BOTH EXERCISES COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER THAN THE 25,000-TROOP MARK REQUIRED FOR NOTIFICATION; IF THEY WERE, THEY MAY HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED TO ENHANCE THE USSR'S RECORD OF COMPLIANCE RATHER THAN BECAUSE THEY WERE GENUINELY "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS."

(E)--THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS, WHICH MET IN FEBRUARY 1976,  
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APPARENTLY ENDORSED A POLICY OF EMPHASIZING SOVIET CBM COMPLIANCE, LATER EPITOMIZED BY BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT AT THE BERLIN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN JUNE 1976.

(F)--TWICE IN OCTOBER 1976, HOWEVER, BREZHNEV WENT BEYOND HIS EARLIER STATEMENT (WHICH ;AD ONLY EMPHASIZED COMPLIANCE) TO SUGGEST THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WERE BOTH DESIRABLE AND EFFECTIVE. CONTRARY TO THE FACTS, HE EVEN CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE A SOVIET INVENTION.

4. THESE LATEST STATEMENTS PUT BREZHNEV AHEAD OF THE SOVIET MEDIA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY ARE CONCERNED THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AT THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE MEETING IN BELGRADE MIGHT TRY TO EXPAND CBM PARAMETERS. BREZHNEV MAY HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEFUSE THIS THREAT WAS TO ASSERT THAT CBMS HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR PURPOSE AND THEREFORE NEED NO MODIFICATION.

5. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY DESIRE A PERFUNCTORY MEETING IN BELGRADE DWELING ON CSCE SUCCESSES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY MAY ALSO HOPE THAT THEY CAN GENERATE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE ON BASKET I THAT WILL HELP CARRY THEM THROUGH BASKET III, WHERE THEY REALLY FEAR A FIGHT.

6. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TACTIC IS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL THAT THE CSCE STATES ADOPT A "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS MAY CALCULATE THAT, IF PRESSED ON CBMS, THEY CAN RETORT THAT IF THE WEST IS REALLY SINCERE ABOUT DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IT SHOULD STOP TALKING ABOUT CBMS AND MOVE AHEAD TO CONCRETE PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. END OF SUMMARY.

7. BEGIN TEXT. SOVIET CBM POLICY AT THE CSCE: THE USSR WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE KEPT SPECIFIC MILITARY SECRET

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MEASURES OFF THE CSCE AGENDA ALTOGETHER. CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE EAST'S FIRST CONCRETE PROPOSAL IN 1969 MADE NO PROVISION FOR THEM.

8. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AS THEY CAME TO BE CALLED, WERE ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN INVENTION. AS A CONCRETE SECURITY ITEM, THEY WERE DESIGNED TO FOCUS SOME DISCUSSION ON THE MILITARY REALITIES IN EUROPE AND THUS HELP MAINTAIN A BALANCED PERSPECTIVE OF DETENTE WITHIN THE LARGER CSCE PICTURE.

9. EVENTUALLY, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT CBMS WERE PART OF THE PRICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO OBTAIN A FORMAL ACCORD, THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THEY BARGAINED HARD ON THE DETAILS, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND, FOR A TIME, EVEN CONTESTED THE NOTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATE TREATMENT OF CBMS. NOTE: FOR EXAMPLE, THEY RESPONDED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD GIVE 60 DAYS' PRIOR NOTICE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT 5 DAYS WOULD BE ADEQUATE. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE END, THEY AGREED TO A DISTINCT SECTION ("DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT") IN THE FINAL ACT.

10. ALL CBMS ARE "VOLUNTARY" (A PREFERENCE SHARED BY BOTH THE US AND THE USSR), BUT SOME APPEAR LESS "VOLUNTARY" THAN OTHERS AND THE FINAL ACT USES THE WORD "WILL" RATHER THAN "MAY" TO DESCRIBE THEM. TWO OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CBMS STATE THAT:

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(A)--PARTICIPATING STATES "WILL" NOTIFY OTHER PARTICIPANTS 21 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS

EXCEEDING A TOTAL OF 25,000 TROOPS"; AND

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(B)--PARTICIPATING STATES "WILL" INVITE OTHER PARTICIPANTS "TO SEND OBSERVERS TO ATTEND MILITARY MANEUVERS."

11. THAT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THESE TERMS IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THEIR FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RATIONALE THAT A FLOW OF INFORMATION ABOUT MANEUVERS THROUGH SUCH SPECIFIC MEASURES COULD PREVENT MISCONCEPTIONS AND THUS REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSION. HAVING AGREED TO CBMS, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, THE SOVIETS TREATED THEM QUITE POSITIVELY AT FIRST.

12. BREZHNEV SETS TONE: IN HIS JULY 31, 1975, SPEECH AT HELSINKI, BREZHNEV NOTED: "THE CONFERENCE HAS ADOPTED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS SUPPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL RELAXATION BY A MILITARY ONE. THIS IS ALSO A QUALITATIVELY NEW STAGE IN BUILDING UP CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES." THIS FAVORABLE, IF SOMEWHAT OBLIQUE, REFERENCE TO CBMS WAS AMPLIFIED BY TASS THE NEXT DAY. THE LATTER DEVOTED NEARLY A FULL PAGE TO A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CBMS, OUT OF FOUR AND A HALF PAGES DESCRIBING THE ENTIRE FINAL ACT. THIS EMPHASIS SEEMED TO REFLECT A SOVIET DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THE TOTAL CSCE PACKAGE.

13. SUPPORT FOR CBMS, CRITICISM OF NATO MANEUVERS: THROUGH AUGUST AND INTO SEPTEMBER 1975, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA FOLLOWED TWO SEPARATE LINES. SOME SOVIET COMMENTATORS CONTINUED TO PRAISE CBMS WHILE OTHERS BEGAN TO CRITICIZE UPCOMING NATO EXERCISES.

14. A LENGTHY PRAVDA ARTICLE ON THE FINAL ACT ON AUGUST 20 REFLECTED AN INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS AND DEFENSIVE TONE IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN SKEPTICISM OF CSCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE AUTHOR SPENT THREE PARAGRAPHS PRAISING CBMS AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN A SOVIET INITIATIVE. A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE USA INSTITUTE TOLD AN AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICER THE SAME DAY THAT THE ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN (UNDER A PSEUDONYM) BY A  
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MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

15. A RED STAR COMMENTATOR STRUCK A DISCORDANT NOTE LESS THAN A WEEK LATER (AUGUST 26), HOWEVER, BY QUESTIONING THE WEST'S INTENT IN INSTITUTING A MORE CONSPICUOUS FORMAT (AUTUMN FORGE) THAN USUAL FOR ITS ANNUAL FALL EXERCISE SERIES JUST AFTER SIGNING THE FINAL ACT.

16. EVEN SO, AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 9, A MOSCOW DOMESTIC TELEVISION PANEL DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL TAKING A FAVORABLE LINE ON CBMS. TOLKUNOV, THE

CHIEF EDITOR OF IZVESTIYA AND THE HEAD OF TASS, LED THE PANEL INTO A FAVORABLE DISCUSSION OF THE CBM CONCEPT. IN FACT, ACTUAL WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS FOR FORTHCOMING NATO EXERCISES IN THE FRG WERE CITED TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONCEPT'S EFFICACY.

17. CBMS DRAWN INTO CRITICISM OF NATO EXERCISES: SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, PRAVDA CARRIED AN ARTICLE ON SEPTEMBER 15 WHICH TREATED CBMS MUCH MORE CRITICALLY THAN THE ASSESSMENT IT HAD PRINTED ON AUGUST 20. THE LATTER ARTICLE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO HAD PROPERLY NOTIFIED ITS EXERCISES, BUT DISMISSED WESTERN NOTIFICATION AS IRRELEVANT TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH EXERCISES COMPORTED WITH THE SPIRIT OF CSCE. SIMILARLY, USING ALMOST IDENTICAL LANGUAGE, AN IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ON SEPTEMBER 23 CHARGED THAT WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS HAD ONLY MET THE LETTER OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT WHILE THE EXERCISES THEMSELVES HAD VIOLATED ITS SPIRIT. WHILE THE SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE EXERCISES, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO OTHER HOSTILE COMMENTARIES DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH CBMS.

18. WHY THE SOVIETS REACTED: THE PRIMARY IMPETUS FOR THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON NATO EXERCISES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN  
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NATO'S NEW UNIFIED EXERCISE CONCEPT (AUTUMN FORGE), WHICH MAY HAVE MADE THE EXERCISES APPEAR LARGER THAN THEY ACTUALLY WERE. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING, AS WELL, TO THE ADDED WESTERN PUBLICITY WHICH ACCOMPANIED ITS INTRODUCTION. THE ATTACK ON CBMS WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF THE NATO EXERCISES.

19. BEYOND THAT, THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY REACTING TO THE FREQUENCY AND DETAIL OF WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, THE INK WAS HARDLY DRY ON THE FINAL ACT WHEN NATO STATES NOTIFIED TWO MAJOR AND THREE MINOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND INVITED OBSERVERS TO ONE OF THE MAJOR MANEUVERS. NOTE: A FOURTH MINOR EXERCISE WAS NOTIFIED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF ONE OF THE MAJOR MANEUVERS.

20. VOLUNTARY NATURE OF CBMS STRESSED: THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE FELT THAT NATO WAS TRYING TO STAMPEDE THEM INTO A PATTERN OF COMPLIANCE BASED ON WESTERN PRECEDENTS WHICH THEY WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. THIS CONCERN SURFACED IN

EARLY OCTOBER 1975 IN A NEW TIMES ARTICLE ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION WHICH QUESTIONED THE WEST'S TWO-MONTH RECORD AND WAS DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE EAST'S. WITHOUT MENTIONING ACTUAL USE OF CBMS, THE AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR VALUE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT NONE REQUIRED AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION:

"A VOLUNTARY BASIS IS STIPULATED FOR EACH OF THE CONFIDENCE MEASURES."

21. WHILE THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS EVER CONTEMPLATED NOT NOTIFYING THEIR MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, THEIR BARGAINING AT CSCE SUGGESTED (AS TIME HAS BORNE OUT) THAT THEY NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF NOTIFYING "SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS." THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT WESTERN PRESS ACCUSATIONS IN 1975 THAT THE SOVIETS OR OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DELIBERATELY  
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SHAVED THEIR EXERCISES TO PUT THEM JUST BELOW THE 25,000 THRESHOLD.

22. IN ADDITION TO THEIR APPARENT CONCERN THAT NATO MAY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SET A PRECEDENT OF NOTIFYING SMALLER-SCALE EXERCISES, THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY CHAGRINED THAT THEY HAD BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND A MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER SO SOON AFTER HELSINKI. WHEN THE SOVIET CSCE NEGOTIATORS HAD FIRST AGREED TO THE OBSERVER CONCEPT IN 1973, THEY HAD ARGUED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD PROCEED "MODESTLY." IN CONTRAST, THEY MUST HAVE FELT, NATO TOOK THE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY AFTER HELSINKI TO PRESS THE POINT.

23. INTERNAL DEBATE ON CBMS: THE UNEVEN SOVIET TREATMENT OF CBMS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1975 SUGGESTS THAT THE USSR SIGNED THE FINAL ACT BEFORE IT HAD DEVELOPED A FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

24. THE SOVIET FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUCRACY WAS APPARENTLY STILL TRYING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH CBMS LONG AFTER ITS LEADERSHIP HAD FORMALLY COMMITTED THE USSR TO OBSERVE THEM. ALTHOUGH INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WAS PROBABLY DRAGGING ITS FEET AS WELL.

25. DURING THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS, THE MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERN INTENTIONS. THEY APPARENTLY SAW PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS A PLOY TO FACILITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING MECHANISMS, AND THEY

SAW THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS IN A SIMILAR LIGHT. AT TIMES, THESE HARDLINERS WERE VIRTUALLY ABLE TO OVERRULE THEIR SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES.  
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26. THIS WAS APPARENTLY NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER, IN THE FINAL HECTIC DAYS OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE. IN EFFECT, THE SOVIET MILITARY WAS CUT OFF FROM THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND LEFT HOLDING A DOCUMENT ON WHICH IT STILL HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, ITS APPARENT RELUCTANCE TO IMPLEMENT CBMS FALLS INTO PLACE.

27. AT LEAST PART (AND PERHAPS ALL) OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY APPARENTLY FAVORED A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE. AND ARBATOV'S USA INSTITUTE EVIDENTLY SHARED THIS ATTITUDE.

28. AN UNSIGNED LEAD ARTICLE ON DETENTE IN THE NOVEMBER 1975 ISSUE OF THE USA INSTITUTE JOURNAL CITED THE "PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMPENDING LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES" AS AN IMPORTANT AND UNPRECEDENTED ACHIEVEMENT. AS THE FIRST EDITORIAL COMMENTARY (AS OPPOSED TO SIGNED ARTICLES) ON CBMS SINCE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AT HELSINKI, THE ARTICLE WAS SIGNIFICANT FOR ITS FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION WAS "...NOT AT ALL OF A 'PURELY TECHNICAL NATURE.' IT WILL AID IN SUPPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL DETENTE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WITH A MILITARY DETENTE."

29. SOVIETS PASS FIRST TEST OF COMPLIANCE: WHATEVER THE EXTENT OF BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING, HOWEVER, SOME CONSENSUS ON COMPLIANCE MUST HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. NOTE: OTHER SOVIET CSCE ACTIVITY AROUND THIS TIME SUGGESTS THAT THE DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD ON CBMS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF HOW TO HANDLE CSCE OVERALL. ON JANUARY 4, 1976, THE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICER OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CALLED IN FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES TO GIVE THEM EXACTLY 21 DAYS' NOTICE OF AN IMPENDING ARMY CORPS EXERCISE ("KAVKAZ") OF "ABOUT 25,000 TROOPS" IN THE TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DIS-  
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TRICT. THE COMPLETE NOTIFICATION WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS INFORMATIVE THAN WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS HAD BEEN, BUT IT DID CONTAIN ALL OF THE RELEVANT INFORMATION PRESCRIBED BY THE FINAL ACT.

30. THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY RIGID ON THE TIME ELEMENT, TO THE POINT OF CALLING IN THE ATTACHES ON A SUNDAY RATHER THAN THE PREVIOUS WORKDAY. THEIR USE OF THE

TERM "ABOUT" WITH THE NUMBER MAY HAVE BEEN AIMED AT THOSE EARLIER WESTERN PRESS CHARGES THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS DELIBERATELY SHAVING MAJOR EXERCISES TO AVOID NOTIFICATION.

31. THE SOVIETS ALSO INVITED FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO

"KAVKAZ," BUT REJECTED NATO'S BROAD FORMULA OF BLANKET INVITATIONS TO ALL CSCE SIGNATORIES IN FAVOR OF A MORE SELECTIVE APPROACH EMPHASIZING A SMALL NUMBER OF NEARBY STATES: BULGARIA, GREECE, ROMANIA, TURKEY, AND YUGOSLAVIA. THIS WAS CONSISTENT, HOWEVER, WITH THEIR EARLY BARGAINING POSITION IN CSCE THAT INVITATIONS SHOULD GO PRIMARILY TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. NOTE: THE FINAL ACT DOES NOT SPELL OUT HOW INVITEES ARE TO BE DETERMINED. THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE FOR "SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS" WHICH RECOMMENDS "SPECIAL REGARD FOR THOSE (STATES) NEAR THE AREA OF SUCH MANEUVERS." THE "KAVKAZ" SELECTION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY BALANCED POLITICALLY IN THAT TWO NATO MEMBERS, TWO WARSAW PACT MEMBERS, AND ONE NEUTRAL WERE INVITED.

32. BY ONE STANDARD, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WERE ARGUABLY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE WEST HAD BEEN. NATO HAD ONLY INVITED LOCALLY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS TO ATTEND ITS EXERCISE IN THE FRG (THE SOVIETS HAD NO MILITARY ATTACHE IN BONN THEN), WHILE THE USSR ALLOWED INVITEES TO SEND  
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REPRESENTATIVES FROM THEIR HOME CAPITALS.

33. NEVERTHELESS, THE WAY THE SOVIETS HANDLED THE OBSERVERS DURING THE EXERCISE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY STILL HAD NO INTENTION OF IMPLEMENTING THE CBM OBSERVER PROVISION IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY. THEY TREATED THE OBSERVERS COURTEOUSLY BUT SHOWED THEM LITTLE THAT WAS RELEVANT TO AN ACTUAL MILITARY MANEUVER.

34. THE "KAVKAZ" COMPROMISE: IN RETROSPECT, "KAVKAZ" APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE SOVIET DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRIES.

(A)--THE MFA GOT ITS EXERCISE FOR NOTIFICATION PURPOSES, AND OBSERVERS WERE INVITED.

(B)--THE MOD PICKED THE EXERCISE, IN THIS CASE AN ORDINARY AND RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT TRAINING MANEUVER IN ONE OF THE MINOR MILITARY DISTRICTS. IN FACT, THE

EXERCISE COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER THAN 25,000 TROOPS.

(C)--FINALLY, THE MILITARY RAN THE SHOW FROM START TO FINISH. UNLIKE THE WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS, WHICH WERE HANDLED THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS, THE SOVIET NOTIFICATIONS WERE ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY ATTACHES FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. (THE FINAL ACT ONLY STIPULATES THAT THE



NOTIFYING STATE EMPLOY "USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.")

35. CBM COMPLIANCE APPARENTLY ENDORSED AT 25TH CPSU CONGRESS: INTERESTINGLY, WHILE THE SOVIET MEDIA MATTER OF FACTLY REPORTED THAT "KAVKAZ" HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED (AND OBSERVERS INVITED) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT, THE FIRST COMMENTARY THAT THIS REPRESENTED POSITIVE  
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EVIDENCE OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT DID NOT COME UNTIL AFTER THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS HAD MET MORE THAN A MONTH LATER.

36. MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL SERVICE (MARCH 14, 1976), ON THE OCCASION OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED PARTY CONGRESS, EXAMINED SOVIET ACTIVITIES SINCE HELSINKI AND OBSERVED THAT THE FINAL ACT: "...IS NOT JUST A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES. MEASURES OF TRUST WERE ALSO ADOPTED IN HELSINKI. A GREAT IMPRESSION HAS BEEN MADE ON THE WORLD AND ON EUROPE IN PARTICULAR BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CARRYING OUT SCRUPULOUSLY AND EXACTLY WHAT WAS AGREED AT THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. NOT LONG AGO, ALL THE STATES WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE WERE NOTIFIED ABOUT OUR MILITARY MANEUVERS CALLED KAVKAZ, WHICH CORRESPONDED TO THE PARAMETERS ACCEPTED FOR NOTIFICATION AT HELSINKI."

37. THIS BROADCAST APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A BELLWETHER FOR ALL SUBSEQUENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND MEDIA STATEMENTS ON CBMS, WHICH HAVE EMPHASIZED COMPLIANCE. ITS TIMING SUGGESTS THAT A DEFINITE POLICY DECISION ON CBMS 'AS NOT REACHED UNTIL THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS.

38. SOVIETS HOLD SECOND NOTIFIED EXERCISE: THE SOVIETS HELD ANOTHER "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER" OF "ABOUT 25,000 MEN" IN THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT IN JUNE 1976. IN VIRTUALLY ALL RESPECTS, "SEVER" WAS A NORTHERN COPY OF "KAVKAZ"--EXCEPT FOR THE GREATER EMPHASIS THAT THE SOVIETS GAVE TO THEIR INTENT AND RECORD OF CBM COMPLIANCE. MAJ. GEN. G. BORISOV, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS BOARD

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OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, TOLD AN INTERVIEWER FROM TASS THAT:

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(A)--THE USSR HAD NOTIFIED THE OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT BECAUSE IT WANTED TO FOLLOW THE LETTER AS WELL AS THE SPIRIT OF THE CSCE; AND

(B)--THE SOVIET OBSERVER INVITATIONS HIGHLIGHTED THE "...PEACE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS COMMITMENT TO DEEPEN CONFIDENCE IN THE RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES." (THE USSR, USING THE SAME REGIONAL FORMULA IT HAD APPLIED TO "KAVKAZ," HAD INVITED OBSERVERS FROM FINLAND, T;E GDR, NORWAY, POLAND, AND SWEDEN.) GENERAL BORISOV WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE OBSERVER INVITATIONS CORRESPONDED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE ELABORATED BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN HIS SPEECH AT HELSINKI. THIS WAS THE FIRST REFERENCE TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN A SOVIET COMMENTARY ON CBMS.

39. BREZHNEV CITES SOVIET COMPLIANCE AT BERLIN CONFERENCE: BREZHNEV HIMSELF MADE THE NEXT SIGNIFICANT REFERENCE TO CBMS--HIS FIRST SINCE HIS SPEECH AT HELSINKI. HE TOLD THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES ON JUNE 29: "THE SOVIET UNION, LOYAL AS IT IS TO THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, DULY INFORMS THE PARTIES TO THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ABOUT MILITARY EXERCISES HELD IN BORDER ZONES AND INVITES OBSERVERS FROM NEIGHBORING STATES TO WATCH THEM." IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BREZHNEV MAY HAVE BEEN PUTTING FORTH AN EXAMPLE THAT HE WANTED THE REST TO FOLLOW. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE FIRST JOINT, AND ONLY OTHER WARSAW PACT, MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER (HELD IN POLAND THIS PAST SEPTEMBER) FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY ESTABLISHED SOVIET NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVER PROCEDURES.

40. IF ROMANIA PRESSED AT THE CONFERENCE FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL PACT SUPPORT FOR CBMS, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE (AND NOT CONTRADICTORY TO THE ABOVE THESIS) THAT BREZHNEV FELT SECRET

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COMPELLED TO DEFEND THE USSR'S RECORD OF COMPLIANCE. EITHER EXPLANATION WOULD ACCOUNT FOR BREZHNEV'S MORE FORCEFUL STAND ON COMPLIANCE THAN HE HAD EVIDENCED IN HIS SPEECH AT HELSINKI ALMOST A YEAR BEFORE.

41. SOVIET MEDIA ON HELSINKI ANNIVERSARY: THE SOVIET MEDIA ONLY CARRIED TWO REFERENCES TO CBMS IN ALL THE

ARTICLES AND BROADCASTS ON THE FIRST CSCE ANNIVERSARY, PERHAPS IN KEEPING WITH THE SOVIETS' GENERAL LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS PART OF THE FINAL ACT. BUT THOSE TWO STATEMENTS FOLLOWED UP BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT THE MONTH BEFORE ON CBM COMPLIANCE.

42. YURY ZHUKOV, THE PROMINENT PRAVDA COMMENTATOR, OBSERVED IN THAT PAPER ON JULY 29, 1976: "MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING TRUST AMONG STATES ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED

IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THESE ACCORDS. I HAVE IN MIND THE NOTIFICATION, IN ADVANCE OF THE HOLDING OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND THE INVITING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN STATES TO ATTEND THEM. EVERYONE REMEMBERS THE MANEUVERS HELD THIS YEAR IN THE NORTH AND IN THE SOUTH OF THE USSR WHICH WERE ATTENDED BY EMISSARIES FROM NEIGHBORING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF NATO."

43. LIKE BREZHNEV A MONTH BEFORE, ZHUKOV EMPHASIZED SOVIET COMPLIANCE WHEN IT CAME TO GIVING EXAMPLES OF CBM IMPLEMENTATION. VSEVOLOD SOFINSKY, THE HEAD OF THE MFA PRESS DEPARTMENT, GAVE A MORE OPEN-ENDED RADIO BROADCAST THE FOLLOWING DAY: "THE SOVIET UNION...HAS ALREADY GIVEN NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES TWICE AND HAS ASKED A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THESE EXERCISES. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE MADE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS TOO." BUT WHILE SOFINSKY'S RADIO TALK WAS THE FIRST FAVORABLE RECOGNITION OF WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1975, IT POINTEDLY FELL SHORT OF ADMITTING THAT  
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NATO HAD INVITED OBSERVERS AS WELL.

44. CURRENT SOVIET OBSERVER POLICY: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE OBSERVER ISSUE AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER THE PAST YEAR INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT PLAN TO ATTEND NATO EXERCISES FOR THE TIME BEING. THEY MAY HAVE CONSIDERED COMING TO EXERCISES IN THE FRG THIS FALL, HOWEVER, BEFORE BACKING OFF THE IDEA.

45. THE SOVIETS DECLINED AN INVITATION IN AUGUST 1976 TO ATTEND EXERCISES IN THE FRG IN SEPTEMBER ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE PROPERLY TRAINED PERSONNEL IN BONN. THEY MUST HAVE KNOWN, OF COURSE, THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY ATTACHES WITH THE FRG WAS IMMINENT. MOREOVER, SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD SIMPLY IGNORED NATO'S INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS TO "CERTAIN TREK" IN THE FALL OF 1975, THEY SHOULD HAVE FELT UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO EXPLAIN THEIR DECISION. IT MUST HAVE BEEN AN

AWKWARD SITUATION FOR THE SOVIETS, THEN, WHEN THEY TURNED DOWN A SUBSEQUENT INVITATION IN OCTOBER FOR A NOVEMBER EXERCISE IN THE FRG, AFTER THEIR NEW MILITARY ATTACHE HAD ALREADY ASSUMED HIS DUTIES IN BONN EARLIER THIS MONTH.

46. WHY THEY DID NOT COME: IF SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THIS FALL'S NATO EXERCISE SERIES CAN BE A GUIDE, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REJECTED THE IDEA IN THE END OUT OF CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT APPEAR TO BE APPROVING OF NATO'S COMPLIANCE--IN SPIRIT AS WELL AS LETTER--WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT. NOTE: THE NUMBER OF CRITICAL SOVIET COMMEN-

TARIES WERE TRIPLE LAST YEAR'S. SEE INR REPORT NO. 638,  
"SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON NATO EXERCISES, FALL 1976,"  
DECEMBER 1, 1976 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

47. MOREOVER, THEIR ATTENDANCE WOULD HAVE WEAKENED SOVIET  
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PROPAGANDA THAT SUCH EXERCISES THREATENED THE "PROCESS OF  
DETENTE." FOR EXAMPLE, IN ONE OF THEIR COMMENTARIES ON A  
NATO EXERCISE IN TURKEY THIS PAST FALL, THEY CITED THE  
ATTENDANCE OF TURKISH OBSERVERS AT "KAVKAZ" TO DEMONSTRATE  
THE UNPROVOCATIVE NATURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD  
TURKEY. THEY OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT THE WESTERN MEDIA  
TO TURN THE TABLES ON THEM.

48. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS ATTITUDE HAS  
HAD NO EFFECT ON THE POLICY OF COMPLIANCE THAT BREZHNEV  
AFFIRMED AT THE BERLIN CONGRESS THIS PAST SUMMER. IN FACT,  
BREZHNEV HAS SINCE GONE BEYOND THAT STATEMENT.

49. BREZHNEV LAUDS SOVIET COMPLIANCE ON FRENCH TV:  
BREZHNEV TOLD A FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEWER, IN REFER-  
ENCE TO CSCE, ON OCTOBER 5, 1976: "WE HAVE STARTED  
ISSUING NOTICES OF LARGE MILITARY EXERCISES AND INVITING  
FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO THEM. THIS HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPOR-  
TANCE FOR STRENGTHENING TRUST AMONG STATES." ALTHOUGH  
BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE CARRIED THE IMPLIED CAVEAT THAT THE  
USSR STILL ONLY INTENDED TO NOTIFY "MAJOR MILITARY MANEU-  
VERS," HIS JUNE 30 BERLIN STATEMENT HAD ONLY ESTABLISHED  
THAT THE USSR WAS COMPLYING WITH THE CBM PROVISION OF THE  
FINAL ACT.

50. HIS OCTOBER 5 STATEMENT (BROADCAST BY SOVIET, AS WELL  
AS FRENCH, TELEVISION) WENT QUALITATIVELY FURTHER; IT  
LINKED SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION WITH AN IMPLIED FAVORABLE  
ASSESSMENT OF THE CBM CONCEPT ITSELF. BREZHNEV APPEARS

TO HAVE BEEN MOVING SOVIET CBM POLICY FROM ONE OF COMPLI-  
ANCE IN ORDER TO SHOW GOOD FAITH TOWARD THE TOTAL CSCE  
PACKAGE TO ONE OF COMPLIANCE BECAUSE CBMS THEMSELVES  
DESERVED SUPPORT.

51. BREZHNEV CLAIMS CREDIT FOR CBMS AT PARTY PLENUM: IN  
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REVIEWING THE PAST YEAR BEFORE A REGULAR PLENUM OF THE  
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (OCTOBER 25, 1976), BREZHNEV  
ELABORATED ON HIS EARLIER STATEMENT: "THE SO-CALLED  
CONFIDENCE MEASURES--THE PRACTICE OF GIVING TIMELY  
NOTICE TO OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT FORTHCOMING MAJOR MILI-

TARY EXERCISES AND INVITING FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO SUCH MANEUVERS, APPROVED ON OUR INITIATIVE (EMPHASIS ADDED) AT THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN CREATING A CALMER ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE." BREZHNEV'S LATEST STATEMENT IS SIGNIFICANT ON TWO COUNTS:

(A)--HIS FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT WAS OPEN-ENDED, ALLOWING FOR WESTERN, AS WELL AS SOVIET, COMPLIANCE.

(B)--HE NOT ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE UTILITY OF CBMS, HE TOOK CREDIT FOR THEM.

52. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS TO FRENCH TV AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE ALL THE MORE INTERESTING IN THAT HE APPEARS TO BE RUNNING AHEAD OF THE SOVIET MEDIA. IT MAY SIGNIFY A DISTINCT SHIFT IN SOVIET TACTICS TOWARD CBMS.

53. CLUES FOR BELGRADE? EARLIER STATEMENTS BY BOTH BREZHNEV AND THE MEDIA SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING A CASE FOR COMPLIANCE THAT THEY COULD TAKE TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN BELGRADE. IF THE WEST DENIGRATED SOVIET CBM IMPLEMENTATION, THEY COULD POINT TO THEIR CAREFUL RECORD OF NOTIFICATIONS AND INVITATIONS FOR OBSERVERS. MOREOVER, SOVIET MEDIA COMMENTARIES ON NATO EXERCISES SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO CHARGE THAT WESTERN COMPLIANCE HAD BEEN A HOLLOW GESTURE BECAUSE CHANGES IN THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE NATO EXERCISES HAVE VIOLATED THE SPIRIT OF CSCE.

54. BREZHNEV NOW APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE CBMS AT BELGRADE IS TO MAKE THEM A NON-SECRET

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CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. BY PROCLAIMING CBMS TO HAVE BEEN A SUCCESS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, HE MAY HOPE TO UNDERCUT ANY WESTERN PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THEIR PARTICULARS. THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY ESPECIALLY KEEN TO HEAD OFF ANY

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WESTERN ATTEMPT TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OR TO EXPAND THE OBSERVER PROGRAM.

55. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE THAT THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE BELGRADE MEETING NOT BECOME EMBROILED WITH BASKET I (WHICH INCLUDES CBMS) BEFORE IT EVEN GETS TO BASKET III (HUMAN CONTACTS, INFORMATION, ETC.), ON WHICH THEY REALLY EXPECT A FIGHT. THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY DESIRE A PERFUNCTORY MEETING IN BELGRADE DWELLING ON CSCE SUCCESSES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY MAY ALSO HOPE THAT THEY CAN GENERATE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE ON BASKET I THAT WILL HELP CARRY THEM THROUGH BASKET III.

56. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TACTIC IS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL THAT THE CSCE STATES ADOPT A "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE WEST TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. THEIR UN PROPOSAL OF 1972 ON NO FIRST USE HAD COMBINED NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH NO FIRST USE OF FORCE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO IMPLY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT LEGITIMATELY BE USED IN DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION. THE 1972 PROPOSAL HAD RESPONDED TO ONE OF THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CURRENT PROPOSAL IS THUS RETROGRADE FROM EARLIER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS.

57. THE SOVIETS MAY CALCULATE THAT, IF PRESSED ON CBMS AT BELGRADE, THEY CAN RETORT THAT IF THE WEST IS REALLY SINCERE ABOUT DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IT SHOULD STOP TALKING ABOUT CBMS AND MOVE AHEAD TO CONCRETE PRO-  
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POSALS SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. END  
OF TEXT.  
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TAGS: NATO, CSCE, MPOL

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBM'S: BACKGROUND PAPER ON SOVIET  
CBM POLICY

1. THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING INR BACKGROUND PAPER ON SOVIET

CBM POLICY SHOULD BE SHARED WITH THE ALLIES:

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. SOVIET POLICY ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
MEASURES (CBMS) UNDERWENT A CAUTIOUS, ALBEIT STEADY, DEVELOP-  
MENT UNTIL RECENTLY. A FEW MONTHS AGO, HOWEVER, THE  
USSR ADOPTED A MORE VIGOROUS APPROACH, WHICH MAY PORTEND  
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A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE ON CBMS AT THE  
FOLLOW-UP CSCE CONFERENCE IN BELGRADE LATER THIS YEAR. THE  
SOVIETS APPARENTLY REEVALUATED THEIR POSITION IN ORDER TO  
PREEMPT POSSIBLE WESTERN CBM MOVES THERE AND TO MAKE THEIR  
CBM TACTICS HARMONIOUS WITH LARGER SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR  
THE MEETING.

3. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF SOVIET CBM ACTIVITY SINCE  
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE A  
YEAR AND A HALF AGO SUGGESTS THAT:

(A)--THE USSR SIGNED THE FINAL ACT BEFORE ITS FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS BUREAUCRACY WAS PREPARED TO HANDLE CBMS.

(B)--CONSEQUENTLY, THE MILITARY (WHICH WAS APPARENTLY  
CUT OUT OF THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LAST MINUTE) WAS  
ABLE TO DRAG ITS FEET FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS UNTIL A  
COMPROMISE ON COMPLIANCE COULD BE REACHED WITH THE  
FOREIGN MINISTRY.

(C)--EVEN SO, IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE TWO EXERCISES WHICH  
THE USSR NOTIFIED THAT THE MILITARY HAS BEEN RUNNING THE  
ENTIRE SHOW AS FAR AS ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN  
CONCERNED.

(D)--BOTH EXERCISES COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER  
THAN THE 25,000-TROOP MARK REQUIRED FOR NOTIFICATION; IF  
THEY WERE, THEY MAY HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED TO ENHANCE THE  
USSR'S RECORD OF COMPLIANCE RATHER THAN BECAUSE THEY WERE  
GENUINELY "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS."

(E)--THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS, WHICH MET IN FEBRUARY 1976,  
APPARENTLY ENDORSED A POLICY OF EMPHASIZING SOVIET CBM  
COMPLIANCE, LATER EPITOMIZED BY BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT TO  
THAT EFFECT AT THE BERLIN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN JUNE  
1976.

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(F)--TWICE IN OCTOBER 1976, HOWEVER, BREZHNEV WENT BEYOND HIS EARLIER STATEMENT (WHICH ;AD ONLY EMPHASIZED COMPLIANCE) TO SUGGEST THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WERE BOTH DESIRABLE AND EFFECTIVE. CONTRARY TO THE FACTS, HE EVEN CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE A SOVIET INVENTION.

4. THESE LATEST STATEMENTS PUT BREZHNEV AHEAD OF THE SOVIET MEDIA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY ARE CONCERNED THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AT THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE MEETING IN BELGRADE MIGHT TRY TO EXPAND CBM PARAMETERS. BREZHNEV MAY HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEFUSE THIS THREAT WAS TO ASSERT THAT CBMS HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR PURPOSE AND THEREFORE NEED NO MODIFICATION.

5. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY DESIRE A PERFUNCTORY MEETING IN BELGRADE DWELING ON CSCE SUCCESSES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY MAY ALSO HOPE THAT THEY CAN GENERATE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE ON BASKET I THAT WILL HELP CARRY THEM THROUGH BASKET III, WHERE THEY REALLY FEAR A FIGHT.

6. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TACTIC IS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL THAT THE CSCE STATES ADOPT A "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS MAY CALCULATE THAT, IF PRESSED ON CBMS, THEY CAN RETORT THAT IF THE WEST IS REALLY SINCERE ABOUT DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IT SHOULD STOP TALKING ABOUT CBMS AND MOVE AHEAD TO CONCRETE PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. END OF SUMMARY.

7. BEGIN TEXT. SOVIET CBM POLICY AT THE CSCE: THE USSR WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE KEPT SPECIFIC MILITARY MEASURES OFF THE CSCE AGENDA ALTOGETHER. CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE EAST'S FIRST CONCRETE PROPOSAL IN 1969 MADE NO PROVISION FOR THEM.

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8. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AS THEY CAME TO BE CALLED, WERE ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN INVENTION. AS A CONCRETE SECURITY ITEM, THEY WERE DESIGNED TO FOCUS SOME DISCUSSION ON THE MILITARY REALITIES IN EUROPE AND THUS HELP MAINTAIN A BALANCED PERSPECTIVE OF DETENTE WITHIN THE LARGER CSCE PICTURE.

9. EVENTUALLY, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT CBMS WERE PART OF THE PRICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO OBTAIN A FORMAL ACCORD, THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THEY BARGAINED HARD ON THE DETAILS, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND, FOR A TIME, EVEN CONTESTED THE NOTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE SEPARATE TREATMENT OF CBMS. NOTE: FOR



EXAMPLE, THEY RESPONDED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD GIVE 60 DAYS' PRIOR NOTICE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT 5 DAYS WOULD BE ADEQUATE. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE END, THEY AGREED TO A DISTINCT SECTION ("DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT") IN THE FINAL ACT.

10. ALL CBMS ARE "VOLUNTARY" (A PREFERENCE SHARED BY BOTH THE US AND THE USSR), BUT SOME APPEAR LESS "VOLUNTARY" THAN OTHERS AND THE FINAL ACT USES THE WORD "WILL" RATHER THAN "MAY" TO DESCRIBE THEM. TWO OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CBMS STATE THAT:

-

(A)--PARTICIPATING STATES "WILL" NOTIFY OTHER PARTICIPANTS 21 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS

EXCEEDING A TOTAL OF 25,000 TROOPS"; AND

(B)--PARTICIPATING STATES "WILL" INVITE OTHER PARTICIPANTS "TO SEND OBSERVERS TO ATTEND MILITARY MANEUVERS."

11. THAT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THESE TERMS IS NOT AS  
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IMPORTANT AS THEIR FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RATIONALE THAT A FLOW OF INFORMATION ABOUT MANEUVERS THROUGH SUCH SPECIFIC MEASURES COULD PREVENT MISCONCEPTIONS AND THUS REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSION. HAVING AGREED TO CBMS, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, THE SOVIETS TREATED THEM QUITE POSITIVELY AT FIRST.

12. BREZHNEV SETS TONE: IN HIS JULY 31, 1975, SPEECH AT HELSINKI, BREZHNEV NOTED: "THE CONFERENCE HAS ADOPTED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS SUPPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL RELAXATION BY A MILITARY ONE. THIS IS ALSO A QUALITATIVELY NEW STAGE IN BUILDING UP CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES." THIS FAVORABLE, IF SOMEWHAT OBLIQUE, REFERENCE TO CBMS WAS AMPLIFIED BY TASS THE NEXT DAY. THE LATTER DEVOTED NEARLY A FULL PAGE TO A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CBMS, OUT OF FOUR AND A HALF PAGES DESCRIBING THE ENTIRE FINAL ACT. THIS EMPHASIS SEEMED TO REFLECT A SOVIET DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THE TOTAL CSCE PACKAGE.

13. SUPPORT FOR CBMS, CRITICISM OF NATO MANEUVERS: THROUGH AUGUST AND INTO SEPTEMBER 1975, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA FOLLOWED TWO SEPARATE LINES. SOME SOVIET COMMENTATORS CONTINUED TO PRAISE CBMS WHILE OTHERS BEGAN TO CRITICIZE UPCOMING NATO EXERCISES.

14. A LENGTHY PRAVDA ARTICLE ON THE FINAL ACT ON AUGUST 20 REFLECTED AN INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS AND DEFENSIVE TONE IN

RESPONSE TO WESTERN SKEPTICISM OF CSCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE AUTHOR SPENT THREE PARAGRAPHS PRAISING CBMS AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN A SOVIET INITIATIVE. A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE USA INSTITUTE TOLD AN AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICER THE SAME DAY THAT THE ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN (UNDER A PSEUDONYM) BY A MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

15. A RED STAR COMMENTATOR STRUCK A DISCORDANT NOTE LESS  
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THAT A WEEK LATER (AUGUST 26), HOWEVER, BY QUESTIONING THE WEST'S INTENT IN INSTITUTING A MORE CONSPICUOUS FORMAT (AUTUMN FORGE) THAN USUAL FOR ITS ANNUAL FALL EXERCISE SERIES JUST AFTER SIGNING THE FINAL ACT.

16. EVEN SO, AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 9, A MOSCOW DOMESTIC TELEVISION PANEL DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL TAKING A FAVORABLE LINE ON CBMS. TOLKUNOV, THE CHIEF EDITOR OF IZVESTIYA AND THE HEAD OF TASS, LED THE PANEL INTO A FAVORABLE DISCUSSION OF THE CBM CONCEPT. IN FACT, ACTUAL WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS FOR FORTHCOMING NATO EXERCISES IN THE FRG WERE CITED TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONCEPT'S EFFICACY.

17. CBMS DRAWN INTO CRITICISM OF NATO EXERCISES: SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, PRAVDA CARRIED AN ARTICLE ON SEPTEMBER 15 WHICH TREATED CBMS MUCH MORE CRITICALLY THAN THE ASSESSMENT IT HAD PRINTED ON AUGUST 20. THE LATTER ARTICLE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NATO HAD PROPERLY NOTIFIED ITS EXERCISES, BUT DISMISSED WESTERN NOTIFICATION AS IRRELEVANT TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH EXERCISES COMPORTED WITH THE SPIRIT OF CSCE. SIMILARLY, USING ALMOST IDENTICAL LANGUAGE, AN IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR ON SEPTEMBER 23 CHARGED THAT WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS HAD ONLY MET THE LETTER OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT WHILE THE EXERCISES THEMSELVES HAD VIOLATED ITS SPIRIT. WHILE THE SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE EXERCISES, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO OTHER HOSTILE COMMENTARIES DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH CBMS.

18. WHY THE SOVIETS REACTED: THE PRIMARY IMPETUS FOR THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON NATO EXERCISES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NATO'S NEW UNIFIED EXERCISE CONCEPT (AUTUMN FORGE), WHICH MAY HAVE MADE THE EXERCISES APPEAR LARGER THAN THEY ACTUALLY WERE. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING, AS WELL, TO THE ADDED WESTERN PUBLICITY WHICH ACCOMPANIED ITS  
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INTRODUCTION. THE ATTACK ON CBMS WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF

THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF THE NATO EXERCISES.

19. BEYOND THAT, THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY REACTING TO THE FREQUENCY AND DETAIL OF WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, THE INK WAS HARDLY DRY ON THE FINAL ACT WHEN NATO STATES NOTIFIED TWO MAJOR AND THREE MINOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND INVITED OBSERVERS TO ONE OF THE MAJOR MANEUVERS. NOTE: A FOURTH MINOR EXERCISE WAS NOTIFIED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF ONE OF THE MAJOR MANEUVERS.

20. VOLUNTARY NATURE OF CBMS STRESSED: THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE FELT THAT NATO WAS TRYING TO STAMPEDE THEM INTO A PATTERN OF COMPLIANCE BASED ON WESTERN PRECEDENTS WHICH THEY WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. THIS CONCERN SURFACED IN

EARLY OCTOBER 1975 IN A NEW TIMES ARTICLE ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION WHICH QUESTIONED THE WEST'S TWO-MONTH RECORD AND WAS DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE EAST'S. WITHOUT MENTIONING ACTUAL USE OF CBMS, THE AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR VALUE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT NONE REQUIRED AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION: "A VOLUNTARY BASIS IS STIPULATED FOR EACH OF THE CONFIDENCE MEASURES."

21. WHILE THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS EVER CONTEMPLATED NOT NOTIFYING THEIR MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, THEIR BARGAINING AT CSCE SUGGESTED (AS TIME HAS BORNE OUT) THAT THEY NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF NOTIFYING "SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS." THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, TO SUPPORT WESTERN PRESS ACCUSATIONS IN 1975 THAT THE SOVIETS OR OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES DELIBERATELY SHAVED THEIR EXERCISES TO PUT THEM JUST BELOW THE 25,000 THRESHOLD.

22. IN ADDITION TO THEIR APPARENT CONCERN THAT NATO MAY  
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HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SET A PRECEDENT OF NOTIFYING SMALLER-SCALE EXERCISES, THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY CHAGRINED THAT THEY HAD BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND A MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER SO SOON AFTER HELSINKI. WHEN THE SOVIET CSCE NEGOTIATORS HAD FIRST AGREED TO THE OBSERVER CONCEPT IN 1973, THEY HAD ARGUED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD PROCEED "MODESTLY." IN CONTRAST, THEY MUST HAVE FELT, NATO TOOK THE FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY AFTER HELSINKI TO PRESS THE POINT.

23. INTERNAL DEBATE ON CBMS: THE UNEVEN SOVIET TREATMENT OF CBMS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1975 SUGGESTS THAT THE USSR SIGNED THE FINAL ACT BEFORE IT HAD DEVELOPED A FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

24. THE SOVIET FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUCRACY WAS APPARENTLY STILL TRYING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH CBMS LONG AFTER ITS LEADERSHIP HAD FORMALLY COMMITTED THE USSR TO OBSERVE THEM. ALTHOUGH INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WAS PROBABLY DRAGGING ITS FEET AS WELL.

25. DURING THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS, THE MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD BEEN EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERN INTENTIONS. THEY APPARENTLY SAW PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS A PLOY TO FACILITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING MECHANISMS, AND THEY

SAW THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS IN A SIMILAR LIGHT. AT TIMES, THESE HARDLINERS WERE VIRTUALLY ABLE TO OVERRULE THEIR SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES.

26. THIS WAS APPARENTLY NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER, IN THE FINAL HECTIC DAYS OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE.

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IN EFFECT, THE SOVIET MILITARY WAS CUT OFF FROM THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND LEFT HOLDING A DOCUMENT ON WHICH IT STILL HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, ITS APPARENT RELUCTANCE TO IMPLEMENT CBMS FALLS INTO PLACE.

27. AT LEAST PART (AND PERHAPS ALL) OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY APPARENTLY FAVORED A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE. AND ARBATOV'S USA INSTITUTE EVIDENTLY SHARED THIS ATTITUDE.

28. AN UNSIGNED LEAD ARTICLE ON DETENTE IN THE NOVEMBER 1975 ISSUE OF THE USA INSTITUTE JOURNAL CITED THE "PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMPENDING LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES" AS AN IMPORTANT AND UNPRECEDENTED ACHIEVEMENT. AS THE FIRST EDITORIAL COMMENTARY (AS OPPOSED TO SIGNED ARTICLES) ON CBMS SINCE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AT HELSINKI, THE ARTICLE WAS SIGNIFICANT FOR ITS FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION WAS "...NOT AT ALL OF A 'PURELY TECHNICAL NATURE.' IT WILL AID IN SUPPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL DETENTE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WITH A MILITARY DETENTE."

29. SOVIETS PASS FIRST TEST OF COMPLIANCE: WHATEVER THE EXTENT OF BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING, HOWEVER, SOME CONSENSUS ON COMPLIANCE MUST HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. NOTE: OTHER SOVIET CSCE ACTIVITY AROUND THIS TIME SUGGESTS THAT THE DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD ON CBMS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF HOW TO HANDLE CSCE OVERALL. ON JANUARY 4, 1976, THE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICER OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CALLED IN

FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES TO GIVE THEM EXACTLY 21 DAYS' NOTICE OF AN IMPENDING ARMY CORPS EXERCISE ("KAVKAZ") OF "ABOUT 25,000 TROOPS" IN THE TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT. THE COMPLETE NOTIFICATION WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS INFORMATIVE THAN WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS HAD BEEN, BUT IT DID CONTAIN ALL OF THE RELEVANT INFORMATION PRESCRIBED BY THE FINAL ACT.

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30. THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY RIGID ON THE TIME ELEMENT, TO THE POINT OF CALLING IN THE ATTACHES ON A SUNDAY RATHER THAN THE PREVIOUS WORKDAY. THEIR USE OF THE

TERM "ABOUT" WITH THE NUMBER MAY HAVE BEEN AIMED AT THOSE EARLIER WESTERN PRESS CHARGES THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS DELIBERATELY SHAVING MAJOR EXERCISES TO AVOID NOTIFICATION.

31. THE SOVIETS ALSO INVITED FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO "KAVKAZ," BUT REJECTED NATO'S BROAD FORMULA OF BLANKET INVITATIONS TO ALL CSCE SIGNATORIES IN FAVOR OF A MORE SELECTIVE APPROACH EMPHASIZING A SMALL NUMBER OF NEARBY STATES: BULGARIA, GREECE, ROMANIA, TURKEY, AND YUGOSLAVIA. THIS WAS CONSISTENT, HOWEVER, WITH THEIR EARLY BARGAINING POSITION IN CSCE THAT INVITATIONS SHOULD GO PRIMARILY TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. NOTE: THE FINAL ACT DOES NOT SPELL OUT HOW INVITEES ARE TO BE DETERMINED. THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE FOR "SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS" WHICH RECOMMENDS "SPECIAL REGARD FOR THOSE (STATES) NEAR THE AREA OF SUCH MANEUVERS." THE "KAVKAZ" SELECTION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY BALANCED POLITICALLY IN THAT TWO NATO MEMBERS, TWO WARSAW PACT MEMBERS, AND ONE NEUTRAL WERE INVITED.

32. BY ONE STANDARD, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WERE ARGUABLY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE WEST HAD BEEN. NATO HAD ONLY INVITED LOCALLY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS TO ATTEND ITS EXERCISE IN THE FRG (THE SOVIETS HAD NO MILITARY ATTACHE IN BONN THEN), WHILE THE USSR ALLOWED INVITEES TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THEIR HOME CAPITALS.

33. NEVERTHELESS, THE WAY THE SOVIETS HANDLED THE OBSERVERS DURING THE EXERCISE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY

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STILL HAD NO INTENTION OF IMPLEMENTING THE CBM OBSERVER PROVISION IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY. THEY TREATED THE OBSERVERS COURTEOUSLY BUT SHOWED THEM LITTLE THAT WAS RELEVANT TO AN ACTUAL MILITARY MANEUVER.

34. THE "KAVKAZ" COMPROMISE: IN RETROSPECT, "KAVKAZ" APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE SOVIET DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRIES.

(A)--THE MFA GOT ITS EXERCISE FOR NOTIFICATION PURPOSES, AND OBSERVERS WERE INVITED.

(B)--THE MOD PICKED THE EXERCISE, IN THIS CASE AN ORDINARY AND RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT TRAINING MANEUVER IN ONE OF THE MINOR MILITARY DISTRICTS. IN FACT, THE

EXERCISE COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER THAN 25,000 TROOPS.

(C)--FINALLY, THE MILITARY RAN THE SHOW FROM START TO FINISH. UNLIKE THE WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS, WHICH WERE HANDLED THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS, THE SOVIET NOTIFICATIONS WERE ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY ATTACHES FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. (THE FINAL ACT ONLY STIPULATES THAT THE NOTIFYING STATE EMPLOY "USUAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.")

35. CBM COMPLIANCE APPARENTLY ENDORSED AT 25TH CPSU CONGRESS: INTERESTINGLY, WHILE THE SOVIET MEDIA MATTER OF FACTLY REPORTED THAT "KAVKAZ" HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED (AND OBSERVERS INVITED) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT, THE FIRST COMMENTARY THAT THIS REPRESENTED POSITIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT DID NOT COME UNTIL AFTER THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS HAD MET MORE THAN A MONTH LATER.

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36. MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL SERVICE (MARCH 14, 1976), ON THE OCCASION OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED PARTY CONGRESS, EXAMINED SOVIET ACTIVITIES SINCE HELSINKI AND OBSERVED THAT THE FINAL ACT: "...IS NOT JUST A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES. MEASURES OF TRUST WERE ALSO ADOPTED IN HELSINKI. A GREAT IMPRESSION HAS BEEN MADE ON THE WORLD AND ON EUROPE IN PARTICULAR BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CARRYING OUT SCRUPULOUSLY AND EXACTLY WHAT WAS AGREED AT THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. NOT LONG AGO, ALL THE STATES WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE WERE NOTIFIED ABOUT OUR MILITARY MANEUVERS CALLED KAVKAZ, WHICH CORRESPONDED TO THE PARAMETERS ACCEPTED FOR NOTIFICATION AT HELSINKI."

37. THIS BROADCAST APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A BELLWETHER FOR ALL SUBSEQUENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND MEDIA STATEMENTS ON CBMS, WHICH HAVE EMPHASIZED COMPLIANCE. ITS TIMING SUGGESTS THAT A DEFINITE POLICY DECISION ON CBMS 'AS

NOT REACHED UNTIL THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS.

38. SOVIETS HOLD SECOND NOTIFIED EXERCISE: THE SOVIETS HELD ANOTHER "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER" OF "ABOUT 25,000 MEN" IN THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT IN JUNE 1976. IN VIRTUALLY ALL RESPECTS, "SEVER" WAS A NORTHERN COPY OF "KAVKAZ"--EXCEPT FOR THE GREATER EMPHASIS THAT THE SOVIETS GAVE TO THEIR INTENT AND RECORD OF CBM COMPLIANCE. MAJ. GEN. G. BORISOV, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS BOARD

OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, TOLD AN INTERVIEWER FROM TASS THAT:

(A)--THE USSR HAD NOTIFIED THE OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT BECAUSE IT WANTED TO FOLLOW THE LETTER AS WELL AS THE SPIRIT OF THE CSCE; AND

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(B)--THE SOVIET OBSERVER INVITATIONS HIGHLIGHTED THE "...PEACE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS COMMITMENT TO DEEPEN CONFIDENCE IN THE RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES." (THE USSR, USING THE SAME REGIONAL FORMULA IT HAD APPLIED TO "KAVKAZ," HAD INVITED OBSERVERS FROM FINLAND, T;E GDR, NORWAY, POLAND, AND SWEDEN.) GENERAL BORISOV WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE OBSERVER INVITATIONS CORRESPONDED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE ELABORATED BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN HIS SPEECH AT HELSINKI. THIS WAS THE FIRST REFERENCE TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN A SOVIET COMMENTARY ON CBMS.

39. BREZHNEV CITES SOVIET COMPLIANCE AT BERLIN CONFERENCE: BREZHNEV HIMSELF MADE THE NEXT SIGNIFICANT REFERENCE TO CBMS--HIS FIRST SINCE HIS SPEECH AT HELSINKI. HE TOLD THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES ON JUNE 29: "THE SOVIET UNION, LOYAL AS IT IS TO THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, DULY INFORMS THE PARTIES TO THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ABOUT MILITARY EXERCISES HELD IN BORDER ZONES AND INVITES OBSERVERS FROM NEIGHBORING STATES TO WATCH THEM." IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BREZHNEV MAY HAVE BEEN PUTTING FORTH AN EXAMPLE THAT HE WANTED THE REST TO FOLLOW. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE FIRST JOINT, AND ONLY OTHER WARSAW PACT, MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVER (HELD IN POLAND THIS PAST SEPTEMBER) FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY ESTABLISHED SOVIET NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVER PROCEDURES.

40. IF ROMANIA PRESSED AT THE CONFERENCE FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL PACT SUPPORT FOR CBMS, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE (AND NOT CONTRADICTORY TO THE ABOVE THESIS) THAT BREZHNEV FELT COMPELLED TO DEFEND THE USSR'S RECORD OF COMPLIANCE.

EITHER EXPLANATION WOULD ACCOUNT FOR BREZHNEV'S MORE  
FORCEFUL STAND ON COMPLIANCE THAN HE HAD EVIDENCED IN HIS  
SPEECH AT HELSINKI ALMOST A YEAR BEFORE.

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41. SOVIET MEDIA ON HELSINKI ANNIVERSARY: THE SOVIET  
MEDIA ONLY CARRIED TWO REFERENCES TO CBMS IN ALL THE

ARTICLES AND BROADCASTS ON THE FIRST CSCE ANNIVERSARY,  
PERHAPS IN KEEPING WITH THE SOVIETS' GENERAL LACK OF  
ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS PART OF THE FINAL ACT. BUT THOSE  
TWO STATEMENTS FOLLOWED UP BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT THE  
MONTH BEFORE ON CBM COMPLIANCE.

42. YURY ZHUKOV, THE PROMINENT PRAVDA COMMENTATOR,  
OBSERVED IN THAT PAPER ON JULY 29, 1976: "MEASURES AIMED  
AT STRENGTHENING TRUST AMONG STATES ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED  
IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THESE ACCORDS. I HAVE IN MIND  
THE NOTIFICATION, IN ADVANCE OF THE HOLDING OF MILITARY  
MANEUVERS AND THE INVITING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN  
STATES TO ATTEND THEM. EVERYONE REMEMBERS THE MANEUVERS  
HELD THIS YEAR IN THE NORTH AND IN THE SOUTH OF THE  
USSR WHICH WERE ATTENDED BY EMISSARIES FROM NEIGHBORING  
STATES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF NATO."

43. LIKE BREZHNEV A MONTH BEFORE, ZHUKOV EMPHASIZED SOVIET  
COMPLIANCE WHEN IT CAME TO GIVING EXAMPLES OF CBM IMPLE-  
MENTATION. VSEVOLOD SOFINSKY, THE HEAD OF THE MFA PRESS  
DEPARTMENT, GAVE A MORE OPEN-ENDED RADIO BROADCAST THE  
FOLLOWING DAY: "THE SOVIET UNION...HAS ALREADY GIVEN  
NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES TWICE AND HAS ASKED A  
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THESE EXERCISES.  
AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE MADE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS  
TOO." BUT WHILE SOFINSKY'S RADIO TALK WAS THE FIRST  
FAVORABLE RECOGNITION OF WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS SINCE  
SEPTEMBER 1975, IT POINTEDLY FELL SHORT OF ADMITTING THAT  
NATO HAD INVITED OBSERVERS AS WELL.

44. CURRENT SOVIET OBSERVER POLICY: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD  
THE OBSERVER ISSUE AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER THE PAST YEAR  
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INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT PLAN TO ATTEND NATO  
EXERCISES FOR THE TIME BEING. THEY MAY HAVE CONSIDERED  
COMING TO EXERCISES IN THE FRG THIS FALL, HOWEVER, BEFORE  
BACKING OFF THE IDEA.

45. THE SOVIETS DECLINED AN INVITATION IN AUGUST 1976 TO  
ATTEND EXERCISES IN THE FRG IN SEPTEMBER ON THE GROUNDS  
THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE PROPERLY TRAINED PERSONNEL IN BONN.



THEY MUST HAVE KNOWN, OF COURSE, THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY ATTACHES WITH THE FRG WAS IMMINENT. MOREOVER, SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD SIMPLY IGNORED NATO'S INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS TO "CERTAIN TREK" IN THE FALL OF 1975, THEY SHOULD HAVE FELT UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO EXPLAIN THEIR DECISION. IT MUST HAVE BEEN AN

AWKWARD SITUATION FOR THE SOVIETS, THEN, WHEN THEY TURNED DOWN A SUBSEQUENT INVITATION IN OCTOBER FOR A NOVEMBER EXERCISE IN THE FRG, AFTER THEIR NEW MILITARY ATTACHE HAD ALREADY ASSUMED HIS DUTIES IN BONN EARLIER THIS MONTH.

46. WHY THEY DID NOT COME: IF SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THIS FALL'S NATO EXERCISE SERIES CAN BE A GUIDE, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REJECTED THE IDEA IN THE END OUT OF CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT APPEAR TO BE APPROVING OF NATO'S COMPLIANCE--IN SPIRIT AS WELL AS LETTER--WITH THE CSCE FINAL ACT. NOTE: THE NUMBER OF CRITICAL SOVIET COMMENTARIES WERE TRIPLE LAST YEAR'S. SEE INR REPORT NO. 638, "SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON NATO EXERCISES, FALL 1976," DECEMBER 1, 1976 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

47. MOREOVER, THEIR ATTENDANCE WOULD HAVE WEAKENED SOVIET PROPAGANDA THAT SUCH EXERCISES THREATENED THE "PROCESS OF DETENTE." FOR EXAMPLE, IN ONE OF THEIR COMMENTARIES ON A NATO EXERCISE IN TURKEY THIS PAST FALL, THEY CITED THE ATTENDANCE OF TURKISH OBSERVERS AT "KAVKAZ" TO DEMONSTRATE  
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THE UNPROVOCATIVE NATURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD TURKEY. THEY OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT THE WESTERN MEDIA TO TURN THE TABLES ON THEM.

48. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS ATTITUDE HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON THE POLICY OF COMPLIANCE THAT BREZHNEV AFFIRMED AT THE BERLIN CONGRESS THIS PAST SUMMER. IN FACT, BREZHNEV HAS SINCE GONE BEYOND THAT STATEMENT.

49. BREZHNEV LAUDS SOVIET COMPLIANCE ON FRENCH TV: BREZHNEV TOLD A FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEWER, IN REFERENCE TO CSCE, ON OCTOBER 5, 1976: "WE HAVE STARTED ISSUING NOTICES OF LARGE MILITARY EXERCISES AND INVITING FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO THEM. THIS HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE FOR STRENGTHENING TRUST AMONG STATES." ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE CARRIED THE IMPLIED CAVEAT THAT THE USSR STILL ONLY INTENDED TO NOTIFY "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS," HIS JUNE 30 BERLIN STATEMENT HAD ONLY ESTABLISHED THAT THE USSR WAS COMPLYING WITH THE CBM PROVISION OF THE FINAL ACT.

50. HIS OCTOBER 5 STATEMENT (BROADCAST BY SOVIET, AS WELL

AS FRENCH, TELEVISION) WENT QUALITATIVELY FURTHER; IT LINKED SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION WITH AN IMPLIED FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT OF THE CBM CONCEPT ITSELF. BREZHNEV APPEARS

TO HAVE BEEN MOVING SOVIET CBM POLICY FROM ONE OF COMPLIANCE IN ORDER TO SHOW GOOD FAITH TOWARD THE TOTAL CSCE PACKAGE TO ONE OF COMPLIANCE BECAUSE CBMS THEMSELVES DESERVED SUPPORT.

51. BREZHNEV CLAIMS CREDIT FOR CBMS AT PARTY PLENUM: IN REVIEWING THE PAST YEAR BEFORE A REGULAR PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (OCTOBER 25, 1976), BREZHNEV ELABORATED ON HIS EARLIER STATEMENT: "THE SO-CALLED CONFIDENCE MEASURES--THE PRACTICE OF GIVING TIMELY  
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NOTICE TO OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT FORTHCOMING MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES AND INVITING FOREIGN OBSERVERS TO SUCH MANEUVERS, APPROVED ON OUR INITIATIVE (EMPHASIS ADDED) AT THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN CREATING A CALMER ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE." BREZHNEV'S LATEST STATEMENT IS SIGNIFICANT ON TWO COUNTS:

(A)--HIS FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT WAS OPEN-ENDED, ALLOWING FOR WESTERN, AS WELL AS SOVIET, COMPLIANCE.

(B)--HE NOT ONLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE UTILITY OF CBMS, HE TOOK CREDIT FOR THEM.

52. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS TO FRENCH TV AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE ALL THE MORE INTERESTING IN THAT HE APPEARS TO BE RUNNING AHEAD OF THE SOVIET MEDIA. IT MAY SIGNIFY A DISTINCT SHIFT IN SOVIET TACTICS TOWARD CBMS.

53. CLUES FOR BELGRADE? EARLIER STATEMENTS BY BOTH BREZHNEV AND THE MEDIA SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING A CASE FOR COMPLIANCE THAT THEY COULD TAKE TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN BELGRADE. IF THE WEST DENIGRATED SOVIET CBM IMPLEMENTATION, THEY COULD POINT TO THEIR CAREFUL RECORD OF NOTIFICATIONS AND INVITATIONS FOR OBSERVERS. MOREOVER, SOVIET MEDIA COMMENTARIES ON NATO EXERCISES SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO CHARGE THAT WESTERN COMPLIANCE HAD BEEN A HOLLOW GESTURE BECAUSE CHANGES IN THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE NATO EXERCISES HAVE VIOLATED THE SPIRIT OF CSCE.

54. BREZHNEV NOW APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE CBMS AT BELGRADE IS TO MAKE THEM A NON-CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. BY PROCLAIMING CBMS TO HAVE BEEN A SUCCESS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, HE MAY HOPE TO UNDERCUT ANY WESTERN PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THEIR PARTICULARS. THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY ESPECIALLY KEEN TO HEAD OFF ANY

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WESTERN ATTEMPT TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION

OR TO EXPAND THE OBSERVER PROGRAM.

55. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE THAT THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE BELGRADE MEETING NOT BECOME EMBROILED WITH BASKET I (WHICH INCLUDES CBMS) BEFORE IT EVEN GETS TO BASKET III (HUMAN CONTACTS, INFORMATION, ETC.), ON WHICH THEY REALLY EXPECT A FIGHT. THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY DESIRE A PERFUNCTORY MEETING IN BELGRADE DWELLING ON CSCE SUCCESSES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY MAY ALSO HOPE THAT THEY CAN GENERATE A FAVORABLE CLIMATE ON BASKET I THAT WILL HELP CARRY THEM THROUGH BASKET III.

56. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TACTIC IS REFLECTED IN THE RECENT WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL THAT THE CSCE STATES ADOPT A "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE WEST TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. THEIR UN PROPOSAL OF 1972 ON NO FIRST USE HAD COMBINED NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH NO FIRST USE OF FORCE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO IMPLY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT LEGITIMATELY BE USED IN DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION. THE 1972 PROPOSAL HAD RESPONDED TO ONE OF THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST BANNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CURRENT PROPOSAL IS THUS RETROGRADE FROM EARLIER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS.

57. THE SOVIETS MAY CALCULATE THAT, IF PRESSED ON CBMS AT BELGRADE, THEY CAN RETORT THAT IF THE WEST IS REALLY SINCERE ABOUT DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IT SHOULD STOP TALKING ABOUT CBMS AND MOVE AHEAD TO CONCRETE PROPOSALS SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. END OF TEXT.

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