DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

In Reply Refer to
I-[illegible]/[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. QUARLES

SUBJECT: Foreign Manpower for Military Purposes:
Status Report on preliminary discussions of State-Defense-CIA Working Group

Pursuant to the discussion of the above subject by the Secretaries of State and Defense on June 17, 1952, and the letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense dated July 2, 1952, an inter-agency Working Group has held preliminary discussions to consider the need and feasibility of using foreign manpower for military purposes; possible situations in which their use might be considered by the United States; possible forms of organization, and the political implications which their use might involve.

Before proceeding further with the study, the Working Group considered it desirable to indicate, by means of the attached status report and annexes, the general directions of its tentative conclusions and course of actions, in order to assure that further work by the Group will best serve the purposes underlying the initiation of the study.

Encl:
Status Report
w/Annexes A thru D

ALONZO P. FOX
Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

Grap A
13-M-1343 R1

~~SECRET~~ Unclassified HAITI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 May 1963

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Maj. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Military Resources

For your information, yesterday CIA (J. C. King) asked us for help in obtaining the names of Haitian military personnel who had received training in the United States. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Jolly and Captain Warren of my staff had contacted the Army, Navy, and Air Force, obtained lists from the Services, and delivered to CIA a list of 101 Haitian military men who had received training here.

In anticipation of the contingency planning on Brazil, which I am monitoring for you (I have spoken to Gen. O'Meara, Adm. Riley, and CIA about this), I am asking for a similar listing of Brazilian military who received training in the U.S.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC § 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1543

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

Unclassified

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;~~
~~DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10~~

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

SUBJECT: List of Military Personnel who have had Assignments with CIA

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/S fr O/SOD dated 30 Oct 59, same subject as above

1. Your memorandum of 30 October 1959, has been referred to this office for action.

2. We expect to complete the list requested by you by 10 December 1959. It is regretted that the list cannot be completed any sooner, but a considerable amount of research is required in the preparation of such a list.

EUGENE J. FIELD
Colonel, Armor
Chief, Mobilization and
Military Personnel Division

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 21 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSBSS2
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

98

30 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SUPPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTENTION: Chief, Military Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Request for List of Military Personnel who have had Assignments with CIA

With reference to recent conversations between a representative of this office and the Chief, Military Personnel Division, CIA, it is requested that you furnish us with a list of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel who have completed tours with your Agency in either a PP, PM or Staff capacity, showing the years in which they were so assigned. Since it is understood that a similar list of Army personnel was recently compiled at the request of ACSI, it is assumed that the inclusion of Naval and Air Force personnel in the list furnished to this office will not place a greatly increased burden upon your staff.

This list is desired in order that we may insure that the most qualified personnel available to the Defense Department will be utilized as appropriate and practicable in furtherance of Defense programs in support of US national security objectives. You may rest assured that the above information will receive the same security protection as similar information furnished to this office by your Agency.

SIGNED

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 21 2013

JTFrench/wb/72969/30 Oct 59

6 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL LANSDALE

SUBJECT: Allied Officer Students in U. S. Military Service Schools and Colleges

1. I will not waste your time belaboring the point on the value of maintaining a folder in this office on outstanding Allied Officer Students who have visited or are currently visiting this country.

2. Specifically, a means should be devised for pulling together at this level brief items on officers from foreign areas who could represent valuable assets to us in time of crises. I am sure that ACSI maintains biographic intelligence on an across-the-board basis on all Allied Officer Students. However, without benefit of personal investigation, I am also sure that this intelligence is developed on a catch-as-catch-can approach and that there is little or no effort devoted to pinpointing individuals of great potential value to us.

3. I would suggest that you have someone run a brief check in ACSI on presently existing procedures in this field. Based on the findings of this brief analysis, I would recommend that a procedure be devised which would bring to the attention of this office presently available biographic data on all student officers from such key regions as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and parts of South America. Individuals who stand out in the course of this brief screening should be earmarked for special attention and appropriate follow-up. I am in no sense suggesting the recruiting of agents, rather I am stressing the strengthening of the bonds of friendship and mutual respect with officers of such caliber that they may eventually rise to positions of importance within their own countries and thus find themselves so situated that they can exercise a key influence in the relations between our respective countries.

4. Obviously, the steps which I have indicated above will not complete the picture. It is essential that someone from this general level analyze the present system of handling Allied Student Officers in this country. (I have noted from my own personal experiences and observations that the treatment of Allied Officers does vary from place to place.) An over-all program which gets down to concrete specifics in this area must be established and promulgated through command channels with such emphasis that little room is left for the local school commandant for deviation from stated objectives. Some such program is in existence. However I do not believe it is working as effectively as it might be.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 21FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 21 2013

100

5. I intend to get further into the specifics of this matter and will write you from down below some additional ideas.

S. V. Wilson

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 21 2013

Encl 107

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CINCPAC FILE
FF1 (J43)
L11-3
Ser 00145
4 March 1959

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~
SPEEDLETTER - AIR MAIL
~~SECRET NO-FORN~~ (Unclassified upon removal enclosures)

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

Encl: (1) Meeting with General Nasution, 17 Feb 59
(2) Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 Feb 59
(3) Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido, 31 Jan 59
(4) Conversation with Indonesian Engineers, 16 Feb 59

Returned 28 Apr 59
Loan to Col Murphy 23 April

Enclosures (1) through (4) are forwarded for your information.

AUTHENTICATED:
J. D. McLEOD
Ass't to Joint Secretary

H. R. WHITTAKER
Ass't Chief of Staff
for Joint Logistics

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

DISTRIBUTION LIST:
ACSI (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
ONI (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
AFOIN (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
JCS (J2) (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
OSO/OSD (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
ISA/OSD (W/3 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
USARMA DJAKARTA (W/1 Cy Encls (1) & (4))
USARMA MANILA (W/1 Cy Encl (3))
USARMA RANGOON (W/1 Cy Encl (2))
DRAPER COM(ANDERSON SUB-COM)(ATTN: COL E. G. LANSDALE) (W/5 Cys Encls (1) thru (4))
CINCUSARPAC (W/1 Cy Encls (1) thru (4))
CINCPACFLT (W/1 Cy Encls (1) thru (4))
CINCPACAF (W/1 Cy Encls (1) thru (4))

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full:
Declassify in Part:
Reason:
MDR: 13-M-1343

1 Cy - [illegible] 9 Mar 59
1 Cy - [illegible]
1 Cy - [illegible]

A-1

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET NO-FORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

By - Colonel E. G. LANSDALE, (Anderson Subcommittee)

Subj: Meeting with General Nasution, 17 February 1959

Present: General Nasution, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army
Colonel Jani, Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel Sukendro, Personal Staff of General Nasution (Security Affairs)
Colonel Imam Sukarto, Chief, Army Intelligence
Major Sunario, Deputy Chief, Army Intelligence
Mr. Dillon Anderson (for first part of discussion)
J. Lawton Collins, General, USA (Ret)
Colonel E. G. Lansdale
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA, Djakarta
Major George Benson, Ass't USARMA, Djakarta (for last part of discussion)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

1. Mr. Anderson explained the general purpose of the Committee's visit, in making a study for our President. General Nasution thanked him and said he welcomed any questions the Americans wished to ask. The following is General Nasution's response to questions and comments:

2. Internal Security:

The Indonesian Army is coping with three types of rebels:

a. The DI, who seek to institute a Moslem state in Indonesia. In Central and West Java, where they are fighting under the leadership of a former Deputy Minister of Defense, they are estimated to have 9,000 weapons. (Nasution related a story of how he hid out in this same area, as a division commander fighting against the Dutch, taking scattered cover during daylight and reassembling his troops at night, just as the DI do now.) They are protected by the people, their fathers and brothers, who also are fanatic Moslems. The DI usually avoid Army posts and patrols, but kill village head-men who have helped the Army and attack isolated, weak police posts.

In the southern part of Sulawesi, the DI have 4-5,000 weapons, mostly taken from the former Dutch police forces. The DI leader in Sulawesi has asked a number of times for a meeting with Nasution, but other operations have had priority and such a meeting has not taken place yet.

In Atjeh, northern Sumatra, there is a form of cease-fire, with DI officials meeting with Nasution and negotiating terms. Nasution is offering unconditional surrender, without reprisals against those who surrender. He tells them that "if we keep fighting, we will all lose our freedom and our territory."

There are no known radio communications between the various groups of DI in Java, Sulawesi and Atjeh. Representatives and couriers travel between the groups by ordinary air and sea commercial means. The Army makes a security check of passengers at airports and piers, to arrest the DI.

b. The PRRI rebels in central Sumatra and Tapanuli (Sumatra) are actually of two different types, one anti-government and the other Moslem like the DI, who have joined together against the government. Their nucleus is from 3 battalions of a regiment that rebelled. 75% of these former Army men have surrendered by now, but the rebels have filled the ranks by recruiting from the local people. In clashes with the Army, the ratio of killed is 80 to 150 rebels to 1 Army man. At Tapanuli, the rebels have been split up, with one group almost entirely surrendered now to Nasution. The rebels are not being given the chance to build up their strength. The "old soldiers" among the rebels in Sumatra are being rehabilitated by the Army, when they surrender. Officers and students are sent to Java, for schooling. Enlisted men are sent to Sibolga, where they are retrained and then sent home to their villages with a little money; if their home villages are in rebel areas, they are kept in Sibolga.

The Pemesta in Sulawesi are somewhat like the PRRI. They are Christians and now hold one regency. The Army has been operating against them.

c. The RMS are a third group of rebels, located in the Moluccas. They are "close to the Dutch." Their number is not big. It is estimated they have about 1,000 weapons. The terrain, however, is very difficult for Army operations.

3. Anti-Rebel Methods:

Nasution explained that anti-rebel operations are carried out in four phases:

(1) Split the rebels up into smaller groups.

(2) Break up the pockets of resistance, mopping up. "This is the most difficult." During this phase, the rebels usually have a "shadow government" of their own in the area, replacing open control.

(3) Patrol activity to keep the broken up groups on the move.

(4) Then, when the rebels are dispersed as individuals, catch the leaders and cadre. If this fourth phase is successful, then area security is turned over to the police.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

4. Progress in Anti-Guerilla Campaign:

General Nasution said that, if the political situation doesn't change, he estimates it will take from 3 to 5 years to clear up the rebel situation. The Army has enough troops for the job.

He commented on the current situation, as follows:

In West Java, near the big cities, the Army is already in the 4th phase.

In West Java, in more remote areas, the Army is entering the 3rd phase.

In South Java, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

In DI areas of Sulawesi, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

Kalimantan (S. Borneo) is clear.

5. Assistance:

General Nasution said that the Army tries to help the people in operational areas, but can only do so in a very limited way. Priority need has been for weapons, which is why he asked the U. S. for rifles instead of road-building equipment. Medical supply is very short. If they could get medical supplies, they would prefer to mobilize their own "student doctors," many of whom have volunteered already, rather than ask for help from foreigners such as the Filipino "Operation Brotherhood" teams, (mentioned as operating in Vietnam and Laos; the Indonesians know little about this.)

Nasution said, "What we need is to send more of our top officers to the United States for training. We also need U. S. training aids and methods. Colonel Jani, my Deputy, is always asking your Military Attache for help on this." (Comment: USARMA, Djakarta, got U. S. Army permission two years ago to furnish training manuals to the Indonesians). Nasution said that Indonesian instructors, including Leavenworth graduates, do the translating.

6. Political Future:

Nasution said that Indonesia doesn't have a stable government. Politicians just follow the party leaders, and sometimes put the interests of the party ahead of the best interests of the country. Thus, President Sukarno started "guided democracy", which is a middle road between U. S. democracy on the one hand, and dictatorial methods on the other, to achieve national goals. "Guided" really means "restricted." So, trouble began when we tried to find just ways of reaching national objectives. The political parties have their own way of reaching these. The President has his. And, Nasution his.

Nasution's idea is that, in the technical field, the government should be organized much the same as an Army headquarters. (He said he couldn't use this analogy openly, because it would scare the politicians). The Cabinet Ministers would act as "sort of a general staff" for the Prime Minister, as well as being like the Chief Quartermaster, for instance, and run his own Ministry. Then there should be Deputy Prime Ministers, to act much the same as an Army G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. He discussed this idea with the President, but when the Cabinet met, Nasution was in the hospital for an operation, so the idea was not adopted.

Nasution said that civil service personnel must not belong to any political party. Members of the Army are needed in Parliament and the Cabinet, but the soldiers must not have the right to vote while on active duty.

Indonesia needs a government that will remain in power for a period of 4 or 5 years, like in the United States. The 1945 Constitution provides the means for this. In the present Constituent Assembly, the adherents of the 1945 Constitution and the Moslem group are "fighting." However, the "Islam Group is not too far from this," (The 1945 Constitution) and could agree, particularly with the "Five Principles" (of Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice). For Nasution, as a Moslem, belief in God is enough. He points out to other Moslems that "it is against our religion to force Christians, Catholics and Hindus."

Nasution said that the President is always thinking in the political field. So, he discussed with him having functional representation (as one House of the Parliament), to replace the parties, and this to be higher than the parties (as an Upper House). The President agreed, but would put only 50% of representation for functional groups (such as labor, farmers, youth, Army, etc.). The political parties want functional representation to be only one-third of the Parliament, and even those should be party members. The President states that he will appoint the functional representatives through the National Front (which is under Nasution's control).

Nasution then commented that the 1945 Constitution provides for the President to be elected by Parliament for a 5-year term. Parliament has 50% of its representatives elected by the people, and 50% "by functional groups." Parliament can change the Constitution. Nasution added that the "1945 Constitution ideology is holy" to the Army. It is the big psychological means "to keep Army morale high."

He then said that both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister agree with the idea of the 1945 Constitution. The Army is helping foster the idea, "But behind the screens." If the Constitution is forced by the Army, there will be a bad popular reaction. The idea for its adoption must come from the people.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

The PKI (Communist Party) doesn't agree. But, if they find that it will be useless for them to oppose, they will join in fast (to adopt the 1945 Constitution, and functional representation) and then try to gain control. Right now, the PKI is fighting for nationalist goals, but Nasution said he was sure that the Communists will change to their own goals later, as they have in other countries.

7. Service Rivalries:

Nasution admitted that there was some rivalry between the Army, Navy and Air Force. He said that Indonesia, is a young country, so there is some technical competition. In 1953, the Defense Minister made three separate services, where before there had been one Chief of the Armed Forces. This has become "liberal" competition, not "guided" competition. However, the Army is "the exponent of the Revolution, the fighter for it." It is "a great pity," but the men in the other services did not fight in the Revolution. Members of the Army "have to be clean from the Revolution on." Nasution added that he is doing more flying than the Chief of the Air Force.

8. Equipment:

Nasution acknowledged that the Indonesian Army should only request U. S. weapons which can be "best used for local conditions." He added that "Colonel Jani, my Deputy, knows both armies."

9. Visit to Vietnam:

Nasution said that he had never visited Vietnam. The two countries have something in common, since the French were probably much like the Dutch.

10. Comment:

General Nasution made a most favorable impression. He talked readily and apparently openly, in the manner of one friend to another. He gave every appearance of a troop commander who has the loyalty of his soldiers, who has thought out his own plans, and who knows the art of leadership. He displayed evident liking for and closeness to his "American" deputy, Colonel Jani. His expressions of patriotism seemed to be natural and unforced.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOFORN~~ ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 February 1959

1. Comment: Colonel Maung Maung invited me to Dagon House, Rangoon, for a discussion on the afternoon of 14 February 1959 about Burmese Army actions against the insurgents, knowing of my interest in counter-guerrilla operations and psychological warfare. At Dagon House, we went into what is evidently General Ne Win's War Room, where we were joined by Colonels Aung Gyi, Bo Lwin (Intelligence), and Ba Than (Psychological Warfare), and by Captain Kyi (of Psychological Warfare). At first, there was a formal briefing by Colonel Bo Lwin, but the conversation soon became general and free in a most friendly manner. I purposely abstained from taking notes at the time. The following is the gist of what these "young colonels" had to say at this conference, based upon notes I wrote much later:

2. Colonel Bo Lwin gave his briefing from an "enemy order of battle map", indicating location and size of insurgent units. Most of the Communist units were in the area west of the Rangoon-Prome road (with headquarters marked at about mid-point between the two cities) and in the Irrawaddy River delta area. Kachin insurgents were also marked, in the mountains and foothills east of Rangoon. Smaller units were marked, scattered over much of Burma. Communist forces are estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000. They are armed with World War II weapons, of many makes. There is no evidence of Chinese Communist help in weapons, equipment, or personnel. It is likely that the Chinese Communists give them funds from time to time. The Communist insurgents are on the defensive, only capable of small harrassing raids now. They used to blow up the rail lines at will; the Army hopes that they would try such a raid now, because they are ready and waiting, and "there would be dead Communists".

3. In reply to a question about radios, Col Maung Maung said that the Communists formerly operated a radio station for broadcasts to the public, but do so no longer. They operate a radio transmitter now, from their headquarters, for communicating with insurgent units, including the Kachins. The Kachins themselves have 4 or 5 transmitters for communicating with units.

4. Col Maung Maung then remarked that the Army was quite worried about the Communists working among the Kachins. Thakin Than Tuan, Communist leader, has visited the Kachin area. The Kachins are "very stubborn" people and, if they become sold on Communism, it is going to be exceptionally difficult to stamp out Communism among the Kachins.

5. The talk turned to the subject of propaganda. Col Aung Gyi said that the Army makes a point of capturing the enemy's mimeograph machines. He stressed the importance of this, saying the Army was well aware of the value of propaganda and wanted to deny this capability to the enemy. He laughingly admitted that the Army's Brigade Commanders made good use of captured enemy mimeograph machines, in the Army's psychological warfare campaign.

6. Col Ba Than remarked that the Army had produced and used 35½ million leaflets, booklets, newspapers, etc. in its psychological warfare campaign, to date. A strong troop information and education program is being pushed, including a troop magazine and radio broadcasts to the Army, with time allotted to the Army on civilian stations.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

7. Maung Maung, Aung Gyi, and Ba Than all started explaining the anti-Communist campaign. Most Army leaders were formerly Communists, so they (Brigade Commanders particularly) are very adept at countering all the Communist arguments. They laughingly recalled that the Army published accounts of the Stalin denigration campaign and air-dropped these on Communist areas, to the chagrin of Communist insurgent leaders who were still praising Stalin, not knowing that he was no longer a Communist hero. During the Bulganin-Krushchev visit at the end of 1955, and the Mikoyan visit early in 1956, they spread pictures and accounts of the visits, saying that the Russians were friendly to the Army, which confused the insurgents further and helped induce surrenders. (Comment: Aung Gyi seemed to have the liveliest interest in psychological warfare among the three, being particularly amused at the "practical joke" aspects of it, which is the mark of an able practicioner. From other remarks, it is likely that he is responsible for the Army's "gray" publications, which were commented about briefly.)

8. All of the Burmese then started telling anecdotes about 1953, when just a few cities were held by the government, and most of the outskirts were held by insurgent bands, as was much of Burma. They pointed out on the map where the main insurgent concentrations were in 1953, and where the few Army battalions were located at that time. Bo Lwin commented that there were 35,000 Communist insurgents then. Maung Maung described the fight for Rangoon's airport. Aung Gyi described how the insurgents would hold one half a city, the Army the other half.

9. In answer to a question, Col Maung Maung described how the Burmese Army became close to the people and won them over to start helping the Army against the insurgents. The Army formed a District Council in each district, as it started expanding its areas of control. The District Council included the Brigade Commander, the District Commissioner, representatives of the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other government organizations in the area. (These District Councils still govern the districts today; the "Brigade Commander really runs the country", as one American in Rangoon put it). After Army patrols secure an area, small teams are sent into the area by the District Council. They distribute seeds, give agricultural advice, publish information, and help organize village self-defense units. Formerly, the insurgents would attack a village shortly after the initial security and civic action operation, singling out head-men, self-defense members, and other villagers who had been firendly to Army and government personnel, and kill them. Now, the Army continues the protection until several villages have self-defense units organized with a runner system between them, so they can come to each others help in the event of an attack. The villagers are now quick to notify the nearest Army unit of any strangers in the neighborhood.

10. Maung Maung explained that the Army had learned a great deal in visits to the Philippines, where Burmese officers spent time with the Philippine Army Civil Affairs Officers in the military areas and with BCTs. They also visited EDCOR centers to study the Army's rehabilitation work with former Huks. He recalled that he had talked at some length, during his last visit in Washington, about the "civic action" the Army is carrying out along the Chinese border, starting schools, distributing medical supplies and blankets, and undertaking public works, as a result of ideas the Burmese officers had picked up in the Philippines. He said that they hadn't learned as much in Vietnam, (probably due to language difficulties); Ba Than remarked that he had spent some time in Vietnam personally, observing similar

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

operations by the Vietnamese Army. They admitted that, if the Vietnamese invited them, they would like to see the operations of the Vietnamese Army in establishing posts and communities in border regions.

11. Maung Maung and Aung Gyi explained the Army's rehabilitation work. Captured and surrendered insurgents are given brief re-indoctrination courses at several centers in Burma; the main one near Rangoon was recently closed. Included in the courses is some instruction in fishing, farming, or handicrafts. Personnel are then sent to several colonies, (a number of locations were pointed out on the map, including one north of Prome and one in the Irrawaddy delta), where the former insurgents can earn their own farms, fishing boats, or small businesses. Maung Maung said that most of this rehabilitation "has flopped", since the insurgents had a "pretty lazy life" camping out and robbing people as insurgents, and they are still too lazy to work hard, even to gain things for themselves as peaceful civilians. One notable exception to this is in the Arakan region, where former insurgents have become very industrious citizens. One group now runs a shipping line, with LSTs, out of Akyab. Another runs a bus line.

12. The Army has great hopes for a large new rehabilitation area it is planning to open up in the Southern Shan States, west of Inle Lake. This is excellent farming land. (All of the colonels expressed admiration for the beauty of this area).

13. The colonels said that the Army is fighting hard against the Communist insurgents. Friends of theirs are getting killed, and they expressed determination to finish off the Communist insurgents, who are getting harder to find and pin down for a fight.

14. Comment: The colonels were present at a buffet dinner that same night, given by General Ne Win in honor of Dillon Anderson and his staff. The colonels were unusually friendly and each asked for more time to continue our talk, but there was no further opportunity. Maung Maung added: "tell General Erskine to invite the new Burma desk man at State to come out and visit Burma".

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT Rreleasable TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (with Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido, 31 January 1959

1. Comment: Having heard rumors that Esteban Bernido, Governor of Bohol Province in the Philippines (President Garcia's home province), was one of several being named as possible successors to Jesus Vargas for the post of Secretary of National Defense, I was interested in meeting him. We had not met before, and I knew little about him except that he had paid for a trip to Japan for himself and his wife out of his own pocket, at the time Garcia visited Japan in 1958, that he was reportedly an honest man quite opposed to graft in government, and that he lived in simple style. On 31 January 1959, I heard that Governor Bernido and his wife were in Manila, and arranged to meet them. I visited them at a small Ermita hotel, where they were staying in an inexpensive room. The highlights of what he told me follow:

2. Bernido makes rather frequent trips to Manila, to discuss Bohol affairs with President Garcia (usually at breakfast at the President's "hide-out") and with Presidential Secretary Pajo, ex-Governor of Bohol.

3. He said that Communism was on the increase in the provinces, at the barrio level. He did not blame this on Opposition parties or Chinese, but explained that this was subversive work by Filipinos who were either card-carrying Communists, or close to it. Subversion is even being carried on in Bohol. (Comment: Much the same was told me by other Filipinos, affiliated with the NP, LP, and PPP, and who spend much of their time in the provinces, about subversion in the barrios on Luzon and in the Visayas; I didn't discuss this problem with anyone who knows Mindanao well. This subversion reportedly has a definite anti-American theme.)

4. In fighting against subversion, Bernido said that he is concentrating on trying to inform the people of Bohol, because a "government that isn't based on popular support is simply nothing". He said that he is the first governor to hold seminars for barrio lieutenants and members of barrio councils, which he follows up with a provincial publication, "The Rural Gazette", which he founded. Seminars and the publication include such topics as the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the role of citizens in a democracy, and agriculture.

5. He commented that the battle against Communism is not on "the land or sea or air" but is in "the human heart". "We should get there first, to the heart of every freedom-loving man". He added, with some colorful cuss-words, that the graft and corruption of "big shots" only helped the Communists and that he had urged President Garcia to prosecute some of these "big shots" (not named) and make real examples of them.

6. He said that one of the things that plagues him now, with a Boholano as President, is that so many of the people in his province want government jobs. He said that he is trying to initiate self-help among the people. He then gave a brief sample of what he tells the people of Bohol. "Don't look up to the government for jobs. The government must look up to you for support. Your taxes and help are what make the government run. If you all go to work for the government, then who is going to be left to support you?"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

7. Bernido was born in Guindalman, Bohol, on 12 February 1916. He mentioned that his mother, an elementary school teacher, had a "hard time making both ends meet" and that he enlisted in the Army after finishing "the secondary grade". (He left the Mapua Institute of Technology in June 1936 for six months Army training, then completed the six months course at the School for Reserve Commission at Camp Kiethley, Lanao, and was commissioned a probationary Third Lieutenant). He was then assigned to the ROTC unit of the Philippine School of Arts and Trade as an assistant instructor. In August 1941, he was assigned as commanding officer of G Company, 61st Infantry Division, which was inducted into USAFFE on 1 September. At the outbreak of World War II, his company was assigned to the defense of the Malabang airstrip in Mindanao, which was attacked by the Japanese. In the mountains of Zamboanga province, he became a battalion commander. When U.S. Major Childress left for Australia, Bernido disbanded his battalion and made his way back to Bohol. There, he organized the East Bohol Battalion of guerrillas, and later became chief of staff of the Bohol Command, when the Bohol guerrillas became unified.

8. After the war, Bernido enrolled again in the Mapua Institute of Technology, which he had left to join the Army in 1936, after his sophomore year. He graduated, as an electrical engineer. He married Consuelo Casenas in 1945; (comment: a very attractive Filipina). She was the only daughter of the late Filomeno Casenas, representative of the 3rd district of Bohol for three terms and governor of Bohol for two terms. After graduation, Bernido worked in the Bureau of Public Works, then in 1947-48 in the National Power Company.

9. In 1949, he was elected representative of the 3rd district of Bohol. (Comment: He remarked that he was the only Nacionalista congressional candidate to win in Bohol in 1949; Cabangbang and Castillo, the other two candidates, lost). In Congress, he was a member of the Defense, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, and Irrigation Committees. He was re-elected in 1953, and became chairman of the Committee on War Veterans, Vice-chairman of the Committee on National Defense, and a ranking member in the Committees on Public Works and Communication and Transportation.

10. In 1957, President Garcia appointed Bernido as Governor of Bohol, to replace Governor Juan C. Pajo, who became Executive Secretary (to President Garcia). In the last convention of the Governor's League, Bernido was voted one of the ten outstanding governors.

11. Comment: Bernido appears youthful and energetic. He is a bit reminiscent of Magsaysay, with his anger against "big shot crooks", obvious feeling of closeness to the people in the barrios, farm and guerrilla background, and friendship for the U. S.

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~SECRET NOFORN~~ ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Indonesian Engineers, 16 Feb 1959

1. USARMA-Djakarta arranged an informal meeting with Indonesian Army Engineers which was held the afternoon of 16 February 1959, at Colonel Sudarto's quarters. Those present were:

Colonel Sudarto, Chief of Engineers.
Major Hartuwan, Assistant to Col Sudarto.
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA-Djakarta,
Colonel E. G. Lansdale, with the Dillon Anderson unit of of the Draper Committee.

2. It was explained to Col Sudarto that the Americans were seeking information about the ways in which the Indonesian Army was helping the Indonesian economy and people, and were not in position to discuss specific U.S. aid programs with him. He smiled and said that he understood that no promises of help could be given, that General Nasution had made the decision to substitute a request for small arms in place of the engineering equipment initially on the request list submitted to the U.S., and that the Indonesian Engineers had some equipment "from outside" now, but didn't have enough rupiahs for adequate maintenance.

3. Pioneer Battalions. Col Sudarto said that the Engineers are now organized in Pioneer Battalions, with a total strength of 5,000. They have had to undertake a number of civil engineering tasks, "due to snipers" (making some public works hazardous in rebel-infested areas) and the availability of skills in the Army Engineers. Col Sudarto mentioned the following current projects:

a. A small harbor in North Sumatra, to accomodate ships of 3,000 tons, and the construction of some roads in Atjeh to permit products to be brought to this harbor.

b. Some road construction in the Balikpapan area.

c. Bridging in Central Sumatra, to assist military operations.

d. Flood control in the Brantas River area, East Java. Col Sudarto said that this was being done by the Pioneer Battalion from Malang, who replaced a Russian engineering team, now departed, so "the Army will handle all explosives". The Army Engineers are tunneling through a mountain, to drain flood waters into the sea, having adopted a plan originally proposed by Japanese engineers, instead of attempting to construct a canal.

e. As Post Engineers for the Army, barracks are to be constructed on 34 selected sites. While a start has been made on this, the Engineers are running into financial difficulties. Col Sudarto said that of the 200 million rupiahs programmed from Surplus Agricultural Commodities funds for this barrack construction, the Engineers only received 50 million rupiahs. He commented that the barracks program is a pressing matter, since the Army is now largely housed in public buildings, mostly in schools and some in banks. He pointed out that Army headquarters in Djakarta was actually a bank building. He added that these buildings should be turned back to the civilians as soon as possible.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

ENCLOSURE (4)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

4. About skills, Col Sudarto remarked that the Army Engineers were far ahead of civil engineers. He said that on a recent bridge construction project, civil engineers had estimated it would take 3 years at a cost of 300 million rupiahs, so the Army Engineers moved in and did the construction in 3 months at a cost of 300 thousand rupiahs.

5. Training. Engineer officers are trained at the Engineer Academy in Bandung. There are 300 students in the academy, for a four year course. 64 have already graduated. The Army is increasing this training and plans to graduate 100 Engineer officers a year, starting in 1960.

6. Nasution's Orders. Col Sudarto said that General Nasution had recently given him orders to:

a. Complete barracks for 8 battalions this year.

b. Start the Construction Battalions as soon as possible.

7. Construction Battalions. The Army plan is to organize 5 Construction Battalions, of 980 men each, to undertake civilian public works. Since there is a shortage of trained technicians in Indonesia, these Construction Battalions will be manned with some retired Army Engineer personnel, some civilian engineer volunteers, and with semi-skilled Infantry personnel released from the Army. The latter will be given training in surveying, maintenance of electrical and mechanical equipment, and operation of equipment. The battalions will be organized by territories needing development, Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.

Col Sudarto estimates that the equipment for each battalion will cost about $5 million (US), not including LSTs which they hope to obtain, to permit minimal ports to be developed through beach-landing areas instead of constructing conventional port facilities, including piers. He estimates further that it will take 3 years to organize, train, and initiate the Construction Battalions. The Army Engineers believe they can train all the soldiers in the semi-skills required, at the rate of 2,000 per year. However, they are hopeful of having 72 engineer officers trained in the United States over the 3 year period.

Col Sudarto said that planning for these Construction Battalions is being done in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as with the Ministries of Mining and of Industries.

The plan of operation envisages these Construction Battalions opening up now inaccessible areas of resources, for settlement and exploitation. Specific examples mentioned by Col Sudarto were the nickel deposits in Sulawesi, now in DI-controlled jungle areas, and the idle lands of Eastern Sumatra which need roads to permit settlers to take up lands and start growing rice and rubber. A beach-landing area would be developed, minimal roads bulldozed and scraped from the beach to the area, and the jungles cleared. Eventually, the Construction Battalions might be used in helping build agricultural processing plants, such as paper and sugar factories.

8. Assistance to Navy and Air Force. Col Sudarto stated that the Army Engineers are helping both the Navy and the Air Force at their request. The Air Force has only an embryo engineer organization at present. Actually, the Navy has the largest

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

requirement at the moment. Navy headquarters are at Surabaja and the Navy requested that air facilities at Surabaja be greatly improved. The Army Engineers commenced construction 3 months ago. The plan is to construct a civil-military air base at Surabaja capable of handling jet transports by 1962. The Indonesians hope that such airlines as PAA and TWA will make use of these facilities then.

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9 March

MEMO FOR Zander RL
Barbey MW
Kellahar JK
Smith BS
French
Curts
Evans

Return Cut-Immediate

Attached are copies of reports I wrote at CINCPAC on the way back from SEA. CINCPAC has distributed to ISA + the Defense Intell. Community.

Please return to me when you have finished with them.

SL

Mr. Barbey has returned May 89

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1343

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 21 2013

SECRET

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

1 NAME OR TITLE: Col Patterson (Res resm)	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION: AFCIN-X	DATE		COORDINATION
2 thru CiN-2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3 Col CHASE CiN-X1			NECESSARY ACTION
4 Walsh Has seen and Ret'd			NOTE AND RETURN
			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

These papers are summaries of various meetings the Anderson Subcommittee had with various representatives of Indonesia, Philippines and Burma recently. They were loaned to me by Mr. Barkey (OSO, OSD) for information in the belief that they probably had not been as yet made available to General Walsh and with the thought that he might be interested in getting the information in advance of normal distribution.

I must return them to Mr. Barkey by about 10 April and would like to be able to advise Mr. Barkey whether or not General Walsh would like to continue receiving such advance information in this form. If so, Barkey can loan this type data to us as he receives it.

On these particular reports we are authorized to thermofax them for AFCIN-2 providing such thermofax copies are controlled in AFCIN and the Security classification is maintained.

FROM NAME OR TITLE: George H. Chase	DATE: 27 Mar 59
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION: AFCIN-X1	TELEPHONE: 53228

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95 Replaces DA Form 12... Apr 48, and ... which may be used. ... SECRET

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1343

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE: Mr Bankey	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION: OSD-OSR	DATE		COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Thank You Very Much.
Just wanted someone interested.
Would appreciate any more like this you might have.

FROM NAME OR TITLE: Steve Garfinkel	DATE: 17 Apr.
ORGANIZATION/FIELD LOCATION: Agency X1	TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and APHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1343

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 21 2013

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

Doc 11

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

By - Colonel E. G. LANSDALE, (Anderson Subcommittee)

Subj: Meeting with General Nasution, 17 February 1958

Present: General Nasution, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Army
Colonel Jani, Deputy Chief of Staff
Colonel Sukendro, Personal Staff of General Nasution (Security Affairs)
Colonel Imam Sukarto, Chief, Army Intelligence
Major Sunario, Deputy Chief, Army Intelligence
Mr. Dillon Anderson (for first part of discussion)
J. Lawton Collins, General, USA (Ret)
Colonel E. G. Lansdale
Colonel Ray Cole, USARMA, Djakarta
Major George Benson, Ass't USARMA, Djakarta (for last part of discussion)

1. Mr. Anderson explained the general purpose of the Committee's visit, in making a study for our President. General Nasution thanked him and said he welcomed any questions the Americans wished to ask. The following is General Nasution's response to questions and comments:

2. Internal Security:

The Indonesian Army is coping with three types of rebels:

a. The DI, who seek to institute a Moslem state in Indonesia. In Central and West Java, where they are fighting under the leadership of a former Deputy Minister of Defense, they are estimated to have 9,000 weapons. (Nasution related a story of how he hid out in this same area, as a division commander fighting against the Dutch, taking scattered cover during daylight and reassembling his troops at night, just as the DI do now.) They are protected by the people, their fathers and brothers, who also are fanatic Moslems. The DI usually avoid Army posts and patrols, but kill village head-men who have helped the Army and attack isolated, weak police posts.

In the southern part of Sulawesi, the DI have 4-5,000 weapons, mostly taken from the former Dutch police forces. The DI leader in Sulawesi has asked a number of times for a meeting with Nasution, but other operations have had priority and such a meeting has not taken place yet.

In Atjeh, northern Sumatra, there is a form of cease-fire, with DI officials meeting with Nasution and negotiating terms. Nasution is offering unconditional surrender, without reprisals against those who surrender. He tells them that "if we keep fighting, we will all lose our freedom and our territory."

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

ENCLOSURE (1)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1343

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

There are no known radio communications between the various groups of DI in Java, Sulawesi and Atjeh. Representatives and couriers travel between the groups by ordinary air and sea commercial means. The Army makes a security check of passengers at airports and piers, to arrest the DI.

b. The PRRI rebels in central Sumatra and Tapanuli (Sumatra) are actually of two different types, one anti-government and the other Moslem like the DI, who have joined together against the government. Their nucleus is from 3 battalions of a regiment that rebelled. 75% of these former Army men have surrendered by now, but the rebels have filled the ranks by recruiting from the local people. In clashes with the Army, the ratio of killed is 80 to 150 rebels to 1 Army man. At Tapanuli, the rebels have been split up, with one group almost entirely surrendered now to Nasution. The rebels are not being given the chance to build up their strength. The "old soldiers" among the rebels in Sumatra are being rehabilitated by the Army, when they surrender. Officers and students are sent to Java, for schooling. Enlisted men are sent to Sibolga, where they are retrained and then sent home to their villages with a little money; if their home villages are in rebel areas, they are kept in Sibolga.

The Permesta in Sulawesi are somewhat like the PRRI. They are Christians and now hold one regency. The Army has been operating against them.

c. The RMS are a third group of rebels, located in the Moluccas. They are "close to the Dutch." Their number is not big. It is estimated they have about 1,000 weapons. The terrain, however, is very difficult for Army operations.

3. Anti-Rebel Methods:

Nasution explained that anti-rebel operations are carried out in four phases:

(1) Split the rebels up into smaller groups.

(2) Break up the pockets of resistance, mopping up. "This is the most difficult." During this phase, the rebels usually have a "shadow government" of their own in the area, replacing open control.

(3) Patrol activity to keep the broken up groups on the move.

(4) Then, when the rebels are dispersed as individuals, catch the leaders and cadre. If this fourth phase is successful, then area security is turned over to the police.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

4. Progress in Anti-Guerilla Campaign:

General Nasution said that, if the political situation doesn't change, he estimates it will take from 3 to 5 years to clear up the rebel situation. The Army has enough troops for the job.

He commented on the current situation, as follows:

In West Java, near the big cities, the Army is already in the 4th phase.

In West Java, in more remote areas, the Army is entering the 3rd phase.

In South Java, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

In DI areas of Sulawesi, the Army is in the 2nd phase.

Kalimantan (S. Borneo) is clear.

5. Assistance:

General Nasution said that the Army tries to help the people in operational areas, but can only do so in a very limited way. Priority need has been for weapons, which is why he asked the U. S. for rifles instead of road-building equipment. Medical supply is very short. If they could get medical supplies, they would prefer to mobilize their own "student doctors," many of whom have volunteered already, rather than ask for help from foreigners such as the Filipino "Operation Brotherhood" teams, (mentioned as operating in Vietnam and Laos; the Indonesians know little about this.)

Nasution said, "What we need is to send more of our top officers to the United States for training. We also need U. S. training aids and methods. Colonel Jani, my Deputy, is always asking your Military Attache for help on this." (Comment: USARMA, Djakarta, got U. S. Army permission two years ago to furnish training manuals to the Indonesians). Nasution said that Indonesian instructors, including Leavenworth graduates, do the translating.

6. Political Future:

Nasution said that Indonesia doesn't have a stable government. Politicians just follow the party leaders, and sometimes put the interests of the party ahead of the best interests of the country. Thus, President Sukarno started "guided democracy", which is a middle road between U. S. democracy on the one hand, and dictatorial methods on the other, to achieve national goals. "Guided" really means "restricted." So, trouble began when we tried to find just ways of reaching national objectives. The political parties have their own way of reaching these. The President has his. And, Nasution his.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

Nasution's idea is that, in the technical field, the government should be organized much the same as an Army headquarters. (He said he couldn't use this analogy openly, because it would scare the politicians). The Cabinet Ministers would act as "sort of a general staff" for the Prime Minister, as well as being like the Chief Quartermaster, for instance, and run his own Ministry. Then there should be Deputy Prime Ministers, to act much the same as an Army G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. He discussed this idea with the President, but when the Cabinet met, Nasution was in the hospital for an operation, so the idea was not adopted.

Nasution said that civil service personnel must not belong to any political party. Members of the Army are needed in Parliament and the Cabinet, but the soldiers must not have the right to vote while on active duty.

Indonesia needs a government that will remain in power for a period of 4 or 5 years, like in the United States. The 1945 Constitution provides the means for this. In the present Constituent Assembly, the adherents of the 1945 Constitution and the Moslem group are "fighting." However, the "Islam Group is not too far from this," (The 1945 Constitution) and could agree, particularly with the "Five Principles" (of Belief in God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, and Social Justice). For Nasution, as a Moslem, belief in God is enough. He points out to other Moslems that "it is against our religion to force Christians, Catholics and Hindus."

Nasution said that the President is always thinking in the political field. So, he discussed with him having functional representation (as one House of the Parliament), to replace the parties, and this to be higher than the parties (as an Upper House). The President agreed, but would put only 50% of representation for functional groups (such as labor, farmers, youth, Army, etc.). The political parties want functional representation to be only one-third of the Parliament, and even those should be party members. The President states that he will appoint the functional representatives through the National Front (which is under Nasution's control).

Nasution then commented that the 1945 Constitution provides for the President to be elected by Parliament for a 5-year term. Parliament has 50% of its representatives elected by the people, and 50% "by functional groups." Parliament can change the Constitution. Nasution added that the "1945 Constitution ideology is holy" to the Army. It is the big psychological means "to keep Army morale high."

He then said that both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister agree with the idea of the 1945 Constitution. The Army is helping foster the idea, "But behind the screens." If the Constitution is forced by the Army, there will be a bad popular reaction. The idea for its adoption must come from the people.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

The PKI (Communist Party) doesn't agree. But, if they find that it will be useless for them to oppose, they will join in fast (to adopt the 1945 Constitution, and functional representation) and then try to gain control. Right now, the PKI is fighting for nationalist goals, but Nasution said he was sure that the Communists will change to their own goals later, as they have in other countries.

7. Service Rivalries:

Nasution admitted that there was some rivalry between the Army, Navy and Air Force. He said that Indonesia, is a young country, so there is some technical competition. In 1953, the Defense Minister made three separate services, where before there had been one Chief of the Armed Forces. This has become "liberal" competition, not "guided" competition. However, the Army is "the exponent of the Revolution, the fighter for it." It is "a great pity," but the men in the other services did not fight in the Revolution. Members of the Army "have to be clean from the Revolution on." Nasution added that he is doing more flying than the Chief of the Air Force.

8. Equipment:

Nasution acknowledged that the Indonesian Army should only request U. S. weapons which can be "best used for local conditions." He added that "Colonel Jani, my Deputy, knows both armies."

9. Visit to Vietnam:

Nasution said that he had never visited Vietnam. The two countries have something in common, since the French were probably much like the Dutch.

10. Comment:

General Nasution made a most favorable impression. He talked readily and apparently openly, in the manner of one friend to another. He gave every appearance of a troop commander who has the loyalty of his soldiers, who has thought out his own plans, and who knows the art of leadership. He displayed evident liking for and closeness to his "American" deputy, Colonel Jani. His expressions of patriotism seemed to be natural and unforced.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPECIAL HANDLING - EQUIRER~~
~~SECRET NOFORN~~ ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Talk with Young Colonels, Burma, 14 February 1959

1. Comment: Colonel Maung Maung invited me to Dagon House, Rangoon, for a discussion on the afternoon of 14 February 1959 about Burmese Army actions against the insurgents, knowing of my interest in counter-guerrilla operations and psychological warfare. At Dagon House, we went into what is evidently General Ne Win's War Room, where we were joined by Colonels Aung Gyi, Bo Lwin (Intelligence), and Ba Than (Psychological Warfare), and by Captain Kyi (of Psychological Warfare). At first, there was a formal briefing by Colonel Bo Lwin, but the conversation soon became general and free in a most friendly manner. I purposely abstained from taking notes at the time. The following is the gist of what these "young colonels" had to say at this conference, based upon notes I wrote much later:

2. Colonel Bo Lwin gave his briefing from an "enemy order of battle map", indicating location and size of insurgent units. Most of the Communist units were in the area west of the Rangoon-Prome road (with headquarters marked at about mid-point between the two cities) and in the Irrawaddy River delta area. Kachin insurgents were also marked, in the mountains and foothills east of Rangoon. Smaller units were marked, scattered over much of Burma. Communist forces are estimated at between 3,500 and 4,000. They are armed with World War II weapons, of many makes. There is no evidence of Chinese Communist help in weapons, equipment, or personnel. It is likely that the Chinese Communists give them funds from time to time. The Communist insurgents are on the defensive, only capable of small harrassing raids now. They used to blow up the rail lines at will; the Army hopes that they would try such a raid now, because they are ready and waiting, and "there would be dead Communists".

3. In reply to a question about radios, Col Maung Maung said that the Communists formerly operated a radio station for broadcasts to the public, but do so no longer. They operate a radio transmitter now, from their headquarters, for communicating with insurgent units, including the Kachins. The Kachins themselves have 4 or 5 transmitters for communicating with units.

4. Col Maung Maung then remarked that the Army was quite worried about the Communists working among the Kachins. Thakin Than Tuan, Communist leader, has visited the Kachin area. The Kachins are "very stubborn" people and, if they become sold on Communism, it is going to be exceptionally difficult to stamp out Communism among the Kachins.

5. The talk turned to the subject of propaganda. Col Aung Gyi said that the Army makes a point of capturing the enemy's mimeograph machines. He stressed the importance of this, saying the Army was well aware of the value of propaganda and wanted to deny this capability to the enemy. He laughingly admitted that the Army's Brigade Commanders made good use of captured enemy mimeograph machines, in the Army's psychological warfare campaign.

6. Col Ba Than remarked that the Army had produced and used 35½ million leaflets, booklets, newspapers, etc. in its psychological warfare campaign, to date. A strong troop information and education program is being pushed, including a troop magazine and radio broadcasts to the Army, with time allotted to the Army on civilian stations.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET NOFORN~~

ENCLOSURE (2)

Office of the Secretary of Defense SVSG.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 2/FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1343

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

7. Maung Maung, Aung Gyi, and Ba Than all started explaining the anti-Communist campaign. Most Army leaders were formerly Communists, so they (Brigade Commanders particularly) are very adept at countering all the Communist arguments. They laughingly recalled that the Army published accounts of the Stalin denigration campaign and air-dropped these on Communist areas, to the chagrin of Communist insurgent leaders who were still praising Stalin, not knowing that he was no longer a Communist hero. During the Bulganin-Krushchev visit at the end of 1955, and the Mikoyan visit early in 1956, they spread pictures and accounts of the visits, saying that the Russians were friendly to the Army, which confused the insurgents further and helped induce surrenders. (Comment: Aung Gyi seemed to have the liveliest interest in psychological warfare among the three, being particularly amused at the "practical joke" aspects of it, which is the mark of an able practicioner. From other remarks, it is likely that he is responsible for the Army's "gray" publications, which were commented about briefly.)

8. All of the Burmese then started telling anecdotes about 1953, when just a few cities were held by the government, and most of the outskirts were held by insurgent bands, as was much of Burma. They pointed out on the map where the main insurgent concentrations were in 1953, and where the few Army battalions were located at that time. Bo Lwin commented that there were 35,000 Communist insurgents then. Maung Maung described the fight for Rangoon's airport. Aung Gyi described how the insurgents would hold one half a city, the Army the other half.

9. In answer to a question, Col Maung Maung described how the Burmese Army became close to the people and won them over to start helping the Army against the insurgents. The Army formed a District Council in each district, as it started expanding its areas of control. The District Council included the Brigade Commander, the District Commissioner, representatives of the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other government organizations in the area. (These District Councils still govern the districts today; the "Brigade Commander really runs the country", as one American in Rangoon put it). After Army patrols secure an area, small teams are sent into the area by the District Council. They distribute seeds, give agricultural advice, publish information, and help organize village self-defense units. Formerly, the insurgents would attack a village shortly after the initial security and civic action operation, singling out head-men, self-defense members, and other villagers who had been friendly to Army and government personnel, and kill them. Now, the Army continues the protection until several villages have self-defense units organized with a runner system between them, so they can come to each others help in the event of an attack. The villagers are now quick to notify the nearest Army unit of any strangers in the neighborhood.

10. Maung Maung explained that the Army had learned a great deal in visits to the Philippines, where Burmese officers spent time with the Philippine Army Civil Affairs Officers in the military areas and with BCTs. They also visited EDCOR centers to study the Army's rehabilitation work with former Huks. He recalled that he had talked at some length, during his last visit [redacted] about the "civic action" the Army is carrying out [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

operations by the Vietnamese Army. They admitted that, if the Vietnamese invited them, they would like to see the operations of the Vietnamese Army in establishing posts and communities in border regions.

11. Maung Maung and Aung Gyi explained the Army's rehabilitation work. Captured and surrendered insurgents are given brief re-indoctrination courses at several centers in Burma; the main one near Rangoon was recently closed. Included in the courses is some instruction in fishing, farming, or handicrafts. Personnel are then sent to several colonies, (a number of locations were pointed out on the map, including one north of Prome and one in the Irrawaddy delta), where the former insurgents can earn their own farms, fishing boats, or small businesses. Maung Maung said that most of this rehabilitation "has flopped", since the insurgents had a "pretty lazy life" camping out and robbing people as insurgents, and they are still too lazy to work hard, even to gain things for themselves as peaceful civilians. One notable exception to this is in the Arakan region, where former insurgents have become very industrious citizens. One group now runs a shipping line, with LSTs, out of Akyab. Another runs a bus line.

12. The Army has great hopes for a large new rehabilitation area it is planning to open up in the Southern Shan States, west of Inle Lake. This is excellent farming land. (All of the colonels expressed admiration for the beauty of this area).

13. The colonels said that the Army is fighting hard against the Communist insurgents. Friends of theirs are getting killed, and they expressed determination to finish off the Communist insurgents, who are getting harder to find and pin down for a fight.

14. Comment: The colonels were present at a buffet dinner that same night, given by General Ne Win in honor of Dillon Anderson and his staff. The colonels were unusually friendly and each asked for more time to continue our talk, but there was no further opportunity. Maung Maung added: "tell General Erskine to invite the new Burma desk man at State to come out and visit Burma".

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 21 2013

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

By: Colonel E. G. Lansdale (with Anderson subcommittee)

Subject: Conversation with Governor Esteban Bernido, 31 January 1959

1. Comment: Having heard rumors that Esteban Bernido, Governor of Bohol Province in the Philippines (President Garcia's home province), was one of several being named as possible successors to Jesus Vargas for the post of Secretary of National Defense, I was interested in meeting him. We had not met before, and I knew little about him except that he had paid for a trip to Japan for himself and his wife out of his own pocket, at the time Garcia visited Japan in 1958, that he was reportedly an honest man quite opposed to graft in government, and that he lived in simple style. On 31 January 1959, I heard that Governor Bernido and his wife were in Manila, and arranged to meet them. I visited them at a small Ermita hotel, where they were staying in an inexpensive room. The highlights of what he told me follow:

2. Bernido makes rather frequent trips to Manila, to discuss Bohol affairs with President Garcia (usually at breakfast at the President's "hide-out") and with Presidential Secretary Pajo, ex-Governor of Bohol.

3. He said that Communism was on the increase in the provinces, at the barrio level. He didnot blame this on Opposition parties or Chinese, but explained that this was subversive work by Filipinos who were either card-carrying Communists, or close to it. Subversion is even being carried on in Bohol. (Comment: Much the same was told me by other Filipinos, affiliated with the NP, LP, and PPP, and who spend much of their time in the provinces, about subversion in the barrios on Luzon and in the Visayas; I didn't discuss this problem with anyone who knows Mindanao well. This subversion reportedly has a definite anti-American theme.)

4. In fighting against subversion, Bernido said that he is concentrating on trying to inform the people of Bohol, because a "government that isn't based on popular support is simply nothing". He said that he is the first governor to hold seminars for barrio lieutenants and members of barrio councils, which he follows up with a provincial publication, "The Rural Gazette", which he founded. Seminars and the publication include such topics as the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the role of citizens in a democracy, and agriculture.

5. He commented that the battle against Communism is not on "the land or sea or air" but is in "the human heart". "We should get there first, to the heart of every freedom-loving man". He added, with some colorful cuss-words, that the graft and corruption of "big shots" only helped the Communists and that he had urged President Garcia to prosecute some of these "big shots" (not named) and make real examples of them.

6. He said that one of the things that plagues him now, with a Boholano as President, is that so many of the people in his province want government jobs. He said that he is trying to initiate self-help among the people. He then gave a brief sample of what he tells the people of Bohol. "Don't look up to the government for jobs. The government must look up to you for support. Your taxes and help are what make the government run. If you all go to work for the government, then who is going to be left to support you?"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 21FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1343

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

7. Bernido was born in Guindalman, Bohol, on 12 February 1916. He mentioned that his mother, an elementary school teacher, had a "hard time making both ends meet" and that he enlisted in the Army after finishing "the secondary grade". (He left the Mapua Institute of Technology in June 1936 for six months Army training, then completed the six months course at the School for Reserve Commission at Camp Kiethley, Lanao, and was commissioned a probationary Third Lieutenant). He was then assigned to the ROTC unit of the Philippine School of Arts and Trade as an assistant instructor. In August 1941, he was assigned as commanding officer of G Company, 61st Infantry Division, which was inducted into USAFFE on 1 September. At the outbreak of World War II, his company was assigned to the defense of the Malabang airstrip in Mindanao, which was attacked by the Japanese. In the mountains of Zamboanga province, he became a battalion commander. When U.S. Major Childress left for Australia, Bernido disbanded his battalion and made his way back to Bohol. There, he organized the East Bohol Battalion of guerrillas, and later became chief of staff of the Bohol Command, when the Bohol guerrillas became unified.

8. After the war, Bernido enrolled again in the Mapua Institute of Technology, which he had left to join the Army in 1936, after his sophomore year. He graduated, as an electrical engineer. He married Consuelo Casenas in 1945; (comment: a very attractive Filipina). She was the only daughter of the late Filomeno Casenas, representative of the 3rd district of Bohol for three terms and governor of Bohol for two terms. After graduation, Bernido worked in the Bureau of Public Works, then in 1947-48 in the National Power Company.

9. In 1949, he was elected representative of the 3rd district of Bohol. (Comment: He remarked that he was the only Nacionalista congressional candidate to win in Bohol in 1949; Cabangbang and Castillo, the other two candidates, lost). In Congress, he was a member of the Defense, Public Works, Transportation and Communication, and Irrigation Committees. He was re-elected in 1953, and became chairman of the Committee on War Veterans, Vice-chairman of the Committee on National Defense, and a ranking member in the Committees on Public Works and Communication and Transportation.

10. In 1957, President Garcia appointed Bernido as Governor of Bohol, to replace Governor Juan C. Pajo, who became Executive Secretary (to President Garcia). In the last convention of the Governor's League, Bernido was voted one of the ten outstanding governors.

11. Comment: Bernido appears youthful and energetic. He is a bit reminiscent of Magsaysay, with his anger against "big shot crooks", obvious feeling of closeness to the people in the barrios, farm and guerrilla background, and friendship for the U. S.

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

V. W. ALDEN, COLONEL, USAF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 21 2013

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted]

11 Sep
2417

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

B7
F1
D108
S/C

4 SEP 1963

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to the United States

1. On 30 August we received the following message from [redacted]

2. At a meeting [redacted] Chiang Ching-kuo on 30 August, Chiang stated that he would be carrying three documents to Washington. Chiang described the nature of the documents but not the contents. The documents are:

a. A letter to President Kennedy from President Chiang.

b. A paper on Sino-American cooperation. This includes a summary of the past relationship, an analysis of the new situation and new paramilitary programs, and a complementary political action program which would be in support of paramilitary operations.

c. A CRC estimate of the situation, particularly with references to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

3. General Ch'en Ta-ching was present at the above meeting and took the opportunity to make the following suggestions:

a. That the CRC be given some token atomic weapons capability in order to effectively counter the anticipated Chinese Communist threat. [redacted]

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 NOV 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
MDR: 13-M-1348

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

[redacted]

GrapF
13-M-1348

105

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

b. That consideration be given to sabotage operations against Chinese Communist nuclear targets. [redacted]

c. That a greater effort be made to prevent U.S. trained Chinese scientists from returning to Communist China. [redacted]

4. [redacted] the following comment on the meeting:

From Chiang's remarks it is obvious that both he and President Chiang regard his trip as an extremely important element in fixing the direction of future GRC-American cooperation, particularly with regard to joint action against the mainland. [redacted]

5. We are passing the above information to the Department of State and to Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, National Security Council.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/s/ William E. Colby

OSD 3.3(b)(/) William E. Colby

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

Re CIA 4Sep63 memo

~~Secret~~ 6 Sep 63

Subject: Visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to the U.S. dated 4Sep63

log #205

copies from Gen Lansdale to the following:

Sec/Def
Mr. Gilpatric
Gen Taylor
Mr. Nitze

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

661

~~SECRET SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SLG~~

CIA

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

Memo for the Record
D. Ellsberg, 26 February 1966

Subject: Colonel Chau and CIA

1. In half a dozen conversations with Colonel Chau starting 29 January he has expressed great concern about the role of OSA in the rural construction program. This memo summarizes the verbal reporting I have made to you after these conversations. Chau's concerns break down into three categories: a) his personal relations with OSA; b) OSA handling of its relations with Thang and the cadre program; c) the impression in Vietnamese minds of the relation of Rural Construction to the Americans, particularly CIA.

2. Frictions and pressures in his relations with CIA have obviously put great emotional strain on Chau because of his past friendship with that agency. In our first conversation and frequently in later ones he would interject with great emotion:

"You know, I have great appreciation and gratitude for help I got in Kien Hoa from CIA: more for the moral support than for material help. They were the only ones who believed in what I was trying to do, and helped me. Believe me, I have nothing against CIA."

"But I think that I was brought to Saigon on a misunderstanding. I though I would run the program, determine the policies: with consultation with all the agencies involved. But I think that Mr. Jorgenson and Mr. Donahugh only wanted me to do a technical job, administering it but not affecting policy matters. If that is what they want, that is fine, but I do not want that job."

3. Apparently major friction erupted on the issue of the size of the cadre groups. After Thang and Chau had briefed all the province chiefs on a program calling for 80-man groups, Jorgenson and Donahugh visited Thang, and Donahugh reported to the Cadre Working Group that they had agreed on a 50-man group: which would mean a 40-man PAT unit and 10 other cadre instead of 40. Each man on the interagency group got the impression and relayed it to his superiors that the initiative for this major change had come from Thang. (Apparently Donahugh did not say this explicitly, but the several members I have talked to all said that they had received this impression, which they didn't question). Chau

~~SECRET SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SLG~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

spoke of resigning; and when Vann, who had been out of town, was called back to dissuade him, Vann questioned the change strongly. Vann and Chau then went to see Thang, who told them that he had not proposed a reduction to 50 men -- he was still in favor of an 80-man team -- but that Jorgenson and Donahugh had told him that it was necessary because of training and budgetary limitations: "and they are the ones with the money."

After negotiation, a 59-man team was decided upon; Chau described this to the Working Group as "a compromise between the 80-man team that Thang and I wanted and the 50-man team proposed by OSA." Donahugh, who was present, did not comment on this characterization of the positions, though it came as a surprise to the other members present. (A mission Weekly Report to the President had gone out already describing the shift to a smaller team as initiated by Thang).

This episode inevitably left bitter feelings all around. (I have not heard an account from the OSA side). Although Chau several times mentioned his respect for Donahugh, when I commented at one point that from everything I had heard I was sure that Donahugh and his colleagues were sincere and well-intentioned, he broke in, "But they said that General Thang wanted 50-man teams!" He felt he had been lied to (though others, searching their memories, conclude that this was not strictly the case).

There were several issues here, from Chau's point of view: a) OSA going to see Thang without telling Chau their proposal; and then fostering a misleading impression of Thang's position; b) the limitation on the non-PAT elements of the team: still inadequate, in Chau's eyes, at 19 men, let alone the 10 proposed; c) a GVN change in the overall plan, just after briefing the provinces on the old one.

Chau tended to depreciate the importance of the first two points (though they may have affected him more than he said); he emphasized the bad impression given to the province chiefs, who had been told that a new version of the plan would be released that reflected their comments. Now, before they had had time to comment, the national government was changing it without waiting for them, indicating either that province chiefs' opinions didn't really matter, that the government didn't know its own mind, or that the Americans had simply dictated a change.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

3. Chau felt that the OSA representatives were insensitive to the political costs of appearing to be in complete charge of the cadre program. He felt that both the province chiefs and General Thang went too far in permitting this impression (he said he had often remonstrated with General Thang over this) because they felt that CIA "had the money." "It would not be so bad if an American in the province seemed to be higher than the province chief: if he were a mature, experienced person; but when a young, obviously inexperienced American seems to be able to tell the province chief what to do, that makes it seem very obvious that we are just working for the Americans."

Chau referred to several incidents on our trip to Dalat to brief II Corps officials; I had noticed all of them myself. At one point, in front of every province chief in II Corps, Thang had pointed at one and said: "Now, you had better be sure that you send only good men to Vung Tau; because if you send poor men, Mr. Donahugh here (sitting next to him) will send them right back, and I will be very unhappy." Also, the OSA representative had ignored the invitation to fly up in the plane with Thang, Chau and all other members of the working group. As usual they took their own plane. The OSA plane was delayed and the OSA members arrived after Vann's briefing on the cadre program to US attendees; the other members of the working group were disappointed by this, because they had found on earlier trips that the OSA field representatives seemed to have heard little or nothing about any changes from the PAT program.

Chau said that he had not been able to get any OSA people to discuss with him their concept of the program; he felt they were totally ignoring him. (as yet OSA had not moved into the building with all of the other members of the working group).

At the end of one conversation he said: "I do not feel that CIA should not have a large say in the program. It is right that they should; they are paying for the program, and it is right that their views should have great weight. I don't want everything on my own way (Vann comments: "Of course, he does want everything his own way ...")but the question is: Is it to be entirely run by CIA?"

4. Substantively, Chau had come to suspect that OSA did not fully understand or believe in the roles of the non-PAT elements of the team. Their willingness to see these elements cut to 10 men (rather than sacrifice PAT trainees, given limited training capability) -- including them,

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
NOV 11 2013

at all, apparently as a sop -- or finally to 19 men, seemed evidence for this. In effect, Chau felt, OSA saw the current Rural Construction Cadre program essentially as an expansion of the PAT program (though it had the added effect of giving OSA -- in Saigon and in the field -- effective control over nearly all cadre in the provinces). Moreover, they either were not aiming at pacifying, as Chau understood it, or they had an exaggerated notion of the role of a PAT team in pacification.

In Chau's view, the PAT team alone was, in practice, only a substitute for PF's: a good substitute, conducting themselves more effectively than most PF platoons both in military and civic action functions: but not a substitute for the Census/Grievance, Civic Action and New Life Development teams on which Chau lays most emphasis for the complex tasks of organizing and motivating the people. At some times, Chau felt, OSA seemed satisfied to see the PAT's quite explicity performing a PF/RF role only, as in Quang Nam. At other times, OSA seemed to believe that the insertion of a PAT team into a VC-dominated hamlet would somehow generate the information flow between villagers and government, the hamlet organization and eventually self-defense that the Cadre Group, with their more specialised training, were designed to produce.

(Donahugh has commented to me that Chau kept adding so many tasks to his Census/Grievance teams in Kien Hoa -- so many "baroque little frills" -- that the project could not have been administered by any other province chiefs. "What is needed here is really something very simple, some simple little measures." Vann agrees that Chau's Kien Hoa program could bear simplification before being imitated widely; but not to the point of hamstringing the non-PAT elements, which he along with Chau regards as vital. I am not yet able to say whether Chau and Vann are right in believing that OSA accords little importance -- less than they say -- to these elements. There is the evidence of the attempt to take the manpower slash wholly out of the training of these elements; and apparent slowness about educating the OSA field representatives -- used to dealing only with PATs -- about the role of the new elements. (One province representative of OSA told me recently he "didn't see the need for the new parts of the team ... couldn't see any point".

While OSA has endorsed the Census/Grievance mechanism introduced by Chau in Kien Hoa by supporting it elsewhere, Chau feels that their practice and interpretation has been to emphasize only the census-making and intelligence -

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

gathering aspects rather than what he regards as most important: the feedback to local government of villagers' aspirations and grievances, and the follow-through on their complaints, informing them of action taken.)

5. Chau says he has lost some of his respect for CIA in the course of working with them in Saigon. "I used to think they had great feel for political and psychological matters." (This was in Kien Hoa, where they backed what he was doing and let him alone!) " Now I think they have little." (Even so, he judged in answer to a question that they had more political sense than any other US field agency.)

Moreover, he felt that top OSA leadership in Saigon was not well informed as to actual PAT/OSA performance in the provinces. "Many of the field representatives are young and inexperienced, and many of them are not good; they don't know what to look for, and they are not sufficiently supervised. OSA has commodities, weapons, money to give; people like province chiefs want these, and they flatter OSA, don't give them a true picture."

6. Even before the episode of the "numbers game," friction had developed between Chau and OSA over the role of Captain Mai, the commandant of the PAT training program. OSA thought very highly of Mai and wanted to keep him in place. Chau expressed, at first, little criticism of Mai as an individual but insisted that he had been known too long as an employee of the Americans, and that if province chiefs were ever to believe that the program was now to be a Vietnamese one, the change mustbe symbolized by downgrading Mai or letting him go. Chau got a very poor impression on his early visits to Vung Tau of the deference paid by Mai to his American counterparts and the general note there of Mai/Vietnamese subordination to US representatives.

(Vann has described the recent graduation ceremony at Vung Tau in a way that supports this picture of Mai and of OSA insensitivity).

A planeload of American Guests was invited to the ceremony; they were met at the airport by Mai, who took them all to a banquet at Cyrano's in Vung Tau. Because of the banquet (no other Vietnamese were present) the Americans and Mai arrive at about 30 minutes late for the ceremony, where 3200 presumably fired-up PATS were waiting. On the stage in front of these new troopers were four easy chairs, with three rows of chairs in back. The four chairs in front were

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

were occupied by Mai, Jorgenson, [redacted] and Donahugh; the two rows behind them were entirely occupied by Americans, including seven "giggling, slightly drunk, high-heeled" secretaries of OSA. Vietnamese were crowded behind. During the ceremony, Mai presented some awards to honor students; about half were handed out by Americans.

All in all, a dubious way of arming the PATs psychologically to answer the taunts they would meet in the field of being "an American army.")

7. Since arriving at Vung Tau to prepare the courses for the non-PAT elements, Chau has received quite a different type of impression. "Incredible ... unbelieveable ... a new surprise every day," he kept murmuring to me, shaking his head: referring to the apparent lack of OSA supervision of the political/psychological courses at Vung Tau -- lack, it seemed, even of knowledge of their content -- and the corresponding freedom accorded to Captain Mai. No American at the base spoke Vietnamese; and Mai informed him that he did not translate or submit his lesson plans to the Americans at all. (I understand that neither of these conditions obtained at the very beginning of the APA program). "I am completely free in running these courses; the Americans do not ask and do not know what I am doing," Mai insisted. Chau, incredulous, forced him to repeat this several times, and asked him: "How can you justify working for these people, who support this whole program, without keeping them informed of what you are doing?" "I am working for the good of the people," Mai answered.

"I simply cannot believe it," Chau said. "I am going to go to Mr. Jorgenson and ask him, I will say, 'I just want to know, for myself,' ... I will not tell his answer to anyone ... not even you, excuse me ...' is it true that you have not known what is being taught at Vung Tau?"

As for the actual content of the courses -- a current set of lesson plans is now being translated -- they seem to be in close correspondance to the doctrines and symbolism of a particular Dai Viet splinter sect, the Duy Dan faction. The Fairy and Dragon legend which gets strong emphasis in the course is widely recognizable as a Duy Dan creation, as is the symbolism of the "100 Vietnamese Peoples" (Thai, Malaysian, Lao, Montagnard, etc.). Chau suspects that much of the "misuse" of PAT teams by various province chiefs reflected simply their distrust of what seemed to be a propaganda team for the Duy Dan/Dai Viets.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES ONLY FOR AID

(Major Be in Binh Dinh had explained to Bumgardner almost a year ago that his reason for retraining PAT teams on their return to province was that "I didn't send our people there to become Dai Viets"; Bumgardner had paid little attention at the time).

Moreover -- although this is tentative at this point -- there are indications that the students are given an orientation that is almost as strongly anti-GVN as it is anti-VC. No relieving features of the GVN are mentioned, nor is the possibility of reforming it from within. In effect, the students seem to be taught to regard themselves as a Third Force, to await directions when the time will come for a new "Special Politics" (the literal translation of Biet Chinh, as the PATS are know), separate from VC or GVN politics.

"All this might be all right," says Chau, "if that is what the government -- and the Americans -- want. It might be all right to back the Dai Viets, or to prepare the cadres for a Special Politics; but is that what the government has decided to do? Do they or the Americans know that that is what they are doing?"

As for Mai, Chau's already low appreciation has fallen still further. He does not feel Mai has acted honorably with his employers (Chau seems sincere about this, despite the fact that, as I pointed out to him, he "should be glad that it has turned out to be a Vietnamese program after all") Also, although he concedes that Mai spends a lot of time with the trainees and has by now acquired much training experience, he is very dubious about Mai's qualifications as a political instructor. Mai has virtually no time in the field in any capacity, his military career having been spent almost completely in staff communications work. Chau finds his political sense naive and does not believe he has a major impact on the students (others disagree). (Chau thinks very highly of Major Be, for example, and says there "is not the slightest comparison" between Be and Mai, pointing primarily to Be's command and field experience and maturity in political matters).

8. Even prior to going to Vung Tau, Chau felt he had "lost the confidence of OSA" and could no longer be effective in the program; he had asked Thang to be relieved, and Thang had agreed, though asking him to stay on for a couple of months. However, Chau would not in any case have stayed on if it were to be primarily an American program.

With considerable emotion, Chau has said to me on two occasions: "It is better for my country to be taken over by the Americans than by the Communists. If that is the only choice, then I think it is better for the Americans to take it over. But I do not want to be part of that. They can do it without me."

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES ONLY FOR AID)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

More specifically, he says: "I like CIA. I have always been a friend of CIA; that is why I speak so frankly to Mr. Jorgensen, because I do not think a friend should hide his feelings. But I do not want to be an employee of CIA. I would not have come here for that."

On another occasion he mentioned: "The generals are all afraid of CIA. They think it is the most powerful US agency; that it has more money and more influence. And they say that CIA can do things to them that other agencies can't. They say," If we disagree with MACV, can MACV have us assassinated? No; but CIA can." ((I was rather startled at this comment, and remarked that after all no major military figure had disappeared lately. Chau said: "Col Thao." Startled again, I said "Does anyone think CIA killed Thao?" "Many say it," Chau said. "They say that Thao lost his usefulness to CIA." "Do you think that?" I asked him directly. "I don't know, I dont know what to think," he said flustered.) (!) Short of assassination, he said later the generals feared that CIA would ruin them by spreading stories - true or not - of their corruption or mistresses.

All in all, he felt the association with CIA was not helpful to the Rural Construction program. "People can understand CIA doing many things ... but they cannot understand CIA running pacification."

9. For future policy, the most important issue raised by Chau is this, is the Rural Construction Cadre Program to be a Vietnamese program, with US support, or primarily a US/CIA program? There are arguments for the latter, in terms of efficiency and control (Chau claims to believe that the US should in any case retain control of financial matters). But if it is to be a US/CIA program, Chau foresees the following problems (aside from his leaving, which is probably too late to change):

a) GVN officials -- the ruling generals, province/district chiefs, division commanders, ministries -- will not support it effectively. They will figure that Americans will take the credit if it succeeds; and in any case, they will feel, "If it's an American program, let them run it." (To be sure, one might question how much they would get behind it even if it were 100% Vietnamese; but if it is identified with Americans, because of heavyhanded American control, their non-involvement is assured). Two years from now, there will be a competent cadre program in operation, but with very little link to any central or provincial authority.

b) The identification with Americans, as it becomes known to local officials and villagers, will seriously hamper the essentially political work of the cadres.

[redacted]

"You could pacify South Vietnam with American Troops alone." Chau says. "But it would take three million troops, and it would last only as long as they stayed."

The crucial target of pacification, in Chau's mind, is to create a spirit in the rural people of willingness to organize in their own self-defense. This spirit cannot be lit by an American occupying army. Nor will it be generated by Vietnamese cadre widely regarded as "American employees" -- particularly if CIA influences on the program emphasizes the role of the PAT element alone.

10. If these points are taken seriously, the policy inferences would be: either

(a) Change CIA's style and direction of influence significantly, persuading them to be less overt(!) in their involvement and control both in Saigon/Vung Tau and in the field and to allow full weight to the role of non-PAT elements; or

(b) Move CIA out of this overt program as quickly as possible - say two or three months - meanwhile channeling financial and field support through another agency, either AID or MACV (perhaps shifting some field reps to the other agency; also reducing the total number and increasing the quality of field reps.)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

[redacted]

Held in "Eyes Only" file

705 Sc

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE/NOFORN
~~EYES ONLY FOR SEC~~

Memo for the Record
D. Ellsberg, 26 February 1966

Subject: Colonel Chau and CIA

1. In half a dozen conversations with Colonel Chau starting 29 January he has expressed great concern about the role of OSA in the rural construction program. This memo summarizes the verbal reporting I have made to you after these conversations. Chau's concerns break down into three categories: a) his personal relations with OSA; b) OSA handling of its relations with Thang and the cadre program; c) the impression in Vietnamese minds of the relation of Rural Construction to the Americans, particularly CIA. B11 F11 D1 S/C

2. Frictions and pressures in his relations with CIA have obviously put great emotional strain on Chau because of his past friendship with that agency. In our first conversation and frequently in later ones he would interject with great emotion:

"You know, I have great appreciation and gratitude for help I got in Kien Hoa from CIA: more for the moral support than for material help. They were the only ones who believed in what I was trying to do, and helped me. Believe me, I have nothing against CIA."

"But I think that I was brought to Saigon on a misunderstanding. I though I would run the program, determine the policies: with consultation with all the agencies involved. But I think that Mr. Jorgenson and Mr. Donahugh only wanted me to do a technical job, administering it but not affecting policy matters. If that is what they want, that is fine, but I do not want that job."

3. Apparently major friction erupted on the issue of the size of the cadre groups. After Thang and Chau had briefed all the province chiefs on a program calling for 80-man groups, Jorgenson and Donahugh visited Thang, and Donahugh reported to the Cadre Working Group that they had agreed on a 50-man group: which would mean a 40-man PAT unit and 10 other cadre instead of 40. Each man on the interagency group got the impression and relayed it to his superiors that the initiative for this major change had come from Thang. (Apparently Donahugh did not say this explicitly, but the several members I have talked to all said that they had received this impression, which they didn't question). Chau

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

spoke of resigning; and when Vann, who had been out of town, was called back to dissuade him, Vann questioned the change strongly. Vann and Chau then went to see Thang, who told them that he had not proposed a reduction to 50 men -- he was still in favor of an 80-man team -- but that Jorgenson and Donahugh had told him that it was necessary because of training and budgetary limitations: "and they are the ones with the money."

After negotiation, a 59-man team was decided upon; Chau described this to the Working Group as "a compromise between the 80-man team that Thang and I wanted and the 50-man team proposed by OSA." Donahugh, who was present, did not comment on this characterization of the positions, though it came as a surprise to the other members present. (A mission Weekly Report to the President had gone out already describing the shift to a smaller team as initiated by Thang).

This episode inevitably left bitter feelings all around. (I have not heard an account from the OSA side). Although Chau several times mentioned his respect for Donahugh, when I commented at one point that from everything I had heard I was sure that Donahugh and his colleagues were sincere and well-intentioned, he broke in, "But they said that General Thang wanted 50-man teams!" He felt he had been lied to (though others, searching their memories, conclude that this was not strictly the case).

There were several issues here, from Chau's point of view: a) OSA going to see Thang without telling Chau their proposal; and then fostering a misleading impression of Thang's position; b) the limitation on the non-PAT elements of the team: still inadequate, in Chau's eyes, at 19 men, let alone the 10 proposed; c) a GVN change in the overall plan, just after briefing the provinces on the old one.

Chau tended to depreciate the importance of the first two points (though they may have affected him more than he said); he emphasized the bad impression given to the province chiefs, who had been told that a new version of the plan would be released that reflected their comments. Now, before they had had time to comment, the national government was changing it without waiting for them, indicating either that province chiefs' opinions didn't really matter, that the government didn't know its own mind, or that the Americans had simply dictated a change.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

3. Chau felt that the OSA representatives were insensitive to the political costs of appearing to be in complete charge of the cadre program. He felt that both the province chiefs and General Thang went too far in permitting this impression (he said he had often remonstrated with General Thang over this) because they felt that CIA "had the money." "It would not be so bad if an American in the province seemed to be higher than the province chief: if he were a mature, experienced person; but when a young, obviously inexperienced American seems to be able to tell the province chief what to do, that makes it seem very obvious that we are just working for the Americans."

Chau referred to several incidents on our trip to Dalat to brief II Corps officials; I had noticed all of them myself. At one point, in front of every province chief in II Corps, Thang had pointed at one and said: "Now, you had better be sure that you send only good men to Vung Tau; because if you send poor men, Mr. Donahugh here (sitting next to him) will send them right back, and I will be very unhappy." Also, the OSA representative had ignored the invitation to fly up in the plane with Thang, Chau and all other members of the working group. As usual they took their own plane. The OSA plane was delayed and the OSA members arrived after Vann's briefing on the cadre program to US attendees; the other members of the working group were disappointed by this, because they had found on earlier trips that the OSA field representatives seemed to have heard little or nothing about any changes from the PAT program.

Chau said that he had not been able to get any OSA people to discuss with him their concept of the program; he felt they were totally ignoring him. (as yet OSA had not moved into the building with all of the other members of the working group).

At the end of one conversation he said: "I do not feel that CIA should not have a large say in the program. It is right that they should; they are paying for the program, and it is right that their views should have great weight. I don't want everything on my own way (Vann comments: "Of course, he does want everything his own way ...") but the question is: Is it to be entirely run by CIA?"

4. Substantively, Chau had come to suspect that OSA did not fully understand or believe in the roles of the non-PAT elements of the team. Their willingness to see these elements cut to 10 men (rather than sacrifice PAT trainees, given limited training capability) -- including them,

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SIG~~

at all, apparently as a sop -- or finally to 19 men, seemed evidence for this. In effect, Chau felt, OSA saw the current Rural Construction Cadre program essentially as an expansion of the PAT program (though it had the added effect of giving OSA -- in Saigon and in the field -- effective control over nearly all cadre in the provinces). Moreover, they either were not aiming at pacifying, as Chau understood it, or they had an exaggerated notion of the role of a PAT team in pacification.

In Chau's view, the PAT team alone was, in practice, only a substitute for PF's: a good substitute, conducting themselves more effectively than most PF platoons both in military and civic action functions: but not a substitute for the Census/Grievance, Civic Action and New Life Development teams on which Chau lays most emphasis for the complex tasks of organizing and motivating the people. At some times, Chau felt, OSA seemed satisfied to see the PAT's quite explicity performing a PF/RF role only, as in Quang Nam. At other times, OSA seemed to believe that the insertion of a PAT team into a VC-dominated hamlet would somehow generate the information flow between villagers and government, the hamlet organization and eventually self-defense that the Cadre Group, with their more specialised training, were designed to produce.

(Donahugh has commented to me that Chau kept adding so many tasks to his Census/Grievance teams in Kien Hoa -- so many "baroque little frills" -- that the project could not have been administered by any other province chiefs. "What is needed here is really something very simple, some simple little measures." Vann agrees that Chau's Kien Hoa program could bear simplification before being imitated widely; but not to the point of hamstringing the non-PAT elements, which he along with Chau regards as vital. I am not yet able to say whether Chau and Vann are right in believing that OSA accords little importance -- less than they say -- to these elements. There is the evidence of the attempt to take the manpower slash wholly out of the training of these elements; and apparent slowness about educating the OSA field representatives -- used to dealing only with PATs -- about the role of the new elements. (One province representative of OSA told me recently he "didn't see the need for the new parts of the team . . . couldn't see any point".

While OSA has endorsed the Census/Grievance mechanism introduced by Chau in Kien Hoa by supporting it elsewhere, Chau feels that their practice and interpretation has been to emphasize only the census-making and intelligence -

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SIG~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

gathering aspects rather than what he regards as most important: the feedback to local government of villagers' aspirations and grievances, and the follow-through on their complaints, informing them of action taken.)

5. Chau says he has lost some of his respect for CIA in the course of working with them in Saigon. "I used to think they had great feel for political and psychological matters." (This was in Kien Hoa, where they backed what he was doing and let him alone!) " Now I think they have little." (Even so, he judged in answer to a question that they had more political sense than any other US field agency.)

Moreover, he felt that top OSA leadership in Saigon was not well informed as to actual PAT/OSA performance in the provinces. "Many of the field representatives are young and inexperienced, and many of them are not good; they don't know what to look for, and they are not sufficiently supervised. OSA has commodities, weapons, money to give; people like province chiefs want these, and they flatter OSA, don't give them a true picture."

6. Even before the episode of the "numbers game," friction had developed between Chau and OSA over the role of Captain Mai, the commandant of the PAT training program. OSA thought very highly of Mai and wanted to keep him in place. Chau expressed, at first, little criticism of Mai as an individual but insisted that he had been known too long as an employee of the Americans, and that if province chiefs were ever to believe that the program was now to be a Vietnamese one, the change mustbe symbolized by downgrading Mai or letting him go. Chau got a very poor impression on his early visits to Vung Tau of the deference paid by Mai to his American counterparts and the general note there of Mai/Vietnamese subordination to US representatives.

(Vann has described the recent graduation ceremony at Vung Tau in a way that supports this picture of Mai and of OSA insensitivity).

A planeload of American Guests was invited to the ceremony; they were met at the airport by Mai, who took them all to a banquet at Cyrano's in Vung Tau. Because of the banquet (no other Vietnamese were present) the Americans and Mai arrive at about 30 minutes late for the ceremony, where 3200 presumably fired-up PATS were waiting. On the stage in front of these new troopers were four easy chairs, with three rows of chairs in back. The four chairs in front were

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SLO~~

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

were occupied by Mai, Jorgenson, [redacted] and Donahugh; the two rows behind them were entirely occupied by Americans, including seven "giggling, slightly drunk, high-heeled" secretaries of OSA. Vietnamese were crowded behind. During the ceremony, Mai presented some awards to honor students; about half were handed out by Americans.

All in all, a dubious way of arming the PATs psychologically to answer the taunts they would meet in the field of being "an American army.")

7. Since arriving at Vung Tau to prepare the courses for the non-PAT elements, Chau has received quite a different type of impression. "Incredible ... unbelieveable ... a new surprise every day," he kept murmuring to me, shaking his head: referring to the apparent lack of OSA supervision of the political/psychological courses at Vung Tau -- lack, it seemed, even of knowledge of their content -- and the corresponding freedom accorded to Captain Mai. No American at the base spoke Vietnamese; and Mai informed him that he did not translate or submit his lesson plans to the Americans at all. (I understand that neither of these conditions obtained at the very beginning of the APA program). "I am completely free in running these courses; the Americans do not ask and do not know what I am doing," Mai insisted. Chau, incredulous, forced him to repeat this several times, and asked him: "How can you justify working for these people, who support this whole program, without keeping them informed of what you are doing?" "I am working for the good of the people," Mai answered.

"I simply cannot believe it," Chau said. "I am going to go to Mr. Jorgenson and ask him, I will say, 'I just want to know, for myself,' ... I will not tell his answer to anyone ... not even you, excuse me ...' is it true that you have not known what is being taught at Vung Tau?"

As for the actual content of the courses -- a current set of lesson plans is now being translated -- they seem to be in close correspondance to the doctrines and symbolism of a particular Dai Viet splinter sect, the Duy Dan faction. The Fairy and Dragon legend which gets strong emphasis in the course is widely recognizable as a Duy Dan creation, as is the symbolism of the "100 Vietnamese Peoples" (Thai, Malaysian, Lao, Montagnard, etc.). Chau suspects that much of the "misuse" of PAT teams by various province chiefs reflected simply their distrust of what seemed to be a propaganda team for the Duy Dan/Dai Viets.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~
~~EYES ONLY FOR SLO~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES ONLY FOR SLG

(Major Be in Binh Dinh had explained to Bumgardner almost a year ago that his reason for retraining PAT teams on their return to province was that "I didn't send our people there to become Dai Viets"; Bumgardner had paid little attention at the time).

Moreover -- although this is tentative at this point -- there are indications that the students are given an orientation that is almost as strongly anti-GVN as it is anti-VC. No relieving features of the GVN are mentioned, nor is the possibility of reforming it from within. In effect, the students seem to be taught to regard themselves as a Third Force, to await directions when the time will come for a new "Special Politics" (the literal translation of Biet Chinh, as the PATS are know), separate from VC or GVN politics.

"All this might be all right," says Chau, "if that is what the government -- and the Americans -- want. It might be all right to back the Dai Viets, or to prepare the cadres for a Special Politics; but is that what the government has decided to do? Do they or the Americans know that that is what they are doing?"

As for Mai, Chau's already low appreciation has fallen still further. He does not feel Mai has acted honorably with his employers (Chau seems sincere about this, despite the fact that, as I pointed out to him, he "should be glad that it has turned out to be a Vietnamese program after all") Also, although he concedes that Mai spends a lot of time with the trainees and has by now acquired much training experience, he is very dubious about Mai's qualifications as a political instructor. Mai has virtually no time in the field in any capacity, his military career having been spent almost completely in staff communications work. Chau finds his political sense naive and does not believe he has a major impact on the students (others disagree). (Chau thinks very highly of Major Be, for example, and says there "is not the slightest comparison" between Be and Mai, pointing primarily to Be's command and field experience and maturity in political matters).

8. Even prior to going to Vung Tau, Chau felt he had "lost the confidence of OSA" and could no longer be effective in the program; he had asked Thang to be relieved, and Thang had agreed, though asking him to stay on for a couple of months. However, Chau would not in any case have stayed on if it were to be primarily an American program.

With considerable emotion, Chau has said to me on two occasions: "It is better for my country to be taken over by the Americans than by the Communists. If that is the only choice, then I think it is better for the Americans to take it over. But I do not want to be part of that. They can do it without me."

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES ONLY FOR SLG

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

More specifically, he says: "I like CIA. I have always been a friend of CIA; that is why I speak so frankly to Mr. Jorgensen, because I do not think a friend should hide his feelings. But I do not want to be an employee of CIA. I would not have come here for that."

On another occasion he mentioned: "The generals are all afraid of CIA. They think it is the most powerful US agency; that it has more money and more influence. And they say that CIA can do things to them that other agencies can't. They say," If we disagree with MACV, can MACV have us assassinated? No; but CIA can.'" (I was rather startled at this comment, and remarked that after all no major military figure had disappeared lately. Chau said: "Col Thao." Startled again, I said "Does anyone think CIA killed Thao?" "Many say it," Chau said. "They say that Thao lost his usefulness to CIA." "Do you think that?" I asked him directly. "I don't know, I dont know what to think," he said, flustered.) (!) Short of assassination, he said later the generals feared that CIA would ruin them by spreading stories - true or not - of their corruption or mistresses.

All in all, he felt the association with CIA was not helpful to the Rural Construction program. "People can understand CIA doing many things ... but they cannot understand CIA running pacification."

9. For future policy, the most important issue raised by Chau is this, is the Rural Construction Cadre Program to be a Vietnamese program, with US support, or primarily a US/CIA program? There are arguments for the latter, in terms of efficiency and control (Chau claims to believe that the US should in any case retain control of financial matters). But if it is to be a US/CIA program, Chau foresees the following problems (aside from his leaving, which is probably too late to change):

a) GVN officials -- the ruling generals, province/district chiefs, division commanders, ministries -- will not support it effectively. They will figure that Americans will take the credit if it succeeds; and in any case, they will feel, "If it's an American program, let them run it." (To be sure, one might question how much they would get behind it even if it were 100% Vietnamese; but if it is identified with Americans, because of heavyhanded American control, their non-involvement is assured). Two years from now, there will be a competent cadre program in operation, but with very little link to any central or provincial authority.

b) The identification with Americans, as it becomes known to local officials and villagers, will seriously hamper the essentially political work of the cadres.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES-ONLY-FOR-SLO

"You could pacify South Vietnam with American Troops alone," Chau says. "But it would take three million troops, and it would last only as long as they stayed."

The crucial target of pacification, in Chau's mind, is to create a spirit in the rural people of willingness to organize in their own self-defense. This spirit cannot be lit by an American occupying army. Nor will it be generated by Vietnamese cadre widely regarded as "American employees" -- particularly if CIA influence on the program emphasizes the role of the PAT element alone.

10. If these points are taken seriously, the policy inference would be: either

(a) Change CIA's style and direction of influence significantly, persuading them to be less overt(!) in their involvement and control both in Saigon/Vung Tau and in the field and to allow full weight to the role of non-PAT elements; or

(b) Move CIA out of this overt program as quickly as possible - say two or three months - meanwhile channeling financial and field support through another agency, either AID or MACV (perhaps shifting some field reps to the other agency; also reducing the total number and increasing the quality of field reps.)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN
EYES-ONLY-FOR-SLO

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

714

27 September 1954

1. OBJECTIVES:

a. To insure survival of Vietnam as an independent nation oriented towards the West.

b. To continue the battle against the Vietminh to accomplish eventual liberation of Northern Vietnam and eventual reconsolidation of the country.

2. POLICY:

a. ODYOKE policy dictates that all ODYOKE efforts be directed toward support of the DIEM government.

~~b. Until and unless ODYOKE~~ policy is changed, ~~any plan implemented to accomplish the objectives must be directed through or conducted in cooperation with the DIEM government.~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: Y
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1348

3. PLANS:

a. Basic Plan:

The only reasonably cohesive national force subject to direction is the Vietnamese Army. A government without military support cannot long survive in a situation that remains essentially military in nature. At the present time the Vietnamese Army is responsive to the Chief of Staff who, in turn, acts in his own behalf rather than at direction of the President.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

The Basic plan of [redacted] Mission then becomes contingent upon the successful alignment of the Vietnamese Army behind the DIEM Government to provide that Government with the required power to insure the accomplishment of governmental decrees. This effort will continue to be a primary goal of [redacted] working as the situation dictates to accomplish this alignment. The Transfer of loyalty From the Chief of Staff to the President may be done in one of several ways: either by 1) Replacement of The Chief of Staff with an individual personally loyal to DIEM and who commands the loyalty of the troops; or, 2) Convincing the present Chief of Staff that it is to his benefit as well as the good of the country of Vietnam to carry out the orders of the central Government. [redacted] will continue working along either or both of the above lines to attempt to establish the situation which is essential to the fulfillment of the remainder of the Basic Plan. OSD 3.3(b)(|)

When the above has been achieved, [redacted] will, through the Presidency, move people into the control the following:

1) Psychological Warfare.

2) Scout-Ranger or "Special Forces" department.

3) Pacification or "Social Action" department.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

[redacted]

CIA 3.3(6)(1)

The Psychological Warfare program, KUHOOK-type operations, and Pacification or military government-type actions will then be ostensibly carried out by Government direction through a Governmental force. Actually it will be controlled by KUBARK personnel under direction of the [redacted]

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 11 2013

Chief of Mission.

The actual steps to accomplish the above must necessarily remain elastic to allow for changes in the national situation which are occuring almost hourly. All avenues will be explored and actions taken as the opportunity to further this objective is presented.

b. Alternate Plan:

Recognizing that the most desirable method of supporting the DIEM Government, which is outlined above, may not be possible in the immediate future, an alternate plan utilizing the only other military forces present in the country will also be explored.

Military forces under control of various sects and political organizations exist. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, National Resistance Front, UMDC, VNQDD, and others possess overt, covert, or in some cases both types of military or quasi-military forces. At present these are an unrelated, uncooperating, group of forces used to further the ambitions of a group or individual who may or may not be also interested in the furtherance of a nationalistic movement. Essentially most of the groups or sects are interested in nationalism but rightly or wrongly believe that the competing groups or sects have aims at variance with their own.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

At present no firm estimate is possible of the over-all strength of these groups. The current estimate of the National Resistance Front places their armed strength at 600-800 men. A recent estimate of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces places their effectives in the neighborhood of 6000 men. Many of the other forces are lying dormant or are at best but a resistance potential rather than a force in being. These forces, however, present the only other military power which might be aligned behind DIEM to provide the support of governmental policy and orders. CIA 3.3(6)(1)

It is the [redacted] plan to develop contacts with as many of the groups and sects as is operationally sound and feasible. Many of these contacts have already been made and operations in conjunction with some of the groups have been approved and initiated. OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Each of the [redacted] contacts will be developed along the lines of a nationalist movement with an anti-communist, pro-nationalist theme. These themes or programs will be so designed that they will be acceptable to the group and in consonance with ODYOKE objectives. As they groups are developed, the program of each group will be oriented to coincide, as nearly as possible, with the plans and programs of all the other groups. When a suitable point of agreement is apparent in the various programs, an attempt will be made to reconcile the remaining

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

differences and bring about a coalition of the groups and sects with a common program which will also be in consonance with the program propounded by the DIEM government. [redacted] will then further attempt to bring this coalition to the direct support of the DIEM Government thus supplying a force in lieu of the National Army. This coalition will necessarily carry into the cabinet appointments, providing representation within the government of the various groups whose support is required. The necessity for this move has already been recognized by the President in his recent appointments of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao representatives as committee advisors to the Minister of Defense. CIA 3.3(b)(1) OSD 3.3(b)(1)

During and after consolidation this group will attempt to make inroads into the strength of the Army by recruiting nationalists within the Army for their group.

Should the above plan prove workable [redacted] will then again move personnel into key advisory spots in the government to control the same functions of the government as outlined in the Basic Plan.

Here again the actual moves must be made as the situation unfolds and details of operation cannot be determined beforehand. Positive progress has been made along these lines in the operational development of the Dai Viet, National Resistance Front, and contacts with the VNQDD. Details for further development of the National Resistance Front

appear in a separate paper.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

c. Emergency Plan:

The least desirable plan and that which holds the least chance of long-range success will be pursued only in the event that no satisfactory power base can be established in support of the DIEM Government. The implementation of this plan will be attempted only when the Basic Plan and the Alternate Plan have proved to be impossible under the existing chaotic conditions. OSD 3.3(b)(|)

Under direction and guidance of the [redacted] Mission, DIEM has proclaimed a National Resistance Movement whereby he has announced his life's aim as a struggle against communism and for consolidation of a free and independent Vietnam. In the event of the collapse of his Government, DIEM has asserted he will flee to a safe area and lead the fight from there. This has the obvious fallacy of failing to determine where the support springs from which will enable him to continue the struggle. CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Under the above [redacted] Mission in cooperation with [redacted] Mission will aid in the preparation of psywar material to be disseminated by the DIEM Government. Two [redacted] selected governmental officials will provide the plan and program which

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

provided by the Chiefs of Mission [redacted] This plan has the additional disadvantage of possessing no legal basis for direct ODYOKE participation. [redacted] The National Resistance Front will be developed as the only military force available should the Basic and Alternate Plans be discarded.

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

715

3312 Corregidor Street
Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila
December 15, 1977

Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale
#2003 Lorraine Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101

CIA
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Dear General Lansdale:

I am forced by circumstances to write to you and request once more for your valuable assistance after my attempts to obtain what I sincerely believe is my just reward and/or privilege have been denied twice. The denial of my application for special immigrant status was based on the unsound, unfair and unjustified action of Vice-Consul William H. Barkell. I am confident that a referral of my case to higher authorities will result in the subsequent approval of my petition and a censorship of the said consul's abuse of official discretion. Please bear with me as I continue to reveal for your information the events that took place from the time I first submitted my application up to the present.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter I prepared and attached to the application for special immigrant status which I personally submitted to the office of the above-mentioned visa officer on 24 August 1977. As you will notice I had intended to submit the same to the Consul General (Miss Lois L. Day) in view of the confidential nature of some of my government services. However, this attempt was thwarted by over-zealous employees who refused to let me in unless I submit my papers to the office of Mr. Barkell, whom they averred is in charge of this type of visa. Upon reaching this office, the Filipino female secretary opened my envelope and went through all my documents. After segregating some and returning others to me she curtly advised me to leave and just wait for the official reply.

After waiting for two weeks, I received a reply contained in a mimeographed and prepared form (NWL-131-3) dated September 9, 1977 (see xerox copy attached) wherein the consul stated he had to refuse my application because I only earned 13 years and 3 months service from 1961 to 1975. He did not even express any comments on my previous employments prior to 1961. In view of his impersonal reaction, it was understandable for me to believe that Consul Barkell may not have read my letter at all and that the female secretary must have submitted to him only my documents relating to the 1961-1975 portion of employments .

On October 5, 1977, I mailed a letter to Mr. Barkell and requested him to reconsider his decision. I reiterated the facts that I served as one of the undercover agent for the 1135th Counterintelligence Corps, US Army from 1946 to 1949 as evidenced by the enclosed letter of certification signed by Lt. Antonino TAGAMLAG, then Adjutant of the said Detachment and the sworn statement of Lt. Col. Charles T. H. BOHANAN (notarized right there at the Consular Section of the US Embassy), then Chief of covert operations of the same outfit. I also mentioned Col. Boh's residence and telephone number for easy verification should he desire to do so.

[redacted]

CIA 3.3(6)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
NOV 11 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(6)(1)
MDR: 13 -M- 1348

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

with latitude for discretionary action and that he could - on the basis of the briefs - have presented - act on my petition favorably. He would be personally using the prerogatives of his office and what he would do is only fitting, proper and justified. I also reminded him that a complete background check was been made about me prior to my various employments in the government. I [illegible] and all of, and at the same time when he again chose to ignore my [illegible] received his reply dated November 18, 1977. I am sending a xerox copy of his second reply. On the basis of his reply it is certain that his feelings were overcome with fright by my allegations. He did not only refer to a former my petition but he - based on his 1st reply - looked 1 year and 9 months to complete the required 15 years - but he now sets the opinion that my 13 years and 2 months - the position that of view not rendered under exceptional circumstances. See while I never thought a government official of his rank could stoop so low as to lie despite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Anybody who would review my record of service would have no decision but to approve my application because the facts remain that my length of service with the US Naval Investigative Services Office [redacted] are replete with [illegible] under exceptional circumstances. Allow me to remark again - and that I can document my facts: I was awarded by the then JS Ambassador [redacted] for "Meritorious Service" and beyond the call

[redacted]

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Life is not even being recognized at all.

It is my firm belief that the foregoing services have been rendered under extreme exceptional circumstances. I doubt very much if any of the employees who have received an immigrating to the United States under the special immigrant status let us say for the last two years alone - could even compare with one half of my accomplished deeds for the success of the US Mission here and abroad. If the forementioned documents I turned in. not constitute exceptional services then I do not know the real meaning of the word "exceptional". I wonder how Mr. Markell will interpret the meaning of the word. I am sure he has a different dictionary.

Sir, now you must understand how I feel and why I mentioned the fact that I am sad and mad. I have been a fighter for democracy for so long and I enjoyed all the risk I took in my fight with you against our common enemy - the communists. In our fight against the Reds, who would trample at our cherished freedoms, is much easier to do. Now my battle is against a different kind and I could not cope with it unless you help me. Please help me so that my years of devotion to everything that America stood for - and for which my father died for - shall not have been in vain. Help me fulfill my wish of immigrating to my father's country so that I may be able to bring my own family to relish on what I strove to accomplish in my years of devoted and loyal service.

Again I extend my best wish to you and your beloved Pat for this yuletide season and may you have a prosperous New Year. Sir, Help me so that I may be able to say "see you next year, Sir."

Your most loyal servant,

Jesus "Suing" Alvarado

Sir, I will be very grateful for your kind assistance and consider it your gift to me and my family for Christmas. Respectfully yours,

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

2312 Corregidor St.
Sta. Mesa, Manila, R.P.
August 24, 1977

Honorable Lois H. Day
Counselor of Embassy for Consular Affairs
Embassy of the United States of America
Roxas Boulevard, Ermita
Manila, R.P.

Dear Consul General Leif H. Day:

With due respect and high regard, I have the honor to submit for your kind scrutiny and consideration my application for special immigrant status under the provisions of Section 101 (a)(27)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. With modesty aside, I am proud to state here that I have served the United States Government faithfully with loyal devotion for more than the required 15 years and that this service was rendered under exceptional circumstances in many instances.

Please allow me to enumerate below in chronological order my services in the United States Government. In order not to lose the sequel of my various employments I have included [illegible] which may not be included as under the U.S. Government. However, it is considered highly significant.

1. February 1945 - October 1945: Labor Foreman, US Quartermaster Depot, Base X, APO 75. Reshaped to pursue studies. Enclosure 1 is a xerox copy of the letter of 2nd Lt. Arthur Levine, USQMC, Labor Officer. Length of service: Eight months. For clearer reading please see attached copy to enclosure 1.

2. February 1947 - November 1949: Undercover-man/confidential investigator for the 113th US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), Manila. Salary drawn from confidential funds and worked directly under then Capt. Charles T.R. Bohanan and Special Agent Isabelo de Vera. Separation due to return of US Army from the Philippines. Enclosure 2 is a copy of the certification with a retyped copy for your convenience, signed by 2nd Lt. Antonino Tabaniag, then Assistant to the Detachment and Enclosure 3 a sworn statement of Capt. Charles T.R. Bohanan. Length of service: Two (2) years and nine (9) months.

NOTE: From 1949 to 1953 I was pursuing my college studies at the Far Eastern University taking up a law course.

1953 - December 1954: Field Investigator, [illegible] Counter Espionage Unit, US Army Assistant Section, [illegible] Counter Espionage under Lt. Col. John G. Weckerly. [illegible] Length of service: [illegible] Please see enclosure 4, xerox copy of [illegible] letter of Col. Edward [illegible]

[redacted]

December 1954 - June 1955: Investigator/Asst.

[redacted]

NOTE: During this period I was sent to French Indochina and acted a courier for the US Military [illegible]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1348

officers assigned in the area. [redacted] took direct orders from US Army Lt. Dave Smith, Lt. Frank "Zan Zan" Garber and Lt. Victor Hugo, Jr., all working under Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, head military intelligence in South Vietnam.

Please allow me to take advantage of this opportunity to mention at this point that [redacted] When we landed in Saigon the city was in flames and fighting was raging in the streets between the forces of President Ngo Dinh Diem and those opposed to him. Martial law and curfew was strictly imposed. This danger did not deter me from accomplishing my mission. As soon as we were safely delivered in our hotel in Cholon by a military escort, I tried to get in touch with [redacted] by phone but he was no longer in his office. Without regard for my own personal safety I ventured out into the night and with God's help I was able to deliver the packa[redacted]n Saigon on the same date which eventually reached Gen. Lansdale.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

The above feat and other acts performed for the success of the US mission are known to my superiors and duly reflected in a letter of commendation given to me by Lt. Col. John D. Waohtel respectfully submitted as enclosure 1 and also corroborated by enclosure 2. As stated by Gen. Lansdal[redacted]

NOTE: Gen. Lansdale's current address is: #2008 Lorraine Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101

b. December 1958 - March 1961: Security and Motor Pool Officer, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos. Performed [redacted] work for the various Special Assistant to the Ambassador [redacted] and other ranking political officers. Length of service: Two (2) years and three (3) months.

[redacted] However, an incident occurred during this period of employment which almost cost me my life and I believe it to be highly significant. This occurred during the 2nd week of December 1960 when the Laotian Nationalist Forces supported by the American mission started to retake Vientiane which was being held by the Pathet Lao (Communist) and the Neutralist Forces who earlier in the year had staged a coup de tat. The two aligned forces put up a stiff resistance so much so that the fighting lasted for 4 nights and 4 days. My superiors then [redacted] both stayed at the American Embassy while I was instructed to look after [redacted] residence and his household help - an elderly Chinese married couple.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

At noon of the 2nd day of fighting, a temporary truce was made to allow all foreign civilians to evacuate the city. Except for the American Ambassador and his staff - all women and children and employees of the mission were airlifted to Bangkok. It was unfortunate indeed that this agreement never reached me [redacted] residence was located on the road leading to the airport and it was here that the Pathet Lao/Neutralist forces chose to put up their line of defense. The bombardment remained in full swing of the next day.

[illegible] the third day of fighting in [illegible] that I saw many shells to [illegible] all hours [illegible] to them to be occurring [illegible] [redacted] house was not spared. The soldiers used [illegible] the upper portion of the [illegible] and after destroying the gate they were about to set the main [illegible] fire when I decided to come out and meet them and cried to attract [illegible] them in their own language. The Chinese couple followed me with arms raised signifying our surrender. They did not touch the couple but they pushed [illegible] them on me. They started to hit me on with the butts of their rifles. I managed to [illegible] head and as I fell on the ground I received kicks in the different parts of my body. I quickly stood up everytime I would fall and at the same time reiterate to them that I was [illegible] about their soldiers and that I was just an ordinary driver and while the Chinese couple worked as cook and laundry and house cleaner. I asked to be taken to their commander, explaining as I told them I knew him personally. This remark somehow made them stop beating me. It was at this point that an officer among them issued an order for the soldiers to stop and he proceeded to question me in the English language. The Lieutenant asked for the whereabouts of [redacted] and I told him the American official has gone to Bangkok. I then requested to him my friendship with Captain Kong Le and he said he will [illegible] out later. In the meantime he instructed [illegible] in the house together with the two Chinese household helpers. The Pathet-Lao officer then led his soldiers out of the house and they resumed their vigil on the other [illegible] to [illegible] Americans.

[illegible] night the fighting intensified and we were forced to seek cover in a duty-free [illegible] in front of the house. The fighting raged throughout the night until the following day. By noon-time of [illegible], there was silence and it was then that we were freed by the Pathet-Lao forces. They retreated and abandoned the position they held for 4 days and nights. We were glad to see the Pathet-Lao forces arrived to take over the [illegible]. They questioned me, and I told them the enemy was gone. I immediately borrow a bicycle and reported to my superiors. [illegible] was guarded by the Ambassador's residence & the Embassy has been evacuated [illegible] during the fighting. I was invited for [illegible] and [redacted] were very sympathetic about what happened to me. [illegible] that I found out about the evacuation of almost all of the civilian employees of the mission to Bangkok. After I was medically treated I immediately set out [illegible] the [illegible] and began to glean [illegible] the [illegible] and happenings of the [illegible].

I [illegible] the Mission home that while the civilian employees of the [illegible] were busily evacuated to Bangkok [illegible] joining [illegible] and receiving [illegible] I was one of those [illegible] were left in Vientiane to suffer the result of the conflict between two forces. I was also among the few who met

CIA 3.3(6)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

[redacted]

[redacted] and through lectures. All claimants were reimbursed for their real and imagined loses. I am proud to state here and records will prove that I - despite of my personal losses did not file any claim at all. Not even for the wounds I received which now form a permanent fixture on my face and head.

Apparently aware of my loyalty to the American mission, my former [redacted] wrote a dedication at the back of our pictures together the following: "To my loyal friend Lorenzo" which I am enclosing as enclosure 8. It was also because of my performance that [redacted] exerted his best [redacted] owing to it that I got my next position with the US Navy [redacted] Investigative Services Office at Sangley Point in 1961.

[redacted] He is now retired and living [redacted] Clos Du Vauxe Andre, St. Peter, Port Guernsey, Channel Islands, Great Britain.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

6. August 1961 - July 1968: Criminal Investigator, US Naval Investigative Service Unit, Office of Naval Intelligence, Sangley Point and later Subic Naval Base. Performs investigative and intelligence work. Separation - Resignation. Length of Service: Six (6) years and eleven (11) months.

It may appear as self-serving when I state that I was one [redacted] most valuable criminal investigator in this office. My [redacted] have contributed in minimizing if not totally eradicating [redacted] activity in the US Naval Base, Subic Bay. My success in this [redacted] best illustrated by the fact that even [redacted] was requested by the US Naval Investigative Support Unit [redacted] assistance in their problem in their area. With the permission of the Regional Security Officer, Mr. Joe M. Little, I was granted my assistance during weekends only. I would work for the [redacted] Embassy during week days and then later to Olongapo [redacted] weekends where I coordinated work with the US Naval [redacted] agents at the Subic Naval Base. This operation [redacted] for about a year and the result of this mission is reflected [redacted] enclosure 9, a letter of appreciation from the Commanding [redacted] dated 30 June 1972.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

During this period of employment I was also picked to assist the Army Support Element in providing investigative [redacted] during the Manila Summit Conference held in Manila which [redacted] by no less than the chief executive of the United [redacted] President Lyndon Johnson. My valuable contribution in this worthwhile project for peace in the world did not [redacted] and I was awarded the following:

Enclosure 10 - Ltr. of Appreciation from Lt. Col. [redacted] M. Von Dyke, Commanding Officer, US [redacted] Support Detachment dtd Nov. 7, 1966;

Enclosure 11 - Certificate of Merit for Exemplary [redacted] from Rear Admiral H. J. Moesler, [redacted] dtd 4 Jan. 1967;

Enclosure 12 - Ltr. of Appreciation from COMNAVPHIL [redacted] was received on the same date as the [redacted] tificate of Merit.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

NOTE: I voluntarily resigned from this office on July 5, 1969 in my desire to improve my community standing and salary earnings. Please see enclosure 13. I joined the staff of the Secretariat of the Peace and Order Coordinating Council which was created and solely responsible to the President of the Republic of the Philippines. My short stint in this office enabled me to expand my contacts and developed more friends in the different branches of the Philippine government which later proved to be valuable when I later re-joined the US government.

7. April 1969 - September 1975: Security Investigator, Regional Security Office, American Embassy, Manila, R.P. Separation - Voluntary resignation to immigrate to the United States. Length of service: Six (6) years and four (4) months and six (6) days.

From the start of my employment in this office, I was immediately assigned by the then Regional Security Officer (RSO) Mr. Max Caldwell to assist the then Consul General, Hon. Wilbur Chaen and Consul Anthony Saga in weeding out undesirables in their office and to put a stop to the anomalies and irregularities which was existing then at that office. My efforts have not been in vain and I am proud to state that I have been instrumental in the success of this mission. It resulted in the removal of two consular employees who were found in cahoots with unscrupulous travel agents; the blacklisting of travel agents and pseudo-travel agents; the destruction of the travel syndicates engaged in the irregular issuance of US visa and the falsification of the US visa stamp; institution of criminal charges against many of them in coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation and the institution of remedial measures to prevent a resurgence of the irregularities.

I believed it is only fair to mention here the dangers I encountered during my mission for the Consular Section. In my relentless drive to thwart the activities of the travel syndicate, and when their attempts to bribe me failed, I started to receive threats of bodily harm and outright liquidation over my office and residential telephone. It was not surprising and I anticipated this threat as I have been accustomed to such threats while I was fighting criminality during my stint with the US Navy at the Naval Base in Subic Bay and Sangley Point. As a matter of course, I informed the local national police agency and my superiors. As a preventive or protective measure, I was allowed by the RSO with the permission of the Minister, to carry a firearm.

I continued in my investigative work and the threats did not hamper me in coordinating with the NBI in accumulating evidences against the unscrupulous travel syndicate members. Those with sufficient evidence were duly charged with the City Fiscal's Office and on many occasions I have appeared as a witness against them during the hearing at the fiscal's office and later before the Court of First Instance. My appearance during this investigative hearings and trial in court have been cleared with the RSO and the Embassy Legal Officer at that time. This efforts earned for me a meritorious step increase in less than a year of my employment. Enclosure 14 is a certification of my service record.

NOTE: Even after I have resigned from this employment I have continued to be dedicated and loyal to the US Government by submitting confidential reports regarding various cases and anomalies and irregularities to the current RSO, Mr. Michael E. Geughlin.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 11 2013

[redacted]

Enclosure 16 is the official Recognition and Appreciation for [redacted] of 10 years Service dated 25 June 1972 which I received during a simple ceremony from His Excellency, Ambassador Henry K. Sullivan.

Enclosure 17 is the Certificate of Appreciation from His Excellency, Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew of the United States of America which I earned from my services during his short visit to the Philippines.

Please allow me to explain further about my employment as described in Items 1 and 2. Some years ago, I requested Mr. Hugh Mims, Administrative Officer of the now defunct US Army Support Element, 4th Floor, EDB, American Embassy, to submit the request for verification of my employments in these two entities to the Federal Records Center in Missouri. The reply of the Center, dated 4 August 1972, indicated "no record" but suggested I submit additional data and substantiating evidence. In this connection, I wish to mention here that when I applied for employment with the US Navy (Item 6) I submitted to that office the original copy of my separation from the US Quartermaster Salvage Depot, Base X, which was signed by 2nd Lt. Arthur Lovino. I also submitted to the same office as proof of my employment with the US Army CIC, the original letter of certification given to me by then Lt. Antonino Tabaniag, who was then the Adjutant of the US Army CIC Detachment at the time. Both of these documents were never returned to me and I did not bother to retrieve them as I was subsequently hired by the US Naval Investigative Service Office. However, I am submitting the only remaining xerox copy I have for your consideration.

It should be noted that prior to my employment, a complete and thorough background investigation has been made on me which is standard operating procedure in the US Government Service and those previous employments of mine have been duly verified otherwise I would not have been hired by said organization. To further prove these employments, aside from enclosures 1 and 2, I am respectfully submitting enclosure 3, sworn statement of [redacted] Lt. J.G. Salvacion, AVS, Retd., with present address: [redacted] Pilar Street, San Juan, Rizal with telephone number 70-58-20.

As for my employment in Items 3 and 5, I am hoping that enclosure 3, Letter of Major Gen. Edward Lansdale, USAF, Retd., would be sufficient proof for verification purposes to complete the claimed length of service with the US Government. I can substantiate my length of service as reflected in Item 4 as the reason that this is also clearly manifested in the letter of [redacted] For your information, prior to submitting this letter/application for special immigrant I have also presented a copy of enclosure 5 to the current RSO (Mr. Coughlin) [redacted] and requested him to make the necessary verification [redacted] prior to save time and effort.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

If I may be allowed to compute my years of service with the United States government, excluding the years mentioned in Item 4, I would have accumulated in my favor a total of twenty (20) years and six (6) months. Without wishing to sound boastful, I am proud to state that very few among my fellow employees who have been granted the privilege as Special Immigrant could even compare with my achievements. My loyalty to the United States is second only to my father. My father's loyalty and devotion to all things American is second to none. Please allow me to include several clippings about my late father. These alone should be sufficient to prove my point. His commendations and earned medals and citations are too numerous to mention here. However, I would like to mention here that even when my father was already retired from the US military service he continued to submit reports that he feels significant and important to the proper authorities. He was even one of the most outspoken and an active member of the Philippine Statehood, U.S.A. movement. I was one of his converts and I was also silently supporting this movement prior to the advent of Martial Law in September 1972. I sincerely believed that our country due to widespread graft and corruption was fast heading to a revolution with the Communists forces actively leading the group. The movement for statehood would have succeeded as there were already more than 5 million members agitating for a change. Martial Law, however, prevented these occurrences.

There are still many incidents in my life that I did not bother to mention here which further manifests my loyalty to the service and to the US Government. One of this instances is the fact that my father, being a G-2 agent for the US military was very active in the underground movement during the enemy/Japanese occupation of the Philippines. My late elder brother and I were likewise active in the guerilla movement and we have always been assisting our father in all his undertakings. Post liberation case, none of us even tried to claim credit for our guerilla services. We were contented with pursuing our normal way of life soon after our father reported back to military control. However, I believed it is significant to mention here that in my application for employments with various US Government agencies I have always included the names of my two guerilla officers as my references. I am sure, as I have already stated above, all my previous employments, education and others have been confirmed by the background investigations initiated prior to my employments. As you may glean from my service records most of them have been sensitive positions.

Since some portions of my services are confidential in nature I deemed it proper to submit this letter and incident enclosures to the Honorable Consul General for her review and consideration and I would request an early reply.

With my sincere wish for your success in all your undertakings, I remain.

Very respectfully yours,

JESUS C. ALVARADO

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 11 2013

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 February 1963

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXIS JOHNSON

From: Brig. Gen. Lanuzale

Subject: Philippines

Dep Sec has seen

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

Mr. Chilpatric intended to show you the attached memorandum of my conversation with Macario Peralta, but apparently was unable to do so prior to his departure for Europe. He asked that I send it to you, for your information.

Re Philippine help in Vietnam, there is a most constructive idea suggested by Senator Manny Manahan of the Philippines who visited Vietnamese recently. Urge that you consider it and, if it makes sense to you, that you use your influence to get the idea implemented.

Senator Manahan, when he visited the High Plateau of Vietnam, was struck by the racial similarities of the Montagnards to the Igorots of Mountain Provinces in the Philippines. (There are many similarities of physical appearance, customs - including the same tribal dances, and clothing.) He suggested that a group of Igorots be recruited, trained, and sent to Vietnam to work with the Montagnards. The Igorots know how mountain people can get along with lowland people, as they have done in the Philippines, and should prove of unusual value in helping get the Vietnamese and the Montagnards together as a team.

Ambassador Nolting reportedly is aware of the current problems of U.S. influence with the Montagnards, how Montagnard loyalties have grown towards Americans at the expense of the Vietnamese. When we phase out U.S. help, this will leave a vacuum which the Communists are almost certain to fill. This can be prevented, if we can get the Vietnamese and Montagnards to respect each other and work together as equal citizens of the country. Properly placed into position in the High Plateau of Vietnam, Igorot advisors from the Philippines could help resolve this problem while assisting the U.S. efforts.

Downgraded per instructions below
8 May 81

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

13M-1349
Group 6

Suggest that this be brought to the attention of Governor Harriman. Ambassador Nolting might be asked to evaluate the idea with [redacted] and Phillips of USOM; Ambassador Stevenson might be asked to explore the idea with Senator Manahan in Manila. It strikes me as a far more dynamic idea than the current Saigon proposal to put a group of Filipinos on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Both Nolting and Stevenson also would benefit by talking with Johnny San Juan, whose Eastern Construction Filipinos have been working for years in the High Plateau and know both the Filipino-Vietnamese and the Montagnard-Vietnamese relationships. San Juan was Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner for Magsaysay (vice Manahan who was Magsaysay's first Commissioner) and the guiding spark of the Freedom Company of the Philippines, the public corporation which was the predecessor of Eastern Construction and which did such splendid work for the Vietnamese government in 1955-56. San Juan would have a lot of practical suggestions on how best to implement the idea noted above.

Attachment

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1349

5USC552

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. LANSDALE

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Hot War

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+ 3.5(c)

1. One of the most important aspects of hot war in Vietnam is to protect the rear from guerilla activities. In fact thevery nature of the Vietnamese terrain and situation means that an aggressi e force must depend on fairly unconventional or guerilla tactics in order to acheive military success.

2. The balance in hot war, therefore, is swung by the local populace who, due to the guerilla type operation, will be called on by both forces to furnish communication, information, transportation of material, and in advanced positions, even food. the side to which this support is denied will be at a tremendous disadvantage.

3. We conceive Civic Action as a political warfare weapon attempting to take the support of the people away from the guerilla forces in the rear as well as away from the attacking Viet Minh force.

4. Civic Action's second and equally important role is to perform the job that the military government sections of the U.S. Army performed in ~~the~~ World War II. In areas to the rear as well as in areas taken over by the SVN forces, Civic Action teams will work over as thoroughly as possible all the village communities and towns, establishing and strengthening local authority.~~the~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5054-532
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11/21/2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)+ 3.5(c)
MDR: 13-M-1349

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 NOV 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: ____ Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)-(9)
MDR: 13-M-13449



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA ILLEGIB

CIA 3.3(b)(1-9)

[redacted]

OSD 3.3(b)(|)-(9)

1: Memo [redacted] CIA 3.3(b)(1) 723

Subject: Briefing for Godel - Laylin Party

1. The content of the briefing will depend to some extent upon who is present and whether it is a joint briefing with Lawton, a separate briefing coordinated with him, or a completely separate, uncoordinated briefing. I assume that it will be a coordinated but separate briefing.

2. Specific suggestions:

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

a) Emphasis on point that we are now engaged in a cold war; we are not at peace.

b) The next problem. Statement of the problem, what you have done, what you are doing now.

c) The implications of the French withdrawal. American - French relationships. Attitude of the Vietnamese vis-a-vis the French

d) Reorganization of Vietnamese

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 17 2019

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: JAN 2013
Declassify: ____ Authority: EO 13526
Declassify in Part: X Deny in Full: ____
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1344

intelligence sharing [redacted]

[redacted]

Many other subjects may come up, even though they may be discussed in other briefings, as the cable indicates that Gobel specifically wants to see you:

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

a) Civic action
b) Rural militia
c) Military and political action in the west.
d) Civil guard and its relationship with the military.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority, EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2019

CIA
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

ROUTING SLIP

Originator [redacted] Date 16 Jan

TO	Date	Initial
[redacted]	16 Jan	[redacted]
	16 Jan	✓
	18 Jan	
	18 Jan	✓
	18 Jan	
	18 Jan	
For Filing / For Destruction		

CIA
3.3(b)(1)+
3.5(c)

COMMENT:

1. [redacted] asks that I give Gorbel, Kayton optional briefing - particularly on what we during civil military preparations for hot war, etc.
2. Desire your suggestions on what to include in my briefing. Can be rough notes.
3. He wants us report substance any contacts [redacted] envisioned action on this [redacted]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)
+ 3.5(c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U15.C552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11/01/2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)+ 3.5(c)
MDR: 13 -M- 1349

WM. H. GODEL, Deputy Asst to Secty Def

Admiral Edwin T. Dayton, Defs Dir for Int of Joint Staff

Kenneth Landon, OCB

Wm A Smith, OSD

Capt J S Holtwick, Jr. USN - NSA

Lt-Col James A Riley, G-2

Capt W. H. Packard, USN - ONI

Col James J Macia, Jr, USAF - AFOIN

Lt-Col R A Martin, USA - JCS

Lt-Col B J Smith, USA - OSD

Saigon ETA 22/1200 ETD 25/1100

Particularly desire discuss intelligence problems re Spl Ops problems.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

730

24 February 1960

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By: Colonel Lansdale, OSO/OSD SIGNED

Subject: Presidential Candidates, Philippines

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

It is time to start planning on how we can best attain U.S. objectives in the Philippines Presidential Election of 1961. Failures in the Philippines elections of 1957 and 1959, and U.S. difficulties with the political entities brought to power in these elections, show the weakness both of doing too little and of dividing our support. Let us take these lessons to heart, quit puttering around as though we are not affected by the results of our actions, and either use our resources and efforts to bring about a Philippine political result beneficial to the U.S. or firmly decide to keep our hands off entirely. And, I don't believe we can afford the latter.

It is believed that a good starting place, at this early date, would be to take a really hard look at those most likely to be Presidential candidates in 1961. Four Filipino politicians seem to stand ahead of others: Garcia, Osmena, Macapagal, and Laurel. They offer a Hobson's choice to us that perhaps we shouldn't take.

Garcia is the only "known quantity" to us, in that we have seen him in power. He has courted our enemies in the Philippines, probably has aided some of them, and has been studiously blind and deaf to the corruptions in his administration. Even so, he is predictable. Essentially, the others are not.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Osmena has been openly pro-American, energetic, sharply intelligent, has rounded his personal life sufficiently to give the appearance of morality, and has shown real political skill. He learns to his associates that he has Americans backing. [redacted] As proof, he points to U.S. interest and assistance in the Mactan airport, with its link by tunnel or bridge to Cebu. While Osmena gives a good performance on the surface, a close scrutiny of him would show a real wolf in sheep's clothing. He has a long record as a ruthless, amoral person - in matters of money, sex, politics, and family obligations. This tremendously ambitious person would be a most dangerous, unstable President.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DOC DENIED UNDER FOIA

OSO-1
F-15-1-82

Macapagal has sounded as a friend to the U.S., and undoubtedly is sincerely so. However, he has demonstrated a rare lack of understanding the political instruments of power. It would be well to examine his personal activities--such as those on his visit to the U.S.--to evaluate his stability and his comprehension of problems which would beset a Chief of State. His provincemates who know him well have bestowed the nick-name "Mac Mac" ("fool") on him after observing his behavior as Vice-President.

Lacson has political sagacity and personal magnetism, a Visayan who has a demonstrated ability to sway the Tagalog mob. However, if he became President, he would probably vie with Osmena in instability and crookedness, helped by drunkenness.

This dreary picture is presented at this early date simply to call attention to the type of problem we might face if we overlook taking any corrective action, or if we fail to consider the serious consequences of encouraging one of these politicians thoughtlessly.

Corrective action would require a survey of all other potential candidates, to see if there is one whom we could help gain a meaningful nomination, and then assist in a realistic manner. This would have to be done early enough to bring such a person into the zone of serious consideration by political organizations by about November 1960, so that they would start noticing him along with other potential candidates. To do this, such a person would have to embark upon a series of constructive actions--not political speeches--from his present position, during the intervening period until 1960. If the U.S. can find such a person, we should help him undertake these constructive actions in the intervening period, on a non-partisan, public-good basis--perhaps even help place him in position to undertake such actions.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1349

SUSC-552

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMO FOR Frank Hand

Unsigned letter from Mario Chanco puzzles me. Sounds psychotic – more so than he did when talking with me. Since he is one of the folks connected with Colby, I wonder now if he really isn't seeking some more active role for them. He never was one of my own leads, but of the Bill Broe recruitment type. Any ideas?

– SL

None except I agree on your assessment ~~on~~

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5026552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

Grap C
13-M-1345

Office of the Secretary of Defense 505c 9552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 4
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

Mario Chanco

manor news corporation
p. o. box 1365, manila ✡ philippine republic

August 3, 1963

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Maj Gen Edward Lansdale
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Lansdale —

In the ten days or so that I have been back, I have seen my worst fears borne out. The Stonehill case (which, prophetically, appears to have been breaking out at about the time that I was talking to you) has done many things —

1) It has widened the breach between the political parties.
2) It has sown a wider distrust among many of our people of constituted government.
3) It has lent aid and comfort to the subversives and to the professional malcontents who are chipping away on every available target.

Our old claim that these issues may be valid only in the cities and larger centers of population is no longer true. The transistor radio has seen a huge boom, both imported items and the locally produced ones. Since there is still a relative prosperity in the provinces, particularly in the coconut regions, purchases of radios have been at record levels. And as almost all the rural radio stations are finding that people tend to listen more to the stations that attack and assassinate, you can imagine the chaos, incipient and real, that the new Stonehill charges have reechoed.

The recent Malaysia talks have taken the edge off the attacks, and we now live in an artificial atmosphere of calm. Summitry, of course, is not a self-sustaining thing. Once the politicians of Malaya and Indonesia leave the same old fireworks, possibly on a more intensive plane, will recur. And I have learned there are more names, more dirty linen to be aired on both sides. It is fatal fascination that holds our people in a dangerous thralldom today. And the only net beneficiaries that I can see are those elements who would just love to see us in turmoil. As a matter of fact, evaluations I have listened to from our people who know what the score is show there is seething activity in the known trouble spots: Laguna, Quezon and Central Luzon. Are these merely local disturbances? Are they symptoms of a larger force? We do not know.

I reported at length on our talks and on my impressions of how American (and Europe) view the political and economic situation of the Philippines, to the man who asked me to bring that letter to you. He was, and is, still numb from the shockm of the Stonehill issues. From what I could gather from him and his associates (two of whom are also my clients) the same feeling exists in the highest levels. They have made a great to-do about minimizing the damage of the last weeks. But I feel (as I suspect they themselves feel) that this is merely whistling in the dark. If the damage cannot be arrestedm, and the stage set for clearing the atmosphere preparatory to the great developmental projects that we have on hand, I feel we will be prey to much larger dangers than may have existed even in our own troubled times.

I feel that you will probably be called before the elections, and now I have mixed emotions about how this should be done. I feel, first of all, that if your consultorial services are to be rendered at all, they should be on a very much diffused plane. Possibly a private grouping of citizens;

manor news corporation
p. o. box 1365, manila ☆ philippine republic

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

possibly the National Press Club of the Philippines. There are many alternative choices. But of the fact that this must be done, I feel there is no choice. And neither the government nor the so-called intellectuals who can do something about the matter seem to have any energy to move.

There are areas where I feel such a group (let us call it BAYAN) must now move. There is the government radio station, still run by your good friend and conscientious worker, Koko Trinidad. This n is one outfit that the politicians have not touched, and for a good reason. This outfit can be infiltrated and its news and positive-building factors stressed. It is now a network with outlets in all key regions. It can be a powerful factor for good. The mechanics need not be outlined here. But it can be done.

Then there is the metropolitan press. My organizational liaison with them is, I like to think, as strong as anyone in my profession can be. They too want to be shown the way. They too realize the deadly corrosion of values and of spirit which thepolluted atmosphere is producing. We have maintained very close liaison with them, especially on the National Press Club level, where my outfit is now finalizing plans for our lead role in the Second Asian Press Organization Economic Conference. The boys want and need motivation. They need it worse than during the times you were here last.

On the rural level, my outfit will help next month in the Second Rural Press Seminars. Here again is another excellent opportunity for the rural journalist to participate in nation-building. But he cannot do this in a polluted atmosphere. He cannot do this without continuous, programmed and consistent help and guidance. He cannot get this from the government. No private groups can have the consciousness to offer it. Where will the rural journalist turn?

There are many other areas that require thoughtful, planned and coordinated assistance. How to put together a super-group, comprising all elements that can effectively help and effectively FOLLOW UP, is the big problem. By a simple process of elimination you can readily see that the assistance we need not only is unavailable locally, but must consist of elements involving possibly more than consultation. And putting together such a group, if it is at all possible, must of course proceed from the assumption that our friends overseas can see a mutuality of interest that today is not easy to perceive. In brief: why should you, or even your country, help? What is in it for the USA? I can't answer those questions. Maybe you can. All I know is that the atmosphere is unhealthy for our type of democratic upbringing; that the means for remedying this traditionally--the ballot---are too obvious, too dispersed, to be of much use at the current moment.

I know that if I can put together a team of specialists who will work quietly, independently of government and of private business, we will accelerate development, return humor tom our way of life and pave the way for our return to our gentle ways. I know these people can be found; most of them are your alumni, and while preoccupations have changed since the early 50's, they still want to be of some use. We have the tapestry, but it must be done of whole cloth.

Looking over what I have written I am struck by this letter's disjointed and rather inarticulate manner of restating a situation which I am not sure I had explained well to you on that all-too brief visit. Is there any way I can give a clearer picture? You have only to write or cable and it will be sped on to you.

The Manor Organization

(1) The Manor Organization is a communications group involved in printing, publishing, public affairs, press, radio and allied media. It publishes a monthly magazine, a daily backgrounder of general affairs and a monthly rural newspaper. A summary of its varied activities may be found in the attached brochure.

(2) In the field of Public Affairs, these have been among its assignments;

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

1. Operations Sunlight (1956-57), a program designed to develop and strengthen the Philippine Rural Press.
2. Operations Pala, a program designed to give assistance to the development of small-scale cottage and other industries in the Philippines (1960 to date).
3. Operations Open Cylinder (1957), an informational support program for the Philippine Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
4. Operations Bahay Ko! a program for low-cost housing for low-income families in the Philippines (1961 to date).
5. Operations Sea Giant, a program which seeks to create a National Fisheries Development Center for the development of the Philippine fishing industry in Navotas, Rizal. This was approved by President Macapagal last February 6, 1963.
6. Operations Oriente, a program built about the Asian Press Organization which this group helped organize in 1962. We are working on the agenda of the 1963 conference (Oct/63) to be held in Tokyo. The theme is Economic Journalism; Teams of Asian journalists are compiling at present resource material on trade practices of the western world which tend either to inhibit or encourage the growth of the underdeveloped countries.

(3) The Manor Organization's government clients have included or includes:

1. The Philippine Dept. of Agriculture & Nat. Resources
2. The Philippine Government Radio and TV Network
3. The Philippine Fisheries Commission
4. The Philippine ACCFA, Central Bank, Development Bank
5. The Philippine Department of National Defense

(4) The Manor Organization's Private Public Affairs & Public Relations Clientele includes:

1. The First United Bank
2. The Republic Bank
3. Tarlac Development Corp. (7)
4. The Hacienda Luisita
5. The Central de Tarlac
6. The Union Import Export Co. (copra
7. Batjak Oil Mills (coconut oil)
8. About 14 other corporations & indiv. dealings, with insurance, finance, cottage industries products, coconut coir yarn & coir rope, auto spare parts, cement, etc.

BANK REFERENCES:

Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. (Manila)
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (Manila)
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (Manila)
First United Bank (Manila)
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (New York)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

DATE 6 Jan 66

MEMORANDUM TO: Arthur R. SCWICKRATH

THROUGH : Chief, Support & Elbert OVERLUNT

FROM : Finance Office

SUBJECT : DELINQUENT ADVANCES First NOTICE

This is to advise that an accounting for funds advanced to you is overdue as follows:

DATE RECEIVED	PURPOSE OF ADVANCE	DUE DATE	AMOUNT US$	AMOUNT VN$
14 Sep 65	Tvl Adv Received in Bangkok enroute to Saigon, PCS.	30 Oct 65	$500.00	

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

You are requested to submit an accounting to clear the above advances as soon as possible.

When third delinquent notice is forwarded to you, the COS has been advised in accordance with FR-30-430 Para 5 (j).

for Elbert W. Mechler
Chief, Finance

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL EDWARD LANSDALE

SUBJECT : Presidential Candidates, Philippines

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, dated 24 February 1960

The following is a precis of comments made by Manila Station in respect to your observations contained in referenced memorandum:

1. We are planning and acting intensively on measures to best attain U.S. objectives in the Philippine Presidential election of 1961. Conclusions from the November 1959 by-elections were drawn immediately and we proceeded on the basis of a policy of no further support to third political groupings. Since these by-elections, there has been no question in our mind of "dividing our support", nor do we incline toward a position of "too little too late". The lessons of past elections have very clearly been taken to heart. We agree that the U.S. would make a profound mistake if it entirely kept its hands off the Presidential elections of 1961. To do so would represent a supine abondonment of fundamental American interests and of our friends and supporters in the Philippines who are actively following our guidance on a day-to-day basis. We would lose respect on the part of both administration forces and on the part of our friends and allies, and U.S. interests would be bound to suffer in the short and in the long run. A flaccid and timid position of this kind would affect the American posture not only in the political field but in other important sectors such as public opinion, intellectual leadership, relationships with the Church, labor, the newspaper world, and so on.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

2. Garcia, Macapagal, Osmena and Lacson stand out from other Filipino politicians as the only leaders realistically in the contest at this time. We agree that Garcia "has courted our enemies in the Philippines, probably has aided some of them, and has been stubbornly blind and deaf to the corruption in his administration". Garcia has, in fact, been soft on communist elements, has allowed them access and undue influence in Malacanang and in his administration, has supported the National Progress Movement and radical extremists, and has allowed ultra-nationalists combined with left-wingers to exercise excessive influence with respect to the image of his administration, the national posture of the Philippines, and the atmosphere of public opinion. Garcia may be "predictable", but we would not willingly settle for what he has to offer.

3. Other figures, like Macapagal, should not be all that unpredictable. Macapagal is "undoubtedly" sincere in his role as a friend of the U.S. We find no evidence that Macapagal "has demonstrated rare lack of understanding of the political instruments of power".

4. Osmena and Lacson could prove dangerous. We have an initial inclination to prefer Lacson over Osmena in terms of personal qualities. Both Osmena and Lacson are obviously power forces in the Philippine scene; we can work constructively with them; and we should not allow ourselves to be unnecessarily alienated from either of these two leaders.

5. We have not found any other potential candidates on the scene of Philippine politics whom under prevailing political, economic, and international conditions, we could help to "gain a meaningful nomination". To even attempt a project of this kind would involve violent fracturing of existing political organizations, taking up arms against all the current political leaders in the Philippines, represent a drastic diversion from the steady and persistent course we are embarked on.

6. We do not think that a resurgent and hopeful Liberal Party under the leadership of Macapagal--combined with at least fair prospects of unification of other elements--necessarily represents a "dreary picture". The fundamental problem in the Philippines is the maintenance of a competitive political balance as between the two main parties. Total concentration of our attention on the figure of the top leaders of the parties is an error. Macapagal is a reasonably able man. Our problem is to see that he is surrounded at a senior level with qualitative

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

supporting leaders. Additionally, we should try to correct what Pelaez has described as Macapagal's failure to "catch fire" with the electorate. It may, however, be open to doubt as to whether anyone could "catch fire" under present circumstances as Magsaysay did under quite different conditions.

Henry D Hecksher
Desmond FitzGerald
for

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

178

27 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK BISSELL

SUBJECT: Son of Manuel Braña

Ambassador Romulo of the Philippines asked me to see him yesterday. When I did, he told me that he had just returned from the celebration in Mexico City and that he met an old Cuban friend while there. The Cuban friend was Manuel Braña who had been chief of the Cuban delegation to the Freedom of Information Conference in Geneva in 1947 and had been Ambassador to Mexico under Socorras at Geneva in 1947. Braña had helped Romulo be elected President of the Conference in opposition to the Soviet political move. In Mexico, Romulo met Braña initially with Raul Noriega who is one of the editors of Novedades in Mexico. Romulo stated also that Braña and other Cubans met secretly in the Argentine Embassy while in Mexico.

Braña told Romulo that he had two sons now in the U.S.; one is in New York and one is in Miami. Romulo stated he couldn't remember the first name of either son; however, the son in New York was a close friend of Cienfuegos and is an intimate friend of many people in the Cuban army. He is supposed to be close to the Army planners who are loyal to the memory of Cienfuegos and also is reputably witting of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. The son who is in Miami was a graduate of a military school in Georgia. Braña has a wife and two daughters in Cuba whom he said he is trying to get out of Cuba.

The son in New York is calling Romulo on Tuesday, 27 September. Romulo stated that he is going to invite this lad to come to Washington on Wednesday, 28 September. He has asked me for some one in the U.S. government to contact this son when he comes to Washington and will get in touch with me sometime on Saturday for this purpose. I told Romulo I would see what I could do on this.

Have you someone whose name I could give to Romulo? If so, and if you wish I will go ahead and make the arrangements.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

I believe Romulo sincerely believes that Brana is a genuine anti-Castro, anti-Communist, Cuban patriot. I believe he knows Manuel Brana well enough to be fairly certain of him. Of course, I had in mind that Castro is now in New York and that there was a possibility of this being a provocation. I didn't put it in these blunt terms to Romulo but pressed him with some questions. [illegible] you have derogatory information. I would suggest that this is worth taking a chance on.

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50USC3552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: K Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

14 July 1960

By Hand

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY HECKSHER, CIA

From: Brigadier General Lansdale, OSO/OSD SIGNED

Subject: PP Weapon, Philippines

This is an idea for your consideration.

One of the most damaging instruments in the 1961 elections in the Philippines would be the publication of "before and after" photographs of politician's homes. The "before" should be of the homes they occupied prior to their present positions, which might take some hard research and "DF-ing." Serrano, I understand, is particularly vulnerable - although I would guess that many of all parties are almost as vulnerable and exploitable.

I'm not certain at all that it would be to the benefit of the U.S. to publish these photos in the 1961 election. Instead, I suggest that this is a potential weapon which might take a little time and effort to prepare, and which might be highly useful if a policy decision is made to undertake action. On a lower plane, this material might be useful blackmail for control purposes. Or, as a way to knock Serrano out.

I don't know what your connections are with Leon Ty and Max Atienza, or their present enterprise called "People's League for Good Government." However, if the decision is ever made in 1961 to take such an action, probably the only national and established publication which would touch these photos with a 10-foot pole would be the Philippine Free Press, probably via Leon Ty. I sure wouldn't trust him with such a thing ahead of time. However, it's the sort of idea he gets, too, from time to time, and maybe he's playing around with such a thing now.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 12 Feb 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: ____
Reason: ____
MDR: 13-M-1345

SECRET

65
F-1
130
5

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Legation
Saigon

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE

17 January 1956

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Subject: ANTI-GUERILLA COURSE, Recommended-

TO : Colonel Edward Lansdale, MAAG-Vietnam

In connection with your desire to revise our previous submitted memorandum titled "Anti-Guerilla Course" the following detailed layout of the said course is strongly recommended based on the assumptions:

a. That the class will not exceed 30 in number.

b. That the course will not exceed 4 weeks in duration.

c. That the conduct of instruction will be mainly on demonstrations, illustrations, tours and field exercises, etc., in order to save time.

d. That, as much as possible, the students should be introduced to Philippine officers and enlisted men who had conducted successful operations according to the precepts of the course; these officers and men to conduct the students to the areas where said operations had been successfully carried out, etc.

e. That round-table discussions will be encouraged in order that exchange of views and experiences will be had.

f. That the instructors will control and conduct the course of instruction so as to emphasize the important aspects of psychological warfare, troop behavior, civil affairs, in that order of priority.

In view of the above assumptions, the following suggestions on the course is hereby submitted:

I. DURATION OF THE COURSE

The course can be reduced to three weeks, with a total of 40 hours of instruction, at 7 hours per day on working days, except Saturdays (5 hours only).
Weekends (Saturday afternoons and the whole day on Sundays)

COPIED FROM OFFICIAL: 23 FEB 1960

SECRET

may be wisely used to advantage by the instructors for conducted tours on areas of Philippine field units that had been successful in anti-guerilla operations.

Resorting to troop demonstrations, lecture room illustrations by chart, diagrams, etc., will save valuable time.

II CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

Troop demonstrations will be greatly resorted to. This will require ample time for these demonstration units to prepare the ground, rehearse, etc.

Diagrams, charts, pictorial records will be used to form the greater bulk of lectures and round-table conferences. Due to the language barrier that will be undoubtedly hamper easy and fast discussions of experiences and exchange of viewpoints, paper illustrations will be greatly resorted to.

Conducted tours on areas of operations will be programmed in order that no time is wasted. One or more subjects may be brought up on one tour so as to reduce travel time to the minimum. Itineraries will be announced in advance to give ample time for field units to prepare their part of the instruction in the proper selection of troops participating in the demonstration, rehearsals and actual demonstration on the actual scene of action, etc. Officers selected as commentators for these demonstrations must be carefully selected for their thorough knowledge of the subject, the objectives desired, etc., and must in all cases, confer with the instructors prior to the demonstration in order that proper orientation is attained.

Round table conferences will be greatly encouraged so that the instruction will be two-way exchange of views and experiences. Information accumulated in these discussions should be recorded and edited for future reference and publication. Open discussions should be encouraged and steered by instructors with the object of comparing methods and techniques used or experienced by both, the students and the instructors.

III. THE COURSE

1. LARGE UNIT INFILTRATION METHODS (6 hours) (Selection of personnel, organization, composition of infiltration groups, selection and establishment of secret training camp site, security and administration of camp, training schedules, use of captured documents and material, indoctrination instructions, use of cover names and titles, instruction on enemy order of battle, use of enemy "slanguage", under cover signal communications, and basic guerrilla training on routes, deceptions, ambush methods and techniques, weapons, etc.)

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on general description of the subject, citing the necessity for this method of infiltration, illustrative examples, etc.
4 hours - Demonstration by troops
1 hour - Round table discussion

2. ANTI-AMBUSCADE METHODS (4 hours) (Methods used for road or motorized patrols, organization, composition and orders to motorized patrols; signal communications; equipment and armament; deception methods; use of terrain; counter-ambush layouts; use of explosives and obstacles; selection of routes of withdrawal, interception and pursuit, etc.)

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on general description of the subject, emphasizing the importance of this technique to guerrilla warfare. Illustrations of actual examples of ambuscades resorted to be the enemy and countermeasures used by the troops successfully will be cited.
2 hours - Demonstration by troops.
1 hour - Round table discussion.

3. DESCRIPTION METHODS BY USE OF ARTILLERY FIRES (2 hours) (Use of artillery and heavy infantry weapons, formations and dispersion of ambush units; use of terrain, cover, fields of fire, obstacles, camouflage, selection of assembly points; coordination of fires of varying calibers, preparation of firing tables; routes of withdrawal and assembly areas; automatic encirclement of the enemy, etc.)

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on general description of the subject; reasons why this method is generally resorted to; description of preparation methods; illustrative examples successfully carried out.
1 hour - Open discussion.

4. AIR RECONNAISSANCE METHODS (4 hours) (Reconnaissance plans by air, coordination with ground reconnaissance; preparations of flight schedules; posting of informers; air-ground signal systems; the "triangulation method"; dispersion of combat units, etc.)

Breakdown: 2 hours - Lecture on description of this method; emphasis on air-ground liaison between pilot and informers on the ground; detailed signal tables; security, etc.
1 hour - Demonstration.
1 hour - Open discussion.

5. USE OF EXPLOSIVES (3 hours) (Demolitions and explosives, coordinated use of mines, booby traps, and demolitions in enemy territory, bivouacs, camp sites, and used routes, etc.)

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on general use of explosives and demolition operations in guerrilla warfare; methods used currently; illustrative examples, etc.)
1 hour - Demonstration.
1 hour - Round table conference.

6. SCREENING TECHNIQUES (5 hours) (Screening plans coordinated with tactical operations; security; instructions and employment of troops, posting of informers and spotters; the "finger man" method; search and interrogation areas; special search groups, etc.)

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Breakdown: 2 hours - Lecture on the general description of the subject; the various methods of search and screening used on areas under enemy influence; illustrative examples, etc.
1 hour - Demonstration.
2 hours - Round table conference.

7. EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 95 hours) (Use of electronic equipment, drugs, special devices, weapons, explosives; and psychological methods, etc.)

Breakdown: 3 hours - Lecture on the subject; divided into: special methods, deception methods, and psycho-war methods; emphasis on the unorthodoxness of the methods and techniques used; illustrative examples.
1 hour - Demonstration.
1 hour - Open discussion.

8. COUNTERSIGN CONTROL SYSTEM (5 hours) (General use of countersign and recognition systems; directives and orders; enforcement of countersigns and countersign control officers; functions and duties of countersign control officers; countersign methods for camps, bivouacs, troop movements; combat; use of recognition signals and identification markings; preparation and dissemination of countersign tables to troops and its security, etc.)

Breakdown: 3 hours - Lecture on the subject with emphasis on the careful preparation of countersign tables, dissemination to troops, security from the enemy and rigid enforcement; various methods resorted to under various conditions, etc.
1 hour - Demonstration.
1 hour - Open discussion.

9. BASIC GUERRILLA TRAINING SUBJECTS (3 hours) (Selection of personnel for anti-guerrilla employment; basic military individual training proficiency on conventional methods; special subjects for guerrilla and anti-guerrilla training; coordination of conventional and special training programs and schedules, etc.)

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on the preparation of training; selection of subjects on conventional and anti-guerrilla warfare.
1 hour - Preparation of the training schedule.
1 hour - Open discussion.

10. TROOP BEHAVIOR & CIVIL AFFAIRS (3 hours) (Proper troop behavior of field units with civilian population; importance of close civilian-military relationships; use of civil population for intelligence and psycho-war purposes; cooperation and assistance of civil authorities, etc.)

Breakdown: 1 hour - Lecture on the general subject with emphasis on civil and military collaboration against guerrilla forces; organizational concept to cultivate and improve relations with the population and local civilian authorities by the military; illustrative examples, etc.
1 hour - Demonstration.
1 hour - Round table conference.

Recapitulation:

(Available hours of instruction: 40 hours)

	Subject	
1.	Large Unit Infiltration Methods	6 hrs.
2.	Anti-ambuscade Methods	4 "
3.	Deception Methods by Use of Artillery Fires	2 "
4.	Air Reconnaissance Methods	4 "
5.	Use of Explosives	3 "
6.	Screening methods	5 "
7.	Employment of Special Equipment	5 "
8.	Countersign Control System	5 "
9.	Basic Guerrilla Training Subjects	3 "
10.	Troop Behavior & Civil Affairs	3 "
	Total	40 hrs.

NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO
Colonel, CAV (GSC)
Presidential Observer
& Actg Military Attache

Annexes:
I - Schedule of Instruction (Recommended)
II - Recommended Subjects (For Basic Guerrilla Training)

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

ANNEX I

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

First Week: Monday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture.	(Characteristics of Guerrilla Warfare; General Principles, etc.)
9:00 - 10:00	Lecture.	(The Hukbalhap Campaign)
10:00 - 11:00	Visit to GHQ AFP, HQ Philippine Training Command (Camp Murphy & Ft. McKinley)	
11:00 - 12:00	Visit to HQ PC (Camp Crame)	
13:00 - 13:30	Lecture.	(The Organization of the AFP during the years 1946-1951)
13:30 - 14:00	Lecture.	(Organization of AFP area commands & BCTs & Special Units.)
14:00 - 15:00	Lecture.	(Organization of Psycho-war teams & Civil Affairs units.)
15:00 - 16:00	Lecture.	(Organization of Philippine Intelligence during the years 1945-1951, including field units.)

Tuesday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture.	(Organization of the Hukbalhap.)
9:00 - 10:00	Lecture.	(Hukbalhap Armed Units & Order of Battle.)
10:00 - 11:00	Lecture.	(Hukbalhap Subversive Methods & Activities during the years 1945-1955.)
11:00 - 12:00	Lecture.	(Map & Terrain Study of the Hukbalhap areas.)
13:00 - 16:00	Air Tour of Huklandia and terrain orientation.	

Wednesday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture.	(Large Unit Infiltration methods.)
9:00 - 12:00	Demonstration.	(Large Unit Infiltration Methods.) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Lt. Col. Laureano Maraña, conducting.

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

13:00 - 14:00	Demonstration. (Continued.)
14:00 - 15:00	Lecture. (Deception Methods by Use of Artillery Fires.) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Major Perfecto Munag, conducting.
15:00 - 16:00	Round table discussion.

Thursday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture. (Anti-ambuscade Methods.) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Capt. G. de la Paz, conducting.
9:00 - 11:00	Demonstration. (Anti-ambuscade Methods) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Capt. G. de la Paz, conducting.
11:00 - 12:00	Round table discussion.
13:00 - 14:00	Lecture. (Use of Explosives.) Ft. Mc Kinley Area; Capt. M. Jacob, conducting.
14:00 - 15:00	Demonstration. (Use of Explosives.) Ft. McKinley Area; Capt. M. Jacob, conducting.
15:00 - 16:00	Round Table discussion.

Friday:

8:00 - 10:00	Lecture. (Air Reconnaissance Methods.) Ft. McKinley Area; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
10:00 -11:00	Demonstration. (Air Reconnaissance Methods.) Nichols Air Base; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
11:00 --12:00	Open discussion.

Saturday:

8:00 - 10:00	Lecture. (Screening Techniques.) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
10:00 - 11:00	Demonstration. (Screening Techniques.) 7th BCT Area, Tagaytay City; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
11:00 - 12:00	Round Table Conference.
13:00 - 14:00	Round Table Conference.
14:00 - 16:00	Lecture. (Employment of Special Equipment.) Tagaytay City, 7th BCT Area; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

Saturday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture. (Employment of Special Equipment.) Ft. McKinley Area; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
9:00 - 10:00	Demonstration. (Employment of Special Equipment.) Ft. McKinley Area; Major M. Justiniano, conducting.
10:00 - 11:00	Open discussion.
11:00 - 13:00	Lecture. (Countersign Control System.) Ft. McKinley Area; Capt. M. Jacob, conducting.

Second Week:

Monday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture. (Countersign Control System.) Ft. McKinley Area; Capt. M. Jacob, conducting.
9:00 - 10:00	Demonstration. (Countersign Control System.) 7th RCT Area, Tagaytay City; Capt. M. Jacob, conducting.
10:00 - 11:00	Open discussion.
11:00 - 12:00	Lecture. (Troop Behavior & Civil Affairs.) 7th RCT Area, Tagaytay City: Capt. R. Balan, conducting.
13:00 - 15:00	Demonstration. (Troop Behavior & Civil Affairs.) 7th RCT Area, Tagaytay City; Capt. R. Balan, conducting.
15:00 - 16:00	Round table discussion.

Tuesday:

8:00 - 9:00	Lecture (Basic Guerrilla Training Subjects.) Ft. McKinley Area; Lt. Col. Rafael Ileto, conducting.
9:00 - 10:00	Practical Exercise. (Preparation of a training schedule for anti-guerrilla troops.) Ft. McKinley Area; Lt. Col. Rafael Ileto, conducting.

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL: 23 FEB 1960

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

10:00 - 12:00 Open discussion.

13:00 - 16:00 Open time.

Wednesday:
Thursday : Tour of the 1st Military Area, visiting the
Friday : Candaba Swamps, Bisk-sa-bato, Mt. Arayat, and
Saturday : Pocac hills, IMA officers, conducting.

Third Week:

Monday : Tour of the 2nd Military Area, visiting the Mt.
Tuesday : Banahaw and Makiling Areas, through the Infanta-
Sinilaan Road, and the Lukban-Mauban Highway.

Wednesday: Visit on the Intelligence Section of Hq. 3rd
PCT, Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary at Santa Cruz, Laguna; IIMA
officers, conducting.

Thursday : Open time.
Friday : Open time.
Saturday : Open time.

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL : 23 FEB 1960

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

ANNEX II

RECOMMENDED SUBJECTS

(For Basic Guerrilla Training)

General Instruction:

ARTICLES OF WAR

RULES OF LAND WARFARE

WEAPONS (incl., blade weapons & archery)

* SCOUTING & PATROLLING

MAP READING & SKETCHING

AERIAL PHOTO INTERPRETATION

* EXPLOSIVES & DEMOLITIONS

COMBAT TACTICS

PHYSICAL TRAINING (incl., unarmed combat)

Special Instruction:

* TROOP BEHAVIOR & CIVIL AFFAIRS

* PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE METHODS

WOODCRAFT

PATHFINDING & TRACKING

JUNGLE SURVIVAL

* RUSES & DECEPTION METHODS

* INTERROGATION & INVESTIGATION

CAMOUFLAGE

* - Emphasized

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL : 23 FEB 1960

1 - Saigon
1 - Landale
3 - diplotab
6

GUERRILLA WARFARE

General Navarre has a strong memory of the French Resistance movement in WW II, in which he was active, and told me that he intended to expand guerrilla activities as one of his immediate means of retaking the initiative. At the present time, French Associated States guerrilla operations are loosely organized among tribes in Tonkin at command levels and utilize minor tribal groups in Laos, and in Northern and Central Vietnam. They form a thin defensive barrier on the outer perimeter of Viet-minh influence in the mountains. French estimates of strength vary from 3,000 to 20,000.

Guerrilla warfare is only

French-Associated States forces are capable of expanding guerrilla forces immediately as defensive measures, by increasing the number of

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

are in being in these areas; tribal people will fight strangers, including the Viet-Minh. ~~A strong effort~~ Effective harassment of Viet-Minh communication lines ~~will require~~ from the Chinese border and ~~flanking~~ flanking the Delta perimeter will require ~~a force of one regiment~~ stronger and better trained guerilla units than now exist, with political convictions to at least match those of the Viet-Minh so that these units can recruit local partisans in the area of operations. ~~Training facilities. These training~~ Parent training facilities can be expanded to train one guerilla battalion within the next two months; a political basis for guerilla action can be accomplished through the existing understanding between Governor Tri and the French in the North, if General Navarre initiates it.

~~[redacted]~~

~~A specific suggestion~~

A concrete suggestion for mounting a guerilla operation prior to 15 September, harassing the Viet-Minh communication line flanking the southern Delta perimeter, was made to General Navarre and

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

[illegible] late, 4 guerilla training facilities were infected and talks were held with S.D.E.C.E. Action Service commanders now responsible for guerilla activities to encourage expansion of training and aggressive actions. They are thinking in terms of specialized defensive guerilla actions in the mountains and "pin-prick" sabotage raids by commandos. [illegible] (See Annex ——).

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: ____
Reason: ____
MDR: 13-M-1345
5 USC 552 +

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

General Navarre, General Hinh, and President Tam [illegible] are in favor of waging more aggressive psychological warfare and are hopeful of obtaining a political answer to the Viet-minh propaganda theme of immediate and complete independence for Vietnam. Psychological [illegible] barely started in the

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

combat psychological warfare, training is [illegible] neither uniform nor effective, and enemy weaknesses are not being exploited. Behavior of French Union and Vietnamese forces in occupying villages is such that it negates much of the present psychological warfare effort. A further handicap is that Navone, Hinh, and Tam approach citizens and leading forces on one side of what [illegible] a [illegible] civil war, Vietnamese against Vietnamese.

Suggestions were given to psychological warfare officers on the adoption of combat techniques, exploitation of enemy weaknesses, and more uniform training. [illegible] I recommended to General Navone that the one French and three Vietnamese officers who completed the psychological warfare course at Ft. Bragg this June be used to organize and supervise a training program. The addition of a psychological warfare officer to the MAAG staff

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

trained psychological warfare officer (Capt. Edward Kool) as an Assistant Military Attache, should benefit the initiation of a comprehensive program (See Annex ___).

PACIFICATION

One pressing aspect of the war is the current insecurity of rear areas. For example, the enemy holds or controls about 80% of the area inside the Delta perimeter with military units up to regiments and divisions and is known to make use of Hanoi itself as a rest area for its officers (and Chinese advisers) dressed as civilians. Most of the lack of aggressive spirit on the part of French command appears to be based on their concern for security to the rear.

In North Vietnam, particularly within the Delta, land action is being coordinated with the

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

a G-5 has been created as a Bureau of Pacification, working closely with Governor Tri's [redacted] civil Committee for Pacification. In [redacted] conjunction with military actions, ~~village and provincial~~ pacification teams establish village and provincial governments, organize and arm village militia for defense against the Viet-minh. G-5 is new and small, there are political questions re Governor Tri's growing strength, [redacted] and militia are poorly armed to resist Viet-minh attacks on villages. (See Annex ___) * It is recommended that the militia be armed with sufficient automatic weapons to cope with Viet-minh regional troops (# 20,000 militia reported now, total of 40,000 by 31 Dec 54 requiring 400 machine guns and 1,200 sub-machine guns from FTED, and 400 machine guns, 800 automatic rifles, and 6,800 sub-machine guns furnished by us under a separate aid program to North Vietnam militia (See Annex ___). (* Item; fact of recommendation needs to be checked with Senior O'Daniel)

The mission of the 54 Commando Battalions to be added to the Vietnamese Army by 1954 [redacted] primarily for pacification [redacted]

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

and trained by 1 Oct 53, including some in Central Vietnam by 1 Sep 53 (14 Commando Bns in Central Vietnam by 31 Dec 53). The Commando Battalions are being trained for political, propaganda, and counter-guerilla warfare.

PRISONERS OF WAR

French officers estimated they held about 30,000 Viet-minh PW's in camps throughout Vietnam. French Union forces have the responsibility for holding PW's, since the Vietnamese government has not signed the Geneva Convention. Separate camps have been established for "de-intoxication" of selected PW's, what the French term "de-intoxication" Of selected PW's, [redacted] stating they obtained the idea from 10 "de-intoxicated" Viet-minh are now cadets at Dalat. our "de-nazification" camps in Germany. (Covered in Psychological Warfare Annex).

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

ENEMY "MAAG"

~~The spirit and effectiveness of the Viet-minh army to be due largely to strong political motivation (complete independence, or anti-French as such as Communism).~~ There are probably 2,000 Chinese Communist advisors, ~~and~~ possibly as many as 10,000, with the Viet-minh. They remain in the background to a large extent, mostly at major headquarters and major supply points. The spirit and effectiveness of the Viet-minh army in resistance before the advent of Chinese advisors established themselves with the Viet-minh, due in part to Marxist trained Vietnamese leaders, and in part to strong political motivation (complete independence or anti-French as such as Communism). Since we have our own MAAG and have suggested a French MAAG to work with the Vietnamese Army, I felt that some information about how the Chinese Communists work with the enemy would be of interest. I requested a brief report on this from the CIA officials (Mr. John Caswell) who have ever been with the French SDECE. (See Annex

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. **Purpose:** To create a partisan effort in the Associated States capable of:

   a. Relieving regular forces of protecting friendly areas outside of fortified zones.
   b. Undertaking major harrassing action on Viet-Minh lines of communication.
   c. Expanding its numbers by recruitment from the civilian population in areas claimed by the enemy.

2. **Facts bearing on the Problem:**

   a. The French Union and Vietnamese forces have the capability of initiating partisan action, as shown by present efforts along these lines. Further, there are French officers and officials who either are close to Vietnamese and tribal groups, or have the combat partisan experience with the Maquis, or both.

   b. There are four geographic areas held by the Viet Minh which the enemy needs: the supply routes from China in the north, the north-south communication route which skirts the southern perimeter of the Delta fortifications, his home in the Vinh area, and the areas under his control within the Delta. The latter is susceptible to action under the Pacification program, ~~and does not lend itself as readily to guerrilla actions as the first three.~~ if closely coordinated with combat forces.

   c. There are sparsely populated mountain regions which have the terrain characteristics for ideal guerrilla bases near the first three Viet Minh areas mentioned above. In the north, there are such places close to the Chinese border and near Haiphong, within guerrilla striking distance of the major Chinese supply routes. On the north-south communications line, there is good guerrilla country near Phu Nho Quan. South, there is good guerrilla country west of Vinh and also northeast of Thanh Hoa.

   d. The French Union forces have the ability to air-drop a guerrilla force into or near a mountain base, and to resupply it by air.

   e. Guerrilla forces have been organized to defend their own homes in some northern and central areas of the Associated States.

3. **Discussion:**

   a. A partisan group should be able to defend itself adequately and to expand by recruitment within its area of operation. A battalion trained for mountain combat, including scouting and patrolling, woodscraft, ambushing, and (above all) marksmanship, should be a strong enough force for operations in the Vinh, Thanh Hoa, or Phu Nho Quan areas. Perhaps after successful operations in one of these areas, experienced cadre could be formed for operations near Haiphong, where there is the possibility of intervention by the Chinese from across the border.

   b. It is estimated that it would take about three months for a guerrilla battalion, in place, to start controlling its area of operation and to enlist the

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

support of the population. It can do so if it keeps moving by aggressive patrol action, selects and defeats enemy groups small enough to make defeat certain, employs ambush tactics, destroys or captures enemy materials, starts giving protection to civilians within the area, and uses political psychological warefare continually (through individual soldiers in the command as well as by the command itself.)

c. The area chosen must have room for rapid withdrawal, in keeping with fluid partisan tactics necessary for success. The area west of Vinh appears to be well-suited in this respect, with the Phu Nho Quon area offering nearly as suitable terrain. At Thanh Hoa, there is the possibility that friendly guerrillas might be joined up by F.T.N.V. forces pushing out from the Delta.

d. It appears that partisan actions initiated in the past have been undertaken more on the basis of opportunity than of military planning, which is understandable in a complex situation such as exists. In order to give military clarity, G-3, F.T.N.V., could coordinate the efforts of organizations now initiating guerrilla actions. Perhaps a joint team might be made up to draft a program modest enough for early implementation and making use of all resources now available, under guidance from G-3 or a special staff officer designated by General Cogny. The special team might be composed of selected officers now initiating guerrilla actions, working with the Vietnamese in the Pacification campaign, waging psychological warfare, and with partisan combat experience. The program might fare better under an officer who understands partisan combat and who is willing to work closely with those who understand the country and its people well. The French officer in charge could move into the background as the Vietnamese take over, if desired. Vietnamese officers in the program should be combat-proven, aggressive, resourceful, and imaginative.

e. A partisan program should envision the organization of a separate command, responsible directly to a major headquarters (such as F.T.N.V.), with a headquarters staff created to insure adequate training, supply, and employment. A minimum requirement would be one battalion of guerrillas for initial employment.

f. A political basis is required for the expansion (by recruiting local civilians) of a guerrilla battalion when it is in its area of combat. However, on an emergency basis, the military situation need not await political action. A team under G-3 auspices, leaning heavily upon someone such as Colonel Miner, should be able to formulate an intermediate basis or substitute for a political basis (perhaps by recruiting through the Governor), without involving the basic policy of the French government...enough to get a program started.

4. Conclusions:

a. A guerrilla action can be an economical and fairly quickly initiated action which could capture the imagination of the people and boost Vietnamese morale.

b. The area most favorable for successful guerrilla action soon is in the mountains west of Vinh, with the Thanh Hoa area a good second.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

5. Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

a. A partisan force be created in Indo-China.

b. That a team of officers with partisan or Vietnamese-political experience be appointed to draft a guerrilla warfare program in Indo-China

Identities:

William H. Godel, Deputy Director of

Office of Special Operations, OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sec 191

Manila, 29 Oct 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

SUBJECT: Smuggling of pornographic films (which are copied in the Philippines) to Saigon, South Vietnam: Laos and Cambodia.

A highly reliable information gathered from a film technician of a local film company and supported by similar information from a Filipino employee of the USIS (United States Information Service) in Manila, states the follow ng facts:

An order for more copies of pornographic films (known in the message as "fighting Fish film"), has been received from Saigon from an American USIS employee named CHARLES T. MERTZ, by a Filipina, employee also of the USIS in Manila, named, Mrs. PATROCINIO YAPSINGCO also known as Mrs. PAT KELLY, last week. Mrs. Kelly or Mrs. Yapsingco contacted a Mr. CALVO of the LEBRAN -MOVIETEC Inc. [redacted] in Quezon City to fill the order. The Pornographic films are owned by RAFAEL ANTON, a Spanish national, Manager of the LEBRAN-MOVIETEC Inc. who is also reported as a very close friend and confidate of Mr. MERTZ. It has been learned that these two are so close that ANTON allows MERTZ to use his car every time the later comes to Manila from Saigon.

This order of 16MM Pornographic films has already been filled yesterday (Oct. 28, 1956) and the copies has been delivered to Mrs. Kelly in the USIS office in the United States Embassy in Manila. This film package together with other 16mm propaganda films destined for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was entrusted to a [redacted] for packing on the date of delivery from [redacted] MOVIETEC Inc. A copy of this said pornographic film was exhibited to the undersigned by informer and the same is an english film which shows many kinds of sexual intercourse, and other immoral human acts.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 505C 5552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

The films in question are now in the possession and under the control of Mrs. YAPSINGCO alias Mrs. KELLY in the United States Embassy in Manila and is ready for delivery on the first airplane for SAIGON either tonight, tomorrow (Oct 30th) or Thursday (Nov. 1, 1956).
The contactman who has access to the said filam assured the undersigned that he will be notified during the delivery of the films to the airport.

The originals or negatives of the said 16mm films in question is in the possession of Mr. Rafael Anton in the LEBRAN-MOVIETEC Inc. laboratory in Quezon City.
It is suggested that a simultaneous search be also made of that place so complete evidence could be secured so no further copies of these pornographic films be produced in the future.

Respectfully submitted:

TRUE COPY:

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

2 Enclosures MSG

Jim,

Idaho is [illegible], Jason and I have been looking for safe land carrier of this to you but no travellers appear at the moment. In an attempt to keep this out of official channels and give you an opportunity to look at it we are sending this way. (Prisoner papers were faxed)

Will appreciate being advised as to the method you take so we can inform Cavlett. No Disposition outside here that we aware of this -- to our knowledge.

Kohrt

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Box 6 FF 4 Doc 72		
AGENCY	R	#

SPECIAL STUDY

THE CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER OPERATIONS

A Study to Investigate the Feasibility of Establishing International Volunteer Air Forces for Operations in the Far East Area During the Time Period 1 July 1955 to 1 January 1960.

by

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP NO. 11
COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOL
Class of 1955

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

"A CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL-VOLUNTEER AIR FORCE OPERATIONS"

INTRODUCTION

"The purpose of this study is to investigate the feasibility of established air forces composed of international volunteers for employment in support of international objectives in the Far East area during the time period 1955 through 1960."

"Modern history records a number of incidents involving the participation of volunteer and quasi-volunteer forces in armed conflict at various and varying degrees of magnitude and intensity. Volunteer forces have participated in armed conflict under conditions of declared war and undeclared war between nations, civil war, and revolution. Basically, such forces have devised their "volunteer" nature from the non-belligerent status of the parent country with respect to the conflict at hand."

"While treating this subject in light of the realities of the day, it is considered necessarily valid, however, to draw upon history to investigate certain fundamental political and military aspects of the organization and operation of volunteer forces in the past . . . . . The study in its historical analysis strives to differentiate between instances of the participation of organized volunteer groups and the participation of individual "soldiers of fortune" all mercenary; the latter not being of significance to the objectives of this study are not, therefore, reported upon . . . . . Those forces composed of individual volunteers-in-fact and those forces of a quasi-volunteer nature composed of military units committed to action, but operating under the continuing orders of a nation not actively or openly belligerent in the conflict, constitute a further differentation. In this case, such forces are considered to be "volunteer" in name only, having the mission of furthering the objectives of their parent nation without necessarily committing that nation to a future of full-scale declared war."

"In view of the complex international political ramifications inherent in the organization and operation of volunteer forces and the important questions of national and international law which bear on the subject, the study reviews all seemingly pertinent aspects of national and international law."

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

SECTION I.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE

CHAPTER I.

World War I, The Lafayette Flying Corps, 1916-18.

"Introduction.....This group served as the first recorded instance of volunteer forces of an international make-up being employed in the air fighting phase of an armed country."

"Factors Involving Establishment. In the early days of World War I many Americans sympathetic to the French cause enlisted in the French Army. These American volunteers were placed in the French Foreign Legion. As members of the Legion they soon lost their American identity as they were members and individuals in the conglomeration of races that made up the ranks. A number of these American volunteers were concerned over the lack of identity of American effort in the fight and they sought some method of uniting the American volunteers into a distinctive group..... Other Americans in France had similar plans for an American volunteer unit. The efforts of these various American elements were consolidated under Dr. Edmund Gros' leadership.... Dr. Gros and an assistant conceived and developed the plan for the 'American Flying Corps'."

"At the outbreak of the war the United States was neutral and under heavy pressure to maintain that neutrality. The position of the United States in regard to the war proved both an obstacle in forming an American volunteer unit and a strong factor in precipitating French approval for the establishment of such a unit..... A large element in America was in open sympathy with France, and the French authorities realized that the plans of a band of young Americans in French uniform, fighting with the air service, would be certain to arouse a widespread interest and sympathy at home..... One must bear in mind that the motive which activated France in promoting the establishment of the American volunteer unit was mainly political."

"Organization..... After some delay the French authorities agreed to accept members of the Lafayette Flying Corps into the French Army under the following terms of enlistment: (a) Volunteers would enlist in the French Army for the duration of the war and would be subject to full military control and discipline of the French Army; (b) The French Government would give each volunteer a six months course of flight train-

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

ing in the French aviation school and pay each recruit the basic wage of 5¢ per day; (c) Most volunteers were guaranteed that their act of engagement with the French Army could be rescinded on demand of the individual or on demand of the French military authorities in case of proven inaptitude for service as flight personnel of the military aviation service."

"While serving as the central agency through which the French Government worked on matters concerning the American volunteers, the Lafayette Flying Corps was not a military organization in a true sense of the word. Rather, it was organized along the lines of a honorary 'Group' whose membership embraced all American volunteers who flew with the French Air Service. A Committee of civilians in France -- mostly Americans -- was organized to generate funds(1) and handle the affairs of the Lafayette Flying Corps. This Committee brought up a living allowance(2) for members of the Corps and gave cash(3) awards of prizes to those members who were awarded military citations and decorations by the French Government. The Committee was also active in recruiting volunteers in the United States and served as the central agency of information and assistance for the Americans desiring enlistment in the French Air Service."

"Operations. The members of the Lafayette Flying Corps enlisted in the French Army as privates, were made corporals on receiving a pilot's license, and sergeants after flying 30 hours of combat. Some, after considerable flying experience, were promoted to the rank of adjutant (warrant officers) and very few obtained commissioned rank....."

"After completing the flight training course, American volunteers were assigned to various flying escadrilles. Pilots of the escadrilles flew from 1 to 3 combat sorties per day. Each sortie averaged approximately two hours..... As NCO's the American volunteers did not hold command positions in the escadrille and were not directly concerned with planning, discipline or logistic problems of the French Air Service."

(1) Over $125,000 was contributed by Mr. W. K. Vanderbilt, Honorary President of the Lafayette Flying Corps.

(2) This living allowance was $25 per month at first; later increased to $50 per month.

(3) $300 for Legion of Honor; $200 for military medals; $100 for War Cross; and $50 for each additional palm.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

"As has been stated previously, a motive for forming the Lafayette Flying Corps was to allow American volunteers to serve in the fighting as a unit. During the first year following the organization of the Corps that aim was not achieved as American volunteers were scattered throughout the various escadrilles of the French Air Service. In April of 1916, however, the 'Escadrille Americiane', later named the Lafayette Escadrille, was placed on duty at the front. This escadrille, commanded by a French officer was made up entirely of American pilots, became known as the "American Squadron'..... Because of its achievements for American identity, the Lafayette Escadrille received much publicity in both the French and American press and the establishment of this American Squadron served to identify and similarize the efforts of the entire Lafayette Flying Corps and the individual American volunteers serving in other escadrilles of the French Air Service."

"International Implications. Out of regard for the strict neutrality policy of the United States at the beginning of the war, the French authorities were hesitant to allow an American volunteer to enlist in the French Army. Weighed against this strict interpretation of neutrality was the psychological advantage to be gained by the French in having American volunteers in French uniform fighting a common cause.....".

"At the outbreak of the war French law forbade any but a Frenchman to serve in the aviation service. A special law was passed permitting American volunteers to serve in the French Air Service."

"The question of citizenship of American volunteers and the possibility of loss of nationality through enlistment in a foreign army was taken up by the Committee of the Lafayette Flying Corps with the United States Consul General in France. The question was referred to Washington and it was there decided that as the volunteer did not swear allegiance to France, only promising to obey orders and submit to discipline, he did not lose his American citizenship."

"Accomplishment. Members of the Lafayette Flying Corps who served with the French Air Service numbered 267. Of this number, 43 were released before receiving the military brevet because of illness, inaptitude, or injuries received in flying accidents. Those who served in combat numbered 180 and they fought with 66 pursuit and 27 observation and bombardment squadrons of the French Aviation Service. After the declaration of war by the United States, 93 of these pilots transferred to the United States air service and 26 to naval aviation; 33 remained with the French Air Service. Members of the Lafayette Flying Corps were officially confirmed with the destruction of 199 enemy machines. 15 members were taken prisoners by the enemy, 19 were wounded in combat and 51 were killed."

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

"As one considers the historical significance of the Lafayette Flying Corps it becomes evident that the military achievements were of minor importance and the outstanding accomplishment of the volunteers was their influence on public opinion in the United States at a time when neutrality was a national issue.....".

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

CHAPTER II

SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939

"During the 32-1/2 months of this period of civil strife in Spain, thousands of foreigners who were referred to as "volunteers" fought on both sides of the conflict. While considering this period in military history, it is necessary to understand the factors that influenced the organization, the dispatchment and operation of the foreign volunteers in the Spanish Civil War."

"....The Spanish Civil War was destined to have many repercussions beyond her own borders. Actually, this conflict threatened the peace of Europe because the strategic, political, economic and religious interests of the European nations were closely involved in the war."

"..... the opposing forces in this conflict are identified as the Loyalists who fought for the Republic and the Fascists who supported General Franco and the rebellious Spanish Army."

"Germany and Italy had an object in Spain in the victory of Franco ... and they both decided early to do all in their power to bring such a victory about. France and England took a negative attitude to the Civil War. They would have preferred a Loyalist victory, but were not willing to involve themselves in the conflict."

German Interest in Spain

"... Germany's interest in Spanish politics was apparent long before the outbreak of war.... Various documents show that since 1930 the Nazi Party in Germany had been supplying money, arms, and propaganda material to Franco. In February 1936 Fascist leaders went to Berlin to assure German air support in case of defection of the Spanish fleet when the rebellion began..."

"....Germany needed Spanish minerals to build up her armaments. A Fascist regime would most likely provide them. Politically she feared the extension of Communism in Europe would strengthen her mortal enemy, Russia, and her traditional enemy, France ... Germany wanted the use of the Canary Islands for air and sea power in case she went to war with England and France."

Italy's Interest in Spain

"Having much closer ties of race, color and religion with Spain, Italy had very strong motives for intervention in this civil war. Italy too was against the spread of Communism in Europe, but the influence of the Roman Catholic Church was the factor which caused both an early interest in Spanish politics, as well as strong support for Franco more than any other power. As early as 1933 several leaders of the Spanish monarchy

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

visited Rome to solicit Italian aid in their support. In March 1934, Mussolini assured these Spaniards that he would do all he could to restore the monarchy. He proposed to furnish them immediately with arms and money. He further assured them at this time that this aid was only the beginning . . . ." She wanted control of the Balearic Islands which were the key to the defense of the western Mediterranean."

France's Interest in Spain

'Problems were different in France. She had formed an alliance with Russia and smaller eastern states in an attempt to counteract the growing power of Germany and Italy . . . As a Fascist victory would threaten her security, France leaned toward the Spanish Republican Government. France also was interested in Spain from an economic standpoint as she held sixty percent of the entire capital invested in Spanish industry . . . France therefore pursued a non-intervention policy hoping that the events in Spain would not make a decision necessary for which she was unwilling to take the responsibility."

British Interest in Spain

"... Britain was trying to resurrect the League of Nations and was hoping for disarmament. Because of her distance from Spain, Britain was less concerned with this war than was France... Politically Britain was in favor of the Spanish Republican Government. Franco's planned government could not be supported by the democratic and constitutional government of Britain. Britain supported very strongly the policy of non-intervention mainly on the basis of the danger of a European general war."

Russian Interest in Spain

Russia was most interested in the Spanish conflice from a political standpoint. Initially she agreed to a non-intervention policy and because of her great distance from Spain, she hoped the non-intervention policy could be pressed strongly enough so that no foreign forces of any great size would be able to actively support Franco. ...Actually at this stage in history, Russia did not fear a European war. She herself was further removed from Spain than were the other nations of Europe and she did not believe that Germany and Italy would wage a general war over Spanish internal strife."

U.S. Interest in Spain

As tension in Spain rose to a high pitch and the outbreak of hostilities appeared inevitable, the first objective of the United States was to refrain from becoming implicated in European affairs. This nation was in strong support of British proposals for peace and non-intervention should war in

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Spain break out. This support emphasized U. S. sympathy with France and England, and, in the words of the State Department, was the best way to keep our country from being drawn into war. Mr. Claude G. Bowers, then the American Ambassador to San Sebastian, was in favor of aiding the Spanish Government. However, he was told by the State Department that we must pursue a broader course which recognized the grave danger that a civil war in Spain might erupt into a general European war."

Composition of Volunteer Forces

In the first months of the war armed intervention went on without official recognition by Germany, Italian, Russian and French governments. It was carried out by private firms, sometimes without the knowledge of their own governments. The German Nazis took great pains to conceal the aid they were sending to Franco. Freighters were carrying guns and munitions in fruit boxes disguised as crates of oranges. Many German ships sailed from "Franco Wharf" in Hamburg under South American flags. These ships carried German volunteer fighters disguised as tourists or sportsmen. Many German soldiers were asked to volunteer for service without being told where they were going."

"First active participation by Axis forces was an air and sea lift of Franco's 5,000 Spanish foreign legion troops and 17,000 Moors across the Gibraltar Straits in July 1936. German and Italian aircraft and ships alone made this lift for Franco. In November 1936 the first German troops arrived in force at Cadiz. The German Air Force commander in Spain, General Sperrle, wrote in the May 1939 issue of "Die Wehrmacht," that this first contingent numbered 6,500 men. One month later 5,000 Luftwaffe volunteers had reached Spain. Artillery, along with trained technicians, continued to flow into Spain from Germany via Portugal. . . . The majority of the aircraft taking part in the raids on Balboa and Tuernika in 1937 were German bombers."

"The first consignment of Italian soldiers arrived in Spain in December 1936. However, previous to this, Italian planes had been at Seville since August 1936 and Italian troops had occupied the Balearic Islands during that same month. By the middle of March 1937 there were four Italian divisions in the Spanish field. . . . The maximum number of Italian troops was from 40,000 to 70,000. Italian strength remained above 40,000 for the entire war."

"Turning to intervention on the Loyalist side, there were two main sources: first, the volunteers from many nations who joined the International Brigade, and secondly, the aid sent by Russia, France and Mexico."

"The International Brigade numbered between 3,000 and 4,000 men. The first unit of this brigade, trained and sent hurriedly to defend Madrid, consisted of 2,000 volunteers. This international group was composed of many

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

nationalities who came to Spain independently or in small groups driven by their conviction that this was a battle of freedom against authority. They could be classed as volunteers in the strict sense of the term, whereas the Germans and Italians were in Spain on the command of their superiors and ultimately with the sanction of their governments."

"During the first few weeks of the war Russia made no effort to send troops to Spain. In August 1936, however, Russia sent 2,000 technicians to join the Spanish Loyalists, but they rarely saw action in the front lines. The 600 Russian members of the International Brigade were political refugees from other countries. During 1938 Stalin withdrew all support from the Loyalists due to the expense of transportation and because of the war in China. ...Some planes and pilots were sent to Spain from Russia but not in sufficient quantity to be of significance to the fighting."

"France sent little help to the Spanish Republicans. Small amounts of Swiss, Czech and Belgian war material were allowed to go through France early in the war. Only a few planes and pilots were furnished Spain by the end of 1936. ...The French frontier was closed to the traffic of arms, munitions, supplies or men for the greater part of 1937-38."

"Britain, who kept most strictly to the non-intervention agreement, provided very little in the way of arms or men to the Spanish Government. Only small groups of volunteers from Britain joined the International Brigade."

"Like Britain, American intervention in the Spanish Civil War was negligible. In the first place the Spanish Government was not too anxious to buy arms from the United States because of the cost of transportation, and secondly the U.S. policy was to keep this nation from becoming involved on the European continent. There were, however, several thousand volunteers from America who did fight on the Loyalist side. This force started as the Abraham Lincoln Battalion. However, the movement of U.S. volunteers to this unit was reorganized as the American Brigade ....".

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

CHAPTER 3

WORLD WAR II, THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER CORPS, CHINA

Influence in China 1932 - 1937

"Italy, under the direction of Mussolini, attempted in 1932 to capture the growing Chinese aviation market by establishing a flying school in China and providing a military mission consisting of forty officers. Since the Italians received an additional bonus for all flying students graduated, it was to their advantage to pass all students regardless of their flying ability. Several assembly plants were established by the Italians in China to build Fiat and Savoia-Narchette aircraft which were an obsolete design. These two factors contributed directly to the inability of the Chinese Air Force to fly effective missions in the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. These factors lead General Chiang Kai Shek to believe that this was a direct conspiracy on the part of the Axis powers to assist in the defeat of China."

Russian Air Influence in China, 1937 - 1939

"When the Japanese attacked in 1937, China sent out a world-wide appeal for assistance. The only country to respond was Russia. . . . . The Chinese Air Force realized little permanent benefit from the Russian participation in the Japanese war. The Russians did not establish a Chinese training program and left Chinese air power completely bankrupt upon their departure from China in 1939."

American Influence on Chinese Air Power, 1941 - 1942

"American air influence in China had its beginning when General Chennault was employed by the Chinese Government in 1937 as Air Advisor to the Chinese Government. It was during this period that General Chennault and a heterogeneous collection of fighter pilots developed many of the aerial techniques which were to become so successful when the American pilots met the Japanese in actual combat. The Japanese Government violently protested against the American pilots and fighter planes which were doing so much heavy damage to their bombers in central China. In fact, this protestation became so violent that the U. S. State Department threatened to revoke Chennault's citizenship. This threat was never carried out.

Organization

"Upon departure of the Russian Air Unit in 1939, China found itself in dire circumstances and Chiang Kai Chek ordered General Chennault to approach the U. S. Government concerning the possibility of obtaining aircraft and pilots to assist China in its fight for freedom. Thorough governmental control and priority under the Lend-Lease Program made it impossible for Chennault to obtain aircraft on

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

the open market as all aircraft were being utilized in building up our own forces and the Royal Air Force. Chinese purchasing agents finally found 100 P-40-B aircraft which were earmarked for the RAF. The British Government relinquished its priority on these aircraft after the Curtis-Wright Corporation agreed to place another assembly line in operation to build a P-40 or more advanced design for the RAF."

". . . . . Chennault used every argument, pointing out the American Volunteer Group would provide the best possible test in fighter planes, pilots, and techniques and still received a negative answer (from the U. S. Government). Secretary Morgenthau became very interested in the project and pushed the plan in official circles." He asked and received the support of Thomas Corcoran, one of President Roosevelt's closest advisors. Mr. Corcoran approached the President with the AVG proposal and shortly afterwards the American Freedom Corps took shape. To avoid any diplomatic amenities, AVG was organized as the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company. It was this company that purchased aircraft from China and contracted for the American pilots to operate these aircraft."

"After many disappointments, General Chennault lowered his criteria for pilots, obtaining the signatures of 100 U. S. pilots on the Camco contracts. The War Department had provided a representative of Camco with an official letter authorizing them to enter Air Corps bases to interview pilots for the AVG. Even under the lowered criteria, only twelve pilots were recruited who had P-40 experience and more than half the pilots had no fighter experience.*//

"As finally organized, the AVG was composed of 100 pilots and aircraft with an additional 200 support personnel. It is of interest that at this time the U. S. Army Air Corps required 1200 men to operate this same type of organization. As the U. S. military services refused to allow its staff to join these volunteers, General Chennault was forced to use his flying officers or any other personnel he could recruit outside the Services to perform administrative duties."

"Under a general clause of the contract agreement with Camco, members of the AVG were obligated to render any services directed by the corporation. The contract provided for:

1. Salaries ranging from $250 for administrative personnel to $750 for squadron leaders.

2. Payment of all travel expenses.

3. Thirty days leave with pay per year.

4. Free quarters.

5. Allowances of $30 a month for rations.//

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

6. A bonus of $500 for each aircraft shot down was not a part of the original contract but was based on rumor. When Chiang Kai Shek learned of this rumor he agreed to pay the bonus and also made large contributions to widows and families of AVG personnel killed in action.

"Under the contract agreement AVG personnel could only be dismissed for insubordination, habitual use of drugs and alcohol, illness or injuries not in line of duty, malingering, and for revealing of confidential information to the enemy. The contract period was one year."

International Implications

"When the AVG arrived in Burma, delay was experienced in uncrating and assembling of aircraft due to diplomatic entanglements with the British Government. The British were interested in maintaining neutrality in the Far East and did not approve of the training of the AVG in Burma. Agreement was finally reached between British and Chinese representatives based on the legal technicality that Japan had never officially declared war on China."

Note: After many difficulties regarding security guards for planes, friction between Burmese and British Gurka Guards, Chennault finally integrated his forces and persuaded the British to loan the AVG ammunition and aviation gasolene without which the operation of the AVG would have been further restricted.

Operations

"The control of the AVG was entirely under General Chennault with no evidence of outside political or military influence adversely affecting the operation of the AVG."

". . . . . Although the primary mission of the AVG was air defense, it soon became obvious to General Channault that air attacks against Japanese airfields would be necessary to reduce the Japanese capability to attack Chinese targets. As a result, the AVG entered into offensive missions against Japanese airfields as a secondary objective."

Note: After many frustrations involving difficulties of maintaining logistic support, maintenance problems, spare parts, overburdened personnel, etc., the AVG commenced and continued operations with brilliant effectiveness.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Effectiveness of the AVG.

"The AVG was in actual combat for seven months and during this period was credited with the following results:

299 Japanese aircraft destroyed.

153 Japanese aircraft possibly destroyed.

12 P-40's lost in combat.

61 P-40's lost on the ground which included 22 aircraft burned for lack of spare parts.

4 pilots killed in aerial combat.

6 pilots killed by enemy aircraft fire.

3 pilots killed by enemy bombs.

3 pilots taken prisoner by the Japanese.

10 men killed as a result of aircraft and ground accidents.

These results were obtained at the total cost of $8 million of which $5 million was for aircraft."

"The foregoing information reflects the military aspects of the AVG operations but does not include the psychological affects on the Chinese people . . . . . Faced with the mental attitude of distrust of foreigners on the part of the Chinese, the AVG, by its effective operation against the Japanese, re-kindled the faith of the Chinese people in the assistance of the outside world in their fight against the Japanese. This faith lead to a better acceptance of the U. S. Air Corps when in July, 1942, it took over from the AVG in the air defense of China."

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

CHAPTER IV.

World War II, The Eagle Squadron, RAF.

"In August, 1940 the German Luftewaffe began its air strike against England. At the outbreak of the 'blitz' it was evident that the Luftewaffe had numerical air superiority over the RAF and was attempting to reduce England to impotency. It was estimated that the Luftewaffe outnumbered the RAF by 15 to 1 during the early days of the 'Battle of Britain'."

Note: Realizing the seriousness of Britain's position, sentiment and help for the British began to generate in the United States. Many American citizens found ways and means of helping the allied cause. The United States followed a neutral position in this conflict but it became evident that individual American citizens could offer only token aid to Britain. U. S. Government involvements at the time included such programs as Bundles for Britain, the swap of 100 destroyers for certain territorial consideration, etc. This situation, however, caused many strong thinking young men of America to consider volunteering to fly for Britain. Early in 1940 many of these men were seeking active ways and means of getting into the 'big show'.

"By mid-August 1940 France had collapsed, and the Dunkerque evacuation of allied forces became history. Along with these events newspaper articles publicized that American pilots were being hired for non-combatant positions with the Royal Air Force."

"American men who volunteered for duty with the RAF traveled to Canada at their own expense. However early volunteers presumed that they were surrendering their United States citizenship because the law was so interpreted at that time."

"After the first group of volunteers arrived in England they found it exceptionally difficult to obtain necessary training because RAF pilots were busy in their primary mission of fighting overwhelmingly numbers of German aircraft. By unlimited training through the doggedly efforts of these RAF pilots, this embryo organization gradually became proficient enough to engage the enemy in battle in December, 1940."

"Composition of Forces. The formation of the original Eagle Squadron composed of 34 American pilots and a small group of British ground crewmen, was announced publicly in December, 1940 by Sir Archibald Sinclair of the British Air Ministry. He stated, 'That the formation

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

of the Eagle Squadron had been the Americans own ideal, and had not come from British sources. To indicate the real American character of it members would wear the distinction badge on both arms of their RAF uniform. This is the American Eagle surmounted by the letters E. S. for the Eagle Squadron, a particularly happy choice of name'."

"Most American pilots indicated that they joined the Eagle Squadron because of their desire for adventure, their love of flying, and to contribute to a good cause....."

"International Complications. The formation of the Eagle Squadron did much to solidify relations between Britain and the United States. This was the outward manifestation of the overall understanding of 'hands across the sea'....."

"Operations. At the completion of initial training in England, Britain decided that new volunteers for the squadron should receive their training in Canada to relieve the load of RAF pilots who primarily joined up to fight. The Eagle Squadron grew in size, until in 1941 it was reorganized into three separate squadrons."

"As the volunteers program continued these men learned definitely from the United States State Department that they would not lose their U. S. citizenship for participating in the Eagle Squadron, because they had never sworn allegiance to the Crown of England."

"All volunteers found it necessary to travel to Canada at their own expense and to provide their own living quarters prior to actual enlistment. Recruiting consisted of flight tests and a period of training in Canada, a physical examination, and background investigation. Because of limited manpower resources and an urgent requirement for pilots by RAF, it lowered its qualification requirements. Some of the American volunteers were men who had been rejected for military service in the U.S. due to physical defects and were able to regain their confidence by joining a real fighting organization..... In view of the meager pay scale for their services* it can be concluded that they had a sincere fascination and pride in their profession and money was not a primary motivating factor."

"During 22 months of operation the Eagles were credited with actually destroying 73 German aircraft and probably destroying an equal number. In addition to the above victories, many ground targets such as supply trains, barges, gun posts, ammunition

* The pay scale ranged from $150 to $300 per month depending on rank and position. This pay was subject to British income tax which was 33 1/3% of their monthly pay scale.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

dumps, and factories were destroyed or damaged by the Eagles. During this period of operation 24 men were killed in action, 51 due to operational difficulties and ground accidents, 9 were listed as missing in action, and 17 became prisoners of war."

Note: General Spatz said upon transfer of the Eagle Squadron to the Allied Air Corp: "The operational experience of the Eagle Squadron was a most valuable asset to the fighter units of the American Air Force. I welcome you with great sincerity."

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

19 July 1961

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA
DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Lansdale

Subject: Communist Organization for Unconventional Warfare

This is for your information.

As we consider more effective Defense organization and use of resources for unconventional warfare, it might be helpful to include some thinking about our international Communist opposition. I have suggested that Dick Bissell cover this as one of the topics in his paper on unconventional warfare, which is still being drafted.

Meanwhile, it might be useful to have an informal, interim report on Communist organization, as we consider our own. So, with the help of the Army and CIA, I have put together some of our scanty intelligence data on the subject and report on it below. Also, I am attaching a copy of a brief talk I gave on a related subject at a JCS seminar last year, and a copy of a brief memo on Chinese Communist counter-guerrilla operations.

1. The Soviets

Policy. Soviet policy for unconventional warfare abroad (political-psychological operations, paramilitary actions, and subversion) apparently is determined in closed-door sessions of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Organization. The direction of covert actions abroad is vested in the two foreign sections of the Central Committee (one section for non-Communist countries, the other for Bloc countries), the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers, and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Defense Ministry. Each has somewhat specialized fields.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: x Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~Excluded from automatic regrading; DOD Directive 5200.10 does not apply.~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

The Central Committee foreign sections are the International Section and the Foreign Section for Relations with Bloc Parties. Both are responsible for staff support of the Central Committee and of the Presidium. The International Section gives direction to Communist parties in the non-Communist world, including open political guidance in congresses of Communist parties; for the past 5 years, it has fostered the development of illegal party mechanisms to engage in armed struggle and in clandestine subversion, including in MAP-supported armed forces. The Foreign Section for Relations with Bloc Parties apparently gives direction to the coordinated efforts of the Bloc in the cold war (such as the East German security, intelligence, and paramilitary operation in Cuba).

The KGB mission is maintaining the security of the Soviet state, which includes surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad. In addition to this security function, the KGB Foreign Directorate engages in positive intelligence collection and counter-intelligence abroad. There is probably a special group in the KGB (the last known was called the Ninth Department) to carry out certain executive tasks: kidnapping, assassination, terrorism, and limited (goon-squad type) paramilitary action. There have been numerous instances of KGB Foreign Directorate agents abroad engaged in political operations; that is, the control and exploitation by KGB agents of foreign officials in positions of influence in their governments go beyond mere intelligence collection and can become clandestine political action.

The GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) reportedly has a Special Missions Department to conduct paramilitary operations. It is said to train foreign Communists to plan, and to conduct sabotage, terror programs, stay-behind and guerrilla operations.

Operation. A plan for covert action in a given country is usually drawn up at the "country desk" of the foreign section of the Central Committee. If the planned action is political (including subversion), it would go to the KGB; if paramilitary, it would go to the GRU. If there are combined political-military actions, Soviet operational doctrine requires that the Central Committee designate a local coordinator in the field, and that he be neither KGB nor GRU. This field coordinator could be the ambassador or, more likely, a special member of the embassy staff quietly staying out of the lime-light.

2. Chinese Communists

Policy. Chinese Communist policy for unconventional warfare abroad apparently is determined in closed-door sessions of the Standing Committee

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

of the Politburo and the Military Affairs Committee under the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party.

Organization. The Chinese Communists apparently do not make a distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare. Almost any part of their Army can be used for guerrilla activity temporarily and then returned for conventional duties, or a small guerrilla activity can be expanded into a large conventional operation by infiltration of more units. Operational guidance in developing unconventional activities in the field possibly is a responsibility of the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense; T'AN Cheng, the Director of this General Political Department, is also a member of the Party's Central Committee and has a parallel chain of command from the Defense Ministry on down to political commissars with military field units.

Operation. Guerrilla operations usually are carried out by the Peoples Liberation Army, based on a hard core of regular troops with large levies of local militia. The regular troops are trained in small unit tactics, with behavior indoctrination similar to Mao's doctrine for the 8th Route Army, and with "iron discipline," which are all ideal preparation for guerrilla warfare. Actual military operations of a unit are directed by the military commander. His nominal second-in-command, the political commissar, is responsible not only for the political conformity of the troops, but also for political-psychological operations with the population. The political commissar has his own channels of communication back to the General Political Department of the Ministry of Defense (and the Party's Central Committee), and thus is in a unique position as "second-in-command" to go over the head of his commander. It makes for tight political discipline in the military units, but also offers a vulnerability which can be exploited by defecting a military commander (a veteran commander who has come up through the ranks, and who has merited promotion by his proven ability in combat, grows quite restive when he has to keep an ever-wary eye on a brash young civilian political commissar, who has a simulated military rank equalling his, and who can end a military career -- and life -- by charging "political deviation" through private channels to the top headquarters).

2 Attachments
29Jun60 JCS Seminar on Collateral Activities
4Jan60 memo on Chinese Communist Counter-Guerrilla Operations

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Lecture - JCS Seminar on Collateral Activities
29 June 1960
By: Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale
Office of the Secretary of Defense

COMMUNIST OPERATIONS

I.

Although we have been in the Cold War for fifteen years, too few people in the Free World seem to know our Communist enemy or how he operates. It is especially important for you, me, and others in the US military to understand just what it is the Communists are doing today, for they have given a top priority to reducing and discrediting the Free World military power and prestige... since the Free World military deterrent is forcing the Communists to take the long way to world conquest.

If we know what the Communists are really doing...how they operate for conquest...then we won't be surprised to learn that students in Tokyo...at 500 yen ($1.39) each per day of demonstrations...halted a good will visit of the US President showing solidarity of the Free World; or, that the Communists spent over $100,000 a day for these Japanese student demonstrations, in addition to huge expenditures for labor demonstrations and other activity going all-out to try and show that local populations do not want our military assistance, bases, and alliances which deter Communist aggression.

Thus, we have included time, in these sessions on US military collateral activities in the Cold War, for a brief look at the Communist enemy operations against our own efforts. We must understand this enemy, if we are to be effective in countering his propaganda and terror operations aimed to undermine vital military assets.

II.

Since you all have heard much about the secret agent type of Communist operations for intelligence and operations furthering Soviet conquest or defeating our freedom policy, it is my purpose today to focus your attention first upon the Communist modus operandi which seems to be hurting us the most, and winning their goals. I refer to the Communists use and support of "fronts;" or, their

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

development and exploitation of groups which ostensibly represent important elements of a nation's population... such as the laborers, the youth, the students, teachers, the womens groups, and the professional class. Sure, I know that you have heard some of this before; but, it pays to keep fundamentals in mind.

The Soviets, and their Communist partners for world conquest, increasingly use these "fronts" around the world as major instruments in effecting Communist policy outside Communist controlled areas. The important "fronts" are international in character. Originally, they were considered by Lenin as "transmission belts" ... a Communist term which will strike familiar chords with those who have been up against Communist guerrilla unit commanders. In our time, these "fronts" are much more than transmission belts. As we have seen in Japan and Cuba and other vital points of contest, these "fronts" are very active means for financing, organizing, recruiting, and propagandizing in behalf of top priority Soviet foreign policy goals.

There are a great many Communist international fronts. Five of these fronts are of vital importance to you. Remember these five as you seek out enemy operations on the local scene, as they go about their political warfare operations, cover-recruiting for the Communist cause, provide a means of financing local anti-American activities, and bring broad policy guidance to local CP organizations. These most important five international fronts are:

The World Peace Council (WPC)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

International Union of Students (IUS)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

I've placed a chart of them at the rear of the auditorium for your information during the next break.

Each of these fronts has similar features. These include complete subservience to Moscow, financial dependence on Moscow, and lack of democratic control. Each is controlled by a dedicated Communist receiving instruction from Moscow, and Communists under discipline and training run these fronts from

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

headquarters to the field. The Communists exploit the character of local popular support, as shown by the key groups... that is, "students," "labor," and so on... but actually have only a clever gimmick for manipulating these groups, since the "fronts" are not truly of, by, or for the locals.

While each of these fronts has important tasks to perform... such as the WFTU's to see that Communist control of the Socialist Party in Japan is achieved... the key organization is the World Peace Council. The others are linked to it by membership participation. It has the broadest mass base. It is also thought of by the Communists as the "Council of Peace Fighters," and actually has its headquarters today in Vienna under cover of the International Institute for Peace (IIP).

What is "fighting for peace?" We saw the Peace Partisans as Communist shock troops in Iraq in 1959. We know they are making a major effort today in undeveloped Africa and certainly in Latin America where the Communist trained cadres are spreading from Cuba to Brazil and to other Latin American nations subject to "national" revolutions. Well, the definition of "fighting for peace" has been documented in many a Communist speech and press story. To the Communist, it means destroying the ability of a non-Communist country to wage war and supporting the theory that the military strength of the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies are vital to the defense of peace in the world. Terrorism in Camau and help for Castro all fit the Communist purpose of undermining the US deterrent to Communist aggression and the furthering of Soviet world conquest.

III.

The international "transmission belts" take the word to national Communist organizations and fronts, the local "transmission belts" to the operators, the folks that you and I have bumped up against. For instance, when U Nu returned to Burma last year from a visit to the United States, the Soviets knew beforehand what remarks he would make upon his return. There were enough Communist operators in the Clean AFPFL around U Nu to participate in drafting his speech. This speech was very critical of the government... meaning Ne Win and the Burmese Defense Forces. The Communists hoped to provoke Ne Win into arresting U Nu. If this had happened, Communist action agents would then lead the Clean AFPFL underground, and start the "Revolutionary Clean AFPFL." Ne Win and his colonels avoided this trap.

The local Communist organizations are somewhat different in every country. So much so that I must skip over them in this brief talk. Instead, I will get down to the core of several matters of military importance.

For the remainder of my talk, I will touch on the opposite numbers of our MAAGs and Military Missions, and then touch on some Communist operations in Latin America and Indonesia which look as though they will give us some real military headaches tomorrow.

IV.

You gentlemen are now participating in a world-wide effort by the US military to come up with some practical plans, country by country, for "collateral activities." In making these country plans, have you considered what the enemy has planned... in terms of the Communists "proletarian military science"... to oppose US objectives in those countries, and to achieve success in the "popular struggle?" I trust that you will not discover later that you were busy tying a shoe lace while our enemy was swinging one at you from the floor, with brass knuckles.

We have Commands, MAAGs, and Missions in more than 40 countries today. In many of those countries, the Communists have a group... sometimes known as the Military Committee... which is a native component, with international support, as probably the closest opposite number we can identify to our own military group there. Often, this group includes crypto-Communists, secret Communists whom we sometimes deal with as everyday non-Communist military and civil officials without knowing their secret duties. Often, too, their proletarian military operations are clandestine ones. For example, the discovery of arms caches in Brazil in 1956 provided clues to the existence of a secret Communist military organization there. In 1956, also, it was noted that 450 young Greeks were trained in resistance warfare at a school in Poland. Today, there are many Latin Americans learning Chinese Communist guerrilla tactics in China and in North Vietnam.

According to their doctrine, the Communists are obliged to provide coordination, leadership, and correct orientation to national revolutionary groups. In some cases, this means sending Communist cadres to join national dissident groups. After the British-French-Israeli try at the Suez Canal, Syrian Communist cadres were sent to join the popular resistance organizations being trained and armed by the Syrian government.

Over in Vietnam, about the same time, Communist Viet-Cong cadres were sent to join Ba Cut and his Hoa Hao dissidents. In negotiations for Ba Cut's surrender, I suggested that he rid himself of these Communist before discussing

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

surrender further. He invited several dozen of them in to have breakfast with him, and liquidated them. Today, the Communist Viet-Cong are running their own show in Vietnam.

The logistical section of the Military Committee often has an international flavor. This is simply because most nations, and the parties therein, do not have their own technicians skilled at making grenades and hand-weapons in basement machine shops, or their own arms smugglers, or their own professionals at stealing and hiding military supplies. This G-4 section is most often known among the Communists as a "technical apparatus."

The "technical apparatus" in Algeria, for example, is from the French Communist Party. This apparatus had been in Indo-China, instructing and supporting the Communist Viet-Minh in the eight year war against the French forces. After Dien-bien-phu and the Geneva capitulation of 1954, this French Communist "technical apparatus" was secretly transferred to Algeria, to support the FLN. This type of secret transfer of personnel is a highly tricky business, so it wasn't until 1955 that this permanent change of station was completed.

V.

Now for a brief look at this hemisphere. At the XXth CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was recommended that Chinese tactics be used in Latin America, due to the Chicoms effectiveness in organizing the peasantry and in combatting "foreign imperialism." That was in 1956. The past four years have seen an increasing implementation of the Chinese role in Latin America, not only in the training of Latin Americans in China, but the appearance of Chinese cadres in Latin America. Chinese Communist tactics were introduced into Fidel Castro's forces in Cuba when they were still in the Sierra Maestra, shortly after the Communists moved in to take over control of the 26th of July Movement.

All US military personnel concerned with our military plans and programs for Latin America are urged to read Mao Tse-tung's lectures on tactics. They are published in booklet form. There are a few copies available in the Army Library here in the Pentagon. You can buy them very cheaply at almost any book store in Latin America, as well as in book stores in many other areas. They will tell you, in some detail, a great deal about what you are up against from now on. Also, in the library here, there's a 4-volume set of Mao's selected writings. I recommend the first two volumes, on Revolutionary War in China.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Early in 1959, at the XXIst CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was decided to select one country as the base for Communist operations in Latin America. Cuba was selected as that base. The objective is a counter-attack on US policy in Latin America. Thus, the "Hate America" campaign is now going on. The method will be Chinese, a "national liberation struggle." This method is the consolidation of all nationalist and anti-imperialist forces in a country, with the Communists as the catalysts, and with such a group then attaining political power. This struggle is now going on, right next door. Secretly, as far as pinning the Communist fingerprints upon it, but with their "fronts" potently active and successfully making our US military position, as well as our political position, vulnerable for a knockout blow right below the heart.... maybe first through Latin America but mighty direct. Their "fronts," using the laborers and students and news media for "hate America" and their secret operatives inside the Castro movement formalizing ties with the Communist Party, are doing the job. . . NOW!

VI.

Now for those of you concerned with the Pacific area. I know you have your headaches in Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan and the Off-shore Islands, but I suggest that Indonesia is worth an extra hard look today.

We have been looking at Indonesia as having three major political power forces: Sukarno himself, the Army, and the PKI. We have been playing the Army pretty hard.

Now, there is increasing evidence that the Communists have not been idle, despite the overt PKI's troubles over Indonesia's policy toward Chinese settlers and other recent developments. The PKI Malam apparatus..."malam" means "night," so this is the Communist covert apparatus...apparently has been establishing what is known as the "Yenan Line," a series of secret strong points for its village militia, to control East Java. Another "Yenan Line" has been reported in Central Java. The strong points are in regencies, cities, and villages which had a heavy Communist vote in the 1957 local elections. Since the majority of Indonesians live in this area, and the Army has drawn heavily on this area for its personnel, we might be running smack into a situation similar in someways to the one we did in China and let us not forget that people's groups, and an allegedly legitimate people's demand for "change," undermined US military aid and gave 500,000 people to the Communists... and that the Communist Target No. 1 was the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

We need to help the Indonesian Army learn a lot more about the loyalties of its own personnel, and about the hidden resistance forces among the majority of the population, centered in Java... and CP penetration of the Army itself, before any decisive action takes place in Indonesia. We need to know a great deal more ourselves about Indonesia, and this should include the influence and control by the Communists of village defense units, such as those the Army gave arms to in Central Sumatra. Do our station lists of friendly military strength in Indonesia, and the Communist station lists, overlap? Do our situation maps vary critically?

VII.

Now, to conclude this talk. Admittedly, this was only a brief look, posing more questions than it answered; but, most of you folks are out on the firing line in this Cold War, simply by being stationed overseas and by being in a position where our enemy wants you out! You had better start getting some answers to these questions with the resources you have now, right in the field. You are the leadership... at the initiative level!

For example. Our Navy base at Subic Bay in the Philippines was a real target of the Communists. Not long ago, it was being exploited to a fare-thee-well, as a Communist target... until the Americans there started looking to the Filipino public like a punch of pug-ugly bullies... until the US government started giving back parts of the base to the Philippines. All of this was done mostly by a few skilled operators who know how to create a little agitation which would look like the "popular mass."

Admiral Spring was transferred to Subic. Using what he had on the base, recognizing his problem, and providing leadership... at the initiative level... he countered all the Communist-inspired gains and moves at Subic. A few days ago, I heard from Filipino friends that the word was out that Admiral Spring's tour was up and that he was leaving. Petitions are out, in the provinces and barrios, a sort of spontaneous reaction among the "popular masses," getting thousands and thousands of signatures, asking President Eisenhower and Secretary Gates to keep him on at Subic. These are results... within the military mission.

We have handed the Communists some lickings in the past. I know damn well that we are going to give them some more. But, we are not going to do it by playing ostrich... expecting someone else to do the job that is ours within national directives... or by being satisfied with a mediocre effort. Let's smarten up what we do from here on in. You have the military part of that effort right on your own shoulders. Make it good, and... good luck!

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Box 6 FF 4 Doc 119

AGENCY	R	H
State		✓
CIA		X
OSD		✓
	34	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~(MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFEN
Washington 25, D. C.

4 January 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Counter-Guerrilla Operations

The attached study on the above subject was written for the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, by Major Stanley Bergman, USAR, and Captain Rene A. DuBois, USAR. Their sources of information were the many reports and documents containing some reference to the subject available in Defense, eliminating those evaluated as fabrications.

The reason for having this study made is simple. If any practical thinking is to be done about guerrilla operations on the Chinese mainland, it needs to be based on an understanding of Chinese Communist capabilities to counter such operations. This study is a start towards understanding the problem.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHINESE COMMUNIST COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Background

1. Since the Chinese Communist assumption of power on the mainland of China, the regime has demonstrated a capability for suppressing organized resistance, but has failed to gain the positive support of large segments of the population and to eliminate discontent. In recent years there has been a definite manifestation of dissidence, which has increased significantly in volume and intensity. However, there has been no significant organized or active resistance on other than a purely local level, with the exception of Tibet, where there has been resistance during the past decade.

2. The Chinese Communist authorities combat dissidence on the mainland through the propaganda and administrative machinery of the vast interlocking State-Party apparatus. They have also followed the practice of alternating pressure and relaxation and to make concessions when expedient. However, they have invariably attempted ultimately to suppress all resistance in uncompromising fashion. In addition to an extensive police network and the armed forces, the machinery of the police state has been extended into all spheres by a system of occupational organizations, urban residence committees and rural communes. The regime attempts to combat resistance movements through this tremendous security apparatus, an incessant program of indoctrination and propaganda, the strictness of travel controls, the rigid supervision and censorship of the press, publications and radio, and the relentless regimentation of people in all walks of life.

Regime's Counter-Guerrilla Organization

3. The regime exercises control of internal security through two principal government agencies, both of which are under the State Council of the Central Government. These agencies are:

a. The Ministry of National Defense, the command organ for the Armed Forces of the People's Republic. It retains direct control of a part of the security elements of the state primarily for the defense of China's frontiers.

b. The Ministry of Public Security, the governmental arm for maintaining public order and internal security. It has set up and operates machinery by which each of Communist China's population of approximately 650,000,000 is kept under tight control. Its responsibilities include counter-espionage, border defense and control, and routine police work. The

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

ministry thus controls the movement of people and the investigation of political attitudes and thought for signs of political deviation or subversion.

4. It is to be noted that the Chinese Communist Party supervises and directs the central government agencies concerned with the maintenance of internal security control. The Party organization parallels that of the civil government, with Party committees at each level including members who serve also in government, military and militia organizations in the area. These Party members in effect control the daily governmental, civil and military activities in their respective administrative areas. For example, the military district Party committee is the military counterpart of the civil provincial Party committee.

5. Since Communist China is a police state, it is difficult to draw sharp distinctions between its military and its security forces. Although Chinese Communist official organs have described the relationship between the Ministry of Public Security and the Public Security Force as "inseparable as a person's two fists," the Public Security Force, however, is considered an independent branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and has approximately 200,000 troops in its divisions and independent regiments.

6. The Public Security Force of the PLA comprises two basic groups: border guards and internal security forces. Both groups are organized into divisions which compare with regular army infantry divisions. Public Security divisions, however, do not usually have heavy supporting equipment and number only about 7,000 troops as against 15,000 for the regular army counterpart. Some units which operate in areas of rugged and difficult terrain have special equipment and take on the character of mechanized cavalry or mountain troops. There is also a marine patrol element which operates in coastal waters. Its mission is to apprehend enemy agents and unauthorized personnel attempting to land or depart from the mainland.

7. Equipment of some Public Security Force units are known to have included, even in rugged terrain, light tanks, armored vehicles, light artillery, recoilless rifles, heavy, light and sub machine guns and heavy mortars.

8. The border guard of the Public Security Force are found at all major seaports and air terminals as well as along the frontier. They have the responsibility of preventing illegal entry of personnel or goods and, to this end, inspect ships, trains, aircraft, trucks, and other conveyances entering the country.

9. The internal security units of the Public Security Force are responsible for suppressing revolutionary activity and apprehending bandits.

They also are charged with protecting government installations, government officials, and foreign embassies and legations. In addition, they guard factories, railroads and associated structures such as tunnels and bridges against sabotage.

10. There is a close relationship between the Public Security Force and the regular Armed Forces (all being under the over-all jurisdiction of the PLA) which enables Public Security Force observation posts to alert Army air defense units in the event of aircraft incursions. The other Services, in turn, pass information concerning guerrilla activities to the Public Security Force.

11. The People's Militia is another organization concerned with the suppression of resistance and the countering of guerrilla activities. Although the Militia is not considered a formal part of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces nor the Public Security Ministry, it serves as an instrument in the maintenance of internal security in the rural areas. Its members are subject to part-time duty and therefore are not too well trained and armed. However, they are capable of maintaining surveillance over the peasantry and reporting possible dissidence or other suspicious activity to local Communist authorities. One of the militia's important functions is to reinforce the Public Security Force and civil police by manning sentry posts and by conducting patrols. It must be noted, too, that an important feature of the new commune movement in Communist China is the militia, with the concept of "everyone a soldier." The militia in the communes represents a vast system of semi-trained military reserves capable of supporting the Public Security Forces and the regular military in the suppression of resistance.

Chinese Communist Counter-Guerrilla Tactics

12. In its early attempts to combat resistance and eliminate guerrilla activities in remote areas with rugged terrain, the regime used inexperienced garrison troops to man their control centers. These troops apparently did not venture too far from their bases, and left the initiative to the guerrillas. However, during this period of relative inactivity on their part, the Chinese Communists appeared to be developing what proved to be a two-phase over-all plan for the suppression of guerrilla activity and organized resistance, involving political and economic as well as military considerations. Attempts were made to create dissension between social segments of the population, through economic and political practices beneficial to certain dissatisfied elements. In the meantime, however, the military aspects of the plan were developed simultaneously in what can be called the first phase or consolidation phase. The Chinese Communists have described their activities during this period

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

as the "white way," which emphasized the friendly, "soft" approach in their attempts to win over the civil population and the guerrilla forces. This phase involved the following military activities:

a. Garrisons under siege were supported logistically by air.

b. Motor convoys were sent in strength and guarded by tactically effective security forces.

c. Troop reinforcements were sent to besieged outposts.

d. Strategically located Chinese Communist strongpoints were reinforced by experienced combat troops.

e. Resistance areas were effectively encircled and then segmented by combat forces.

f. Routes of ingress and egress were blocked.

g. Mountain lookout teams were established.

When the First or Consolidated Phase had been completed and logistical supplies were adequate, then second phase or elimination campaign was begun. The Chinese Communists have described their activities during this period as the "black way," which emphasized their attempts to suppress all resistance activities and to force the entire population of the area into submission. This phase involved the following activities:

a. Travel controls were rigidly inforced.

b. Ground troops employed were primarily cavalry.

c. Air support was used, occasionally very effectively, for bombing and strafing runs and reconnaissance during daylight hours.

d. Maintenance of radio communication among tactical units as well as with support aircraft.

e. Tactical deployment of troop units was well coordinated and there was a skillful employment of all tactical factors in the campaign.

f. In addition to troops in direct contact with guerrilla units, cavalry units were assigned to patrol activity in order to maintain separation of guerrillas from civilian population and thus prevent resupply of food and equipment.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

g. Retreating guerrillas were pursued and harassed by cavalry units to prevent regrouping by the guerrillas.

13. The Chinese Communists consider the collection of intelligence information concerning guerrilla activities essential in conducting a campaign for the elimination of guerrilla forces. They have used a variety of methods to obtain the required information, some of which are as follows:

a. Resistance organizations have been penetrated by Chinese Communist controlled indigenous personnel.

b. Some Chinese Communist agents have been disguised as beggars and thus gained the confidence of the guerrillas.

c. Members of guerrilla forces have been given large sums of money to report to Chinese Communist authorities on the guerrillas' plans and activities.

d. Chinese Communist soldiers have ostensibly defected to the guerrillas and have then reported back to the Chinese Communists through clandestine means.

e. Before engaging in offensive action against guerrillas, the Chinese Communists have performed thorough reconnaissance as well as engaged in clandestine information-collection activities to determine areas likely to serve as hideouts, roads and trails approaching suspected or known guerrilla areas, the components of the guerrilla force, the characteristics of its leaders, the sources of supply for the guerrilla force, and existence of pro-guerrilla groups among the civilian population. Special attention has also been paid to surveillance of known friends and relatives of members of the guerrilla forces.

f. By using children as informers the Chinese Communists have been able to obtain important information concerning guerrilla personalities and activities.

g. By the use of bribes the Chinese Communists have also been able to obtain information from the local population concerning guerrilla activities.

h. By the holding of hostages (important government officials as well as religious and civil leaders) the Chinese Communists have been able to force leaders of guerrilla bands to surrender or withdraw from an area.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Defensive Practices

14. Special Chinese Communist defensive practices for combatting guerrilla operations are as follows:

a. Underground tunnels have been dug to connect key installations in a garrison area.

b. Moats approximately 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep have been constructed around key military installations. These moats have been well camouflaged to resemble level and firm ground, with floating wood covered with dirt and grass; the camouflaged surface collapsed under the weight of attacking guerrillas, causing them to fall into the moat.

c. Security units exist at each headquarters, beginning with the regiment, with the primary mission of protecting rear installations and routes of supply. At regiment it consists of two platoons; at field army level it has been as much as a full division. In Korea, the Chinese Communists were known to have employed at least two security divisions in rear areas.

d. To prevent surprise attacks by guerrilla forces, Chinese Communist field troops have employed extensive patrolling and screening actions as well as local security operations. Direct security measures have been instituted by each unit to complete the command's activities to prevent surprise attacks.

e. All Chinese Communist commanders are responsible for their own local security. A series of sentry posts rings the headquarters and other important installations. These posts are in turn connected by roving patrols. A reserve force is kept on the alert so as to have available a mobile group to meet an attack in force by guerrillas. It should be noted that the Chinese Communists still follow the old Chinese custom of assigning bodyguards to important personnel.

f. To maintain effective control over the civil population and to prevent movement of all elements of the guerrilla forces, the Chinese Communists have instituted the following control procedures in areas of guerrilla activity:

(1) Check points have been set up at vital locations.

(2) Curfews have been imposed on the civil populations, thus making the detection of guerrilla elements easier.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

(3) Movement at night has been restricted to military personnel only.

(4) In highly critical areas, the civil population has been evacuated entirely.

(5) Important communication facilities in the area have been carefully guarded and inspected.

(6) In one area of guerrilla activity the Chinese Communists compelled all those not born in the area to obtain residence permits and to submit 3 photographs. Of the three photographs, one was placed on the permit, one was sent to the registrant's native village for a security and character check, and the third was placed with the pertinent information in the local files.

(7) The Chinese Communists' control of food as well as currency has made it difficult for guerrilla forces to obtain food and other essentials.

g. In a Chinese Communist force in a combat zone, down to battalion level, there is a unit known as a "Bandit Annihilation Command." It consists of selected staff officers whose duties consist of:

(1) Planning counter-guerrilla operations.

(2) Conducting training in security and counter-guerrilla tactics.

(3) Investigating the civilian population and maintaining liaison with local civil or military government.

(4) Collecting and collating information on guerrilla activities and preparing and disseminating pertinent intelligence.

(5) Directing operations against guerrilla forces.

Offensive Practices

15. Special Chinese Communist offensive practices for combatting guerrilla operations:

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

a. Chinese Communist troops masquerading as guerrillas have been used to deceive guerrilla troops and thus manage to draw close enough for a surprise attack.

b. On occasion, the Chinese Communist military authorities have arranged for a cease fire conference and given promises that no reprisals would be made if the guerrillas surrendered their weapons. Almost immediately after the Chinese Communist emissaries have left, Chinese Communist aircraft have flown over the conference area, dropped bombs and strafed the area.

c. Religious edifices have not been considered sacrosanct and have been bombed and strafed.

d. Mass arrests have been made suddenly, without any warning, in villages and towns in areas of guerrilla activity; many guerrillas were apprehended in this way.

e. Chinese Communist agents, disguised as guerrillas, have been sent into villages and towns in areas controlled by guerrillas and have stirred up trouble in these areas, causing the civil population to turn against the guerrillas.

f. Delegations of pro-Chinese indigenous individuals have been sent to confer with guerrilla leaders and have attempted to provoke them into military actions which would enable the Chinese Communists troops to inflict heavy losses on them.

g. Ambush techniques have very often been employed by Chinese Communist troops against guerrilla bands. On one occasion approximately 500 Chinese Communist troops surrounded the advance guard (approximately 100 men) of a guerrilla force. They were soon joined by additional Chinese Communist troops and with their assistance completely wiped out the advance guard. On another occasion Chinese Communist troops attacked the guerrilla force's rear guard, while the latter was on a hunting detail, and managed to inflict heavy losses before elements of the main guerrilla force were able to come to their rescue.

h. Chinese Communist troops have also often employed encirclement tactics, particularly against large, well-organized guerrilla groups. After infiltration has been effected, encirclement has been achieved by covert means and assault forces have been passed through to execute a surprise attack. Then mopping up action has been conducted methodically. The encircling forces then have slowly closed on the center of the area.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

However, if the Chinese Communist troops have encountered strong resistance, they have often broken their circle and attempted to entice the guerrilla force to break out. Their mobile reserves have attempted to intercept and destroy the fleeing force.

i. Chinese Communist commanders have on occasion had rumors circulated by agents through the civilian population in areas of guerrilla activity indicating that a Chinese Communist military force, much larger than was actually the case, was present in the area. At other times, the local Chinese Communist commander has publicly announced the dispatching of larger units to certain areas than were actually sent.

j. Chinese Communist troops have deceived guerrilla forces into believing that the latter had achieved victory in a specific military encounter. During the celebration that followed this alleged "victory," the Chinese Communist troops attacked and caught the guerrillas completely off guard, thus inflicting heavy losses.

k. Equipment as well as airborne troops have been dropped by the Chinese Communists to resupply and reinforce a besieged area.

l. To eliminate guerrillas who had taken refuge among the civilian population, villages and towns have been bombed from the air as well as attacked and destroyed by artillery fire and machine gunning.

m. During combat with guerrilla forces (as well as during periods of preparation for combat), Chinese Communist units have maintained radio contact with other units and with aircraft acting in support of the operation. Walkie-talkies have also been used.

n. Almost all guerrillas captured have been executed after an attempt to interrogate, usually through torture, has been made.

o. Aircraft have been employed to strafe and bomb guerrilla troops and encampments. Bombs of approximately 100 pounds have been used.

p. When pursuing guerrilla forces, Chinese Communist troops have demonstrated an awareness of guerrilla attempts to entice them to attack in areas advantageous to the guerrilla. They have often avoided being led into a trap by halting when the guerrillas had halted in an area which would have given the guerrillas the advantage if the Chinese Communists had attacked.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

q. It is to be noted that the Chinese Communist guerrilla doctrine of never engaging enemy forces unless victory is certain also applies to their anti-guerrilla operations. There are several examples of long periods of Chinese Communist neglect of certain guerrilla units or of a "political" approach to a guerrilla force. On the other hand, however, when the situation demanded it, the Chinese Communists have attacked in overwhelming strength with the obvious aim of complete annihilation.

r. The Chinese Communists have employed subtle forms of bribery and blackmail to compel involuntary collaboration of members of the civil population. Increases in salaries of certain selected local officials have been effected by the Chinese Communist authorities and monetary aid (in the form of Chinese silver dollars and not the local currency) has been given to members of the civil base in areas of guerrilla activity when aid was requested or, in many cases, when it was not, but was not refused. Detailed records were then maintained for future identification of those who had received this financial assistance and the information used as a means of forcing cooperation from the recipients for fear of public exposure and possible subsequent reprisals by the guerrillas.

Intimidation Practices

17. Chinese Communist practices to intimidate guerrillas and discourage resistance to the regime have included the following atrocities committed against the civilian population as well as the members of guerrilla bands:

a. Some captured guerrillas have been buried alive; others have been tortured with bamboo slivers forced under their fingernails, their eyes gouged out, and then killed; some have been swathed in cotton which was then soaked in kerosene and ignited; some have been thrown into deep water after a heavy stone has been tied around their neck; some have been drawn and quartered; some have had red hot wire thrust down their throats.

b. Some guerrillas as well as civilians have been sterilized by injections, by castration and by other means.

c. Groups of individuals who have assisted guerrilla bands have been assembled by the Chinese Communist authorities, ostensibly for the purpose of having the group photographed, and have been suddenly fired upon by Chinese Communist troops, with all members of the group killed.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Lessons Learned by the Communists

18. The Chinese Communists seem to have learned the following lessons from their counter-guerrilla operations:

a. To conduct effective counter-guerrilla operations there should be special counter-guerrilla units, extremely mobile, well versed in tactics employed by guerrilla forces, and with adequate fire-power to combat hard-and-fast-hitting guerrilla forces.

b. There must be an active and aggressive offense by sufficient, well-trained combat troops (constituting the counter-guerrilla force) to carry the fight to the guerrillas.

c. All counter-guerrilla operations should be aimed at destroying the guerrilla force, not merely at expelling it from the area or causing it to retreat and disperse.

d. The counter-guerrilla command should be unified under an experienced frontline commander no matter how diverse the composite units.

e. The most complete security possible should be maintained during the planning and assembly of troops for specific counter-guerrilla operations in order to preserve the element of surprise.

f. Whenever possible, covert encirclement of the target area should be closely followed by a surprise attack.

g. Pressure on the guerrilla force, once applied, must not be relaxed long enough to permit it to reconsitute.

h. Continued maintenance of contact among all counter-guerrilla units in a given area is essential for the insurance of well-coordinated offensive actions as well as for effective security.

i. Area gaps between counter-guerrilla units must be taken under control as soon as possible and effectively patrolled to prevent encirclement and surprise attacks by the guerrilla force.

j. In addition to the patrol system within a net of strong points, dependable signal communications must be established. Radio communications should be used to a large extent, as it will expedite the dispatching of relief units and will greatly reduce the effect of guerrilla surprise attacks.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

k. Complete and current intelligence concerning the guerrilla force is essential and must be obtained through all available means, such as clandestine agent nets, reconnaissance units, aircraft reconnaissance, patrols, interrogation of the civil population as well as captured guerrillas, establishment of well-camouflaged observation posts, and monitoring of the guerrilla forces' communications (telephone, radio, signal, etc.) through the use of well-trained and reliable military interpreters.

l. Aircraft should be employed in support of ground operations, not only for reconnaissance but also for strafing and bombing the guerrilla force and its installations, and for air-dropping supplies and equipment to anti-guerrilla units in the field.

m. Special administrative measures for effecting population controls must be imposed in areas of guerrilla activity to minimize the ability of the civil population to collaborate with hostile guerrillas. These include the registering and photographing of all civilians, the controlling and restricting of all movement into and out of the area, the imposing of a curfew, the confiscating of weapons and war equipment, the controlling of all communication facilities, including radio, house-to-house searching for contraband, the controlling and rationing of food, the evacuating of designated areas, and the screening of refugees.

n. Political and economic differences existing among the guerrillas as well as the civil population can be exploited to play one group against another and thus decrease the over-all effectiveness of the resistance movement.

o. Counterintelligence activities must also be directed against the intelligence collection apparatus of the guerrillas to attempt to prevent their acquisition of vital information.

p. A thorough knowledge of the mode of life and method of combat of the guerrilla forces is essential for success in counter-guerrilla operations.

q. In special situations it may be possible for special counter-guerrilla units to masquerade as guerrilla units and in this way enable them either to draw very close to the guerrilla forces and then suddenly attack, or even to gain the confidence of actual guerrilla units and their civilian supporters and thus lead them into actions advantageous to the counter-guerrilla troops.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

r. It is of primary importance that guerrillas be effectively separated and sealed off from the civil population. In this way the guerrilla force will find it difficult to be resupplied with food, equipment, weapons, ammunition and other essentials; it will be unable to acquire some of the requisite information concerning the occupying force and its activities; nor will it be in a position to obtain the assistance of elements of the unit population in performing acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism as well as propaganda activities.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

SECRET
NOFORN

Lecture - JCS Seminar on Collateral Activities
29 June 1960
By: Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale
Office of the Secretary of Defense

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

COMMUNIST OPERATIONS

I.

Although we have been in the Cold War for fifteen years, too few people in the Free World seem to know our Communist enemy or how he operates. It is especially important for you, me, and others in the US military to understand just what it is the Communists are doing today, for they have given a top priority to reducing and discrediting the Free World military power and prestige...since the Free World military deterrent is forcing the Communists to take the long way to world conquest.

If we know what the Communists are really doing....how they operate for conquest...then we won't be surprised to learn that students in Tokyo...at 500 yen ($1.39) each per day of demonstrations...halted a good will visit of the US President showing solidarity of the Free World; or, that the Communists spent over $100,000 a day for these Japanese student demonstrations, in addition to huge expenditures for labor demonstrations and other activity going all-out to try and show that local populations do not want our military assistance, bases, and alliances which deter Communist aggression.

Thus, we have included time, in these sessions on US military collateral activities in the Cold War, for a brief look at the Communist enemy operations against our own efforts. We must understand this enemy, if we are to be effective in countering his propaganda and terror operations aimed to undermine vital military assets.

II.

Since you all have heard much about the secret agent type of Communist operations for intelligence and operations furthering Soviet conquest or defeating our freedom policy, it is my purpose today to focus your attention first upon the Communist modus operandi which seems to be hurting us the most, and winning their goals. I refer to the Communists use and support of "fronts"; or, their

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

development and exploitation of groups which ostensibly represent important elements of a nation's population...such as the laborers, the youth, the students, teachers, the womens groups, and the professional class. Sure, I know that you have heard some of this before; but, it pays to keep fundamentals in mind.

The Soviets, and their Communist partners for world conquest, increasingly use these "fronts" around the world as major instruments in effecting Communist policy outside Communist controlled areas. The important "fronts" are international in character. Originally, they were considered by Lenin as "transmission belts"...a Communist term which will strike familiar chords with those who have been up against Communist guerrilla unit commanders. In our time, these "fronts" are much more than transmission belts. As we have seen in Japan and Cuba and other vital points of contest, these "fronts" are very active means for financing, organizing, recruiting, and propagandizing in behalf of top priority Soviet foreign policy goals.

There are a great many Communist international fronts. Five of these fronts are of vital importance to you. Remember these five as you seek out enemy operations on the local scene, as they go about their political warfare operations, cover-recruiting for the Communist cause, provide a means of financing local anti-American activities, and bring broad policy guidance to local CP organizations. These most important five international fronts are:

The World Peace Council (WPC)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

International Union of Students (IUS)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

I've placed a chart of them at the rear of the auditorium for your information during the next break.

Each of these fronts has similar features. These include complete subservience to Moscow, financial dependence on Moscow, and lack of democratic control. Each is controlled by a dedicated Communist receiving instruction from Moscow, and Communists under discipline and training run these fronts from

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

headquarters to the field. The Communists exploit the character of local popular support, as shown by the key groups...that is; "students," "labor," and so on... but actually have only a clever gimmick for manipulating these groups, since the "fronts" are not truly of, by, or for the locals.

While each of these fronts has important tasks to perform...such as the WFTU's to see that Communist control of the Socialist Party in Japan is achieved...the key organization is the World Peace Council. The others are linked to it by membership participation. It has the broadest mass base. It is also thought of by the Communists as the "Council of Peace Fighters," and actually has its headquarters today in Vienna under cover of the International Institute for Peace (IIP).

What is "fighting for peace"? We saw the Peace Partisans as Communist shock troops in Iraq in 1959. We know they are making a major effort today in undeveloped Africa and certainly in Latin America where the Communist trained cadres are spreading from Cuba to Brazil and to other Latin American nations subject to "national" revolutions. Well, the definition of "fighting for peace" has been documented in many a Communist speech and press story. To the Communist, it means destroying the ability of a non-Communist country to wage war and supporting the theory that the military strength of the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies are vital to the defense of peace in the world. Terrorism in Caracas and help for Castro all fit the Communist purpose of undermining the US deterrent to Communist aggression and the furthering of Soviet world conquest.

III.

The international "transmission belts" take the word to national Communist organizations and fronts, the local "transmission belts" to the operators, the folks that you and I have bumped up against. For instance, when U Nu returned to Burma last year from a visit to the United States, the Soviets knew beforehand what remarks he would make upon his return. There were enough Communist operators in the Clean AFPFL around U Nu to participate in drafting his speech. This speech was very critical of the government...meaning Ne Win and the Burmese Defense Forces. The Communists hoped to provoke Ne Win into arresting U Nu. If this had happened, Communist action agents would then lead the Clean AFPFL underground, and start the "Revolutionary Clean AFPFL." Ne Win and his colonels avoided this trap.

The local Communist organizations are somewhat different in every country. So much so that I must skip over them in this brief talk. Instead, I will get down to the core of several matters of military importance.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

For the remainder of my talk, I will touch on the opposite numbers of our MAAGs and Military Missions, and then touch on some Communist operations in Latin America and Indonesia which look as though they will give us some real military headaches tomorrow.

IV.

You gentlemen are now participating in a world-wide effort by the US military to come up with some practical plans, country by country, for "collateral activities." In making these country plans, have you considered what the enemy has planned...in terms of the Communists "proletarian military science"...to oppose US objectives in those countries, and to achieve success in the "popular struggle"? I trust that you will not discover later that you were busy tying a shoe lace while our enemy was swinging one at you from the floor, with brass knuckles.

We have Commands, MAAGs, and Missions in more than 40 countries today. In many of those countries, the Communists have a group...sometimes known as the Military Committee...which is a native component, with international support, as probably the closest opposite number we can identify to our own military group there. Often, this group includes crypto-Communists, secret Communists whom we sometimes deal with as everyday non-Communist military and civil officials without knowing their secret duties. Often, too, their proletarian military operations are clandestine ones. For example, the discovery of arms caches in Brazil in 1956 provided clues to the existence of a secret Communist military organization there. In 1956, also, it was noted that 450 young Greeks were trained in resistance warfare at a school in Poland. Today, there are many Latin Americans learning Chinese Communist guerrilla tactics in China and in North Vietnam.

According to their doctrine, the Communists are obliged to provide coordination, leadership, and correct orientation to national revolutionary groups. In some cases, this means sending Communist cadres to join national dissident groups. After the British-French-Israeli try at the Suez Canal, Syrian Communist cadres were sent to join the popular resistance organizations being trained and armed by the Syrian government.

Over in Vietnam, about the same time, Communist Viet-cong cadres were sent to join Ba Cut and his Hoa Hao dissidents. In negotiations for Ba Cut's surrender, I suggested that he rid himself of these Communist before discussing

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

surrender further. He invited several dozen of them in to have breakfast with him, and liquidated them. Today, the Communist Viet-cong are running their own show in Vietnam.

The logistical section of the Military Committee often has an international flavor. This is simply because most nations, and the parties therein, do not have their own technicians skilled at making grenades and hand-weapons in basement machine shops, or their own arms smugglers, or their own professionals at stealing and hiding military supplies. This G-4 section is most often known among the Communists as a "technical apparatus."

The "technical apparatus" in Algeria, for example, is from the French Communist Party. This apparatus had been in Indo-China, instructing and supporting the Communist Viet-minh in the eight year war against the French forces. After Dien-bien-phu and the Geneva capitulation of 1954, this French Communist "technical apparatus" was secretly transferred to Algeria, to support the FLN. This type of secret transfer of personnel is a highly tricky business, so it wasn't until 1955 that this permanent change of station was completed.

V.

Now for a brief look at this hemisphere. At the XXth CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was recommended that Chinese tactics be used in Latin America, due to the Chicoms effectiveness in organizing the peasantry and in combatting "foreign imperialism." That was in 1956. The past four years have seen an increasing implementation of the Chinese role in Latin America, not only in the training of Latin Americans in China, but the appearance of Chinese cadres in Latin America. Chinese Communist tactics were introduced into Fidel Castro's forces in Cuba when they were still in the Sierra Maestra, shortly after the Communists moved in to take over control of the 26th of July Movement.

All US military personnel concerned with our military plans and programs for Latin America are urged to read Mao Tse-tung's lectures on tactics. They are published in booklet form. There are a few copies available in the Army Library here in the Pentagon. You can buy them very cheaply at almost any book store in Latin America, as well as in book stores in many other areas. They will tell you, in some detail, a great deal about what you are up against from now on. Also, in the library here, there's a 4-volume set of Mao's selected writings. I recommend the first two volumes, on Revolutionary War in China.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Early in 1959, at the XXIst CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was decided to select one country as the base for Communist operations in Latin America. Cuba was selected as that base. The objective is a counter-attack on US policy in Latin America. Thus, the "Hate America" campaign is now going on. The method will be Chinese, a "national liberation struggle." This method is the consolidation of all nationalist and anti-imperialist forces in a country, with the Communists as the catalysts, and with such a group then attaining political power. This struggle is now going on, right next door. Secretly, as far as pinning the Communist fingerprints upon it, but with their "fronts" potently active and successfully making our US military position, as well as our political position, vulnerable for a knockout blow right below the heart.... maybe first through Latin America but mighty direct. Their "fronts," using the laborers and students and news media for "hate America" and their secret operatives inside the Castro movement formalizing ties with the Communist Party, are doing the job...NOW!

VI.

Now, for those of you concerned with the Pacific area. I know you have your headaches in Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan and the Off-shore Islands, but I suggest that Indonesia is worth an extra hard look today.

We have been looking at Indonesia as having three major political power forces: Sukarno himself, the Army, and the PKI. We have been playing the Army pretty hard.

Now, there is increasing evidence that the Communists have not been idle, despite the overt PKI's troubles over Indonesia's policy toward Chinese settlers and other recent developments. The PKI Malam apparatus..."malam" means "night," so this is the Communist covert apparatus...apparently has been establishing what is known as the "Yenan Line," a series of secret strong points for its village militia, to control East Java. Another "Yenan Line" has been reported in Central Java. The strong points are in regencies, cities, and villages which had a heavy Communist vote in the 1957 local elections. Since the majority of Indonesians live in this area, and the Army has drawn heavily on this area for its personnel, we might be running smack into a situation similar in someways to the one we did in China, and let us not forget that people's groups, and an allegedly legitimate people's demand for "change," undermined US military aid and gave 500,000,000 people to the Communists... and that the Communist Target No. 1 was the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

We need to help the Indonesian Army learn a lot more about the loyalties of its own personnel, and about the hidden resistance forces among the majority of the population, centered in Java...and CP penetration of the Army itself, before any decisive action takes place in Indonesia. We need to know a great deal more ourselves about Indonesia, and this should include the influence and control by the Communists of village defense units, such as those the Army gave arms to in Central Sumatra. Do our station lists of friendly military strength in Indonesia, and the Communist station lists, overlap? Do our situation maps vary critically?

VII.

Now, to conclude this talk. Admittedly, this was only a brief look, posing more questions than it answered; but, most of you folks are out on the firing line in this Cold War, simply by being stationed overseas and by being in a position where our enemy wants you out! You had better start getting some answers to these questions with the resources you have now, right in the field. You are the leadership...at the initiative level!

For example. Our Navy base at Subic Bay in the Philippines was a real target of the Communists. Not long ago, it was being exploited to a fare-thee-well, as a Communist target...until the Americans there started looking to the Filipino public like a bunch of pug-ugly bullies...until the US government started giving back parts of the base to the Philippines. All of this was done mostly by a few skilled operators who know how to create a little agitation which would look like the "popular mass."

Admiral Spring was transferred to Subic. Using what he had on the base, recognizing his problem, and providing leadership...at the initiative level...he countered all the Communist-inspired gains and moves at Subic. A few days ago, I heard from Filipino friends that the word was out that Admiral Spring's tour was up and that he was leaving. Petitions are out, in the provinces and barrios, a sort of spontaneous reaction among the "popular masses," getting thousands and thousands of signatures, asking President Eisenhower and Secretary Gates to keep him on at Subic. These are results...within the military mission.

We have handed the Communists some lickings in the past. I know damn well that we are going to give them some more. But, we are not going to do it by playing ostrich...expecting someone else to do the job that is ours within national directives...or by being satisfied with a mediocre effort. Let's smarten up what we do from here on in. You have the military part of that effort right on your own shoulders. Make it good, and...good luck!

Unclassified

13 March 1962

12 45 pm
Lunch w/
Mr. Gilpatric

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Sir Richard White

Frank Wisner, who is the CIA man in London now, saw me just before returning to London last week end. He reminded me that Dick White, the Chief of MI-6, was visiting the U.S. for a few days starting 4 April, and suggested that it would be helpful and constructive if White were invited to the Pentagon. We thought you might like to give him a little luncheon.

Sir Richard White is the real operator and policy man, along 5412 lines, in the British government. He is notably bright and decisive, and gets teased by his colleagues for being too pro-U.S.

Suggest that you would find it interesting and rewarding to have a little luncheon for him in the Pentagon. If you do so, I would suggest further that the guest list include General Lemnitzer, Paul Nitze, and General Carroll. If you wanted someone from CIA, I would suggest Dick Helms. I would really like to come, myself. If you had a slightly larger guest list, I would suggest three of your counter-insurgency people: Generals Krulak, (Burchinal, and Rosson.)

Arrangements could be made through my office.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC §552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Unclassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;~~
~~DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10~~

WHITE

~~SECRET~~ copies of biography of Sir Dick White

honor guest of luncheon on 6 April 1962

sent to the following with penned note fr Gen Lansdale. 23 Mar 62

Depy Secy Gilpatric

Gen Parker D 22401
Gen Krulak D 22402
Mr. Nitze D 22403
Gen Carroll D 22404

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick"; therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U.S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigation activity MI-5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, graying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probably that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Farthing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about 17 and a boy about 12.

22 Mar 1962

SECRET

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 12FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick"; therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World War II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U.S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigation activity MI-5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, graying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probably that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Farthing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about 17 and a boy about 12.

22 Mar 1962

~~SECRET~~

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: ~~SECRET~~
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1345

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.B., K.B.E., C.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick"; therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World War II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U.S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigative activity MI-5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, greying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probable that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Fessing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about 17 and a boy about 12.

22 Mar 1962

SECRET

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.B., K.B.E., O.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick", therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World War II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U. S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigation activity MI-5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, graying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probable that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Farthing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about ~~14~~ 17 and a boy about ~~12~~ 12.

SECRET

MAR 1962 22

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.B., K.B.E., O.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick", therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World War II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U. S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigation activity MI 5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, graying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probable that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Farthing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about ~~17~~ 17 and a boy about ~~12~~ 12.

SECRET

MAR 1982 22

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1345

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Sir Dick Goldsmith WHITE, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B.E.
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6)

Sir Dick was born 20 December 1906 at Tunbridge, England. He was christened "Dick", therefore, his name is not to be confused as a nickname for Richard. He graduated from Oxford with honors and obtained a Commonwealth Fellowship to study American history in the United States. He spent one year at the University of Michigan and then went to the University of California for another year. Sir Dick is very knowledgeable about American history and government. After returning to England in 1934 he taught school briefly prior to entering MI-5.

During World War II Sir Dick was loaned to the British Army by MI-5. He was first a colonel and later became a brigadier. He received the U. S. Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. After the war, when he returned to MI-5 he headed "B" Division which was the section in MI-5 concerned with virtually all investigation activity MI-5 conducted in the United Kingdom. In July 1953 Sir Dick was made Director General of MI-5, replacing Sir Percy SILLITOE who retired.

In April 1956 Sir Dick resigned from MI-5, and was appointed Chief, MI-6, upon the retirement of Maj. Gen. Sir John Alexander SINCLAIR.

Sir Dick is about 5'10" tall, has a slender build, brown, graying hair, a narrow face, fairly prominent nose, blue eyes, and a reddish complexion. He is considered to be easy-going, friendly and very competent. His health might be described as fragile. It has been noted on at least two previous occasions that Sir Dick was not well due to internal intestinal disorders. It is probable that this was caused by ulcers.

Sir Dick's wife, Gertrude Farthing, is Anglo-Argentine and much younger than he. She has had several seizures of asthma and he bought a house in Sussex in the hope she would benefit from living out of London. The Whites have two children, a girl about ~~15~~ 17 and a boy about ~~11~~ 12.

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

249

19 July 1961

Dup of Doc 226

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA
DEPUTY SECRETARY GILPATRIC

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Lansdale

Subject: Communist Organization for Unconventional Warfare

This is for your information.

As we consider more effective Defense organization and use of resources for unconventional warfare, it might be helpful to include some thinking about our international Communist opposition. I have suggested that Dick Bissell cover this as one of the topics in his paper on unconventional warfare, which is still being drafted.

Meanwhile, it might be useful to have an informal, interim report on Communist organization, as we consider our own. So, with the help of the Army and CIA, I have put together some of our scanty intelligence data on the subject and report on it below. Also, I am attaching a copy of a brief talk I gave on a related subject at a JCS seminar last year, and a copy of a brief memo on Chinese Communist counter-guerrilla operations.

1. The Soviets

Policy. Soviet policy for unconventional warfare abroad (political-psychological operations, paramilitary actions, and subversion) apparently is determined in closed-door sessions of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Organization. The direction of covert actions abroad is vested in the two foreign sections of the Central Committee (one section for non-Communist countries, the other for Bloc countries), the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers, and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Defense Ministry. Each has somewhat specialized fields.

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSLS552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

~~Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD Directive 5200.10 does not apply.~~

GRUP E
13-M-1347 R1

The Central Committee foreign sections are the International Section and the Foreign Section for Relations with Bloc Parties. Both are responsible for staff support of the Central Committee and of the Presidium. The International Section gives direction to Communist parties in the non-Communist world, including open political guidance in congresses of Communist parties; for the past 5 years, it has fostered the development of illegal party mechanisms to engage in armed struggle and in clandestine subversion, including in MAP-supported armed forces. The Foreign Section for Relations with Bloc Parties apparently gives direction to the coordinated efforts of the Bloc in the cold war (such as the East German security, intelligence, and paramilitary operation in Cuba).

The KGB mission is maintaining the security of the Soviet state, which includes surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad. In addition to this security function, the KGB Foreign Directorate engages in positive intelligence collection and counter-intelligence abroad. There is probably a special group in the KGB (the last known was called the Ninth Department) to carry out certain executive tasks: kidnapping, assassination, terrorism, and limited (goon-squad type) paramilitary action. There have been numerous instances of KGB Foreign Directorate agents abroad engaged in political operations; that is, the control and exploitation by KGB agents of foreign officials in positions of influence in their governments go beyond mere intelligence collection and can become clandestine political action.

The GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) reportedly has a Special Missions Department to conduct paramilitary operations. It is said to train foreign Communists to plan, and to conduct sabotage, terror programs, stay-behind and guerrilla operations.

Operation. A plan for covert action in a given country is usually drawn up at the "country desk" of the foreign section of the Central Committee. If the planned action is political (including subversion), it would go to the KGB; if paramilitary, it would go to the GRU. If there are combined political-military actions, Soviet operational doctrine requires that the Central Committee designate a local coordinator in the field, and that he be neither KGB nor GRU. This field coordinator could be the ambassador or, more likely, a special member of the embassy staff quietly staying out of the lime-light.

2. Chinese Communists

Policy. Chinese Communist policy for unconventional warfare abroad apparently is determined in closed-door sessions of the Standing Committee

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

of the Politburo and the Military Affairs Committee under the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party.

Organization. The Chinese Communists apparently do not make a distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare. Almost any part of their Army can be used for guerrilla activity temporarily and then returned for conventional duties, or a small guerrilla activity can be expanded into a large conventional operation by infiltration of more units. Operational guidance in developing unconventional activities in the field possibly is a responsibility of the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense; T'AN Cheng, the Director of this General Political Department, is also a member of the Party's Central Committee and has a parallel chain of command from the Defense Ministry on down to political commissars with military field units.

Operation. Guerrilla operations usually are carried out by the Peoples Liberation Army, based on a hard core of regular troops with large levies of local militia. The regular troops are trained in small unit tactics, with behavior indoctrination similar to Mao's doctrine for the 8th Route Army, and with "iron discipline," which are all ideal preparation for guerrilla warfare. Actual military operations of a unit are directed by the military commander. His nominal second-in-command, the political commissar, is responsible not only for the political conformity of the troops, but also for political-psychological operations with the population. The political commissar has his own channels of communication back to the General Political Department of the Ministry of Defense (and the Party's Central Committee), and thus is in a unique position as "second-in-command" to go over the head of his commander. It makes for tight political discipline in the military units, but also offers a vulnerability which can be exploited by defecting a military commander (a veteran commander who has come up through the ranks, and who has merited promotion by his proven ability in combat, grows quite restive when he has to keep an ever-wary eye on a brash young civilian political commissar, who has a simulated military rank equalling his, and who can end a military career -- and life -- by charging "political deviation" through private channels to the top headquarters).

2 Attachments
29Jun60 JCS Seminar on Collateral Activities
4Jan60 memo on Chinese Communist Counter-Guerrilla Operations

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5016552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Lecture - JCS Seminar on Collateral Activities
29 June 1960
By: Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale
Office of the Secretary of Defense

COMMUNIST OPERATIONS

I.

Although we have been in the Cold War for fifteen years, too few people in the Free World seem to know our Communist enemy or how he operates. It is especially important for you, me, and others in the US military to understand just what it is the Communists are doing today, for they have given a top priority to reducing and discrediting the Free World military power and prestige... since the Free World military deterrent is forcing the Communists to take the long way to world conquest.

If we know what the Communists are really doing...how they operate for conquest...then we won't be surprised to learn that students in Tokyo...at 500 yen ($1.39) each per day of demonstrations...halted a good will visit of the US President showing solidarity of the Free World; or, that the Communists spent over $100,000 a day for these Japanese student demonstrations, in addition to huge expenditures for labor demonstrations and other activity going all-out to try and show that local populations do not want our military assistance, bases, and alliances which deter Communist aggression.

Thus, we have included time, in these sessions on US military collateral activities in the Cold War, for a brief look at the Communist enemy operations against our own efforts. We must understand this enemy, if we are to be effective in countering his propaganda and terror operations aimed to undermine vital military assets.

II.

Since you all have heard much about the secret agent type of Communist operations for intelligence and operations furthering Soviet conquest or defeating our freedom policy, it is my purpose today to focus your attention first upon the Communist modus operandi which seems to be hurting us the most, and winning their goals. I refer to the Communists use and support of "fronts;" or, their

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

development and exploitation of groups which ostensibly represent important elements of a nation's population... such as the laborers, the youth, the students, teachers, the womens groups, and the professional class. Sure, I know that you have heard some of this before; but, it pays to keep fundamentals in mind.

The Soviets, and their Communist partners for world conquest, increasingly use these "fronts" around the world as major instruments in effecting Communist policy outside Communist controlled areas. The important "fronts" are international in character. Originally, they were considered by Lenin as "transmission belts" ... a Communist term which will strike familiar chords with those who have been up against Communist guerrilla unit commanders. In our time, these "fronts" are much more than transmission belts. As we have seen in Japan and Cuba and other vital points of contest, these "fronts" are very active means for financing, organizing, recruiting, and propagandizing in behalf of top priority Soviet foreign policy goals.

There are a great many Communist international fronts. Five of these fronts are of vital importance to you. Remember these five as you seek out enemy operations on the local scene, as they go about their political warfare operations, cover-recruiting for the Communist cause, provide a means of financing local anti-American activities, and bring broad policy guidance to local CP organizations. These most important five international fronts are:

The World Peace Council (WPC)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

International Union of Students (IUS)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

I've placed a chart of them at the rear of the auditorium for your information during the next break.

Each of these fronts has similar features. These include complete subservience to Moscow, financial dependence on Moscow, and lack of democratic control. Each is controlled by a dedicated Communist receiving instruction from Moscow, and Communists under discipline and training run these fronts from

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

headquarters to the field. The Communists exploit the character of local popular support, as shown by the key groups... that is, "students," "labor," and so on... but actually have only a clever gimmick for manipulating these groups, since the "fronts" are not truly of, by, or for the locals.

While each of these fronts has important tasks to perform... such as the WFTU's to see that Communist control of the Socialist Party in Japan is achieved... the key organization is the World Peace Council. The others are linked to it by membership participation. It has the broadest mass base. It is also thought of by the Communists as the "Council of Peace Fighters," and actually has its headquarters today in Vienna under cover of the International Institute for Peace (IIP).

What is "fighting for peace?" We saw the Peace Partisans as Communist shock troops in Iraq in 1959. We know they are making a major effort today in undeveloped Africa and certainly in Latin America where the Communist trained cadres are spreading from Cuba to Brazil and to other Latin American nations subject to "national" revolutions. Well, the definition of "fighting for peace" has been documented in many a Communist speech and press story. To the Communist, it means destroying the ability of a non-Communist country to wage war and supporting the theory that the military strength of the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies are vital to the defense of peace in the world. Terrorism in Camau and help for Castro all fit the Communist purpose of undermining the US deterrent to Communist aggression and the furthering of Soviet world conquest.

III.

The international "transmission belts" take the word to national Communist organizations and fronts, the local "transmission belts" to the operators, the folks that you and I have bumped up against. For instance, when U Nu returned to Burma last year from a visit to the United States, the Soviets knew beforehand what remarks he would make upon his return. There were enough Communist operators in the Clean AFPFL around U Nu to participate in drafting his speech. This speech was very critical of the government... meaning Ne Win and the Burmese Defense Forces. The Communists hoped to provoke Ne Win into arresting U Nu. If this had happened, Communist action agents would then lead the Clean AFPFL underground, and start the "Revolutionary Clean AFPFL." Ne Win and his colonels avoided this trap.

The local Communist organizations are somewhat different in every country. So much so that I must skip over them in this brief talk. Instead, I will get down to the core of several matters of military importance.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

For the remainder of my talk, I will touch on the opposite numbers of our MAAGs and Military Missions, and then touch on some Communist operations in Latin America and Indonesia which look as though they will give us some real military headaches tomorrow.

IV.

You gentlemen are now participating in a world-wide effort by the US military to come up with some practical plans, country by country, for "collateral activities." In making these country plans, have you considered what the enemy has planned... in terms of the Communists "proletarian military science"... to oppose US objectives in those countries, and to achieve success in the "popular struggle?" I trust that you will not discover later that you were busy tying a shoe lace while our enemy was swinging one at you from the floor, with brass knuckles.

We have Commands, MAAGs, and Missions in more than 40 countries today. In many of those countries, the Communists have a group... sometimes known as the Military Committee... which is a native component, with international support, as probably the closest opposite number we can identify to our own military group there. Often, this group includes crypto-Communists, secret Communists whom we sometimes deal with as everyday non-Communist military and civil officials without knowing their secret duties. Often, too, their proletarian military operations are clandestine ones. For example, the discovery of arms caches in Brazil in 1956 provided clues to the existence of a secret Communist military organization there. In 1956, also, it was noted that 450 young Greeks were trained in resistance warfare at a school in Poland. Today, there are many Latin Americans learning Chinese Communist guerrilla tactics in China and in North Vietnam.

According to their doctrine, the Communists are obliged to provide coordination, leadership, and correct orientation to national revolutionary groups. In some cases, this means sending Communist cadres to join national dissident groups. After the British-French-Israeli try at the Suez Canal, Syrian Communist cadres were sent to join the popular resistance organizations being trained and armed by the Syrian government.

Over in Vietnam, about the same time, Communist Viet-Cong cadres were sent to join Ba Cut and his Hoa Hao dissidents. In negotiations for Ba Cut's surrender, I suggested that he rid himself of these Communist before discussing

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

surrender further. He invited several dozen of them in to have breakfast with him, and liquidated them. Today, the Communist Viet-Cong are running their own show in Vietnam.

The logistical section of the Military Committee often has an international flavor. This is simply because most nations, and the parties therein, do not have their own technicians skilled at making grenades and hand-weapons in basement machine shops, or their own arms smugglers, or their own professionals at stealing and hiding military supplies. This G-4 section is most often known among the Communists as a "technical apparatus."

The "technical apparatus" in Algeria, for example, is from the French Communist Party. This apparatus had been in Indo-China, instructing and supporting the Communist Viet-Minh in the eight year war against the French forces. After Dien-bien-phu and the Geneva capitulation of 1954, this French Communist "technical apparatus" was secretly transferred to Algeria, to support the FLN. This type of secret transfer of personnel is a highly tricky business, so it wasn't until 1955 that this permanent change of station was completed.

V.

Now for a brief look at this hemisphere. At the XXth CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was recommended that Chinese tactics be used in Latin America, due to the Chicoms effectiveness in organizing the peasantry and in combatting "foreign imperialism." That was in 1956. The past four years have seen an increasing implementation of the Chinese role in Latin America, not only in the training of Latin Americans in China, but the appearance of Chinese cadres in Latin America. Chinese Communist tactics were introduced into Fidel Castro's forces in Cuba when they were still in the Sierra Maestra, shortly after the Communists moved in to take over control of the 26th of July Movement.

All US military personnel concerned with our military plans and programs for Latin America are urged to read Mao Tse-tung's lectures on tactics. They are published in booklet form. There are a few copies available in the Army Library here in the Pentagon. You can buy them very cheaply at almost any book store in Latin America, as well as in book stores in many other areas. They will tell you, in some detail, a great deal about what you are up against from now on. Also, in the library here, there's a 4-volume set of Mao's selected writings. I recommend the first two volumes, on Revolutionary War in China.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

Early in 1959, at the XXIst CPSU Congress in Moscow, it was decided to select one country as the base for Communist operations in Latin America. Cuba was selected as that base. The objective is a counter-attack on US policy in Latin America. Thus, the "Hate America" campaign is now going on. The method will be Chinese, a "national liberation struggle." This method is the consolidation of all nationalist and anti-imperialist forces in a country, with the Communists as the catalysts, and with such a group then attaining political power. This struggle is now going on, right next door. Secretly, as far as pinning the Communist fingerprints upon it, but with their "fronts" potently active and successfully making our US military position, as well as our political position, vulnerable for a knockout blow right below the heart..., maybe first through Latin America but mighty direct. Their "fronts," using the laborers and students and news media for "hate America" and their secret operatives inside the Castro movement formalizing ties with the Communist Party, are doing the job. . . NOW!

VI.

Now for those of you concerned with the Pacific area. I know you have your headaches in Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan and the Off-shore Islands, but I suggest that Indonesia is worth an extra hard look today.

We have been looking at Indonesia as having three major political power forces: Sukarno himself, the Army, and the PKI. We have been playing the Army pretty hard.

Now, there is increasing evidence that the Communists have not been idle, despite the overt PKI's troubles over Indonesia's policy toward Chinese settlers and other recent developments. The PKI Malam apparatus..."malam" means "night," so this is the Communist covert apparatus...apparently has been establishing what is known as the "Yenan Line," a series of secret strong points for its village militia, to control East Java. Another "Yenan Line" has been reported in Central Java. The strong points are in regencies, cities, and villages which had a heavy Communist vote in the 1957 local elections. Since the majority of Indonesians live in this area, and the Army has drawn heavily on this area for its personnel, we might be running smack into a situation similar in someways to the one we did in China and let us not forget that people's groups, and an allegedly legitimate people's demand for "change," undermined US military aid and gave 500,000 people to the Communists... and that the Communist Target No. 1 was the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

We need to help the Indonesian Army learn a lot more about the loyalties of its own personnel, and about the hidden resistance forces among the majority of the population, centered in Java... and CP penetration of the Army itself, before any decisive action takes place in Indonesia. We need to know a great deal more ourselves about Indonesia, and this should include the influence and control by the Communists of village defense units, such as those the Army gave arms to in Central Sumatra. Do our station lists of friendly military strength in Indonesia, and the Communist station lists, overlap? Do our situation maps vary critically?

VII.

Now, to conclude this talk. Admittedly, this was only a brief look, posing more questions than it answered; but, most of you folks are out on the firing line in this Cold War, simply by being stationed overseas and by being in a position where our enemy wants you out! You had better start getting some answers to these questions with the resources you have now, right in the field. You are the leadership... at the initiative level!

For example. Our Navy base at Subic Bay in the Philippines was a real target of the Communists. Not long ago, it was being exploited to a fare-thee-well, as a Communist target... until the Americans there started looking to the Filipino public like a punch of pug-ugly bullies... until the US government started giving back parts of the base to the Philippines. All of this was done mostly by a few skilled operators who know how to create a little agitation which would look like the "popular mass."

Admiral Spring was transferred to Subic. Using what he had on the base, recognizing his problem, and providing leadership... at the initiative level... he countered all the Communist-inspired gains and moves at Subic. A few days ago, I heard from Filipino friends that the word was out that Admiral Spring's tour was up and that he was leaving. Petitions are out, in the provinces and barrios, a sort of spontaneous reaction among the "popular masses," getting thousands and thousands of signatures, asking President Eisenhower and Secretary Gates to keep him on at Subic. These are results... within the military mission.

We have handed the Communists some lickings in the past. I know damn well that we are going to give them some more. But, we are not going to do it by playing ostrich... expecting someone else to do the job that is ours within national directives... or by being satisfied with a mediocre effort. Let's smarten up what we do from here on in. You have the military part of that effort right on your own shoulders. Make it good, and... good luck!

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

256

Dear Ed:- Personal + Confidential 17 May 60

This is in reply to yours of 8th rec'd today. About last of April I was handed a 'draft' message, I know it now to be the one you referred to. D— wanted permission to cable Diem and threaten him with slow down, or stop, of Mil.Aid. I questioned advisability of the threat. There was much discussion between D— and V— of CAS and D— of USOM. I thought the whole thing was left up in the air for D— to study further. I'm fairly positive that the draft had been written for him as he was not familiar with some of the wording. I presumed, in error, if it was to be corrected and sent out it would be sent to me for comment. I never saw it again! I considered it a most ill advised piece of work and assumed V— had written the draft as he knew most about it.

On the 14th May I saw the [illegible] message, dated 12 May and to my utmost surprise read in the last line that I had Concurred! This could have been a honest error but I do not believe so. However, at the same time I saw State's reply which said the threat could not be used so— to avoid another fight that would have gained nothing— said nothing.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSDSS2
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: ___ Deny in Full: ___
Declassify in Part: ___
Reason: ___
MDR: 13-M-1347

"Thank Christ you were able to guess something was wrong and thus influence the answer from State. Now to carry this a bit further. D— told us at "small meeting" that he had scolded Diem and that he had taken it. Mr T— told me the Pres told D— that (could I quote verbatim) "I am more concerned with Conditions here than [redacted] Wash. because I see a deterioration between UN and the U.S. based on such false reports." T— told me Diem was white with anger. It was described by D— to Diem as a "verbal" note but when conference was over D— didn't know any note with Diem. T— said to have a copy of a "verbal" note was proper. That Diem then sent for his For Min and told him to get a copy. That the For Min had been unsuccessful. T— is making a big point of this in his conversation with me. Frankly, T— is plenty worried and, honestly I am too. Something is going on here. Outgoing Messages never fail to carry little remarks about Br. are worried, Fr. are worried, Germans etc, etc. One said "I have suggested" they (Br. & Fr.) get instructions from their Govt, to have words with Diem. What the hell. Is this a new campaign to ruin Diem? Why? Personal hate? Today at C.T. meeting he told us he had been asked by various heads of missions if the US was looking for a replacement for Diem and

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

that if any of us should be asked the same question we were to say that the US supported Diem. Who in the hell would asked me such a question? In a message to State he reports these questions to him and suggests that, in view of his lectures to Diem had "leaked". However he has a doubt that may be They too see things are "bad" and think we would be looking for someone. He asked me in our C.T. meeting today if I thought some elements might be grooming Big Minh as his replacement? I was so taken back I had him repeat the question. In front of a room full of people how long will that be a secret? What rumors will spread from it? Is this an attempt to kill Big Minh?

I don't believe anyone here other than T— or Diem know that we know each other and they won't find it out from me. State asked VN Amb if request for you to come out had been taken up with me and VN answered in negative, so says T—. In State query to O—, mentioned above, it said "answer in this same channel" so he is probably not using normal channels & could be sending anything.

One more item O— is afraid of N— and I've come to believe N— is encouraging him to smear Diem. He is the first and often the only one to laugh out loud when the remark is made in front of a room full. "Tomorrow I see Diem & I'll hit the S o B in the head with a sock full of you know what." Regardless of how subtle a smear is being conducted, a man that makes such remarks in public can't be smart.

I was happy to see TWX from DA saying my nomination had gone to Seattle for retirement in present grade of 3. I thought surely some one would try to block that and will not feel safe until I hear that Seattle has acted. Once I get that news the wraps will really be off.

Hope to see you soon— here. Only Jail.

Jim

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

FORM 11-63 DS-1032 (Exception to SF-50 approved by CSC and B of B July 1962)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAR No. R-67-1307 10-03-67

personnel A-268

JOURNAL NUMBER 11937

SERVICE FS S

1. NAME (CAPS) LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE	MR.-MISS-MRS.	2. EMPLOYEE NO. & SEX	3. BIRTH DATE (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
THONG, Tran Sam	X	M	06-19-19	

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE (1 - NO; 2 - 5 PT.; 3 - 10 PT. DISAB.; 4 - 10 PT. COMP.; 5 - 10 PT. OTHER)	6. TENURE	CODE	7. SERVICE COMP. DATE	8. PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE
			12-13-66	

9. FEGLI (1 - COVERED; 2 - INELIGIBLE; 3 - WAIVED)	10. RETIREMENT (3-FS; 1-CS; 4-NONE; 2-FICA; 5-OTHER)	10A. MO. & YR. OF GRADE	11. (For CSC use)
	4		

12. NATURE OF ACTION CODE		13. EFFECTIVE DATE	14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	Transfer	12-18-67	FSA, 1946, as amended, Sec 541; Exec Ord 10973, 1961; US State

15. FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17. GRADE	18. SALARY
Admin. Clerk IV #E 405		FSL-7/4	105,436 pa (44 hr)

19. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

Embassy - Saigon
Senior Liaison Office

20. TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER (OPT. CODE)	21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE (NEXT PSI DUE)	22. GRADE	23. SALARY	WORK SCHED.
Communic Clerk I A-15533-A		Same	Same	

24. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

USAID - Saigon
ADA-MAD
Telecommunications

25. DUTY STATION (City-County-State)		26. LOCATION CODE
SAIGON, VIETNAM		

27. APPROPRIATION	28. POSITION OCCUPIED (1 - COMPETITIVE; 2 - EXCEPTED SERVICE)	29. APPORTIONED POSITION (FROM:; TO:; STATE; 1 - PROVED - 1; 2 - WAIVED - 2)
From 1980113-8A-5320/532001 To 72FT800	2	

30. REMARKS:
A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY (OR TRIAL) PERIOD COMMENCING
B. SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER (OR PERMANENT) TENURE FROM:

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW, AS REQUIRED. CHECK IF APPLICABLE: C. DURING PROBATION; D. FROM APPOINTMENT OF 6 MONTHS OR LESS

This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department. This action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements. The grade of the position to which you are officially assigned may be reviewed and corrected by the Department or by the Civil Service Commission.

a. Base and 1 ELIS	110,708 pa (44 hr)
b. Fam Allow - Single	-
c. Total	110,708
d. TET	9,226
e. GROSS	119,934 pa

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Direct transfer from Embassy to USAID without break in service.

31. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT (Accessions only)

32. OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER (If different from employing office): USAID Local Personnel Office

33. CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: ST 01 | DEPARTMENT OF STATE

34. SIGNATURE (Or other authentication) AND TITLE
For Francis X. McCarthy,
Deputy Personnel Officer (Local)

35. DATE: 12-18-67

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO. 2951

1 EMPLOYEE COPY

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347 #1727
5 U.S.C. 552

FORM DS-1692
11-67
(Exception to SF-50 approved by CSC and B of B July 1962)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JOURNAL NUMBER: _____

SERVICE: Foreign Service

1. NAME (CAPS) LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE — MR.-MISS-MRS.	2. EMPLOYEE NO. & SEX	3. BIRTH DATE (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Mr. Tran Sam THONG	Male	6-19-19	

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE (1 - NO; 2 - 5 PT.; 3 - 10 PT. DISAB.; 4 - 10 PT. COMP.; 5 - 10 PT. OTHER)	6. TENURE / CODE	7. SERVICE COMP. DATE	8. PHYSICAL HANDICAP CODE
		12-13-66	

9. FEGLI (1 - COVERED; 2 - INELIGIBLE; 3 - WAIVED)	10. RETIREMENT (3-FS; 1-CS; 4-NONE; 2-FICA; 5-OTHER)	10A. MO. & YR. OF GRADE	11. (For CSC use)
	4		

12. NATURE OF ACTION / CODE	13. EFFECTIVE DATE	14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Termination by Inter Agency Transfer From EMBASSY	Dec. 16, 1967 at 12:30 P.M.	

15. FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE	17. GRADE	18. SALARY
Admin. Clerk IV #E-405		FSL-7/5*	110,708 p/a (Full-44 hr.w/w)

19. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520
AmEmbassy - Saigon
Senior Liaison Office

*Includes PSI due 12/17/67.

20. TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER / PPL. CODE	21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE / NEXT PSI DUE	22. GRADE	23. SALARY / WORK SCHED.

24. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE — DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

25. DUTY STATION (City-County-State)		26. LOCATION CODE
SAIGON, VIETNAM		

27. APPROPRIATION	28. POSITION OCCUPIED (1 - COMPETITIVE; 2 - EXCEPTED SERVICE)	29. APPORTIONED POSITION (FROM: ; TO: ; 1 - PROVED - 1; 2 - WAIVED - 2; STATE)
1980113-8A-4320/332001	2	Vietnam

30. REMARKS:
A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY (OR TRIAL) PERIOD COMMENCING _____
B. SERVICE COUNTING TOWARD CAREER (OR PERMANENT) TENURE FROM: _____

SEPARATIONS: SHOW REASON BELOW, AS REQUIRED. CHECK IF APPLICABLE: C. DURING PROBATION; D. FROM APPOINTMENT OF 6 MONTHS OR LESS

This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department. This action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.
The grade of the position to which you are officially assigned may be reviewed and corrected by the Department or by the Civil Service Commission.

*See Personnel Action #896 dated 9/14/67 for explanation of a,b,c,d,e.

Direct transfer from EMBASSY to USAID without break in service.

Accrued annual leave and sick leave transferred.

*a. 116,243
*b. None
*c. 116,243
*d. 9,687
*e. 125,930

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

31. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVIT (Accessions only)

32. OFFICE MAINTAINING PERSONNEL FOLDER (If different from employing office)
Embassy Personnel Office

33. CODE EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY
ST 01 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

34. SIGNATURE (Or other authentication) AND TITLE
for Clare R Moore
Alice D. Westbrook, Personnel Officer

35. DATE 12-13-67

SUBMITTING OFFICE NO. 2951

1 EMPLOYEE COPY

USAID Local Personnel - Mr. L. Holsey November 9, 1967

Embassy Personnel Office - Clara A. Moore

Availability for Employment - Mr. Tran Sam THONG

As it is planned to reduce the staff of the Senior Liaison Office, the Embassy is trying to find a position for Mr. Tran Sam THONG more in keeping with his previous experience and training. Although Mr. THONG has been working as an Administrative Clerk with the Embassy since December 1966, he is a qualified radio technician and would prefer to be employed again in that field.

If USAID has a need for a person with his qualifications and experience, it would be appreciated if he could be scheduled for an interview. Attached are copies of his Form DSP-85 and Forms DS-1032 recording his employment with the Embassy. Please return if you do not have a vacancy for which he can be considered.

Enclosures:

a/s

CRMoore/crm

CC: Calvin E. Mehlert, SLO

Office of the Secretary of Defense 505C8552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

DOC 345

Lorraine gaugglers - April 1955
review, 8 April
up to 28 April

March 55 - 30 days NDV PM

Saigon - arrived July 54

CO White Team, 11 Jan 6
PM be sufficient

under fire prior to cease-fire

all NDV ofs equip into units by 31

Hanoi withdrawal

development of PM in Tonkin

contamination oil refinery Haiphong bus company just prior to VM takeover 9 Oct - French, Ha

Bohannan - ofs Brotherhood

recog VN by Phils thru PVL

cattle Action

Freedom Co

April 55 - TMT plan for attack Rung Sat

29 April - TMT, Canal de Derivation, move towards from Bien Hoa

30 April TMT Kia

Michael Moriarity - arrived Aug 54

member northern team develop PM

cadring of arms; equip Haiphong Jan 55 to

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Robert Andrews - arrived Aug 54

member northern team develop PM

Sept 1954 exfiltration pm team Haiphong to navy ship, Task Force 98 under Adm Sabin

23 Nov exfilt from Saigon, 21 agents & 2 cooks

Frank Gabers - arrived Aug 54

member northern team develop PM

contamination oil refinery Haiphong bus company - French

lessons learned in Cannon

Tran Trung Dung

Pfl only non-VN officer participating

Col Le Van Kim / 31st & 32nd Divs

Kien Cong Cung - Jan 55 Civic Action

Cannon 8 Feb

Rufus Phillips Jr - arrived Aug 54

PVL - VVL Dec 54

Almanac

Jan 55

Surrender leaflets - 29 April 55 - Col Manh - 5 bns

pacification Oct 54

Army - govt teams

trip to Phil. min. of Social Action, Pub Health,

Army program

Social Action

Refugee

Classes PW June 55 - 15 to Phils

Dec 54 - draft NSA Pacif.

"Giai Phong" (Binh Dinh & Quang Ngai) - 22 Apr

hong-Kong ofs under Dulac, Nov 54

Arthur Arundel - arrived Aug 54

additional

black propaganda strike Hanoi Sept 54 - forcing refugee to monetary devaluation

also 3-day work stoppage

"VM Resistance Commi" leaflet re Polish to Russian decision - Oct 54

Dec 54 - draft NSA Pacif

Thomas Paine series

July - Sept 55

IT Sept 54

Honorable Radich - arrived Aug 54

Kien Cong Cung - Jan - GAMO's to Civic Action

executive assistant to Chief of MISSION

Ho Thon Minh

13 Feb

instrumental in working with Lien Minh to Caodai

[redacted] Allen – arrived Aug 1954

develop PM in south

Sept – Gen Vy PM group, started developing

23 Nov 21 agents le 2 cadres Vy group Saigon

March-April – Vy group Phils into Haiphong by Navy 8½ tons equip

Edward Williams – arrived Aug 1954

work with revolutionary political groups

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Edward Bain – arrived Aug 1954

support

Richard Smith – arrived Aug 1954

Support – cargo ofrs PM supplies

Wittmayer

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC-552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

John C Wachtel Jr

Freedom Co. Nov 54,

PVL – NVL (Enriquez on Saigon Dec 54)

Camp Baton, planning from Dec 54

David Smith – on Dec 54

Ofrs Bro, Cannon support 8 Feb

E. liaison with USIS – 3 million leaflets Ofrs Liberty

Sec'y State Dulles visited 28 Feb – Ofrs Bro

April B-X leaflets

105 Filipino drs le nurses 2,000 patients per day by April 1955

vet legion First National Congress 29 May

Alfonso Enriquez & Freeco

Edmund Quereau – on Jan 55

CO Blue Team, Jan 55 PP

Dick Halloran – 28-29 March Saigon

John Gates

[redacted] – arrived April 1955

c. Dick Mallon

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

676

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

311
Pac
D30

Efficiency Report
Michael J. DEUTCH
September 1965 - March 1966

During the period September 1965 to March 1966, Mr. Michael J. Deutch engaged in the following activities in Saigon:

1. Made a survey of the electric power situation and the possibilities of VC sabotage of essential public services; pointed out the necessity of a priority system of protection of essential installations in case of renewed VC terrorism.

2. Served as a member of the Economic Warfare Committee established by Ambassador Lodge to study the VC supply system and determine ways of disrupting it. Drafted instructions and a questionnaire for other posts and arranged with the Consulate General in Hong Kong for surveillance of shipments originating there. He brought a rare professionalism to this sensitive field, in which he worked actively to achieve inter-agency cooperation.

3. As a part of the planning for democratic institution-building in South Vietnam, Mr. Deutch prepared a study of possible tasks of a national legislative or constitutional council; he also outlined the political and economic framework of a "Revolutionary Village".

4. Assisted General Lansdale in delicate negotiations with leaders of the largest labor organization in South Vietnam in an attempt to enlist their support of governmental pacification efforts.

5. Brought a wealth of experience to the study of many problems, such as rural electrification, transportation bottlenecks and port congestion, racketeering, housing, rice and pork supply, distribution of scarce commodities, rubber plantations, etc.

6. Gained the confidence of the various cabinet members and other government personnel involved in economic and financial matters; obtained important and timely information on fiscal matters, inflation, the rise in prices of essential foodstuffs, etc.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. Made a careful study of the problems that would arise in case of negotiations for a cease-fire or a stand-down.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

691

IV. REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

Martha N. Devlin

Personnel Evaluation Report

I have observed Miss Devlin's work on a daily basis and concur in the Rating Officer's report.

EG Lansdale

Edward G. Lansdale
Minister
Assistant to the Ambassador

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUXSJJ7
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

☒ Department of State ☐ U.S. Information Agency

F11
F10
D1
S

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1-8
FSS 10-7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

CHECK BELOW
☒ Regular Report ☐ Probationary Report
Interim Report:
☐ Departure of Rated Employee
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	EMPLOYEE'S GRADE OR CLASS
DEVLIN, Martha M.	151834	FSS-8

POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE
Saigon	Secretary

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
7/27/67	7/27/67 - 12/31/67	[illegible]

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Calvin E Mehlert	SIGNATURE: E G Lansdale
TYPED NAME: Calvin E. Mehlert	TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: FSO-4, Assistant to General Lansdale	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE
	March 5, 1968	Martha M Devlin

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	690.1	8-MB	293

WHAT is done by the employee: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any, which are distinct from those covered by the SDD.
SDD NO. 46

A. Miss Devlin is assigned to the Senior Liaison Office (SLO), American Embassy, Saigon. (SLO is the personal staff -- 3 officers and 2 secretaries -- of General Edward G. Lansdale who, as Assistant to the Ambassador, is charged with maintaining liaison with top Vietnamese leaders, and with providing advice on political development and other facets of counterinsurgency affairs.) Miss Devlin and our other secretary are responsible for the smooth administrative functioning of the office (typing, routing and filing of messages, memoranda, etc., TA records, travel arrangements and other administrative tasks.)

B. HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing these duties.

Accuracy and speed are particularly required. Papers typed by Miss Devlin are disseminated to the Ambassador and other top US officials in Saigon, often on a priority basis. Also, since SLO does not have a full-time administrative officer, she has been required to bear a considerable share of the administrative work load.

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the employee's performance in the duties described above by considering the following factors as related to the requirements of the job. Place a check (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies. Use a plus (+) or minus (—) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe are significant. Those factors which have a box under the heading may be marked "NA" for not applicable if that is clearly the case. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I.O."

1. Specialized Job Knowledge
(List below in the left hand boxes the major technical or specialized knowledge or skills needed to perform this job, e.g., typing, shorthand, accounting, coding, filing, etc.)

Typing					X
Shorthand					X
Administration					X

	Unable to perform at satisfactory level. Lacks the required knowledge and skill to do this job.	Performance on this job is hampered by low level of proficiency in this skill.	Skill is wholly sufficient to meet the performance requirements of this job.	Performance on this job reflects particular adeptness in this skill.	Performs this duty with exceptional ease, speed and accuracy. Is extraordinarily competent in this skill.
2. Productivity					X
	Volume or output of work is generally inadequate to meet requirements of this job.	Is sometimes slow or erratic in producing useful work.	Volume or output of work is wholly sufficient for job requirements.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	Output of useful work is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy					X
	Errors and omissions are frequent and serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise or incorrect.	Is careful and conscientious in performing duties. Work is complete and precise.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors.	Work is invariably outstanding in accuracy and completeness.
4. Dependability					X
	Fails to follow instructions, meet commitments or complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions or to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Fulfills commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Invariably meets the most difficult deadlines and commitments. Follows through even without special instructions.
5. Adaptability				X	
	Resists changes or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work is hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts changes, new approaches and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches and ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, to adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
6. Supervision Required					X
	Needs very close supervision. Fails to act on own even in routine situations.	Requires specific instructions and seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	With normal supervision acts on own, using good judgment to work things out for himself.	Adept at acting on own. Is resourceful and uses good judgment in meeting unusual situations.	Invariably demonstrates exceptional initiative, sound judgment and resourcefulness, even in difficult situations.
7. Acceptance of Responsibility					X
	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for current or past actions.	Is sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and does so only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for current or past actions.	Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions. Always accepts the responsibilities of his position.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued)

8. Written Communication ☐ NA		Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires extensive editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style. Only occasional minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication ☐		Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	X Speaks well, is concise and to the point. Retains listener's interest.	Outstandingly articulate. Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor ☐ NA		Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans		Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly or shows limited sense of community responsibility at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	X Effective in personal relations at all levels. Tolerant, highly respected and well-liked.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans ☐ IO		Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very sucessful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked; develops rapport.	Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement ☐		Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	X Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A. Factors of Performance - Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I. B. Especially, discuss those factors in Part II rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential - Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate, discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL (continued)

C. Special Factors and Recommendations - Discuss any special factors, including weaknesses or deficiencies, which may affect placement and promotion of this employee. Do you consider the employee ready to assume higher level responsibilities? If appropriate, comment on employee's readiness to assume officer-level responsibilities. Give your recommendations for placement or for special training.

Following for FSS in field assignments only:

D. Conduct and Representation - Discuss employee's conduct at and away from the office, including informal representation efforts as well as formal representation activities, if any.

PART IV REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the employee's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the employee received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the employee's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

V. OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The appraisal under Part II and Part III A. constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

VI. THE PROBATIONARY REPORT

This report is to be completed only once, for a Civil Service employee between his ninth and tenth month after entrance on duty, and for a Foreign Service Staff employee between his eighteenth and twenty-fourth month on duty.

When the other portions of this form are complete, the principal officer or his deputy (for employees overseas), or the rating officer (for those in Washington), should check one of the two statements below and sign in the space provided.

☐ A. Because this employee's performance, general traits of character, and ability (if overseas) to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are satisfactory, I recommend retention.

☐ B. I recommend against retention of this employee because his performance, or conduct, or general traits of character, or (if overseas) his ability to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are unsatisfactory.

If additional comments seem appropriate, they should be incorporated into the appraisal called for under Part III. If retention is not recommended, these comments should include a reference to discussions held with the employee.

PRINCIPAL OR
RATING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE _____

TYPED NAME _____

CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE _____

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 27 Feb 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-0347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

III. Summary Comments and Appraisal - Martha N. Devlin

A. Factors of Performance:

Miss Devlin has performed her duties in a superior fashion. In typing, shorthand, and office administration, she is particularly accurate, meticulous and dependable.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential:

Miss Devlin has demonstrated the ability to efficiently organize and conduct the secretarial/administrative operations of a small office, such as SLO, and thus is particularly qualified for a position requiring the capability to run such an office smoothly.

C. Special Factors and Recommendations:

Under trying conditions, Miss Devlin has shown the ability to "keep her cool," through a coup in her last post, and through the Communist 1968 Tet offensive in Saigon. In view of these circumstances it is recommended that, if at all possible, her wish to be assigned next to the US Embassy, Tripoli, be granted. (Hopefully, further emergencies will not follow her there.)

D. Conduct and Representation:

Miss Devlin takes part in the extremely limited Saigon social life, entertaining her friends in a gracious and wholesome manner. She has also assisted General Lansdale in representational activities, including helping host informal gatherings attended by top Vietnamese and American officials.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: _____ Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: _____-M-_____

Calvin E. Mehlert
FSO-4
Assistant to General Lansdale

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

192

☒ Department of State ☐ U. S. Information Agency

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1-8
FSS 10-7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

B11
F10
D2
5

CHECK BELOW
☐ Regular Report ☐ Probationary Report
Interim Report:
☐ Departure of Rated Employee
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	EMPLOYEE'S GRADE OR CLASS
GOFFETTE, Patricia A.	221413	FSS-8

POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE
Saigon	Secretary

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
9/10/65	January 1, 1966 -	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.	SIGNATURE: EGhansdale
TYPED NAME: Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.	TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Executive Officer, Senior Liaison Office	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Minister

I have read and received a copy of this report. DATE: Sept. 9, 1966 SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE: Patricia A. Goffette

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	690.1	MC	292

WHAT is done by the employee: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below, and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any, which are distinct from those covered by the SDD.

SDD NO.

A. **Miss Goffette is, in effect, responsible for the smooth administrative functioning of the office, handling routing and filing of messages and documents, suspense files, time and attendance records, travel arrangements, and a large volume of typing. She and one other secretary perform these duties for eight senior officers, one of whom is a Minister, and two of whom hold FS-1 ratings (FSR-1 and FSCR-1).**

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2018

HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing these duties.

B. **Miss Goffette is assigned to the Senior Liaison Office (SLO) of the Embassy, an all-volunteer team of counter-insurgency experts on detail from several government agencies, headed by Minister E. G. Lansdale (Maj. Gen. USAF, Ret.) and formed at the request of Ambassador Lodge. Work performed by Miss Goffette has had to be accurate and frequently has been done on a priority basis. Papers she types are circulated among Mission Council members in Saigon, and in senior Washington offices. Her work has had to**

 WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the employee's performance in the duties described above by considering the following factors as related to the requirements of the job. Place a check (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies. Use a plus (+) or minus (—) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe are significant. Those factors which have a box under the heading may be marked "NA" for not applicable if that is clearly the case. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I.O."

1. Specialized Job Knowledge
(List below in the left hand boxes the major technical or specialized knowledge or skills needed to perform this job, e.g., typing, shorthand, accounting, coding, filing, etc.)

Typing Shorthand Administration				X	X
	Unable to perform at satisfactory level. Lacks the required knowledge and skill to do this job.	Performance on this job is hampered by low level of proficiency in this skill.	Skill is wholly sufficient to meet the performance requirements of this job.	Performance on this job reflects particular adeptness in this skill.	Performs this duty with exceptional ease, speed and accuracy. Is extraordinarily competent in this skill.
2. Productivity				X+	
	Volume or output of work is generally inadequate to meet requirements of this job.	Is sometimes slow or erratic in producing useful work.	Volume or output of work is wholly sufficient for job requirements.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	Output of useful work is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy				X	
	Errors and omissions are frequent and serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise or incorrect.	Is careful and conscientious in performing duties. Work is complete and precise.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors.	Work is invariably outstanding in accuracy and completeness.
4. Dependability			✓		X
	Fails to follow instructions, meet commitments, or complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions or to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Fulfills commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Invariably meets the most difficult deadlines and commitments. Follows through even without special instructions.
5. Adaptability					X
	Resists changes or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work is hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts changes, new approaches and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches and ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, to adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
6. Supervision Required					X
	Needs very close supervision. Fails to act on own even in routine situations.	Requires specific instructions and seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	With normal supervision acts on own, using good judgment to work things out for himself.	Adept at acting on own is resourceful and uses good judgment in meeting unusual situations.	Invariably demonstrates exceptional initiative, sound judgment and resourcefulness, even in difficult situations.
7. Acceptance of Responsibility					X
	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for current or past actions.	Is sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and does so only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for current or past actions.	Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions. Always accepts the responsibilities of his position.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued

8. Written Communication ☐ N.A.					
	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires extensive editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style. Only occasional minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication ☐					X
	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well, is concise and to the point. Retains listener's interest.	Outstandingly articulate. Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor ☐ N.A.					
	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well, is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans					X
	Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Tolerant, highly respected and well-liked.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans ☐ IO					
	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive, or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very sucessful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked; develops rapport.	Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement ☐ IO					
	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A. Factors of Performance - Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I. B. Especially, discuss those factors in Part II rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential - Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate, discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL (continued)

C. Special Factors and Recommendations - Discuss any special factors, including weaknesses or deficiencies, which may affect placement and promotion of this employee. Do you consider the employee ready to assume higher level responsibilities ? If appropriate, comment on employee's readiness to assume officer-level responsibilities. Give your recommendations for placement or for special training.

Following for FSS in field assignments only :

D. Conduct and Representation - Discuss employee's conduct at and away from the office, including informal representation efforts as well as formal representation activities, if any.

PART VI. REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the employee's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the employee received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the employee's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

V. OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The appraisal under Part II and Part III A. constitute a general rating of " Satisfactory " under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating " Outstanding " or " Unsatisfactory " is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

VI. THE PROBATIONARY REPORT

This report is to be completed only once, for a Civil Service employee between his ninth and tenth month after entrance on duty, and for a Foreign Service Staff employee between his eighteenth and twenty-fourth month on duty.

When the other portions of this form are complete, the principal officer or his deputy (for employees overseas), or the rating officer (for those in Washington), should check one of the two statements below and sign in the space provided.

☐ A. Because this employee's performance, general traits of character, and ability (if overseas) to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are satisfactory, I recommend retention.

☐ B. I recommend against retention of this employee because his performance, or conduct, or general traits of character, or (if overseas) his ability to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are unsatisfactory.

If additional comments seem appropriate, they should be incorporated into the appraisal called for under Part III. If retention is not recommended, these comments should include a reference to discussions held with the employee.

PRINCIPAL OR
RATING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE _____

TYPED NAME _____

CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE _____

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22Feb2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full:
Declassify in Part:
Reason:
MDR: 13-M-1307

Sec. 552

PATRICIA A. GOFFETTE FSS-8 PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

PART I. B. (Continued)

be top quality. There is no trained State Department administative officer in SLO, therefore she has had to work without the benefit of close technical supervision in matters of administration.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

PART III.

A. Factors of Performance

Miss Goffette has carried out her duties in superior fashion, taking personal interest in the activities of the office, giving generously of her time and energies. She has put her heart into her work. Consequently, not only has she met the technical requirements of her position outstandingly, but she has contributed greatly to the intangibles which have made the office a pleasant and friendly place to work as well as an efficient one. She has worked well under pressure -- in fact does her best work when the pressure is greatest.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential

Miss Goffette (with one other secretary) has managed to work for eight senior officers -- each of whom has been accustomed to having his own secretary and his own office -- without causing any one of them to feel that his legitimate demands have been slighted. I believe she would make an outstanding private secretary for a busy executive. I consider her qualified for positions requiring supervision and coordination of the work of others.

C. Special Factors and Recommendations

I would avoid assigning Miss Goffette to a routine clerical job: she is capable of far more, and thrives on the stimulation of challenging work. See also B above. I recommend she be promoted to the next higher grade as soon as she is eligible.

D. Conduct and Representation

Miss Goffette's conduct at and away from the office has always been appropriate for the occasion and beyond criticism. She entertains friends frequently but not excessively. She has taken the lead with a small number of Embassy secretaries in visiting wounded U.S. service personnel in local military hospitals.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1247

Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.
Executive Officer
Senior Liaison Office

September 7, 1966

PATRICIA A. GOFFETTE FSS-8 PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

PART IV. Reviewing Officer's Statement

I have observed Miss Goffette's work on a daily basis and concur fully in the rating officer's report. I would add only that Miss Goffette has the potential for secretarial duties at the highest echelon of the Department. I concur in recommending promotion.

EG Lansdale

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: ____
Reason: ____
MDR: 13-M-1347

September 7, 1966

693

☐ Department of State ☐ U.S. Information Agency

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1-8
FSS 10-7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

CHECK BELOW

☐ Regular Report ☐ Probationary Report
Interim Report:
☒ Departure of Rated Employee
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

B11 F10 D3 S

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	EMPLOYEE'S GRADE OR CLASS
MISKOVISH, Regina	812039	FSS-7
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon	Secretary	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
4/30/66	1/1/67 - November 9, 1967	NOV. 15 1967

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Calvin E. Mehlert	SIGNATURE: E G Lansdale
TYPED NAME: Calvin E. Mehlert	TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: FSO-4 Staff Assistant to General Lansdale	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE
	Nov. 9, 1967	Regina Miskovish

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	698.1	7	292

WHAT is done by the employee: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any, which are distinct from those covered by the SDD.

SDD NO. 16

A. **Miss Miskovish has been assigned to the Senior Liaison Office (SLO), U.S. Embassy, Saigon. (SLO is the personal staff of General Lansdale, who as Assistant to the Ambassador is responsible for maintaining liaison with top Vietnamese leaders and for providing advice on political development and counter-insurgency affairs.) Miss Miskovish, a key member of the office team, has been responsible for much of the administrative affairs and secretarial workload of SLO. During the last year she has served in effect as General Lansdale's personal secretary, including being responsible for typing and dissemination of particularly sensitive papers.**

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing these duties.

B. **Accuracy and speed have been of special importance. Papers typed by Miss Miskovish go to the Ambassador and to other top U.S. officials in Saigon, often on a priority basis. Also of particular importance has been courtesy and grace in dealing by telephone and in person with senior U.S. and Vietnamese officials and their staffs.**

MISKOVISH, Regina departed 11/9/67

FORM 1-65 FS-315B WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the employee's performance in the duties described above by considering the following factors as related to the requirements of the job. Place a check (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies. Use a plus (+) or minus (—) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe are significant. Those factors which have a box under the heading may be marked "NA" for not applicable if that is clearly the case. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I.O."

1. Specialized Job Knowledge
(List below in the left hand boxes the major technical or specialized knowledge or skills needed to perform this job, e.g., typing, shorthand, accounting, coding, filing, etc.)

Typing					X
Shorthand					X
Admin.					X
	Unable to perform at satisfactory level. Lacks the required knowledge and skill to do this job.	Performance on this job is hampered by low level of proficiency in this skill.	Skill is wholly sufficient to meet the performance requirements of this job.	Performance on this job reflects particular adeptness in this skill.	Performs this duty with exceptional ease, speed and accuracy. Is extraordinarily competent in this skill.
2. Productivity					X
	Volume or output of work is generally inadequate to meet requirements of this job.	Is sometimes slow or erratic in producing useful work.	Volume or output of work is wholly sufficient for job requirements.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	Output of useful work is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy					X
	Errors and omissions are frequent and serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise or incorrect.	Is careful and conscientious in performing duties. Work is complete and precise.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors.	Work is invariably outstanding in accuracy and completeness.
4. Dependability					X
	Fails to follow instructions, meet commitments or complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions or to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Fulfills commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Invariably meets the most difficult deadlines and commitments. Follows through even without special instructions.
5. Adaptability					X
	Resists changes or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work is hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts changes, new approaches and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches and ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, to adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
6. Supervision Required					X
	Needs very close supervision. Fails to act on own even in routine situations.	Requires specific instructions and seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	With normal supervision acts on own, using good judgment to work things out for himself.	Adept at acting on own. Is resourceful and uses good judgment in meeting unusual situations.	Invariably demonstrates exceptional initiative, sound judgment and resourcefulness, even in difficult situations.
7. Acceptance of Responsibility					X
	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for current or past actions.	Is sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and does so only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for current or past actions.	Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions. Always accepts the responsibilities of his position.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued)

8. Written Communication ☐ NA		Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires extensive editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style. Only occasional minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication ☐		Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	X Speaks well, is concise and to the point. Retains listener's interest.	Outstandingly articulate. Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor ☐ NA		Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans		Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly or shows limited sense of community responsibility at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Tolerant, highly respected and well-liked.	X Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans ☐ I.O.		Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very sucessful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked; develops rapport.	Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement ☐		Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	X Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A. Factors of Performance - Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I. B. Especially, discuss those factors in PartII rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential - Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate, discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL (continued)

C. Special Factors and Recommendations - Discuss any special factors, including weaknesses or deficiencies, which may affect placement and promotion of this employee. Do you consider the employee ready to assume higher level responsibilities? If appropriate, comment on employee's readiness to assume officer-level responsibilities. Give your recommendations for placement or for special training.

Following for FSS in field assignments only:

D. Conduct and Representation - Discuss employee's conduct at and away from the office, including informal representation efforts as well as formal representation activities, if any.

PART IV REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the employee's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the employee received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the employee's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

V. OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The appraisal under Part II and Part III A. constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

VI. THE PROBATIONARY REPORT

This report is to be completed only once, for a Civil Service employee between his ninth and tenth month after entrance on duty, and for a Foreign Service Staff employee between his eighteenth and twenty-fourth month on duty.

When the other portions of this form are complete, the principal officer or his deputy (for employees overseas), or the rating officer (for those in Washington), should check one of the two statements below and sign in the space provided.

☐ A. Because this employee's performance, general traits of character, and ability (if overseas) to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are satisfactory, I recommend retention.

☐ B. I recommend against retention of this employee because his performance, or conduct, or general traits of character, or (if overseas) his ability to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are unsatisfactory.

If additional comments seem appropriate, they should be incorporated into the appraisal called for under Part III. If retention is not recommended, these comments should include a reference to discussions held with the employee.

PRINCIPAL OR
RATING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE _____

TYPED NAME _____

CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE _____

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 2/22/2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: 1.5(c)
MDR: 13-M-1347

PART III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

REGINA A. MISKOVISH -- FSS-7

A. Factors of Performance: Miss Miskovish has performed her duties in a superior manner, working rapidly and accurately at all times, including under pressure.

She has also contributed greatly to making Vietnamese and Americans dealing with SLO feel it is a friendly office as well as an efficient one.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential: Miss Miskovish is fully qualified now to serve as personal secretary to a senior U.S. official. She is also fully qualified to serve in a position requiring real team-work among an unusually versatile, under-daily-pressure staff, including supervisory duties.

C. Special Factors and Recommendations: Miss Miskovish, who recently was promoted, should be assigned to a position in keeping with her qualifications noted in B above.

D. Conduct and Representation: Miss Miskovish takes part in the limited U.S. social life in Saigon, entertaining her friends in a gracious and wholesome manner. She also has ably assisted the Senior Liaison Office in representational activities to including helping host informal gatherings attended by top Vietnamese and American officials. In addition, she has demonstrated a personal commitment to help U.S. objectives in Viet Nam outside of her official duties. In cooperation with another secretary in our office, she quietly but determinedly organized an extremely successful U.S. and Allied operation to help a Vietnamese orphanage near Saigon, enlisting assistance from U.S. civil and military personnel and spending much of her free time working there.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U1C8552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Calvin E. Mehlert
FSO-4
Staff Assistant to General Lansdale

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

Regina A. Miskovish, FSS-7

Personal Evaluation Report

I have observed Miss Miskovish's work on a daily basis and concur in the rating officer's report.

Office of the Secretary of Defense JUSLSS2
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Edward G. Lansdale
Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

☑ Department of State ☐ U. S. Information Agency

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1 - 8
FSS 10-7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

CHECK BELOW
☒ Regular Report ☐ Probationary Report
Interim Report:
☐ Departure of Rated Employee
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	EMPLOYEE'S GRADE OR CLASS
MISKOVISH, Regina A.	412039	FSS-8

POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE
Saigon	Secretary

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
4/30/66	April 30, 1966 - December 31, 1966	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Samuel N. Karrick	SIGNATURE: EG Lansdale
TYPED NAME: Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.	TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Colonel, USA, Executive Officer Senior Liaison Office	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Minister, Senior Liaison Officer

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE
	January 9, 1967	Regina Miskovish

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	690.1	MC	293

WHAT is done by the employee: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any, which are distinct from those covered by the SDD.

SDD NO._____

A. **Miss Miskovish works in the Senior Liaison Office with a group of counter-insurgency experts assembled by Minister E. G. Lansdale (Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.) and brought to Viet Nam at the request of Ambassador Lodge. She is a key member of the office team and shares responsibility with one other secretary for the smooth administrative functioning of the office (e.g. routing and filing messages and documents, suspense files, time and attendance records, travel arrangements, typing).**

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing these duties.

B. **Work performed by Miss Miskovish has had to be accurate, and often has had to be done on an urgent basis. Papers she has typed have been circulated among senior Americans in Saigon and Washington and, on occasion, to leadership levels in the Government of Viet Nam. Her work has had to be top quality. In matters of administration she has had to work without the benefit of supervision by officers trained in State Department administrative procedures.**

 WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued)

8. Written Communication ☐ **N.A.**		Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires extensive editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style. Only occasional minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication ☐		Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	X Speaks well, is concise and to the point. Retains listener's interest.	Outstandingly articulate. Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor ☐ **N.A.**		Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans		Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Tolerant, highly respected and well-liked.	X Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans ☐ **I.O.**		Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive, or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very sucessful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked ; develops rapport.	Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement ☐		Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	X Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit. **(French)**	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A. Factors of Performance - Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I. B. Especially, discuss those factors in Part II rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential - Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate, discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Part III SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

REGINA A. MISKOVISH -- FSS-8

A. Factors of Performance -- Miss Miskovish has carried out her duties in a uniformly superior fashion, responding to pressure by working quickly and competently without losing her poise or sense of good order. She has acted on her own initiative to improve working conditions and procedures (or recommend improvements) and has contributed greatly to the intangibles which have made the office a friendly place to work as well as an efficient one.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential -- There are seven senior officers assigned to the office, each of whom in the past had his own office and secretary. Somehow she has managed to meet the legitimate demands of each one individually. She would make a fine secretary for a busy executive, and should do well in a position requiring supervision or coordination of the work of others.

C. Special Factors and Recommendations -- Miss Miskovish is a more mature and understanding person than most of her contemporaries. I recommend her early promotion and assignment to increased responsibilities.

D. Conduct and Representation -- Miss Miskovish takes part in normal Saigon social life and entertains her friends in a gracious, wholesome and natural manner that is a credit to Americans. She has been active in organizing support for a Vietnamese orphanage outside Saigon, and regularly spends much of her free time on weekends and holidays working at the orphanage.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5U-S-1.552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.
Colonel U.S. Army
Executive Officer
Senior Liaison Office

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

VI. REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

Name: Regina Miskovish **FSS-8**

Personal Evaluation Report

I have observed Miss Miskovish's work on a daily basis and concur in the rating officer's report.

EG Lansdale

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

695

[X] Department of State [ ] U. S. Information Agency

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1 - 8
FSS 10 7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

CHECK BELOW

[X] Regular Report [ ] Probationary Report
Interim Report:
[ ] Departure of Rated Employee
[ ] Departure of Rating Officer
[ ] Change of Duty

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	CLASS OR GRADE OF CLASS
HEIMGARTNER, Maryann	259737	FSS-7
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon	Secretary	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
5/15/65	September 2,1966 - December 31, 1966	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE [signature]	SIGNATURE EG Lansdale
TYPED NAME: Samuel N. Karrick, Jr.	TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE Colonel, US Army Executive Officer, Senior Liaison Office	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE Minister, Senior Liaison Officer

	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE
I have read and received a copy of this report.	January 9, 1967	Maryann Heimgartner

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE. Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class of Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	690.1	7	292

WHAT is done by the employee. List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below, and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any which are distinguishable from those covered by the SDD.

SDD NO.

A. Miss Heimgartner is assigned to the Senior Liaison Office (SLO) of the Embassy, an all-volunteer team of counter-insurgency experts on detail from various government agencies, headed by Minister E. G. Lansdale (Maj. Gen. USAF, Ret.) and formed at the request of Ambassador Lodge. She and one other secretary are, in effect, responsible for the smooth administrative functioning of the office, handling routing and filing of messages and documents, suspense files, time and attendance records, travel arrangements, and a large volume of typing.

HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing items above.

B. Work performed by Miss Heimgartner has had to be accurate and frequently has been done on a priority basis. Papers she types are circulated among Mission Council members in Saigon, and among senior officials in Washington. Her work has had to be top quality. There is no trained State Department administrative officer in SLO, therefore she has had to work without the benefit of close technical supervision in matters of administration.

FOR FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the employee's performance in the duties described above by considering the following factors as related to the requirements of the job. Place a check (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies. Use a plus (+) or minus (−) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe are significant. Those factors which have a box under the heading may be marked "NA" for not applicable if that is clearly the case. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I.O."

1. Specialized Job Knowledge
(List below in the left hand box the major technical or specialized knowledge or skills needed to perform this job, e.g., typing, shorthand, accounting, coding, filing, etc.)

Typing					X
Shorthand					X
Administration					X
	Unable to perform at satisfactory level. Lacks the required knowledge and skill to do this job.	Performance on this job is hampered by low level of proficiency in this skill.	Skill is wholly sufficient to meet the performance requirements of this job.	Performance on this job reflects particular aptness in this skill.	Performs this duty with exceptional ease, speed and accuracy. Is extraordinarily competent in this skill.
2. Productivity	Volume or output of work is generally inadequate to meet requirements of this job.	Is sometimes slow or erratic in producing useful work.	Volume or output of work is wholly sufficient for job requirements.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work	X Output of useful work is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy	Errors and omissions are frequent and serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise or incorrect.	Is careful and conscientious in performing duties. Work is complete and precise.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors.	X Work is invariably outstanding in accuracy and completeness
4. Dependability	Fails to follow instructions, meet commitments, or complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions or to meet deadlines and commitments	Conscientious and steady worker. Fulfills commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision	X Invariably meets the most difficult deadlines and commitments, follows through even without special instructions.
5. Adaptability	Reacts to changes or new approaches, or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work is hampered by old habits or fixed ideas or adjusts with difficulty to new environment	Accepts changes, new approaches and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts self to new or different environment.	X Immediately grasps new approaches and ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new to adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
6. Supervision Required	Needs very close supervision. Fails to [illegible] work in normal situations.	Requires specific instructions and seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	With normal supervision acts on own, using good judgment in working things out for himself	Adapts position or self to present job requirements in meeting new and unusual situations	X Invariably demonstrates resourceful initiative, sound judgment and resourcefulness, even in difficult situations.
7. Acceptance of Responsibility	Usually fails to accept responsibility for own actions	Is sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and does so only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly	Displays well developed sense of responsibility for current or past actions	X Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions. Always accepts the responsibilities of his position.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued)

8. Written Communication [ ] NA	Does not express ideas clearly on paper.	Could use simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or other themes. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	[ ] Writes clearly and effectively. Composition is of excellent style and readily suited to the subject. Product rarely needs extensive editing.	[ ] Exceptional level of skill. Writes clearly, precisely, and concisely; great organization, perfect punctuation, and style. Only correct and minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication [ ]	[ ] Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	[ ] Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	[ ] Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	[X] Speaks well. Is concise and to the point. Holds listener's interest.	[ ] Outstandingly articulate. Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor [ ] NA	[ ] Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	[ ] Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	[ ] Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	[ ] Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	[ ] Runs and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans	[ ] Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	[ ] Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	[ ] Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	[X] Effective in personal relations at all level. Tolerant, highly respected and well liked.	[ ] Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans [ ] IO	[ ] Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	[ ] Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive, or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	[ ] Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	[ ] Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked; develops rapport.	[ ] Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement [ ]	[ ] Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	[ ] Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	[X] Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit. (French)	[ ] Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	[ ] Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A Factors of Performance. Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I B. Specifically, discuss those factors in Part II rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B Additional Qualifications and Potential. Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL (continued)

C. Special Factors and Recommendations — Discuss any special factors, including weaknesses or deficiencies which may affect placement and promotion of this employee. Do you consider the employee ready to assume higher level responsibilities? If appropriate, comment on employee's readiness to assume officer-level responsibilities. Give your recommendations for placement or for special training.

Following for FSS in field assignments only:

D. Conduct and Representation - Discuss employee's conduct at and away from the office, including informal representation efforts as well as formal representation activities, if any.

PART VI. REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the employee's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the employee received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the employee's performance if he has sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

V. OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The appraisal under Part II and Part III A. constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

VI. THE PROBATIONARY REPORT

This report is to be completed only once, for a Civil Service employee between his ninth and tenth month after entrance on duty, and for a Foreign Service Staff employee between his eighteenth and twenty-fourth month on duty.

When the other portions of this form are complete, the principal officer or his deputy (for employees overseas), or the rating officer (for those in Washington), should check one of the two statements below and sign in the space provided.

☐ A. Because this employee's performance, general traits of character, and ability (if overseas) to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are satisfactory, I recommend retention.

☐ B. I recommend against retention of this employee because his performance, or conduct, or general traits of character, or (if overseas) his ability to adjust to the environment and other conditions at the post are unsatisfactory.

If additional comments seem appropriate, they should be incorporated into the appraisal called for under Part III. If retention is not recommended, these comments should include a reference to discussions held with the employee.

PRINCIPAL OR RATING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME

CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

696

☒ Department of State ☐ U.S. Information Agency

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

SUPPORT STAFF PERSONNEL
GS 1-8
FSS 10-7
ALL SECRETARIES AND WAGE BOARD PERSONNEL

CHECK BELOW
☐ Regular Report ☐ Probationary Report
Interim Report:
☒ Departure of Rated Employee
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF EMPLOYEE BEING RATED (last, first, middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	EMPLOYEE'S GRADE OR CLASS
HEIMGARTNER, Maryann L.	259737	FSS-7
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	EMPLOYEE'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon	Secretary	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
5/18/66	1/1/67 - 6/19/67	6/19/67

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: John C. Mehlert	SIGNATURE:
TYPED NAME: Calvin E. Mehlert	TYPED NAME: E. G. Lansdale
TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: FSO-4 Staff Assistant to General Lansdale	TYPED CLASS OR GRADE, TITLE: Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador

I have read and received a copy of this report. DATE: June 17, 1967 SIGNATURE OF RATED EMPLOYEE: Maryann Heimgartner

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated employee.

I. POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSS, GS, WB, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
Secretary	FSS	690.1	7	292

WHAT is done by the employee: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of the relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below and statements added to outline additional or special duties, if any, which are distinct from those covered by the SDD. SDD. SDD NO. 46

A. Miss Heimgartner has been assigned to the Senior Liaison Office (SLO), U.S. Embassy, Saigon. (SLO is a small staff, headed by Minister E. G. Lansdale (Maj.Gen., USAF, Ret.), working directly under the Ambassador, and charged with maintaining liaison with top Vietnamese leaders, and with providing advice on political development and counterinsurgency matters.) She and one other secretary have been responsible for the smooth administrative functioning of the office (handling routing and filing of messages and documents, TA records, travel arrangements, a large amount of typing, and other administrative tasks).

HOW it should be done: Briefly state the quantitative or qualitative standards or requirements for performing these duties.

B. Accuracy and speed have been particularly required. Papers typed by Miss Heimgartner go to the Ambassador and other top U.S. officials in Saigon, often on a priority basis. Further, since SLO has no trained State Department Administrative Officer, she has been required to exercise considerable initiative in administrative affairs.

II. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued)

8. Written Communication ☐ NA	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition usually requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires extensive editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence; clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style. Only occasional minor editing is ever required.
9. Oral Communication ☐	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defects such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	X Speaks well, is concise and to the point. Retains listener's interest.	Outstandingly articulate Always conveys ideas clearly and with appropriate choice of words. Holds attention of audience even under adverse conditions.
10. Effectiveness as a Supervisor ☐ NA	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excell in morale.
11. Relations with Americans	Personal relations (at work or socially) are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly or shows limited sense of community responsibility at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations (at work and socially). Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	X Effective in personal relations at all levels. Tolerant, highly respected and well-liked.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels.
12. Relations with non-Americans ☐ IO	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very sucessful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked; develops rapport.	Attentive to and exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations with local citizens. Is respected, sought after, and is responsive.
13. Language Improvement ☐	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	X (French) Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.

III. SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

On an attached sheet, signed by the rating officer, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the employee's performance should be mentioned, but should not be discussed in any detail. Rating officers are reminded that decisions regarding promotions and other personnel actions are made on the basis of well documented, carefully written reports.

A. Factors of Performance - Discuss the employee's performance as measured against the requirements listed in Part I, B. Especially, discuss those factors in PartII rated high or low, or which otherwise call for special comment or explanation, citing supporting examples where possible.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential - Describe any special skills of the employee additional to those listed under item one of Part II. Particularly note any new skills acquired during the rating period, and those skills which should be considered in future assignments. As appropriate, discuss the employee's potential in his present type of work, in other fields of work, or as a supervisor.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

MARYANN L. HEIMGARTNER -- SUMMARY COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

A. Factors of Performance

Miss Heimgartner has performed her duties in a superior fashion, working rapidly and accurately, particularly when under pressure. She has acted on her own initiative to help improve office efficiency, and has maintained a friendly and cooperative attitude at all times toward all members of the office.

B. Additional Qualifications and Potential

Miss Heimgartner has considerable interest in and experience with office management.

She is fully qualified now to serve as secretary to a senior U. S. official and also is qualified for supervisory positions.

C. Special Factors and Recommendations

Miss Heimgartner would be most effectively employed in a position requiring considerable initiative, energy, and acceptance of responsibility.

She should be considered for early promotion.

D. Conduct and Representation

Miss Heimgartner takes part in normal Saigon social life, entertaining her friends in a gracious and wholesome manner. She also has ably assisted the Senior Liaison Office in representational activities to include helping host informal gatherings attended by the Prime Minister and other top Vietnamese leaders. Further, she has demonstrated a personal commitment to help U. S. objectives in Viet Nam outside her official duties; in cooperation with our other secretary, she organized an extremely successful operation to support a Vietnamese orphanage near Saigon, enlisting assistance in the form of money, commodities and labor from many American civilian and military personnel.

Calvin E. Mehlert
FSO-4
Staff Assistant to General Lansdale

June 17, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

VI. REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

Name: Maryann Heimgartner FSS-7

Personal Evaluation Report

I have observed Miss Heimgartner's work on a daily basis and concur in the rating officer's report. I would also like to note that on a number of occasions Miss Heimgartner served in the Ambassador's office when the latter's secretary was absent.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

697

☐ Department of State ☒ U. S. Information Agency

PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,

AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6

CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX

☐ Regular Report

Interim Report:

☒ Departure of Rated Officer

☐ Departure of Rating Officer

☐ Change of Duty

B11 F10 D7 S

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
MILLER, Henry L.	54260	FSR-1
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon (Detail to State)	International Relations Officer	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
9/4/65	6/16/66 - 5/15/67	June 13, 1967

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE: See note attached.
TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE: Minister; Assistant to the Ambassador	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated officer. The Development Appraisal Report (Form FS-315A) is to be prepared at the same time, but in DUPLICATE only.

PART I - POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSO, FSS, GS, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
International Relations Officer	FSO	151.1	2	300

WHAT is done by the officer: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of their relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below. Additional significant duties not covered by the SDD should be listed below.

SDD NO. _____

Mr. Miller served as my deputy, Senior Liaison Office, American Embassy, Saigon. (The Senior Liaison Office is a small staff operating directly under the Ambassador, charged with maintaining liaison with senior Vietnamese officials and with providing advice concerning political development and counterinsurgency affairs.) His major duties have been: advice and assistance to senior Vietnamese and American leaders concerning true communication between leadership and the people, particularly supporting the Revolutionary Development program; assisting in the imaginative development of folk music, both Vietnamese and American, to help strengthen Vietnamese national pride and esprit and to explain to

PART II - PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the officer's performance with respect to the factors listed below. Place a (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies, with a (+) or a (-) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe to be significant. Most of the 26 factors apply to most positions, and all of the first 17 factors are significant performance elements in almost every position. If, however, any of the 26 performance factors is not applicable to the position, the rating officer can so signify by marking "N. A." in the space below its number. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I. O."

1. Knowledge of Work	Lacks the kind of knowledge required for satisfactory performance.	Has most required knowledge but lacks depth or breadth in certain respects.	Possesses adequate knowledge for good work performance.	Work reflects particularly comprehensive and suitable knowledge.	X Has exceptionally commanding knowledge of and insight into all aspects of work.
2. Productivity	Useful output or volume of work is generally inadequate.	Somewhat slow or erratic in production of useful work.	Volume of useful output wholly adequate.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	X His work output is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy	Error of commission or omission, or lack of precision, is frequent or serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise, incomplete, incorrect or superficial.	Careful, conscientious. Work meets position demands for accuracy.	X Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors of commission or omission.	Invariably turns out work outstanding in accuracy and completeness.

WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

4. Initiative	Does not take independent action.	Sometimes overlooks need for action or seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	Acts on his own in usual activities, quite adequate.	Sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently in new or unforeseen situations.	X Invariably sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently even in the most difficult or important situations.
5. Resourcefulness	Goes strictly "by the book". Does not produce original ideas or adaptations.	Prefers conventional solutions to problems but occasionally displays originality.	His work reflects the imagination and originality required.	Highly adept in finding original solutions to unforeseen problems.	X Develops and applies original solutions to his most difficult problems with exceptional success.
6. Dependability	Fails to follow instructions, or to observe commitments, or to complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions, and to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Complies with commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	X Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Regardless of own inconvenience, invariably meets the most difficult commitments and deadlines. Certain to follow through even in absence of instructions.
7. Decisiveness	Cannot make up his mind, or vacillates.	Slow at making decisions unless pushed, or jumps too hastily to conclusions.	Makes sound decisions with reasonable promptness.	Makes sound decisions in a very timely and confident fashion.	X Officer's decisiveness, even under acute pressure, is outstanding in speed and success.
8. Analytical Ability	Generally misjudges or fails to realize causes or significance of problems, facts or events.	Tends to accept statements or events with little critical thought or frequently fails to interpret or interrelate facts adequately.	Generally identifies the facts or underlying events, ideas, or problems and interprets them with reasonable accuracy.	Thoughtfully and successfully examines the essential elements of problem situations and reaches valid conclusions.	X Exceptionally effective in reaching the heart of a difficult problem, evaluating its elements and their interrelationships and true significance.
9. Ability to Anticipate	Short-sighted. Tries to solve today's problem without regard to other problems or tomorrow's needs.	Sometimes compartmentalizes problems, does not perceive relationships to other events and later eventualities. Occasionally caught off base.	Foresighted. Usually chooses course of action that has broad and lasting utility.	Nearly always shapes actions to future developments as well as to present problem. Visualizes indirect as well as direct consequences of an action.	X Exceptionally sensitive to ultimate consequences of action. Invariably examines particular item as a part of the total stream of events. Whole decision-making process is integrated.
10. Judgment	Unreliable judgment. Overlooks pertinent considerations or has little sense of proportion.	Judgment adequate if clear-cut precedents exist; lacks practicality, wisdom, or sensitivity in new situations.	Exercises good judgment in normal activities. Carefully considers facts and possible courses of action.	Nearly always displays good judgment in meeting both normal and unusual situations.	X Displays excellent judgment, timing, and insight, even in the most difficult and sensitive situations. Judgment unimpaired by work pressures.
11. Perspective	Has a poor understanding of the goals of his job.	Fair understanding of the principal objectives of his job, but poorly oriented in some respects.	Good knowledge of objectives and of his part in achieving them.	Well-informed, very good insights, knows what he is doing and why.	X Remarkable grasp of relationship of his job to total picture and of currents which might affect this relationship.
12. Attitude Toward Job	Indifferent attitude. Shows little interest in his work.	Makes an effort but has little real enthusiasm for the job.	Has an interest in the work and helps out on other tasks when asked.	Displays keen interest in job. Works extra hours on own initiative. Offers to assist in other duties.	X Exceptionally high degree of interest, willingness, and dedication. His job invariably comes first.
13. Acceptance of Responsibility	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for past or future actions.	Sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and then only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for past or future actions, including those of his subordinates, if any.	X Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions and those of subordinates, if any. Does not hesitate to act in interests of organization.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

14. Written Communication	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition requires little editing.	X Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style.
15. Oral Communication	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defect such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well. Convincing and to the point. Effective in debate.	X Outstandingly articulate in choice of words, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness. Holds listeners' interest even under adverse conditions.
16. Adaptability	Resists change or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work somewhat hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts change, new approaches, and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	X Immediately grasps new approaches, ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, and adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
17. Relations with Americans	Officer's relations at work or socially are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations at work and socially. Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Stimulates rapport. Tolerant, highly respected, and well liked. Active in community to extent job permits.	X Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels. Has deep understanding of human nature. Highly respected and sought after. A leader in community affairs.
18. Relations with Non-Americans	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs. Creates problems.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked. Effective in contacts and develops rapport.	X Exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations. He is sincerely respected, sought after, and responsive.
19. Language Improvement	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	X Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.
20. Official Representation	Makes a poor impression as a representative of the United States.	Does not make the contacts he should or sometimes is rather ineffective in contacts.	Does his part in mixing with the local people and represents the organization effectively at social and unofficial functions.	Has wide range of useful contacts and is effective at using them and at promoting the interests of the U.S. in host country.	X Makes excellent use, for the U.S., of extraordinary range of local contacts. Performs effectively at any social or official function.
21. Negotiating Ability	Not effective as a negotiator. Lacks force or the ability to think clearly in negotiations.	Generally successful in negotiating matters of only minor importance or complexity. Must be given detailed instructions.	Good negotiator. Displays good judgment, patience, and tact in applying instructions.	Performance superior in sensitive or difficult negotiations. Forceful. A clear thinker and well prepared. Obtains good results.	X Excellent negotiator who holds up under pressure. Rarely if ever caught off guard. Knows subject thoroughly. Obtains desired results.
22. Effectiveness as a Supervisor	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	X Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excel in morale.

23. Effectiveness as an Executive	☐ Ineffective as an executive.	☐ Marginal because he lacks forcefulness or decisiveness; or he does not comprehend the total picture; or he is weak in organization, planning, delegating, or staff relations.	☐ Organizes and plans work effectively and produces good results through exercise of executive skills.	☒ Achieves superior results through exercise of planning, organization, leadership and related executive skills.	☐ Superb planner, organizer and leader. Accomplishment as executive is outstanding.
24. Effectiveness as a Rating Officer N. A.	☐ Evaluations generally are not objective, candid, thorough or substantive, or frequently either are not submitted or are so delinquent as not to serve the purpose.	☐ Evaluations sometimes are not candid, objective, thorough, perceptive, or do not demonstrate comprehension of service standards, or are not timely.	☐ Reports are reasonably objective, candid, thorough, and perceptive. Gets reports in on time.	☐ Evaluations are ample, unbiased, and perceptive, showing insight into the performance, character and ability of subordinates.	☐ Evaluations are comprehensive, objective, and candid, clearly depicting the true value of the rated officers.
25. Technical Advice	☐ Seriously deficient as a technician or advisor.	☐ Fairly competent in his specialized field, but specific local advise or or advisory technique is marginal.	☐ Fully qualified in his specialized field and provides sound and timely advise in an acceptable manner.	☐ Superior advisor in his technical field. Understands ramifications of problems and the implications of his advise.	☒ Outstandingly competent advisor. His analysis of conditions is penetrating. Understands the implications of his advise. Inspires action.

PART III - NARRATIVE COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE

On attached sheets, signed and dated, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance should be mentioned, but not be discussed in any detail. As you respond to items B and C observe carefully the instructions contained in agency guides to rating officers for selected occupations, where applicable.

A. ASSOCIATION WITH RATED OFFICER. Indicate how long you have known the officer and the nature of your association.

B. POSITION REQUIREMENTS. State briefly the requirements or performance factors which are of primary importance in measuring the officer's effectiveness in this job. This could include standards of quality, technique, or style, and such special circumstances as shortage of help, lack of direct supervision, or sudden emergency demands, or other operational difficulties.

C. PERFORMANCE SUMMARY. Describe the depth and breadth of the officer's weaknesses in relation to the performance requirements described in Section B above, and discuss those factors in Part II above which were particularly significant, or which were rated high or low. Give concrete examples whenever possible.

D. ALLOWANCE FOR POSITION CLASS. (Foreign Service Only.) If the officer's personal rank differs by more than one class from the class of the position, explain as clearly as possible the allowance you have made in this report for such difference.

PART IV - REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the rated officer's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the rated officer received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the officer's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

PART V - REVIEW PANEL

WAS REVIEW PANEL USED?

☐ No ☐ Yes. No comments. ☐ Yes. Panel's comments attached.

DATE SIGNED BY PANEL CHAIRMAN	SIGNATURE OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME, TITLE AND CLASS OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

PART VI - OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE

The appraisal under Part II and Part III-C constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526 5.3.c.552
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

HENRY L. MILLER -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART I. (Continued)

the U. S. public the validity of the U. S. role in Viet Nam; liaison with a wide range of Vietnamese, including assisting me in hosting informal meetings with the Prime Minister and other top GVN leaders; advice and assistance to the Mission Youth Program; representing me as required at Mission Council meetings and weekly agency chief meetings chaired by the Deputy Ambassador.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSCSSR
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

HENRY L. MILLER -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART III -- Narrative Comments on Performance

I have known Mr. Miller for 20 years, both as a friend and professionally. He has served directly under me for 21 months (September, 1965 to May, 1967). During this period of service with me the key performance factors required of him were: considerable tact and understanding of human feelings so as to generate cooperative, fruitful working relationships with both Vietnamese and American officials; the capability to stand up under pressure while maintaining sound judgment, a sense of balance and a sense of humor; complete discretion; being on duty or at least on call all day, every day; a sound background knowledge of both our strategy and tactics and those of the Communists.

Mr. Miller's performance measured up fully to all of these requirements. Factors of particular importance in Part II above were: initiative; resourcefulness; judgment; attitude toward job; adaptability; and relations with Americans and non-Americans. Specific examples follow of duties performed demonstrating outstanding ability in terms of these factors: assisting the exceptional Vietnamese folk music composer and artist, Pham Duy, in using his music to help generate esprit among the Revolutionary Development cadre and among Vietnamese in general; assisting Pham Duy, American folk singer Steve Addis, and other artists in employing Vietnamese and American folk music to develop further understanding of and support for the Viet Nam war among the American public; advice and assistance to the highly successful pilot youth project in District 8 of Saigon; studies and recommendations leading toward an improved U. S. policy with respect to the strategic political/cultural center of Hue University.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

5 U.S.C. 552

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

June 13, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

NOTE:

The Reviewing Officer, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, departed this post just prior to the completion of Mr. Miller's tour. Thus, this report is submitted without inclusion of comments by the Reviewing Officer. If such comments are desired, it is suggested that Mr. Lodge, now Ambassador-at-Large, be contacted at the Department of State in Washington.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

June 13, 1967

HENRY L. MILLER -- DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

A. Personal Characteristics:

1. Appearance: Dresses appropriately for the occasion. General impression: always courteous, warmly friendly, and at ease. He "stands tall" (nearly 6 1/2 feet).

2. Bearing: Mature, poised, yet enthusiastic in all situations; has outstanding ability to put people at ease and to develop close friendships with people of all nationalities and in all walks of life.

3. Personality: Outgoing; friendly and enthusiastic in a way which generates a similar attitude among those with whom he is dealing; has a wholesome sense of humor. He was invited into many Vietnamese homes, due to the deep affection shown him by Vietnamese.

4. Range of Interests: Music of all kinds; gardening; mastering technical details and techniques in the field of communications media (for example, with respect to broadcasting, filming, and recording). Reads fiction and professional material related to his work. Is a member of several correspondents' clubs. He has a rare ability to make pets of a wide variety of animals; in Viet Nam, his pets included a rooster, a peacock, a mongrel dog, and a 12-foot boa constrictor.

5. Other: An individual of deep integrity genuinely devoted to serving his country and to helping people. Willing to admit mistakes and to correct them promptly.

B. Family:

Though normally sharing his overseas tours, his wife, Anne, has not been able to be with him during this assignment in Viet Nam, a "hardship tour" without family. An outstanding figure in the field of public affairs in her own right, Anne has served as an associate of mine in the past. Both she and their children support him thoroughly in his work. When she has been with him at overseas posts in the past, she has demonstrated exceptional ability to assist in developing friendly working relationships with key members of the host government as well as with a wide range of local citizens.

C. Limiting Factors:

None.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

D. Leadership and Executive Capabilities:

Plans soundly. Makes decisions wisely and rapidly in fields which he is thoroughly familiar. Organizes resources well and delegates authority effectively. Follows through energetically to insure effective execution of plans, taking corrective actions quickly if plans become unhinged. Is particularly skilful at training and motivating subordinates.

E. Growth Capacity:

This officer has thorough knowledge of his field as well as unusually broad experience in the areas of political development and counterinsurgency affairs. He is an imaginative, creative officer with keen intelligence and a high capacity for sustained, vigorous action. As such he is qualified now for posts of highest responsibility. No further professional training required. Recommended next assignment, Public Affairs Officer at an overseas post in which unusual sensitivity to local feelings is required and in which his Viet Nam experience is particularly apropos.

F. Advancement Potential:

"Suitable for advancement to highest rank." The rating I have given him in this report and in the Performance Rating Report should be sufficient to support this evaluation.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

June 13, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

NOTE:

The Reviewing Officer, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, departed this post just prior to the completion of Mr. Miller's tour. Thus, this report is submitted without inclusion of comments by the Reviewing Officer. If such comments are desired, it is suggested that Mr. Lodge, now Ambassador-at-Large, be contacted at the Department of State in Washington.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

June 13, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

698

TO: Ambassador Porter

FROM: Ed Lansdale

SUBJECT: Efficiency Report - - Henry L. Miller

Attached are copies of Performance and Development Appraisal Reports on Hank Miller which I have completed as rater. Inasmuch as Hank, along with the rest of us, is a part of your and Ambassador Lodge's staff, it would seem fitting for you to endorse the two reports. Perhaps some comment such as the following would be appropriate:

Performance Report:

I have been able to observe Mr. Miller's performance on many occasions, noting the results of his work and the relaxed competence with which he approaches his tasks. He has worked directly for the rating officer who was solely responsible for his assignments and his supervision. From my vantage point, the supervision seemed adequate. I concur fully in the ratings given. I might add that the officer's wife, who is in Hong Kong as a safe haven, has been very helpful to my wife in her responsibilities to the other dependents stationed in Hong Kong. We have been able to call on her for many chores in complete confidence.

Development Appraisal Report:

I have had contact with the rated officer at various Embassy meetings where he represented the rating officer, as well as social and representational functions. I would say that the relations between the rated officer and the rating officer are excellent. Due to the long relationship between the two, and the closeness of the supervision, I have no disagreement with this appraisal report.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

SLO:EGLansdale:rm
August 15, 1966

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

[ ] Department of State [ ] U.S. Information Agency

PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,
AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX
[ ] Regular Report
Interim Report:
[ ] Departure of Rated Officer
[ ] Departure of Rating Officer
[ ] Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
MILLER, Henry L.	34230	FSO-1

POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE
Saigon	Deputy to Senior Liaison Officer

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
9/3/67	9/[illegible] - 4/[illegible]/68	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE: FSO-1 Senior Liaison Officer	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated officer. The Development Appraisal Report (Form FS-315A) is to be prepared at the same time, but in DUPLICATE only.

PART I - POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSO, FSS, GS, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
International Relations Officer	FSR			

WHAT is done by the officer: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of their relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below. Additional significant duties not covered by the SDD should be listed below.

SDD NO. _____

Mr. Miller has been my Deputy and principal staff assistant for public affairs in the group of volunteers making up the Ambassador's special team known as the Senior Liaison Office. His major duties include: encouraging a rebirth of Vietnamese national morale after 20 years of war, through the creative work of Vietnamese artists; advice to me and to key Vietnamese and American personalities in effective use of mass communications and techniques of psychological operations; informal liaison with a number of Vietnamese officials, teachers, students, and villagers in the provinces; continuing contact with artists and performers; liaison with JUSPAO; membership on the (cont'd)

PART II - PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the officer's performance with respect to the factors listed below. Place a (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies, with a (+) or a (-) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe to be significant. Most of the 26 factors apply to most positions, and all of the first 17 factors are significant performance elements in almost every position. If, however, any of the 26 performance factors is not applicable to the position, the rating officer can so signify by marking "N. A." in the space below its number. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I. O."

1. Knowledge of Work					X
	Lacks the kind of knowledge required for satisfactory performance.	Has most required knowledge but lacks depth or breadth in certain respects.	Possesses adequate knowledge for good work performance.	Work reflects particularly comprehensive and suitable knowledge.	Has exceptionally commanding knowledge of and insight into all aspects of work.
2. Productivity					X
	Useful output or volume of work is generally inadequate.	Somewhat slow or erratic in production of useful work.	Volume of useful output wholly adequate.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	His work output is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy				X	
	Error of commission or omission, or lack of precision, is frequent or serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise, incomplete, incorrect or superficial.	Careful, conscientious. Work meets position demands for accuracy.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors of commission or omission.	Invariably turns out work outstanding in accuracy and completeness.

WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

4. Initiative					X
	Does not take independent action	Sometimes overlooks need for action or seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	Acts on his own in usual activities, quite adequate.	Sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently in new or unforeseen situations.	Invariably sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently even in the most difficult or important situations.
5. Resourcefulness					X
	Goes strictly "by the book". Does not produce original ideas or adaptations.	Prefers conventional solutions to problems but occasionally displays originality.	His work reflects the imagination and originality required.	Highly adept in finding original solutions to unforeseen problems.	Develops and applies original solutions to his most difficult problems with exceptional success
6. Dependability				X	
	Fails to follow instructions, or to observe commitments, or to complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions, and to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Complies with commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Regardless of own inconvenience, invariably meets the most difficult commitments and deadlines. Certain to follow through even in absence of instructions.
7. Decisiveness					X
	Cannot make up his mind, or vacillates.	Slow at making decisions unless pushed, or jumps too hastily to conclusions.	Makes sound decisions with reasonable promptness.	Makes sound decisions in a very timely and confident fashion.	Officer's decisiveness, even under acute pressure, is outstanding in speed and success.
8. Analytical Ability					X
	Generally misjudges or fails to realize causes or significance of problems, facts or events.	Tends to accept statements or events with little critical thought or frequently fails to interpret or interrelate facts adequately.	Generally identifies the facts or underlying events, ideas, or problems and interprets them with reasonable accuracy.	Thoughtfully and successfully examines the essential elements of problem situations and reaches valid conclusions.	Exceptionally effective in reaching the heart of a difficult problem, evaluating its elements and their interrelationships and true significance.
9. Ability to Anticipate					X
	Short-sighted. Tries to solve today's problem without regard to other problems or tomorrow's needs.	Sometimes compartmentalizes problems, does not perceive relationships to other events and later eventualities. Occasionally caught off base.	Foresighted. Usually chooses course of action that has broad and lasting utility.	Nearly always shapes actions to future developments as well as to present problem. Visualizes indirect as well as direct consequences of an action.	Exceptionally sensitive to ultimate consequences of action. Invariably examines particular item as a part of the total stream of events. Whole decision-making process is integrated.
10. Judgment					X
	Unreliable judgment. Overlooks pertinent considerations or has little sense of proportion.	Judgment adequate if clear-cut precedents exist, lacks practicality, wisdom, or sensitivity in new situations.	Exercises good judgment in normal activities. Carefully considers facts and possible courses of action.	Nearly always displays good judgment in meeting both normal and unusual situations.	Displays excellent judgment, timing, and insight, even in the most difficult and sensitive situations. Judgment unimpaired by work pressures.
11. Perspective					X
	Has a poor understanding of the goals of his job.	Fair understanding of the principal objectives of his job, but poorly oriented in some respects.	Good knowledge of objectives and of his part in achieving them.	Well-informed, very good insights, knows what he is doing and why.	Remarkable grasp of relationship of his job to total picture and of currents which might affect this relationship.
12. Attitude Toward Job					X
	Indifferent attitude. Shows little interest in his work.	Makes an effort but has little real enthusiasm for the job.	Has an interest in the work and helps out on other tasks when asked.	Displays keen interest in job. Works extra hours on own initiative. Offers to assist in other duties.	Exceptionally high degree of interest, willingness, and dedication. His job invariably comes first.
13. Acceptance of Responsibility					X
	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for past or future actions.	Sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and then only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for past or future actions, including those of his subordinates, if any.	Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions and those of subordinates, if any. Does not hesitate to act in interests of organization.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

14. Written Communication				X	
	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style.
15. Oral Communication					X
	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defect such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well. Convincing and to the point. Effective in debate.	Outstandingly articulate in choice of words, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness. Holds listeners' interest even under adverse conditions.
16. Adaptability					X
	Resists change or new approaches, or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work somewhat hampered by old habits or fixed ideas, or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts change, new approaches, and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches, ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, and adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
17. Relations with Americans					X
	Officer's relations at work or socially are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations at work and socially. Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Stimulates rapport. Tolerant, highly respected, and well liked. Active in community to extent job permits.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels. Has deep understanding of human nature. Highly respected and sought after. A leader in community affairs.
18. Relations with Non-Americans					X
	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs. Creates problems.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked. Effective in contacts and develops rapport.	Exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations. He is sincerely respected, sought after, and responsive.
19. Language Improvement			X		
	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.
20. Official Representation					X
	Makes a poor impression as a representative of the United States.	Does not make the contacts he should or sometimes is rather ineffective in contacts.	Does his part in mixing with the local people and represents the organization effectively at social and unofficial functions.	Has wide range of useful contacts and is effective at using them and at promoting the interests of the U.S. in host country.	Makes excellent use, for the U.S., of extraordinary range of local contacts. Performs effectively at any social or official function.
21. Negotiating Ability					X
	Not effective as a negotiator. Lacks force or the ability to think clearly in negotiations.	Generally successful in negotiating matters of only minor importance or complexity. Must be given detailed instructions.	Good negotiator. Displays good judgment, patience, and tact in applying instructions.	Performance superior in sensitive or difficult negotiations. Forceful. A clear thinker and well prepared. Obtains good results.	Excellent negotiator who holds up under pressure. Rarely if ever caught off guard. Knows subject thoroughly. Obtains desired results.
22. Effectiveness as a Supervisor					X
	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excel in morale.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

23. Effectiveness as an Executive				X	
	Ineffective as an executive	Marginal because he lacks forcefulness or decisiveness, or he does not comprehend the total picture, or he is weak in organization, planning, delegating, or staff relations.	Organizes and plans work effectively and produces good results through exercise of executive skills.	Achieves superior results through exercise of planning, organization, leadership and related executive skills.	Superb planner, organizer and leader. Accomplishment as executive is outstanding.
24. Effectiveness as a Rating Officer					
N.A.	Evaluations generally are not objective, candid, thorough or substantive, or frequently either are not submitted or are so delinquent as not to serve the purpose.	Evaluations sometimes are not candid, objective, thorough, perceptive, or do not demonstrate comprehension of service standards, or are not timely.	Reports are reasonably objective, candid, thorough, and perceptive. Gets reports in on time.	Evaluations are ample, unbiased, and perceptive, showing insight into the performance, character and ability of subordinates.	Evaluations are comprehensive, objective, and candid, clearly depicting the true value of the rated officers.
25. Technical Advice					X
	Seriously deficient as a technician or advisor.	Fairly competent in his specialized field, but specific local advise or or advisory technique is marginal.	Fully qualified in his specialized field and provides sound and timely advise in an acceptable manner.	Superior advisor in his technical field. Understands ramifications of problems and the implications of his advise.	Outstandingly competent advisor. His analysis of conditions is penetrating. Understands the implications of his advise. Inspires action.

PART III - NARRATIVE COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE

On attached sheets, signed and dated, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance should be mentioned, but not be discussed in any detail. As you respond to items B and C observe carefully the instructions contained in agency guides to rating officers for selected occupations, where applicable.

A. ASSOCIATION WITH RATED OFFICER. Indicate how long you have known the officer and the nature of your association.

B. POSITION REQUIREMENTS. State briefly the requirements or performance factors which are of primary importance in measuring the officer's effectiveness in this job. This could include standards of quality, technique, or style, and such special circumstances as shortage of help, lack of direct supervision, or sudden emergency demands, or other operational difficulties.

C. PERFORMANCE SUMMARY. Describe the depth and breadth of the officer's weaknesses in relation to the performance requirements described in Section B above, and discuss those factors in Part II above which were particularly significant, or which were rated high or low. Give concrete examples whenever possible.

D. ALLOWANCE FOR POSITION CLASS. (Foreign Service Only.) If the officer's personal rank differs by more than one class from the class of the position, explain as clearly as possible the allowance you have made in this report for such difference.

PART IV - REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the rated officer's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the rated officer received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the officer's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

PART V - REVIEW PANEL

WAS REVIEW PANEL USED?

☐ No ☐ Yes. No comments. ☐ Yes. Panel's comments attached.

DATE SIGNED BY PANEL CHAIRMAN	SIGNATURE OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME, TITLE AND CLASS OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

PART VI - OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE

The appraisal under Part II and Part III-C constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

HENRY L. MILLER -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART I. (Continued)

Mission Montagnard Committee and Mission Youth Council; acting as my representative at the Deputy Ambassador's regular inter-agency conferences and, in my absence, at meetings of the Mission Council.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

HENRY L. MILLER -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART III -- Narrative Comments on Performance

I have known Mr. Miller since 1946 and, although he has been under my supervision only since September 1965, I have kept in touch with him through the whole 20-year period and have watched his career develop with interest. His present position makes severe demands on his skills and on his time. Performance factors of primary importance include: availability and capability to perform 24 hours a day, seven days a week; ability to stand up under pressure, maintaining judgement, poise, and sense of humor; absolute discretion; sensitivity to the basic factors governing a situation and ability to use these factors to advantage; familiarity with Communist techniques and tactics. The necessity for him to operate with minimum guidance, and the seniority of Americans and Vietnamese with whom he deals, require of him the very highest standards of performance. In all respects he has measured up fully to the demands of his position. Some specific examples of work performed which embody the above requirements and illustrate the outstanding factors noted in Part II include: behind the scenes support, advice, and assistance to numerous Vietnamese artists lending their efforts to help with Revolutionary Development, among them the folk ~~singer~~ musician composer and artist Pham Duy who made tours of both the U.S. and Vietnam; encouragement and quiet assistance to Vietnamese youth working on such vital projects as the development of Saigon's District 8; advising representatives of press and television where stories can be found which would further the work of Revolutionary Development; studies for this office and the Ambassador leading to impact projects such as the TET Chieu Hoi campaign and the issuance of Vietnamese stamps commemorating Free World Assistance Forces.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

August 1, 1966

☐ Department of State ☐ U.S. Information Agency

DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS, AND STAFF OFFICERS FSR 1-6 CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-13 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX
☐ Regular Report
Interim Report:
☐ Departure of Rated Officer
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER (LAST, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	CLASS AND GRADE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY Performance Rating REPORT (attached)	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
3/8/63	3/8/63 to 3/[illegible]/65	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
TYPED NAME: [illegible]	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE [illegible]	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

PURPOSE. The Development Appraisal Report is a written evaluation of the officer's capacity for growth, his leadership qualities, his ability to assume higher level responsibilities, and of any factors such as family, health, or suitability which might limit or enhance his advancement. It is not an evaluation of the officer's performance in any particular job during a particular rating period, although the appraisal must necessarily be based in part on an observation of the officer's performance and must bear a close relationship to the evaluation of that performance.

APPLICABILITY, SCHEDULE, AND PARTICIPATION. This report is to be prepared IN DUPLICATE whenever a Performance Rating Report (FS-315) is prepared. It shall be written and reviewed by the same rating and reviewing officers who prepared the Performance Rating Report, and will be attached to and submitted with it.

INSTRUCTIONS ON PREPARATION. The appraisal of a man's potential is one of your most difficult and important tasks as a supervisor. It demands impartiality, intellectual honesty, and precision of expression. It must take into account the projected needs of the organization, and must evaluate an individual in relation to these future needs.

Prepare the report on plain sheets of paper stapled to this form; follow the underlined subject headings listed below. Appraise the officer's potential for growth and development, describe and evaluate his capacities and limitations, and where possible, use actual examples to illustrate points. Beware of understatements or overstatements, carelessness, or undue brevity which may injure both the organization and the officer being appraised.

Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance or potential should be mentioned under item C below, but should not be discussed in detail. When reporting undesirable traits or shortcomings, you should identify where and how their adverse effect, if any, on past performance is reported in the Performance Rating (FS-315). Likewise, the effect of outstanding personal attributes should also be reflected in the Performance Rating.

DISCUSSION AND DISCLOSURE. This report will not be shown to the rated officer at the time it is prepared, nor will it be shown to him subsequently unless and until a step is taken that is intended to lead to an adverse personnel action for which the officer is not otherwise entitled by law or regulation to an opportunity to reply to specific charges.

The restriction on disclosure is not intended to discourage discussion between supervisor and subordinate of matters covered in this report, particularly when such discussion and guidance could assist the subordinate in his self-improvement efforts. On the contrary, supervisors and personnel officers are obliged to counsel persons under their responsibility. Occasionally, however, some factors, traits, or limitations, though they form a necessary part of appraisal of an officer's potential, may be beyond his power to alter or control; in such cases a discussion of them with him might serve no useful end, and may even be counter-productive. In summary, you are obliged to report your appraisal of the officer's potential fully and candidly; you are also obliged to counsel him on all matters which lend themselves to such discussion.

PART I - RATING OFFICER'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTS

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

A. Personal Characteristics:

1. Appearance - Neatness, propriety in dress, general impression.
2. Bearing - Degree of maturity, composure under varying circumstances, facility in personal contact.
3. Personality - Discuss fully personality traits of the officer, e.g., bright sparkling, extrovert, dull, aloof, introvert, pleasant, spontaneous, sharp, witty, good sense of humor, heavy, obsequious, sarcastic, biting.
4. Range of Interests - Languages, arts, reading, avocations, hobbies, and where appropriate membership in political science, economic, technical, social and other professional institutions or societies.
5. Other Matters of special significance not covered above, e.g., acceptance or evasion of responsibilities (community or otherwise), willingness to admit error, attitudes towards superiors and subordinates, personal integrity.

HENRY L. MILLER -- DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

A. Personal Characteristics

1. Appearance. Dresses appropriately for the occasion, usually on the informal side. Gives the general impression of one who waves aside unnecessary conventionalities in order to get on with the task at hand.

2. Bearing. His maturity and poise are obvious, and not diminished by his enthusiasm. I have yet to see him awed by the obstacles facing him in any situation. He has a rare and valuable flair for personal contact with people of all walks of life.

3. Personality. Infectiously enthusiastic; informal without violating good taste; outgoing; makes friends easily, and disarms resistance quickly; spontaneous wholesome sense of humor; interested in people and in helping them.

4. Interests. Interested in radio, films, tape recording, gardening. Reads fiction, and non-fiction related to his work or geographical area of assignment. Maintains his membership in several press/correspondents' clubs.

5. Other. A very selfless individual devoted to serving his country rather than his own self-interest.

B. Family

His wife, Anne, usually shares overseas tours with him but is not present in Vietnam. She is a highly gifted and capable contributor to public affairs work in her own right and has served as an associate of mine in the past. Those who have served with him at posts where she has been present hold her in warm affection as a friend. She supports her husband thoroughly in his work, and helps him realize that what he is doing is both necessary and important. His children show the same attitude.

C. Limiting Factors

None.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

D. Leadership and Executive Capabilities

He is able to get to the heart of a problem quickly, to isolate the governing factors, and to plan and organize action required. He is particularly adept at training and making the best use of his subordinates. He is essentially

an operator rather than a planner, and produces results quickly, catching up others in his own enthusiasm and skillfully overcoming or avoiding obstacles.

E. Growth Capacity

He is now a fully trained, mature and highly capable officer. He has extensive experience, keen insight into the motivations of people, a quick intelligence, great vigor and staying power. Further development will of course come with each new experience, but this individual is ready now for posts of highest responsibility.

His next assignment should be a senior post in public affairs work, such as Director of a U.S. Information Agency overseas.

F. Advancement Potential

Considering the officer from an overall viewpoint I believe him suitable for advancement to highest rank. The outstanding rating I have given him in his performance rating report and my preceding comments in this development appraisal should be sufficient support for the above statement. I consider him capable of advancing more rapidly than his contemporaries.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

August 1, 1966

699

READ CAREFULLY REFERENCED SECTION IN AR 623-105 BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO FILL OUT ANY ITEM

PART I - PERSONAL DATA *(Read Section IV, AR 623-105)*

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL	2. SERVICE NUMBER	3. GRADE	4. DATE OF RANK	5. BRANCH BASIC	5. BRANCH DETAIL	6. INIT RA APPT YES	6. INIT RA APPT NO
FARRICK, SAMUEL N. JR.	O 25 446	COL	22 Jun 62	INF			X

7. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, STATION AND MAJOR COMMAND

US MACV, SAIGON, VIETNAM, PACOM

PART II - REPORTING PERIOD AND DUTY DATA *(Read Sections IV and V, AR 623-105)*

8. PERIOD COVERED FROM DAY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO DAY	TO MONTH	TO YEAR	9. REASON FOR RENDERING REPORT (Check)		10. REPORT BASED ON (Check)	RATER	INDORSER
28	Aug	66	7	Mar	67		ANNUAL	DAILY CONTACT	X	
							CHANGE OF RATER	FREQUENT OBSERVATION		
						X	PCS RATED OFFICER	INFREQUENT OBSERVATION		
DUTY DAYS			OTHER DAYS				CHANGE OF DUTY FOR RATED OFFICER	RECORDS AND REPORTS		
							OTHER (Specify)	OTHER (Specify)		
192			0							

DUTY ASSIGNMENT FOR RATED PERIOD

11. PRINCIPAL DUTY — 12. DUTY MOS 2162 — 13. AUTH GRADE COL

Mil Asst To Sp Asst To U.S. Ambassador. Executive Officer, Senior Liaison Office, American Embassy, Saigon. Supervises and coordinates staff work and engages in daily liaison with senior U.S. and Vietnamese officials.

14. MAJOR ADDITIONAL DUTIES Represents the Senior Liaison Officer at top level meetings, as required.

PART III - MANNER OF PERFORMANCE *(Read paragraph 21c, AR 623-105)*

15. RATER

During the period of this report, this officer continued to perform in an outstanding manner his duties as military member and executive officer of a specially selected staff drawn from various U.S. Agencies and Services to serve directly under the Ambassador to counter Communist insurgency and to seek imaginative solutions to socio-politico-military problems. This officer combines qualities which permitted him to serve the U.S. uniquely in this unusual and sensitive position: absolute integrity; leadership ability; an active, broad-ranging intelligence; empathy; mature judgment; articulate use of language; and a deep understanding of the problems of counterinsurgency and their solutions. These qualities, along with his conscientiousness, attention to necessary detail, soldierly bearing, pleasing personality, and quiet wit were of the highest value in developing and maintaining excellent working relations with various parts of the U.S. Mission and of the Vietnamese Government. His value was enhanced by his willingness to make field trips and surveys throughout Viet Nam despite the hazard, and by the professional skill, judgment, and analytical ability shown in the resulting studies. In view of his demonstrated qualities and performance I recommend early promotion to general officer grade.

16. INDORSER ☐ I AM UNABLE TO EVALUATE THIS OFFICER FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

This performance was recognized by the award of the Legion of Merit By COMUSMACV and of a high Vietnamese decoration by the Vietnamese Government.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

SUSLOSS2

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

RATED OFFICERS NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER: SAMUEL N. KARRICK, JR., O 25 446

PART IV - PERSONAL QUALITIES (Read paragraph 21d, AR 623-105)

LEGEND	DEGREE	INADEQUATE	MARGINAL	BELOW AVERAGE	AVERAGE	ABOVE AVERAGE	EXEMPLARY
	NUMBER	.0	.1	.2	.3	.4	.5

RATER	INDORSER	
.5	.	a. ADAPTABILITY (Adjusts to new or changing situations & stresses; bears up under pressure)
.5	.	b. AMBITION (Seeks and welcomes additional and more important responsibilities)
.5	.	c. APPEARANCE (Possesses military bearing and is neat, smart, and well-groomed)
.5	.	d. COOPERATION (Works in harmony with others as a team member)
.5	.	e. DEPENDABILITY (Consistently accomplishes desired actions with minimum supervision)
.4	.	f. ENTHUSIASM (Motivates others by his zeal)
.5	.	g. EXPRESSION (Expresses himself clearly and concisely both orally and in writing)
.4	.	h. FORCE (Executes actions vigorously)
.5	.	i. INGENUITY (Finds solutions to problems regardless of obstacles)
.5	.	j. INITIATIVE (Takes necessary and appropriate action on his own)
.5	.	k. INTELLIGENCE (Acquires knowledge and grasps concepts readily)
.5	.	l. JUDGEMENT (Thinks logically and makes practical decisions)
.5	.	m. LOYALTY (Renders faithful and willing support to superiors and subordinates)
.5	.	n. MORAL COURAGE (Intellectual honesty, willingness to stand up and be counted)
.5	.	o. SELF-DISCIPLINE (Conducts himself in accordance with accepted standards)
.6	.	p. SELF-IMPROVEMENT (Takes action to improve himself)
.5	.	q. SOCIABILITY (Participates freely and easily in social and community activities)
.5	.	r. STAMINA (Performs successfully under protracted physical and mental stress)
.5	.	s. TACT (Says or does what is appropriate without giving unnecessary offense)
.5	.	t. UNDERSTANDING (Appreciation of another person's viewpoint)
9.8		← SCORE

PART V - APPRAISAL OF QUALIFICATIONS (Read paragraph 21e, AR 623-105)

DUTIES		RATER	INDORSER
a. COMMAND A TACTICAL UNIT		1	
b. COMD NON-TACTICAL UNIT			
c. STAFF	PERSONNEL	( )	( )
UNIT (U)	INTEL.	( )	( )
GENERAL (G)	OPERATIONS	2 (J)	( )
OR	LOGISTICS	( )	( )
JOINT (J)	R & D	( )	( )
	COMPT	( )	( )
d. SPECIAL STAFF RATER (Specify)			
INDORSER (Specify)			
e. SPECIALIST RATER (Specify)		3	
		Counterinsurgency	
INDORSER (Specify)			
f. WITH OTHER US FORCES OR AGENCIES		4	
g. WITH FOREIGN FORCES OR GOVERNMENTS		5	
h. INSTRUCTOR			
i. WITH RESERVE COMPONENTS			

PART VI - OVERALL DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE AND ESTIMATED POTENTIAL (Read paragraphs 21f and 21g, AR 623-105)

RATING	EXPECTED DISTRIBUTION OF 100 OFFICERS RATED	OVERALL DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE (1) RATER	VALUE	INDORSER	ESTIMATED POTENTIAL (2) RATER	VALUE	INDORSER
a. OUTSTANDING	1	* 98	96 - 100	*	10	10	
b. EXCEPTIONAL	11	*	90 - 95	*		9	
c. SUPERIOR	1111		80 - 89			8	
	11111111111		70 - 79			7	
d. EXCELLENT	11111111111111111111111		60 - 69			6	
	11111111111111111111111		50 - 59			5	
e. EFFECTIVE	1111111111		40 - 49			4	
	1111		30 - 39			3	
f. MARGINAL	11	*	20 - 29	*		2	
g. INADEQUATE	1	*	10 - 19	*		1	
		SCORE 98			10		

PART VII - NUMERICAL VALUE (Read paragraph 21h, AR 623-105)

(Scores to be entered by rater and indorser, and verified by a personnel officer)

SCORES	RATER	INDORSER
PART IV	9.8	
PART VI (1)	98	
PART VI (2)	10	
TOTAL	117.8	
COMPOSITE SCORE		

PART VIII - AUTHENTICATION (Read paragraph 21i, AR 623-105)

17. SIGNATURE OF RATER: EG Lansdale — DATE: 14 March 67

TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT:
Edward G. Lansdale, Minister
U.S. Embassy, Saigon (Major General USAF-Retired)

18. SIGNATURE OF INDORSER — DATE

TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT

19. REVIEWER (Read Section VI, AR 623-105) MY REVIEW ☐ INDICATES NO FURTHER ACTION ☐ RESULTS IN ACTION STATED ON CONTINUATION SHEET

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER | TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT | DATE

20. THIS REPORT HAS _____ INCLOSURES. (Insert "0" if appropriate)

21. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66

22. PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

FPO, Japan

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

TO: Ambassador Lodge

FROM: Ed Lansdale

SUBJECT: OER on Sam Karrick

MACV has requested that you be the indorsing officer for the Officer Efficiency Report on Colonel Karrick of SLO. Since he is an Academy graduate, is within the zone of consideration for promotion to General Officer, and has served on your staff at the Embassy in an outstanding manner, your indorsement can be of significant help to him.

The AR says that the indorser must complete all parts of the report if he has been in a position to observe performance for 60 days or more, which you have been. The easy way out, on the scoring would be to duplicate the scores I gave him. Or, you might say, in item 16 that you trust my judgement in this scoring.

In item 10, on the front page, suggest you check the box for "frequent observation" or "infrequent observation," whichever you prefer.

On item 16, suggest you may wish to say something like: "This officer has served on my staff at the American Embassy, Saigon, and I am generally familiar with his work, which has been of superior service to me and the needs of the United States."

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

SLO:EGLansdale:rm
September 3, 1966

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, SAIGON, VIETNAM, PACIFIC COMMAND

PART II - REPORTING PERIOD AND DUTY DATA (Read Sections IV and V, AR 623-105)

FROM	TO	REASON FOR REPORT (Check)	REPORT BASED ON (Check)
28 Aug 65	27 Aug 66	X ANNUAL	X
DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS	CHANGE OF RATED OFFICER	FREQUENT OBSERVATION
359		CHANGE OF DUTY FOR RATED OFFICER	INFREQUENT OBSERVATION
		OTHER (Specify)	RECORDS AND REPORTS

DUTY ASSIGNMENT FOR RATED PERIOD

11. PRINCIPAL DUTY 12. DUTY CODE 2162 13. ARMY GRADE Colonel

Executive Officer, Senior Liaison Office, American Embassy, Saigon. Detailed to Department of State for this sensative duty that directly serves Ambassador in broad spectrum of countering Communist [illegible]. Supervises, coordinates staff work. Liaison with senior U.S. and Vietnamese officials, daily.

14. MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES Represents me at top level meetings, as required. Short checks provincial conditions, including combat areas. Liaison with MACV

PART III - MANNER OF PERFORMANCE (Read paragraph 3-7, AR 623-105)

15. DUTIES

Selected as U.S. military member of staff composed of personnel from several U.S. Agencies and Services, for imaginatively unconventional solution of problems posed by political-military warfare, this officer has performed in an outstanding manner. His quick intelligence, understanding grasp of political-psychological factors effecting socio-economic and military operations, his thoroughness with necessary details, his articulate use of language coupled with quiet wit, his soldierly bearing, and his friendly personality have served the U.S. needs uniquely, in inter-agency work groups, in maintaining fine working relationships with widely varying organizations (U.S. and foreign) and in bridging U.S. and Vietnamese thinking for understanding cooperation. His first-hand field surveys, including combat areas, have been accomplished in a professional military manner and have displayed mature judgement in analysis of complex problems. His understanding of the needs and solutions in counterinsurgency is exceptional, far above that of the usual "expert," and he demonstrated a definite talent in making good use of this understanding. Based upon this performance, I recommend early promotion to general officer grade.

16. REMARKS

☐ I AM UNABLE TO EVALUATE THIS OFFICER FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC-552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 27FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

DA FORM 67-9, 1 JUL 63 — REPLACES DA FORM 67, 1 FEB 62, WHICH IS OBSOLETE EFFECTIVE 30 SEP 63 — US ARMY OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT (AR 623-105)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

.5	ALERTNESS (Acts to learn or change. Initiative. Effort or desire to improve under pressure)	
.5	APPEARANCE (Neat, well-groomed)	
.5	COOPERATION (Works in harmony with others. Is a team player)	
.5	DEPENDABILITY (Accomplishes assigned tasks with minimum supervision)	
.4	LEADERSHIP (Motivates others by his ideal)	
.5	ORAL EXPRESSION (Expresses himself clearly and correctly in orally and in writing)	
.4	POTENTIAL (Has the qualities necessary for increased responsibility)	
.5	PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Has adequate knowledge of his duties)	
.5	RESOURCEFULNESS (Uses time, facilities, and personnel effectively)	
.5	SELF-CONFIDENCE (Has confidence in his own ability and judgment)	
.5	MORAL COURAGE (Has the necessary willingness to stand up and be counted)	
.5	SELF-DISCIPLINE (Controls his reactions and emotions under trying circumstances)	
.5	SELF-IMPROVEMENT (Takes action to improve himself)	
.5	SOCIABILITY (Participates readily and naturally in social and community activities)	
.5	PHYSICAL FITNESS (Has the stamina and vigor necessary for effective performance)	
.5	UNDERSTANDING (Appreciates another person's viewpoint)	
8.3	TOTAL SCORE	

a. COMMAND & TACTICAL DUTY

b. COMMAND & TACTICAL DUTY

c. STAFF — PERSONNEL

UNIT (I) — G1

GENERAL (G) — OPERATIONS 2

OR — LOGISTIC

JOINT (J) — S & J

COMPT

d. SPECIAL STAFF

DUTIES (Specify)

INDORSER (Specify)

e. SPECIAL STAFF

RATER (Specify) Counterinsurgency

INDORSER (Specify)

f. WITH OTHER U. FORCES OR AGENCIES 4

g. WITH FOREIGN FORCES OR GOVERNMENTS 3

h. INSTRUCTOR

i. WITH RESERVE COMPONENTS

PART VII - OVERALL DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE AND ESTIMATED POTENTIAL (Read paragraphs 21f and 21j, AR 623-105)

RATING	EXPECTED DISTRIBUTION OF 100 OFFICERS RATED	OVERALL DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE (1) RATER	(1) VALUE	(1) INDORSER	(2) RATER	(2) VALUE	(2) INDORSER
a. OUTSTANDING	1	* 98	96 - 100	*	10	10	
b. EXCEPTIONAL	11	*	90 - 95	*		9	
c. SUPERIOR	17		80 - 89			8	
			70 - 79			7	
d. EXCELLENT	40		60 - 69			6	
			50 - 59			5	
e. GOOD	17		40 - 49			4	
			30 - 39			3	
f. FAIR	11	*	20 - 29	*		2	
g. INADEQUATE	1	*	10 - 19	*		1	
		SCORE	98		10		

PART VII - NUMERICAL VALUE (Read paragraph 21h, AR 623-105) (Scores will be entered in ruler and indorser and verified by personnel officer)

SCORES	RATER	INDORSER
PART IV	9.8	
PART V (1)	98	
PART V (2)	10	
TOTAL	117.8	

PART VIII - AUTHENTICATION (Read paragraph 21i, AR 623-105)

17. SIGNATURE OF RATER — DATE: 2Sept.66

TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT

Edward G. Lansdale, Minister
U.S. Embassy, Saigon (Major General USAF-Retired)

18. SIGNATURE OF INDORSER — DATE

TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT

TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, SERVICE NUMBER, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT — DATE

20. THIS REPORT HAS ____ INCLOSURES. (Insert "NO" if inapplicable)

21. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 67

22. PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

700

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [illegible] DATE: [illegible]

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT:

Suggest that you notice this report on the particular chair. since [illegible] your staff can with you [illegible] regarding me the way the case, I could not [illegible] this [illegible] would use [illegible] specially this. You might just say that [illegible] PPRC Japan [illegible]

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Joseph P. REDICK, FSR-3

PART IV - REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

I am delighted to set down my good opinion of Joseph P. Redick who has made an excellent impression on me on several occasions. I trust Mr. Lansdale's judgment on him, as he has an intimate knowledge of Mr. Redick. I, therefore, concur in his evaluation.

Henry Cabot Lodge
U. S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 22 FEB 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

July 16, 1966.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

☒ Department of State ☐ U. S. Information Agency

PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,
AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX
☒ Regular Report
Interim Report:
☐ Departure of Rated Officer
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
REDICK, Joseph P.	429800	FSR-5
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon	International Relations Officer	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
8/30/65	August 30, 1965 - June 15, 1966	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: E G Lansdale	SIGNATURE:
TYPED NAME: E. G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE: Minister - Assistant to the Ambassador	TYPED CLASS, TITLE:

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated officer. The Development Appraisal Report (Form FS-315A) is to be prepared at the same time, but in DUPLICATE only.

PART I - POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSO, FSS, GS, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
International Relations Officer	FSO	131.1	2	297

WHAT is done by the officer: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of their relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below. Additional significant duties not covered by the SDD should be listed below.

SDD NO. _____

Mr. Redick has been the key personal assistant to me in the group of volunteers making up the Ambassador's special team known as the Senior Liaison Office. I rely heavily on his advice and judgment in matters of the greatest delicacy and sensitivity. Mr. Redick's major routine duties include the following: advice on Vietnamese personalities and political groupings; advice on strategy and tactics in furthering U.S. objectives in Vietnam; screening official message traffic and preparing outgoing messages; arranging for official appointments; (continued on attachment)

PART II - PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the officer's performance with respect to the factors listed below. Place a (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies, with a (+) or a (-) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe to be significant. Most of the 26 factors apply to most positions, and all of the first 17 factors are significant performance elements in almost every position. If, however, any of the 26 performance factors is not applicable to the position, the rating officer can so signify by marking "N. A." in the space below its number. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I. O."

1. Knowledge of Work	Lacks the kind of knowledge required for satisfactory performance.	Has most required knowledge but lacks depth or breadth in certain respects.	Possesses adequate knowledge for good work performance.	Work reflects particularly comprehensive and suitable knowledge.	☒ Has exceptionally commanding knowledge of and insight into all aspects of work.
2. Productivity	Useful output or volume of work is generally inadequate.	Somewhat slow or erratic in production of useful work.	Volume of useful output wholly adequate.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	☒ His work output is phenomenal.
3. Accuracy	Error of commission or omission, or lack of precision, is frequent or serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise, incomplete, incorrect or superficial.	Careful, conscientious. Work meets position demands for accuracy.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors of commission or omission.	Invariably turns out work outstanding in accuracy and completeness.

WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

14. Written Communication	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires editing.	X Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style.
15. Oral Communication	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defect such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well. Convincing and to the point. Effective in debate.	X Outstandingly articulate in choice of words, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness. Holds listeners' interest even under adverse conditions.
16. Adaptability	Resists change or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work somewhat hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts change, new approaches, and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	X Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches, ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, and adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
17. Relations with Americans	Officer's relations at work or socially are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations at work and socially. Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	X Effective in personal relations at all levels. Stimulates rapport. Tolerant, highly respected, and well liked. Active in community to extent job permits.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels. Has deep understanding of human nature. Highly respected and sought after. A leader in community affairs.
18. Relations with Non-Americans	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs. Creates problems.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked. Effective in contacts and develops rapport.	X Exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations. He is sincerely respected, sought after, and responsive.
19. Language Improvement	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	X Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.
20. Official Representation	Makes a poor impression as a representative of the United States.	Does not make the contacts he should or sometimes is rather ineffective in contacts.	Does his part in mixing with the local people and represents the organization effectively at social and unofficial functions.	Has wide range of useful contacts and is effective at using them and at promoting the interests of the U.S. in host country.	X Makes excellent use, for the U.S., of extraordinary range of local contacts. Performs effectively at any social or official function.
21. Negotiating Ability	Not effective as a negotiator. Lacks force or the ability to think clearly in negotiations.	Generally successful in negotiating matters of only minor importance or complexity. Must be given detailed instructions.	Good negotiator. Displays good judgment, patience, and tact in applying instructions.	Performance superior in sensitive or difficult negotiations. Forceful. A clear thinker and well prepared. Obtains good results.	X Excellent negotiator who holds up under pressure. Rarely if ever caught off guard. Knows subject thoroughly. Obtains desired results.
22. Effectiveness as a Supervisor	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	X Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excel in morale.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2015

[X] Department of State [ ] U.S. Information Agency

PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,
AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX
[X] Regular Report
Interim Report
[X] Departure of Rated Officer
[ ] Departure of Rating Officer
[ ] Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
REDICK, Joseph P.	495800	FSR-5
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	
Saigon	International Relations Officer	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY
8/30/65	August 30, 1965 - June 15, 1966	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: EG Wansdale	SIGNATURE:
TYPED NAME:	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

I have read and received a copy of this report. DATE: July 13, 1966 SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER: Joseph P. Redick

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated officer. The Development Appraisal Report (Form FS-315A) is to be prepared at the same time, but in DUPLICATE only.

PART I - POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSO, FSS, GS, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
International Relations Officer	FSO	151.1	2	237

WHAT is done by the officer: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of their relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below. Additional significant duties not covered by the SDD should be listed below.

SDD NO. _____

Mr. Redick has been the key personal assistant to me in the group of volunteers making up the Ambassador's special team known as the Senior Liaison Office. I rely heavily on his advice and judgment in matters of the greatest delicacy and sensitivity. Mr. Redick's major routine duties include the following: advice on Vietnamese personalities and political groupings; advice on strategy and tactics in furthering U.S. objectives in Vietnam; screening official message traffic and preparing outgoing messages; arranging for official appointments;

PART II - PERFORMANCE FACTORS (continued on attachment)

Evaluate the officer's performance with respect to the factors listed below. Place a (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies, with a (+) or a (-) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe to be significant. Most of the 26 factors apply to most positions, and all of the first 17 factors are significant performance elements in almost every position. If, however, any of the 26 performance factors is not applicable to the position, the rating officer can so signify by marking "N.A." in the space below its number. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I.O."

1. Knowledge of Work	Lacks the kind of knowledge required for satisfactory performance.	Has most required knowledge but lacks depth or breadth in certain respects.	Possesses adequate knowledge for good work performance.	Work reflects particularly comprehensive and suitable knowledge.	X Has exceptionally commanding knowledge of and insight into all aspects of work.
2. Productivity	Useful output or volume of work is generally inadequate.	Somewhat slow or erratic in production of useful work.	Volume of useful output wholly adequate.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful	X His work output is phenomenal

4. Initiative					X
	Does not take independent action	Sometimes overlooks need for action or seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	Acts on his own in usual activities, quite adequately.	Sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently in new or unforeseen situations.	Invariably sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently even in the most difficult or important situations.
5. Resourcefulness					X
	Goes strictly "by the book". Does not produce original ideas or adaptations.	Prefers conventional solutions to problems but occasionally displays originality.	His work reflects the imagination and originality required.	Highly adept in finding original solutions to unforeseen problems.	Develops and applies original solutions to his most difficult problems with exceptional success.
6. Dependability					X
	Fails to follow instructions, or to observe commitments, or to complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions, and to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Complies with commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	Regardless of own inconvenience, invariably meets the most difficult commitments and deadlines. Certain to follow through even in absence of instructions.
7. Decisiveness				X	
	Cannot make up his mind, or vacillates.	Slow at making decisions unless pushed, or jumps too hastily to conclusions.	Makes sound decisions with reasonable promptness.	Makes sound decisions in a very timely and confident fashion.	Officer's decisiveness, even under acute pressure, is outstanding in speed and success.
8. Analytical Ability					X
	Generally misjudges or fails to realize causes or significance of problems, facts or events.	Tends to accept statements or events with little critical thought or frequently fails to interpret or interrelate facts adequately.	Generally identifies the facts or underlying events, ideas, or problems and interprets them with reasonable accuracy.	Thoughtfully and successfully examines the essential elements of problem situations and reaches valid conclusions.	Exceptionally effective in reaching the heart of a difficult problem, evaluating its elements and their interrelationships and true significance.
9. Ability to Anticipate					X
	Short-sighted. Tries to solve today's problem without regard to other problems or tomorrow's needs.	Sometimes compartmentalizes problems, does not perceive relationships to other events and later eventualities. Occasionally caught off base.	Foresighted. Usually chooses course of action that has broad and lasting utility.	Nearly always shapes actions to future developments as well as to present problem. Visualizes indirect as well as direct consequences of an action.	Exceptionally sensitive to ultimate consequences of action. Invariably examines particular item as a part of the total stream of events. Whole decision-making process is integrated.
10. Judgment					X
	Unreliable judgment. Overlooks pertinent considerations or has little sense of proportion.	Judgment adequate if clear-cut precedents exist, lacks practicality, wisdom, or sensitivity in new situations.	Exercises good judgment in normal activities. Carefully considers facts and possible courses of action.	Nearly always displays good judgment in meeting both normal and unusual situations.	Displays excellent judgment, timing, and insight, even in the most difficult and sensitive situations. Judgment unimpaired by work pressures.
11. Perspective					X
	Has a poor understanding of the goals of his job.	Fair understanding of the principal objectives of his job, but poorly oriented in some respects.	Good knowledge of objectives and of his part in achieving them.	Well-informed, very good insights, knows what he is doing and why.	Remarkable grasp of relationship of his job to total picture and of currents which might affect this relationship.
12. Attitude Toward Job					X
	Indifferent attitude. Shows little interest in his work.	Makes an effort but has little real enthusiasm for the job.	Has an interest in the work and helps out on other tasks when asked.	Displays keen interest in job. Works extra hours on own initiative. Offers to assist in other duties.	Exceptionally high degree of interest, willingness, and dedication. His job invariably comes first.
13. Acceptance of Responsibility					X
	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for past or future actions.	Sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and then only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for past or future actions, including those of his subordinates, if any.	Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions and those of subordinates, if any. Does not hesitate to act in interests of organization.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

14. Written Communication					X
	Does not get ideas on paper clearly or clarify on paper.	Poor organization, drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires editing.	Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style.
15. Oral Communication					X
	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defect such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well. Convincing and to the point. Effective in debate	Outstandingly articulate in choice of words, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness. Holds listeners' interest even under adverse conditions.
16. Adaptability				X	
	Resists change or new approaches, or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work somewhat hampered by old habits or fixed ideas; or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts change, new approaches, and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches, ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, and adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
17. Relations with Americans				X	
	Officer's relations at work or socially are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations at work and socially. Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	Effective in personal relations at all levels. Stimulates rapport. Tolerant, highly respected, and well liked. Active in community to extent job permits.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels. Has deep understanding of human nature, highly respected and sought after. A leader in community affairs.
18. Relations with Non-Americans					X
	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs. Creates problems.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked. Effective in contacts and develops rapport.	Exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations. He is sincerely respected, sought after, and responsive.
19. Language Improvement					X
	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.
20. Official Representation					X
	Makes a poor impression as a representative of the United States.	Does not make the contacts he should or sometimes is rather ineffective in contacts.	Does his part in mixing with the local people and represents the organization effectively at social and unofficial functions.	Has wide range of useful contacts and is effective at using them and at promoting the interests of the U.S. in host country.	Makes excellent use, for the U.S., of extraordinary range of local contacts. Performs effectively at any social or official function.
21. Negotiating Ability					X
	Not effective as a negotiator. Lacks force or the ability to think clearly in negotiations.	Generally successful in negotiating matters of only minor importance or complexity. Must be given detailed instructions.	Good negotiator. Displays good judgment, patience, and tact in applying instructions.	Performance superior in sensitive or difficult negotiations. Forceful. A clear thinker and well prepared. Obtains good results.	Excellent negotiator who holds up under pressure. Rarely if ever caught off guard. Knows subject thoroughly. Obtains desired results.
22. Effectiveness as a Supervisor					X
	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production	Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excel in morale

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

23. Effectiveness as an Executive	Ineffective as an executive.	Marginal because he lacks forcefulness or decisiveness, or he does not comprehend the total picture; or he is weak in organization, planning, delegating, or staff relations.	Organizes and plans work effectively and produces good results through exercise of executive skills.	X Achieves superior results through exercise of planning, organization, leadership and related executive skills.	Superb planner, organizer and leader. Accomplishment as executive is outstanding.
24. Effectiveness as a Rating Officer ? NA	Evaluations generally are not objective, candid, thorough or substantive, or frequently either are not submitted or are so delinquent as not to serve the purpose.	Evaluations sometimes are not candid, objective, thorough, perceptive, or do not demonstrate comprehension of service standards, or are not timely.	Reports are reasonably objective, candid, thorough, and perceptive. Gets reports in on time.	Evaluations are ample, unbiased, and perceptive, showing insight into the performance, character and ability of subordinates.	Evaluations are comprehensive, objective, and candid, clearly depicting the true value of the rated officers.
25. Technical Advice NA	Seriously deficient as a technician or advisor.	Fairly competent in his specialized field, but specific local advise or or advisory technique is marginal.	Fully qualified in his specialized field and provides sound and timely advise in an acceptable manner.	Superior advisor in his technical field. Understands ramifications of problems and the implications of his advise.	Outstandingly competent advisor. His analysis of conditions is penetrating. Understands the implications of his advise. Inspires action.

PART III - NARRATIVE COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE

On attached sheets, signed and dated, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance should be mentioned, but not be discussed in any detail. As you respond to items B and C observe carefully the instructions contained in agency guides to rating officers for selected occupations, where applicable.

A. ASSOCIATION WITH RATED OFFICER. Indicate how long you have known the officer and the nature of your association.

B. POSITION REQUIREMENTS. State briefly the requirements or performance factors which are of primary importance in measuring the officer's effectiveness in this job. This could include standards of quality, technique, or style, and such special circumstances as shortage of help, lack of direct supervision, or sudden emergency demands, or other operational difficulties.

C. PERFORMANCE SUMMARY. Describe the depth and breadth of the officer's weaknesses in relation to the performance requirements described in Section B above, and discuss those factors in Part II above which were particularly significant, or which were rated high or low. Give concrete examples whenever possible.

D. ALLOWANCE FOR POSITION CLASS. (Foreign Service Only.) If the officer's personal rank differs by more than one class from the class of the position, explain as clearly as possible the allowance you have made in this report for such difference.

PART IV - REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the rated officer's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the rated officer received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the officer's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

PART V - REVIEW PANEL

WAS REVIEW PANEL USED?

☐ No ☐ Yes. No comments. ☐ Yes. Panel's comments attached.

DATE SIGNED BY PANEL CHAIRMAN	SIGNATURE OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME, TITLE AND CLASS OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

PART VI - OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE

The appraisal under Part II and Part III-C constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

JOSEPH P. REDICK -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART I. (continued)

liaison with selected U.S. agencies in Vietnam; continuing contacts with Vietnamese known to him over a period of nearly 12 years.

PART III.

I have known Mr. Redick since August 1954. We have worked together in many different assignments, he acting generally as a combination personal assistant and executive officer. Mr. Redick's present position makes many demands upon him, the most important of which are: availability and capability to perform 24 hours a day, seven days a week; ability to stand up under pressure, maintaining judgment, poise, and sense of humor; absolute discretion; extreme sensitivity to the "feel" of a situation; skill in written and oral communications, in both English and French; background in psychological warfare; familiarity with communist techniques and tactics. Some specific examples of work performed which embody the above requirements and illustrate the outstanding factors noted in Part II include: a compilation of political parties and personalities in Vietnam; a study on V.C. political organization and strengths, used in Mission studies of GVN manpower; acting as interpreter in delicate, sensitive talks with a wide range of Vietnamese leaders.

EG Lansdale

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

SLO:EGLansdale
July 12, 1966

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (When Completed)

☒ Department of State ☐ U.S. Information Agency

DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,
AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX
☒ Regular Report
Interim Report :
☐ Departure of Rated Officer
☐ Departure of Rating Officer
☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
REDICK, Joseph P.	493600	FSR-3

POST OR (To Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE
Saigon	International Relations Officer

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	PERIOD COVERED BY Performance Rating REPORT (attached)	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE E G Lansdale	SIGNATURE
TYPED NAME E. G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME :
TYPED CLASS, TITLE Minister - Assistant to the Ambassador	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

PURPOSE. The Development Appraisal Report is a written evaluation of the officer's capacity for growth, his leadership qualities, his ability to assume higher level responsibilities, and of any factors such as family, health, or suitability which might limit or enhance his advancement. It is not an evaluation of the officer's performance in any particular job during a particular rating period, although the appraisal must necessarily be based in part on an observation of the officer's performance and must bear a close relationship to the evaluation of that performance.

APPLICABILITY, SCHEDULE, AND PARTICIPATION. This report is to be prepared IN DUPLICATE whenever a Performance Rating Report (FS-315) is prepared. It shall be written and reviewed by the same rating and reviewing officers who prepared the Performance Rating Report, and will be attached to and submitted with it.

INSTRUCTIONS ON PREPARATION. The appraisal of a man's potential is one of your most difficult and important tasks as a supervisor. It demands impartiality, intellectual honesty, and precision of expression. It must take into account the projected needs of the organization, and must evaluate an individual in relation to these future needs.

Prepare the report on plain sheets of paper stapled to this form; follow the underlined subject headings listed below. Appraise the officer's potential for growth and development; describe and valuate his capacities and limitations, and where possible, use actual examples to illustrate points. Beware of understatements or overstatements, carelessness, or undue brevity which may injure both the organization and the officer being appraised.

Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance or potential should be mentioned under item C below, but should not be discussed in detail. When reporting undesirable traits, or shortcomings, you should identify where and how their adverse effect, if any, on past performance is reported in the Performance Rating (FS-315). Likewise, the effect of outstanding personal attributes should also be reflected in the Performance Rating.

DISCUSSION AND DISCLOSURE. This report will not be shown to the rated officer at the time it is prepared, nor will it be shown to him subsequently unless and until a step is taken that is intended to lead to an adverse personnel action for which the officer is not otherwise entitled by law or regulation to an opportunity to reply to specific charges.

The restriction on disclosure is not intended to discourage discussion between supervisor and subordinate of matters covered in this report, particularly when such discussion and guidance could assist the subordinate in his self-improvement efforts. On the contrary, supervisors and personnel officers are obliged to counsel persons under their responsibility. Occasionally, however, some factors, traits, or limitations, though they form a necessary part of appraisal of an officer's potential, may be beyond his power to alter or control; in such cases a discussion of them with him might serve no useful end, and may even be counter-productive. In summary, you are obliged to report your appraisal of the officer's potential fully and candidly; you are also obliged to counsel him on all matters which lend themselves to such discussion.

PART I - RATING OFFICER'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTS

A. Personal Characteristics :

1. Appearance - Neatness, propriety in dress, general impression.
2. Bearing - Degree of maturity, composure under varying circumstances, facility in personal contact.
3. Personality - Discuss fully personality traits of the officer, e.g., bright sparkling, extrovert, dull, abrasive, introvert, pleasant, spontaneous, sharp, witty, good sense of humor, heavy, obsequious, sarcastic, biting.
4. Range of Interests - Languages, arts, reading, avocations, hobbies, and where appropriate membership in political science, economic, technical, social and other professional institutions or societies.
5. Other - Matters of special significance not covered above, e.g., acceptance or evasion of responsibilities (community or otherwise), willingness to admit error, attitudes toward superiors and subordinates, personal integrity.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

B. Family: (Normally this item may be omitted from the appraisal of a Civil Service Officer unless there are family considerations which could significantly affect the officer's potential.)

Comment on family, particularly the wife. Is family a source of strength or weakness to the officer in his performance on this or future assignments? Include, where applicable, comments on the following: What is the family's attitude toward the host country and the people? What is the wife's representational ability? To what extent does the family mix with nationals of the host country and attempt to learn their language? Does the wife participate in local community organizations? Does the family entertain and visit with the local people in addition to Americans at the post? Does the wife participate in U.S.-program activities where appropriate, e.g., English language seminars? Does the family travel about the country?

C. Limiting Factors:

Health, conduct, over indulgence (excessive use of alcohol, etc.), suitability, and other factors relating to both officer and family which should be considered.

D. Leadership and Executive Capabilities:

Capacity to plan, direct, organize, analyze perceptively, make decisions, delegate autority, train and supervise subordinates, negotiate effectively, and insure efficient accomplishment of objectives. (Particularly thorough coverage of this factor is essential in reports on officers of Class 4 and above.)

E. Growth Capacity:

Officer's strengths and weaknesses related to his work capacity, energy, intellectual abilities and knowledge, versatility, creativity and other factors pertinent to an officer's potential to assume broader or higher responsibility. After making a thorough analysis of the officer's growth capacity, the rating officer shall comment in specific terms on assignments and further training which would be most appropriate for realization of the officer's capacity.

F. Advancement Potential:

Consider the officer from an overall viewpoint, including evaluations in this appraisal and in the performance evaluation. State which of the following best expresses your evaluation of the officer's advancement potential:

"Not suitable for further advancement"

"Suitable for advancement of possibly not more than one rank"

"Suitable for advancement of more than one rank"

"Suitable for advancement to highest rank"

Support your selection and comment specifically on the rapidity with which officer is capable of advancing.

PART II - INSTRUCTIONS TO REVIEWING OFFICER

In a separate narrative statement, indicate precisely the extent to which you concur with the rating officer's appraisal, explaining any differences. To make your divergent view clear, describe and evaluate fully any or all of the factors covered by the report. Describe how closely you observed the rated officer. Indicate also whether good working relationships existed between the rated officer and the rating officer.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

JOSEPH P. REDICK -- DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

A. Personal Characteristics

1. Appearance. Always neatly dressed, in appropriate attire for the occasion. General impression: poised, courteous, alert, gentlemanly.

2. Bearing: mature, never loses poise, appears on top of situation even when actually somewhat at a loss. Finds personal contact natural and easy with people of different stations, backgrounds, and nationalities.

3. Personality: Alert, cooperative; good sense of humor but kindly, not caustic; good mixer.

4. Interests: Wholesome interests in photography as a hobby, in automobiles, and in guns. Reads selectively in fields of political science, international affairs, and "whodunnits."

5. Most completely loyal individual I know.

B. Family

His wife, Margaret, usually shares overseas tours with him but is not present in Viet Nam. As a friend of long-standing, I have considerable admiration for the splendidly helpful attitude she has shown him in this enforced separation. She makes him feel that what he is doing is both necessary and important. His son and daughter show the same attitude.

C. Limiting Factors

None.

D. Leadership/Executive Qualities

Has quiet, effective way of checking on execution of assigned tasks; inspires cooperation. Plans work schedule and allotment of individual tasks on equitable basis.

E. Growth Capacity

Extremely intelligent, versatile, and capable officer who is qualified now for senior positions requiring exercise of judgment, discretion, and executive leadership. Further training not required. Next assignment recommended in Washington or at major European post.

F. Advancement Potential

Qualified for immediate promotion to FSR-2.

JOSEPH P. REDICK -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART I. (continued)

liaison with selected U.S. agencies in Vietnam; continuing contacts with Vietnamese known to him over a period of nearly 12 years.

PART III.

I have known Mr. Redick since August 1954. We have worked together in many different assignments, he acting generally as a combination personal assistant and executive officer. Mr. Redick's present position makes many demands upon him, the most important of which are: availability and capability to perform 24 hours a day, seven days a week; ability to stand up under pressure, maintaining judgment, poise, and sense of humor; absolute discretion; extreme sensitivity to the "feel" of a situation; skill in written and oral communications, in both English and French; background in psychological warfare; familiarity with communist techniques and tactics. Some specific examples of work performed which embody the above requirements and illustrate the outstanding factors noted in Part II include: a compilation of political parties and personalities in Vietnam; a study on V.C. political organization and strengths, used in Mission studies of GVN manpower; acting as interpreter in delicate, sensitive talks with a wide range of Vietnamese leaders.

EG Lansdale

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

SLD:EGLansdale
July 12, 1966

Doc 701

B11
F10
D11
5

TO: Miss Alice Westbrook, Personnel Officer

FROM: Ed Lansdale

SUBJECT: Joseph P. Redick

I am forwarding the attached evaluation reports concerning Mr. Redick without the signature of a Reviewing Officer since in the past the latter was Ambassador Lodge who departed before this evaluation was prepared. I might note, however, that in reviewing Mr. Redick's last Performance Rating Report, Ambassador Lodge wrote:

"I am delighted to set down my good opinion of Joseph P. Redick who has made an excellent impression on me on several occasions. I trust Mr. Lansdale's judgment on him, as he has an intimate knowledge of Mr. Redick. I, therefore, concur in his evaluation."

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3,5
Date: FEB 22 2013

SLO:DEHudson:mlh
May 8, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

☐ Department of State ☐ U. S. Information Agency

PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,

AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6

CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

CHECK ONE BOX

☐ Regular Report

Interim Report:

☒ Departure of Rated Officer

☐ Departure of Rating Officer

☐ Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
[redacted], Joseph P.	[redacted]00	FSR-3
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL: Saigon	OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE: International Relations Officer	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST: 8/30/65	PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT: 6/16/66 - 4/30/67	DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: EG Lourdale	SIGNATURE:
TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE: Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador	TYPED CLASS, TITLE:

I have read and received a copy of this report.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Prepare in TRIPLICATE: Original for Washington Office of Personnel, a copy for post or administrative file, and a copy for the rated officer. The Development Appraisal Report (Form FS-315A) is to be prepared at the same time, but in DUPLICATE only.

PART I - POSITION DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Classification Title of Position	Category (FSO, FSS, GS, etc.)	Occupational Series	Class or Grade	Position Number
International Relations Officer	FSO	131.1	2	297

WHAT is done by the officer: List in descending order of importance, the major duties of the position. (Amount of time spent is not necessarily an indication of their relative importance.) If the duties of the position are described by a Standard Description of Duties (SDD) the SDD number may be cited below. Additional significant duties not covered by the SDD should be listed below.

[redacted] has been my personal assistant during the last 10 months, and in the last two months has served at the same time as Executive Officer of my staff, the Saigon liaison office. (A small team operating directly under the Ambassador charged with maintaining liaison with senior Vietnamese officials as well as providing advice concerning counter-insurgency strategy and action.) His major duties have been as follows:

As Executive Officer, coordinating and supervising the work of the 150 staff in my personal assistant, being my key daily internal consultant concerning Vietnamese political developments, personalities and groupings (continued)

PART II - PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Evaluate the officer's performance with respect to the factors listed below. Place a (✓) in the box above the descriptive statement which most nearly applies, with a (+) or a (–) symbol to reflect any refinements you believe to be significant. Most of the 26 factors apply to most positions, and all of the first 17 factors are significant performance elements in almost every position. If, however, any of the 26 performance factors is not applicable to the position, the rating officer can so signify by marking "N. A." in the space below its number. If the factor is applicable but insufficiently observed, mark it "I. O."

1. Knowledge of Work	Lacks the kind of knowledge required for satisfactory performance.	Has most required knowledge but lacks depth or breadth in certain respects.	Possesses adequate knowledge for good work performance.	Work reflects particularly comprehensive and suitable knowledge.	Has exceptionally commanding knowledge of and insight into all aspects of work. ☒
2. Productivity	Useful output or volume of work is generally inadequate.	Somewhat slow or erratic in production of useful work.	Volume of useful output wholly adequate.	Consistently produces superior volume of useful work.	His work output is phenomenal ☒
3. Accuracy	Error of commission or omission, or lack of precision, is frequent or serious.	Work is sometimes imprecise, incomplete, incorrect or superficial.	Careful, conscientious. Work meets position demands for accuracy.	Excels in thoroughness and accuracy. Makes minimum of errors of commission or omission.	Invariably turns out work outstanding in accuracy and completeness.

WHEN COMPLETED ON FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL, THIS IS AN EFFICIENCY REPORT WHICH SHALL BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 612 OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED.

4. Initiative	Does not take independent action.	Sometimes overlooks need for action or seeks guidance or approval unnecessarily before acting.	Acts on his own in usual activities; quite adequate.	Sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently in new or unforeseen situations.	X Invariably sees opportunities and acts promptly and independently even in the most difficult or important situations.
5. Resourcefulness	Goes strictly "by the book". Does not produce original ideas or adaptations.	Prefers conventional solutions to problems but occasionally displays originality.	His work reflects the imagination and originality required.	Highly adept in finding original solutions to unforeseen problems.	X Develops and applies original solutions to his most difficult problems with exceptional success.
6. Dependability	Fails to follow instructions, or to observe commitments, or to complete work on time.	Needs undue amount of supervision to comply with instructions, and to meet deadlines and commitments.	Conscientious and steady worker. Complies with commitments, meets deadlines, and produces useful work with normal supervision.	Conscientious and reliable worker. Completes each task, meets deadlines and commitments with a minimum of supervision.	X Regardless of own inconvenience, invariably meets the most difficult commitments and deadlines. Certain to follow through even in absence of instructions.
7. Decisiveness	Cannot make up his mind, or vacillates.	Slow at making decisions unless pushed, or jumps too hastily to conclusions.	Makes sound decisions with reasonable promptness.	X Makes sound decisions in a very timely and confident fashion.	Officer's decisiveness, even under acute pressure, is outstanding in speed and success.
8. Analytical Ability	Generally misjudges or fails to realize causes or significance of problems, facts or events.	Tends to accept statements or events with little critical thought or frequently fails to interpret or interrelate facts adequately.	Generally identifies the facts or underlying events, ideas, or problems and interprets them with reasonable accuracy.	Thoughtfully and successfully examines the essential elements of problem situations and reaches valid conclusions.	X Exceptionally effective in reaching the heart of a difficult problem, evaluating its elements and their interrelationships and true significance.
9. Ability to Anticipate	Short-sighted. Tries to solve today's problem without regard to other problems or tomorrow's needs.	Sometimes compartmentalizes problems, does not perceive relationships to other events and later eventualities. Occasionally caught off base.	Foresighted. Usually chooses course of action that has broad and lasting utility.	Nearly always shapes actions to future developments as well as to present problem. Visualizes indirect as well as direct consequences of an action.	X Exceptionally sensitive to ultimate consequences of action. Invariably examines particular item as a part of the total stream of events. Whole decision-making process is integrated.
10. Judgment	Unreliable judgment. Overlooks pertinent considerations or has little sense of proportion.	Judgment adequate if clear-cut precedents exist; lacks practicality, wisdom, or sensitivity in new situations.	Exercises good judgment in normal activities. Carefully considers facts and possible courses of action.	Nearly always displays good judgment in meeting both normal and unusual situations.	X Displays excellent judgment, timing, and insight, even in the most difficult and sensitive situations. Judgment unimpaired by work pressures.
11. Perspective	Has a poor understanding of the goals of his job.	Fair understanding of the principal objectives of his job, but poorly oriented in some respects.	Good knowledge of objectives and of his part in achieving them.	Well-informed, very good insights, knows what he is doing and why.	X Remarkable grasp of relationship of his job to total picture and of currents which might affect this relationship.
12. Attitude Toward Job	Indifferent attitude. Shows little interest in his work.	Makes an effort but has little real enthusiasm for the job.	Has an interest in the work and helps out on other tasks when asked.	Displays keen interest in job. Works extra hours on own initiative. Offers to assist in other duties.	X Exceptionally high degree of interest, willingness, and dedication. His job invariably comes first.
13. Acceptance of Responsibility	Generally seeks to avoid responsibility for past or future actions.	Sometimes reluctant to acknowledge or accept responsibility, and then only within well-defined limits.	Generally acknowledges or accepts responsibility willingly.	Displays well above-average sense of responsibility for past or future actions, including those of his subordinates, if any.	X Invariably regards himself as fully accountable for his actions and those of subordinates, if any. Does not hesitate to act in interests of organization.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

14. Written Communication	Does not get ideas across clearly on paper.	Can do simple drafting. Writing often lacks clarity, brevity, or effectiveness. Composition usually requires extensive editorial revision.	Writing is understandable, to the point, and acceptably organized. Composition requires little editing.	Writes clearly and effectively. Composition and style are admirably suited to the objective. Product rarely requires editing.	X Composition has all qualities of excellence: clarity, precision, conciseness, good organization, persuasiveness and style.
15. Oral Communication	Has great difficulty in conveying ideas orally.	Effectiveness of oral communication sometimes lessened by defect such as wordiness, imprecision, poor grammar, or rambling.	Gets ideas across clearly in oral communication.	Speaks well. Convincing and to the point. Effective in debate.	X Outstandingly articulate in choice of words, clarity, conciseness, and persuasiveness. Holds listeners' interest even under adverse conditions.
16. Adaptability	Resists change or new approaches; or is upset by new or different environmental situations.	Adjustment to change or new approaches in work somewhat hampered by old habits or fixed ideas, or adjusts with difficulty to new environment.	Accepts change, new approaches, and new ideas in work and works well with them. Adjusts to new environment reasonably soon.	X Receptive to new approaches and ideas in work. Applies them readily and effectively. Quickly adapts to new or different environment.	Immediately grasps new approaches, ideas. Exceptionally able to blend old and new, and adapt own interests and enthusiasms. Takes difficult environmental situations in stride.
17. Relations with Americans	Officer's relations at work or socially are generally marked by friction.	Sometimes irritates others, or is quick to take offense, or goes along grudgingly, or shows limited sense of community responsibility, at the office or at home.	Maintains good relations at work and socially. Is generally well liked and respected. Cooperates in community affairs.	X Effective in personal relations at all levels. Stimulates rapport. Tolerant, highly respected, and well liked. Active in community to extent job permits.	Exceptionally effective in personal relations at all levels. Has deep understanding of human nature. Highly respected and sought after. A leader in community affairs.
18. Relations with Non-Americans	Insensitive to and lacks understanding of local people and customs. Creates problems.	Sometimes offends, or misunderstands, or is unduly sensitive; or may ignore rapport in "getting job done."	Maintains good relations at work and socially with local citizens.	Very successful in creating good relations at work and socially. Very well liked. Effective in contacts and develops rapport.	X Exceptionally successful in developing good personal relations. He is sincerely respected, sought after, and responsive.
19. Language Improvement	Makes no or virtually no effort to learn the local language even when the demands of his job leave time for study.	Makes a little effort to learn the local language, but only when not at personal inconvenience.	Makes a satisfactory effort to improve knowledge of the local language insofar as job demands on his time permit.	Makes a determined effort to improve his grasp of the local language.	X Neglects no opportunity to master the local language, giving it all the attention his other duties permit, even at some personal inconvenience.
20. Official Representation	Makes a poor impression as a representative of the United States.	Does not make the contacts he should or sometimes is rather ineffective in contacts.	Does his part in mixing with the local people and represents the organization effectively at social and unofficial functions.	Has wide range of useful contacts and is effective at using them and at promoting the interests of the U.S. in host country.	X Makes excellent use, for the U.S., of extraordinary range of local contacts. Performs effectively at any social or official function.
21. Negotiating Ability	Not effective as a negotiator. Lacks force or the ability to think clearly in negotiations.	Generally successful in negotiating matters of only minor importance or complexity. Must be given detailed instructions.	Good negotiator. Displays good judgment, patience, and tact in applying instructions.	Performance superior in sensitive or difficult negotiations. Forceful. A clear thinker and well prepared. Obtains good results.	X Excellent negotiator who holds up under pressure. Rarely if ever caught off guard. Knows subject thoroughly. Obtains desired results.
22. Effectiveness as a Supervisor	Unsuccessful as a supervisor.	Supervises repetitive operations fairly well. Is somewhat weak in meeting new demands, goals, or deadlines, or in staff relations.	Plans and assigns work in an orderly manner and sees that objectives are achieved. Maintains good morale. Carries out instructions conscientiously.	Performance reflects superior skill in most aspects of supervision. Strong both in staff relations and production.	X Plans and organizes work to meet all contingencies. Takes positive steps to develop staff capabilities. Subordinates give maximum performance and excel in morale.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

23. Effectiveness as an Executive	Ineffective as an executive.	Marginal because he lacks forcefulness or decisiveness; or he does not comprehend the total picture; or he is weak in organization, planning, delegating, or staff relations.	Organizes and plans work effectively and produces good results through exercise of executive skills.	Achieves superior results through exercise of planning, organization, leadership and related executive skills.	Superb planner, organizer and leader. Accomplishment as executive is outstanding.
24. Effectiveness as a Rating Officer [redacted]	Evaluations generally are not objective, candid, thorough or substantive, or frequently either are not submitted or are so delinquent as not to serve the purpose.	Evaluations sometimes are not candid, objective, thorough, perceptive, or do not demonstrate comprehension of service standards, or are not timely.	Reports are reasonably objective, candid, thorough, and perceptive. Gets reports in on time.	Evaluations are ample, unbiased, and perceptive, showing insight into the performance, character and ability of subordinates.	Evaluations are comprehensive, objective, and candid, clearly depicting the true value of the rated officers.
25. Technical Advice [redacted]	Seriously deficient as a technician or advisor.	Fairly competent in his specialized field, but specific local advise or or advisory technique is marginal.	Fully qualified in his specialized field and provides sound and timely advise in an acceptable manner.	Superior advisor in his technical field. Understands ramifications of problems and the implications of his advise.	Outstandingly competent advisor. His analysis of conditions is penetrating. Understands the implications of his advise. Inspires action.

PART III - NARRATIVE COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE

On attached sheets, signed and dated, discuss the topics listed below. Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance should be mentioned, but not be discussed in any detail. As you respond to items B and C observe carefully the instructions contained in agency guides to rating officers for selected occupations, where applicable.

A. ASSOCIATION WITH RATED OFFICER. Indicate how long you have known the officer and the nature of your association.

B. POSITION REQUIREMENTS. State briefly the requirements or performance factors which are of primary importance in measuring the officer's effectiveness in this job. This could include standards of quality, technique, or style, and such special circumstances as shortage of help, lack of direct supervision, or sudden emergency demands, or other operational difficulties.

C. PERFORMANCE SUMMARY. Describe the depth and breadth of the officer's weaknesses in relation to the performance requirements described in Section B above, and discuss those factors in Part II above which were particularly significant, or which were rated high or low. Give concrete examples whenever possible.

D. ALLOWANCE FOR POSITION CLASS. (Foreign Service Only.) If the officer's personal rank differs by more than one class from the class of the position, explain as clearly as possible the allowance you have made in this report for such difference.

PART IV - REVIEWING OFFICER'S STATEMENT

The primary role of the reviewing officer concerning this report is to ensure the application of appropriate and equitable rating standards. When the rating officer has completed his report, including adjustments he may want to make after discussion of differing views with the reviewing officer, the latter prepares his own evaluation according to the instructions below, and attaches it to this report.

A. The reviewing officer is required to indicate the extent of his observation of the rated officer's work, the extent to which he concurs in the rating officer's report and to explain any differences. He should comment on whether the rated officer received adequate supervision and guidance, whether the rating officer's report appears unduly strict or lenient, and any other matters he deems pertinent.

B. The reviewing officer should summarize his own evaluation of the officer's performance if he has a sufficient basis and observation for doing so.

PART V - REVIEW PANEL

WAS REVIEW PANEL USED?

☐ No ☐ Yes. No comments. ☐ Yes. Panel's comments attached.

DATE SIGNED BY PANEL CHAIRMAN	SIGNATURE OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME, TITLE AND CLASS OF PANEL CHAIRMAN

PART VI -OVER-ALL RATING - CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE

The appraisal under Part II and Part III-C constitute a general rating of "Satisfactory" under the Performance Rating Act of 1950 unless otherwise indicated below. (An additional statement of justification is required if the rating "Outstanding" or "Unsatisfactory" is given. See 3 FAM 573.6.)

☐ Unsatisfactory ☐ Outstanding

JOSEPH P. REDICK -- PERFORMANCE RATING REPORT

PART I. (Continued)

including carefully screening my contacts with Vietnamese; advice concerning counterinsurgency strategy and tactics; arranging official appointments and screening official message traffic as well as preparing outgoing messages; liaison with selected U.S. agencies; liaison with Vietnamese political figures known to Mr. Redick for many years.

PART III.

During the 13 years I have known Mr. Redick, we have worked closely together in a variety of assignments in which he generally has served as my personal assistant and executive officer. In this most recent assignment the key factors required of him in the performance of his duties have been: great sensitivity to human feelings and tact so as to generate liking and trust among Vietnamese and cooperation with American officials; the capability to stand up under all kinds of pressure, maintaining clear judgment, a sense of balance and a sense of humor; complete discretion; being on duty or at least on call all day, every day; the capability to write and edit memorandums and reports with speed and accuracy; and a sound background in both our strategy and tactics and those of the communists.

Factors of particular importance in Part II above are: knowledge of work, accuracy, dependability, analytical ability, the ability to anticipate, judgment, and skill in both written and oral communications. Specific examples of duties performed illustrating outstanding competency in these factors follow: interpreting during, and helping host, informal meetings with Vietnamese leaders, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet members; writing and editing reports concerning political developments and counterinsurgency affairs; compiling a "working" study of Vietnamese political groupings and personalities.

EG Lansdale

Edward G. Lansdale
Minister
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

May 4, 1967

DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, RESERVE OFFICERS,
AND STAFF OFFICERS FSS-1 - 6
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS GS-9 AND ABOVE

Interim Report :
[X] Departure of Rated Officer
[ ] Departure of Rating Officer
[ ] Change of Duty

NAME OF OFFICER BEING RATED (Last, First, Middle)	EMPLOYEE NUMBER	OFFICER'S CLASS OR GRADE
REDICK, Joseph P.	493600	FSR-3
POST OR (for Washington) ORGANIZATIONAL SYMBOL	**OFFICER'S FUNCTIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE**	
Saigon	International Relations Officer	
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST	**PERIOD COVERED BY Performance Rating REPORT (attached)**	**DATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO AGENCY**
8/30/65	6/16/66 - 4/30/67	

RATING OFFICER	REVIEWING OFFICER
SIGNATURE EG Lansdale	SIGNATURE
TYPED NAME: Edward G. Lansdale	TYPED NAME:
TYPED CLASS, TITLE Minister, Assistant to the Ambassador	TYPED CLASS, TITLE

PURPOSE. The Development Appraisal Report is a written evaluation of the officer's capacity for growth, his leadership qualities, his ability to assume higher level responsibilities, and of any factors such as family, health, or suitability which might limit or enhance his advancement. It is not an evaluation of the officer's performance in any particular job during a particular rating period, although the appraisal must necessarily be based in part on an observation of the officer's performance and must bear a close relationship to the evaluation of that performance.

APPLICABILITY, SCHEDULE, AND PARTICIPATION. This report is to be prepared IN DUPLICATE whenever a Performance Rating Report (FS-315) is prepared. It shall be written and reviewed by the same rating and reviewing officers who prepared the Performance Rating Report, and will be attached to and submitted with it.

INSTRUCTIONS ON PREPARATION. The appraisal of a man's potential is one of your most difficult and important tasks as a supervisor It demands impartiality, intellectual honesty, and precision of expression. It must take into account the projected needs of the organization, and must evaluate an individual in relation to these future needs.

Prepare the report on plain sheets of paper stapled to this form; follow the underlined subject headings listed below. Appraise the officer's potential for growth and development; describe and valuate his capacities and limitations, and where possible, use actual examples to illustrate points. Beware of understatements or overstatements, carelessness, or undue brevity which may injure both the organization and the officer being appraised.

Reference to race, color, creed, or national origin must not be included in this report. Medical problems which could affect the officer's performance or potential should be mentioned under item C below, but should not be discussed in detail. When reporting undesirable traits, or shortcomings, you should identify where and how their adverse effect, if any, on past performance is reported in the Performance Rating (FS-315). Likewise, the effect of outstanding personal attributes should also be reflected in the Performance Rating.

DISCUSSION AND DISCLOSURE. This report will not be shown to the rated officer at the time it is prepared, nor will it be shown to him subsequently unless and until a step is taken that is intended to lead to an adverse personnel action for which the officer is not otherwise entitled by law or regulation to an opportunity to reply to specific charges.

The restriction on disclosure is not intended to discourage discussion between supervisor and subordinate of matters covered in this report, particularly when such discussion and guidance could assist the subordinate in his self-improvement efforts. On the contrary, supervisors and personnel officers are obliged to counsel persons under their responsibility. Occasionally, however, some factors, traits, or limitations, though they form a necessary part of appraisal of an officer's potential, may be beyond his power to alter or control ; in such cases a discussion of them with him might serve no useful end, and may aven be counter-productive. In summary, you are obliged to report your appraisal of the officer's potential fully and candidly ; you are also obliged to counsel him on all matters which lend themselves to such discussion.

PART I - RATING OFFICER'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTS

A. Personal Characteristics :

1. Appearance - Neatness, propriety in dress, general impression.
2. Bearing - Degree of maturity, composure under varying circumstances, facility in personal contact.
3. Personality - Discuss fully personality traits of the officer, e.g., bright sparkling, extrovert, dull, abrasive, introvert, pleasant, spontaneous, sharp, witty, good sense of humor, heavy, obsequious, sarcastic, biting.
4. Range of Interests - Languages, arts, reading, avocations, hobbies, and where appropriate membership in political science, economic, technical, social and other professional institutions or societies.
5. Other - Matters of special significance not covered above, e.g., acceptance or evasion of responsibilities (community or otherwise), willingness to admit error, attitudes towards superiors and subordinates, personal integrity.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Comment on family, particularly the wife. Is family a source of strength or weakness to the officer in his performance on this or future assignments ? Include, where applicable, comments on the following : What is the family's attitude toward the host country and the people ? What is the wife's representational ability ? To what extent does the family mix with nationals of the host country and attempt to learn their language ? Does the wife participate in local community organizations ? Does the family entertain and visit with the local people in addition to Americans at the post ? Does the wife participate in U.S. program activities where appropriate, e.g., English language seminars ? Does the family travel about the country ?

C. Limiting Factors :

Health, conduct, over-indulgence (excessive use of alcohol, etc.), suitability, and other factors relating to both officer and family which should be considered.

D. Leadership and Executive Capabilities :

Capacity to plan, direct, organize, analyze perceptively, make decisions, delegate autority, train and supervise subordinates, negotiate effectively, and insure efficient accomplishment of objectives. (Particularly thorough coverage of this factor is essential in reports on officers of Class 4 and above.)

E. Growth Capacity :

Officer's strengths and weaknesses related to his work capacity, energy, intellectual abilities and knowledge, versatility, creativity and other factors pertinent to an officer's potential to assume broader or higher responsibility. After making a thorough analysis of the officer's growth capacity, the rating officer shall comment in specific terms on assignments and further training which would be most appropriate for realization of the officer's capacity.

F. Advancement Potential :

Consider the officer from an overall viewpoint, including evaluations in this appraisal and in the performance evaluation. State which of the following best expresses your evaluation of the officer's advancement potential :

" Not suitable for further advancement "

" Suitable for advancement of possibly not more than one rank "

" Suitable for advancement of more than one rank "

" Suitable for advancement to highest rank "

Support your selection and comment specifically on the rapidity with which officer is capable of advancing.

PART II - INSTRUCTIONS TO REVIEWING OFFICER

In a separate narrative statement, indicate precisely the extent to which you concur with the rating officer's appraisal, explaining any differences. To make your divergent view clear, describe and evaluate fully any or all of the factors covered by the report. Describe how closely you observed the rated officer. Indicate also whether good working relationships existed between the rated officer and the rating officer.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

JOSEPH P. REDICK -- DEVELOPMENT APPRAISAL REPORT

A. Personal Characteristics

1. Appearance: Always neatly and appropriately dressed. General impression: Alert in a quiet, relaxed way; always gentlemanly.

2. Bearing: Mature, calm and poised in all circumstances; at ease dealing with all types of people from household staff members to senior Vietnamese and American officials.

3. Personality: Quietly conservative, though a good mixer with a friendly sense of humor; cooperative.

4. Interests: A student of languages, reads selectively in fields of international affairs and political science; a good amateur photographer; healthy interests in automobiles and guns.

5. An individual with deep personal integrity, willing to admit his own mistakes and capable of quietly persuading others to do the same, including superiors.

B. Family

Though normally sharing his overseas tours, his wife of course has not been able to be with him during this assignment. Her attitude during this period, however, has been one of helping him feel his job has been necessary and important. His son and daughter have shown the same support.

C. Limiting Factors

None.

D. Leadership/Executive Qualities

Plans thoroughly and well; organizes assignments carefully; delegates authority, then quietly follows up to insure effective execution, doing so in a way which generates cooperation; makes decisions rapidly in areas with which he is thoroughly familiar.

E. Growth Capacity

This officer has thorough, in-depth knowledge of his field, including its subleties, and high intellectual abilities and work capacity. He is qualified now for senior positions requiring exercise of judgment, coolness and dependability under pressure and the ability to inspire teamwork among a staff. Further training not required. Next assignment recommended in Washington or at a major European post.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

F. Advancement Potential

"Suitable for advancement of more than one rank." Qualified for immediate promotion to FSR-2.

EG Lansdale

Edward G. Lansdale
Minister
Assistant to the Ambassador

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

May 4, 1967

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

702

o A.I.D./W	Agency for International Development **COMPLETION OF ASSIGNMENT REPORT** AID 4-253 (2-66) Report No. U-505 (See M.O. 418.1 for instructions)	☒ Regular Report ☐ Supplemental Report	Transmittal Date MAR 24 1967 Participating Agency
VN/A/PA			

ı. From (Mission)	B. Employee's Post of Assignment	C. This is employee's
USAID/VIETNAM	Saigon, Vietnam	☐ 1st tour at post ☒ 2nd tour at post ☐ 3rd tour at post (Also mil temp 1955-6)

ı. Employee's Name (Last, first, middle)	Date of Birth	E. Backstop Code
MELVIN, George H	01-20-26	99

·. Position Title: Provincial Representative Functional Title: Intn'l Rel Off, USIS/Embassy	G. Sequence No.	H. Employee Class	I. Position Grade
	6905	R-3	R-3

. Home Leave Eligibility Date	K. ☐ Home Leave to be postponed 3 months or less ☐ Postponement to exceed 3 months (Justification attached)	L. Estimated Completion of Tour Date
MAY 18, 1967 *		June 18, 1967

PART I – REPORT BY EMPLOYEE

. a. During your tour have you performed duties other than those of your regular position which would qualify you for another type position? (Explain kinds of duties and period of time spent on each.) Two assignments in Laos served as AID Regional Rep (Comm Dev Advr, Arpa) Vientiane and Pakse (comparable to previous two positions in Vietnam). Mid-tour transfer to USIS Senior Liaison Office where serving as IRO. Although have not served as a Prov Rep, fully qualified at that level as well as at region and have gained experience as IRO under General U.S. Consulate.

b. Has there been any special training or self-improvement effort (excluding language training) made during tour which should be reflected in your A.I.D./W records? (If so, give school, degree, if any, dates attended, subjects, etc.)

None

c. Self appraisal of language proficiency rated in accordance with definitions contained in Attachment A to M.O. 462.8

French language proficiency S_____ R_____

Spanish language proficiency S_____ R_____

If you have learned a new language or have greater proficiency in previously declared languages, give language and proficiency. No language proficiency claimed

Language:_____ S_____R_____ Language:_____ S_____R_____

. Career Appraisal: Even though this may in part repeat statements you have made in earlier reports, a new statement representing your current opinions is urged.

What do you regard as the best long-term contribution you can make to the A.I.D. program; in what kinds of work and in what part of the A.I.D. organization? In answering this question in the space below, indicate (a) Which assignments within A.I.D. have proved to be most valuable and satisfying to you; which least valuable and satisfying. (b) What future training and what kind of additional experience you believe necessary to enable you to make your maximum contribution. My particular talents are in the areas of counter insurgency and community development. I believe that I am most effective when working with foreign national leaders in liaison, field negotiation and field administration. Because of this I believe that my best long term contribution to AID continues to be in field operations and administration at the regional or country level.

My interests also follow these lines. My greatest satisfaction with AID assignments always has been when I have had people-level program initiation and execution responsibilities. In both Vietnam and Laos I have been successful as an advisor of local and regional leaders and in helping these leaders inspire the people into accepting their rightful role of forming the "first line of defense" against Communist insurgency (Cont.)

* Will be being amended according to Annual Leave taken in the U.S.
Mid-tour transfer from Vientiane, Laos, arrived Saigon 10-19-65

5. Exercise of Reemployment Rights: This item is to be completed only by employees who have reemployment rights within the Federal service limited to 30 months.

Reemployment rights expired January 31, 1964

☐ I request return to post or transfer to another post.

I understand that my statutory reemployment rights to (Agency) _____ are limited to a period of not to exceed 30 months from date of my appointment with the A.I.D. Foreign Service. I also understand that I will forfeit these reemployment rights if I remain in the A.I.D. Foreign Service beyond the 30 month period.

☐ I request separation from A.I.D. Foreign Service.

I understand that my statutory reemployment rights to (Agency) _____ are limited to a period of not to exceed 30 months from the date of my appointment to the A.I.D. Foreign Service. I also understand that

I must personally apply to (Agency) _____ within 30 calendar days after my separation from the A.I.D. Foreign Service in order to exercise these reemployment rights.

I (do desire, do not desire) to exercise my statutory reemployment rights.

Signature of Employee

Original s/ George H. Melvin

Date Submitted to Supervisor
January 22, 1967

PART II – REPORT BY SUPERVISOR

Instructions: The Supervisor shall examine carefully Part I of this form and complete the sections below recording his comments (supplemental, explanatory, or qualifying) in order to improve the accuracy, clarity, and soundness of the report.

1. Do you concur with the employee's comments in Part I, Item 1, a, b, and c? If not, explain.

Concur.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

2. Are there any factors in the employee's family situation other than those described in Part I, Item 3, which you think should be taken into consideration in making his next assignment?

None.

3. Evaluation of Employee's Statement in Part I, Item 2. Evaluate the statement indicating your agreements and disagreements together with the reasons for disagreements, and suggesting more realistic career objectives and the training and experience necessary for their accomplishment.

I agree with Mr. Melvin's statements. Mr. Melvin has a very rare ability to gain the confidence and respect of Vietnamese, whether peasants, servants, or educated leaders, and to inspire them to base their actions on sound principles. He has a better understanding of the governing factors interacting-interagency than many of the better known experts.

I have known Mr. Melvin for some time and agree that family interests dictate that his family be with him on his next tour of duty. Consequently, I recommend that AID assign him where his talents can be used to advantage but where he can be accompanied by his family. Perhaps the War Short Training Center in Hawaii would be appropriate.

AID 4-150A'(4-65) Please TYPE or PRINT

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

NAME (*Last, First, Middle*): **MELVIN, George E.**

ASSIGNMENT LIMITATIONS (*Health, etc.*): **Family circumstances resulting from prolonged unaccompanied tour absences necessitates my remaining in U. S. during next tour.**

CHANGE IN MARITAL STATUS
[X] MARRIED [ ] SINGLE
[ ] DIVORCED [ ] WIDOWED

STUDY OR TRAINING (Within the last two years or since last report)

TITLE OF COURSE OR SUBJECT	WHERE RECEIVED	DATES

RECENT EMPLOYMENT RECORD WITH AID. List each position held WITHIN THE LAST TWO YEARS in chronological order, BEGINNING WITH THE MOST RECENT.

POSITION TITLE, GRADE, OFFICE OR POST, AND MAJOR DUTIES	RANK AND SALARY	SUPERVISOR'S NAME
International Rel Off Attache (FR-1511: level 03/03), Senior Lao Off, USOMB, Saigon (On loan from AID). Major Duties: Assist SLO in plans and opns establish/maintain liaison with all levels Vietnamese leaders; emphasis on popular leadership.	**FSR-3/3 $16,941**	**E. G. Lansdale**
	DATES OF SERVICE: **10/24/65 06/18/67**	LENGTH OF SERVICE: **01 Yrs. 08 Mos.**
Comm Dev Advr, Area (FR-0101;level 03/02), USAID/LAOS. Major Duties: Under Director USAID, responsible for coordinating all RD and tech service field activities in Pakse Region comprising the five southern provinces of Laos.	**FSR-3/2 $15,375**	**A. Mendenhall (last)**
	DATES OF SERVICE: **07/22/65 10/19/65**	LENGTH OF SERVICE: **0 Yrs. 03 Mos.**
Comm Dev Advr, Area (FR-0101; level 03/02), RD Div, USAID/Laos. Major Duties: Under Chief, USAID RD Div., administered all community development activities, coordinated with other USAID divisions, in the Vientiane 3-province Capital Region.	**FSR-4/6 $14,175**	**Dr. Howard E. Thomas (last)**
	DATES OF SERVICE: **05/18/65 07/21/65**	LENGTH OF SERVICE: **0 Yrs. 02 Mos.**

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

1/12/67
DATE

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5USC§552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: ____
Reason: ____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: K Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

5USC. 552 + MSD

704

CONFIDENTIAL

Efficiency Report
Michael J. DEUTCH
September 1965 - March 1966

During the period September 1965 to March 1966, Mr. Michael J. Deutch engaged in the following activities in Saigon:

1. Made a survey of the electric power situation and the possibilities of VC sabotage of essential public services; pointed out the necessity of a priority system of protection of essential installations in case of renewed VC terrorism.

2. Served as a member of the Economic Warfare Committee established by Ambassador Lodge to study the VC supply system and determine ways of disrupting it. Drafted instructions and a questionnaire for other posts and arranged with the Consulate General in Hong Kong for surveillance of shipments originating there. He brought a rare professionalism to this sensitive field, in which he worked actively to achieve inter-agency cooperation.

3. As a part of the planning for democratic institution-building in South Vietnam, Mr. Deutch prepared a study of possible tasks of a national legislative or constitutional council; he also outlined the political and economic framework of a "Revolutionary Village".

4. Assisted General Landsdale in delicate negotiations with leaders of the largest labor organization in South Vietnam in an attempt to enlist their support of governmental pacification efforts.

5. Brought a wealth of experience to the study of many problems, such as rural electrification, transportation bottlenecks and port congestion, racketeering, housing, rice and pork supply, distribution of scarce commodities, rubber plantations, etc.

6. Gained the confidence of the various cabinet members and other government personnel involved in economic and financial matters; obtained important and timely information on fiscal matters, inflation, the rise in prices of essential foodstuffs, etc.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

7. Made a careful study of the problems that would arise in case of negotiations for a cease-fire or a stand-down.

Edward G. Lansdale
Assistant to the Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

AN ANALYSIS

PROPOSITION I: That a militant program of social, political, agrarian reform and military action ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ such as the program carried out by Col. Leroy in the province of Bentre (see attachment 1) is the only way South Viet-Nam can be won back from the communists.

PROPOSITION II: That the carrying out of such a program requires an active and inspired military force and that the present government has no such force at its disposition at the present time.

PROPOSITION III: That the VNA is to a great extent controlled by the French and that it will be several months at least before any real program of army-government team-work against the Vietminh in the south can be worked out. And that the only means at our disposal to fight the Vietminh at the present or for some time to come are three religious armies in the South -- The Cao Dai, The Hoa Hao, The U.M.D.C.

PROPOSITION IV: That these three army groups could carry out a program in conjunction with the central government as outlined in PROPOSITION I.

PROPOSITION V: That the gamble of an attempt to clear the south of the Vietminh using the three religious armies is worth more to Uncle Sam than the mere consideration and quasi-development of these groups as stay behind assets. That even if the attempt has only limited success these groups will have increased their strenght which will make them even better stay behind assets than they are at present.

PROPOSITION VI: That the time to begin clearing the Vietminh out of the south is now and not five months from now when it will be too late. That we may be making a fatal mistake by throwing all our efforts behind the creation of a strong Diem government measured by Diem's supremacy over the Army on the local scene and letting the rest of South Viet-Nam shift for itself completely into the Vietminh camp.

PROPOSITION VII: That the south can be cleaned up without the army and that strenth for the Diem government can built up at the same time by proper use of the three previously mentioned religious armies.

CONCLUSION:

THAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PLAN AND BASE A PROGRAM FOR CLEARING SOUTH VIET-NAM OF THE VIETMIHN OF THESE THREE RELIGIOUS ARMY GROUPS: THE CAO DAI, THE HOA HAO, THE U.M.D.C.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552 +
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

PROGRAM OF ACTION

1. That the U.S. establish liaison immediately with the Hoa Hao to determine their organization, unity, and what they are capable of. They should be made to write a comprehensive program of action with our support and subsidy being contingent upon our acceptance of their program and their demonstrated unity of purpose and action.

2. That the U.S. establish liaison immdeiately with the Cao Dai to determine their organization, unity, and capabilities for action. They should be made to write a comprehensive program of action, including the role of Gen. The, with our support and subsidy being contingent upon acceptance of their program and their demonstrated unity of purpose and action.

3. That the U.S. establish liaison immediately with Col. Leroy to determine his aims and what he is capable of. That he should be made to write a comprehensive program of action with our support being contingent upon acceptance of his program.

4. That these three groups should be brought together to work out areas of responsibility, and that our support and subsidy be also contingent upon their cooperation in a comprehensive program which we and they can plan out together.

5. That the mechanism used to bring the three groups together be a special section established under the President or the Department of Defense to deal directly with the groups. That this section, composed of leaders from the groups, the Minister of Defense, and an American advisor function as an overall planning headquarters to coordinate the separate actions of the three groups.

6. That a team of two American advisors-observors be attached to each religious group in the field.

7. That contingent upon the result of the first 6 points, the three religious groups be subsidized in a coordinated program to eliminate communism in South Viet-Nam. That the aims and results of each of the three groups be constantly assesed throughout the program to keep control and to predict the end result in overall political terms.

8. That the Vietnamese Government work toward the adoption of a constitution which will allow some means of coalescing the large religious groups into the government under a representative system. That at least one rerresentative from each group be admitted to the present cabinet immediately (with the possible exception of Col. Leroy who presently represents only one province).

9. That the Binh Xuyen be excluded from any subsidy or support in this program.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

(Attachment 1)

COLONEL LEROY

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

HISTORY:

In July 1947, General De Latour, French Commissioner for South Viet-Nam, authorized Jean Leroy, who was then an administrative delegate from the island of An Hoa, to recruit three volunteer caodaist brigades. Leroy suggested instead the creation of three Catholic brigades, to be recruited from his home village and to be staffed by men who were veterans of resistance against the Japanese.

By November 1947 three brigades had been formed, destined for use as protection against the Vietminh in the Catholic communities of Bentre and Mytho. In order to calm the fears of the clergy who were afraid this military movement might get out of hand, Leroy renamed his formations "UNites Mobiles de Defense des Chretientes".

Initially the expansion the U.M.D.C. met some difficulties in the attempts of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups to incorporate them into their own show. However this was overcome as the brigades became stronger. In August 1948 Leroy began to centralize control by opening a cultural and military center at Phu-Thuan, An Hoa, in which cadres were trained in the U.M.D.C.'s particular brand of psywar.

In February 1949 the real step toward centralization was taken with the creation of an Office of the Inspector and Supreme Command of the U.M.D.C, with Leroy at It's head. During 1949 Leroy was busy organizing and clearing out the area around An Hoa.

In July 1950 Leroy was appointed the administrator of the Province of Bentre at the same time he became head of the military sector of Bentre. In six months Leroy had under the control of his administration 230,000 of the 300,000 inhabitants of the province. In February 1951 a large exposition was put on in the city of Bentre showing how the province, after being almost totally devasted by the war had arisen out of its own ashes. The fair contained some 120 stands, the largest of which were converted into schools once the fair was over. In October 1951, elections of more than 120 provincial representatives took place with universal suffrage and a secret ballot. This body has served in an advisory capacity to Leroy since then. Coincident with these other acts were land reform, tax reform, the building of schools and hospitals, and the creation of self-defense units.

Leroy's land reform program consisted largely in lowering the rent rates which the farmer payed to the proprietor of the land by 60 %. This left the farmer not only enough to eat but enough left over to buy other products, which in return resulted in an economic boom for the province as a whole. In addition land reclamation and irrigation projects were undertaken.

COLONEL LEROY'S PROGRAM AT WORK:

1. The first step in the clearing of any area was military action designed to drive the Vietminh out of a particular village. When this had been accomplished the village would be deserted, the villagers having fled not knowing exactly what to expect. The U.M.D.C. would set headquarters in the village, begin rebuilding it, and wait. In several days the villagers would begin to trickle back in.

2. As they came back in, the villagers were organized into self-defense groups. At the same time they were given something to fight for by the announcement of permanent reforms in land rent rates. Also at the same time the U.M. D. C. helped them to rebuild their homes and community projects such as schools and dispensaries were started.

3. Any captured Vietminh soldiers were resettled with their families in villages which they built themselves with materials furnished by the U.M.D.C. and with help from the U.M.D.C.

4. Larger projects such as roads, theatres, and schools were started after the basic necessities of the village, the homes and the rice fields, had been rehabilitated. Free elections both on a local basis and for the province assembly were held as soon as possible.

EVALUATION:

1. This is not a startling program but was evidentally an extremely well run one. Anyone after reading Col. Leroy's pamphlet should be convinced that the job can be done here in Southern Vietnam.

2. A good many facts are missing from this particular pamphlet which is a compilation of newspaper and magazine articles about Leroy, some of his speeches, and a short introduction written by him. The articles if factual, represent an impressive record and a method which can be extended over South Vietnam. What the method needs is an instrument.

3. Where religion fitted into the picture of Leroy's success is not too clear. His military units have religious-political commissars with them according to one correspondent. Leroy's speeches themselves are full of references to the pacification program of the U.M.D.C. being a crusade for God and for country, but I suspect that this was largely to keep the clergy happy and his troops inspired. Leroy does say in his introduction in regard to the religious question that his group is not to be confused with the Cao Dai or the Hoa Hao in that his group is military and receives no directives from the religious leaders.

4. Leroy has pitched his approach right at the Vietnamese peasant giving him what the Vietminh promised him and more and it has worked. There is no reason why the Vietnamese government cannot do the same, if it has the initial military power at its disposal.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

1. Telegram system
(Joe Banzon ran organization)

2. Peace fund = pay survivors of civilian casualties, etc.

3. Reward system – persons rifles

4. Commendations
faster – out of ofc reports
to civilians also

5. Morale of individual soldier
insurance
better ~~hos~~ medical care
Peace funds for magazines, ~~tafars~~, ~~games~~
athletic & musical equipment
(softball, basketball,
Mutual Benefit fund – small monthly
contribution – ~~in~~ sum within 24 hrs to
widows

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:
FEB 22 2013

Hiuk – office hours 9-12, 3-6
change & dramatize
walk faster, etc.
attraction to press
pictures of MDAP equipment coming in to
bolster up morale.

Office of the Secretary of Defense JUX 8552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

Representative govt – reps at Geneva picked by Fr.
If looks like partition ~~demistize~~ – trouble
Bao Dai fade until only titular head –

5 year plan
Need Constitution
Ref govt
Two administrations
Genl elections

behavior of troops.

Organizing village committees to work with the troops (giving diploma-type certificate to members)

for complaints re Army, for ways to help Army (get people clear) distribution of leaflets for Army,

"Eye of God" combat technique

Each student write short paper on local superstitions in his home neighborhood. Name & location of home neighborhood description of superstition, who believes it (children, old people, women, men) - if ghostly animal or person at what time day or what season.

How to report effectiveness of leaflets, movies, etc so can judge whether psy war campaign is working or not,

5
7:30-12:30 lunch Siesta 3 to 5 = 8 × 5 = 40

make this a travelling school? One

Attraction Policy

100 2 hrs.
1
Kowon

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

CHART OF PROPOSED REVISION, VIETNAM PRESS SYSTEM



SEP. 1954

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

1. Help construct govt which people prefer Communism be willingly defend against Communism.

2. Keep subversives out of Army

3 Give Army will to fight, morale.

4. Keep partisan politics out of Army.

5. Give Army strong psywar org within chain of command. Trained personnel.

6. Give Army strong (effective) intell org within chain command. Trained personnel.

7. Help teach Army how fight unconventional commies. Commando-rangers. Anti-guerilla. ~~Paramil~~

8. Lay foundation for stay-behind org.

9. ~~Give paramilitary~~ Advise Chief MAAG on unconventional warfare: psywar, paramil

10. Act as G-2 for Chief, MAAG

11. Advise Diem as required of friend in his confidence.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

12. Philippines

13. Lansdale - Turnill -

14. Sects - dissidents - or, help unify all non-Commie elements behind natl govt.

Gen. Radio: last night: it got which wants three, very demoralizing

2. Ministers - get written notes from Ely-Collins text they had requested fighting stopped. Morning too demoralizing.

3. Hsu, Min Health, conciliatory vs B-K, but asked that Cabinet be reworked, because 2 Ministers resigned

4. 2 other Ministers: If Pres doesn't want Sang himself, then should be done by Min Interior. A decree saying Sang is replaced, or take back job from him,
At least this - minimum

5. People will not understand - lose people's confidence.

6. Min Def Educ } this a.m. no political
2 C-D Min } consultation until get rid Sang

7. Just about all Mins say US & French should come out publically & announce "we are only who wanted ofa stopped".

8. Smiled when talked about Holy Week - that is a Christian Anglo-Saxon idea - okay if must - said - but you must get rid of Sang,

9. Told Ambs Stevens, B-D about this. Mins: If any time civil servant kicked out, chief State, then can be no govt. This simple admin. task for Min Interior

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

went Geneva - neutralism group
4th Int'l

coexist with VM

Govt in West -
Tran Van Huu as President
If attacked by VNA & have retreat
Estab. new govt in Co Cong, anti-American, radio broadcasts, assassinate those who collaborate with Americans.

B-X counsellors:

Tran Van Am - editor weekly mag. with Japs 1942

Le Van Ngo - former Minister of ., journalist

Luu Duc Trung - adventurer, lived Hong, Macau, swindler there with VN traders - including try swindle Bao Dai - who didn't listen

Hoang Quynh - Catholic priest

Ho Hieu Tuong - former prof in private school, known Trotskyite in Saigon.

Trinh Khanh Vang - involved workers syndicates believed ?

Nguyen Duc Tuynh - writes beautiful Vietnamese

Rumor re msg to Bao Dai by Ty-Vy - other officers VNA ?

B-D msg NDD & Seeks 5 April
extend truce 2 weeks

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

---

234 + 7 on 5 April - B-X commanders rallied to govt in Dalat

retirés du Front [illegible] Tâche veillant réagir et aller avec les Binh xuyen et les Hoa Hao pour présenter une nouvelle motion obligeant Ngo dinh Diem à démissionner. Si le Président ne consent pas à démissionner, ils vont provoquer un meeting populaire, avant de recourir à la force. Dans cette affaire le Pape a usé de son autorité pour obliger le général Phuong à signer sur cette nouvelle motion et à mettre en jeu toutes les troupes catholiques à soutenir ce meeting populaire et ensuite le coup de force déclenché par les Binh xuyen et les Hoa Hao. Si le général Phuong n'agit pas selon le désir du Pape, il sera obligé de démissionner de son poste de Commandant en chef des Forces catholiques et le Pape choisira pour le remplacer un de ses hommes qui agira suivant sa propre volonté, c'est-à-dire suivant le plan destructeur des Binh xuyen et des Hoa Hao. Ainsi la solution nationaliste au Viet Nam va être perdue et les efforts menés jusqu'ici par les nationalistes et les Etats Unis pour combattre le communisme seraient vains.

Le général The vous propose de traiter avec le général Phuong le problème de l'intégration totale de toute l'armée catholique dont l'effectif dans l'armée nationale, intégration sans aucune condition. Le général Phuong propose l'intégration de 12.000 hommes

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

ainsi ou cela du gouvernement — personne ne peut
plus l'employer à aucun autre but que celui de
soutenir le Président Ngo Dinh Diem et de combattre efficacement
les communistes —

De ces 6000 hommes, 3.000 ont déjà été intégrés
Il ne reste plus que 3.000 — Or jusqu'ici les troupes Hoa
Hao composées d'ailleurs des éléments indisciplinés, ont
toujours agi contre le Gouvernement — On peut ne pas envisager
l'intégration des soldats Hoa Hao et utiliser tout le crédit seulement
pour l'intégration des soldats Cao Dai qui seront recrutés
parmi les meilleurs et les plus dévoués —

Voilà toute la proposition du général Thé,
proposition qui mérite votre attention, étant donné la
gravité de l'heure — Je vous la soumets pour étude
et vous pourrez la débattre ce soir dans votre entrevue
avec les 2 généraux —

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE : VIETNAM, DEC 54 – MAY 55

A. PACIFICATION – NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION

B. APPOINTMENT SINGLE COMMANDER BY AMBASSADOR :

1. VERBALLY IN COUNTRY TEAM MEETING

2. PLACED UNDER MILITARY, DUE MAJOR ROLE MILITARY TRIM – WHICH BE STAFFED BOTH FRENCH & U.S.

C. STAFFING

1. MILITARY, FRENCH & U.S., AT TRIM

2. PERMANENT LIAISON, DAILY:
USOM, POL. SEC. EMBASSY, USIS

D. TASK ASSIGNMENTS, LEADER & TEAM FOR EACH
DEMOBILIZATION, ROADS, ESTAB. CIVIL GOVT, MEDICAL AID, ETC.

E. SECT PROBLEM:

ELY-COLLINS APPOINTMENT OF THIS SAME

BASIC ORGANIZATION TO SOLVE, WITH FRENCH-U.S. FUNDING

F. AMBASSADOR – CHIEF OF MISSION

SPECIFIC DAILY POLITICAL : AMBASSADOR

MILITARY : CHIEF, MAAG

AMBASSADOR'S NEED FOR COORDINATION, COMPLIANCE, COMPTROLLER IN CRUCIAL PERIOD – TO PERMIT HIM TO EXERCISE COMMAND

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

PHIL. ELECTIONS : 1951, 1953, 1955

1. CONDITIONS : A. LEGAL, IN CONSTITUTION, ELECTORAL CODE

B. CORRUPT GANG IN POWER - 1949 STEAL-

HUK RECRUITMENT, EXPLOITATION

C. PROBLEM : GIVE GOVT BACK TO PEOPLE

QUIRINO - JOHNS HOPKINS & FRANCO

2. ARMY ROLE :

A. PROTECT FREEDOM SPEECH CANDIDATES AGAINST POLITICAL GOONS, HUK TRIGGER SQDS

B. GUARD POLLING PLACES IN PRECINCTS, INSURE SECRET BALLOT

ARMY - IN PLACES HEAVIEST VIOLENCE EXPECTED

ROTC - IN FRINGE AREAS & CITIES

C. ESCORT BALLOT BOXES, WITNESS BOARD'S TALLY EACH PRECINCT, DISTRICT & PROVINCIAL TALLIES

D. COMMUNICATION TO MANILA

PROMPT PUBLICATION : RADIO & PRESS

3. RESULTS

A. INCREASE INTELL TAKE, SOLDIER - CIVIL REL.

B. FIELD HOSPITAL, IMA, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA

C. BAREFOOT IN PALACE ; ANDY JACKSON

HOW CAN COMMUNISTS ASK PEOPLE OVERTHROW GOVT WHICH THEY FEEL BELONGS TO THEM ?

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

BRIEFING

2. LAND RESETTLEMENT
3. SOCIAL AMELIORATION
4. ~~SOL~~ IMPROVED SOLDIER-CIVILIAN RELATIONS

CONDITIONS 1954 : VIETNAM

1. POLITICAL

A. ALL POLITICAL GROUPS AGREED UNITY – IF THEY BE NUMBER ONE – SECTS, DAI VIETS, VNQDD, VNA

B. FRENCH – U.S. : COALITION CABINETS

C. HINH REVOLT

D. VM HOLDING AREAS – LAND REFORM, POL. CADRES

E. GOVT ADMIN. – MORE THAN 80% ALL GOVT EMPLOYES IN SAIGON OFFICES. INVERTED PYRAMID. GAP BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVT – PROVINCE CHIEFS – VILLAGES.

2. ARMY

A. POLITICAL DISSENSION RE HINH REVOLT, INCL. FRENCH INFLUENCED GPS SUCH G-6

B. ARROGANCE ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEOPLE.

C. REQUIREMENT UNDER GENEVA [redacted] TAKE OVER TERRITORY

3. DECISIONS

A. BACK DIEM – AS UNIFYING FORCE

B. EXTEND GOVT INTO VILLAGES

C. USE ARMY OCCUPY VM VACATED AREAS – AS BROTHERS OF PEOPLE

[redacted]ATIVE GOVT.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

CONFIDENTIAL
Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13-M-1347

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: FEB 22 2013

dispatch to hq
info to Hula
Tufare

Subject: The Unconventional in War

1. This is an idea paper, provoked by some recent opinions from Headquarters. The ideas expressed below are personal opinions, followed by the [redacted] unedited opinions of some members of Tuspum on this important subject. It is suggested that this paper be circulated to appropriate staffs within Kubark, and a sanitized version be disseminated to appropriate persons outside.

2. What is the true role of [redacted] the unconventional in a war waged by the United States?

3. We do not seem to have found the answer to that question, despite the fact that we have been engaged in both a hot and cold struggle with an enemy who has made masterly use of unconventional weapons in seeking our defeat. The question deserves more serious thought, now. It calls for an answer which probably will ask still more demands upon those officials who already have shown such moral courage in shaping and furnishing the unconventional weapons we now use.

4. At policy levels in Washington, a great deal of time, thought, and energy has been given to this subject. Unconventional weapons have been made for political, psychological, paramilitary, and economic warfare. These weapons have been delivered to the field. [redacted] They are being used there. In Washington, means have been found to coordinate in making policy for the use of these weapons. In the field, there is still lack of coordination to a large extent. And, it's nobody's fault...except all of us.

5. A comparison between the enemy and ourselves is illuminating. In a hot war, the enemy's unconventional warfare chief has equal status with the conventional commander; if there is a conflict of views, the unconventional commander makes the decision. In a hot war, we have no unconventional commander; we [redacted] bury an unconventional staff under a conventional theater commander's staff to insure it take a subordinate role to conventional operations; and we split our unconventional commands into piecemeal organizations where rivalry is natural and coordination is beset with obstacles. There are all toomany examples of enemy effectiveness in using his unconventional weapons, too few examples of our own.

6. In a cold war situation, we win when we break our own rules and get a strong, unified command, with a makeshift staff dedicated to winning that particular cold war battle. We lose, even though we do so slowly, when we rely on our conventional means. In important cold war battlefields, we still have a series of independent commands (military, political, economic, information, and clandestine) under an ambassador as commander. The

711

B12
F2
D1

Atjeh, 4 January, 1978

Dear Ed:

I am most grateful for your very kind letter of May 20, 1977, which I had received long time already. I appreciate and accept your severe chastisement about my being irresponsible to my immediate family. I know it was given very sincerely. I am fortunate to have such a friend, who cares. I only beg your leave to say, with all the warriors in the past, that one does not always go to war all prepared, and often the time was imposed by the action of the enemy.

I have just celebrated the first year anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Atjeh, on December 4, 1977. I have a good cause for the celebration: I have survived the Javanese onslaught for the whole year. I lost 7 of my good men in action, against 16 of the enemy killed; and about 1000 of my men, women and children were arrested for activities such as disseminating pamphlets, bringing rice to the mountains, etc. Enemy's endeavor to block foodstuffs from reaching the mountains by stationing soldiers in every village along 1000 mile perimeters was a total failure. The Javanese have resorted to such tactics as rationing the rice to the population, and taking into their custody all foodstuffs that was above one-day requirements in every household; even a pack of cigarettes was not allowed a person a day in villages close to the mountains; the Javanese soldiers would take half of a pack of cigarettes and would order the villagers to return tomorrow to the army camp to pick up another half of the pack; members of every household were registered so that no sugar, salt, meat or fish can be taken home beyond one day requirement. Soldiers are stationed in every village and would make their round of patrols, day and night, entering into every house to check everybody's food supply. Even to check what every housewife was cooking. In the district of Truseb an edict was issued by the Javanese commander forbidding any housewife from baking cakes - because they found in one of their raid to my guerilla's camp how much cakes of all sorts the guerillas got from the people!

In short, in one year time, I have got all the people supported the Free Acheh Movement, accepted the State of Acheh Government, gave their time, energy, money and lives to the cause! Only a handful of top leaders stay in the mountain (they are my Cabinet members, 16 Governors, and guerilla troops) but all the rest of the ranks and files are at large in the countryside. For every village we have the village head; for every district we have the district heads, and for every province a governor. For 75% they are the same functionaries who have become our adherents. The remaining 25% of functionaries (less than 1% of the total population of 4 millions) are pro Javanese on account of other personal involvement with the Javanese corrupt establishment but they are no longer dangerous to us. And yet the Javanese still think that the only guerillas in Acheh are those small group in the mountains whom they tried to "starve" and "to isolate" from the people!

Therefore, I think, I can win this struggle without actual war. At most with some skirmishes.

In the meantime I am concentrating on destroying enemy's economic and financial resources, I will shortly closed down the multi-billion dollars LNG plant in Arun. This will bring me in direct confrontation with Mobil Oil Corporation, and Bechtel Corporation of San Francisco, who had collaborated with the Javanese in stealing Achehnese natural gas for their mutual advantage. The Government of the State of Acheh had contacted them in normal and polite fashion advising them to desist from being mere extension of Javanese colonialism on Achehnese soil. We had proposed to them a reasonable way out. But, they betrayed us instead to the Javanese. We had requested Mobil and Bechtel to meet with Achehnese representative, in the Land of Acheh, at a pre-designated rendez-vous. Instead of meeting with us, Mobil and Bechtel executives ganged-up with the Javanese mercenaries on a vicious attempt to ambush our men. That happened in August, 1977. In October, therefore, we gave advice to all foreign workers, especially Americans, Europeans and Australians to leave Acheh for the time being in order not to get shot, for we must take action against the Javanese. The Announcement is enclosed for your information.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSC 6552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 22FEB2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 13 -M- 1347

This advise was totally ignored by Mobil and Bechtel and they joined hands with the Javanese authorities in confiscating the Announcements from the hands of their workers. On November 30, some two months after our advice, the Army of Atjeh attacked the Javanese troops guarding one of the LNG plants. In the attack 5 Javanese soldiers were killed, and unfortunately 2 un-identified Caucasians (who could be Americans, Australians or Britishers) who were there were found to be among the casualties. According to the story printed by the Singapore's Straits Times, on Dec. 7th, the two were Americans, one dead, one wounded. I was very sorry. I must close down the LNG plant unless Mobil and Bechtel cooperate with the Government of the State of Acheh. In order to avoid similar loss to American lives I have saturated the area with the announcements advising the Americans to leave for a while, to the point of handing the leaflets into the palm of every Americans in the area. The Javanese can finance their war against the people of Acheh by selling the gas of the Achehnese right from under our nose! This is intolerable. I must close down this plant at all cost.

I am now ready to demonstrate to the US Government, through your intermediary, if they would accept, to show how much support my movement received from the people of Acheh. I urge the US Government not to support the Javanese colonial regime hastily before it sends one or two eye-witnesses to our controlled territory to see how the people of Atjeh have identified themselves with my cause, without any coercion whatever. My people is experiencing a Renaissance since I returned. It is inevitable that other nationalities on other islands will follow suite. It will not lead to chaos, as the Javanese colonialist claims, but to real independence for the peoples of these islands. The eye-witnesses should enter our territory through a conducted tours beginning from Medan. This tours have to be conducted because the Javanese still maintain a presence in some areas where they hold guns and only the knowledgeables know which area is controlled by whom. There is no danger involved and this can be arranged easily, without Suharto knowing anything. He did not even know that I have been in the country for one year. Having failed to do anything against me, he is maintaining the fiction that I am out of the country. Java is indeed very far away from North Sumatra: the distance from Atjeh to Jakarta is equal to that from London to Rome. I am proposing this to avoid the possibility of conflict between the US and the emerging independent movements which will engulf the Javanese colonial empire (which is Dutch colonial empire being artificially kept) in Southeast Asia. I do not think it will pay for the US to shore up Javanese colonialism over half-a-dozen nationalities in the region who are bend on being free.

What I need to gain a total victory now is not more than a couple hundreds more rifles for parades. No one is willing to die to defend "indonesia" even a Javanese, who has not been known for his martial spirit, or for possessing a temper that can survive defeat. In their history, Javanese have never been known to have defended anything, not even their country.

Once again, Ed, please accept my heartfelt appreciation for your letter of May 20, 1977. To do it justice, I think I should tell you as it was. One week after your letter arrived I was surprised by one of my leading commanders, Colonel Daud Husin who came to me on behalf of his concerned colleagues, to say:"We have never seen the Tengku looked at a letter like that, and read and reread it for days. That letter must be very important. Can we know what was in it?" So I told them:It was from a man, who is my true friend, on the other side of the globe, expressing concern for my wife, and my son - whose interests I have neglected - and concern too, for you all, my people. May we all live to welcome him here one day!"

With kindest regard to Pat.

As ever,

Hasan

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: FEB 22 2013

[redacted]

28 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY QUARLES

A copy of my memorandum which enclosed a suggested plan for initial organization of Freedom, Inc is enclosed herewith for your information.

Encl.
Memo and
Attachment

G. B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1-9)
MDR: 13 -M- 1344

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

13-M-1344

OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(9)

CIA ILLEGIB



CIA 3.3(b)(1-9)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)
MDR: 13 -M- 1344

MEMORANDUM FOR: AL COX

SUBJECT : Lt. Colonel Clarke T. Baldwin

CIA
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

1. I have looked through Baldwin's file and find that his record with us is uniformly superior. The following points may be of interest to Col. Lansdale.

2. Baldwin came to the attention of CIA through our representatives who have known Baldwin at the Russian language school at Regensburg. Because of his outstanding qualities, our people were anxious to have him serve a tour with CIA. An internal memorandum of 1953 refers to Baldwin as follows:

"Col. deSilva knows Subject to be an outstanding officer in every regard and to be a man of high competence in the field of USSR affairs. He is a graduate of the Army Language and Area School, Detachment R, at Regensburg, Germany, has served a short tour in Moscow, and has performed in a superior fashion as liaison officer with various Soviet missions in Germany and Austria. Major Baldwin is a person who will bring the highest type of competence and integrity to his assignment."

[redacted]

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

5. Baldwin was born on 27 February 1923. He is married and has one child. He is a graduate of West Point where he was later an instructor

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+35(c)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

in Russian and German. He also did Russian area study at Columbia for one year and a half in 1946 and 1947. In addition to fluent Russian and German, he is fluent in French. I do not know about his Arabic. One of his hobbies is short-wave radio operating.

6. It might be worth mentioning that he is undoubtedly known to be RIB. However, this Branch does not consider this to be serious draw back in the contemplated mission to Iran.

7. [redacted] and I believe that Baldwin has the qualifications for which Col. Lansdale is looking.

[redacted]

CIA 3.3(b)(1) +3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1) +
3.5(c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority. EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

~~SECRET~~

CIA
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)

20 January 1960

Lt. Col. Louis A. WAPLE;

Present assignment: PMS&T Colerado State University

Career Service: Artillery

[redacted]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+ 3.5(c)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

General: A highly qualified and highly regarded military officer. Did an outstanding job during his assignment to Project [redacted] Waple is well oriented [redacted] works well without close supervision, gets along well with other people and was very popular with his [redacted] associates during his time in [redacted]

Lt. Col. Robert FRANCIS;

Present assignment: D/C, 1st Bg. 8th Inf. 4Th Div
Fort Lewis, Washington.

Career Service: Infantry

[redacted]

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: JUN 2013
Declassify: ____ Authority: EO 13526
Declassify in Part: X Deny in Full: ____
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)+ 3.5(c)
MDR: 13-M-1344

5 U.S.C. 552

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

General: A highly qualified and highly regarded military officer. (Rated in the top ten Lt. Col.s of the army at time of his assignment [redacted] Did an outstanding job [redacted] particullarly in connection with [redacted] Was very well oriented [redacted] extremely adept at making friends with [redacted] he came in contact with, works well without close supervision, highly esteemed by all who worked with him during his tour.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

COMPARATIVE:

Both Leu and Bob are extraordinarily capable officers. They both managed to keep [redacted] interests foremost during their assignment s[redacted]even though their careers are based in their parent service. I handled both these men [redacted] and consider them two of the most astute officers [redacted] received on detail from the military services. I think either of them could do a highly competent and professional job of the task at hand. In a choice between the two, Bob may be slightly more aggressive in tackling a job of the type in question.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Engineer School (24 Oct) VA
Ft. Belvoir, VA

Major Norman L. Williams, CE, 026173, assigned in spring of 1957 to the Office of District Engineer, Persian Gulf Area, Tehran, Iran:

[redacted]

Fluent in Persian and French - previously stationed in Iran under Army FAST Program.

Lt Col Harry K. Thomson, 024307, prior to 1957:

[redacted]

Lt Col Robert Francis [redacted] late 1957:

Replacement for Lt Col Thomson.

Col Henri E. La Tendresse, USAF:

Assigned to MAAG 1955 as special advisor to Gen Gullamhah, Chief of Shah's Military Bureau. [redacted]

Major William Kayser, 6902A, USAF:

Has to have been assigned in 1955 to AF Foreign Area Training Program with duty station Iran (to attend University of Tehran).

[redacted]

OSD 3.3(b)(|)

CIA 3.3(6)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(6)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1344

5 U.S.C. 552

CIA
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Major Norman L. Williams, CE, 026173, assigned in spring of 1957 to the Office of District Engineer, Persian Gulf Area, Tehran, Iran:

[redacted]

Fluent in Persian and French - previously stationed in Iran under Army FAST Program.

Lt Col Harry K. Thomson, 024307, prior to 1957:

[redacted]

Lt Col Robert Francis - [redacted] - late 1957:

Replacement for Lt Col Thomson.

Col Henri E. La Tendresse, USAF:

Assigned to MAAG 1955 as special advisor to Gen Guilansbah, Chief of Shah's Military Bureau. [redacted]

Major William Keyser, 6982A, USAF:

Was to have been assigned in 1955 to AF Foreign Area Training Program with duty station Iran (to attend University of Tehran).

[redacted]

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

CIA · 3.3(b)(1)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5US(C-552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 NOV 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: ____ Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)
MDR: 13-M-1349

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DATE: 08-Jul-2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

~~SECRET~~

10 September 1958

OSD Working Paper

The Problem: To provide the United States with the means of having foreign manpower readily available for military use, with the following characteristics:

a. Legally deniable by the United States, if desired;

b. Trained for ground, naval, and air combat;

c. Operating under U. S. control;

d. At an acceptable cost.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 11 NOV 2013 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: x Deny in Full: ____
Declassify in Part: ____
Reason: ____
MDR: 13-M-1349

SUSC 552

Facts Bearing on the Problem

a. There is nothing new in using "volunteers" to satisfy national objectives in foreign areas. It has long been an established practice. There are numerous examples in modern times, such as the U. S. Army's Macabebe Scouts and its Philippine Scouts (including the 12th and 14th Divisions after World War II), as well as the AVG who flew for the Chinese. Several nations had volunteer forces in the Spanish Civil War, as part of the Spanish forces.

b. The Communists are adept at the practice; witness the Communist "volunteers" in Korea and Khrushchev's recent threat to send "volunteers" into the Middle East.

c. The Freedom Company of the Philippines permitted some telling action in saving Vietnam from Communist take-over.

d. Recent examples of employment of "volunteers" is illustrated by the infiltration of Egyptian and Syrian "volunteers" into Lebanon

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

and Jordan before and during the recent crisis in the Middle East.

e. In the past few years, the U. S. has considered several plans for developing a foreign manpower capability to combat Communist-guided forces in foreign areas. Most of this planning has envisioned a "Foreign Legion" type of organization, with considerable political and budgetary problems, and has not been implemented.

f. At present, the U. S. has some limited capability of this type through clandestine projects, mostly fixed to a local area and local contingency.

g. U. S. defense programs have created a potential pool of foreign manpower for U. S. military use, which only awaits proper exploitation.

h. Through the Lodge Act (PL 597) and through language and area training, there are military personnel equipped to deal with the peoples and problems of a number of Communist target areas.

i. Through our 38 JUSMAGs, MAAGs, and Military Missions in foreign countries, there are now foreign armed forces equipped and trained with U. S. materiel, schooled in U. S. tactics, and with personnel who generally meet security standards acceptable to the U. S.; most of these foreign armed forces include ground, naval, and air forces.

j. Sizable numbers of these foreign military officers and men have shown a willingness to volunteer when man's freedom has been threatened in a neighboring country. This fact will be attested to by American officials in foreign countries during the Hungarian Revolt, the Indonesian Rebellion, the Indochinese War, and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines. Today's

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

trouble in the Middle East is no exception.

k. Methods could have been developed in several nations of the Free World, including the United States, for processing military personnel so they can be used in foreign areas and be diplomatically deniable by the government involved. Although the processes for doing this in free countries are more complex (to protect the individual) than those in Communist countries, the Free World does have this capability.

It is contemplated that the foreign manpower being discussed in this paper would be employed only in accordance with national policy on approval by the President.

During the past few years several situations have existed wherein it appeared that foreign manpower could have been used to advantage in carrying out our national policies. Some assets were available and were clandestinely employed on a small scale without achieving the initial objectives. It therefore appears that a method can be devised by which trained foreign manpower on a larger scale can be made available in a manner that would not require the United States to have any official connection with such use of foreign manpower.

A potential reservoir of trained foreign manpower exists within the units being supported by the various military assistance agreements and within units receiving the assistance of United States military and naval missions. The feasibility and practicability of utilizing manpower from

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

these sources will depend upon the nature of agreements that can be made with the respective governments in each instance. It is doubtful that any pattern of agreement can be obtained because of various problems which may be created in certain areas of the world. It is preferable that agreements be made on a country basis. Planning should be done on a regional basis in order that manpower employed in a given locality would resemble as closely as possible the indigenous population in the areas in which it is to be employed.

Other factors which would influence employment of foreign manpower would be certain religious bitterness and racial animosity which may exist in the areas concerned.

The implementation of any basic plan for employment of foreign manpower must take into consideration the factors enumerated in the above paragraph, stability of the government being dealt with, the possibility of an internal coup d'etat and other security hazards that may exist. Implementation of such a plan would also need to take account of the political and foreign policy problems in regard to the relations of the United States with the country willing to provide volunteers.

It is required that the foreign volunteers be employed by the entity which we are supporting or by some mechanism which has no visible relationship with the U. S. Government. The Central Intelligence Agency is specifically charged with the conduct of clandestine operations in support

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

of our national policies. The extent of participation by the Defense Department initially would be in a support role. Should the covertly supported operation develop beyond the capability of CIA, the direction of the operation should pass to the Defense Department, with CIA continuing in support. The exact point at which this change of direction and control would be made from CIA to the Department of Defense is difficult to determine, but for planning purposes it is regarded that when the size of the foreign volunteer units is that of a battalion or greater, such change should be made. Thus, the type of organization dealt with in this paper in each instance must have the capability of processing and handling units of battalion size or larger.

Discussion

Considering the aforementioned factors, it appears that the following courses of action are open for consideration as a means for the development of a plan as follows:

Course I (Ad Hoc) - When the situation requires, arrange for the entities that the United States is supporting to set up one or more purchasing agencies, the purchasing agencies to assume the responsibility of processing the volunteers in accordance with the agreement of the country providing the volunteers, and arrange for them to join the entity to be supported. The purchasing agency should also engage in the purchase of certain war supplies.

Course II (Covert Permanent) - To organize permanent covert units which would organize covert affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers, for the purpose of processing the volunteers and arrange means

for them to join the entities to be supported, conduct advance planning for organizing, equipping the troops, and logistics support of the volunteer project, as well as demobilization upon completion of the operation.

Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) -To establish a new, or utilize an existing, organization within each country under secret U.S. sponsorship and with no visible affiliation between each other or with the United States. These organizations would conduct appropriate local programs in addition to carrying out the activities listed in Course II.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) - To organize a permanent, non-profit corporation which would establish affiliates in countries willing to provide volunteers. This corporation would conduct a suitable overt program through the affiliates as well as secretly carry out the activities listed in Course II above.

Discussion of Courses of Action

Course I (Ad Hoc) would appear to have the following advantages:

a. Provide a means for employment of foreign manpower in support of the selected entity designated.

b. The plan is simple and would provide a high degree of deniability of United States involvement.

The disadvantages of Course I (Ad Hoc) are:

a. This course of action would function initially at least on a crash basis and it is doubtful that it would have the capability of an operation of any magnitude.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

b. It has a disadvantage of not having predetermined plans or personnel for supporting the designated entity.

Course II (Covert Permanent) would appear to have the following advantages:

a. A small permanent organization would be in being and in contact with the officials who would be involved in assisting and providing volunteers.

b. Better control of procurement of equipment, organization, logistic support could be provided.

c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.

The disadvantages of Course II (Covert Permanent) appear to be that it would be difficult to operate on a covert basis for an extended period of time and be deniable because of the possible magnitude of the operation.

Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

a. There would be no visible evidence of U. S. sponsorship and support.

b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification for the activities in connection with the foreign volunteer project.

c. Predetermined plans could be made and adequate personnel could be earmarked and positioned.

d. It appears possible, especially in the case of existing organizations, that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013

The disadvantages of Course III (Covert-Overt Permanent) are:

a. Because of the requirement for covert U. S. participation, control would not be as effective as direct participation makes possible.

b. In some instances it would be more costly, at least initially, than either Courses I or II because the public programs would have to be covertly financed by the U. S. Government.

Course IV (Overt Permanent) appears to have the following advantages:

a. The affiliates would receive guidance and supervision on a permanent basis from the unit organized in the United States.

b. The public program could be conducted so as to provide excellent justification of activities connected with the foreign volunteer project.

c. The affiliates could conduct their programs in such a manner and under such titles as to indicate a relationship or affiliation with the organization in the United States.

d. Once the programs are underway, it appears possible that part of the program could be financed from public contributions.

The disadvantages of Course IV (Overt Permanent) are:

a. It would be more costly, at least initially, than either Course I or II because the public programs would initially have to be financed by the government.

b. The visible relationship between the affiliate and the U. S. organization could be a weakness. (Note: Covert funding would be the sole clandestine aspect of Course IV.)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 1 1 2013

Courses I, II and III if adopted would be the exclusive responsibility of CIA as regards control and direction. Pre-planning and logistic support with the Defense Department to the extent possible will be necessary in each instance. (Course III would involve closer coordination and would make possible more extensive planning than Courses I and II.)

Course IV is overt in nature, with the sole covert aspect the funding of the organizations involved. Major responsibility therefore should lie with the Department of Defense, with CIA supporting on the covert aspects. Because of its overt nature, Course IV permits the greatest amount of pre-planning and pre-arrangements vis-a-vis the other courses of action.

Any of the four courses of action listed above would appear to have the following advantages for the utilization of foreign manpower versus the "foreign legion" concept as follows:

a. They would be more likely to secure the enthusiasm and support of other free world nations than a solely U. S.- sponsored foreign legion volunteer effort. It could conceivably contribute to uniting the free world to some extent against communist-inspired subversion.

b. The United States would be much less susceptible to Soviet propaganda charges of "war mongering" than if it were to establish a "foreign legion" type force and attempt to hold it in readiness.

c. The cost factor would be much more acceptable since training costs would be largely absorbed within existing military aid programs.

d. A much greater flexibility could be achieved with regard to the type of forces to be employed and the nature of their employment. Forces to be committed could be readily tailored to meet the demands of the existing situation.

e. This concept would permit commitment of a volunteer force largely indigenous to the geographic area in which the emergency exists, thus relieving it of the stigma of being a force for Western imperialism in contravention of nationalistic aspirations.

f. U. S. Government sponsorship under this concept can be maintained on a secret basis and could be legally deniable.

g. No substantial detraction from regular U. S. military programs would result from this approach.

h. Regular U. S. foreign military assistance programs would not be duplicated but rather they would be rendered more immediately productive in terms of their being more responsive to the immediate threat.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 11 2013