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The National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Univ

WEDNESDAY 31 MAY 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 126

ANGOLA

Frictions with Cubans, Soviets

have played a critical role in countering the guerrilia threat to the regime of President Noto and in providing occely resistant iven and m proving overy needed technical experies. At the same time, their activities have provoked much popular resentment. The Cubana are accused of currentlem, thievery, and avoiding combat with the insurgents. around comout with the insurgent.
The even less popular Soriets are regarded as neocolonialists, wanting only to exploit the country's resources.
Difficulties regarding civilian advisors have been resolved fairly entity when top political leaders have stepped in, but antipathy in the military toward the Cubana is tikely to become an in-creasingly serious problem for the

regime.
The extrmated 5,000 Cuban civilian advisers in Angola fill much of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial and technical personnel of the

colonial period. They are developing a national educational system, running the public health service, assisting in the coffee and sugar harvests, and reconstructing roads and bridges destroyed during the civil war. Another 5,000 Cuban advisers, mostly teachers and construction

workers, are due by the end of the year.
The strains between the Angolana and
their Cuban and Soviet advisers are not uncommon in any client-patron relationship. Angolans complain that the Cuban advisers assume they know more than the Angolans, that they insist on un-

than the Angolans, that they failst on unmecessary changes, and that they disregard local customs.

A major dispute arose last year in the
Angolan Labor Ministry.

when Cubans pressed for
the unionization of the entire Angolan
labor force. The Angolans flatly rejected
the plan on unitural and cultilated counter. the plan on cultural and political grounds.

Another dispute arose after the Cuban (See Angola. , .Page 2)

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25 CW-3664./26-2

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WEDNESDAY 31 MAY 1978

HE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Angola: Frictions with Cubans, Soviets. . .

From Page 1
Ministry of Interior tried to introduce a cationing system to cope with Angolas severe food shortages, but Angolas of ficials refused, Cuban President Castro apparently had to intervene, and he ruled in favor of the Angolans, Castro may also have had to settle a squabble involving the Transportation Ministry.

Seriet Adviser

There are approximately 1,000 Soviet adviser in Angola, in recent months, they have been moving into key financial and commercial positions, particularly in the Finance Ministry and the central bank. They have apparently also been replacing Cubans in the Transportation, Fisheries,

and Trade Ministries.
The Soviets almost never mix socially with the Angolens, who consider them arrogant. Part of the beach at Luands, for example, is reserved for the exclusive use of the Soviets.

Many senior Angolan officials auspect that the USSR is interested primarily in exploiting Angola's resources. They assert that much sugar, coffee, and diamonds have been sent to the USSR to pay for military aid and that the Soviets have

monopolized fishing off Angola.

| Soviet fishing fleets allocate 10 percent of their catch to Angola and 20 percent to Cuba, and send the remainder to the USSR. Much of the Soviet share is then processed and reexported to Angola, which must pay for it in leard currency.

Cuban Soldlers

Cuban soldiers are often accused of thievery, smuggling, and black-market ac-tivities. There are now an estimated 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angols; indications are that the number may increase somewhat in the near future.

In early March, a cutoms inspector at Luanda Airport stopped 100 Cubans on their way home and discovered suitesses full of contraband watches, imported food, clothing, and US dollars.

Cuban soldiers virtually strip areas they occupy of all valuable items, even home furnishings, and ship them to Cuba as personal property.

Imported goods appear to be a prime target of the Cubans. In one recent in-stance, a riot ensued after it was dis-covered that Cubans had stolen part of a shipment of clothing intended for sale to Angolan workers at reduced prices.

a quarter of all goods shipped to Angola are stolen off the docks by Cubans and that another quarter are skimmed off by Angolan officials.

The system of keeping well-stocked atores in major towns for the exclusive use of Cuhans and senior government officials is deeply resented by most Angolans, who have to wait in long lines for food and consumer goods. A Cuban soldier was assaulted after he attempted to sell some items to Angolans waiting in one such line at triple the price he had just paid for

At the Front
The war against the insurgents of the
National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola is causing grow-

ing strains between Cuban and Angolan forces. Morale is low because they have been unable to stamp out UNITA, and each partner save the other is not doing its part.

fairing several cent drives Cuban soldiers stayed in the rear and forced the Angelans to do most of the fighting.

There are some reports that Cubin units have refused to go on patrol in UNITA territory and that both Cuban UNITA territory and that both Cuban and Angolan units have refused combat assignments against other Angolan insurgent groups. Cuban refuctance stems from the knowledge that Cubans are the insurgent, highest priority target and their fear that, if captured, they might be tortured, For their part, the Cubans assert that the Angolans are poor soldiers and alraid to light the insurgents,

The use of Cuban soldiers to enforce discipling has also generated much ten-

Cuban soldiers have executed Angolans for cowardice in the field. There have been occasional reports of fights between Cuban and Angolan soldiers—and even among Cubans themselves—resulting in casualties.

The Future

Neto knows that the introduction of more foreign troops and advisers into Angola will heighten tensions, but he has little choice, given the immensity and immediacy of his problems.

Increasing friction between Cubans and Academia

Angolans in the military probably poses the most serious problem for the Neto

government. The tensions apparently have already forced some changes in military tactics. If morale continues to deteriorate, military effectiveness will be further reduced, casualties could in-crease, and even larger numbers of Cuban soldiers would be required to contain the insurgents. In recent months, both Cubans and Angolans have expressed doubt that UNITA can be defeated

doubt that UNITA can be defeated militarily. Angola's difficulty with its foreign patrons has encouraged Neto to look to the West, specifically to Portugal, for technical and soonomic assistance. His success will depend on how receptive the West is to his approaches and how effective the pro-Soviet faction in the leadership is in blocking such efforts. In addition, Angolan disperhantment

In addition, Angolan disenchantment with the Cubans may have led Noto to make some cautious approaches to UNITA for some sort of accommodation, It is unlikely, however, that such contacts could move beyond exploratory stages for some time.

The more Neto's problems with the Cubans and the Soviets grow, the greater will be the pressure on him to pursue this option, UNITA leader Savimbi knows this and will no doubt continue to insist that no solution is possible without total Cuban withdrawal

CW-3064-126-2





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The National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

FRIDAY DECEMBER 19, 1975

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 295

The **Daily** Summary

ANGOLA: Forces of the National Union and the National Front are threatening Quibala and moving toward a key base of the Popular Movement in eastern Angola. A Popular Movement force reportedly is advancing in the north.

[Page 1]

Fighting Picks Up in Angola; Both Sides Make Some Gains



the past few days.

The combined National Union National Front force that captured Cela from the Popular Movement late last week has moved to within 10 miles of

Quibala, second ivational Onton force, approaching Quibala from the east, reportedly is within 14 miles of the town.

The cupture of Quibala would put the

Union-Front force in a position to move toward Dondo, the Popular Movement's only major hase between this force and Luanda. A hydroelectric plant that provides power to Luanda is near Dondo. In eastern Angola, National Union

forces are now moving from Luso toward Henrique de Carvalho, the Popular Movement's base in the east. A Popular Movement message of December 16 said that Movement forces had destroyed a number of bridges in the area and were

forming a new defense line.

A 300-man Popular Movement force, meanwhile, reportedly has advanced to within 60 miles of the National Front's base at Negage in northern Angola but has not yet broken through the outer defenses of the town. The force hopes to take Carmona, an important National Front base on the coast.

National Union president Jonas Savimbi thad high praise for the South Africans. He asserted the South African (See Angole. . . Page 4)

4 FRIDAY DECEMBER 19, 1975

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Angola . . .

From Page 1
forces in Angola are engaged only in truining and in operating and maintaining armored equipment. He insisted there is no South African Infantry in Angola.

J Actually, the South Africans have been the key factor in sains made by the Union and the Front over the post two months.

Savimbi said the troops of his Angolan ally, the National: Front, lack discipline and military spirit. Recent reports have underscored the tenuous nature of the military and political ecoperation between the National Front and National Union.

Publicly, Savimbi has attempted to disown Pretoria's assistance by claiming that any South African forces in Angola are there on their own and by calling on African states to help drive them out. He is unlikely to fool anyone with this line.

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
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National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Trincipals Only

TUESDAY DECEMBER 23, 1975

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 298



TUESDAY DECEMBER 23, 1975

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

AFRICA

Direct Combat Role Marks Cuba's Angolan Effort

involvement in the Angolan civil war is not the only case of Cuban intervention abroad, though it is by far the iargest.

Even now, Cubu has some 2,000 people serving in a variety of roles elsewhere in Africa and in Asia—in addition to the 6,000 troops it has sent to Angola.

6,MO froops it has sent to Angola.

Cuban subversive efforts in this
hemisphere declined shurply after the
debacle in Bolivia in 1967 when Che
Guevara was killed. Interest in Africa—
already evident in the early 1960—bera led a group of some 100 men conducting guerrilla warfare in Zaire (then Congo-Leopoldville) from bases in Tanzania

After 1965, the number of Cubana serving with African guerrilla organizathe Cuban guerrilla support groups was the Cuban guerrint support groups was usually smaller than Guevara's. The Cubans, serving mainly as military ad-visers, technicians, and medical person-nel, were generally in groups of between 10 and 50 men, depending on the im-mediate prospects for the African guerrilla group and the state of its relations with Havana.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nature of the Cuban assistance changed as new leftist governments clame to power in Africa in need of the kind of assistance Cuba could give. The number of Cubans rose as they took on a new range of responsibilities—from technical and responsibilities-from technical and economic tasks to political and administrative duties. Still, in many cases, they continued to perform military of paramilitary chores

Cubans in Africa, Middle East Today, the Cubans have about 300 to 400 men and women in Equatorial Guines, an estimated 150 in Guinea-Bissau, over 300 in Guinea, more than 50 in Zambia, another 100 or more in Congo, from 30 to 50 in Somalia, and perhaps a dozen or so each in Algeria, Nigeria, and Tanzania. They run the gamut from fishing experts and secondary school teachers to road engineers, construction workers, medical personnel, and

militia instructors.

In the Middle East, the first sizable group of Cubans appeared in South Yemen in 1972. A handful of medical specialists arrived late that year, and were followed in January 1973 by 100 or so military personnel who served as militia instructors, military and security advisers, and training officers for both the armed forces and the Omani guerrillas then

based in Yemen.

The Cuban military contingent there grew to about 250 to 300 men and even included some pilots. We believe the number has probably been reduced somewhat in the past year. Some of the military advisers in Yemen were sent to Syria during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 were joined there by more than 50 medical personnel and about 500 tank-crew members. By early this year, most of these had returned to Cuba. In Asia


In the Far East, the Cubans have given ussistance to the communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos. During the war, a number of Cuban military men were in North Vietnam, some apparently helping to man the air defense system. Others sent to Hanol included doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and construction workers

After the war, some of the medical personnel were shifted to Laos and the number of Cuban construction workers was increased to about 500 men and women. Havana apparently intends to keep a significant Cuban presence there and seems to be rotating members of the Laos and Vietnam contingents on a regular basis.

Cuba's commitment in Angola differs significantly from these other Cuban efforts abroad in that the Cubans in Angola are primarily troops sent to take part in combat. In the only other occasions when Cuban troops were sent abroad in large numbers—to Algeria in the early 1960s and to Syria after the outhreak of the Arab-Israeli war-they were not sent to the front lines but were used in rear areas to free foculs for combat duty.

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


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National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday 16 January 1979

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| Ar | gola: Airfield Capture |
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| | ANGOLA: Airfield Car | | have dentured |
| | M'Pupa airfield, when ment and supplies des | ent and Cuban force re foreign-provide stined for Jones Sa | d military equip- |
| | Union for the Total I during the past year. | Independence of And | gola have arrived |
| | ment objective, appar last month | rently was taken di | uring an offensive |
| | The loss | of M'Pupa '/ill d | isrupt UNITA's |
| | logistic network, but effective guerrilla of looking for alternations | campaign. The inst | urgents are now |
| | culty, however, find: | ing one secure from | m government at- |
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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday 10 May 1979

Top Secret

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ANGOLA: Troops in the South


Some Cuban and Angolan forces in southwestern Angola are moving farther from the Namibian border. The failure in mid-March of Cuban-directed air defenses to counter South African airstrikes against guerrilla camps of the South-West Africa People's Organization in southern Angola may have accelerated the redeployments, which have been in progress since at least the beginning of the year.

bases in the south have been abandoned.

some of the units once posted there have moved north to the Mocamedes-Menongue axis, where most of the major forces in the southwest are located. The Angolans also have strengthened air defenses along this corridor and moved in additional men and equipment. A few installations along the main highway from Namibia are still occupied, and some are being improved.

The northward shift allows Angola to concentrate its limited resources in an area more secure from South African raids, but the move will reduce defenses for SWAPO camps in the south. The abandoned installations may be reoccupied once the Angolan military becomes better trained and equipped or if the threat to the area is reduced. The withdrawal may enable guerrillas of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to operate more freely in the southwest.

10 May 1979



National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday 15 May 1979 (b) (1) (b) (3)

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| | The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the Daily, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments. | |
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| ANGCLA: First SA-3 Sites Angola, aided by Cuba, is p first SA-3 surface-to-air missil against further South African ai | es to improve its defenses |
| The missile there will almost certainly be m Cubans. Cuba was embarrassed in against a series of South Africa Angola aimed at guerrilla bases People's Organization. During thas consolidated and strengthene along the Mocamedes-Lubango-Meno some isolated units from the bor | March by its poor defense n air raids into southern of the South-West Africa he past few months, Cuba d its air defense units ngue axis and withdrawn |
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The National Intelligence

THURSDAY 3 AUGUST 1978

VOLUME 5. NUMBER 180

Angola: Effort to Improve Relations with West

economic support. The Angolau stey also before a new strateg dealing with the large-scale insure that continues despite several to Cubun-numerted offensives

Angola: Relations with West.



Angola's Strategy i
The Angolans hope greater Western involvement not only will bring them
economic benefits but also will enhance

ment and increase their fertibility in dealing with the USSR. The Angolans appear to be pleased with the results of Ambasador McHenny's wish to Angola in late June, and the wish probably encouraged them to peak harder on their opening to the West.

The insurgency being essatined by the National Usion for the Total Independence of Angola throughout a broad area of Angolas territory is the

most pressing problem facing Angolan leaders. The apparent failure of several recent Cuban-supported offensives against UNITA may be pushing Angolan leader to the conclusion that the intergents carnot be defeated under present circumstance—sere with the substantial number of Cuban troops now in the country. South Africa's location in May, when it attacked a South-West Africa People's Organization base in Angola,

further underscored the fragility of Angola's security situation despite the Cuban military commitment. The continuing frictions generated by the presence of substantial numbers of foreign troops in the country also concern Angolan leaders and provide a further motive for a shift in strategy against the insuremb. insurgents.

Neto now seems to have concluded that Neto now seems to have concluded that the only way he can ultimately reduce UNITA to the point of negotiating on his terms is by isolating it from cettide support. His opening to the west could help achieve this objective if it resulted in a weakening of foreign support for the insurgents. His efforts to secure Angola's northern and southern borders would also have tested from the first that the four of cuttle strengts.

surgents. His efforts to secura Angola's northern and southern borders would also help restrict the flow of outside support to the insurgents.

This appears to be the primary reason why the Angolans forced the South-West Africa People's Organization to eccept the Western proposals for a settlemant in Namibla. By supporting an internationally acceptable solution in Namibla, the Angolans hope to remore the South African military threat from their southern border.

In the north, the Angolans have begun an effort to neutralize the Katangan rebels as a guerrille threat to Zalrian president Mobutu's regime in exchange for Zairian promises to pesify Angola's northern border and stop aiding UNITA.

The Angolans probably also hope establishment of secure borders will mainty to possible for Cuba to withdraw some of

it possible for Cuba to withdraw some of

it possible for Cubs to withdraw some of its troops from Angola—a more that would greatly facilitate father Angolan avertures to the West.

The Saviete and the Cubsas would find advantages in such an Angolan strategy. The Saviets would presumably welcome some relief from the economic burden they are now carrying in Angola. The Cabana, assilous to improve their image in the nonaligned movement, are already reported to be considering the withdrawal of some of their troops from the country if security guarantees can be worked out on Angola's northern and southern hondars.

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The National Intelligence (b) (1)(b) (3)

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1.11 (1.11) · 1.11 · 1.11 · 1.11 · 1.11 TUESDAY, 22 AUGUST 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 198

Angola: Frustration with Communists



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TUFSDAY 22 AUGUST 1978

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Angola: Frustration with Communists...

managers, and agricultural, water, elec-tric power, and medical technicians. The Soviets have concentrated on com-

the Soviets new concentrates on com-merce and finance, and they are said to control the central bank, the Finance Ministry, and the Fisheries Ministry. They have begun to replace Cubes in the top echelons of the Fereign Trade Ministry. Ministry.

In the spirit of their Portuguese predecessors, the Cubans and the Soviets appear to be earning hard currency by hartering technical advice and military equipment for Angolan ex-ports-expecially coffee and diamonds-valued at cohessionary prices, then reselling the goods on the vorld market.

munist collee purchases at concessionary prices may have accounted for as much as half the crop in 1976. It has been sumored half the crop in 1978, it has been rumored that Cuba may take the entire 1978 crop, which would be worth more than \$200 million at world market prices. Sixty persont of diamond production—with an estimated annual value of \$30 million at 1072 market market prices. 1978 world market prices—has also been transferred to the USSR and Cube.

transferred to the USSR end Cuba. Both Cubans and Soviets in Angola have preempted scarce consumer goods for their own use. Urban Angolana are resentful about waiting in long lines for consumer items, while "special stores" are well stocked for foreign personnel. Cuban troops often receive priority in food distribution, penticularly for coarce commodities such as bosf, The Cuban are accused of profitting from smuggling diamonds and black market trading of contumer traports.

The Economic Decline
Cuban and Soviet advisors have not
reversed the slide in the Angolan economy

i

Cuben and Sovie acrises have not reversed the side in the Angolan economy sparked by the drill war, the departure of 300,000 to 400,000 Portuguese, and persistent UNITA gueirilla activity in the southeastern part of the country. Since 1973, GNP has falles at least 13 persent in real terms, and output of important foreign exchange senters such as coffee, diamonds, and iros ore has plammeted.

Commercial agriculture, which had benefited from seasoned Portuguese management, has been peritodiarly hard hit. Production of coffee, Angola's leading onth érop, is estimated this year at only one-third of prindependents levels. In recent years Holden Roberto's in recent years Holden Roberto's harprast group seperating in northern Angola has damaged the coffee trees. Southern migrant labor needed to work the northern coffee plantations has largely been cut off by UNITA.

The food production and distribution

been cut off by UNITA.

The food production and distribution system has also broken down. Subsidience farmers, who normally produce small surpluses for lead itselfing, have sent output to avoid thaft by government troops. Hards of livestock and game have been depicted through indistriminate sleaghter. Transport of food and other crops to either have been depicted than the contraction of the statement of the sta Transport of food and other crops to sities has been interrupted by guerrilla sahotage, perts shortages, and the lack of

experienced operators and mechanics.
The mining sector has also suffered greatly in recent years. Iron ore output from the all-important Jamba mine ceased in 1973 when the Portuguese field and the Angolan military conflicated mine property and mobile squipment. Diamond output has also dropped harply. The diamond mines are located mostly in an area controlled by Chales Income and heave.

mono mines are not view mostly in an area controlled by Cuban troops, who have been accused of large-scale diamond theft. The rest of the economy remains in poor shape. Even though oil production resumed in April 1976, the current girt in the world potroleom market has kept the

offshore oil pistforms at Cabinda produc-ing at only about 100,000 harrels per day—70 percent of preindependence levels.

Current Account Surplus Down
The dislocation in economic activity
has greatly reduced Angolan exports and
contributed to a meady drop in the current contributed to a feedy drop in the current account surplus. Coffise seports from stocks built up in previous years and the return to normal operation of the Cacinda-oil fields have kept caport losses since in-dependence from being much greater. In-creasing imports have replaced equip-mant—capecially vehicles—destroyad is



Deying Angolan coffee bean

the fighting or removed by the Portuguese. Imports of grain and other foodstuffs are also up substantially.

Foreign remittences by Cuban technicians, who are paid by the Angolan Government, represent a growing foreign exchange drain—about \$10 million anraum-arout 510 million an-nually, Income from the Benguela Railroad, which had earned 540 million to 550 million a year from transchipments of Zambian and Zairian trade, has also been fost. Labor problems at the ports of Luan-da and Lobito are causing berthing delays of 60 to 90 days, costing Angols as much as \$3 million a month in demurrage

as 33 million a month in demurrage charges.
Disappointment with Cuban and Soviet technical and managerial assistance has played an important part in the government's decision to seek closer ties with the West, but ven large-scale Western help and peace with UNITA would not quickly return output to preindependence levels. Coffee production, for example, will remain depressed for several years because of the warding demage and inadequate attention to coffee trees. Oil production will decline will decline with the coffee trees. Oil production will decline will decline will decline with the coffee trees. Oil production will decline will desire with the will be wil coffee trees. Oil production will decline over the near term because of weak inter-national demand for the waxy Cabinda

Given the poor outlook for key Angolan exports and the likelihood that Angoian exports and the likelihood that imports will pick up as the government attempts to regain development momentum, Angola almost certainly is headed for a payments problem. It is likely to seek at least \$100 million in credits and grants from Western suppliers in the next YEST OF SO.

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EUROPE

Approach of Independence for Angola Stirring Unrest in Portugal

Portuguese leftign are citing the arrest tast weekend of two supporters of former president Spinola to justify their claims that a right-wing coup is imminent.

The two former military officers, who reportedly left the country with Spinola following the abortive coup of March 11, were picked up by security troops at a camp for Angolan refugues in northern Portugal. They were said to have Spanish currency and to have sentered Portugal secretly from Spanish cretly from Spain.

poveral individuals with the to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army may also have been

detained.

Auti-Communist military leaders, including Prime Minister Azzwelo, are
appealing for calm and unity in the midst
of unrest stirred by anticipation of
Angolan independence next week. An
army spotsers any setterday denied leftistinspired reports that Eve-fire maneuvers
are achaeuled for this week. He labeled

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the story "alarmist" and said such drills could only lead to a coup attempt from the right.

General Charais, commander of the central military region, warned the left in an interview last week that any effort on its part to overthrow the Azeredo government and turn Angola over to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola would lead to a move by the right wine. Charais believes that the left has alienated a substantial portion of the population and has created the conditions for a successful resurgence of the right.

The left has been agitating to abandon Lisbon's policy of impartiality among the three Angola liberation movements but the Azevedo government does not appear likely to support the Popular Movem Movement activists are also arriving in Lisbon on refigee flights to take part in pre - Popular Movement is actualled for tonisht. ent callies. The first

As the airlift of refegees from Angola comes to an end, conservative refegee groups are certain to become bolder in speaking out against left-wing support for the Popular Movement. The bombing and sacking late last month of an Angolan cultural center controlled by the Popular Movement indicates that the returness will use violence. Refugees have pleased a demonstration in opposition to the Popular Movement for late this work

· # i.,

The 19-man Revolutionary Cou trying to carry out brainess as usual in the midst of the turmol. The Council did not, as rumored, take action against army chief Fabino or security head Carvalho at their session last weekend. They did approve the long-awaited legal framework for the investigation and trial of searly 1,300 members of the former regime's security police, who have been detained without charges since the coup in April

The council also set up a tribusal to deal with persons implicated in the March Il coup attempt and announced its inten-tion to arrest civilians possessing military

The anti-communist council mem may have decided to delay action against Fabino and Carvalho because of the campaign by left-wing military and civiliest groups to equate their removal with rightist plots to take over the governe riginise pois to cake over the government.
They may have been further influenced by reports that the radical military police hold arrest orders signed by Carvalho for 500 individuals, including high-ranking neticomprunies of Thems. anti-communist officers.

Another likely obstacle is President Costs Gomes, who has served as the ma-jor stumbling block in previous attempts to oust radical officers from high positions

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
National Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

March 8, 1976

Nº 676

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NIDC 82-185C CIACPAS 16 March1982 five Mirage fighters in northern Namibia at Andangua airfield and a minor buildup on the (b)(1) border with Zimbabwe. //Last week Pretoria also sent two helicopters and elements of a 140-mm howitzer battery to N'Giva in southern Angola. No other movement of ground forces in that area has been observed. //At least 80 tents, capable of housing 800 men, and two Impala train r aircraft have arrived at the Messina order with Zimbabwe over the past two airfield near the weeks. An additi al 25 tents have doubled the size of a nearby Army encampment. Comment: //Although the movement of Mirages usually has been associated with preparations for major incursions or air operations independent of ground activities, the South Africans may hesitate to conduct major actions at this time to avoid disrupting the talks on Namibia. If the South Africans have spotted a major buildup by insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization near the Namibian border, however, they would be likely to attack regardless of the diplomatic consequences

//The activity at Messina probably is related to routine South African Army training maneuvers. The South Africans, however, apparently are aware Zimbabwean officials are considering the arrest of ousted opposition leader Joshua Nkomo. Pretoria may be placing troops near the border because it believes violence could erupt in Nkomo's stronghold of Matabeleland and spill over into South Africa



National Intelligence



Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

TUESDAY 6 JUNE 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 131

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Angola: Cuban Plans for Offensive Against UNITA

for the Total Independence of



paigns and over the past year has ac-tually expanded its area of operations. By waging a sustained guerritic struggie, it has inflicted iosses on government and Cuban forces for in excess of its own.

2,000 Cuban soldlers and a number of armored vehicles had arrived in Culto Cuanavale in preparation for another Cuban-Angolan offensive against UNITA forces in southeastern Angola.

The Cubana will see up to 10 nestoopers to support the stack, Athhough their last offensive in March and April largely failed, the Cubana did have some success using helicopter guaships and troop-carrying helicopters in combined airmobile and ground assaults.

UNITA has apparently positioned about 2,000 guerrillas north and east of Cuito Cuanavale in anticipation of the offensive.

in a statement issued in Zaire on Satur-day, UNITA's foreign affairs spokesman, Jorges Sangumbe, asserted that Angolan forces were preparing a major sweep (See Angola. . . Page 2)

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| Angola | among the Angolans and a worsening of relations between Angolan and Cuban soldiers, however, the guerriles should be able to survive another offensive without too much difficulty. Although UNITA is probably capable of launching a major campaiga of its own, it is now apparently trying to build a stronger base of support. Inside Angola, the guerrilla leaders are focusing their efforts on developing support and supply lines, improving conditions for civilians living under UNITA influence, and developing stronger military and popular leadership. UNITA may go on the offensive once | transport in an effort to foster a growing sense of insecurity in the larger towns and in other areas that remain under the control of the Angolan Government. They are also ambushing Guben and Angolan soldiers as they try to inflict as many Cuben carualities as possible. The UNITA Issafership estimates that in 1977 its forces: • Killed 3,850 Angolan and 1,200 Cuban soldiers and captured 250 Angolans and 12 Cubans. • Destroyed 15 Lanks, 180 trucks, it three helicopters, and one plane. • Destroyed 40 highway bridges, the railroad bridges, and 25 diesel | | |
| The growing Cuban use of sirpower is a ricus concern for UNITA, which does | Savimbi rejoins his guerrilla forces. Savimbi ies contern Angola for Zaire more than two months ago in order to accelerate the delivery of military equipment and supplies to his guerrillas and to secure new promises of support from West European and moderate Arab states. The guerrilla forces are continuing to sabotage lines of communication and | locomotives. UNITA believes it took 265 casualites—including seven officers—and lost 200 weapons and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. Some 1,200 UNITA sym- pathizers were captured and 30 local party officials killed. These statistics are doubtless strongly blased in UNITA's favor. UNITA also claims that it controls almost 20 towns in | | |
| nt have an adequate antisireraft pability. Because of declining morals | and of Communication and | southern Angola, but this claim probably should also be viewed somewhat cautiously. Aithough UNITA guerrillas are present in the countryside, they usually do not occupy the towns. UNITA probably could not defend these towns against a cencerted Angolan and Cuban sie and ground attack. Guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization have been very active near Ngiva, and | | |

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CIACPAS NIDC 83-028C FEBRUARY 3, 1983

Angola shows over 60 armored personnel carriers, nine loaded trucks, and three helicopter dunships at South Africa's forward base at Ngiva.

a buildup of munitions at the South African support base at Grootfontein in northern Namibia but has not shown a significant increase in troops commented the presence of Mirage fighter aircraft elsewhere in that region.//

Comment: //The force at Ngiva is not large enough to undertake a major operation outside of the South African zone of control. Moreover, extensive incursions into Angola usually are supported by Mirage aircraft. The South Africans may be preparing to conduct a sweep operation in the no man's land south of Angolan positions.//

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VISITOR TO THE KREMLIN IN RECENT WEEKS, AND CUBAN DEFENSE MINISTER RAUL CASTRO SPENT ABOUT IN DAYS THERE EARLIER THIS MONTH.Y

THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG ARGUED THAT THERE IS NO -CONTRADICTION OR INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES AND "DETENTE" AND THAT "DE-

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Central Intelligence Agency



85-10196_M-DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

6 November 1985

Regional Issues at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's Options

Summary

Moscow expects President Reagan to raise the issue of Soviet bloc military activity in Third World Marxist-Leninist states at his November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and is preparing for this. Soviet authorities see the President's three-stage proposal for resolving conflict in these countries, which he presented in his address to the UN General Assembly, as a design to shift the focus of world attention away from SDI, undercut the Soviet global propaganda campaign keyed to "star wars" and nuclear holocaust, and justify armed aid to "counterrevolutionaries." The Soviet leadership throughout the 1980s has demonstrated a steady resolve to defend its gains in the states mentioned by the President--Afghanistan, Cambodia, the states mentioned by the President--Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua--and has viewed consolidation of client regimes in these countries as an essential element in expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Gorbachev is not deviating from this line. While the Soviets probably believe that time is working in favor of consolidation of these regimes, they are aware of their present weaknesses and will try to ignite political backfires aimed at deflecting or reducing further outside support of anti-Marxist insurgencies.

| This memorandum was prepared by Regional Issues Group, Office of Soviet An and queries are welcome and may be directed to t Regional Issues Group, SOVA, on | alysis. Comments he Chief, |
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(b)(1)(b)(3) At the November meeting Gorbachev will have no interest in settling the armed conflicts in these "socialist-oriented" countries on the terms proposed by the President. For tactical reasons it is conceivable, although unlikely, that Gorbachev might suggest talks--premised on entirely different terms--about insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola or Nicaragua. He will not-either to promote arms control objectives or to contain the "costs of empire"--make significant concessions to the United States on Third World issues, although such considerations could affect his decision on whether to take a low-key approach to the regional conflict problem or look to score propaganda points at this meeting. Conceivably he might seek to constrain the supply of mobile surface-to-air missiles and other weapon systems to insurgents fighting against Soviet clients. It is possible that he will present "tension reduction" proposals designed to spotlight areas of US vulnerability and capitalize on potential longer-term opportunities the Soviets see to advance their fortunes in the Third World.

1. President Reagan's address to the United Nations General Assembly put Moscow firmly on notice that the United States intends at the November meeting to pursue vigorously the question of Soviet bloc military activity in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. This message could hardly have

began at the USA and Canada Institute in September.

Nevertheless, the Soviet press response demonstrates that the US move was an unwelcomed development. Soviet authorities see this step as an initiative designed to shift the focus of attention away from SDI, undercut their global propaganda campaign keyed to "star wars," and pave the way for further US support of anti-Marxist insurgencies. They themselves have no interest whatever in settling the armed conflicts in these five "Socialist-oriented" states on the terms proposed by the President, which they must read as an invitation to dismantle Soviet influence, abandon clients and repudiate support for Third World radicalism in return for more economic aid from the West.

Marxist-Leninist Clients and Soviet Third World Policy

2. Consolidation of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Nicaragua is an essential element of Hoscow's continuing broad-gauged strategy for increasing its influence in the Third World and acquiring new political and military bases from which to expand Soviet influence further. Levels of Soviet military and economic assistance to these regimes have fluctuated considerably over the past five years, with economic aid clearly being squeezed by declining growth of Soviet GNP. The constant factor has been a

basic Soviet determination to make Marxist revolutions irreversible in these countries. The tactical changes made in each case—in levels of assistance and Soviet bloc military participation—have been based principally on the client's degree of peril and on the Kremlin's judgment of what risks the traffic would bear.

- 3. Soviet military assistance in recent years to client "Socialist-oriented" Marxist-Leninist regimes has been substantial:
 - -- In Afghanistan, the USSR increased the number of its troops by 7,500 men in 1984-85 (now about 118,000) and has taken more forceful measures to suppress the insurrection's growing capabilities. This has involved improved operational planning and reconnaissance, more direct use of Soviet ground and airpower, more aggressive tactics, and the dispatch during 1985 of three additional Spetznaz (Special Purposes Force) battalions (bringing the total to seven battalions--about 4,000 men).
 - Vietnamese occupation of the country. Soviet military aid to Vietnam has levelled off in the past three years to about \$600 million annually. Without Moscow's extensive economic aid (an estimated \$1 billion annually), Hanoi would have been hard pressed to maintain the level and intensity of its pressure in Cambodia.

 Despite the existence of certain frictions between the Vietnamese and the Soviets concerning Cambodia (and Laos),

 In Cambodia.

 Soviet artillery has been made available to Vietnamese and forces in Cambodia

tanks, older MIG aircraft, and small naval vessels to the Cambodian armed forces, and have trained Cambodian Air Force personnel.

- -- In Ethiopia, of the \$3 billion worth of arms provided by the USSR since 1977, Moscow sent about \$1.3 billion in 1977-1978 and another \$1.3 billion in 1983-1985-- including modern MI-24/25 helicopters and jet fighters. This aid enabled the Ethiopians to mount, for the first time, a successful counterattack against Eritrean insurgents and to rapidly recapture lost territory.
- -- In Mozambique, the USSR since 1981 has supplied some \$700-800 million in military assistance. Soviet military assistance rose considerably in 1983, including unprecedented deliveries of military equipment by air.

Deliveries fell off in 1984 (probably due to Moscow's displeasure with Mozambique President Machel's signing of the Nkomati Agreement with South Africa), but they have increased in 1985. This year's aid has included MI-24/25 helicopters, tanks and APCs, patrol boats, artillery, and three batteries of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. Soviet economic assistance has also increased in 1985.

-- In <u>Angola</u>, the Soviets have clearly beefed up their military support, raising their 1983 deliveries of arms (\$582 million) to \$850 million in 1984

Among the more sophisticated weapons Moscow has supplied Luanda since 1983 have been over 100 fighter aircraft, including MIG-23s and SU-22s; more than 20 MI-24/25 helicopters; antiaircraft systems for the creation of an integrated air defense over a large portion of the country; and large quantities of armor, transport, and ammunition.

-- In Nicaragua, Soviet bloc military aid deliveries in 1984 doubled over those of 1983. Also, the nature of Soviet bloc military aid has expanded to include such equipment as MI-24/25 assault helicopters, minesweepers, and radar-controlled air defense guns. There was a lull during the first three quarters of 1985 in the delivery of Soviet weapons to Nicaragua, although deliveries of Soviet military-associated cargoes (trucks, jeeps, and so forth) rose sharply over that of corresponding months in 1984. In October however, a major Soviet weapons delivery to Nicaragua appeared to be under way, the first since last November.

The new weaponry probably includes more tanks,

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artillery, and air defense wea<u>pons</u>, although it has not yet been precisely identified.

- 4. Soviet actions over the past months have affirmed Gorbachev's apparent intention to protect these client regimes. Like his three predecessors, Gorbachev seems willing to furnish such military support as appears necessary—at least in the absence of great risk or significantly increased costs—to ensure their survival. The USSR does face serious operational and logistical problems in conducting counterinsurgency wars at great distances and in unfamiliar situations, but these ventures are not that costly. Soviet military assistance, while large in absolute terms is—except for Afghanistan—at the margin of existing Soviet force structure stockpiles, and military production.
- 5. Despite Moscow's concern over the possibility of more forceful US initiatives in the Third World, the Soviet leadership seems to believe that the United States and others who seek to frustrate Soviet efforts there are hemmed in by a variety of constraints which, over the long run, will work against sustained effective opposition to Soviet aims. At the same time, the Soviets probably think they will be able to profit from certain major trends now visible in the international environment:
 - -- The fundamental shift in the regional "correlation of forces" in Southeast Asia that could arise with the loss of US bases in the Philippines--with or without a successful communist revolution in that country.
 - -- The accelerating potential for serious revolutionary activity in South Africa.
 - -- Growing frustration over the US role in the Middle East peace process and a possibly growing inclination of moderates in the region to accept more of a Soviet role.
 - -- North/South tensions resulting from the debt problem and possible revolutionary upheavals, especially in Latin America.
- 6. The Soviets are well aware, however, of the short run problems of their client states: economic crisis, incomplete systemic and leadership institutionalization, and military vulnerability to insurgent attack. They know Washington has provided steadily increased support for some resistance groups and can see Washington is in the midst of a policy debate over escalation of that assistance to other insurgent groups. The clear reference in the President's address to support for democratic resistance forces is probably read by the Kremlin as an accurate indication of the admiristration's intent to up the military ante in anti-Marxist insurgencies if this is politically feasible.

- 7. Under these circumstances, the Soviets almost certainly will:
 - -- Attempt to continue to provide client regimes with levels of military assistance deemed adequate to prevent serious insurgent challenge to client governments.
 - -- Seek to generate political pressures that will deflect further outside support for insurgencies in client states.
 - -- Play for time in which to strengthen political, social and economic controls in these regimes.
 - -- Try to distract world attention from the anti-Marxist insurgencies by focusing on areas of US vulnerability and Soviet opportunity.

Runup to the November Meeting

- 8. Between now and 19 November Moscow will publicly attack President Reagan's proposal, strive to impose its own terms of reference on discussion of regional issues at the meeting, and lay the groundwork for subsequent exploitation of whatever positions Gorbachev advances in his talks with President Reagan.
- 9. Theoretically, Moscow could consider strengthening Gorbachev's hand in the talks by attempting to inflict a major military or political defeat beforehand on freedom fighters in one or more of its client states. Practically, however, time is running out and opportunities to score such a psychological victory are not evident—even if Moscow did decide to risk more publicity for its involvement in counter—insurgency efforts and to expose the steel beneath its current efforts to appear "reasonable."
- 10. The main arenas of Soviet activity, thus, are likely to be propaganda and more finely tuned political influence operations ("active measures"). The most authoritative reaction to date to the President's comments on regional conflict in his UN address has been Gorbachev's speech of 1 November at a dinner for Ethiopian chief Mengistu. Gorbachev did not address the President's proposals directly, but
 - -- Asserted that the charge of Soviet machinations in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Third World was an attempt to cover up US interference in these countries, obstruct their ties with the Soviet bloc (i.e., "hinder their free and independent development"), distract world attention from US encouragement of Israel and South Africa, and avoid addressing the nuclear arms control issue.

- -- Declared that the Soviet Union would continue to support Ethiopia.
- -- Repeated the conventional Soviet propaganda appeal for channeling funds saved from arms spending to Third World development needs.
- -- Approved the resolution of the Organization of African Unity on turning Africa into a nuclear free zone and announced that the USSR would be prepared to observe Africa'a nuclear free status and serve as a guarantor of such a zone.

Lesser Soviet spokesmen have stated that the USSR will be willing to discuss regional conflicts at the November meeting, but have suggested that Moscow's agenda might include US "state terrorism and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other people," settlement of the Middle East conflict, and establishment of various "zones of peace" and nuclear free zones.

11. Moscow probably will wait to see how much positive response the President gets before deciding whether more is needed before the November meeting to put the United States on the propaganda defensive. Thus far, the Soviets appear encouraged by statements from some Western leaders and Prime Minister Gandhi that the primary focus of the November meeting should be arms control, not regional conflicts. If the President's proposal does not achieve much international resonance, the Soviets could very well decide to play it down in their own propaganda—hoping others will ignore it or write it off as simply a rhetorical maneuver.

Soviet Behavior at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's Options

12. During Secretary Shultz's recent trip to Moscow, the Soviets reportedly dismissed US efforts to discuss regional issues in order to get the talks back to arms control. Moscow realizes that, whatever it might 'sh, it cannot prevent the United States from raising the issue of regional conflict for discussion at the November meeting. Gorbachev's choices revolve around (a) acceptance or not of any "linkage" between Soviet behavior in the Third Morld and achievement of Soviet objectives in the bilateral US/USSR relationship, including arms control agreements; (b) whether there is anything at all to be gained from even discussing the possibility of negotiations over insurgencies in one or more of the five Soviet client states mentioned in the President's address; (c) how actively to engage the President in talking about regional conflict; and (d)--looking beyond the meeting--what the best way is to turn the regional conflict theme against the United States.

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Linkage with the US/USSR Bilateral Relationship and Arms Talks

13. There are no compelling reasons from Moscow's standpoint to give up gains already achieved in the "socialistoriented" countries or elsewhere in the Third World out of hopes of enticing Washington to agree to more favorable terms in arms negotiations. Soviet America watchers would hardly feel confident enough to offer their leadership assurances about what such concessions might gain from Washington, and Gorbachev would probably not be able politically to "give away the farm"--even if he wanted to, which he does not. The Soviet leadership d recognize as a practical matter, however, that there is a connection between flagrant Soviet support of "national The Soviet leadership does liberation" activities in the Third World and Congressional treatment of arms control issues. For this reason it may well continue to exercise tactical caution in its support of, or conduct of, counterinsurgency efforts in its client states; and it may choose at the November meeting to argue that it has been acting prudently with respect, for example, to "provocations" along the Pakistan border or to military supply of Nicaragua. If reminded of linkage at the November meeting by the United States and pressed for a commitment to future responsible behavior, the Soviets will probably restate their general principle of support for revolutionary movements. But conceivably they might decide that calculated ambiguity or assertions that "revolution cannot be exported" could be perceived in this context by the United States as tacit consent to restrain specific possible future actions--for example, military supply of guerrillas in South Africa or the New Peoples' Army in the Philippines.

Deflecting the Issue?

has dealt with their attempts to raise Third World issues by merely listening and quietly reiterating Soviet positions. He might do the same with the President at the November meeting. Alternatively, he could reaffirm agreement that the two countries' foreign ministers continue and institutionalize the dialogue begun this year on regional issues. The objective would be to terminate the discussion as quickly as possible and get back to arms control. Such a strategy would help muffle the regional conflict theme, display Soviet "statesmanship," and minimize potential tensions that might arise between the USSR and client regimes if serious talks were initiated with the United States. However, the strategy would not provide much of a platform for post-meeting propaganda and active measures campaigns, and would leave the initiative with Washington.

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15. Taking a more activist stance, Moscow might use the discussion of regional issues at the meeting to score propaganda points against the United States while attempting to manipulate American unease with appearing to act hypocritically or not "even-handedly." Picking up themes already in Soviet propaganda, Gorbachev could try to put the President off balance by directly accusing him of instigating "state terrorism" against regimes friendly to the USSR, of preparing to crank up aid to the South African "puppet" Savimbi, of supporting South African racism and aggression against its neighbors, of working with Israel against Arab interests, of backing military dictatorships in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America, or of exacerbating Third World tensions by deploying nuclear-armed vessels throughout the world. Such an approach might win kudos for Gorbachev among conservative elements in the Soviet elite, but would risk generating unwanted controversy over Soviet bloc military activities in the Third World and might be seen by Soviet strategists as likely to spoil an atmosphere at the meeting otherwise more conducive to American concessions on arms control questions.

Recasting the Entire Debate

- 16. An obvious option open to Gorbachev is to try to put the US in a "no win" position by presenting "constructive" "tension-reduction" proposals that are not transparently self-serving, but acceptance of which would constrain US military power projection capabilities, weaken US political influence, and enhance the Soviet presence in the Third World. If Washington decided to accept the proposed negotiating agenda, so much the better from the Kremlin's standpoint. But Moscow's main aim would be to position itself to (a) link US rejection of the proposals with US "bellicosity" in "star wars" and use this indictment to fan anti-Americanism in Western Europe and the Third World, and (b) to advance political initiatives in the Third World calculated to exploit US vulnerabilities.
- 17. The statement issued by a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact in late October, together with Gorbachev's response to a letter from the Club of Rome on the international arms trade and his 1 November speech, probably provide some clues about the items that would be included in such a set of "tension-reduction" proposals. We might see calls for:
 - -- A "code of conduct" for the Third World based on "respect for national independence and sovereignty, nonuse of force or the threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, peaceful solution of disputes," etc.
 - -- Resumption of the conventional arms transfer talks.

- -- An international effort to effect dismantlement of foreign military bases and a withdrawal of forces from foreign territories.
- -- The convening under UN auspices of an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
- -- An invitation to the US to join with the USSR in promoting an Asian Collective Security pact.
- -- Recognition of "zones of peace" and nuclear free zones in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Africa, Indian Ocean and South Pacific.
- -- Approval of principles of North/South trade that paid lip service to the Third World's "New International Economic Order" initiative.
- -- Negotiations under UN auspices dealing with the Third World debt problem.
- -- Approval of a global program for sharing high technology.

We rate the chances of the Soviets presenting some set of "tension-reduction" proposals at the November meeting about fifty-fifty. Whatever the particular mix of proposals may be, the package would be designed not only to deflect attention from President Reagan's regional conflict agenda, but actively to advance longer-term strategems of capitalizing on the perceived opportunities noted just above.

Regotiating One or More Conflicts Mentioned by the President

18. From Moscow's perspective, the President's proposal implies actions which are either in fundamental opposition to Soviet interests, or are unlikely to succeed:

- -- Promotion of negotiations between client Marxist regimes and insurgents. The Soviets have tried but apparently failed to achieve negotiations in Ethiopia; they are probably uninterested in either having such talks or pressuring Cuba to engineer them in Angola and Nicaragua; and they are probably skeptical about the prospects of achieving serious talks with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, or between the two opposed Cambodian factions even if they wanted to pursue such a tack.
- -- Democratization of these five states. This path would involve a complete reversal of efforts by the Soviets and

their bloc partners to build single-party Marxist-Leninist systems of rule.

- -- Withdrawal of bloc military support of clients, with verification. Pursuit of such a move would lead to collapse of client regimes in at least Afghanistan and Angola, serious loss of influence with Vietnam, probably loss of presence in Ethiopia, and major conflict with Cuba.
- -- Expanded trade and aid relations between client regimes and Western partners. While the Soviets accept a certain amount of such intercourse as unavoidable and even desirable, their long-term objective is precisely to reduce the structural economic dependence of their clients on the West and strengthen integration of those countries in the Soviet bloc.
- 19. Perhaps the only positive aspects of the President's proposal from Moscow's standpoint are its implicit acceptance of the USSR's role in the Third World as a superpower and potential co-guarantor with the United States of agreements, and acceptance by Washington of non-intervention principles that might constrain future US actions. Conceivably those pluses, supplementing more concrete cost/benefit calculations (including the benefits to be gained from simply being seen to be engaged in a negotiating process with Washington), might lead Gorbachev to explore talks about some of the insurgencies mentioned by the President. It is difficult to imagine why Moscow would broach the subject of Ethiopia or Cambodia, but scenarios involving the three other countries are not totally implausible:
 - -- Afghanistan. The objective here would be to draw or create the illusion of drawing the United States into discussion of "guarantees" before the initiation of talks between the Karmal regime and the Mujahedeen, with the aim of eroding Pakistan's confidence in US staying power and Pakistani resistance to direct talks with the Afghans, and creating doubts among the Mujahedeen about the continuation of external support.
 - -- Angola. The Soviets might restate their theoretical acceptance of at least partial Cuban evacuation from Angola in return for withdrawal of South African support for UNITA, combined with implementation of UN 435 guaranteeing free elections in Namibia supervised by the UN. The gain would be a probable SWAPO victory in Namibia; but the Soviets probably would doubt that the US could deliver the South Africans, and they would feel that the MPLA could not handle UNITA one-on-one even though they might be more heartened by FAPLA's performance in this year's offensive.

-- Nicaragua/El Salvador. Any Soviet counter-proposal here would be conditioned by the need for gaining Cuban and Sandinista collaboration, which could well prove an insuperable obstacle. No doubt the Soviets would be prepared to trade withdrawal of Western support for the Afghan freedom fighters for Soviet withdrawal of support from the insurgency in El Salvador; but it is difficult to conceive how they would visualize such a deal being consummated. The Soviets might see hints of it, however, as a useful active measures tactic aimed at undercutting Pakistani resolve. Similarly, while they would see consolidation of Sandinista power in Nicaragua as far more important than legitimation of limited participation of the FMLN in electoral politics in El Salvador, they might see hints of talks between Moscow and Washington about reciprocal incorporation of insurgents into the political process of both countries as a means of sowing doubt in Central America about the US commitment to El Salvador, and encouraging Congressional opposition to further US support for the contras.

20. The level of sophistication and destructiveness of weapon systems introduced into Third World conflicts is a question which Soviet policymakers inevitably must address. we suggest below, it is conceivable they might see some utility in broaching this issue on a global level in the context of a proposal to renew the conventional arms transfer talks. But they also might see an advantage in raising the question on a regional basis. As a backer of counterinsurgency warfare in the five countries mentioned by the President, the Soviets now have an obvious interest in reducing the flow to insurgents of anti-armor weaponry and--especially--mobile surface-to-air missiles and heavy machineguns capable of downing helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The problem from the Soviet standpoint would be to find something to trade--openly or tacitly--for restraint on the part of their opponents. It is conceivable that Soviet policy planners might entertain the possibility of offering to trade continued restraint in the bloc's supply of such weapons to guerrillas in El Salvador for future restraint in weapons available to the contras in Nicaragua. Less plausible would be a Soviet attempt to gain US agreement to seek restraint in the types of weapons that might get to insurgents in Afghanistan or perhaps even in Angola by means of an offer of Bloc restraint, for example, in overall military delivers to Nicaragua or of Soviet restraint in "active pursuit" along the Pakistan border. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would initiate discussion of US restraint anywhere in return for an understanding, however vague, about possible future Soviet non-supply of arms to South African dissidents or Communist insurgents in the Philippines.

CIA/CI / 76-10059 XM

January 26, 1976

JAIOCH

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Present Military Situation in Angola

- 1. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), reinforced by about 11,000 Guban troops are a continuing flow of Soviet military equipment, now holds a clear super ority of military power in . Angola. The MPLA's military leaders are convinced that they can win a conventional military victory over their opponents in the very near future, perhaps within the next several weeks. We believe that this outcome is likely, although it will fall short of a total victory in that at least small-scale guerrilla and insurgent activity will probably continue.
- 2. MPLA and Cuban forces have already destroyed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in the north; the Front is not likely to pose a significant conventional military threat to the MPLA in the near future, though it may fight on as a guerrilla movement.
- 3. The MPLA side is confident that it can win a similar victory over the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in central and southern Angola, and the MPLA and Cubans are now regrouping their forces for a concerted offensive against UNITA. This judgment of the MPLA is almost certainly correct. Although UNITA can be expected to put up stiff resistance, it does not have without the combat paricipation and heavy weepons of South African forces the ability to withstand the combined Cuban and MPLA forces. UNITA's military position has been seriously undermined by the withdrawal of more than 1,000 South African troops and advisors. Even a continuation of covert South African material assistance is not likely to shore up UNITA significantly as a conventional military force.
- 4. Given the present situation, the remaining forces in Angola opposing the MPLA cannot expect to receive any significant increase of aid either material or manpower from Zaire, Zambia, South Africa or other nations. These nations are all in the process of rethinking their policies toward Angola and related questions. They are in every



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case more likely to make an accommodation to what they see as an emerging new situation in southern Africa, than they are to expand their support to the UNITA and FNLA in an effort to preserve what they now think is unpreservable.

5. In sum, as the situation now stands, there is little to prevent the MPLA side from winning a conventional military victory, and in farily short order. There is every indication that Soviet and Cuban aid will continue to arrive in Angola in amounts regarded by Moscow and Havana as necessary to finish the job quickly. While the MPLA over the short term probably cannot totally eliminate guerrilla activity by its rivals, the MPLA and Cubans will be able to consolidate their military position throughout Angola. They will also succeed in tightening their administrative grip on Angola's major urban and economic centers and gaining control over the Benguela railroad. They will, at least initially, leave the rural population to fend for itself as the Portuguese did before. Finally, they will probably avoid a direct military confrontation with South Africa by not challenging, with conventional forces, the South African forces in the far south of Angola around the Cunene hydroelectric project.

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10 June 1977

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Assessment of Developments in Angola

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Neto regime has been weakened and its long-term prospects are much dimmer as a result of recent developments, deteriorating economic and social conditions in Angola, increased resentment against the growing Cuban involvement, and insurgent successes.

Nevertheless, with determined Cuban support,
Neto is likely to survive the current crisis. No
dissident faction nor any insurgent group acting
alone possesses the capacity to overthrow the
government, although insurgents may expand somewhat
or consolidate their position in territory they now
hold. We have no clear evidence that insurgents or
dissidents are planning to combine their forces, and
we believe that the crackdown now underway against
the regime's opponents as well as the persisting
differences among them will hinder any cohesive antiregime effort in the next few months.

The current turmoil is rooted in racial and factional divisions (mulatto-black, civilian-military)

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which have existed within the Popular Movement since it was founded in 1956. No purge can eliminate them or even suppress them for long.

We believe that in these circumstances the Neto government will be forced into increasing dependence on the Cubans. Although the Angolan commitment is increasingly burdensome, the Cuban government now appears willing to commit additional resources to assure the survival of the Neto regime, and we believe that Havana will continue to do so unless the military situation becomes untenable or the USSR presses for a major shift toward a policy of compromise.

Although other African leaders are increasingly uneasy about the situation in Angola, we foresee no significant shifts in Neto's relationships with the OAU governments.

DISCUSSION

MPLA Internal Problems

- 1. The uprising on 27 May in Luanda began primarily as an effort to secure the release of two dissident leaders, Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem, from prison. Broadcasts made while the dissidents had control of the radio station, however, triggered a number of spontaneous but uncoordinated moves against the government in Luanda as well as lesser disturbances in the provinces and among several military units.
- The uprising revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the Neto regime among both officials and the population at large, but it also exposed to Neto's security organs many within the government, the party, and the military who were hostile to his leadership. As soon as Neto with Cuban support had reasserted command, the government initiated a major purge, arresting hundreds of dissidents in Luanda and provinces. While the purge has temporarily reduced the ability of Neto's opponents to challenge his leadership, the uprising | highlighted fundamental weaknesses of the Popular Move-Neither Neto nor any likely ment (MPLA) leadership. successor will be able to alleviate Angola's serious: economic and social problems as long as he remains unwilling to compromise with the insurgent movements. A few thousand additional Cuban troops may prevent the military situation from deteriorating further but they will be unable to solve the basic problem. out stability in the interior, economic reconstruction cannot even begin. Other ambitious Angolan leaders, regardless of ideology, will attempt to build their own bases of power by exploiting Neto's inability to improve the situation.
- 3. The uprising presumably placed substantial emotional as well as political strains on Neto himself.

 About a month ago Neto reportedly resumed heavy drinking, and the uprising could have made him yet more despondent.

Although Neto might conceivably become personally incapable of governing, his departure probably would not signal the end of MPLA control over the government. Other party leaders of the Neto faction would step in, and at least initially follow the established line.

Sources of Disaffection

- 4. The most serious threat to the Neto regime comes from the Alves faction, which draws support from the slum areas surrounding Luanda where Alves has tapped popular discontent over critical food shortages and deteriorating economic and social conditions—problems which have been aggravated by recent insurgent successes in the south. He also makes racist appeals to the resentments against the advice and visible presence of Cubans and Soviets as foreigners and nonblacks.
- Both unemployed black Angolans and radicals in the military are attracted to Alves' arguments that blacks are inadequately represented at the top levels of the party and the military and that mulattos have gained a disproportionate share of power and of the sweeter fruits of the revolution. The dominant position Cubans are assuming in the army and the government is also producing widespread discontent. In recent months, Cuban troops have seemed reluctant to engage insurgent forces, and this has intensified frictions between government and Cuban troops. Angola's military and economic difficulties, moreover, have forced Neto to look increasingly to other countries, particularly Cuba, for assistance; this will strengthen Alves' claim that Neto has rejected a black, nationalist solution to Angola's problems.
- 6. Many senior army officers will support in principal efforts to rid the government and the army of corrupt and incompetent leaders and those who have misused their powers during the liberation struggle and since the Popular Movement assumed control. Although some of the officers who share this view appear

to have close ties to the Alves faction, the failure of the uprising and the subsequent purges will probably prevent them for the time being from organizing an effective opposition movement. There is a chance, however, that in purging too many, or in using Cubans too overtly, Neto may provoke a more serious revolt. Our knowledge of MPLA internal relationships at this time is not sufficient to rule this out.

7. In addition to the militants of the Alves faction, a group called the Active Revolt, which draws its support from the better educated and more moderate elements in the MPLA, has opposed the Neto government since its formation. Although the Active Revolt is the only dissident faction with enough intellectual talent to set up an alternative government, most of its leaders are in jail or in exile, and it lacks a popular base.

An Opposition Coalition?

- 8. Active Revolt leaders have indicated that they might be willing to join Alves' faction in a coordinated attempt to topple the government. Such an alliance of Alves with the Active Revolt is unlikely, given his black racist outlook (most of the leaders in the Active Revolt are mulattos) and his insistence that no effort be made to improve relations with Portugal or any other Western government—a major objective of the Active Revolt. The Active Revolt could find common cause, however, with dissidents in the military who are not committed to Alves' extreme views.
- 9. Active Revolt leaders and some dissidents in the military have also said they would be willing to ally themselves with the National Front or National Union insurgent forces, but only if Roberto and Savimbi agreed not to seek any top posts in a new government. Although the possibility of such an alliance cannot be discounted totally, neither insurgent leader is likely to accept such conditions in the near future.

The Insurgent Threat

- 10. The uprising on 27 May undoubtedly gave the insurgent forces fresh hopes for eventual victory over the MPLA. So long as Cuba maintains a substantial military presence in the country, however, there is almost no chance that any of the three major insurgent groups could capture Luanda or otherwise bring down the Neto government.
- ll. Savimbi's forces, estimated at about 7,000 men, control almost all of Angola around the Benguela railroad and to the south, with the exception of the coast and the major towns—and most of the latter are encircled by National Union guerrillas. As a result of recent guerrilla successes, rail traffic in southern Angola has been impeded, the supply of food to the coast has been disrupted, and the morale of government as well as Cuban troops has seriously declined. Extension of the MPLA purge to the countryside will only further impede the government troops' capacity and willingness to engage insurgent forces.
- Savimbi appears to be shifting his emphasis toward building a working political structure than with further extending his territorial base. National Union forces operate almost exclusively in their own tribal area, and this accounts in large part for the success of their operations. If the National Union were to capture Luanda and seize control of the government -- a virtual impossibility so long as Cuba maintains its commitment to defend the Neto regime -- it would be confronted with a number of the same fundamental problems that now beset the Neto regime. Savimbi's movement has kept going militarily on accumulated stores and captured materiel and some continuing assistance from the South Africans. We do not know the full extent of this aid, but we believe it is not large. is not now providing any significant military aid.
- 13. Holden Roberto's claim that his forces--possibly 3,000 to 5,000--control over one-third of the countryside is highly exaggerated. Although Roberto has been able

to wage a guerrilla war of surprising tenaciousness in northern Angola, his troops are poorly equipped and organized, and his effort is not likely to expand significantly. Roberto may be receiving some minimal, covert assistance from Zaire, but it is not significant

- The Cabindan insurgents belonging to the Front at this time. for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC), numbering possibly 500 armed men, likewise pose no immediate political Although they have attempted to step up guerrilla operations in recent months and now claim "control" over two-thirds of Cabinda, the territory is probably contested by both sides rather than controlled by one or the other.
 - 15. Cabinda is occupied by several thousand MPLA and Cuban troops; this reflects the economic importance to the MPLA of the Gulf Oil installations. vulnerable to hit-and-run attack, and if significant damage were done, this would be a major psychological and material blow to the Neto government. If the guerrillas succeeded in forcing Gulf to stop production-either through guerrilla action or through intimidation -- this would have a serious impact on the economy because the Gulf operations provide Angola with its only major source of foreign revenue. what we know at present, we do not believe that FLEC can accomplish this.
 - 16. Although there have been contacts between FLEC and UNITA, we do not think an alliance between these two movements or between UNITA and Roberto's FNLA would have significant consequences, and we see virtually no chance of a workable union of all three insurgent groups.

Prospects for Compromise Neto is under increasing pressure from Zambian President Kaunda -- and possibly the Soviets and other leaders of the "front-line" states -- to reach a political accommodation with Savimbi, but he has steadfastly refused to do so. So far the Cubans have backed Nelo's refusal to treat with Savimbi and it is unlikely that Neto's current difficulties will lead him to change his mind.

18. It is equally unlikely that Castro will push for an accommodation unless the military situation becomes untenable or the Soviet Union begins to exert strong pressure for a negotiated settlement. Savimbi, moreover, would probably have great difficulty convincing his supporters to accept a compromise given their recent military successes.

The State of Angola

19. Neto's hold on the country thus varies widely. The southern countryside, behind the coastal mountain range, is out of his hands for all practical purposes. So are some areas of the north. In the other half or less of the country, Neto's writ still runs where he has local tribal support or where Cuban assistance keeps the administrative machinery going but at minimal speed. Unless the Cubans are willing to make a very major, long-term military commitment to "pacification," Neto is likely to remain in control of only part of the country, and his regime's performance in that part will suffer from its inability to make its writ run in the rest. This, together with the persisting factionalism in the MPLA itself, argues for a fundamentally unstable situation for Neto for the indefinite future.

The Cuban Commitment

- 20. The MPLA's need for Cuban military aid is obvious:
 - --The MPLA has always depended heavily on Cuban forces for its military advantage over rival nationalist movements. This need is increasing, and a substantial reinforcement appears to be underway.

- --The failure of the Angolan-based invasion of Zaire has kindled Angolan fears of Zairian military retaliation.
- --Now, following the uprising of 27 May, Neto apparently must rely on Cuban backing against important elements within his own government. One effect of the uprising may be that he will now place more faith in the Cubans than in many of those Angolans closest to him. In any event he will be forced to rely ever more heavily on Cuban support unless he can reduce opposition to him from MPLA dissidents or, much less likely, achieve a compromise with Savimbi.
- 21. The Cuban military involvement in Angola has been deeper than either had anticipated. How long Cuba remains able and willing to provide this high level of support probably holds the key to the future of the Neto regime.
- 22. The Cuban government is clearly disturbed by the situation it faces in Angola. What appeared last year as an easy triumph for Cuban "internationalism" has now assumed the characteristics of a quagmire. So long as Castro continues to receive full Soviet backing he probably would be willing to commit additional civilian resources and combat troops to assure the survival of the Neto regime.
- 23. Fresh troops should be able to mount a more successful campaign against the insurgents. At the very least, they should be able to contain the insurgent forces throughout this summer's dry season when guerrilla forces are most vulnerable to attack, even though UNITA reportedly plans some aggressive operations. Cuban troops probably will also be called upon to assume increasingly important security functions within MPLA territory, although this could provoke a major backlash. Castro and Neto presumably are aware of this problem, but view it as a minor concern when compared to the fundamental problem of survival.

The Soviet Factor

- 24. If Angola depends most directly upon Cuban troops and technicians, it also needs Soviet arms, political support, and economic aid. The recent uprising, however, may have introduced an element of suspicion into the Luanda-Moscow relationship. Neto has publicly accused "certain embassies" of fomenting unrest in Luanda, and there are tentative indications that these remarks reflect a suspicion that the USSR has been involved with the dissidents. While we do not believe that there was Soviet involvement with Alves' recent activities, they cultivated him in the past as a member of the government.
- 25. Even if Neto is unable to discover any firm evidence of Soviet complicity with Alves, Neto's suspicion of their involvement may well prompt to search for alternative supporters in the West-he has expressed continued interest in normalizing relations with the United States-and to reduce, if possible, his reliance upon the USSR. Backing away from the Soviets while continuing to embrace the Cubans might be a difficult maneuver, however.

African States

- 26. Other African states, except for some of the most radical, have never been happy with Angola's heavy reliance upon external military assistance. They have understood Angola's serious problems but have been uneasy about the large Cuban military presence, which they have accepted only because of South African involvement in the Angolan civil war and the suspicion that the South Africans may be aiding the Luanda regime's enemies.
- 27. As it becomes clear that Neto depends upon Cuban support, not only against foreign threats but also against dissidents within the regime itself, African respect for the Angolan regime will decline further. This will not have a significant impact on Angola's relations with other African countries, however, with the exception of Zaire.
- 28. Angola's support of the Katangan invasion of Zaire appears to have been intended, among other things,

to deter Mobutu from providing further support to the FNLA insurgents. Following the failure of the Kaiangan invasion (which has apparently strengthened Mobutu's position, at least temporarily), and the trauma of the Luanda uprising, the Angolan regime can ill-afford to antagonize its neighbors. The substitution of Congo for Nigeria as the mediator with Zaire suggests that Angola (possibly with Soviet prompting), may now be willing to accept mediation efforts to settle its disputes with Zaire.

- 29. The long strain in Angola's relations with Zambia appears to be easing. Zambian President Kaunda has on several occasions urged Neto to reach an accommodation with UNITA, and implied that this was a precondition for better relations. But Kaunda's attention has been diverted from Angolan matters by more pressing southern African concerns, and Zambia will probably continue to move, albeit cautiously, toward normal relations with Angola while remaining uncomfortable with the Neto regime.
- 30. Except for its relations with its Communist benefactors, however, foreign affairs—even the Namibian issue and the Rhodesian question—probably will be a distinctly secondary concern of the Angolan government in the near future. The all-consuming objective of the Angolan leadership will be to attempt to remain in power in the face of the violent split within the MPLA and continuing challenges from the insurgent movements.

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CI-M 7610078 NO. 0747-76 February 26, 1976

MEMORANDUM.

SUBJECT: Fidel Castro's Expanding Role as a Broker Between the Communist and Third Worlds

Fidel Castro stands out as a protean and commanding figure among the Soviet-style communist party leaders gathered in Moscow this week. Bearded, and in the khaki-green attire of the guerrilla movement that he led to victory 17 years ago, his credentials are currently as good with the heads of third world governments and revolutionary groups as they are with his more stolid communist counterparts. While in Moscow, and later in Eastern Europe, Castro well seek to exploit these unique bona fides to win support for his increasingly assertive and global foreign policy.

Unlike the four visits Castro made to the USSR in earlier years when he was cast in the role of an underprivileged client seeking Soviet beneficence, he will consult with Soviet leaders this time from a position of greater strength. The Cuban Revolution is more secure and successful than ever before, (although still dependent on massive Soviet aid) and he is at the peak of his power and prestige. Decisive Cuban victories with the Popular Movement in Angola underscore for many the wisdom of his audacious decision to project Cuban military power 8,000 miles across the Atlantic.

This paper was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency. All comments and queries should be addressed to the author,

CONFIDENTIAL

MICAO ONLY While these and other solid Cuban accomplishments undoubtedly impress the leaders of the other communist parties, Castro's credibility with them is probably better enhanced by important steps he has taken recently to accept Soviet orthodoxy. The first congress of the Cuban Communist Party last December was a final step in the pervasive institutionalization of the Revolution along lines recommended by Moscow. In recent weeks, moreover, Havana has abandoned ten years of silence in the Sino-Soviet dispute by loosing a vicious propaganda barrage against Peking.

Castro's remarkable success in simultaneously augmenting his credibility as a communist and third world leader will better enable him to carry out the more expansive foreign policy he is now embarked on the aspires not only to continue enhancing his dual credentials in the communist and third worlds, but to act as a bridge between them. He seems genuinely to believe that in this manner he can help to forge a greater convergence of interests between the two, and once again become a major player on the world stage.

Castro is encouraged to pursue this ambitious design because he believes that the international balance of power has shifted during the last few years. The US failure in Southeast Asia, Watergate, revelations about and investigations of the US intelligence community, and other developments have persuaded him that 'imperialism' is in eclipse and that communist and third world forces have gained the upper hand. Cuban successes in Angola have strongly reinforced that view.

castro also is encouraged by the increasing compatability of Cuban and Soviet objectives and methods in the third world, and by Moscow's apparent satisfaction that his efforts there work to its advantage as well as his. The economic, technical,

and security assistance that Cuban advisers provide the governments of several countries, including Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea, Bissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia, contributes to the fulfillment of both Cuban and Soviet objectives. Castro may even believe that he helped to persuade the Soviet leaders to more actively support third world causes. This heightened degree of mutual trust has resulted in increased Soviet willingness to delegate to the Cubans immediate responsibility for advancing the objectives of both countries in certain Caribbean and African countries.

<u> Guba's Future Role in Africa</u>

capitalize on Cuban successes in Angola by continuing to perform as a major power broker in Africa. At least 12,000 seasoned Cuban troops are believed to be in Angola even now after the fighting has all but ended. Castro may be keeping them there primarily as a reminder to the white minority governments of southern Africa that he is irrevocably committed to support wars of national liberation in the area.

The extent of the support Cuba eventually will provide to guerrilla movements in southern Africa will depend largely on how much of a commitment Castro can win from the Soviets. His ambitions for that part of the world undoubtedly will be one of the central topics in his discussions with Soviet leaders during his stay in Moscow. The presence in his entourage of Osmani-Cienfuegos, Cuba's senior troubleshooter in Africa and the Middle East, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the regime's top foreign policy official, seem to emphasize the priority that Castro places on his African pursuits.

Castro will probably seek Soviet backing to begin providing material support and training to the faction of the African National Council that supports Joshua Nkomo in his efforts to negotiate a settlement with the Smith government in Rhodesia. Moscow has long aided Nkomo, and may agree to funnel arms and money through the Cubans. If there is any truth in reports that Cuban military personnel and Soviet military equipment have been sent to Mozambique from Angola, then such a decision may already have been made. Cuban efforts will be hampered, however, by the poor organization and small size of the group, and by the fact that Peking supports another faction of the Council that is stronger and more active than Nkomo's.

Confine their efforts in behalf of the Rhodesian guerrillas to training and organizational areas while seeking to build up the group's capability. A small number of Cuban advisers could be expected to engage in guerrilla operations, but it is not likely that regular Cuban troops will become involved without strong endorsements from Moscow and major African nations.

Cuba is also likely to provide training and material support to the South West African People's Organization in concert with the expected efforts of the Angolan Popular Movement to support insurgency in Namibia, even if an accomodation is reached with Pretoria. The levels and types of Cuban assistance would depend here, as in Rhodesia, on a variety of external factors. In balance, it seems unlikely that in the next few months Cuban personnel will become involved other than as advisers with guerrilla units.

Cuban efforts in support of the Katangan secessionists who oppose the Mobutu government in Zaire also are possible, but restraints that extend

well beyond those discussed in the above cases apply here. Despite his antipathy for Mobutu, -- against whom Che Guevara fought a guerrilla action in 1965--Castro would support a struggle against a legitimate black African government only in the extremely unlikely event that its opponents enjoyed the overwhelming support of other black nations.

In the longer term, Cuba also can be expected to expend considerable and growing energy-both diplomatic and subversive--against white minority rule in South Africa. The possibilities for Cuban meddling are more limited there than elsewhere in southern Africa, but Havana may endeavor to establish and support a guerrilla force--perhaps from bases in Mozambique--in the hopes of generating support in the international arena for more direct involvement. Despite the triumphant mood that Castro and most of his military commanders are in following their success in Angola, however, few of them have illusions about how much more difficult and costly a conventional war with South Africa would be.

During the remainder of the year and beyond, the Castro regime can be expected to perform in . Africa in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the European colonial powers of the last century. A growing number of Cuban guerrilla advisers are likely to be assigned with African liberation groups, diverse Cuban aid programs probably will be expanded, and large numbers of Cuban advisers will work in Angola to help pattern a system modeled on Cuba's.

Unless the Neto government strongly objects, moreover, a Cuban military contingent of at least several thousand is likely to remain indefinitely in Angola both as a defensive force and to unsettle nearby white minority governments. In concert with these efforts, Cuban officials and the media will concentrate on a theme that Castro broached late. last year: 'Cuba is not just a Latin American country, but also a Latin African country. African blood flows abundantly in our veins.'

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| Director of Central · Intelligence |

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Soviet Foreign Military Assistance

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

May 1987
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
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
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
This Memorandum assesses the role and significance of Soviet military assistance programs in furthering Moscow's foreign policy in lesser developed countries (LDCs). It describes the institutions and mechanisms involved, the impact on recipient countries, and the benefits and costs for the USSR. Finally, it estimates the prospects for Soviet assistance and its significance for US interests over the next five

This Memorandum is the first attempt by the Intelligence Community to evaluate the overall significance of Soviet military assistance in the Third World to both Communist and non-Communist LDCs. It describes the Soviet Bloc effort, including deliveries of military equipment, the functions of advisers, the training programs for LDC personnel in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, and what these efforts have and have not brought the USSR. Where necessary, this IIM also addresses Soviet economic programs in LDCs as they relate to Soviet military assistance. The IIM was drafted by of the National Intelligence Council Analytic Group and sponsored by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces


Technical Considerations

- Deliveries versus Agreements. This IIM discusses military equipment actually delivered rather than agreements. Agreements are a less useful indicator because: we have little detail on most Soviet arms agreements, major agreements are signed periodically but take a number of years to fulfill, and specific evidence is often lacking on numerous follow-on agreements. Finally, some agreements are not completely fulfilled, and thus give an inflated sense of an arms relationship.
- The values of arms deliveries provided in this assessment are in current US dollars, unless otherwise noted. No inflation factor is applied. The dollar figures are based on the prices the Soviets actually charge in arms contracts, converted into US dollars at the official ruble-dollar exchange rate.
- In this assessment Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia and North Korea are considered Communist LDCs





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KEY JUDGMENTS

The USSR's military assistance efforts to date, and those of its partners in Eastern Europe and Cuba, have been impressive both in the amount of weapons, training, and assistance provided and in the coordination among these donor states. Their efforts pose major problems for US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. However, there is a limit to the benefits the Soviets can accrue in the more developed and independent countries of the Third World.

Highlights of Soviet efforts in the Third World include:

- The USSR and Bloc countries have delivered over \$225 billion worth of arms over the last \$0 years. In 1982, an estimated one-third of total military aid was grants, including almost all deliveries to Communist countries in the Third World; the remainder was sold. Almost a quarter of the arms sold was financed by credits.
- The Warsaw Pact has sent about \$40 billion worth of economic aid in the last five years, mostly to Communist Third World countries. Almost three-quarters of this economic aid—about \$5.6 billion a year—goes to shoring up the economics of Cuba and Vietnam. The remaining quarter is sent to non-Communist Third World countries to support many objectives of Soviet foreign policy; some of it is paid back in hard currency.

Moscow's carefully coordinated military assistance programs play an important role in advancing its overall strategic goals:

— Political Influence. Soviet efforts have helped the USSR gain significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but also in a number of Third World Marxist countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. As a result, Moscow is able to exert influence in key regions of the Third World: Southeast Asia, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Caribbean.



— Hard Currency Earnings. Sales of arms to Third World customers are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities. In 1983 such activities reached a peak and accounted for 22 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. Hard currency is critical to Moscow's purchase of agricultural

products and advanced technological equipment.

— Access to Military Facilities. The Soviets' military assistance program has helped them gain access to naval and air facilities in Libya, Syria, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cuba, and to a base in Vietnam. This access extends Soviet military presence and reach, complicates and hinders Western defense planning, and diverts some US attention from Western Europe and Japan. But the access is limited—only in Vietnam do the Soviets have a full-scale base. Use of naval and air facilities in the other countries is limited to military logistics, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrols. The USSR has lost its access in Egypt and Somalia.


The Soviet's military assistance policy has brought them significant gains, particularly in countries that have a rigid socialist orientation and face a significant internal or external threat. But many other countries have managed to stay out of or to cast off a close Soviet embrace while continuing to receive Soviet arms. Soviet expansion and influence face limitations:

- The amount of arms the Soviets deliver seems to have little relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gain. While the Soviets have sent over the last five years close to \$40 billion worth of arms to Iraq, Syria, India, Algeria, and Libya, Moscow does not exercise significant control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of these nations. Moreover, Soviet attempts to modify the policies of client states by cutting arms supplies, as in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, have proved counterproductive.
- On occasion Moscow has turned against longstanding clients. The Soviets have not only shifted support (as they did from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977) but they have also been involved to varying degrees in the overthrow of governments in Afghanistan in 1979 and South Yemen in 1986. As a result, some Third World countries are wary of hosting a large Soviet presence.



- Moscow's training of LDC military personnel has often produced mixed results. In some poorer countries, mainly in Africa, Soviet military training is sometimes the only type available, is valued, and can win friends and influence people. However, the trainees often resent the political indoctrination, rigid format, and limited hands-on training that characterize Soviet military instruction. They also experience the racism of Soviet society.
- The Soviets are reluctant to supply advanced weapons to LDCs because they fear technological compromise to the West, are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly in the hands of Third World operators, and because sales of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.
- The Soviets have failed to protect client regimes. Over the last quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly been unwilling to project their military power against Western military forces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states. Western opposition has become an increasing constraint in Soviet military relationships with LDCs. The application of direct Western force in Grenada, Libya, and Chad, for example, must have dampened Soviet willingness to provide direct military backing to such countries. The Soviets, however, will note the Contra controversy of late 1986 and 1987 and the effect it will have on Washington's willingness to support insurgencies in Angola and Nicaragua.
- But the most compelling factors that will constrain future deliveries of Soviet military assistance are economic. The fall in energy prices and the decline of the dollar have reduced the capability of energy-exporting countries such as Libya, Algeria, and Iraq to pay hard currency for Soviet arms. Also reduced is the ability of conservative Arab states to continue subsidizing the arms purchases of states such as Syria. Beyond the decline in the price of oil, other factors constrain Soviet arms earnings: shifting needs and diversification by independent clients and competition from the West and from Communist suppliers outside the Warsaw Pact.





To counter these factors, Moscow will search aggressively for new customers. New agreements will probably enable Moscow to prevent further decline in hard currency earnings from arms sales; however, these earnings will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of the decade, and the hard currency return to Moscow from these sales will probably remain at about \$5-6 billion a year.


The decline has raised the question of whether Moscow will be able to sustain the economic "burden of empire." Over the last five years Soviet economic assistance has totaled about \$8 billion a year, and military assistance amounted to about \$15 billion a year. We believe this burden is, and will continue to be, affordable.

Outlook and Implications for the West

Gorbachev has projected an image of foreign policy activism by use of increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda, and more sophistication in foreign policy. Although the Soviets remain willing to provide economic support to a few clients that depend on it for their survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is still arms transfers.

The delivery of military weapons alone has never given the Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxist Third World countries, and there is nothing inexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy to the USSR in the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and the interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences in determining the policies and orientation of LDCs. Thus, it is going to be much more difficult for the Soviets to use their military assistance to make significant new gains in the Third World.

This does not mean that the Soviets are not going to make gains in the future—they are. In particular, their efforts in Central America and southern Africa will prove to be extremely troublesome for the United States. They will also find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait. They may gain significant influence over a few regimes, and they may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries to which they already have access. But the Soviets—





because of their inability to extend substantial economic aid, the increased Western support to some insurgencies challenging Marxist regimes, their inability to project power against significant opposition, and declining hard currency earnings from arms sales—are coming up against limits to the benefits they can accrue by providing military assistance.

Moscow's difficulties in earning hard currency raise the opportunity costs of aiding its client states and may reduce prospects for new grant aid or credits to non-Communist LDCs. Gorbachev knows that the USSR cannot underwrite the economic, social, or military development of any but a very few Third World countries—historically Cuba and Vietnam and now, increasingly, Nicaragua. In some countries the Soviets encourage a mixed economy with foreign investment from Western nations. Thus, even in states where Soviet influence is strong, the West will maintain an entree.

Soviet limitations are particularly evident in their lack of opportunities to expand military access in return for their military assistance. Even in nations where there is a strong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about increasing the Soviet presence:

- Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give the United States an excuse to bring its superior air and naval power to bear in Third World settings. On a broad scale, the Soviets will continue to militarily strengthen their allied regimes through measures that stop short of Soviet confrontation with the United States. Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unlikely to increase their military access in these countries.
- Syria probably realizes there are limits to the protection it can expect from Moscow. This stems from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness to directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and suspicions that Moscow might back revolutionary groups in opposition to the current leadership.
- The best prospects for Moscow's expansion of its access will probably occur in Vietnam and southern Africa. Over the next






five years the Soviets will probably increase their naval and air capabilities in Vietnam. In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola. They could also send IL-38 ASW aircraft to Mozambique again, but such deployments would probably be sporadic in the near term.


Despite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly in the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for the use of arms transfers in support of Soviet policy:

- Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftist governments fending off revolts, and countries confronting the West will almost always turn to the Soviets for support—partly for the political statement such ties imply.
- And the Soviets will almost always provide arms to movements and states, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit from sustaining the movements as long as Moscow's commitment and risk are not substantial.

The Soviets will attempt to maintain their markets and to remain competitive with Western rivals. We believe that the Soviets will provide at favorable prices or terms a number of advanced weapons such as MIG-29s, SU-25s, and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers in LDCs will probably increase somewhat. Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so in the future. The number of Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will also increase. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries that perceive active threats from across their borders.

Moscow will also continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when this action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leaning toward the West. Thus, Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western






interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. In addition, the Soviets also have the potential to gain in other regions if the West fails to provide significant economic and security assistance:

- In the Philippines the Soviets may be able to make inroads.
- Prospects for the Soviets would also improve in Algeria, Morocco, and especially Tunisia, if any of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling to provide vital economic or security assistance.
- Insufficient Western security assistance to African countries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies; for example, facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the major US effort for economic policy reform by African governments would suffer a major blow.





The dollar value of Soviet military assistance exports has recently been recalculated. Community estimates of Soviet military deliveries based on this reevaluation result in a 65-percent increase, from a previously estimated \$46 billion to \$75 billion, for 1982 to 1986 (see figure 2). This increase results primarily from a tripling in the estimated value of "residual"—largely unidentified—tonnage included in arms shipments.

Since the estimated value of Soviet military aid consists of the value of observed major weapons plus the value of residual tonnage, the Increases are most pronounced for Third World recipients of large unidentified tonnages (see figure 3). Iraq, Vietnam, Cuba, Syria, and Angola have the largest increases in terms of total dollars and account for over half of the \$31 billion increase. Each of these countries has been at war or involved in conflict during this period, and each has received substantial imports of usually unidentified material (for example, munitions and spare_narts) in addition to identified major military arms


The new estimates also indicate that the grant portion of Soviet military aid is larger than previously thought. Estimates of the Soviet's hard currency earnings from arms sales, however, do not change. These estimates are based on Soviet trade data, which exclude the value of Soviet arms delivered on a grant basis. Finally, the reevaluation of Soviet military exports affected only dollar values; no changes have been made to the numbers or types of equipment delivered.

In this paper, military assistance data beginning in 1980 reflected the new calculations.

ngures for these years have been adjusted by an appropriate factor to make them roughly comparable with the new figures

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DISCUSSION

I. The Evolution of Soviet Military Assistance in the Third World

- 1. The Soviet military assistance program is a broad effort that currently provides military equipment, technical services, training, or direct operational support to 42 Third World countries. The program has been an invaluable tool of Soviet foreign policy:
 - For over three decades Soviet arms deliveries have provided the entree for a Soviet advisory and military presence in Third World countries. Combined with aid from Eastern Europe and Cuba, Soviet deliveries of arms and deployment of advisers to Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia have propped up a number of Marxist-Leninist regimes, broadened Soviet military reach, extended Moscow's influence, and contributed to the destabilization of countries bordering Soviet-oriented LDCs.
 - Since the early 1970s Soviet deliveries of arms for hard currency have been an important prop to the Soviet economy. In 1970 hard currency arms sales amounted to about \$250 million. Hard currency arms sales peaked at \$8 billion in 1983, but declined to \$5.6 billion in 1985, which was still about 20 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. As the Soviet Union looks for ways to offset its decline in hard currency earnings brought on by low world oil prices, the pressure for increased Soviet military sales will intensify and will probably result in a more aggressive search for markets in the Third World.

Growth of the Military Assistance Program

- 2. A number of factors spurred the establishment and growth of the Soviet military assistance program over the last 30 years:
 - The breakdown of colonial empires and the increased instability in the Third World resulting

Billion US &

| | Soviet 1982-8ô | NSWP 1962-86 |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Latin America | | |
| Cuba | 6.5 | 1.36 |
| Nicaragua | 1.4 | 0.11 |
| Peru | 0.3 | 0 |
| Middle East | | |
| Syria | 9.5 | 0.98 |
| Libya | 4.8 | 2.47 |
| Algeria | 3.0 | 0.02 |
| Iraq | 15.4 | 2.88 |
| Iran | 0.25 | 0.88 |
| North Yernen | 1.2 | 0.10 |
| South Yemen | 1.8-1.9 | 0.01 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | | |
| Angola | 4.6 | 0.20 |
| Mozambique | 1.3 | 0.04 |
| Zimbabwe | NECL | 0.01 |
| Mali | 0.06 | 0 |
| Guinea | 0.2 | 0 |
| Ethiopia | 3.75-3.9 | 0.020 |
| Madagasear | . 0.11 | 0 |
| Seychelles | 0.05 | 0 |
| Asia | | |
| Alghanistan | 2.5-3.7 | 0.07 |
| India | 6.3 | 0.29 |
| Vietnam | 6.8-7.5 | 0.14 |
| Cambodia | 0.8-0.9 | 0.001 |
| 1.aos | 0.5 | 0 |
| North Korea | 0.9 | 0.15 |
| Approximate total of aid to all LDCs) | 75,0 | 10.2 |

a Values over \$20 million are rounded to the nearest \$5 million; values under \$20 million are rounded to the nearest million. When one value is given, CIA and DIA estimates are the same or an average of the two was taken. When two values are given, CIA and DIA estimates varied by over 10 percent for major recipients tover \$100 million) or by over 20 percent for minor recipients. DIA estimates are given firs

Table 1 a Value of Soviet and NSWP Arms Deliveries to Selected Countries

¹ It is sometimes difficult to appreciate the crucial role that a small amount of hard currency earnings plays in the Soviet economy. Soviet hard currency earnings reached their greatest height in 1983 and 1984 with about \$34 billion per year. This is minute compared to Western countries, yet is vital to the USSR to import agricultural products and Western technology

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from the creation of new states, many of which faced internal and external enemies.

- The unwillingness of Western arms suppliers to upset Third World power balances by shipping sophisticated weapons, or to sell them on terms LDCs could afford.
- Soviet willingness to offer arms to many countries at low prices and on favorable terms of payment.
- The OPEC cartel, whose price escalations enabled several Third World oil-producing countries to purchase large amounts of Soviet arms on a cash basis.
- Moscow's exploitation of the openings provided by the retrenchment of US military activity in the Third World following the Vietnam war.
- 3. One reason for Moscow's success was the conditions under which most developing nations achieved independence. The new nations were inclined to adopt anti-Western positions at home and abroad because of their experience with colonial rule. The USSR, though a superpower, had never been a classic colonial power and was therefore not as suspect in Third World eyes. The Soviets were quick to exploit this opportunity to acquire clients, most of which, while remaining independent in their domestic policies, tended to become dependent on their patron for military assistance.
- 4. Soviet military aid is attractive to many Third World leaders because weapons are readily available at attractive prices. In addition, Soviet military assistance provides them:
 - An opportunity to receive crucial weapons supplies rapidly in crisis situations.
 - An ability to assist embattled allies and insurgencies.
 - An alternative to Western supplies when these are unavailable for political or economic reasons.
 - In some cases, an organizational and security structure that aids them in maintaining power.
- 5. Past experience indicates that Soviet client states need not always continue in that status. For example, Egypt, Indonesia, and Somalia—once major recipients of Soviet military aid—expelled their Soviet advisers and turned to more balanced foreign policies. Other Soviet clients, such as Angola and Mozambique, would

- be less likely to remain so if external threats were eliminated
- 6. Broadly speaking, the Soviet military aid program has evolved over the past 30 years as follows:
 - The Soviet program that began in the mid-1950s was defined by a growing Soviet determination to compete with the Western powers for influence. In 1955 the Egyptians began to purchase Soviet military hardware with Czechoslovakia acting for Moscow. Soviet military and some economic aid was extended to other Middle Eastern countries without many military advisers. Soviet advisers began to be deployed in Third World countries in small numbers in the early 1960s to provide training and assistance. The Soviets first deployed large numbers of military personnel to the Third World in 1962: about 20,000 military advisers and combat forces were sent to Cuba to set up a ballistic missile force. After their setback in the Cuban crisis, most of the troops were withdrawn and only a brigade remained. The next major Soviet deployment of advisers was to Egypt in 1967. The June war of that year resulted in heavy Egyptian military dependence on the Soviet Union and a large rapid increase in the resident Soviet military presence to about 10,000 men in 1970. Until it was expelled in 1972, the Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Egypt not only administered a large aid program, but also was instrumental in overseeing the deployment of Soviet air defense troops and in establishing several Soviet naval and air facilities.
 - In the mid-1970s Moscow expanded its criteria for providing assistance to include receipt of hard currency whenever possible. This phase was given a major push by the rise in oil prices, which enabled the Soviets to increase arms sales for hard currency and to send their own advisers and those of their surrogates (Cubans and East Europeans) to LDCs. The Soviets also demonstrated their continued interest in exploiting new opportunities created in part by the cutback in arms exports by the United States and by regional conflicts. New military aid commitments to Angola and Ethiopia were quickly consummated. and other advisory relationships that had begun in the 1960s, such as those with Cubz and Syria, were expanded.
 - At the beginning of the 1980s, Soviet activities began to be challenged by Western and Chinese

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Table 2
Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World, 1981-86

Numbers of items

| | Near East and South Asia | Sub-Saharan Africa | Latin America | East Asia and Pacific | Total |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------------|--------|
| Tanks/self-propelled guns | 3,720 | 585 | 500 . | 660 | 5.465 |
| Light armor | 6,975 | 1,050 | 200 | 660 | 8,885 |
| Artillery | 3,350 | 1,825 | 800 | 530 | 6.505 |
| Major surface combatants | 22 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 34 |
| Minor surface combatants | 28 | 18 | 39 | 37 | 122 |
| Submarines | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| Missile attack boats | 10 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 26 |
| Supersonie aircraft | 1,060 | 325 | 110 | 210 | 1,705 |
| Subsonie aireroft | 110 | 5 . | 0 | 5 | 1,703 |
| Helicopters | 635 | 185 | 130 | 75 | |
| Other combat aircraft | 235 | 70 | 50 | 90 | L,025 |
| Surface-to-air missiles | 11,300 | 2,300 | 1,300 | 375 | 15,275 |
| This table i | | | | 0.0 | 10,213 |

support of insurgencies against Soviet-backed client regimes. Soviet and Cuban performance in counterinsurgency operations has not been particularly impressive.

- In the mid-1980s the USSR's hard currency earnings and purchasing power began to fall because of: declining prices for Soviet oil and gas exports and the weakening of the dollar, which reduced the ability of oil-producing Third World countries to buy arms. The decline in Soviet hard currency earnings, combined with an increased potential for military action against Soviet clients, is going to create significant problems for the Soviets in their attempt to maintain their influence in some Marxist countries and to improve their military access in the Third World. Moscow will note, however, the Contra investigations within the United States of late 1986 and 1987 and the effect these will have on Washington's willingness to support insurgencies in Angola and Nicaragua

Value of Military Aid

7. The amount of military aid delivered by the Warsaw Pact countries over the last 50 years has been significant. Together, they have delivered over \$225 billion* in arms. In recent years, an estimated one-

third of total military aid was grant aid, including almost all deliveries to Communist LDCs, and the remainder was sold. Of the arms sold, almost a quarter was financed by credits. Table 2 shows the types of major Soviet equipment and the annex shows the value of Soviet arms deliveries to LDCs in recent years

Value of Economic Aid

8. The amount of Soviet economic aid is a small but important complement to military assistance. Whereas Soviet and Warsaw Pact deliveries of military aid in the years 1982 through 1986 totaled about \$82 billion, economic aid was about half, about \$87 billion. Almost three-quarters of the economic aid, about \$5.6 billion a year, went to prop up the Cuban and Vietnamese economies. The remainder was sent to non-Communist LDCs. Economic aid supports many objectives of Soviet foreign policy by:

- Gaining access to markets for new equipment and strategic commodities.
- Increasing the dependency of LDCs for followon support.
- Earning hard currency from the sale of Soviet goods and associated technical services. In the last 10 years, the Soviets alone earned about \$300 million from all non-Communist LDCs for such technical services; about half of that amount was earned by the USSR in oil-producing states by providing development services not necessarily related to aid projects.






Figure 4
Number of Soviet, East European, and Cuban
Military Advisers and Troops in
Communist and Non-Communist LDCs, 1965-85



a Includes all LDCs exclusive of the Soviet combat presence in Afghanistan.

Figure 5 Number of Soviet, East European, and Cuban Economic Advisers and Technicians in LDCs, 1965-85*



"Best estimate for 1985 or 1984 figures.

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 Placing large numbers of Soviet economic advisers in recipient countries, sometimes in influential positions

Personnel Involved in Soviet Military and Economic Aid

- 9. To carry out its Third World activities, Moscow acts with and often directs its East European allies and Cuba (see inset). Since the mid-1970s this cooperation has increased dramatically:
 - The number of military advisers from the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba deployed to LDCs reached over 60,000 (excluding Soviet troops in Afghanistan) (see figure 4 and figure 36 foldout). In the last decade the number of Cuban military advisers has risen dramatically, as has the total Warsaw Pact and Cuban presence.
 - Economic technicians now number 159,500 more than double the number of military advisers—a figure over four times the number deployed in 1975 (see figure 5). East European

countries have relied more on economic ties than military assistance to sustain their relationship with LDCs, and this is reflected in the large rise in numbers of technicians abroad. Their pledges of economic aid have been designed almost solely to finance sales of equipment; these economic aid pledges exceed East European military agreements by almost \$2 billion.

- LDC personnel receiving training in the Warsaw Pact under the economic and military aid programs has increased to over 100,000—almost triple the number of a decade ago (see figure 6). Roughly 7 percent of these received military training. This training enables the Soviets to identify and sometimes assist the career advancement of pro-Soviet personnel who maxultimately assume positions of leadership
- 10. The Cuban role is particularly significant. Moscow's relationship with Havana is probably the closest it has with any country in the Third World. The Cubans have provided large numbers of combat troops for Ethiopia and Angola and, since the early 1980s, a





Figure 6 Number of Communist and Non-Communist LDC Personnel Receiving Training in USSR and Eastern Europe, 1965-85

120.000



*Includes all personnel from LDCs including Communist ones and non-Communist personnel from Africa, Middle East and other regions.

* Best estimate for 1985 or 1984 figures.

military advisory presence in Nicaragua. At this time the Cubans have deployed 45,000 combat troops and/or military advisers, primarily in the following countries: Nicaragua, 2,000 to 2,500; Angola, about 36,000; Ethiopia, 3,000 to 4,000; and Mozambique, 800. Soviet military assistance and economic subsidies also have made it possible for the Cubans to send 20,000 economic advisers to countries in pursuit of both Havana's and Moscow's revolutionary goals. Cuba also hosts some 15,000 trainees from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Namibia, South Yemen, Ghana, and Nicaragua

II. The Function of MAGs in Soviet Military Assistance Policy

- 11. Military advisory groups generally administer Soviet military assistance in those states where the programs have become fairly extensive. The discussion below will examine the unique functions of MAGs and how they further Soviet national security objectives:
 - In some key states, where they see potential for greater economic or strategic gain, the Soviets

Soviet Direction of Allied Efforts in LDCs

We have little reporting on how the burden is shared among Bloc countries and Cuba, but from their conduct it is clear that the Soviets encourage a division of responsibilities. Cuban combat troops and advisers are more acceptable in some Third World countries than are those of the USSR. The East Europeans, in contrast, have assumed virtually no combat role, nor are they likely to in the future. In addition, we believe they do not provide any grant aid; their assistance is primarily for mostic and for greater influence in the Third World.

In contrast, the Soviets probably provide little direction to Vietnam, which acts primarily in its own interest. North Korea's arms sales are also probably not coordinated with Moscow. In fact, Pyongyang's sales generally compete with the Soviets

seek to establish a large, widely skilled group of advisers who structure the clients' armed forces, oversee and support client military operations, and look after broader Soviet security interests in the client country.

- In many cases the Soviet goal is to establish a MAG of sufficient size to guarantee extensive influence—in some cases even control—over the client state's armed forces and thereby over client security policy.
- 12. Soviet MAGs are tightly integrated into the Soviet command structure, not just to maintain strict control over any Soviet presence on foreign soil, but also to allow for their direct use by higher command authorities. In some LDCs the Soviet contingents are so large the advisers have broad responsibilities and autonomy, to the point where they constitute a Soviet military colony in the client state.

Planning and Administration

- 13. Responsibility for planning and administering military advisory groups lies with the Tenth Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (CKES). These two organizations share responsibility for the day-to-day management of advisory assistance to Third World countries. Apparently, the Tenth Directorate determines policy and prepares for negotiations with clients while the GKES is responsible for administering established contracts
- 14. The process that leads to a formal military assistance contract between the USSR and a Third World state will vary depending on the extent of supplies or services contracted as well as on the sense

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Figure 7. African military trainees in East Germany (note: photo is montage)



Figure 8. Soviet MAG headquarters in Damascus, Syria

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of urgency with which an arrangement must be made. The Soviet political leadership has ultimate decision-making authority, but the extent of its involvement will be governed by the importance of the commitment

15. In general, the process unfolds as follows:

- After receiving a request for assistance from a potential client or a directive from the Soviet political leadership, the Tenth Directorate prepares a feasibility report on military assistance to the requester, which includes economic and political information as well as an assessment of the client's military status. The GKES provides specific information on potential financial and contractual considerations of the proposed deal.
- —With this information, the Soviet Government, usually led by the Defense Minister, enters into discussions with representatives of the prospective client. Any political conditions associated with granting military aid would be discussed at this time.
- When preliminary agreement is reached, the request for assistance is submitted to the Politburo for the first time. The Politburo passes the agreement back to the participating agencies as a directive. At this point, according to the description of former Council of Ministers Chairman Alexey Kosygin, specific items or requests are considered in detail by all the agencies that have an interest. In particular:
 - The General Staff stipulates the effectiveness of specific hardware and advisory aid proposals for the client.
 - GKES provides its consideration of the specific economic costs and benefits of the deal for the USSR.
 - The Military Industrial Commission provides an appraisal of the agreement's impact on Soviet defense industry capabilities.
 - The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Gosplan assess the impact of the proposed military assistance on the internal Soviet economy.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the Central Committee provide an assessment of the internal political implications of the proposed agreement.
- -- The recommendations of these agencies are forwarded to the Politburo, which considers the proposal a second time.

- Once formally cleared by the political leadership, the proposal is presented to the client and detailed negotiations begin between high-level political and military leaders of the two countries. As Moscow's point men, the Ministry of Defense and the CKES hammer out the detailed contractual arrangements with the client representatives.
- The decision that emerges from these discussions is submitted to the Politburo a final time for approval; in turn, it is submitted to the client government for its full review and approval. Any further contractual details are subsequently negotiated by the Tenth Main Directorate and the GKES.

Role of the General Staff

16. The functions of the Soviet General Staff's Tenth Main Directorate in military assistance fall into three main categories: planning, program review, and administration. Its planning responsibilities include:

- Review of the military aid requirements of the client.
- Preparation of military aid studies for the Soviet leadership (supporting both negotiations with visiting delegations and visits abroad by the military and political leadership).
- Preparation of military aid plans as inputs to annual and five-year economic plans, as well as inputs to annual, five-year, and longer-term military plans

17. The Directorate's program responsibilities involve review of military aid requirements of clients and effectiveness of Soviet military aid programs in client countries, oversight of contract negotiations, coordination of equipment deliveries, and coordination of aid-related activities of other government agencies (intelligence, press coverage, and so forth). The Directorate administers the selection and appointment of personnel and the selection and training of foreign nationals in Soviet military schools

18. All indications are that the Soviet military leadership follows the political authorities in determining which countries are to receive military assistance. The military then pragmatically attempts to implement whatever military assistance program has been agreed upon. The military does evaluate client countries in terms of their strategic importance (for example, access to facilities) but, in general, it does not get involved in the larger foreign policy implications of a Soviet presence in a client country

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19. Today the largest Soviet military advisory groups are located in the key states of Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam. The importance of the Soviet commitment to these countries is reflected in the number of advisers, rank of the MAG chiefs, and supply of military equipment. Payoffs for the Soviets can be high. In Vietnam the Soviets have bartered substantial military assistance and an expanded MAG for a major military base in a strategically important area. In Cuba, Soviet advisers have established a relationship with the Cuban military that allows them to work effectively together in several Third World countries such as Ethiopia and Angola. Finally, in Afghanistan, the Soviets dominate their client's armed forces even more than they do those in Eastern Europe

20. In a number of countries, instruction—provided by MAGs on the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment, operations planning, and counsel on counterinsurgency methods or restructure of the armed forces—allows Moscow to reap benefits both overt and hidden. By working to increase the dependence of the client armed forces on its advisors and technicians, usually in conjunction with large deliveries of advanced weapons, Moscow has frequently been able to deploy greater numbers of military advisers, to send other kinds of advisers (such as intelligence specialists from the KGB), and to extract other concessions as well. These include:

- Communications facilities and access to air and naval facilities.
- Increased sales of weapons for hard currency.
- Use of MAGs to provide intelligence, garner allies, and read the pulse of military discontent in states where the military coup is the predominant method of political change. Such relations have provided the Soviets links to officers who might seize power in the future.
- Manipulation of local politics. Advisory relationships provide unique access within the hierarchies of client governments.
- Evaluations of Soviet and Western military hardware.
- Extension of services to insurgents amenable to Moscow, such as the African National Congress and the South-West Africa People's Organization through the use of their MAGs in client countries such as Angola.
- Political indoctrination of client armed forces.
 Because of the close relationship between high

level officers in the client LDCs and Soviet advisers, the Soviets can make contact with rising military leaders. The Soviet MAG nominates client military officers for long-term study (three to five years) in the USSR, and the Soviets attempt to win their allegiance during their stay by manipulating the process.

21. At times, there is conflict within the Soviet military leadership over the extent of support of Third World clients. Conflict generally arises over:

- The wisdom of providing advanced Soviet technology, such as late-model Soviet aircraft, to countries whose air forces are not well trained or where there is a possibility of compromise of technology. Objections such as these are sometimes overcome by the Soviet need for hard currency and the need for Third World clients such as those in the Middle East to have aircraft capable of matching aircraft provided by the West to neighboring opposing countries.
- The military or strategic value of any client that cannot pay for weapons versus the gains the Soviets may make in increasing influence in any region or in gaining access to air and naval facilities.

How the Soviets Gain and Maintain a Foothold

22. While military supply relationships between the Soviets and Third World countries have commenced under a variety of economic, political, and military circumstances, the development of large MAGs usually has resulted from the heightened sense of military need associated with an internal or external threat to client countries. For example, the large MAG in Syria has been the direct outgrowth of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The MAG in Cuba has prospered from the perceived threat from the United States, and the MAG in Vietnam built up after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979. Iraq is an exception; the Soviet MAG there has not grown significantly as a result of conflict with Iran because Moscow tried in 1980 to cut off arms deliveries to show its displeasure with Iraq for starting the war with Iran. Since the embargo was lifted, the number of Soviet advisers in Iraq is estimated to have returned to its prewar level but has not grown, despite large arms shipments

Fostering Dependence

23. Very often a dependent relationship develops between armed forces of the client and their Soviet

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advisers, especially when the advisers are assisting with ongoing combat efforts. As Moscow responds to urgent requests for materiel or services, the number of advisers and technical personnel increases and the Soviet foothold typically grows. New weapons, in turn, require more training and maintenance assistance, and larger Soviet contingents may require more developed communications and logistic support. In most cases, the increases in MAG personnel are likely to endure even if the need for training decreases.

Strategems To Perpetuate the Soviet Presence

24. Soviet policy for arms transfers and advisory services is developed and carried out with the intention of perpetuating a Soviet presence in the client country, rather than promoting the self-reliance of the clients. As a result, no Soviet MAG has yet been voluntarily disbanded. MAG personnel seek to perpetuate their stay in a country in order to position themselves to make additional gains. Several major aid recipients have contended that the Soviets intentionally slow their training regimen and introduce more sophisticated equipment from time to time as a means of justifying a continued large Soviet presence. The USSR has removed its advisers when explicitly told to do so, as was the case with Egypt in the mid-1970s and with Somalia in 1977, but the Soviets prefer to adapt their services rather than reduce their advisory numbers. For example, despite the increasing skill of the Cuban military there has been no reduction in Soviet advisory strength there

25. Moscow also manipulates these relations in order to increase its political penetration of the client government. The Soviets especially seek liaison in the intelligence sphere; access to the host country's intelligence organization allows the Soviets to penetrate the client military and thus neutralizes one of the client government's checks on Soviet subversive activities.

Problems Between Soviet MAGs and Host Governments

26. Because of these conflicts and Soviet strategems there is frequently tension between supplier and client. There are local issues as well. One is the aloofness of the Soviets; another is the chronic, often acerbic, criticism of the host country's military forces by the Soviet advisers. (At one time or another officers in most Third World countries have reported Soviet disdain and racist attitudes.) Finally, the performance of Soviet MAG personnel has often been found wanting by the countries they serve. But all of this rarely affects the relationship if the clients' arms needs are



Figure 9. Families often accompany Soviet advisers. Some wives (these in Angola) may perform military intelligence functions.

great enough and if Soviet terms of assistance are more favorable than those given by the West

LDC Efforts To Limit Soviet Penetration

27. Although many Third World countries are eager to obtain Soviet arms because of their comparatively better prices or availability, few wish to host a Soviet military colony in their country unless forced by circumstances to do so Numerous LDCs presume that they can bring in Soviet military advisers and utilize their services to improve their own military capability but effectively isolate the Soviets and limit their influence. Some clients, like India, Algeria, and Zambia, are quite successful in this effort; some are not: for example, the Soviets are heavily involved in military planning and policy in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola

III. Soviet Military Assistance to Third World Countries

Latin America

28. Soviet objectives in the region are to undermine US influence and, in the long term, promote conditions conducive to revolutionary change. Moscow is positioning itself for the future by supporting the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua by supplying arms, training, and advisers to states and revolutionary movements, and by making incremental advances in a variety of political, economic, and cultural spheres

29. For the near term, the Soviets will concentrate their efforts on Cuba and Central America. Although the removal of the current constraints on Sandinista expansionism would raise South American fears of Soviet influence in the region, most governments would also regard such developments as a significant setback for Washington


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30. Cuba's Unique Role in Soviet Third World Policy. Over the last quarter century the USSR-Cuban relationship has evolved into the closest the Soviets have throughout the Third World. The Soviet military presence in Cuba began in 1960. By mid-1962, in addition to deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and light bombers, the Soviets had established four mobile armored combat groups. Full air defense coverage of the island was provided by 24 SA-2 Guideline sites controlled, if not completely manned, by the Soviets. By October 1962, Soviet pilots manned 39 MIG-21 Fishbeds, which flew air defense cover for Cuba, and Soviet air defense troops operated an air surveillance radar system without Cuban participation. At that time, the Soviet Navy also manned 12 Komar-class guided-missile patrol boats and at least four Samlet coastal defense cruise missile sites. After the 1962 missile crisis, the Soviets shipped the missiles and bombers home and turned most of the remaining military equipment on the island over to Cuba.

31. Although a Soviet MAG almost surely existed in Cuba before the 1962 missile crisis, it probably was relatively small and consisted of officers assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service headquarters in an advisory capacity. In 1963, as the Soviets withdrew many combat and combat support units and turned over their equipment to Cuban replacement units, the MAG complement and activities apparently expanded. The Soviet brigade probably has been maintained there since the early 1960s:

32. The Soviets maintain a 7,000- to 7,300-man military contingent in Cuba: 2,600 to 2,900 in the combat brigade; 2,500 to 2,800 in the MAG; and 1,900 to 2,100 KGB, GRU, and military service troops manning intelligence installations. Soviet pilots also fly Soviet TU-95 and TU-142 aircraft that deploy to Cuba from the USSR to monitor US military activity. Moscow values Cuban territory as a base for intelligence collection against the United States. The Soviets also gain the strategic benefits discussed in section IV below

33. In 1976 and 1977, when Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet pilots flew in Cuba to maintain the operational strength of the latter's air force. The maximum Soviet contingent probably consisted of approximately 38 pilots in 1977. Today, occasional flights by Soviets in Cuban aircraft are noted over Cuba but are believed to consist of flight



proficiency activity by pilots assigned to the Cuban pilot schools

34. Deliveries of new types of weapons to Cuba depend on Cuban needs and Soviet perceptions of the readiness of the United States to respond to provocative armaments deliveries by Moscow. The USSR appears committed to strengthening Cuba's capability to defend against an air attack or possible naval blockade, but it presumably understands that the delivery or deployment to Cuba of weapons that the United States regards as offensive would cause a serious crisis, as it did in 1962 and, to a lesser extent, in 1970 (when the Soviets deployed barges there capable of servicing Soviet nuclear-powered submarines)

35. Soviet military assistance—in most cases, free has fluctuated, but, since 1982, has amounted to about \$1.3 billion annually-and has transformed Cuba's military into one of the largest and best equipped forces in the Third World (see figure 10). But the costs to Moscow of its relationship with Cuba are much higher. Over the last three years the Soviets have had to subsidize the Cuban economy with an average of \$4.5 billion each year. In the future the Cubans cannot count on a continued expansion of Soviet largess, especially in the economic arena. The economic costs of Soviet support to Cuba are becoming a serious concern to Moscow, and it is likely that Moscow will place stricter limits on this aid, pressing Havana to make much needed internal adjustments. Military deliveries, which generally have not been linked to

20 Top Socret economic performance, are expected to ebb and flow through the present modernization effort

36. To date, Moscow has rationalized its economic aid costs. Although Cuban spending and economic problems have created some friction between them, we see little evidence that either country is backing off from its commitment to support key clients or to exploit new opportunities in the Third World as they arise. Indeed, both Gorbachev and Castro have reiterated their willingness to bear the increasing burden of maintaining their influence in the Third World, particularly regarding their allies in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Cuba and the USSR mutually benefit from their cooperation in the developing areas and still view support of "movements of national liberation" and consolidation of Marxist regimes in power as integral to their struggle against the West. Castro's disproportionately large role in world affairs and his ability to cause problems for the United States in the Third World will continue to rest on massive levels of Soviet economic and military aid. In fact, Cuban dependence has grown to the point that we believe Castro would be hard pressed to refuse a Soviet request to send military personnel to an endangered pro-Soviet regime in the Third World

S7. We believe Castro's revolutionary zeal and more aggressive pursuit of socialist "internationalist" goals will continue to be conditioned by Moscow's desire to avoid a serious confrontation with the United States in a region that is peripheral to vital Soviet interests. Castro has, at times, chafed at Soviet constraints on his policy options, but, in the final analysis, he recognizes that he has accomplished far more in the Third World with Soviet assistance than he could have without it. Given Cuba's deep dependence on the Soviet Union, we do not foresee a major Soviet-Cuban fissure over Third World issues in the near future.

88. Nicaragua. The total Soviet presence in Nicaragua is quite limited: about 50 to 60 military advisers, 250 civilian technicians, and some 40 diplomats. Until late 1984 large shipments of Soviet arms for Nicaragua were delivered on ships from Algeria, Bulgaria, and Cuba. Since then, the Soviets have made direct deliveries and, in 1986, delivered in their own ships the great majority of all military materiel

39. Even though the number of Soviet military personnel in country is low, their contacts with Nicaraguan counterparts could afford them an opportunity to influence the Sandinista military establishment. Soviet-Nicaraguan relations are formal. Fraternization

is nil, and, to date, there has been no credible evidence that the Soviets have participated in actual combat operations. Soviet personnel still assemble helicopters and light utility airplanes delivered to Nicaragua and test-fly the helicopters after assembly. But reporting suggests that Soviet technicians have not undertaken the normal maintenance and repair work with those aircraft beyond the warranty period (turning this iob over to Cuban maintenance personnel).

40. The Cubans, however, maintain a significant military assistance contingent in Nicaragua of 2,000 to 2,500 men:

- Cuban military personnel are attached to some Nicaraguan units, and their presence is well established at training centers and support bases.
- They have participated actively in combat actions undertaken by the Nicaraguan units to which they are assigned; they are not solely performing in an advisory capacity. Currently, however, their participation in combat is rare.

41. By the end of 1986 the Nicaraguan Air Force had received at least 60 helicopters, including at least 45 MI-8 or MI-17 assault transports and about 12 MI-25 gunships. From September 1985 through 1986 the Nicaraguans lost ten of their MI-8 and MI-17 helicopters for various reasons; some of these helicopters were flown by Cuban pilots. Nicaragua will ask Moscow to replace the losses

42. Since the fall of 1985, Nicaragua's Soviet-built helicopters have made a growing contribution to the war effort against anti-Sandinista insurgents. They have increased the government's mobility and firepower and have made it more difficult for the insurgents to mass forces and hold towns, even temporarily. Nonetheless, maintenance problems, command and control limitations, difficult terrain, and bad weather will continue to reduce their effectiveness. If the insurgents learn to employ mobile SAMs effectively, the helicopters' advantage would be further reduced. The helicopter force is still inadequate to meet all military needs, but it has increased Sandinista tactical flexibility. We believe Soviet and Cuban efforts will continue to improve Nicaraguan counterinsurgency capabilities. However, helicopters and other advanced equipment will require even greater Nicaraguan dependence on Cuban and Soviet aid and technicians

43. Soviet deliveries of military equipment have been heavy over the last four years (see figure 11). Only substantial increases of Soviet deliveries of economic aid, including oil, have averted the collapse of the Nicaraguan economy. Even though Moscow has indicated that most of its deliveries are covered by credits, cash-short Managua probably will be unable to make any substantial payments on its debts to the Bloc countries, and the Soviets probably do not expect to be repaid any time soon. Warsaw Pact economic aid has grown from less then \$200 million in 1982 to \$500 million in 1986. Even though the Warsaw Pact countries have granted new credits, they will not be

Moscow's support will probably have to continue to replace the reduction of aid from Western nations. In 1981 Western multilateral and bilateral aid reached a total of almost \$500 million. It is expected to decline to less than \$150 million by the end of 1986

sufficient to halt the decline in Nicaragua's economy.

44. Peru. Although the United States served as Peru's principal source of Army and Air Force materiel and training throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the military government that ruled from 1968 to 1975 pursued a stridently nationalistic, Third World-oriented foreign policy, which severely strained relations with the United States. Relations were further exacerbated by the US refusal to sell tanks and sophisticated fighter aircraft to Latin America. Peruvian seizure of US fishing boats resulted in a cutoff of US military aid in 1969. At the same time, Peru sought closer relations with the Soviet Bloc and in 1973 received its first Soviet military advisers and major shipments of arms

45. The Soviet military assistance program gained momentum and produced a growing Peruvian arms dependence on the Soviet Union even as Peruvian-US military relations were improving after 1975. To date Peru is the only South American country to have purchased major Soviet arms, to send its military personnel to the USSR for training (about 2,000 since the early 1970s), and to have Soviet military advisers in country (about 115). The most visible aspect of the Soviet-Peruvian relationship is the extensive Soviet military sales and technical assistance program. The Soviets have provided about half of all Peruvian military deliveries since 1973, about \$1.5 billion; all of the weadoury has gone to the Army and Air Force.

46. So far, we believe that the Soviet assistance program has not provided Moscow with any demonstrable influence over decisionmaking in the Peruvian armed forces, and the current working relationship

Figure 11
Current Value of
Soviet Arms Deliveries to
Nicaragua, 1982-86

4,000

2,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000

3,000




Figure 12. Soviet-supplied, Nicaraguan M1-25 Hind helicopter.

between the Soviets and the Peruvians is strained. Soviets are often perceived as uncooperative and insensitive to the Peruvian interests. The Peruvians have gone to some lengths to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. However, we believe severe budget restrictions, the relatively low cost of Soviet arms, the lack of alternative sources for spare parts, and highly favorable financing terms will continue to make Soviet weaponry attractive to the Peruvian military.



Figure 13. MI-8 Hip troop carrier helicopters of the Peruvian Air Force sit in flight-ready position at a Peruvian airfield

Africa, South of the Sahara

47. In this region the Soviets and the Cubans are facing some of their greatest challenges. At the same time they have an opportunity to exploit and, in some cases, generate instability in the region; to foster Marxist regimes; to gain greater access to commodities for internal consumption or for barter for hard currency; and, potentially, to deny or cause disruptions of the deliveries of strategic materials to the West. In the early 1970s, the Soviets focused on Guinea, Mali, and Somalia. Over the last decade they have concentrated on Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia


48. The Cuban role in Sub-Saharan Africa gives Soviet arms policies a new dimension. Africa has given Castro the opportunity to become an important political actor on a global scale. Since 1975 the Cuban presence there has grown rapidly and includes some 49,000 military and civilian personnel. The presence of Cuban combat troops in Sub-Saharan Africa presents Cuba with opportunities to exert influence on the internal politics of the host countries and provides a military presence on the continent, limited numbers of which could be moved to other countries that might request assistance. Cuban intelligence and security advisers stationed in numerous African countries provide Havana with prime sources of information and influence

49. Angola. From the time of Angola's independence in November 1975 to 1982 the size of the Soviet MAC grew to 500 men. Over the last three years, it

has expanded further to about 1,200 men. The Soviets are assisted by 500 East Germans and a 36,000-man Cuban military contingent (including some 28,000 combat troops) that backs the Angolan Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support services, pilots jet fighters, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operation.

50. The role of Angola's key backers has grown since August 1983, when the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) took the town of Cangamba in a major defeat for Luanda that shocked the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) leadership; UNITA's advances challenged Moscow's credibility as an ally and military patron. As a result, the MPLA requested more Communist military assistance. Soviet arms deliveries to Angola then rose sharply. Since then deliveries have included MIG-23 Flogger and SU-22 Fitter fighterbombers (as well as additional MIG-21 Fishbed fighters and MI-25 Hind attack helicopters); substantial quantities of antiaircraft and SAM equipment; and large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. From 1982 to 1986, Soviet deliveries amounted to \$4.8 billion (see figure 14).

- 51. Functions performed by the Soviet MAG through the early 1980s include:
 - Planning, coordinating, and supervising the activities of all Soviet military advisers, technicians, and air transport assets in country.



- Advising the Angolan Ministry of Defense, overseeing and maintaining the operational readiness of Angolan military operations and training.
- Assembling, testing, and maintaining equipment too complex for the Angolans or for which they have not yet been adequately trained. While Soviet pilots have on rare occasions flown combat missions. Cuban pilots do so on a routine basis.
- Playing a key role in setting up the Angolan air defense system, which incorporates radars, various surface-to-air missiles, and late-model fighter aircraft.
- Probably monitoring the training of African National Congress (ANC) and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) insurgents in Angola
- 52. Soviet and Cuban support for the MAG has provided Moscow with important benefits:
 - A foothold in southern Africa and access to Angolan ports for Soviet naval vessels, naval repair ships and replenishment facilities, and to airfields for limited deployments of Soviet longrange reconnaissance aircraft for patrols over the South Atlantic Ocean.
 - An opportunity, to educate large numbers of Angolaa youth and to indoctrinate those judged amenable to ideological commitments.

- Training facilities to advance the Soviet contribution to the training of insurgents seeking to gain power in Namibia and South Africa.
- A testing ground for the Cubans on new Soviet weapons systems prior to their introduction into Cuba.
- -- Hard currency for arms deliveries. Until the drop in oil prices, Angola paid Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries about \$1 billion a year in hard currency for arms, training assistance, Cuban combat forces, and other expenses. A drastic cut in Angolan earnings has forced a moratorium on Angolan payments for arms to the Soviets.

53. The Soviet position in Angola is strengthened by the almost total reliance on Soviet-supplied weaponry and by the Cuban garrison, without which the embattled regime fears it would fall to the UNITA insurgents. It is difficult to assess whether the Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola are so pervasive that they could prevent a turn to the West on the part of the Angolan leadership. The leadership itself seems to believe that if it would hazard such a turn, the Soviets and Cubans would immediately pull out, leading to a UNITA victory

54. Mozambique. The Soviets began supporting the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRE-LIMO) insurgents against the Portuguese in the late 1960s. Upon coming to power in 1975, FRELIMO began to transform itself from a Marxist-oriented body into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party on the Soviet model. The Soviets extended substantial military assistance and established a MAG by early 1978, and the East Germans formed and trained the indigenous internal security service. The Soviets provide administrative and political advisers to help form and run the government. Mozambique signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR within two years after independence and also has treaties of cooperation with East European states

55. Soviet advisers are assigned to principal officers of the Armed Forces General Staff, the military commanders of each of the 10 Mozambican provinces, the nine ground force brigades, air force/air defense units, and the major military training centers. The largest number of Soviet advisers/specialists is apparently assigned to ground force brigades.

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56. The MAC is engaged in a number of activities in country. Its main duties are to:

- Supervise, organize, and train Mozambique's military forces along Soviet lines.
- Plan combat operations against the insurgents, and monitor the performance of government forces and the course of war.
- Arrange the assembly, turnover, and maintenance of Soviet military equipment provided to the government.
- Arrange for selection of qualified local personnel to be sent to the USSR for training.
- --- Administer and fly Soviet transport aircraft for intra-Mozambican shuttle flights

57. Although the late President Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in March 1984 in an effort to weaken the RENAMO opposition (Mozambique National Resistance) and to expand ties to the West, there is little likelihood that Mozambique will soon be able to reduce its military dependence on the Soviets. RENAMO continues to pose a serious threat to the regime, and Mozambique must rely on the Kremlin's military assistance. Although the Soviets were stunned by Machel's signing of an accord with South Africa, they continued military assistance, with ne apparent reduction in either the roles or importance of the MAG

58. Although the Soviets have provided about \$1.7 billion worth of arms since 1977 and have deployed some 800 military advisers of their own, their position in the country weakened somewhat. After 10 years of socialism, further undermined by the growing insurgency, Mozambique's economic crisis has reached nearly unmanageable proportions; industry has collapsed and export earnings have fallen below \$100 million a year since 1984. As long as the insurgency continues, the economic and political situation in Mozambique will remain precarious

59. The new leadership probably views the relationship with Moscow as essential, being based on Soviet willingness to provide arms, to train and educate large numbers of Mozambicans, to furnish security and communication services, and to supply a modest amount of economic aid. But Mozambique also recognizes that total reliance on Soviet patronage is impossible because Mozambican problems are too formidable and the Soviet responses inadequate. Machel's successor. President Chissano. has sought a

middle ground—an accommodation with South Africa, economic aid from the West, and military assistance from other African states, while still retaining a military relationship with Moscow

60. The modest Soviet economic aid has had little effect on reversing the economic slide, and Soviet weapons and tactical advice are largely inappropriate to the guerrilla war being waged in the countryside. Nonetheless, the Soviets have maintained a flow of arms to Mozambique and preached the standard message on "South African and Western potential for treachery." In early 1985 the Soviets sent a pair of IL-38 ASW aircraft to Maputo. These aircraft flew no operational sorties from Mozambique, and the 10-day deployment of IL-38s has not been repeated.

61. Moscow's expectations over the near term are probably modest. The Soviets are counting on Mozambique's continuing need for Soviet military assistance to maintain their position, although the level of military assistance has fallen since 1983. FRELIMO's search for alternative sources of military support has yielded little so far. Certainly, the small training program granted by the United Kingdom, the modest offers of Portugal and France, and the important but still small contribution of approximately 6,000 troops from Zimbabwe do not add up to a viable alternative to Soviet arms, advisers, and training programs. In the current difficult situation military support is essential.

62. Zimbabwe. Until recently Harare's relations with Moscow had been proper but restrained. Prime Minister Mugabe's suspicions of Soviet intentions in southern Africa, and Moscow's close ties to a rival nationalist party during the war for Zimbabwean independence acted as a barrier to improving relations. Zimbabwean-Soviet relations have improved, however, as the Soviets have cut their ties to the opposition and as Mozambique's security situation has declined. Despite Mugabe's wariness of the USSR, his commitment to keeping the railway, road, and pipeline open through Mozambique (the Beira Corridor) and his growing fears of threats from South Africa and RENAMO guerrillas in Mozambique have prompted him to seek Soviet military assistance. In late October 1986, a high-level delegation went to Moscow to negotiate an arms purchase for Zimbabwean forces fighting insurgents in Mozambique and to bolster that Harare's air defenses negotiations have been difficult, with the Soviets apparently unwilling to offer Zimbabwe concessionary terms. Zimbabwe has also been considering purchases of Western arm

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Soviet Military Assistance to the African National Congress

Soviet policy toward South Africa meshes with the policies of other southern African states whose governments are generally sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), the most prominent of the organizations attempting to overthrow the South African Covernment. For example, a portion of the Soviet military assistance to some of those states is channeled toward the arming and training of the ANC. South Africa often retaliates against its neighbors for their support, to the ANC, creating a perceived need for improved self-defense and military assistance this is an opening the Soviets can exploit

The Soviets probably calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view the South African Communist Party (SACP)—a protege of the Soviet Communist Party, which funds and guides it—as a good means for influencing the ANC. Despite differences, Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region, deserving of financial, political, and military support. However, the Soviets suspect that the ANC leadership is ideologically unreliable

Soviet support to the ANC is across the board and through multiple channels and seems designed both to enhance the influence of the SACP within the ANC and to maintain Soviet influence over the broader ANC leadership. The Soviet Bloc provides much of the military assistance received by the ANC, mainly small arms, landmines, and other insurgency weapons, but is much less generous regarding nonmilitary aid. In both cases, we cannot estimate specific dollar amounts of this assistance

63. Mali. The Soviet military presence in Mali has turned into a marriage of inconvenience for its hosts. It began in the 1960s and peaked in the mid-1970s. Since 1972 some \$1.1 billion worth of arms has been delivered by the USSR. About 60 Soviet military advisers assisted by civilian technicians have been involved in constructing and maintaining airfields. These fields could improve Soviet airlift capabilities, via Mali and Algeria, to western and southern Africa. Recent Soviet construction has lengthened airstrips in the country to 3,000 meters—long enough to accommodate large, high-performance aircraft. Mali uses the airfields to maintain its own air communications

64. The Malians complain that, although a significant part of their military assistance is paid for by indigenous gold production, the Soviets do not instruct Malian technicians on the repair and maintenance procedures for the missiles and aircraft they have supplied. This makes the Malians unnecessarily dependent upon the Soviets and it costs the Malians significant extra hard currency.

65. Although Mali has expressed an interest in acquiring Western arms, the expense probably makes any significant acquisitions unlikely for the foreseeable future. Soviet interest in access to Malian airfields for contingency purposes makes it probable that Moscow will try to provide aid at terms very favorable to Mali. Mali will continue to rely on Soviet military assistance, but the government remains suspicious of Soviet intentions in Mali and in West Africa as a whole.

66. Guinea. In the heyday of Soviet-Guinean relations in the 1970s the Soviets enjoyed significant access for their ships to Guinea's ports, and Bear reconnaissance aircraft periodically deployed to airfields there. In return the Soviets delivered a substantial amount of military aid, developed bauxite mines within the country, and greatly enlarged the fishing industry.

67. In 1977 Conakry decreed that Soviet reconnaissance aircraft could no longer use Guinea's airfields. Soviet ships still use Conakry for berthing and Soviet transport aircraft transit Conakry en route to Angola. The Soviet position in Guinea is still substantial because of Moscow's extensive involvement in key military and some economic sectors. This involvement does not guarantee political influence, nor will it regain for Moscow the ability to deploy military aircraft, but it does underpin the Soviet position in Guinea and makes a sudden reversal of its position unlikely.

68. Moscow has been Conakry's primary source of military equipment and training since independence. The Guinean armed forces operate various types of Soviet equipment, including MIG-21 fighters (of which eight more were delivered in 1986), MI-8 Hip helicopters, and medium tanks and armored vehicles; they are aided by about 50 Soviet advisers. Many Guinean officers have received training in the USSR. While Conakry may seek to diversify its arms inventory somewhat, Guinea's need for Soviet spare parts and maintenance support and its poor prospects for obtaining favorable credit terms in the West should continue to ensure near total military dependence on the USSR

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Somalia: A Former Client

Although the Soviet MAG was expelled from Somalia in 1977 when the USSR refused to support Mogadishu in its war with Ethiopia, its role there was a classic case history of the evolution of Soviet military assistance in a Third World country. From 1969 to 1977, Soviet military advisers played an important role, and in that period the Soviet MAG apparently operated in Somalia with little or no control or interference from the Soviet Embassy

The authority of the Somali Government over the MAC was also minimal: Soviet advisers could come and go as they wished because neither passports or visas were required. These immigration mechanisms might have been useless in any event because MAC personnel were said to arrive on Soviet aircraft at the Soviet part of the international airport at Mogadishu. Even President Siad was said to be unaware of how many Soviet advisers were in Somalia. The MAC continued to operate with a surprising degree of autonomy even after the months of tension that led up to the beginning of the 1977 Ogaden war

The approximately 1,500 Soviet advisers in Somalia helped support Soviet naval and air operations from facilities there. The USSR constructed several facilities in Somalia, including some in Berbera to support the Indian Ocean Squadron. These consisted of a missile storage and handling facility, a POL storage depot, an airbase capable of accommodating all types of aircraft, and a naval communications facility. The Soviets staged

IL-38 May ASW aircraft from the airfield at Hargeysa, and TU-95 Bear Daircraft once visited an airfield outside Mogadishu.

During the time of the MAC's preeminence, Somalia was almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts, training, and periodic maintenance of virtually the entire inventory of Somali military equipment. In addition, Soviet advisers provided training at schools in the USSR and within Somali units

During their stay in Somalia, there was only minimal off-duty contact between Soviet military personnel and their Somali counterparts. Contact was inhibited by the fact that the MAC personnel lived in facilities separated from the general population. The Soviets had exclusive recreational facilities, used private cars and buses for transportation, used a portion of a public beach reserved solely for them, and socialized with each other in places like the "Russian Club" located in Mogadishu. By 1975, the lack of fraternization and the Soviets overbearing attitude had engendered Somali resentment to such a degree that Soviet nationals had to travel in groups at night for fear of attack

The expulsion of the Soviets in 1977 contributed to Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia. The advisers had been an important element of the Somali logistic and maintenance system, and their removal hampered Somali military operations. In addition, Soviet advisers had provided secure communications for the entire Somali military

69. The Soviets appear confident that Conakry's turn to the West will not jeopardize their important interests—limited access to facilities, landing rights for Soviet military air transport (VTA) flights, and extensive imports of Guinea's bauxite and fish. The Sovietrum bauxite mine pays for nearly half of Guinea's \$236 million debt to the USSR and supplies one-eighth of Soviet bauxite needs. In view of the 1984 collapse of the bauxite industry, Guinea is no doubt happy to have the USSR as a market for its production. Moscow recently provided Guinea with its largest economic credits ever—\$140 million worth—to assuage some of Conakry's previous complaints on the lack of Soviet assistance

70. Ethiopia. The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie by the military in 1974, the subsequent deterioration of once-strong US-Ethiopian relations, and the Soviet shift of priorities in the region led to the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia. The Soviets turned down the first Ethiopian requests for arms in 1975 because of uncertainties over the staying power of the military

council and a fear of upsetting their longstanding patronage of neighboring Somalia. But by the end of 1976 the Soviets were convinced that Ethiopia was too attractive an opportunity to pass up. A small initial arms deal was followed by a succession of others, marking the principal avenue of entree for the Soviets. The Soviets began to send military advisers to Ethiopia in 1977 even before they were expelled from Somalia. Mengistu's purges of his more moderate colleagues in the ruling council, and the elimination of civilian opponents in the Red Terror of 1977-78 established Mengistu as the sole leader of the country and gave further impetus to the movement toward Marxism. Ethiopia is now one of the USSR's staunchest Third World clients

71. The Soviets provided arms to Ethiopia in 1977, and the invasion by Somalia in that year led to urgent Ethiopian requests for more arms from the USSR. The Soviets responded with air and sea !ifts and arranged with Castro for the dispatch of Cuban combat forces to Ethiopia. Massive arms deliveries and the infusion

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
of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops turned back the Somalis.

72. Soviet military advisers assist in planning major Ethiopian military operations against Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents in the north. Ethiopian military leaders frequently criticize or sometimes ignore tactical advice. To a lesser extent the Soviets are involved in an advisory role at the major headquarters in the Ogaden. Soviet MAG personnel almost certainly coordinate closely with the Cuban mechanized brigade in the country and provide the infrastructure that enables the Cubans to remain there. The effectiveness of joint Soviet-Cuban effort was amply demonstrated during the 1977-78 Ogaden war. By early 1978, Soviet and Cuban advisers were effectively in control of Ethiopian strategic and tactical planning during the climactic stages of the war; Cuban combat units were the key to victory, and Soviet advisers accompanied units on combat missions

73. In Eritrea in 1978 Soviet advisers directed strategic, tactical, and logistic operations. Soviet involvement in daily combat operations was significantly reduced following the Ogaden war against Somalia and the 1978 campaign against guerrillas in Eritrea, although Soviet advisers continued to accompany some Ethiopian units into combat until the spring of 1984. Today, although Ethiopians appear to be in complete charge of their units fighting the insurgents within their country, a return to close Soviet control cannot be discounted in a future crisis

74. While the number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia has increased moderately since the late 1970s, as is traditional in the expansion of Soviet activities, the number of Cubans has been significantly reduced:

- In 1978, after Soviet and Cuban efforts had helped Mengistu repulse the invasion from Somalia, there were 1,200 to 1,300 Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia, as well as 50 East Europeans, and 13,000 to 15,000 Cubans (including combat troops).
- By the mid-1980s, the number of Soviet military advisers had grown to at least 1,700 and the number of East German military advisers increased to 500, but the number of Cuban troops and military advisors had been reduced to about 3,500. This change has resulted from the reduction of the threat from Somalia, the need for an increased Cuban military presence in Angola, and Cuban unwillingness to get involved in fighting the northern insurgents



75. Ethiopia's relationship with the USSR is based in part upon a continuing strong need for Soviet arms. Soviet deliveries of military equipment averaged over \$900 million a year during 1982-85 but dropped off significantly in 1986 to \$245 million (see figure 15). The sharp drop may reflect the large amounts of equipment sent in previous years. Ethiopia has the largest military force in the region, but it also has a large military debt with Moscow—\$3.7 billion.

76. The Soviets have put considerable effort into their patronage of Ethiopia and undoubtedly believe they get important benefits: extended military reach, consolidation of their influence in the country, and the undermining of US strategic policies in the region:

The Soviets have acquired virtually free access to Dehalak Deset (Dahlak Island) off the Red Sea coast of Ethiopia. This helped offset the loss of Soviet naval facilities in Somalia in 1977. Dahlak, though a small support facility, is strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea and is useful to the Soviets for repairing ships and submarines of their Indian Ocean Squadron.

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- The Soviets are attempting to consolidate influence in Addis Ababa and to foster close ties between the regime and Moscow. They are counting on a continuing Ethiopian need for large-scale military aid to afford the time required to indoctrinate Ethiopian cadres and establish the basis for a vanguard workers party. Some 3,000 Ethiopian youths are undergoing technical, academic, and political training in the USSR, and another 2,000 are in Eastern Europe and Cuba.³ The Soviets expect that a number of these trainees will be more ideologically attuned to Soviet aims and interests, and will move into official positions in Ethiopia.
- The USSR is using its influence in Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies in the Horn of Africa area. The Soviets are counting on projecting an image of patron reliability, military force, and permanent presence in Ethiopia in order to intimidate US allies in the region or to persuade them that Soviet patronage carries greater advantages than US patronage. This policy has yet to produce a resounding success, but Somalia, where the United States has access to military facilities, is seeking better relations and some tangible aid from the USSR. The post-Nimeiri government in Sudan, where the United States has pre-positioned equipment, is exploring closer relations with the Soviets
- 77. From Chairman Mengistu's point of view, the arrangement with the Soviets is indispensable. He depends upon the flow of Soviet arms to maintain pressure on the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray and to dissuade the Somalis from another Ogaden invasion. The paucity of Soviet economic aid has not affected his relationship with the USSR. Minor aid deliveries from Communist countries are well publicized, but the generosity of the West is rarely acknowledged publicly. Mengistu has used famine for his own political advantage. He diverted some food from its intended recipients to feed the urban populace and the military, blocked distribution to areas controlled by insurgents, and forcibly removed many northern Ethiopians from the food distribution centers to remote resettleme areas in the west and south of the country
- 78. Although the Soviets are determined to maintain their foothold in Ethiopia, it is a challenging undertaking:
- The insurgency in Eritrea and Tigray continues, and Addis Ababa shows no sign of ultimately winning.

- The feeding of the population has depended on Western largess over the past two years.
- The cost of supporting the Ethiopian economy continues to rise, and Moscow has had to give the country oil subsidies and credits.
- 79. To help run the government the Soviets also maintain about 2,000 civilian technicians in Ethiopia, with some at the highest levels of the economic establishment, in an attempt to exercise direct influence over economic decision making. Yet Ethiopia's economy continues to deteriorate. Moscow has refused to join international efforts to assist Ethiopia's millions of starving refugees and has even demanded hard currency payments for Soviet technicians transporting Western donations to refugee camps, although the USSR distributes Western-supplied food within Ethiopia in its trucks and aircraft
- 80. Over the years there have been instances of disharmony in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship over issues such as the party, strategy in the insurgency, economic aid, and policy toward South Yemen. The cultural and personal clashes between Ethiopians and Soviets, especially in the military, and the high-handed, ill-mannered behavior of the Soviets toward Ethiopians have marred but not seriously threatened their relationship. With the emergence of Mengistu as the autocratic ruler of Ethiopia, the only Ethiopian attitude that really counts is his
- 81. Madagaecar. This country is the largest, most populous, and most strategically located of the southwestern Indian Ocean island states. Soviet military assistance began there in late 1975, and the Soviets have since sold, donated, or leased helicopters, transports, MIG-21 fighter aircraft, and ground force equipment. By mid-1980, the number of Soviet advisers and technicians accompanying these items had risen to an estimated 300. Since then, their number has been reduced to around 50, following a Malagasy decision to assume a more nonaligned posture. After more than a decade in power the often unpredictable Malagasy President, Didier Ratsiraka, has become accommodating to the West out of sheer economic necessity rather than any fundamental change in ideology. Madagascar's need for financial aid thus provides the West appartunities to counter Soviet influence in the region

^{*}From 1981-83 Libya also helped subsidize Ethiopia. Tripoli provided \$265 million worth of oil or cash subsidies and delivered \$40 million worth of military aid. These subsidies stopped in 1984 and will neabably not be resumed unless oil prices rise substantially.

However, many Ethiopian students have defected to Western Furnpe after completing training in Fastern Europe and the USSR.

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82. Seuchelles. The Seychelles archipelago became a target of Soviet interest soon after it achieved independence in 1976. President Rene came to power in 1977 as the result of a coup, and since then the islands have experienced several coup scares, a mercenary invasion in which South Africans were involved, and a major army mutiny in 1982. The Soviets have consistently supported Rene. Soviet military deliveries to Seychelles began in 1978 and totaled nearly \$70 million worth by the end of 1986, making Moscow Rene's main source of arms. In addition, the Soviet Navy has made a number of port calls to Victoria at Rene's request, particularly during times when he was out of the country and fearful of attempts to depose him. In return for this support. Rene has permitted Soviet VTA and Aeroflot aircraft to use Seychelles as a stopover point on flights to southern Africa. Soviet technicians have also restored some 5,000-ton capacity oil storage tanks at Victoria. Although use of these tanks by Soviet naval vessels has not been confirmed they would probably be available in an emergency

The Middle East: Including the Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf.

83. The Gorbachev regime is understandably displeased with the lack of impact USSR policies have had in the Middle East. However, the specific policy lines being followed under Gorbachev have been in place for some years: preservation of the USSR's key relationship with Syria, support of most objectives of the PLO, the effort to improve relations with moderate Arab governments, and support for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the Gulf region the Soviets maintain relations with Iraq while seeking to develop openings to Iran. Finally, Moscow is experimenting with preliminary moves toward restablishing relations with Israel, recognizing that relations with both the Arab states and Israel are necessary for achieving a central political role in the region

84. The Mediterranean. Although the Soviets have been active in the region since the mid-1950s and have delivered more military aid to countries there and in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf than to all other regions combined, there is no country in the area that the Soviets can claim as a reliable ally. Islam, the oil wealth of a number of these countries, their preference for Western goods, and historical ties to the West have, in a number of cases, worked against the Soviet efforts to translate their military assistance into a permanent entree

85. Nevertheless, the Arab-Israeli dispute, US support for Israel, the Palestinian issue, and endemic intra-Arab rivalries perpetuate a situation of no-war/no-peace, instability, and the potential for large-scale




Figure 16. Tin Shield acquisition radar exported to Syria in the fall of 1983. This was the first time this radar was detected outside the USSR.

conflict. As long as the Arab countries have the money to pay for arms and permit the Soviets some access to air and naval facilities, Moscow will have a role to play but will continue to stay clear of direct conflict with superior Western and Israeli military and naval power. The two most important countries to the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean are Syria and Libya

86. Syria. Although Soviet-Syrian ties are strong, relations have frequently been strained. The arms supply relationship goes back to 1957 and has survived Syrian governmental changes and military defeats over the years. Broad Syrian and Soviet goals in the region are similar. Both countries are primarily interested in limiting the US role in the region while enhancing their own position and influence. For this reason, both states have opposed the Camp David agreements, the Jordanian peace plan, and the Jordanian-PLO Amman Accord. They consider these agreements to be "separate deals," which preclude Soviet and Syrian involvement. While the USSR advocates a general conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Syria pays only lipservice to the idea, and Damascus and Moscow have significant differences over the specifics of such a conference. The two countries fundamentally disagree on many other issues; in particular, over the role of, and support to, the PLO, and Syria's support for Iran in the Gulf war. Over the years, the Syrians have taken foreign policy stances that have been directly opposed to Soviet interests, and Soviet attempts to manipulate military assistance to influence Syria's position in these matters has largely failed:

— Syria refused Moscow's urging to attend the proposed US-Soviet-sponsored Geneva Conference in 1973, which underlined the fundamental difference between Moscow and Damascus regarding negotiations with Israel.

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- Syrian President Assad ignored Moscow's objections to Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976, despite Soviet threats to stop arms supplies to Syria. In retaliation Damascus reportedly threatened to bar Soviet use of the port of Tartus. Ultimately Moscow resumed arms shipments without Syria having to withdraw.
- Assad sought to improve relations with the United States between 1974 and 1979 in the face of obvious Soviet displeasure.
- Recently, Soviet-Syrian relations have been strained over Assad's policy toward the PLO of undermining Arafat's leadership and blocking Soviet efforts at Palestinian reunification; Syrian support for Iran in the Gulf war: and Syrian activities in Lebanon that threaten Soviet allies there, primarily Assad's support for Amal against the Palestinians in the ongoing camps war
- 87. The Soviets also know that without Syrian cooperation they would have significantly less influence in the Middle East peace process. Thus, the Soviet's dependence on Syria for presence and influence in the Middle East probably is at least as great as Syrian dependence on Soviet arms. For this reason, Moscow has acquiesced to some Syrian policies on regional issues that Damascus considers vital to its security, while Syria promotes Soviet policies as long as they do not conflict with Syrian objectives
- 88. The quality of Soviet military training of Syrians has been described as only adequate. Syrian officers at branch schools have complained that Soviet instructors follow a very rigid lesson plan and are unable (or unwilling) to answer questions that do not exactly follow that outline. Freewheeling discussions and innovative ideas are not encouraged. Nonetheless, Soviet ground training has improved the Syrian Army's combat capabilities, though not providing it with the tactical flexibility emphasized in the Israeli army. Lack of flexibility, which is partially attributable to Soviet training, exacerbates overall Syrian command, control, and communications and information shortfalls, and significantly degrades Syrian operations at the battalion level and higher. Soviet pilot training tends to concentrate more on aircraft safety and on ground control intercept procedures than on air combat maneuvers; as a result, the Syrian Air Force is hopelessly outclassed by the Israelis.
- 89. Soviet MAG relations with the Syrians are extensive, but strained:
 - While Syrian officers generally recognize the need for Soviet technicians to assist Syrian per-

- sonnel with new equipment, they will ignore Soviet advice on the tactical employment of forces. The Syrians believe that the few Indian and Pakistani Air Force advisers who served with their forces prior to 1976 were far better pilots than the Soviets.
- -- Many Soviet advisers are known to have a low opinion of their Syrian counterparts and of Arabs in general. This attitude has been perceived and reciprocated by many in the Syrian populace. For their part, Syrians are distressed with common incidents of Soviet drunkenness
- 90. Moscow upgraded the rank of the MAC chief in Syria in April 1984 from lieutenant general to colonel general, a strong indication of the MAC's importance. The MAC is very rank heavy, with 90 percent of its hilitary personnel in the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, including up to 16 general officers. The Damascus garrison has generals from the air forces, ground forces, tank troops, motorized rifle troops, and air defense troops, and there are several other garrisons located in various Syrian cities
- 91. There are about 3,000 to 3,600 Sovict military advisers in country. About 1,300 of these work with the Syrian Army and reportedly are present in all tank, mechanized infantry, artillery, commando, and air defense artillery battalions, and probably with the surface-to-surface missile systems such as the SS-21. About 1,800 Soviet air and air defense advisers are at the SA-5 complexes, in the other SAM battalions and brigade headquarters, in all air defense artillery regiments, and at all electronic warfare and radar facilities and interceptor squadrons. The remaining advisers are found in aircraft assembly, maintenance, and logistic support facilities throughout the air and air defense structure.
- 92. While Soviet advisers test-fly Soviet military aircraft assembled in Syria, they have not been detected flying any air combat missions against the Israelis Between 1982 and late 1984 the Soviets had 2,000 of their own air defense troops operate and maintain the SA-5 complexes in Syria. The value of the Soviet manning was twofold: to bolster the Soviets' image as a "great power" protector and to deter large-scale Israeli air attacks over Syria itself. But the SA-5s have not been fired at any Israeli aircraft flying over Syria and probably will not be, short of an Israeli invasion of Syria or a direct attack upon the complexes themselves

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93. The Soviets have provided Syria with over \$22 billion worth of arms since the beginning of the 1970s, more than half since 1980. Even so, recent Soviet arms deliveries have declined significantly, as figure 17 shows, from over \$3.3 billion in 1983 to less than \$600 million by 1986. Part of this drop reflects the drastic decline in Syrian foreign aid receipts. As figure 18 shows, these are projected to fall by half from the high of over \$1.7 billion in 1981. Although Warsaw Pact deliveries have recently been in decline, Syria was the first recipient outside the Warsaw Pact of a number of weapons including the SA-5 and SA-13 SAM systems; SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles; and one of their most advanced air defense command and control systems, the Vektor II.

Figure 17
Current Value of
Soviet Arms Deliveries to
Syria, 1982-86

Converted into million US \$

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



Figure 18 Million US \$
Syrian Foreign Aid Receipts,
1980-86



94. In return for their military assistance the Soviets have used Syrian airfields since 1981 to deploy TU-16s (reconnaissance) and IL-38s (reconnaissance and ASW) periodically to Mediterranean airfields (the Soviets have not deployed bombers or air-to-surface missile-carrying aircraft to Mediterranean airfields since they lost their access to those in Egypt in 1972). The Soviet Mediterranean Naval Squadron also uses the port of Tartus for replenishment and minor repairs; support ships berthed in Syria enable the Soviets to extend the patrol time of their ships and submarines in the Mediterranean

95. Despite frictions, the Syrian low opinion of Soviet training, and the declines in Soviet military deliveries, the Syrians will remain dependent on Soviet arms to maintain and upgrade their armed forces. Of greatest importance to Syria is that an arms relationship with the USSR holds the only hope of achieving their elusive goal of "strategic parity" with Israel

The Soviets and the Palestinians

The USSR has long been a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause. Under Moscow's guidance, the other members of the Soviet Bloc have also aided the Palestinians. Although Arab states provide most of the financial underpinnings to the various Palestinian guerrilla groups, the Soviet Bloc provides much of the military assistance and training (along with other forms of aid such as academic scholarships). The training is in both conventional and unconventional military techniques. The fragmentation of the PLO that occurred in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon presented the Soviets with a problem, because its policies are based on a unified Palestinian front. Moscow's response was to try to paper over the split and to urge the antagonists (whose agents have been murdering each other all over Europe and the Middle East) to submerge their differences for the sake of the Palestinian cause. The Soviets are trying to try to ensure that, if some faction decisively wins the internecine struggle, Moscow would be on good terms with that faction. Moscow has continued to support various elements in the dispute, thereby forfeiting much of the leverage its support might otherwise bring.

- 96. Libua. Although Libya frequently does not act in concert with Moscow's wishes, its policies and foreign activities often advance Soviet goals. Examples abound:
 - Support to revolutionary groups and terrorist factions in a number of states (whose activities cannot be directly traced to Moscow).




- Provision to the Soviets of limited access to naval and air facilities.
- The potential threat Libyan armed forces pose to Western fleets in the Mediterranean.
- Libyan efforts to reduce Western influence in various countries.
- Libyan economic subsidies of over \$2 billion given to Syria Ethionia and Nicaragua in the early 1980s

97. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that Libya's support of terrorism, its incursion into Chad, its subversion of Tunisia, and its "gifts" of arms to Iran alienate countries in the West, and Soviet clients such as Iraq as well. Libyan isolation, along with Soviet concern about future US airstrikes-creating the risk of a Soviet confrontation with the United States-and the possibility of a coup in Tripoli have made the Soviets leery of making a stronger security agreement with Libya. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, Moscow probably would deliver more arms to obtain greater access to Libyan air and naval facilities

58. Libya has obtained a total of about \$18 billion worth of weapons from the Warsaw Pact. Since 1982, the Soviets alone have delivered almost \$5 billion. But deliveries have declined in the last few years both from the Soviets-see figure 19-and from non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries-see figure 20. (Libya buys Western arms as well-over \$2.6 billion worth of deliveries in the same five-year period.) To train the Libyans and maintain equipment, the Soviets had 1,500 to 2,000 advisers in country at the end of 1986, supplemented by 150 Cubans and 1,100 East Europeans. Until recently, the Soviets also had up to 5,000 civilian personnel in Libya working on projects worth about \$5 billion.

99. The Soviets have been indispensable in building up the Libyan armed forces; Soviet advisers are currently assisting the Libyans in completely reorganizing the Army. Not only has Moscow supplied weapons, maintenance, and training, it has constructed an extensive air defense system there and has played a role in Libya's foreign confrontations:

- In 1977, the Soviets were active in Libyan air defenses when Egyptian aircraft attacked Libyan airfields.
- In the 1980s, the Soviets logistically assisted the Libyan occupation and buildup in the Aozou Strip but have avoided providing aid within Chad itself.



3,000

2,000

1,000 1982

Fairs of Soviet 11-30 maritime patrol aircraft have deployed periodically to Umm 'Aitigah airfield since July 1981

312689 587

By the end of 1986 there were over 225 Libyan combat aircraft assigned to Libyan squadrons. (Nearly 100 more were unassigned and another

33



Figure 21. One of Libya's MIG-25s. Libya has both an interceptor and a reconnaissance squadron. Soviet advisers reportedly process and exploit the imagery from Libyan Foxbats

200 or so were in crates.) There are insufficient Libyan pilots to man these aircraft. Nearly 100 sites are defended by over 550 SAM launchers.

— By the end of 1986 the Soviets had also delivered enough equipment to create two SA-5 complexes and the supporting command and control system. Although these systems are manned by Libyan troops, Soviet advisers will probably perform a major role in maintenance and training, at least in the short term.

100. Libyan oil has made it one of the most important LDC consumers of Warsaw Pact goods and services. It is the major LDC employer of East European personnel and is the largest source of hard currency services earnings for most East European governments. In 1984 there were close to 50,000 East European workers in Libya under several billion dollars of commercial contracts financed under Libya's current fiveyear plan. Further growth of Soviet and East European economic projects in Libya may be curtailed by, among other factors. Tripoli's current revenue squeeze, which has already delayed the start of a number of projects that were scheduled to use Soviet equipment and technical assistance. Libyan foreign exchange reserves have dwindled from about \$14 billion in 1981 to \$3.5 billion at the end of 1985

101. There seems to be general dissatisfaction among the rank and file of the Libyan military with Soviet equipment, training, and protection against US attacks. There is a perception that Soviet advisers generally regard Libyan personnel as incapable of operating Soviet equipment without constant Soviet supervision. Many Libyan officers view the East European military personnel in Libya as providing security for Qadhafi from his own military and acting essentially as soles.

More recently, the Libyan military is probably disappointed that the Soviets refused to intervene in Libya's defense against the US attacks. And Qadhafi knows that Moscow would almost certainly not take risks that could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation in a future US attack.

102. Nonetheless, from the US airstrikes in March and April of 1986, Qadhafi may have drawn several important lessons about the impact of the Soviet presence in Libya on US tactical planning. He was almost certainly impressed by several factors:

- US press reports that, in March, Washington directed its forces to attack only the SA-5 radars so as to avoid casualties among Soviet advisers believed to be in other parts of the SA-5 complex.
- In April, US aircraft attacked Tripoli International Airport rather than the nearby Umm Aitiqah airbase, which had dozens of MIG-25s and other military aircraft. Qadhafi probably believes that Umm Aitiqah was a more worthwhile target, but he may conclude it was left untouched because of the presence there of three Soviet naval aircraft.

These factors could convince Qadhafi that Libya would derive increased protection from a larger Soviet presence, even without a Soviet commitment to Libya's defense.

103. Algeria. The Soviet MAG in Algeria was established in 1963, one year after that country's independence from France. The Soviets recently have streamlined the MAG in Algeria, aligning its structure with the various types of equipment being serviced in the country. There are maintenance advisory groups for T-62 and T-72 tanks; MIG-21, MIG-23, and MIG-25 aircraft; and SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-8B air defense systems. Each group, composed of teams numbering between 30 and 50 men, is organized to make scheduled calls on Algerian units to provide repairs:

— Soviet military advisers generally do not serve with Algerian tactical ground units. Their main functions involve training and include instructing in Algerian military schools and providing maintenance support. The Algerians have been careful



Figure 22. Algeria was the first country outside the Warsaw Pact to receive the SA-8 surface-to-air missile

to ensure that sufficient Soviet advisers remain to maintain the readiness of the armed forces


vithout the aid of Soviet advisers, the Algerians would not be able to keep their MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft flying.

— Soviet advisers also play a vital role in training the Algerian Navy in submarine operations. In the early 1980s they trained Algerians to operate two Soviet-built Romeo-class submarines. It was reported that 20 percent of the sub crews were Soviet, and that the Soviets manned all essential duty stations. The Algerians now consider the Romeos unreliable for submerged operations, but may soon obtain new Kilo-class submarines.

104. The Algerian Government has probably forbidden Soviet MAG advisers to have contact with Algerians except on duty; they are also prohibited from having contacts with other advisers in Algeria, including those from Eastern Europe

Other Algerian complaints with Moscow include lack of responsiveness to requests for spare parts, political indoctrination of Algerians receiving training in the Soviet Union, Soviet boorishness, and dissatisfaction with the quality of materiel provided by Moscow

105. Nonetheless, the Soviets have provided approximately 90 percent of the military equipment of the Algerian armed forces; through 1986 the Warsaw Pact had delivered over \$7.4 billion of military assistance. Over the past five years, the Algerians have received \$3.0 billion worth of arms from the Warsaw



Pact (see figure 23), compared with less than \$400 million from the West, and have paid cash for all their arms. (S NF)

106. Notwithstanding, the Soviets are concerned about the future of their relationship with Algeria and have indicated their displeasure at Algeria's attempts to diversify arms purchases. In addition to reducing the size of the Soviet MAG (from a high of 2,500 in the late 1970s to about 800 in 1986) and seeking Western and US military equipment and technology, President Bendjedid has improved relations with the West and has replaced senior Algerian military officers with men who are strongly nationalistic and more Western in their outlook, tastes, and style. Algeria's efforts to improve its nonaligned credentials along with its more moderate voice in international forums, as well as its concentration on domestic development, are leading it toward closer cooperation with the West on technology transfer and trade issues. These factors, combined with a lack of significant Soviet economic initiatives, are eroding Moscow's influence in this key nonaligned state

107. In March 1986, Bendjedid went to Moscow, but the visit appears not to have affected either Algeria's strong support for Arab goals or its slow shift toward genuine nonalignment. During his trip, Bendjedid did not endorse Gorbachev's proposal for the removal of both superpowers' naval presence in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, in line with its long-held position, Algiers is working with Moscow to achieve Palestinian reunification

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
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108. Although the Soviets have offered new weapons deliveries including tanks and advanced aircraft, the ratio of purchases between the Warsaw Pact and the West will probably be more evenly divided over the next five years unless the Soviets severely undercut the Western market. Algiers will still want to buy sophisticated military equipment at a lower cost than is obtainable from the West, as well as maintain its stock of spare parts. Although hard currency payments from Algiers to Moscow could drop if Algerian purchases from the West increase, the Soviets will still be a major supplier of weapons. During 1986 Algeria and the USSR reportedly reached an agreement on a new arms deal that may include T-72 tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, Kilo-class submarines, new aircraft, and possibly SA-5 SAMs. Thus, Algeria will likely remain dependent on Soviet military assistance for the near term

109. The Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf. Soviet and Warsaw Pact military assistance policy in the region is focused on protecting its entree in Iraq and South Yemen, trying to maintain and increase Warsaw Pact arms deliveries to North Yemen, and attempting to improve relations with Iran. Above all, it attempts to prevent the United States from expanding its military deliveries and presence in the region. Although the Soviets have provided billions of dollars worth of weapons, they have gained a significant tochold in only one country: South Yemen, the poorest of the lo

110. Iraq. The overthrow of the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958 opened the door to the Soviet military assistance program. Since 1971, Moscow's East European allies have provided Iraq with over \$3.5 billion worth of arms, and the Soviets have sent over \$25.4 billion for a total of nearly \$29 billion. Shortly after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 the Soviets put an embargo on arms deliveries to both countries. The result backfired: Iraq continued the war, and Western and Chinese arms suppliers moved in to further erode Moscow's once preeminent position. Even though the Soviets restarted deliveries to Iraq, and during the period from 1982 through 1986 they delivered over \$15 billion worth (see figure 24), the arms deliveries of the West (primarily of sophisticated aircraft) and China rose considerably, and together they were worth \$19.2 billion. The Soviets still delivered the bulk of ground equipment

111. Having achieved no gains in Tehran, while angering Baghdad, the Soviets resumed deliveries in 1981. There was no evidence that Soviet MAG personnel were then attached to frontline Iraqi army units.



In recent years this has changed marginally, but there is little evidence of Soviet participation in Iraqi highlevel military plauning. Contact with Iraqi nationals by the Soviets or other foreign personnel, both military and civilian, is discouraged by Baghdad, which closely monitors the movements of Soviet MAG personnel within the country. The Soviets are required to have all travel approved by Iraqi security organizations.

112. The Iraqis must rely on MAG personnel to repair some of their newer ground force equipment, especially tanks such as the T-72. An estimated 700 Soviet advisers are attached to the Iraqi Air Force. Most perform repair and maintenance for the large number of Soviet-supplied aircraft, including fighters, transports, bombers, and helicopters. MAG personnel are responsible for assembling and testing Soviet aircraft, and Soviet advisers serve as instructor pilots at Iraqi flight schools and airbases. Soviet and East European deliveries over the last five years have averaged over \$3 billon a year

113. There are an estimated 1,000 Soviet MAG personnel in the country, as well as 225 East Europeans. In addition, Soviet and East European countries maintain a strong economic presence in Iraq of 2,000 economic technicians. Soviet experts are responsible for planning, awarding subcontracts, procuring equipment, and handling the finances for Iraqi undertakings in the oil and power industries (of which the most recent example is the appointment of a Soviet to the position of general manager of the trans-Iraqi pipeline. The Iraqis probably will agree to cooperate with the

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USSR and its allies on more development projects. Baghdad will nevertheless keep expanding its commercial ties to the United States because the Iraqis value technology of the United States

114. Although Iraq has undertaken an effort to diversify its sources of arms, it is likely to remain heavily dependent on Soviet military equipment and training. Iraq owes Moscow more than \$9 billion for arms that have already been delivered; despite these debts, the USSR is likely to continue to provide about \$3 billion worth of arms to Iraq per year as long as the war with Iran continues. In 1986 Iraq received over 100,000 tons of Soviet military cargo, more than 25 percent of all Soviet deliveries to the Third World.

115. Baghdad is playing on Moscow's concern that Soviet influence with the Iraqis will crode if Iraq continues to expand its ties to the United States. To satisfy some of Baghdad's requests, the Soviets provided at least 36 SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft in 1985 and 1986 and about 25 MIG-29 Fulcrums in late 1986 and early 1987. In his visit at the end of 1985 President Saddam probably renewed Iraq's request for the SU-24 Fencer, which has greater range, speed, and radar capability than Soviet or French aircraft currently in Iraq's inventory. Prospects for its export, however, are slim

116. Iran. The Soviets regard Iran as the key strategic country in the region. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war the Soviets initially tried to take a neutral stance and stopped arms sales and deliveries to both Iran and Iraq. This was done primarily to improve relations with Iran-Iraq was far more dependent on Soviet weapons. At the start of the war, only a small proportion of key items in Iran's ground forces and none of their Air Force or naval equipment, had been supplied by Warsaw Pact countries. When relations with Iran did not improve and Soviet-Iraq relations were damaged, Moscow resumed arms supplies to Iraq. As a result the Soviets have no military advisers or technicians stationed in Iran, and they have withdrawn a large portion of their economic advisers from the country. Even so, the Soviets continue to sell equipment such as trucks-but not in significant amounts-and they permit other East European countries to sell munitions and other military supplies to Iran for hard currency

117. One reason the Soviet arms cutoff failed to influence Iran was because Tehran looked primarily to Western countries and North Korea and, by 1982, to China as well. By 1984, however, non-Soviet Warsaw

Pact countries had increased their deliveries. East Germany accounted for half of all Warsaw Pact deliveries while Bulgaria also was a key supplier. This probably reflects a Soviet desire for continued East European sales to earn hard currency for the Warsaw Pact, to maintain an indirect entree to Iran, and to hedge Moscow's bets vis-a-vis Iraq without direct Soviet involvement.

118. South Yemen. The tenacity of Moscow's effort to maintain its presence and military assistance in South Yemen derives from the country's strategic position athwart the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and the fact that it is the only Arab Marxist state. Moreover, its proximity to rich Persian Culf oil countries as well as to the Horn of Africa gives it a key role in the Soviet strategy.

119. Soviet ties to Aden were an outgrowth of the leftist coup in South Yemen in 1969. In 1970, the state was reconstituted as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) under a Marxist-oriented regime. To support the country the Soviets provided over \$4.5 billion worth of military aid through 1986, and we believe Moscow also provides \$100-125 million annually in balance-of-payments support. In addition, most of South Yemen's oil debts to the USSR have been rescheduled and probably never will be repaid

120. Soviet advisers perform training, maintenance, and logistic support functions; 1,000 Soviet advisers assist the South Yemeni armed forces (26,000 men in January 1986 before the coup). In addition, there are 500 Cuban military personnel who train the military and the militia. and possibly some East Germans attached to South Yemen's internal security organizations. It is probable that the Soviet MAG commander coordinates the activities of these other foreign military personnel

121. The Soviets have been able to translate their military assistance program in South Yemen into a range of military and political benefits to the USSR. Specifically:

- Aden has supported subversion in neighboring countries.
- An additional 300 Soviet military personnel are involved in operating: IL-38/May ASW aircraft out of Al Anad Airfield;

Soviet access to facilities in South Yemen (and Ethiopia) supports the USSR's efforts to monitor

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
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and potentially threaten Western sea lines of communication through the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb (strait), and the Arabian Sea. Access to naval and air facilities in South Yemen enables the Soviets to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering activities in the region and helps to provide logistic support to the Indian Ocean Squadron.

- The South Yemen regime has supported virtually all of the Soviet foreign policy goals. Aden could be counted on to reject any US-identified proposals to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, to support the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and to join with Moscow in denouncing USCENTCOM activities.
- The status of South Yemon as the only Arab Marxist state is useful as a conduit from the Soviet Communist Party to some Arab parties.
- The extensive training programs maintained by the Soviets in South Yemen and in the USSR, together with Cuban and East German programs, provide access to the next generation of South Yemeni leaders along with opportunities to recruit agents and collaborators

122. Soviet MAG personnel work closely with South Yemen's military forces:

— Soviet advisers were reported to have given limited help in logistics and communications to support South Yemen's military operations against North Yemen in early 1979.



— Soviet military personnel probably also have provided support to South Yemen in several confrontations between that country and its neighbors. In 1983, for instance, Soviet military personnel (members of the MAG, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squardon, or both) provided sup-



Figure 25. South Yemeni amphibious vessel

port to South Yemeni-based raiding parties operating in the Dhofar region of Oman

123. When President Ali Nasir took power in 1980, South Yemen remained in general accord with Soviet policies. Ali Nasir's moves to improve relations with South Yemen's neighbors meshed with Soviet desires to promote better relations with states in the region. When Ali Nasir ousted his predecessor, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, the Soviets provided a comfortable place of exile for Ismail in the USSR. In 1984 Ali Nasir accepted the return of Ismail to Aden, and provided a position for him in the party. On his return Ismail became involved in longstanding party factionalism, leading to heightened instability in the part

124. Although the Soviets realized that the feuding parties in Aden were contemplating armed action, there is no evidence to indicate that they took steps either to avert or precipitate the coup in January 1986. The Soviets were not known to have taken any military or political precautions:

- During the initial stages of the fighting, the Soviets tried to limit the damage to their position by trying to mediate an end to the dispute.
- As the situation deteriorated, the Soviets evacuated most of their civilian advisory personnel.
- They eventually shifted their assessment of the situation as the rebels gained strength. Soviet military personnel were reported to have intervened in the fighting on a limited scale

125. Soviet failure at the outset to give strong support to Ali Nasir and Moscow's subsequent pressure on Ethiopia and North Yemen not to intervene contributed to Ali Nasir's downfall. After Ali Nasir left the country, Soviet military advisers became directly involved in ground and air combat operations against

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the loyalist forces. The Soviets clearly decided to take steps to protect their long-term stake in South Yemen, and they switched sides in time to back the winners.

126. The new regime will have difficulty dealing with tribal differences. Aden close not have sufficient fighter aircraft, helicopters, or pilots to deal with widespread guerrilla attacks. While the new government may be able to hold the capital and the home areas of its tribal backers, its control over the rest of the country is tenuous

127. North Yemen. Moscow has been involved since 1928, when it signed a friendship treaty with Sanaa—the first such Soviet accord with an Arab country. Moscow's presence in North Yemen has always been small but significant. Soviets have served in North Yemeni military units, and in the 1960s took part in combat operations:

In the civil war in 1967, Soviet advisers flew combat missions (on the Republican side) until replaced by pilots from Arab countries. Many North Yemenis believe that Moscow's support was instrumental in preventing the Saudi-backed royalists from winning in the civil war that followed the Republican revolution.

128. The Soviets devote a large level of aid to this country because of its strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea and the potential pressure it can bring to Saudi Arabia. East European countries have delivered nearly \$300 million worth of arms to the country and the Soviets about \$2.3 billion-of which \$1.2 billion has come in the last five years. To train the North Yemenis, and to contest US efforts to build influence in the country, the Soviets maintain 400 military advisers and technicians, as well as 400 economic and other specialists. We estimate that more than 250 North Yemeni military personnel are also training in the USSR. Moscow also offers some 450 academic scholarships a year to North Yemenis to study in the Soviet Union, and approximately 750 North Yemenis are studying there now. Most senior North Yemeni military officers have been trained in the USSR, and some probably have been recruited by the Soviets; they could work to erode President Salih's military support if he threatens Moscow's interests.

129. Frictions have arisen between Moscow and Sanaa over North Yemen's estimated \$600-700 million arms debt and over Sanaa's dissatisfaction with the quality of Soviet military training and equipment. North Yemen is reportedly investigating alternative sources of training and support for its Soviet equipment, including East Germany and India. In addition, President Salih's perception of Soviet complicity in the January 1986 coup in South Yemen has probably heightened his distrust of the Soviets. For their part, the Soviets reportedly informed Salih that shipments of military supplies would cease until Sanaa's relations with Aden improved. However, recently the USSR has made some arms deliveries, perhaps as an interim measure to prevent a further deterioration in the relationship

Asia: Around China's Periphery

130. The Soviet military assistance program in the four key countries in the region—Afghanistan, India, Vietnam, and North Korea—is based on Soviet efforts to shore up its own borders, contain China, and project power. Because the Soviets have allied themselves with countries that all have uneasy, hostile, or confrontational relations with their neighbors, Soviet efforts with their clients alienate their relations with other states.

131. Afghanistan. The Soviet military aid program in Afghanistan began in 1956 when Afghanistan purchased \$100 million of Soviet equipment on credit in order to modernize its armed forces. The Afghan Air Force's purchase of technically sophisticted equipment necessitated a fundamental reorganization of that force, which soon became dependent on Soviet advisory personnel. In the Afghan Army, there was a steadily growing Soviet orientation, and Russian became the technical language. Afghan military students were sent to the USSR for training, and in 1958 Moscow established a course of military instruction in Kabul

132. As Soviet military deliveries to Afghanistan continued to grow, so did Afghan dependence on the 425-man Soviet MAG, and Soviet advisers were placed directly in all of the most sensitive departments of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). Soviet advisers were installed in operational army units to provide operational, logistic, and technical support. While the MAG officers in Afghanistan continued to maintain a low public profile and lacked operational authority, the presence of Soviet officers in the MOD and armed forces units gave Moscow significant leverage.

133. Between 1956 and 1978 the USSR trained over


133. Between 1956 and 1978 the USSR trained over 3,300 Afghan military officers in the Soviet Union and delivered more than \$700 million in military assistance. Thus by 1978, on the eve of the Afghan Marxist military coup, they had achieved extensive influence in the armed forces

134. In 1978, following the coup, the Soviet MAG had a period of explosive growth. Soviet advisory personnel were assigned throughout the Afghan Armed Forces down to the battalion level, with each Afghan division receiving approximately 35 Soviet advisers. During this period—from the April 1978 Marxist coup until the December 1979 Soviet invasion—the independence of the Afghan armed forces from Soviet authority was lost. By the end of 1979 Soviet MAG personnel approved all MOD decisions, countersigned all important documents, rejected or approved all military operations, and had de facto command of most Afghan military units

135. Shortly after the 1979 Soviet invasion, the MAG became the essential element in the Kremlin's campaign to train an Afghan Army capable of assuming the counterinsurgency role that Moscow currently performs. The MAG's task, a formidable undertaking under the best of circumstances, has been greatly complicated by three major difficulties: widespread descrition of Afghan soldiers, dependence on conscripted replacements often impressed off the streets, and continued factional strife among Afghan officers. Despite such difficulties, the MAG has continued to insert Afghan units into combat whenever possible. In the initial stages of counterinsurgency operations in the 1980s, the Chief of the MAG and his approximately 3,500 Soviet advisers commanded some 45,000 Afghan troops and were responsible for coordinating joint operations with the then approximately 86,000-man Soviet 40th Army.

186. The MAC is one of two coordinating Soviet command and control structures in Afghanistan. With full control of the nominally independent Afghan armed forces, the Chief of MAC is the de facto commander of the Afghan Army. Soviet forces are under the command of the Turkestan Military District (TMD) and operate through the Soviet 40th Army Command in Afghanistan. Those operations requiring Afghan Army support are coordinated with the MAC in Kabul.

137. In seeking solutions to the military stalemate the Soviets have tried different tactical approaches, looking for the least costly and most effective combination of manpower and weaponry to achieve their objectives. In recent years, they probably believe that



an influx of advanced weaponry would cut down on casualties and would allow them to increase firepower dramatically with only a marginal increase in manpower and give the Soviet military aumious opportunity to test new weapons in combat.

138. Thus during the past two years, the Sovicts have made relatively minor increases in their ground combat manpower in Afghanistan, but since the fall of 1984 upgrades of major ground force weapons and the deployment of helicopters have substantially increased both the firepower and mobility of Soviet forces. The resistance has reacted by shifting more of their supply activity to nighttime and dispatching smaller supply caravans over varied infiltration routes. The resistance forces also place more emphasis on cover and concealment techniques and keep their own units as small and as mobile as possible. Consequently, although the insurgents have lost more supply trains to Soviet interdiction, they are generally better supplied now than in the past

139. In the last five years, in addition to supporting their own combat forces there, the Soviets have delivered between \$2.5 to \$3.7 billion worth of arms to Afghanistan (see figure 26). Deliveries constst mainly of consumables such as munitions and replacements for lost arms. To counter the effects of the insurgency costs Moscow \$300-400 million a year in grant aid. They will continue to try to wear down the resistance, to close the insurgents' supply routes from Iran and Pakistan, and to train enough Afghans (and kill enough of those resisting) to ultimately set up a viable pro-

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Soviet government. If they could do this, the regime could be buttressed by a reduced contingent of Soviet forces—much like those in Eastern Europe (or, simply, by a large MAG contingent). To this end, the Soviets are reputed to be sending more than 10,000 Afghans a year to schools in the USSR for further training. The Soviets have also placed their own economic advisers in the Afghan Government to exercise direct control over economic decision making.

140. India. As a result of the longstanding Indo-Soviet arms relationship the Indian military is heavily dependent on Soviet weapons. Some 65 percent of the combat aircraft, 40 percent of the tanks, and 70 percent of the warships in the Indian arsenal are Soviet in origin. We estimate that at least 3,400 Indian officers and enlisted men have been trained in the USSR since 1975, and about 200 to 500 Soviet technicians usually are present in India to help maintain Soviet-built equipment and assist in the construction of Indian corpoduction facilities and military bases

141. There is no formal Soviet MAG structure within India and the number of Soviet personnel incountry supporting military assistance is relatively small at 500 men. New Delhi's sensitivity to both the form and substance of the Soviet military presence is drawn from an awareness of the potential for subversion that a large Soviet presence could offer, a desire to maintain India's status as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement, and the intention not to view the Soviet Union as an ally. Thus, India has consistently refused Soviet requests for joint military exercises and access to naval and air facilities. Indian policymakers argue that their nonaligned foreign policy would require the extension of similar privileges to other great powers if New Delhi agreed to Moscow's requests

142. Nonetheless, the continuing interaction required in manufacturing, updating, and operating Soviet equipment in India has created a professional rapport between Soviet and Indian officers. For example, MIG-21 pilots of the early 1960s have recently begun to rise to the top levels of the Indian Air Force Command. The younger generation in all services has been trained on Soviet equipment and, in some cases, develops pro-Soviet attitudes early on. Not only may this interchange contribute to positive attitudes, but also the long-term reliability of Soviet arms deliveries. especially during crisis periods, has made an impression on Indian military professionals. It is the general perception of the USSR as a reliable "friend in need"-the willingness to deliver arms and to deploy Soviet forces in a crisis to deter potential Western or Chinese intervention-that is the most successful aspect of the Soviet effort to influence the Indian military

143. To restrict the overall Soviet presence in India, New Delhi has employed a procedure whereby teams of Indian specialists are sent to the Soviet Union for training on the use and maintenance of a given piece of Soviet military equpment such as the T-72 tank, the BMP-1 APC, or the MIG-29 aircraft. Upon completion of the training, the Indian teams return and train other Indians in-country. Approximately 500 Indian officers and enlisted personnel from the various services attend training programs in the USSR on an annual basis. Moscow has resisted this Indian approach. The Soviets appear to provide only superficial instruction to Indian teams that train in the Soviet Union and to stress (so far, unsuccessfully) the need for direct Soviet involvement

144. Despite frictions, India remains one of Moscow's most highly prized Third World clients. Arms



Figure 27. INS Ranjit is the third Soviet Mod-Kashin destroyer purchased by the Indian Navy




Figure 28. The Indian Army has acquired large numbers of T-72 tanks from the USSR, and is assembling the tank with Soviet technical assistance

contracts with India are still made on exceedingly generous terms, normally featuring very long repayment schedules (averaging 17 years), low interest rates (2 to 3 percent), and, often, discounted prices. As a result, the Indians have acquired over \$6.8 billion of Soviet arms over the past five years (see figure 29) and a total of well over \$10 billion since the Soviets first started delivering weapons. The country differs from other major Soviet arms customers in two fundamental ways:

- It is the only major arms recipient permitted to purchase weapons in soft, not hard currency.
- It is the only LDC that has extensive coproduction agreements to manufacture Soviet weapons.

145. Barring a Soviet invasion of Pakistan, the Soviet-Indian "special relationship" will probably endure over this decade. Although recognized as the strongest military power in South Asia, India wants to maintain a substantial margin of military superiority over Pakistan. The value of undelivered arms is almost \$10 billion and includes orders of major pieces of equipment from both the USSR and the West. Examples are listed in table 3.

146. Indian negotiators will continue to use purchases of Western technology to wring more out of the Soviets. Despite deliveries of the MIG-29, however, it is uncertain India can exert enough leverage to pry

deliveries of aircraft with the most advanced Soviet engines and electronics. Indian demands for advanced Soviet weapons and selective purchases of Western technology will be countered with stiff Soviet opposition and substantial efforts to retain its role as India's primary source of arms

147. Vietnam. Soviet deliveries of over \$16 billion worth of military aid in the last 15 years have made Vietnam the strongest military power in Southeast Asia. This assistance, coupled with substantial economic aid, enables Vietnam to sustain its occupation of Cambodia and strengthen its forces along the Chinese border. Soviet deliveries also provide Vietnam with limited capabilities to defend offshore islands and oil exploration sites and to gradually modernize its ground, air, and naval forces

148. Hanoi's relationship with Moscow is rooted in their shared deep distrust of China, a convergence of foreign policy goals, and the absence of any present alternatives to the Soviets. Neither side fully trusts the other, and there are some potential vulnerabilities in the relationship. Soviet advisers in Vietnam frequently have been discouraged and disillusioned by their experience in working with Vietnamese Army personnel, and, the Soviets have had great difficulties in recruiting personnel for advisory assignments in Vietnam.

149. The Hanoi regime would like to revive its mismanaged economy, but that objective is secondary

Figure 29
Current Value of million US S
Soviet Arms Deliveries to
India, 1982-86

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to its national security goals that include maintaining dominance over Indochina. Since the late 1970s when the Western governments withdrew support for Vietnam and Western lending institutions refused to advance loans, hostile relations with China have drawn Vietnam into a tight client relationship with the USSR. The key event was the limited Chinase invasion of 1979, which led to a massive military and economic aid package from the USSR

1982

150. From the Soviet perspective, Vietnam is worth the considerable sums of aid and associated political liabilities. The Soviets enjoy the following tangible benefits:

- Unrestricted use of naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, which supports the largest concentration of Soviet combat ships and aircraft permanently based outside of the USSR.
- Soviet involvement in some phases of Vietnamese military training helps the Soviets cultivate ties to the next generation of Vietnamese military leaders.
- Vietnamese dependence upon Soviet weapons, spare parts, and technical services.
- The services of some 60,000 Vietnamese laborers in the USSR and Eastern Europe, limited amounts of raw materials, and the potential for mutual sharing of oil production if the current exploratory programs succeed.

A regime on China's southern flank that is hostile to China's expansion of influence into Southeast Asia and draws China's attention and resources away from the Sino-Soviet border


151. The steady Soviet military buildup at Cam Ranh has substantially increased Soviet capabilities to monitor the US and allied naval and air activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and to threaten regional sea lines of communications (especially maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca). It has also improved Soviet capabilities to augment their naval strength in the Indian Ocean quickly in crises.


152. The access to Cam Ranh Bay gives Moscow its first major overseas naval and air base since it was forced to leave Egypt in 1972. The Soviets continue to renovate the port facilities at Cam Ranh, upgrading and constucting new buildings for POL and missile storage, barracks, and other facilities. In addition:


- The overall defense of Cam Ranh has been improved with the deployment of missileequipped naval combatants, fighter aircraft, and the deployment of mobile surface-to-surface coastal defense missiles.
- The Soviets appear to have formed a composite air regiment at Cam Ranh composed of two to four Bear F ASW aircraft, two to four Bear D reconnaissance aircraft, 16 Badger bombers and support aircraft, and 14 Flogger fighters.

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In an emergency, the Soviets could probably deploy even more strike aircraft to Cam Ranh on short notice.

153. During 1982 through 1986 the Soviets provided Vietnam with \$6.8-7.5 billion in military aid (see figure 30). They have also sent some \$900 million worth of arms to Cambodia and \$500 million to Lacs (for a total of nearly \$9 billion worth of military assistance to Indochina in the past five years). Approximately 2,500 Soviet military advisers support the military assistance program in Vietnam and some 1,500 Soviet military personnel man installations in the country. In addition, there are 500 Soviet advisers in Lacs and another 100 in Kampuchea. The advisers have enabled Vietnam to modernize its Army through assistance in training, maintenance, and organization; advisers also instruct on military strategy, tactics, and doctrine

154. Despite frictions, the Soviet/Vietnamese relationship will continue. To back up their commitment, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official said in 1985 that the USSR would double its economic aid to Vietnam in the next five years. The promised aid was tied to Vietnamese undertakings to increase production and to the export of raw materials to the USSR, and a good part of the aid will apparently go to the oil sector

155. North Korea. The Soviet Union made major provisions of arms to North Korea until 1974, when deliveries were sharply reduced. The reasons for reduced deliveries of weapons were Soviet reluctance to fuel a new conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Moscow's disapproval of Pyongyang's close ties to China, and

North Korea's inability to pay in hard currency. In addition, the Soviets and the North Koreans became competitors in the Third World arms market. North Korea made almost \$2 billion worth of deliveries of Soviet-designed arms to Middle Eastern countries in exchange for hard currency from 1980 to 1984

156. In the mid-1980s, Soviet-North Korean relations improved, and the provision of arms and assistance resumed. During 1982 to 1986 the value of Soviet deliveries was over \$850 million. The Soviets have delivered 46 MIG-23 Floggers, giving North Korea the first qualitative improvement to its Air Force in many years; the Soviets also have provided SA-3 missiles. Ships from the two countries have exchanged port visits and air and naval forces of the two countries recently conducted their first known combined military exercise. In return Pyongyang has given the Soviets permission to fly reconnaissance planes over North Korea to collect intelligence against US, South Korean, and Chinese forces, and it has increased its support for the USSR's nuclear disarmament initiative and Moscow's call for an Asian security conference.

IV. How Military Assistance Advances Soviet Foreign Policy

157. Military assistance plays an important role in advancing Moscow's overall strategic goals:

- Political Influence. Soviet military assistance efforts have helped give Moscow significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but also in a number of Third World Marxist countries: especially Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. To a limited degree, large arms sales have also increased Soviet influence in non-Marxist countries such as India, Syria, and Libya.
- Hard Currency Earnings. These accrued from sales of arms to Third World customers that are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities. In 1983 such activities reached a peak of \$8 billion, and arms sales accounted for 23 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. Hard currency remains a critical component of Moscow's efforts to pay for imports of agricultural products and advanced technological equipment. In this regard, hard currency plays a particularly critical role because it can be applied to eliminate bottlenecks (through purchase of spare parts) and to lead modernization efforts (through purchase of turnkey factories and new technology).

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Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and to a base in Vietnam. Deployments of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Libya and Syria are intermittent but taken together they serve to make a Soviet naval air presence virtually continuous in the Mediterranean. Soviet access to facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen supports a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean (albeit on a much smaller scale than in the Mediterranean)

159. The Soviets also enjoy benefits vis-a-vis China by their presence in Vietnam. It reinforces the image of the USSR as a global power, helps deter large-scale Chinese military action against Vietnam, curbs Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, and is a constant reminder to China that it is encircled by unfriendly states.

160. The USSR is also using its political and military influence in Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets are counting on projecting an image of patron reliability, military force, and permanent presence in Ethiopia in order to intimidate US allies in the region or to persuade them that Soviet patronage carries greater advantages than does that of the United States

161. Soviet Arming and Training of Terrorists and Revolutionary Groups. The Soviets have no compunction about supporting foreign insurgent and terrorist groups; the primary consideration is whether the activities of these groups further Soviet interests. A key factor, however, is whether Moscow's efforts can be camouflaged. The Soviets openly support only select insurgent groups, mainly those with a claim to political legitimacy, like the PLO or SWAPO. By contrast, in dealing with most other foreign political extremist groups, they try to work with and through allies and radical states, including several Marxist regimes. Since some of these governments engage in terrorism or support terrorist groups on their own accounts, the precise Soviet role is obscured:

- In the Middle East, some Soviet military equipment—primarily small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-fired SAMs—supplied to Syria, Libya, and South Yemen is passed on to terrorist groups.
- In other parts of the Third World, particularly in Latin America, where violence has long been the normal way to achieve political power, the USSR and its allies—notably Cuba, East Germany, and Bulgaria—provide training, weapons, funding, guidance, and other forms of support to numerous Marxist insurgent and terrorist groups. Chief

among the target countries are Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Typically, the Soviets and East Europeans advocate revolutionary violence only when the prospects seem rewarding; the Cubans and Nicaraguans are more adventuresome, viewing violence as a way to bring about rewarding prospects.

162. Soviet Access to Western Technology. As a spinoff of its military aid to India, the USSR is well positioned to acquire technology. The large official Soviet presence there reinforces bilateral cooperation across a number of fronts—political, economic, military, and scientific—and provides an excellent cover for clandestine technology acquisition

163. The Soviet Union acquires Western technology in India through a variety of mechanisms, including legal and illegal purchases, cooperation and exchange agreements, and intelligence operations. We have no evidence that formal trade agreements themselves promote illegal technology transfer, but the continued well-established, bilateral cooperation over a broad range of scientific disciplines enables Soviet scientists to profit from access to their Indian counterparts. Many scientists in India were trained in the United States and have retained informal contacts with US colleagues in high-technology fields. We believe these contacts—which the Indian Government encourages—offer great scope for technical data diversions that are almost impossible to monitor

164. International Support for Soviet Policies. Recipients of Soviet military assistance are influenced to support Soviet foreign policy positions, particularly in the UN. Moreover, Third World countries that have emerged from the Western colonial experience are generally predisposed to support Moscow's positions in situations where their own interests or ideology are not engaged

165. Stability of Regimes Friendly to the USSR. In the countries where Moscow has gained a measure of influence, the Soviet presence has lent a measure of stability. Soviet and Bloc assistance to many LDCs has enhanced their internal security forces to such a degree that they have been able to survive extensive internal strife and insurgencies. In other countries, particularly Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, the Soviet-assisted buildup of military forces has strengthened these countries so other Third World countries are deterred from threatening them. Not content merely to deter, Soviet aid has helped Nicaragua and Vietnam to challenge their neighbors, while

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Libya's ability to pursue a military role in North Africa stems largely from huge Soviet arms transfers to it over the years.

V. Factors That Inhibit Growth in Soviet Military Assistance

166. There is little doubt that the Soviets believe they have made significant gains from their military assistance policy, and, by any objective standard of measurement, they have. Particularly noteworthy are gains in countries with a rigid socialist orientation and which face a significant internal and/or external threat. These countries include Nicaragua, Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Many other countries have managed to stay out of or cast off a close Soviet embrace even as they continue to receive Soviet arms. Such countries include Algeria, Guinea, Egypt, India, Lihya, North Yemen, Somalia, and Syria. Soviet expansion and influence are subject to limitations:

- The amount of arms the Soviets deliver seems to have little relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gain. During the period 1982 through 1986 the Soviets sent approximately \$15 billion worth of arms to Iraq, \$9-10 billion to Syria, \$6-8 billion to India, \$3 billion to Algeria, and \$5 billion to Libya. While none of these states directly criticize Soviet policies and most give vocal support to them, the Soviets do not exercise meaningful control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of these countries. L. fact, except for countries where Soviet or Cuban military forces are dominant, for example, Afghanistan and Angola, no Third World country faces the risk of sacrificing its sovereignty to Soviet control.
- The Soviets have failed to protect client regimes. Over the last quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to project military power against Western military forces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states.
 - Moscow's most serious setback was in Cuba in 1962 when the potential of escalation with the United States prevented the IUSSR from setting up medium-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States.
 - In 1970, at the request of the Egyptian Government, the Soviets deployed almost 10,000 military personnel in a defensive role against Israeli air attacks. But the Soviets took no offensive action against Israel itself.

167. As a result of these setbacks, the Soviets have been careful to avoid situations in the Third World that could lead to escalation. In the 1980s, Moscow helped set up new air defense systems and trained pilots in both Syria and Libya. When these air defenses were challenged by Israel and the United States respectively, the Soviets limited their own involvement. They responded to subsequent criticism and repaired diplomatic rifts by providing more advanced weapons

168. Moscow has on occasion turned against long-standing client regimes, shifting support from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977, and overthrowing governments in Afghanistan in 1979 and South Yemen in 1986. As a result, the enthusiasm in some Third World countries for inviting a larger Soviet presence into their territory has been soured. Third World countries have noted other detriments to Soviet aid:

- Moscow's training of LDC military personnel has often produced mixed results. In some poorer countries, mainly in Africa, Soviet military training is sometimes the only type available, is valued, and sometimes wins friends and influences people. Often, however, trainees resent the political indoctrination that accompanies the military training. Among more experienced trainees, even the military instruction is disdained because it is technically unsophisticated, rigidly formatted, and provides limited opportunity for handson training. Trainees also experience racism from instructors and Soviet society.
- The Soviets have mixed feelings in supplying advanced weapons to LDCs. They want their clients to do well in confrontations, but they are reluctant to provide their most advanced systems for three reasons: they fear technological compromise to the West, they are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly in the hands of Third World operators, and sales of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Warsaw Pact forces. Nonetheless, the Soviets will need to sell more advanced weapons both to earn currency and to retain markets in key countries, such as India and Algeria, against Western competition. Thus, a variant of the MIG-29, Moscow's latest tactical fighter, will probably be sold abroad in some quantity. In doing so the Soviets will probably accept economic and security trade-offs similar to those of the West providing F-16s and Tornado aircraft to LDCs

169. Despite all of these difficulties, it would be very hard to dislodge the Soviets from their most

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valued Third World countries. As previously mentioned, the West will have little success in states such as Angola and Ethiopia as long as the regimes rely so much on Soviet arms, training, logistics, and security. Moreover, such regimes may believe that any attempt to rid themselves of Soviet control would result in a country.

- The continuing attractiveness of low Soviet prices, substantial grant aid, and easy repayment terms on most military hardware is likely to preserve Soviet military assistance relationships. Although states such as Algeria and Peru flirt with Western hardware supplies, and probably would prefer Western systems, they have not, thus far, found the Western financial terms sufficiently attractive to warrant significantly diminishing their ties to Moscow.
- The provision of spare parts, training, and support equipment is a major part of the Soviet military assistance program. Spare parts, and the technicians who provide needed expertise, afford the Soviets with continued entree over an extended period.


170. Because of the Soviets' concern over maintaining security for their advanced technology and over their own modernization needs, there are certain weapons which we believe the Soviets will not deliver to Third World countries in the next few years:

- The MIC-31 Foxhound. When deployed in numbers, this aircraft will be the primary defender against cruise missiles launched from the B-52/B-1; it embodies too many technical secrets for the Soviets to risk its export.
- The SU-24 Fencer D. The Fencer D has a "buddy" air-refueling capability and was specifically designed to be able to penetrate enemy air defenses and attack ground targets. It has new avionics as well, including TV and/or forwardlooking infrared (FLIR).
- Late-model missiles, such as the AS-13 Kingbolt, the SA-12 Gladiator, and the SS-12 Scaleboard.
- Advanced electronics and fire control sustems on selected modern weaponry

VI. "The Burden of Empire"

171. In the years since World War II the Soviet Union, in its struggle for influence beyond its borders—as it believes befits a world power—has acquired a number of dissimilar socialist allies and has

Figure 32
Soviet Economic Aid to
LDCs, 1982-86



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established aid relationships with a number of other countries. As noted previously, these countries receive extensive military assistance as well as economic aid and constitute a considerable economic burden to the USSR. This burden has increased at a time when Moscow's export earnings are falling because of reduced oil prices and the decline of the dollar. Nonetheless, we judge that this burden is and will continue to remain, affordable

The Value of Economic Aid

172. Soviet economic aid to non-Communist LDCs amounts to about \$1.5 billion—only 14 percent of total Soviet economic aid—and is likely to remain at a low level. As shown in figure 32, the bulk goes to Communist LDCs, with Cuba by far the largest single recipient. Aid requirements to Cuba and Vietnam will continue to run at least \$5-6 billion a year

173. The protracted deterioration in the economies of Third World Marxist client states is raising the ante for Moscow. Future aid requests from Nicaragua will probably amount to at least half a billion dollars annually over the next five years and the war in Afghanistan is costing Moscow about \$200-300 million annually, according to some sources

174. Moscow's economic aid has been primarily fashioned to penetrate the economies of a few key states; it is not designed to address the basic development needs of Third World countries. In spite of the resources Moscow has devoted to its program in recent years, friends and foes alike have been critical of Soviet aid. In order to stem the further deterioration of

their clients' economies, in several cases the Soviets have encouraged expanded economic contacts between Soviet-supported LDCs and Western aid donors. Moscow will encourage the manipulation of Western economic assistance while counting on military assistance to maintain its status as these countries' principal patron:

- Among Soviet client states, Angola and Mozambique have encouraged increased aid and investment from the West, and Ethiopia uses Western-supplied food to selectively feed a population that is being deliberately uprooted (and sometimes selectively starved) to prevent dissent.
- Socialist countries such as Congo, Guinea, Mali, and Madagascar are turning to the West to rebuild their economies.
- South Yemen's economy has been shattered by the conflict in early 1986 and the demise of much of its trained and educated leadership. With little help from the West in sight, Moscow will have primary responsibility in propping up its economy.

Although Moscow has typically relied on military programs to preempt Western influence and maintain its own, we believe Moscow's loss of credibility in the economic field is negatively affecting Soviet interests in these countries

The Value of Military Assistance


175. As noted above, Soviet economic assistance to Communist countries is high, and to non-Communist countries is low. The reverse is true for military aid. Figure 33 shows that military assistance has averaged a little over \$3 billion per year from 1982 to 1986 to Communist LDCs. It will probably remain at that level in the future. Most Soviet military assistance goes to non-Communist countries; deliveries to these states peaked at about \$13 billion in 1982-83 as a result of the emphasis (which began in the 1970s) placed on hard currency earnings. While grant aid and attractive credits continued to be offered to Moscow's poorer arms recipients, financial concessions to major customers such as Algeria and Libya largely disappeared. Moreover, since the 1970s the Soviets have generally demanded hard currency payments for spare parts and nonlethal equipment such as trucks and transport helicopters sold by the USSR's civil exporters

VII. Soviet Arms Sales for Hard Currency

176. Despite the difficulties described in the previous section, the military assistance program has pro-

Figure 33

Current Value of
Soviet Arms Deliveries to
Third World Countries, 1982-86



vided the Soviets with significant hard currency earnings. In fact, even though these earnings have declined in the past few years, they still constitute over 20 percent of all Soviet hard currency earnings. Total Soviet carnings from arms sales (including freight and insurance charges) in the last six years—most of which consist of hard currency—are as follows:

| | | | | | Billion US\$ |
|--------|------|------|------|------|-----------------------|
| 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 (preliminary) |
| 6.5 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 5.6 | 6.0 |
| (S NF) | | | | | |

177. Moscow faces a number of constraints in its efforts to retain its share of the arms market. Some are cyclical, for example, the normal period of consolidation after the signing of a major contract. Other constraints, however, appear to be longer term and will in future years reduce Moscow's ability to maintain its market share. In 1986 Soviet total hard currency earnings declined to about \$28-30 billion due primarily to the fall in energy prices, which decreased the earnings of Soviet oil and gas exports and reduced the capability of other oil exporting countries to buy arms and to import goods. Beyond the decline in the price of oil, other factors will constrain Soviet arms earnings:

— Shifting needs and expectations of recipient states. Many clients have become more demanding as they encounter problems absorbing equipment already received. Some, such as Algeria,

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are unhappy with Soviet arms and seek better or more sophisticated equipment. Others want to diversify their arms sources for political reasons.

- Increased competition from the West. Traditional suppliers, including the United States and Western Europe, have been joined by new ones, such as Brazil and South Korea, in aggressive and successful marketing efforts. In the early 1980s even Egypt delivered almost \$500 million worth of arms to Iraq, including MIG-21s and T-54/55 tanks. This has cut into what might otherwise have been even stronger markets for Moscow.
- Increased competition from Communist suppliers outside the Warsaw Pact. China, North Korea, and Yugoslavia—all holders of significant inventories of older Soviet equipment—are making inroads on Warsaw Pact arms sales. During the period 1982-86, these Communist countries exported about \$9.4 billion worth of arms.

In order to retain its market share, Moscow may give some traditional cash customers <u>such as Iraq and</u> Libya substantial amounts of credit

178. Moscow's insistence that most of its customers pay for at least part of the arms they receive means increased weapons deliveries will tend to generate increased hard currency earnings even when substantial credit is given. Soviet attempts to maximize hard currency earnings, particularly from arms sales, will result in a more aggressive search for markets in the Third World. This sales campaign will be concentrated on OPEC members and others that have had large hard currency surpluses with the USSR, such as Malaysia and Argentina. Despite declining oil revenues, there are still a few opportunities for expansion, and Moscow could decide to offer state-of-the-art arms as an incentive. The Soviets will probably sign additional agreements with countries such as Algeria, Jordan, and Kuwait. These will probably enable Moscow to prevent further decline in hard currency earnings from arms sales; however, these earnings will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of the decade.

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VIII. Probable Developments in the Soviet Military Assistance Program Over the Next Five Years

179. While the fall in oil prices and tight finances in Third World countries will continue to constrain Soviet sales of arms for hard currency, these factors, in themselves, will not basically affect the overall Soviet position in the Third World. The number of Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers and technicians in LDCs will probably increase marginally because of the need for greater technological assistance to service advanced weapons. The number of Third World personnel being trained in Warsaw Pact countries will also increase. Overall, Moscow will look for states in need of a military supplier that perceive there is no better option than the USSR.

180. Another major group of countries that will continue to receive assistance are pro-Soviet Third World countries facing external threats or insurgencies. Western and Chinese support for insurgencies against Soviet-backed regimes will prompt the Soviets to continue their large deliveries of conventional fighting equipment, particularly military helicopters. Vietnam and Afghanistan received large numbers of helicopters in the early 1980s and, from 1983 to 1985, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua received many more. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries such as Libya, Iraq, Angola, and Mozambique, which perceive active threats from across their borders

181. The Soviets will continue their indirect support for terrorist groups. The costs of supporting terrorists via intermediaries appear to be slight, whether in terms of money, reputation, influence, or risk. The Soviets will work with and through allies and radical states that engage in terrorism or support terrorist groups on their own accounts, thus obscuring the precise Soviet role

In the Americas

182. Deliveries of military assistance will go to:

— Cuba. Although Soviet military aid to Cuba has given Castro some offensive capability in recent years, Cuba's military is still primarily a defensive force geared to making an attack by the United States on Cuba as costly as possible. We believe that the Soviets will continue to strengthen Cuban air defenses and naval units but will not send weapons that the United States would

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find provocative. The Soviets have not sent MIG-25 fighters or SA-5 missiles that could challenge SR-71 flights (equipment they have delivered to other LDCs) and probably will not, both for reasons of cost and potential provocation. The Soviets will also continue to moderately expand their own assets on the island and to improve Castro's capacity to support revolutionary regimes and movements abroad.

- Nicaragua. Despite Moscow's desire to maintain a ceiling on its commitments, Warsaw Pact military aid continues, and economic aid is going to be an increasing burden to the Soviets. The Soviets and Cubans will continue to support counterinsurgency operations and improve air defenses. Ground-based air defenses probably will be upgraded during the next 18 months as the Sandinista regime expands its air surveillance tracking network, acquires more modern equipment (such as the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns), and gains experience. The lack of trained Nicaraguan operators and maintenance personnel means that additional Cubans will be needed to staff and maintain the radar network. Despite the fact that the Soviets and their allies have trained or are training up to 40 Nicaraguan pilots to fly MIG-21s, we believe it is unlikely that Moscow will provide jet fighters in the near future. Provision of jet trainers such as the L-39, however, is a possibility.
- Peru. We doubt that Peru's ties to the Soviet Union will expand significantly during President Garcia's term, but Peru will continue to be attracted to Soviet weaponry. Despite efforts to reduce dependence on the USSR (for example, by purchasing Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers from France) the Peruvian military, faced with severe budget restrictions, continues to purchase Soviet weaponry because of highly favorable financing terms, the relatively low price tags on Soviet arms, and a lack of alternative sources for spare parts. Soviet arms sales probably will include counterinsurgency equipment for the Army and helicopters and transport aircraft for the Air Force. Because of poor high-altitude performance, the Peruvian Air Force may replace some of its MI-6 Hook and MI-8 helicopters with MI-17 Hip Hs. Such a trade would require the dispatch of more Soviet advisers. There is a continuing danger that, over the long term, exposure to Soviet hardware, training, and doctrine could undermine the anti-Communist

Elsewhere in Latin America. The Soviet Union will continue efforts to improve relations with other Latin American democracies. Economic relationships with Brazil and Argentina may expand, and the Soviets may even succeed in selling military equipment to other Latin countries.

Africa: South of the Sahara

183. Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets and Cubans are pursuing long-term objectives there that reflect a mix of motivations. Critical variables will affect the course of Soviet policy, but the unfolding of events will provide Moscow and Havana with several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region. Moscow's efforts will be primarily directed to strengthening its two clients bordering South Africa and reinforcing the Soviet position in the Horn. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique have often complained about the Soviets' poor logistic supply networks, insufficient stores of fuel and ammunition, inadequate training, poor counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, and the general shoddiness of Soviet equipment. Nonetheless, we expect the USSR to remain the region's principal supplier of military assistance. Few if any of the most advanced Soviet military systems will be deployed; they are not needed in the types of operations that will be conducted.

184. The Soviets will also emphasize their assistance to insurgent groups such as SWAPO and the ANC. Developments expected in specific countries include:

— Angola. The Soviet determination to hold on in Angola and to neutralize UNITA is plain. Deliveries of military equipment have been heavy in the last three years, and, at times, there is an apparent urgency to the Soviet effort. The number of Soviet transport aircraft flying military

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cargo missions is the highest since 1975 when the Soviets and Cubans consolidated the MPLA in power; the deliveries of the most recently provided fighter, the MIG-23 Flogger G, and the Soviet-supplied, Cuban-manned SAM belt across southwestern Angola complicate future South African tactical air sorties and resupply flights to UNITA. This Soviet commitment is expected to continue, with expanded air defenses to complete the SAM belt in southeastern Angola, but SA-5s will probably not be sent.

- Should the South Africans inflict serious damage on Angolan Government forces, pressure would almost certainly grow on the Soviets and Cubans for expanded involvement in air-to-ground and air-to-air operations. We believe that Moscow would prefer to avoid direct confrontation with South African-piloted aircraft. However, we cannot rule out a Soviet combat role in air operations if Moscow believes that South Africa's activity poses a direct threat to the viability of Angola's military forces. If such a threat does not materialize, the Soviets are not likely to expand their involvement to include direct participation in combat actions, but Cuban air activity may increase.
- We do not envision new MPLA policies over the next year that would violate what the Soviets perceive as Moscow's fundamental interests. In fact, we anticipate a strengthened MPLA commitment to the armed struggle against both UNITA and South Africa, which, in the MPLA's view, is not inconsistent with participation in the talks on withdrawal of Cuban forces.
- Mozambique. While limiting risks and costs, Moscow wants Maputo to return to a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet orientation, and the Soviets seek a central role in influencing Mozambique's foreign and domestic policies. The Kremlin will work to undermine Western influence by emphasizing that the West is not to be trusted, despite the fact that Western donors have provided economic aid and minor amounts of military assistance. The security situation will continue to deteriorate, and the FRE-LIMO government may lose control of some key urban areas.
- If this scenario comes to pass, Moscow would probably increase its military support to Maputo by providing more fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery, and advisory support in exchange

for a Mozambican pledge to limit its turn Westward or for an agreement to increase Soviet naval and air access to Mozambican facilities. Moscow might also take this step in response to Western or increased South African efforts to aid RENAMO. A moderate increase in Soviet military aid would not be enough to turn the military tide against the rebels, but it could reinforce the Soviet position in Mozambique at a reasonable cost.

- Zimbabwe. The cool relations between Zimbabwe and the USSR are improving somewhat, but military, economic, and party-to-party ties to Moscow and other Communist governments will probably remain limited. Mugabe might increase his reliance on the Soviets as a source of security assistance if Harare becomes bogged down in a seemingly unending military commitment in Mozambique, or if there are more South African cross-border raids, or if other sources of assistance dry up. Although negotiations have so far been difficult, we believe Zimbabwe and the USSR will eventually sign a military aid agreement that includes the provision of air defense equipment.
- South Africa. The senior Soviet leadership see its South African programs as a long-term effort. Several Soviet officials have spoken about a 10-to 15-year time frame before the ANC has a real prospect of coming to power because Moscow judges the Botha regime as still firmly in power. South African Communist Party (SACP) and ANC programs to encourage, probe, and exploit disaffection will be encouraged by the Soviets. In the interim, Moscow will keep up its across-the-board but low-level support.
- Tanzania. In late 1986 the Soviets signed a \$190 million arms deal with Tanzania. Moscow has also authorized Tanzanian use of Soviet weapons for operations inside Mozambique, believing it to be an effective way to support Maputo—and to curry favor with the other states adjacent to South Africa—without using Soviet forces.
- Guinea. Guinea and the USSR have signed new military assistance agreements, but they do not appear to signify a shift in Conakry's increasingly pro-Western stance.

- Somalia. Somali President Siad's recent effort to improve relations with the USSR is designed to deflect domestic criticism of his close ties to the United States, to explore the possibility of gaining Soviet assistance in his continuing talks with Ethiopia, and to offset anticipated cuts in US military aid. These initiatives are not likely to eniov much success, however, because of Moscow's deep distrust of Siad and its unwillingness to jeopardize its relationship with Ethiopia. The Siad government probably believes that the threat of improved Soviet-Somali relations can win it more assistance from Washington. Although Siad is not likely to abrogate the military access agreement with the United States, he may express his frustration by putting restrictions on the use of Somali facilities for operational, exer-
- Ethiopia. The Soviets will continue to deliver to Ethiopia the same types of military equipment as before. In return, the Soviets may expand their use of military facilities there. Soviet interest in such an expansion is probably heightened because their access to airfields and ports in South Yemen may be affected by the continuing instability in that country. Soviet naval air operations from Asmara airfield will probably not be resumed, however, until the security situation also improves in Ethiopia.

cise, or logistic activity.

Despite disagreements, a significant reduction in the Soviet military advisory presence in Ethiopia is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Mengistu appears determined to seek a military solution to the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies and needs the Soviets to keep his armed forces combat capable, but neither the government nor the insurgents have the capability to decisively defeat the other. In the unlikely event Mengistu were overthrown soon, we believe a successor military regime might move to climinate or at least reduce the influence of Marxist-Leninist institutions in an effort to attract Western economic support and to rally domestic political support. But Ethiopian security interests will all but guarantee Moscow a high degree of political leverage with almost any new regime that wields power in Addis Ababa

The Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf

185. In response to increased Western competition (and to security threats to their clients), the Soviets have moved to make some of their more capable weapon systems available. Syria obtained SA-5s and SS-21s in 1983. Iraq has received the MIG-29, Syria may get it soon, and Libya (which received SA-5s in 1985-86) could get it later in the decade. Beginning in 1985, SA-13s and SA-14s have been delivered to Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. To retain valued clients such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq, Moscow has been willing to reschedule payments in the past few years. But we believe major buyers of arms for hard currency owe Moscow at least \$30-45 billion for past deliveries. As a result the Soviets may now be less willing to sell or give away arms to these countries unless there is a clear need, as in Iraq, or unless they can obtain political gains in return for easier terms

186. Soviet efforts to gain greater influence in the region through arms deliveries are probably stymied. Few Arab countries in the Mediterranean will allow a significant increase of Soviet advisers and technicians in their countries. In the Arabian Peninsula, most countries are apprehensive of what they perceive as the Soviet role in the coup in South Yemen. The aftermath of the coup will make their relations with other countries there more difficult. The North Yemenis are already openly suspicious of Moscow's behavior in the crisis, and the conservative Persian Gulf states are more convinced of the dangers of opening too much to Moscow. Should South Yemen pursue policies designed to undermine its neighbors, the Soviet position in the region would be adversely affected:

— Suria. The Soviet Union will continue to supply Syria with some of its more advanced military equipment. It will do so to demonstrate its commitment to the Syrian regime short of a direct confrontation with the United States or Israel and to attempt to gain greater access to Syrian air and naval facilities. Moscow's refusal to risk escalation will nonetheless preclude Soviet pilots from flying fighters or bombers in a combat role from Syrian airfields. Newer weapons the Soviets could provide to Syrian forces over the next five years include SA-11 SAMs, MIG-29 and SU-25 aircraft, tanks, and Kilo-class submarines. Less likely candidates include SA-10 SAMs



Figure 34. Frogfoot A (SU-25).

and SS-23 SSMs. But the amounts of future Soviet deliveries will depend on a number of factors: Soviet perceptions of the threats to Syria, Syrian progress on debt payments, and Moscow's concern over Syrian actions that could lead to unwanted escalation.

- The USSR's economic relationship with Syria has been substantially upgraded over the past few years. Moscow has provided more than \$1 billion in new financing as well as planning on construction of nuclear research facilities and possibly a nuclear power plant. The projects greatly increase Damascus' dependence on Moscow for follow-on support. More than 4,000 Soviet and East European technicians are already working on development projects in Syria and, if these programs continue to grow, the number of Warsaw Pact technicians is likely to double. In addition, 6,400 Syrians are studying in Warsaw Pact countries, and, if current trends continue, this number could easily reach 10,000.
- Although Assad is firmly entrenched, his survival is also of concern to the Soviets. If he were to die soon—and there is a moderate chance of this occurring in the next two to five years—the Soviet position in Syria could erode, though we believe this is unlikely and there is little chance that Syria would align itself with the West.
- Libya. If oil prices stay at current levels, Tripoli's arms purchases will remain depressed. The Soviets have provided support to automate and upgrade Libyan air defenses, but they will probably wait a few years before providing advanced arms such as the MIG-29, the SU-25, and the 300-km range SSC-1B coastal defense cruise missile. The Soviets are likely to continue to rebuff Qadhafi's requests for a defense agreement, but will attempt to patch over differences with him to gain greater influence over Libyan politics and the choice of a possible successor. Deliveries will probably be carried out on a case-by-case basis to force Libya to pay Moscow its back debts.

- Although Qadhafi knows that the Soviets will not directly intervene if the United States should mount further attacks against Libya, he probably believes that an increased Soviet presence in the country would help deter potential US attacks or limit the resultant damage. Qadhafi probably is prepared to allow Moscow a moderate increase in access to Libyan ports and airfields, above the current rate of 10 ship visits and four to five aircraft deployments to Libya per year. Soviet ships and submarines could also increasingly rely on Libyan ports instead of on some of the offshore anchorages where they currently rest and replenish. But the Soviets would almost certainly not deploy Soviet-manned bombers or interceptors to Libya as long as Qadhafi rules the country.
- Moscow's willingness or ability to influence any succession in Libya is unknown. The Soviets might adopt a wait-and-see approach, believing their interests would be preserved in any case by continued Libyan dependence on Soviet military assistance. To strengthen Libya's dependency, the Soviets might offer additional weaponry to the new regime at concessional rates. A new government could be cool toward such an offer because of reduced enthusiasm for more arms purchases or because other weapons might be available from Western suppliers.
- Algeria. Algeria's decisions on weapons purchases are influenced by its perception of a lack of US response to its weapons requests, a fall in the price of oil and gas that greatly reduced its capacity to purchase arms, and its concern over tensions in the region. All of these factors favor continued purchases of Soviet weapons. Despite its need for continued access to sophisticated military equipment at a lower cost than is obtainable from the West, Algeria will remain interested in Western weapons and a military relationship with the United States.
- --- The Soviets have offered an attractive arms package to Algeria including the T-72 tank, SA-5 missiles, and advanced aircraft. The Soviets might be willing to provide early models of the SU-24 Fencer in a few years. As a long-range penetrator, the SU-24 would add significantly to Algeria's capability to fight a two-front war. It would be especially valuable against Libya, where long distances and heavy SAM defenses must be negotiated to attack key targets.

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- Iraq. The Soviets are determined to supply Iraq with the weapons necessary to survive Iranian attacks. Thus, they will continue to provide the type of weapons they have in the past in addition to new types of aircraft, such as the MIG-29. The Soviets have stepped up their deliveries of arms, in particular, tanks and ground attack aircraft. Baghdad will nevertheless keep expanding its ties to the West because the Iraqis value its technology.
- Iran. Soviet-Iranian relations will remain strained as long as Tehran keeps up its anti-Soviet rhetoric, gives support to Afghan insurgents, suppresses the Tudeh Party, and keeps up other behavior that is hostile toward Moscow. Nonetheless, the Soviets will probably not restrain continued sales of munitions and small arms by Eastern Europe. Depending on the changing dynamics of international events, the Soviets may even encourage an expansion of sales from East European countries.
- Growing instability in Iran may also increase Soviet opportunities to cultivate contacts with leading radicals and among Iran's minorities and to intensify support for leftist opposition groups. If Moscow were to see opportunities for significantly expanded Soviet influence and Iranian concessions on key issues, including a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, it might consider relaxing its embargo on the sale of major weapon systems to Iran.
- -South Yemen. By using its MAG forces to intervene in the aftermath of the 1986 coup, Moscow protected its stake in South Yemen. Any South Yemeni government will be dependent on Moscow for most military and economic assistance and, in return, the Soviets will be able to maintain-and possibly enhance-their capacity to monitor US and Western activities in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean through their intelligence facilities there. Improved Soviet access to South Yemeni facilities would probably focus on maintaining their naval air reconnaissance capability and even upgrading it-perhaps by substituting TU-95 aircraft for IL-38s. But Moscow's first priority will be to restore stability in the country.
- —North Yemen. President Salih has not been satisfied with the quality of Soviet training programs and is concerned with the potential for subversion. In the wake of Soviet support for the

robels in South Yemen, he has probably moved to reduce North Yemen's reliance on the USSR for military aid and training. North Yemen has already replaced some Soviet advisers with others from Jordan and Egypt. The discovery of oil in North Yemen will enable it to obtain greater economic and military trade with the West over the long term. And in two to three years Salih will be able to achieve greater balance in his relations with Moscow and other countries. Nonetheless, North Yemen's significant debt (about \$700 million) to the USSR for past deliveries of military equipment and its recent renewal of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty will force Salih to continue to consider Soviet policy concerns. North Yemen could reduce the number of Soviet advisers in country if Iordan and/or Egypt were to send replacements

Asia Around China's Periphery

187. Soviet arms to Asian countries will continue to play a crucial role in buttressing the USSR's foreign policy in the region:

- Afghanistan. Moscow clearly wishes to increase the prospects for eventual Soviet success in pacifying and controlling the country through a more effective Kabul regime, better military performance against the Mujahedin, and, especially, a combination of pressures and inducements that could change Pakistan's policies. The costs and risks of alternatives-either withdrawal without regard for the survival of a Marxist regime or substantial escalation of military activity-have, up to now, contributed to the decision to hold course. The sham withdrawal of a token number of Soviet troops, declarations of a unilateral cease-fire, and pressures on Pakistan are designed to reinforce these efforts. Erosion of Pakistan's resolve is a key goal.
- India. Even though India is increasing its arms purchases from the West—advanced fighters from France, an aircraft carrier and Sea Harrier fighters from the United Kingdom, and submarines from West Germany—New Delhi will continue to rely on Moscow to play a strong supportive role in Indian defense strategy. Reporting indicates that Gandhi's government continues to see the USSR as a strategic counterweight to China and the United States. In our view, New Delhi will continue to pay little attention to Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, which normally operate in the far west, distant




Figure 35. Kilo-class medium-range attack submarine

from Indian shores. The Indians will also continue to take a low-key approach to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. We estimate that India will continue to depend on Moscow for spare parts, training, and major new weapon systems such as the MIG-29 aircraft and Kiloclass submarines. Deliveries of Soviet military equipment, under major arms agreements signed in the early 1980s or now planned, will not be completed until the mid-1990s and will dramatically increase India's estimated payments to the USSR. By then almost half of India's combat aircraft and more than half of its armored vehicles and major warships will be Soviet supplied. However, the September 1986 decision of the Indian Government to purchase the US-built F404 jet engine for its own indigenously designed jet fighter was a major blow to Moscow's efforts to limit the Western share of the Indian market.

Vietnam. Over the long term, there are some major weaknesses that might cause the Soviet/ Vietnamese alliance to unravel. These include the evergrowing debt that Hanoi owes to Moscow for aid and a rapprochement by either side with China. However, these issues are not likely to be overly troublesome in the next five years. Moscow will continue to deliver the same types of less modern military equipment it has sent before. To back up its military commitment the USSR has pledged to double its economic aid to Vietnam in the next five years. We believe that the Soviets' efforts in Vietnam are directed toward improving the capabilities of their base to better support their forward-deployed composite group of naval ships and military aircraft.

- North Korea. With the accession of new leadership in Moscow, Soviet-North Korean relations have improved dramatically over the last three years, particularly in the strengthening of military cooperation. The Soviets realize, however, that P'yongyang has an insatiable need for arms and economic aid. In return for increased deliveries of military equipment, North Korea could let Soviet planes stage flights from North Korean airfields. But relations are not likely to grow too much closer, and the Soviets will probably not deploy their own long-range aircraft to North Korea. The marginal increase in range that such basing would provide Soviet aircraft would be more than offset by the negative reactions of China, Japan, and the United States

IX. Implications for the West

188. Gorbachev has projected an image of foreign policy activism by use of increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda, and more sophistication in foreign policy. Although the Soviets remain willing to provide economic support to a few clients that depend on it for their survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is still arms transfer.

189. The delivery of military weapons alone has never given the Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxist Third World countries, and there is nothing inexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy to the USSR in the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and the interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences in determining the policies and orientation



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of LDCs. Thus, it is going to be much more difficult for the Soviets to use their military assistance to make significant new gains in the Third World.

190. This does not mean that the Soviets are not going to make gains in the future-they are. In particular, their efforts in Central America and southern Africa will prove to be extremely troublesome for the United States. They will also find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait. They may gain significant influence over a few regimes, and they may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries to which they already have access. But the Soviets-because of their inability to extend substantial economic aid, the increased Western support to some insurgencies challenging Marxist regimes, their inability to project power against significant opposition, and declining hard currency earnings from arms sales-are coming up against limits to the benefits they can accrue by providing military assistance

191. Moscow's difficulties in earning hard currency raise the opportunity costs of aiding its client states and may reduce prospects for new grant aid or credits to non-Communist LDCs. Gorbachev knows that the USSR cannot underwrite the economic, social, or military development of any but a very few Third World countries—historically Cuba and Vietnam and now, increasingly, Nicaragua. In some countries the Soviets encourage a mixed economy with foreign investment from Western nations. Thus, even in states where Soviet influence is strong, the West will maintain an entree

192. Soviet limitations are particularly evident in their lack of opportunities to expand military access in return for their military assistance. Even in nations where there is a strong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about increasing the Soviet presence:

Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give the United States an excuse to bring its superior air and naval power to bear in Third World settings. On a broad scale, the Soviets will continue to militarily strengthen their allied regimes through measures that stop short of Soviet confrontation with the United States. Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unlikely to increase their military access in these countries.

- Syria probably realizes there are limits to the protection it can expect from Moscow. This stems from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness to directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and suspicions that Moscow might back revolutionary groups in opposition to the current leadership.
- The best prospects for Moscow's expansion of its access will probably occur in Vietnam and southern Africa. Over the next five years the Soviets will probably increase their naval and air capabilities in Vietnam. In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola. They could also send IL-38 ASW aircraft to Mozambique again, but such deployments would probably be sporadic in the near term

193. Despite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly in the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for the use of arms transfers in support of Soviet policy:

- Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftist governments fending off revolts, and countries confronting the West will almost always turn to the Soviets for support—partly for the political statement such ties imply.
- --- And the Soviets will almost always provide arms to movements and states, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit from sustaining the movements as long as Moscow's commitment and risk are not substantial

194. The Soviets will attempt to maintain their markets and to remain competitive with Western rivals. We believe that the Soviets will provide at favorable prices or terms a number of advanced weapons such as MIG-29s, SU-25s, and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers in LDCs will probably increase somewhat. Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so in the future. The number of Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will also increase. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries that perceive active threats from across their horders

195. Moscow will also continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when this


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action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leaning toward the West. Thus, Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. In addition, the Soviets also have the potential to gain in other regions if the West fails to provide significant economic and security assistance:

- In the Philippines the Soviets may be able to make inroads.
- Prospects for the Soviets would also improve in Algeria, Morocco, and especially Turisia, if any

of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling to provide vital economic or security assistance.

— Insufficient Western security assistance to African countries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies; for example, facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the major US effort for economic policy reform by African governments would suffer a major blow



ANNEX

Table 4 Current Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries to the Third World, 1982-86 a


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
| Recipient | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|---------------------|----------|-----------|---|-------------|------------|
| Latin America | | | | • | |
| Cuba | 1,620 | 1,280 | 1,360 | 805 | 1,460 |
| Grenada | 6 | NEGI. | | 0 | 0 |
| Guyana | 0 | 0 | | 15 | |
| Nicaraguo | 130 | 225 | 315 | 230 | 550 |
| Peru | 50 | 145 | 2 | 50 | 10 |
| Middle East | | | ········· | | |
| Algeria | 1,050 | 495 | 540 | 385 | 560 |
| gy pt | 25 | 60 | 55 | 50 | 6 |
| ran | 145 | 95 | 5 | NEGI. | |
| raq | 3,200 | 2,465 | 3,500 | 2,275 | 3,970 |
| ordan | 280 | 120/70 | 20 | 400 | 200 |
| Suwait | 0 | 45/75 | 65/110 | 25 | 13 |
| ibya | 1,120 | 940 | 1,165 | 840 | 730 |
| yria | 2,430 | 3,840 | 1,920 | 1,280 | 575 |
| North Yemen | 295 | 470 | 60 | 165/195 | 225 |
| outh Yemen | 245 | 785/600 | 325 | 395 | 225 185 |
| ub-Saharan Africa | | | | | |
| ngols | 655 | 1,070 | 1,345 | 730 | :,640 |
| enin | 5 | 17 | 3 | | 9 |
| urundi | 3 | | 10 | | |
| Sape Verde | 0 | 2 | 2 | ·· <u>-</u> | 9 |
| Conto | <u>ò</u> | 70 | 95 | | |
| thiopia | 550 | 1.000 | 1,200 | 900/750 | 17 245 |
| hana | 0 | 0 | 16 | | |
| uinea | 2 | <u>12</u> | 50 | 65 | 6 |
| uinaa-Bissay | | | 35 | | 50 |
| fadagasear | 37 | 45 | | | 20 |
| iali | 9 | 5 | 30 | | 9 |
| lozambique | i40 | 370 | 335 | | . 9 |
| igeria | 6 | 20 | ** * ********************************** | 270 | 165 |
| o Tome and Principe | 0 | | | | |
| ychelles | | <u>6</u> | 2 | | 3 |
| anzania | 50 | | | 2 | 25 |
| mbabwe | 0 | 18 | 35 | 40 | 20 |
| imbia | 0 | NEGI. | <u> </u> | 0 | 0 |
| sia | <u>v</u> | | | _ | 9 |
| ighanistan | 690/450 | 510/300 | | · | |
| ngladesh | 15 | | 740/645 | 735/500 | 1,060/600 |
| ambodia | 60 | | NECI. | NEGI. | <u>1</u> |
| din | 1,430 | | 195 | 355/275 | 125 |
| ini | | 980 | 930 | 1,525 | 1,885 |
| orth Korea | 85 | 140 | 125 | | 55 |
| elnam | 25 | 55 | 15 | 350 | 420 |
| cuan | 1.415 | 1.385 | 1,490/1,290 | 1,560/1,055 | 1,610 |

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
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

THURSDAY JULY 7, 1977 3

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Bordeaux and is Zaire's leading

party since 1972. (C)

Angola: Insurgent Activity in Cabinda

Insurgents in the Angeloni excitave of Cubinds. have suffered a number of reverses in recent weeks at the hands of Cubin and Angelon troops. Nerestheless, the Cabladen apparations are still pile to insuch small-content next of the content of the

After receiving relationements of more than 2,000 Cubens in May, Angolan government troops were able to regain ground lost during the spring and to drive Cabindan generalias out of the sorth. The

Cuban-Angolan task force receptured two Cabindan towns in late May and drove the guerillas from their provisional headquarters near the Zairian border in early June.

The Angolan government also responded to the insurgents' public threats against Gulf Oil Installations in Cabinda, by reinforning the area with Cuban troops.

Cuban tanks have been dug in around protected sites.

Government pressure in the north apparently prompted the genrillae to shift their focus to central Cabinda, where they claim to have made some gains. They say they overran two towns and attacked a regional military headquarters in late May.

gonal minary macacatares are every.

Nonetheless, the guerrillas' military
position appears to have deteriorated
seriously. The insurgent group reportedly
is renning low on supplies and ammunition.

no Western state has agreed to provide them with financial or military aid, but they believe their prospects for securing assistance in Portugal are good. They have opened an information office in Lisbon and are actively seaking the support of Portuguese businessmen and exites who had business interests in Cubinda but left when the present Angolan government assumed control.

ment assumed control.

In addition to their recent military setbecks, the guerrillar reportedly continue
to be plagued by internal political dissension stamming from long-standing
rivalries within the movement's top
leadership. Last month, a splinter group
hast claims to control two of the
movement's fire military districts in
Cabinda annousced the "dismissal" of
the president of the movement and the
formation of an alternative political
bureau. The leadership disputs, however,
will probably not interfere with the
guerrillar' ability to harass government
forces

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25



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National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

FRIDAY 21 APRIL 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 093

Angola: Aid to UNITA

Foreign military manufactor to Jenna Sarimbi's intergent National Union for the Total Independence of Angela has lacrossed sharply this year. UNITA's primary henefactors are France, Morocco, Sandi Arabia, Iran, and Egyst. While South Africa provided considerable support to UNITA during the Angelan ciril way, there is no evidence it has given the guerriles any material essistance this year.

Since the Angolan civil war, UNITA Since the Angolan civil war, UNITA has depended primarily on weapons and supplies eached during the fighting and on what it has subsequently captured from Cuban and Angolan Government forces. To obtain food, clothing, sad medicine, UNITA has often attacked government garrisons or stores in government-controlled villages. Over the past year, however, consumer goods have become increasingly scarce throughout the country and there have been critical food short-

try and there have been ortical food shortages in many rural areas.

UNITA is looking to its foreign supporters for additional supplies and more
sophisticated wasponry as it increases its
ize and extends its activities into
northern and eastern Angola. Over the
past year UNITA has increased its combat strength by 50 percom-it can now
field about 18,000 trained guerrillas in addition to about 5,000 recreits.

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

FRIDAY 21 APRIL 1978

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Angola...

From Page 1

UNITA's Other Supporters
Zaire has provided substantial
diplomatic and logistic support to
UNITA. It claims to have armed and
equipped two battations, which reportedly have been operating—sometimes in con-junction with Zairian armed forces—from

southern Zaire into eastern Angola.

Senegalese President Senghor has actively solicited international assistance for UNITA, most recently securing promises of possible support from Ivory Coast and Sudan. Senegal also sent UNITA 5,000

uniforms last month,
Earlier this month, TASS reported that 30 tons of military equipment stamped "Made in China" had been captured from "Made in China" had been captured from UNITA forces in southern Angola. There have been occasional unsubstantiated reports that the Chinese are funneling small amounts of aid to UNITA through

South Africa provided UNITA with only limited amounts of ammunition last year; no military essistance has been received since mid-1977, UNITA probably would prefer to cut all ties with the South Africans in order to attract increased support from other African and Arab states. West European and Arab supporters could easily make up for whatever limited military assistance the South Africans had been providing.

Deliveries to UNITA . Since January, about 130 tons of food, medicine, clothing, rifles, mortars, bazookas, ammunition, antitank and antipersonnel mines, and antiaircraft weapons have been delivered to UNITA weapons have been delivered to UNITA forces in southern Angola. UNITA owns several small planes, which it has used to fly the supplies along Zambia's border into southeastern Angola. UNITA also brings some supplies into eastern Angola by land from Zaire.

Savimbi soon bopes to establish a third supply route from Zaire into north-central Angola.

UNITA asserts that the alrifth has allowed it to clothe and equip several thousand guerrillas. It is hoping to receive another 100 tons of equipment and supplies in the next few months, which should allow it to field 2,000 more trained

should allow it to field 2,000 more trained guerrillas.

After spending several months with his forces in southern Angola, Savimbi departed last week for Kinshata where he hopes to expedite the delivery of already promised assistance and possibly secure new aid commitments. He plans while there to appeal personally to the Moroc-cans and the French to accelerate their shipments, and may try to contact poten-

tial new suppliers.
Savimbi is particularly anxious to acquire antiaircraft weapons to counter Cuban-piloted helicopters and fighter air-Cuban-pitoted heuropters and signter air-craft. Although some guerrilla units in southern Angola recently acquired SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, Savimbi says they are inoperable because of mishandling.

Outlook
Savimbi has often toyed with the idea
of capturing and holding several key
towns in southern Angola, His African supporters have strongly argued against such action, however, because they see it

as a step toward establishing a as a step toward establishing a secessionist government. Although they are apparently willing to provide clandestine support to a guertilla movement claiming to represent the Angolan people, they would have considerable difficulty justifying their support for a secessionist regime in the face of the OAU's longstreding position that all African borders are inviolable.

A decision to escalate the energille

A decision to escalate the guerrilla A decision to escalate the guerrilla struggle to the conventional level could cause problems for some of UNITA's West European and Arab backers because this would require a greater and more which be commitment on their part. Such a decision, however, might be more acceptable if UNITA were able to demonstrate as effective antisireraft and antiarmor cambility.

capability.

As long as Cuba maintains its substantial military presence in Angola, the conflict will remain stalemated. A substantial increase in Cuban troop levels, particular-

ly if coupled with an enhanced airstrike capability, could force Savimbi into a primarily defensive posture, but UNITA's guerilla forces could probably not be effectively neutralized even if the Cubans greatly increased their force



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Africa Weekly Review

10 March 1978

RP AWR 78-010 10 March 1978

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AFRICA WEEKLY REVIEW

10 March 1978

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NOTE: A supplement to today's edition of AFRICA WEEKLY REVIEW has been published and disseminated

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to

Angola: A Beleaguered Neto

Popular support for the Neto regime appears to be declining as Angolan and Cuban troops continue to battle antiregime guerrilla forces throughout the country and Angola's major economic and social problems go unresolved. Although these conditions have forced Neto to rely increasingly on Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other socialist states for economic and military assistance, the Angolan Government has not abandoned efforts to improve relations with the West. The cabinet appears split, however, between those advocating a balanced approach to foreign policy and the more militant pro-Soviet members who are gaining influence.

Only the substantial Cuban and Soviet presence in the country and foreign exchange earnings from the Cabinda oil operations—amounting to \$600 to \$800 million a year—prevent a total collapse of government authority. Plans are under way to increase oil production in Cabinda and off Angola's northern coast, but otherwise the economy is a shambles.

The economic situation in Angola appears to be worse than it was before the abortive popular revolt last May. There are critical food shortages in some rural areas and cases of starvation have been reported at some Luanda hospitals. Food, clothing, and consumer goods are scarce and very few markets or shops are operating in Luanda.

These problems are compounded by labor disorganization at the docks and a shortage of trucks. As of early January, at least 30 ships were reportedly waiting to unload their cargo at Luanda harbor; the backlog is costing the Angolan Government an estimated \$3 million a month in demurrage cost.

Although Neto has made considerable progress toward controlling dissent within his own party--another 200 political dissidents were reportedly detained late last month--the possibility of another popular uprising cannot

10 March 1978

be entirely discounted. Recent government attacks on the Catholic Church are deeply resented, and the secret police do not hesitate to arrest people arbitrarily.

Jonas Savimbi's insurgent guerrillas operate in over half the country and they pose a growing political and military threat to the Neto regime. While Angolan and Cuban troops have had some success containing insurgent groups in northern Angola and Cabinda, they are sustaining numerous casualties in all parts of the country.

The Communist Presence

Growing pressures on the regime have forced Neto to look increasingly to the Soviets and the Cubans for support. There are now about 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. By the beginning of 1978, 4,000 to 5.000 Cuban civilian advisers were serving in Angola and

this total is expected to climb to 10,000 during the year. The Cuban presence is augmented by about 1,000 Soviets and several thousand advisers from other socialist countries.

Cuban advisers are said virtually to run entire government ministries. Cubans are most numerous in the ministries of Construction and Housing, followed by Defense, Finance, Health, Education, Transport, and Foreign Trade. They also hold important posts at the banks and at the top levels of the internal security forces and the judiciary police. No Cubans apparently have been assigned to the Foreign Ministry or to the communications secretariat in the Transport Ministry—a probable indication of Neto's desire to maintain control over these functions.

The Soviets serve mainly as military instructors, technicians, or as advisers in the use of Soviet armor and other military equipment. They are now much more in evidence in Luanda, where they are said to run the naval base and in Mocamedes, where they are involved in the construction of a new ship repair facility.

Almost every East European state is represented in Angola. Bulgaria, followed by East Germany, has the largest contingent of advisers in the country. Most

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of the East Europeans work as agricultural advisers, although Romanian and Hungarian advisers reportedly run the customs office. The North Koreans have sent some textile experts to Angola.

The substantial and growing foreign presence in the country has become a major source of friction with the Angolans. There are numerous stories in Luanda of Cuban looting, rape, and cruelty by Cuban police and security forces. Popular dislike of the Cubans has reportedly become so widespread that Cubans usually travel in groups and avoid entering some of the urban slums, where black nationalist sentiment is strongest.

The Soviets are even less popular than the Cubans. They are considered arrogant, insensitive, and are strongly criticized for enjoying a much higher standard of living at the Angolans' expense. Neto undoubtedly realizes that his growing dependence on Cuban and Soviet advisers will aggravate such tensions, but he has little choice given the immensity and immediacy of his problems.

Relations With the West

Although Neto has moved closer to the Soviets in recent months, this has not slowed his campaign to attract Western technical expertise and economic assistance. Neto may hope that by encouraging greater Western involvement in Angola he will enhance the political legitimacy of his regime and increase his flexibility vis-a-vis Moscow.

Neto is not impressed with the quality of Soviet products sent to his country, and he probably doubts his Communist benefactors can meet all of Angola's needs. Moreover, Neto claims he suspects the Soviets were involved in the attempt to overthrow his government last May, and he reportedly believes another Soviet-backed effort to depose him could be in the offing now that his overall position appears to be weakening.

In announcing the appointment of Angola's first ambassador to Portugal last month, Neto noted the important economic benefits, including "the supply of technicians, machines, industrial, and agricultural products," that he hoped would result from improved relations with the West. The Angolans have also approached the Portuguese

and the Yugoslavs with requests for military assistance, but Portugal in particular has been slow in responding.

Neto has made significant progress in his efforts to gain international recognition. Sixteen Western and non-aligned states are represented in Luanda, including most Scandinavian states, the UK, Italy, and Brazil. Diplomatic relations have been established recently with Canada, Belgium, and the European Community, and an announcement is expected shortly regarding Spain. Neto says he is prepared to establish relations with the United States at any time so long as there are no preconditions.

The Yugoslav, Romanian, Nigerian, and Guinean Ambassadors in Luanda have urged the United States to recognize the Neto regime on the grounds that Angola will become totally dependent on the Soviet bloc if it is denied access to a broader array of foreign assistance. The Portuguese Government made the same argument last year when it embarked on a major effort to improve relations with Angola, but in recent months it is having second thoughts.

Such indications that Angola plans to keep the door open to the West, however, must be viewed cautiously. Neto appears to be under increasing pressure from militant prosoviets in the party to abandon the Western "option" and remove from office those advocating better relations with the West.

A Divided Leadership

Despite earlier reports that a major cabinet shakeup was likely early this year, Neto has announced only a

minor reshuffle in several lesser ministries. Several nonblack cabinet members who have been advocating better ties to the West, including Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and Justice Minister Diogenis Boavida, are still considered vulnerable, but so far they have retained their posts.

Neto probably is more sympathetic toward the pro-Western faction, but it is questionable how long he can resist demands that they be replaced by more leftist blacks. With the inclusion of more blacks and leftist military officers in the party leadership last December, the pressure is mounting on Neto to set Angola firmly on a Marxist-Leninist course in both foreign and domestic affairs.

Even if Neto succumbs and removes several pro-Western nonblacks from their current posts, they probably will continue to exert substantial influence in the government. Neto probably would try to move them into positions of secondary importance, rather than remove them entirely, because there are few, if any, high-ranking blacks who are qualified to assume such demanding posts.

Domestic Impact of Cuba's Involvement in Africa

The political, military, economic, and social costs to Cuba of its expanding role in Africa are still well within manageable limits and are not a significant constraint on Cuban policymakers. Only heavy Cuban casualties would be likely to present the Castro regime with difficult political problems.

Reaction to the country's extensive involvement in Africa is mixed among the Cuban people. Proregime activists openly support the African commitments, but many people are convinced that the country's current austerity is caused by the involvement; in fact, it stems largely from low world sugar prices. No organized opposition exists in Cuba, however, and without planning, coordination, and leadership, those who oppose Cuba's role in Africa have little impact on regime leaders. So far, opposition is limited to grumbling among friends and family of ordinary Cubans sent to do service in Africa.

As is his custom during periods of flagging popular support, President Fidel Castro has spent a good deal of time since mid-1977 traveling through the country trying to bolster morale. Castro is keenly aware of—and exploits—the considerable capacity of the Cuban people to endure hardships. His normal reaction is to manufacture both a reason to suffer and a scapegoat to hate. A master of media manipulation, he has little trouble refocusing public anger and generating renewed revolutionary momentum.

Castro is probably not yet overly concerned about public attitudes. The numerous speeches and heavy media treatment in the last six months are, in effect, preemptive moves to head off disaffection. Castro doubtless knows that the current level of discontent is well within tolerable limits and that by careful persuasion

he can keep it far short of the point where outright repression might be required.

Military Costs

Cuba now has 30,000 to 33,000 military personnel in Africa, including 19,000 to 20,000 in Angola and an estimated 10,000 to 11,000 in Ethiopia. Most were mobilized from Cuba's ready reserves, in part to spread the effects throughout the island and in part to avoid weakening Cuba's defences by drawing from active-duty personnel. The USSR has supplied about 30 Soviet fighter pilots to take the place of Cuban pilots flying combat missions in Ethiopia.

Provided the USSR continues to underwrite important aspects of the Cuban effort, Havana probably could increase its commitment significantly in Africa without seriously damaging its economy or defense capabilities.

For example, a 50-percent increase in Cuban military personnel in Africa-to about 50,000-would impinge on Cuba's military capabilities, but the impact would probably be manageable. Cuba's armed forces total about 180,000 personnel, includi g some 60,000 ready reservists who can be mobilized within 24 hours.

In addition, there are another 210,000 reservists who have undergone basic training and who could be on active duty within 20 days. Cuba's population is relatively young--53 percent of its 9.65 million people are under 25 years of age, with some 550,000 males between 18 and 24.

Economic Costs

The loss of skilled and unskilled workers has caused disruption in several sectors of the economy, but the costs to the economy in general have been relatively small. The loss of unskilled workers has been minimized by increased mechanization of the labor-intensive sugarcane harvest and the widespread use of student labor in agriculture.

Logistic costs have been limited to a relatively small portion of the Cuban merchant fleet at any one time and a small number of aircraft. This cost of

diversion has amounted to only about \$15 million annually at most and has not seriously disrupted Cuban trade patterns or commercial airline schedules.

Cuba's economic growth rate apparently slowed in 1976, but the slowdown was primarily the result of a small decrease in that year's sugar harvest and a decline in investment. Nonsugar agriculture registered small gains, as did industry, although output was impaired by a reduction in raw material imports from the West. In neither case did a shortage of labor significantly affect output. Although production data for 1977 are not yet available, it is unlikely that gross national product was any more affected in 1977 by Havana's involvement in Africa than it was in 1976.

While Cuba supplies much of the subsistence and salary costs for its military forces in Africa, the cost of virtually all the equipment and supplies used by the Cubans, as well as by the Africans being supported, is borne by the USSR. The USSR has also provided planes to facilitate Cuban logistics between Havana and Luanda. In addition, Soviet passenger ships have been utilized to transport many of the Cuban combat personnel now in Ethiopia.

The Angolan Government also apparently is sharing the cost of the Cuban presence in that country. The Angolans probably pay for the food and lodging of Cuban civilian advisers, and perhaps part of the subsistence costs for Cuban military personnel.

The direct costs of maintaining Cuban military personnel in Africa is estimated at about \$55 million to \$60 million annually. The total estimated \$70 million to \$75 million annual bill, including the cost of diverting Cuban ships and planes to the effort, represents only about 0.9 percent of estimated 1976 GNP. The share of Cuba's labor force represented by its military personnel in Africa equals about 1.1 percent.

Outlook

The political and economic costs of Cuban involvement in Africa will probably remain manageable for Havana, at least for the near term. A deepening popular disaffection—stemming from an exaggerated perception of

the financial costs--could pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers should the number of casualties the Cubans suffer increase rapidly.

Reporting on the number killed or wounded in Angola and Ethiopia is spotty at best and the regime does not announce casualty figures; estimates of Cubans killed in Angola since late 1975 range between 600 and 2,000. If there were a surge of casualties the regime would probably be unable to manage the domestic impact sufficiently to prevent open disaffection.

In such circumstances, the Cuban populace might resort to passive protests. Such measures would not be unprecedented in recent Cuban history. Worker slowdowns and widespread absenteeism occurred in the early 1970s when supplies of consumer goods failed to improve after the record 1970 harvest. These protests, together with strong pressures from the USSR, caused the government to institute major economic policy changes—some of which went against its basic ideological tenets—in an effort to increase economic production.

The Cuban people's demonstrated capacity for endurance and sacrifice may be further enhanced by the government's propaganda machinery. In the end, however, the extent and duration of Cuba's involvement will depend mainly on the degree of its leaders' dedication to the African policy. All indications so far are that they are prepared to pay a heavy price.

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this issue includes . . .

- Warsaw, Moscow strategy on Solidarity
- Moscow on Egyptian developments
- Soviet statement on role in Angola
- CPSU-Japanese Communist Party polemics

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23 SEPTEMBER 1981 FB TM 81-038











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USSR-SOUTHERN AFRICA

MOSCOW REPORTS DEATH OF PERSONNEL, AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR ANGOLA

Moscow has belatedly acknowledged that four Soviet personnel were killed and one captured during South Africa's recent incursion into southern Angola. A 19 September TASS report, published in PRAVDA on the 20th, seemed designed to respond to foreign and domestic speculation about Soviet involvement in Angola. It offered Moscow's strongest pledge to date of continuing military and diplomatic support for the Angolan Government. The TASS report, released almost three weeks after Pretoria reported that South African troops had engaged Soviet personnel, read like an official "TASS statement," but Moscow chose not to give the report the authority and commitment that such a designation would convey.

The TASS report was in part a blunt message for South Africa. It warned that "the Soviet side" placed responsibility for the death of the Soviet personnel on the South African Government and demanded "the immediate return" of the captured "engineer" and of the remains of the deceased. Like earlier Soviet statements on the intervention, it demanded an end to South African "aggression" and charged that Pretoria's "patrons" shared responsibility for it.

The report's careful delineation of the role of Soviet personnel in Angola may have been calculated to assuage any concern aroused among the domestic audience by reports of the Soviet deaths broadcast to the USSR by foreign radios. It maintained that Soviet personnel were in Angola only to provide training and technical advice, but it conceded that they were assisting in the defense sector as well as in the economy. It charged that foreign media were exaggerating Soviet involvement to justify Pretoria's attacks on Angola.

While underscoring the limits on the USSR's direct participation, the TASS report at the same time contained a stronger affirmation of Moscow's commitments to assist Angola than that offered by the official TASS statement on the South African incursion publicized on 26 August. Like the TASS statement, the report reiterated the USSR's "solidarity" with Angola and noted the friendship and cooperation treaty signed in 1976. But unlike the statement, it went on to specify that Soviet commitments to the Angolans include assistance in "strengthening their defenses" and promised that the USSR "will continue giving political, diplomatic, and material support both to Angola and to the national liberation movements in southern Africa.

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Latin American Trends

STAFF NOTES

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CI SNLA 76-020 No. 0700-76 May 19, 1976

LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Cuba-Venezuela: Repairing the Damage*

The Castro regime has begun efforts to repair the damage involvement in Angola has done to its relations with Venezuela, until recently one of the most influential proponents of reintegrating Cuba into Western Hemisphere activities.

Through a number of channels, Castro has tried to assure President Perez that he wants to return to the former relationship, which though still in the formative stages seemed to hold out prospects for substantial diplomatic cooperation and increased economic ties. When Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito visited Venezuela in mid-March, he reportedly conveyed Castro's assurances that Cuba would refrain from military intervention in the hemisphere. Then, in an interview published in early May in the widely read Venezuelan magazine "Bohemia," Castro took pains to emphasize that "no country in Latin America, whatever its social regime may be, should have anything to fear from the Cuban armed forces."

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May 19, 1976

*This is the first of two articles analyzing the impact on Cuba's Latin American relations caused by its intervention in Angola.

Cuba's efforts have had some effect in the economic field. An agreement announced in early May calls for Cuban purchase of \$1.6 million in petroleum by-products from one of the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum companies. Caracas is reportedly negotiating with Cuba and other countries for the purchase of 100,000 tons of sugar.

restore Cubana airline's charter service to Caracas. Flights were suspended indefinitely in early April by Venezuela on grounds that Cuba was trying to bring unauthorized persons into the country and circumventing customs inspections.

Meanwhile, Venezuelan tourists--who made up a large percentage of the passengers on the Cubana flights--appear to be traveling to Cuba via Panama.

Perez' distrust of the Castro regime is likely to be enduring. The Angolan intervention has revived his memories of Cuban activities in Venezuela when he was interior minister in the 1960s, and this is likely to increase his willingness to believe unconfirmed press allegations that Cuban military personnel are training Guyanese forces in military installations near the Venezuelan border.

May 19, 1976

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Weekly Summary

Secret

No. 0047/75 November 21, 1975

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| The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents. | MIDDLE EAST AFRICA | 1 Angola: After Independence 4 5 6 7 9 |
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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary

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ANGOLA: AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The country's first days of independence have been marked by more fighting between forces of the two rival "regimes" that are vying for recognition as the legitimate government. With the continuing efforts of the Africans' regional organization to arrange a truce apparently getting nowhere, the outlook is still for a protracted military struggle in which the foreign support going to the two sides may be decisive.

On the Scene


The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola remains under heavy pressure in areas of eastern and central Angola from the more moderate National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. On November 18, the National Union announced that its forces, which are operating with elements of the National Front, had taken Malanje, one of the Popular Movement's few remaining strongholds in central Angola. Its fall leaves a wide gap between the Movement's forces in Luanda and important units operating from Henrique de Carvalho.

Forces of the National Front that have been moving toward Luanda from the south apparently reached Dondo this week, putting them close to the hydroelectric plant that supplies power to Luanda. North of the capital, the Front may be about to abandon its effort-stalled for nearly a month—to break through the Popular Movement's defenses around Quifangando. Instead, the Front may try to move on the capital from the east.

In Cabinda, where the Popular Movement is 1558839 11-75 UK strongly entrenched, its forces apparently

succeeded late last week in beating off an invasion attempt from Zaire by a Cabindan separatist group that is supported by Zairian President Mobutu. There have been no recent reports of further fighting in Cabinda.

On the political level, the Luanda-based Popular Movement regime headed by Agostinho Neto late last week installed an 18-man cabinet in which Neto's lieutenant, Lopo de Nascimento, holds the post of prime minister. He was the Movement's principal representative in the fourparty transitional government that collapsed last summer. Both the political and military wings of the Popular Movement are represented in the cabinet. The rival National Front - National Union 'government," meanwhile, has had trouble get-



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ting off the ground. A leadership slate has still not been announced, but it now appears that neither National Front leader Holden Roberto nor the National Union's Jonas Savimbi will take top positions. Each is hesitant to become too closely linked with the joint government, which they both regard as a marriage of convenience to provide a focus for anti-Soviet foreign support.


Foreign Reaction

Partly because of the existence of the competing regimes, most nations—including the bulk of the 46-member states of the Organization of African Unity—are withholding recognition from either Angola claimant. Some 25 governments, including the USSR, Cuba, ten other Communist countries, and ten African states, have recognized Neto's government, however, while no state has formally accepted the National Front - National Union regime. This week, Neto's people unsuccessfully sought admission to the current meeting in London of the International Coffee Council.

The Organization of African Unity is still trying to resolve the Angolan situation through a government of national unity, but its efforts have been impaired by the failure of the ten African states—all radical regimes—that have recognized Neto to abide by the OAU's request to remain neutral. Other OAU members want to avoid any further division over the Angola issue. At present, OAU Chairman Amin's proposal for sending an African peacekeeping force to Angola and calls by Somalia for a summit meeting and by Ethiopia for a foreign ministers' conference show little sign of getting off the ground.

The Soviet Role

Moscow provided fresh evidence during the past week of the importance it attaches to a victory by the Popular Movement, the group the USSR has supported for years. With the Movement's forces continuing to retreat in most sectors and the threat to its hold on Luanda apparently growing, the USSR mounted another substantial airlift of military supplies and equipment—its second within about two weeks.



Holden Roberto

The operation, which began on November 13, was carried out by a number of heavy transports that staged through Conakry, Guinea.

Specific details about the cargo rushed to Neto's hard-pressed forces are not available, but it surely included substantial quantities of the small arms and ammunition expended so freely in the Angolan fighting. After the earlier airlift, there were reports that the Soviets had sent up to 12

MIG-21 fighters and some rocket launchers. No such aircraft have been seen and the reports remain unconfirmed.

At present, there is no firm evidence that Moscow is planning additional supply flights to Angola soon. The Soviets will be watching the military situation closely, however, and may well provide further support to the Popular Movement if its fortunes continue to decline.

The USSR has had to pay a price in black Africa for its strong military and diplomatic support of Neto's regime, although Soviet leaders presumably had made a prior determination that the prospect of gaining significant influence in southern Africa was worth the price. A number of African states have been particularly upset by the Kremlin's flouting of the OAU's call for neutrality in the Angolan dispute.

Soviet pressure on Uganda's Amin—the OAU chairman-to recognize Neto's government contributed to the recent temporary rupture in relations between Moscow and Kampala. Nigeria, long an important target country for the Soviets in Africa, has publicly criticized the Soviet Union's "flagrant interference" in Angola's affairs. Zaire is trying to make an issue in the UN Security Council of the Soviets' support for their Angolan protege.

Cuban Involvement

Concurrent with the Soviet supply airlifts, Havana, probably with a nudge from Moscow, has stepped up its airlift of troops to support the Popular Movement's military operations. Cubans have advised and trained Neto's forces for years, both in Cuba and in Africa. The number of Castro's people involved in the situation has risen sharply in recent months, particularly since the end of September when the airlift apparently began.

Cubana Airlines planes have made at least 16 flights to black Africa via Barbados, more than half of them this month. The Cuban aircraft, mostly Bristol Britannia's, fly to Guinea-Bissau and then to Brazzaville with some now continuing on into Luanda. The flights made so far could have carried

well over 1,000 troops. Adding in additional Cuban personnel reported to have arrived by sea over the past two months, Neto's Cuban helpers may now total more than 3,000.

The Cubans have almost certainly become more directly involved in the Angolan fighting since the tide of battle turned against the Popular Movement last month. They probably played an important role, for example, in the Movement's successful defense, so far, of its position in Cabinda. If Moscow has provided Neto with fighter aircraft, they most likely would be flown by Cuban pilots.

Peking Finesses

The Chinese, who have long viewed the Angolan strife in the broader context of Sino-Soviet rivalry, have taken ill-concealed delight in the African backlash to Moscow's heavy-handed involvement with the Popular Movement. Peking's media have been saturated with replays of anti-Soviet articles and statements from numerous African capitals, and Chinese propagandists have authored a number of articles clearly aimed at fanning African emotions.

Early this week, the Chinese sent an official letter to OAU Chairman Amin indicating that, in line with the organization's stand on Angola, China would not recognize any regime until "national unity" is achieved and lambasting Soviet "interference in Angolan and African issues."

Anticipation of precisely such a propaganda windfall led Peking, in the immediate pre-independence period, to lower the visibility of its own involvement in Angola. China withdrew military advisers from Zairian programs for training units of the National Front-the primary recipient of past Chinese assistance. Future Chinese support for the National Front -National Union coalition will almost certainly be of the type that can be funneled through African intermediaries in a way that will leave Peking with a plausible case for denying any direct role.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

January 19, 1976

Nº 676

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ANNEX: A Turning Point In the Angolan Civil War

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ANNEX

A Turning Point in the Angolan Civil War

The military collapse of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola is a major turning point in the Angolan civil war. It is highly unlikely that the National Front will be able to regain its former military position in northern Angola as long as the Cubans remain to aid the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Given time to recuperate, the Front probably could develop a low-level insurgency in northern Angola, as it did against the Portuguese.

Zairian Choices

The collapse of the National Front presents Zairian President Mobutu, a major backer, with some hard choices. He may be tempted to underwrite an insurgency in northern Angola, but he will have to give serious consideration to the consequences.

Zairian assistance to Front insurgent operations might invite retaliation in kind, possibly against Zaire's copper-producing region of Shaba—formerly Katanga. There is the question of some 4,000 exiled followers of the late Moise Tshombe's Katangan secessionist movement. These exiles have been in Angola since the Katangan regime collapsed in 1963 and have been fighting with the Popular Movement against the National Front. Even when the Portuguese controlled Angola, Mobutu saw the Katangans as a threat, and a mere suggestion from the Popular Movement that they might be sent into Zaire may be enough to restrain Mobutu's enthusiasm for a National Front insurgency in Angola.

Zaire's copper industry relies heavily on Angola's rail and port facilities, and Mobulu cannot afford to jeopardize access to those facilities by supporting the Front guerrillas. A more realistic option—and Mobutu is a realist—is to strengthen his ties with the National Union, through whose tribal territory the currently inoperative Benguela railroad passes, and perhaps support a political coalition between the National Union and the Popular Movement.

At the moment, Mobutu must be concerned that the Angolan civil war has reached Zaire's border in two places, at Santo Antonio do Zaire in northwestern Angola and at Teixeira de Sousa in eastern Angola. The 1,000 or so Zairian troops who fought in Angola have fled back to Zaire. Mobutu must have serious misgivings about the effectiveness of his army and may not want to commit Zairian troops to further fighting at this time, despite bellicose statements that recent clashes between Popular Movement and Zairian forces at Teixeira de Sousa could lead to war.

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The National Front's collapse will quickly result in new pressures on its military and political ally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The alliance was tenuous at best and did not fulfill its tactical goal of forcing the Popular Movement into a political compromise.

From the start, the National Union regarded the Front's military capabilities with skepticism and for the most part conducted its own operations as if the alliance did not exist. Still, National Front forces on the Popular Movement's northern front, however weak, were of use to the National Union because they did tie up a good part of the Popular Movement's resources. Those resources can now be shifted to central and southern Angola.

Problems for South Africa

Fighting in central and southern Angola has increased as the Popular Movement has launched a new offensive. The National Union's position now appears to be deteriorating. This new situation will present serious problems for South Africa.

Pretoria is already giving substantial assistance to the National Union and probably has the resources to increase its support significantly. Pretoria cannot, however, hope to match the assistance available to the Popular Movement from Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Pretoria has probably been encouraged by the failure of the Organization of African Unity to condemn South African involvement in Angola, but any sudden and dramatic build-up of the South African role would doubtless bring forth new efforts to condemn Pretoria. Pretoria, in fact, ordered its troops to withdraw from active combat zones prior to the OAU summit. The South African forces appear to be in defensive positions, suggesting that Pretoria has not yet decided on future South African participation.

Political Options

The main question raised by the National Front's collapse is whether the withdrawal of the National Front—historically the Popular Movement's main adversary—offers an opening for a political settlement between the Popular Movement and the National Union. The National Union is on record in favor of political compromise and would not be held back by its political alliance with the Front.

Publicly, the Popular Movement is proclaiming that the collapse of the National Front changes nothing and that the fight will continue. A number of Popular Movement officials have said privately, however, that a coalition with the National Union is possible if South African forces withdraw from Angola and National Union president Jonas Savimbi resigns.

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The first proviso obviously is non-negotiable; the second could be open to discussion.

The fragmentary information we have suggests the Popular Movement is not a monolithic organization and although the military hardliners in the organization will be encouraged by the collapse of the National Front to advocate a military solution, the organization's politicians might be sensitive to political pressures. It is quite possible that African leaders, including a number of those who support the Popular Movement, may conclude that the Movement ought now to be more flexible. If so, they may try to use whatever influence they have to resolve the Angolan problem politically.

| Moscow also may be looking into the possibility of a political solution in |
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| Angola |
| the USSR is beginning to think |
| seriously about the possibility of some sort of coalition in Angola. |
| such a coalition would be weighted heavily in favor of the Popular Movement and be designed to enable the Movement to emerge as the dominant force in Angola moderate African states, which in the Soviet view are desperately searching for a way out of the Angolan impasse, might acquiesce in a take-over by the Popular Movement in order to bring an end to the fighting. |
| Soviet press commentary on Angola has thus far given little hint that the USSR is interested in a coalition. External pressure will probably be needed to convince the strong-willed Popular Movement leader, Agostinho Neto, to accept a political compromise |
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National Intelligence Bulletin

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January 21, 1976

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January 21, 1976

ANGOLA

Pretoria has ordered its troops to withdraw from Angola
Units in the eastern and western portions of the country on a line from Novo Redondo to Teixeira de Sousa reportedly have begun to withdraw by road to South-West Africa.

the South African decision was influenced by the lack of more international assistance to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

The decision to withdraw probably also reflects Prime Minister Vorster's concern over growing domestic opposition to the South African military role in Angola. The South African parliament convenes this week, and Vorster may have anticipated problems from the opposition on the question of sending South African forces to fight outside the country.

The loss of this assistance will be a major blow to the National Union, which was counting heavily on the support of South African troops to help it cope with expected attacks from the north by strengthened forces of the Popular Movement. National Union officials had, in fact, expected Pretoria to step up its assistance, in view of the failure of the OAU to condemn South African participation in Angola officially at its recent emergency summit meeting.

The National Union itself has neither the technical know-how nor the equipment to compete with the Cuban-backed Popular Movement forces. Its only chance for long-term survival may be to revert to guerrilla tactics.

Meanwhile, the Popular Movement apparently has not yet advanced significantly beyond Ambrizete in the northern sector. The shattered National Front is trying to regroup behind new defensive positions north of the M'Bridge River.

In central Angola, heavy fighting apparently is continuing around Cela Luso and Teixeira de Sousa but no gains have been scored by either side

National Union leader Savimbi is preparing his forces for an expected three-pronged offensive by Popular Movement and Cuban forces against Luso, Andulo, and Lobito-Benguela. If successful, such an offensive would put the Popular

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Movement into key areas of the tribal territory of the National Union and in a position to move against Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa), the capital of the joint National Union - National Front government, and Bie (Silva Porto), the National Union's main staging base in central Angola.

Savimbi reportedly planned to meet with National Front President Holden Roberto yesterday, presumably in Kinshasa, to discuss possible future operations by the Front aimed at reviving pressure on the Popular Movement from the north. Press reports that the National Union will airlift several thousand troops to assist the National Front probably are without foundation. The National Union cannot soare troops for northern operations at this time.

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USSR-ANGOLA

Moscow continues publicly to attack the concept of a coalition government in Angola, as advanced by the Popular Movement's opponents at the Addis Ababa summit.

Apparently buoyed by Cuban-assisted Popular Movement successes on the battlefield, *Pravda's* weekly international review on January 18, in its strongest statement on the subject to date, claimed that there is no "realistic" basis for forming a government of national unity.

The *Pravda* article attributed such an idea to pressures from imperialist circles in the West-meaning the United States-and added that the results of the OAU summit had proven that imperialist forces cannot dictate the course of events in Angola. Progressive African countries, it insisted, will now more than ever rally to the support of the Popular Movement.

Meanwhile, Soviet media are continuing their efforts to play up the Popular Movement's claims to legitimacy as well as its military successes. Pravda on January 17 reported that National Front leader Holden Roberto had deserted to Kinshasa, and on the following day it repeated the claim that most of northern Angola had been "liberated." Zaire has come under increasing attack for actively supporting anti-MPLA forces, and National Union leader Savimbi is said to have turned to the West with repeated calls for aid.

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National Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

January 31, 1976

Nº 676

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CUBA-ANGOLA

Zaire.

We have pieced together what seems to be a plausible account of how Cuba became involved in a major combat role in the Angolan civil war.

involvement grew out of an urgent request from the Movement last July for Soviet combat personnel. Moscow reportedly refused the request but told the Popular Movement to ask the Cubans, Fidel Castro was initially reluctant, but by mid-August he had agreed to send troops

We doubt that Castro would have overcome his initial reluctance unless he had been encouraged to do so by Moscow. He probably first requested, then sought, and eventually received assurances of logistic and financial support from the USSR

Castro and the Soviets probably believed that only a small force would be needed. neither Cuha nor the Popular

Movement expected South Africa to enter the war, and

there was no indication that the US would give substantial help to the National Front of the National Union. Last August, the main concern of both the Popular Movement and Cuba was the threat of a military incursion by

By the time the Cuban troops had arrived, however, the fortunes of the Popular. Movement had taken a turn for the worse. The Cubans apparently found that their initial force was inadequate.

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Apparently in response to a request for reinforcements, Havana stepped up the airlift significantly in November, but a six-week delay occurred in the sealift. Ship arrivals picked up markedly in December, and the pace of both the sealift and the airlift quickened in January—the latter largely because [oscow provided long-range Aeroflot jets, which took an estimated 2,800 Cuban troops to Luanda.

serving in all-Cuban infantry units.

Cuban soldiers also perform technical roles as communications specialists, tank drivers, and artillery and rocket-fire controllers.


In addition, Cubans train Angolan recruits and provide security services in Luanda. Some 400 officers of the Popular Movement have been receiving training in Cuba since July. They are expected to return to Angola soon.

A general mood of "quiet melancholy" exists in Cuba, according to the source. Families of military personnel are not even told where their relatives have been sent, thus adding to the uncertainty. It is becoming increasingly clear to the general public that Cubans have not been given the full story of their country's involvement in Angola.

This mood will be dissipated to some extent by the public's knowledge that the soldiers are clearly on the victorious side in the Angolan fighting. With this boost—and the corollary that Cuban casualties are now likely to be minimized—morals at home will begin to rebound.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Review.

ANGOLA

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola scored some significant military gains during the past week, especially in the northern battle zone against the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. The Front's losses could be politically damaging at the Organization of African Unity's emergency summit that is to begin in Addis Ababa on January 10.


Military Situation

Last weekend, Popular Movement forces, backed by Cuban-manned T-34 tanks and multiple rocket-launchers, captured Carmona (also known as Uige), the Front's second largest operational base in northern Angola. On the way, Movement troops took Negage, a former Portuguese are base that had been the Front's major supply point for operations in the northern sector.

In addition, Popular Movement forces advanced a little toward the National Front's main headquarters at Ambriz. On January 3, the small Popular Movement contingent that crossed the Lifune River earlier gained control of Tabi and Onzo. The Movement apparently has not yet crossed the river in strength because heavy rains and lack of equipment have delayed efforts to restore bridges destroyed by the National Front.

In west-central Angola, the Popular Movement has broken the siege of Quibala by the National Front and its ally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Popular Movement forces have mounted a drive to the Southeast. Their objective is the town of Andulo, a gateway to the heavily populated central highlands, where the National Union draws its tribal support.

In the east, neither side has made any notable gains recently, although heavy fighting between the Popular Movement and the National Union has been taking place near Teixeira de Sousa for two weeks. Movement troops, in an apparent move to protect themselves from a possible attack from the east, have destroyed a railway bridge at Teixeira de Sousa, ensuring that a reopening of the important Benguela Railway is a long way off. Zairian forces based across the border at Dilolo have been involved in the clashes.



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Political Developments

The loss of Carmona, a district capital within the area inhabited by the National Front's tribal supporters, is a major political as well as military setback for the National Front. The Popular Movement's propaganda machinery is heralding its capture as a blow against National Front "oppression" in the north. The Popular Movment will probably play heavily on this theme as it campaigns for recognition as the only legitimate Angolan nationalist organization at the OAU meetings that began with a preparatory foreign ministers' session on January 8.

The Popular Movement has strong support within the OAU, but its success at the summit is apparently not assured. During the past week announcements by Libya and Chad that they had recognized the Movement's government at Luanda raised to 19 the number of OAU members that have taken that action. A two-thirds majority of the organization's 46 members, however, is required to pass a resolution recognizing the Popular Movement. African states that are wary of the Movement and of Soviet Intentions, led by Zaire and Zambia, are pushing hard behind the scenes to keep such a resolution from surfacing.

The participation of South African forces in the civil war in support of the National Union and National Front is certain to draw emotional denunciation at the meetings. Unless Pretoria and the allied Angolan groups are able to convince African leaders that South African troops are withdrawing, a number of uncommitted members—perhaps enough to give the Popular Movement majority support—may announce recognition of the Luanda regime during the conference.

Soviet Press Defends

The Soviet central press is continuing to give extremely heavy play to developments in Angola..

Signs of some possible new facets of Moscow's position on the civil war in Angola appeared in an unsigned *Pravda* commentary on January 3. The Soviets repeated their tough

language on US, South African, and Chinese involvement in Angola and firmly defended the USSR's own role there as consistent with Soviet anticolonialist traditions, with UN and OAU resolutions on decolonization, and with the request of the "lawful government" of Angola.

Pravda went on, however, specifically to disclaim any Soviet interest in seeking military bases, economic gains, or other advantages in Angola. It repeated previous calls for the "termination of foreign armed intervention," but left unstated the extent of Moscow's and its allies' current role in the war.

The Angolans, Pravda said, should be left to settle their futures themselves—if need be, by consolidating "patriotic and anti-imperialist forces" that favor "genuine independence and territorial integrity." This formulation seems to exclude at least the top leaders of the National Front and National Union, but leaves the way open for Moscow to approve a solution to the Angolan dispute that might be reached at the OAU summit this week. It is also obviously designed to deflect criticism from the USSR when the Africans convene to review the problem.

Izvestia, in a hard-hitting front page editorial three days later, seemed to try to quiet speculation that the Pravda article foreshadowed a major change in Soviet policy toward Angola. The editorial emphasized once again that there is no contradiction between Soviet support for the Popular Movement and detente and went on to state flatly that detente and the "struggle against racism and apartheid"—an obvious swipe at South African involvement in Angola—are perfectly compatible.

The state of the s

Izvestia reiterated Moscow's positive approach to OAU peace-making efforts, but tarred the National Front and National Union as "tools of imperialism" and reasserted that the USSR—and by implication Cuba—has a right to intervene in Angola. Although the editorial did not exclude the possibility of an eventual coalition regime in Angola or the cassation of Soviet—and Cuban—intervention, it offered little encouragement along either line.

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Page 3 WEEKLY REVIEW Jan 9, 70

In late December, Havana initiated a major diplomatic offensive on behalf of the Popular Movement and in defense of the Cuban military involvement in Angola. A high-level Cuban delegation traveled to several African countries including Algeria, Congo, and Nigeria to coordinate strategy for the OAU meeting that opens Saturday. Another diplomatic team was sent to Ethiopia to lobby before and during the OAU meeting.

A Popular Movement delegation, after attending the Cuban party congress in December, has been flown by the Cubans to various countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—including Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela, and probably Panama and Peru—to drum up support for its cause.

No Pressure from Peking

Peking has registered disappointment with some third-world supporters of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement, but has apparently stopped

short of any real arm-twisting. Within the past month Chinese officials have:

- differed publicly over Angola with visiting President da Costa of Sao Tome and Principe, whose government officially recognizes the Popular Movement;
- walked out on a reception for Popular Movement representatives hosted by Guyana's Prime Minister Burnham;
- privately expressed displeasure with the Tanzanian government over its support for the Popular Movement.

On the other hand, Vice Premier Li-Hsien-nien and da Costa signed economic agreements several days after the two clashed verbally at da Costa's welcoming banquet. Moreover, Tanzania is the leading African recipient of Chinese aid, while Guyana is the only Latin American country with an active Chinese assistance program. There is no evidence that the Chinese have made any significant efforts to use this leverage either to persuade Burnham's government to stop refueling Cuban aircraft involved in the airlift to Angola or to dissuade Tanzanian President Nyerere from championing the Popular Movement's cause the Organization of African Unity.

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/255 TX

National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

MONDAY 24 APRIL 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 095

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Angola: End of Offensive Against UNITA

Augolan and Cuban forces have end-ed their largely unsuccessful offensive in anotheastern Augola against pearrillas of Jonas Sarrind's National Union for the Total Independence of Augola. UNITA apparently has ex-panded its area of military activity in the past few months.

Most Cuban and government forces appear to have withdrawn to their bases in northern Cuando Cubango Province after more than a moeth of heavy fighting. Despite the government's claims that it inflicted heavy casualties and destroyed inaurgent supply routes, it probably has only temporarily disrupted UNITA operations in the area.

Despite numerous air-supported sweepe and ambushes, the Cuban and govern.

Daspits numerous air-supportment and ambushes, the Cuban and government forces did not achieve the apparent soals of their offensive—to seize ment forces did not achieve the apparent major goals of their offensive—to seize UNITA-controlled airfields, kill or capture large numbers of insurgents, liberate some areas of the southern border for use by Namibian nationalists, and capture Savimbi. UNITA was able to thwart government troops by using small-scale raids and delaying sterilos and avoiding major battles and detection by Cubanpiloted fighter aircraft. guerrilla unita elsewhere have expanded UNITA's ac-tivities into parts of northern and eastern Angola and along the southwattern coast. (See Angola...Page 3)



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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

MONDAY 24 APRIL 1978

MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA

Angola...

From Page 1

UNITA

Evident Delication have ambushed convoys near Dalatando and Nova Galia, and it claims to control basches and coastal roads in an area north of Lobito. The insurgents have also been more active in the Cazombo and Calanda areas near Zaire.

The guerrillas continus to disrupt the Benguela Railroa is assert points in Bie Province

UNITA has destroyed bridges of the Mocamedes Railroad and has been attacking truck convoys earrying government military supplies. The Cubans are now protecting these coavoys with combat hallcopters.

CW. 3064-095-4 292

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

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National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Unity

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THURSDAY JANUARY 5, 1976

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 6

OAU Emergency Angola Session Opens Today

by Jerry Griffle, cia

The Organization of African Unity
opens an emergency season today la:Addia Ababa on the civil war in Angola. The
OAU is badly divided, and the meeting is
bound to be contentious. The summit may
contribute little, if anything, toward a
solution of the Angolan conflict.

During the first two days of the seasion,
OAU foreign ministers will debate
various approaches to the Angolan
problem and try to draft resolutions for
consideration over the weekend by
African heads of state. Substantive
decisions in the 46-member body require a
two-thirde majority. two-thirds majority.

two-thirds majority.

The emergency session is an OAU first, and there has been intense diplomatic maneuvering in preparation for it. A number of African lesders, anticipating a rancorous session, probably will not show

up in Addis Ababe, but will send standine.
The basic issue is whether the OAU is

to-remain neutral toward the three war-ring Angolan factions and support a

government of national unity...

This policy was set at the OAU summit

This policy was set at the OAU summit four months before Portugal: made Angola independent.

The only likely alternative is for the OAU to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the legitimate government. The Popular Movement comes to the summit in a strong position, but it cannot yet count on a two-thirds majority.

Since the Portuguese departure and the subsequent establishment of two rival Angolan regimes, the diplomatic trend has been running in favor of Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement regimes.

Neto's Popular Movement regime:

Nineteen OAU states have of-ficially recognized the Popular Move-ment as the sole legitimate government of Angola.

. No African state has endorsed the joint regime set up in Huambo by Holden Roberto and Jones Savimbi, leaders of the National Front for the Liberation of Angels and of the National Union for the Total

Independence of Angola, respectively.

The OAU summit was convened through the efforts of Somalia and other strong beckers of the Popular

e Nigeria, which recognized the Popular Movement in November, has since waged an extensive diplomatic

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AFRICA

Tide in OAU Runs Against Staying Neutral; South Africa an Issue

From Page 1

• The Soviet Union and Cuba have expended a considerable diplomatic effort to line up support for the Popular Movement,

The Popular Movement and its backers will try to parlay such support into summit resolutions that:

emn South African and US

et and Cuban as legitimate aid. a Popular Movement

ant of Angola ee for Neutrality the tide has been in the ., Movement's favor, twenty-seven AU members have refrained fro

recognizing either of the rival Angolan regimes, and most of these states will do ncir best to avoid resolutions that take

The uncommitted group includes some states that privately favor the rivals of the Popular Movement. Such states will attempt to hold the line against recogni-tion of the Popular Movement and will


Condemning all foreign interference in Angola.

National Front On Defensive In Angola War

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola is preparing defensive positions at a road junction cast of Ambriz in anterparing of the statement of Ambriz in Anterparing of the Section 1985 of the Popular Movement.

Front morale in the area is plummating, some keavy weapons have already been moved to Ambridate to keep them from falling into the hands of Popular Movement forces.

The Front kopes to mount an operation to recepture Carmona which it lost to the Popular Movement last weekend. Carmona is a district capital within the area inhabited by the Bakongo tribe, and its



loss was a political and military setback

The Popular Movement is heralding capture of the town as a major blow against National Front and the Move-ment will probably stress its victories at

the OAU meeting.

The Popular Movement has broken the National Front - National Union slege of Quibals in central Angola, and is pushing southeast toward Andulo, a gateway to the heavily populated central highlands from which the National Union draws its main support.

The situation in the east remains unchanged; some fighting is taking place between Popular Movement an Zairlan forces at Telxeira de Sousa. Movement forces apparently destroyed a bridge linking Teixeira de Sousa with Diolo on the Zairian side of the border in a move to forestall a possible attack from Zaire.

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Research the Papular Maximum (19)

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States Tending to Paver Popular Mavement (2)

tral Brates (13)

States Tending to Pover the National Front - National Union (1)

- · Seeking the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel.
- Urging the cessation of all foreign assistance to the warring groups.
- e Calling for a cease-fire and the negotiation of a government of national unity. national unity.
- Zambia clearly hopes to take the lead in working for such positions. The Zambians have had extensive contacts with uncommitted African states, including Kenya, Liberia; Sierra' Leone, and Botswane. Zambie has also tried to per-suade Mozambique, Tanzania, and

perhaps other champions of the Popula Movement to accept the concept of a government of national unity in Angola.

The question of who will preside over the summit is still undecided. There is no procedent regarding the chairmanship of emergency sumi

Ugandan President Idi Amin-the OAU chairman this year-is a logical candidate; he would automatically chair an ordinary summit session.

Amin, however, has a checkered record on Angola, For a while, he was neutral: next he appeared to be leaning toward the Popular Movement; last week, he went back to neutrality and opposition to

foreign interference in Angola.

This latest position was announced in a communique issued after he met in Bangui with presidents Bokassa of the Central African Republic and Mobutu of Zuire. African leaders who back the Popular Movement will view Amin's posturing with Bokassa and Mobutu with disfavor. Some of them may well press the summit to consure Amin, if not to have him removed as OAU chairman,

In the end, the outcome of the summit may well be decided by the emotional issue of South Africa's much-publicized military role in support of the National Front and the National Union. Most African governments are much more upset by South Africs's intervention in Angola than by Soviet and Cuban in-

Pretoria's intervention was the deciding factor in prompting Nigeria, Ghana, Burundi, Lihya, and Chad to recognize the Popular Movement.
Popular Movement supporters will seek

to make South Africa the focal point of the summit. They will argue that the collusion of the National Front and the National Union with South Africa has made a government of national unity impossible and that the OAU must officially recognize the Popular Movement.

The National Front and National Union have been damaged politically by Pretoria's support. Those OAU states that favor a government of national unity will not strongly defend the National Front and National Union less they be charged with defending South Africa. In fact, no OAU member will openly oppose a resolution condemning South Africa's interference, and such a resolution could well be extended to formal OAU recognition of the Popular Movement.

The chances of this happening may depend on whether South Africa decides to withdraw from Angola before the OAU summit concludes and makes its withdrawal both known and credible to black Africans.

Today, however, press reports indicate that Pretoria is prepared to withdraw by

In the absence of an advertised South frican withdrawal probably the most but the Nutional Front and National Union can hope for from the summit is a

If the session does deadlock, OAU members may make a serious effort to push the Angolan factions into a com-promise solution. The principal stumbling block to such a compromise has been the Popular Movement's adamant refusal to participate in a government of national unity with the National Front and National Union, That stumbling block is still there.

It is possible that some of the states that recognize the Popular Movement could be persuaded to press the Popular Movement to negotiate with the other factions. Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, and Burundi, for example, acknowledge that the Popular Movement does not represent a majority of Angola's population and that the Neto faction probably cannot govern effectively. It is, however, doubtful that these coun-

tries have much real influence with the

The military situation in Angola will affect the outcome of the summit. The Popular Movement has scored important gains this week in northern Angola, the National Front's tribal base. If the military situation continues to run in its favor, the Popular Movement will be dis-

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The National Intelligence



Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

FRIDAY MARCH 19, 1976

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 66

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Angolan Regime, Castro Raise Issue of South Africa's Troops

held a discussion with the Popular Movement regime in Angola concerning South Africa's interest in talks

concerning South Africa's interest in talks on protecting the Cunene River hydroelectric project.

The Movement reportedly responded that it will not engage in talks with Pretoria as long as South African troops remain inside Angola, but that it does not wish the Namibian people to lose the

The Soviets reportedly believe that the Movement's response could provide a basis for dropping the UN Security Coun-Movement's response could provide a basis for dropping the UN Security Council discussion of South African "aggression" in Angola, requested last week by the African states, Pertoria is annious to block a Security Council discussion and has been seeking an accommodation with Luanda through Zairian President Moburu.

The number of South African troops inside Angola dropped recently when Pretoria closed two camps it had been maintaining for refugees from the civil war. The South Africans have announced they will withdraw from the two remaining camps by March 27.

Castro Speech

Fidel Castro discussed Cuban intentions in southern Africa in a speech in Consakry on Monday, He portrayed the Cuban effort as limited to consolidating the victory in Angola. He warned South (See S. Airlos... Page 4)

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FRIDAY MARCH 19, 1976

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

NIDDLE EAST-AFRICA

S. Africa . . .

From Page 1
Africa, however, that failure to withdraw its forces from southern Angola could lead to extended fighting beyond the Angolan border.
Castro was in Conakry to meet with African leaders Luis Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Agostinho Neto of Angola, and Sekou Toure of Guinea.
In his appeech, Castro touched only briefly on the situations in Rhodesia and Namibia and directed his harshat comments at the South African presence in

ments at the South African presence in

ments at the South African presence in Angola.
His criticism of continued South African occupation of Angolan soil was couched in belligerent language, but he appeared to be giving assurances that the South African interests in the Cunene dam would be protected if the troops were withdrawn.

As the alternative to unilateral withdrawal, he held up the specter of military clash between the South Africans and a multi-national army—presumably of Cubans and Africans—which might spill over into Namibie.

Castro said that the purpose of the

spill over into Namibia.

Castro said that the purpose of the Conakry summit was to decide on strategy for the consolidation of Angola's independence. Despite the fervor of the occasion, he was careful not to mention Rhodesia and Namibia as objects of Cuba's liberation efforts.

By focusing on the South African presence in southern Angola, Castro stands to reap additional credit if the South Africans negotiate an agreement on the Cuneno darm which nermits them to remove their troops.

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
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4 November 1986



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4 November 1986

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| | Special Analysis |
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| ANGOLA: | A Different War in the Southwest |
| | (This is the fourth in a series of articles analyzing the conflict in Angola by region and assessing UNITA's performance according to several criteria for examining insurgent activity.) |
| , • | Luanda's security concerns in the southwest focus on South African forces in Namibla and their frequent cross-border operations against SWAPO insurgents based in Angola. UNITA has never enjoyed a strong position in the southwest and apparently gives the region a lower priority than other areas. |
| | UNITA's opportunities in the southwestern region are limited by ethnic differences, sparse population, and nearly a decade of conflict involving Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO forces on the one hand and South Africa on the other. UNITA reportedly has two full-time battalions in the region, as well as a small number of indigenous guerrillas. It pulled back one battalion last year, apparently using it to |
| | bolster the defenses of its southeastern redoubt |
| | |
| | There are an estimated 4,000 SWAPO combatants in camps in Angola near the southern rail line, and at least several hundred guerrillas at a time are sent on seasonal forays into northern Namibia. SWAPO's successes have declined markedly in recent years, in part because of South Africa's aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, but also as a result of SWAPO's internal problems South Africa supports some 21,000 troops and security police in Namibia, of which about a half are indigenous territorial forces created by Pretoria. Between 1978 and 1984, South Africa launched |
| | several major incursions into Angola against SWAPO base camps, including a large incursion in 1981 during which South Africa |
| | occupied a substantial portion of territory south of the rail line. It held this territory until 1984, when its regulars withdrew |
| | Concern about the South African threat in southwestern Angola prompted the initial deployment of Cuban forces to the region in the 1970s. there are some 10,000 Cuban ground and air defense troops there now—a far larger concentration than in any other region. The Cubans occupy garrisons along the Namibe rail line, manning air defenses and guarding Angola's main line of defense in southern Angola. The Angolan Army mans forward defensive positions, but it maintains only a small portion of its overall troop strength in the region |

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Military Activity

South Africa and SWAPO insurgents instigate most of the military activity in the region, with activities ranging from threats of major invasions to border crossings, hot-pursuit operations, and special forces reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Pretoria has unsuccessfully urged UNITA to occupy several towns near the border, hoping it would strengthen the buffer zone between Namibia and the SWAPO camps along the rail line

UNITA leader Savimbi enjoyed relatively close relations with SWAPO in the preindependence period. During the last decade, however, relations have deteriorated from wary neutrality to open hostility as each side's backers have drawn them into the larger conflict. In the last few years, Pretoria has limited most of its operations—which are sometimes carried out with UNITA support—to hot-pursuit attacks against SWAPO infiltrators and to special forces raids against Angolan or SWAPO bases or lines of communication. Earlier this year, South African frogmen damaged two Soviet arms carriers and sank a Cuban ship in Namibe harbor. In 1985 Pretoria used the pretext of an anti-SWAPO operation to cover its direct intervention in support of UNITA in the southeast. Actions such as these, as well as continued threats of major operations, have increased Angolan security concerns and prevented Luanda from concentrating its forces fully against UNITA

| Despite the potentially unstable military situation in the region, civilians, particularly those living along the rail line and around major provincial center at Lubange, appear more secure than | the |
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| major provincial center at Eubange, appear more seems man | livina |
| | |
| conditions actually have improved somewhat in the area, and | .ne |
| Angolan Government has given tours of Lubango to recent We | stern |
| visitors. | |

Prospects

Given UNITA's relatively limited opportunities in the southwest and its focus elsewhere, it is unlikely to step up operations or gain increased influence in the region. The situation remains potentially unstable, however, largely because of Pretoria's continued support of UNITA and the chance of direct South African military operations in Angola. Angola fears that a major South African strike is likely and, with Cuban and Soviet support, will maintain its defenses in the region.

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DCINI SIIM 88-10001.

Angola: Implications of a Cuban Troop Withdrawal for the Military Balance

Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Secret

NI SIIM 88-10001 January 1988

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NI SIIM 88-10001

ANGOLA: IMPLICATIONS OF A CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FOR THE MILITARY BALANCE

Information available as of 12 January 1988 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on that date by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

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SCOPE NOTE

We believe that recent signals from the Angolan Government indicate genuine interest in reconsidering proposals for a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola coupled with a South African pullout from neighboring Namibia. This raises the question of whether one or the other side in the Angolan civil war—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government—would gain a military advantage were such an arrangement agreed on and implemented

This study examines the military implications for Angola of a two-phase Cuban troop withdrawal occurring in tandem with implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence—a process projected to last between two and two-and-a-half years. It also assesses US capabilities to monitor and verify Cuban and South African compliance with a negotiated troop withdrawal agreement.

This Memorandum does not address prospects for reaching accord on a troop withdrawal plan. Rather, it is a speculative analysis that takes as its point of departure the assumption that ongoing negotiations on such a plan succeed. For broader discussion of the strategic interests of the MPLA regime, UNITA insurgents, and their Soviet, Cuban, and South African backers, see Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate 71-86, Prospects for the Angola Civil War in 1987 (February 1987); Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 11/70-85, Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in Southern Africa Through 1988 (February 1987); and Interagency Intelligence Memorandum 87-10007, Namibia: Prospects for a Solution (July 1987)

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
Cuban Forces in Angola and the Withdrawal Scenario

An estimated 38,000 Cuban military personnel are in Angola serving in combat, support, advisory, and training roles. Major Cuban units include seven mechanized infantry regiments, two armored regiments, and an air and air defense brigade, all deployed to back up Angolan forces and used mainly to guard strategic lines of communication and key political, economic, and military facilities. More than 18,000 of these troops are assigned to the Southern Troop Group (ATS), whose mission is to defend against South African incursions from neighboring Namibia.

Ongoing US negotiations with the Angolan Government aim at a complete Cuban military withdrawal in a two-phase process. During the yearlong Phase One, those Cuban troops assigned to the ATS would leave Angola simultaneously with implementation of the UN plan for independence in Namibia. During Phase Two, the remaining Cuban forces in Angola, contained north of the 13th parallel, would withdraw. Further modalities still to be negotiated could have substantial impact on the military balance and the difficulty of verification

South African officials say they will grant Namibian independence if the Cubans leave Angola, and the MPLA government reportedly would like to dispense with the expensive Cuban contingent, gambling that it can cope with UNITA and a reduced South African threat without Cuban help. Because Cuban forces are in southern Angola primarily to defend against the South African threat from Namibia, and South African troops are in northern Namibia to guard against attacks from Angolan territory, the Phase One simultaneous withdrawal is arguably mutually advantageous. Moreover, a South African pullout from Namibia would make it more difficult for Pretoria to resupply UNITA, and MPLA officials might let the rest of the Cubans depart during Phase Two if they perceived UNITA to be weakening

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KEY JUDGMENTS


Neither the MPLA government nor the UNITA insurgency would be likely to gain a decisive military advantage were a plan implemented for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and South African withdrawal from neighboring Namibia. In relative terms, however, UNITA would be the net gainer, at least for the first year or two, since it would be able to continue its insurgency—albeit at somewhat reduced levels—while government forces would assume an increasingly defensive posture.

The Military Balance. The military capabilities of both the UNITA rebels and the MPLA government would be reduced by removal of their major outside backers from the immediate scene. A Cuban withdrawal would have immediate negative impact on the MPLA government's military capabilities, whereas UNITA would begin to suffer only gradually from diminished South African resupply, especially if Pretoria built up the rebels' stockpiles before the agreement was enacted. Were the Cubans and South Africans gone, Pretoria's ability to reinforce UNITA quickly would be seriously reduced, but so would the MPLA's ability to mount major offensives against the insurgent heartland. Finally, the MPLA's relative advantage in external supply, primarily from the Soviet Union, would be balanced by UNITA's superiority in such human factors as leadership, morale, motivation, and skill.

Assuming agreement on a two-stage withdrawal plan, at the conclusion of Phase One neither the government nor UNITA would hold an overwhelming military advantage. The government probably would concentrate on holding key population centers, economic facilities, and military installations, and thus refrain from any major offensives against UNITA. Although its pace of operations might be slowed by the need to husband resources, UNITA probably would capitalize on the opportunity to extend its control over the countryside and to probe for government weakness, particularly in the south.

Despite the government forces' continued access to Soviet arms and advisers, during Phase Two the loss of Cuban backing probably would hurt their military capabilities more than reduced outside support

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would hurt UNITA. Departed Cuban support personnel as well as combat troops guarding key centers could not be fully replaced by any new recruitment efforts or even by introducing substitute foreign forces, for instance from other African countries. Unless the agreement unraveled, the MPLA strategy probably would become primarily defensive as it had fewer troops to spare for large counterinsurgency operations.

UNITA's prospects during Phase Two would depend on how well it conserved resources, captured materiel, and managed to keep its outside supply pipeline open. If UNITA were handicapped by haphazard supply, it would have to cut back on conventional activity and concentrate on guerrilla tactics. Even under these circumstances, however, UNITA would not be reduced to an easily containable security threat. It would benefit from a broad base of popular support, an improving combat force ratio, and traditional advantages such as terrain and surprise that often accrue to guerrillas. UNITA would strive to continue to operate throughout the country and probably would be able at the very least to keep the economy in turmoil.

Compliance. Despite the international condemnation that would follow noncompliance or abrogation, neither South Africa nor Angola would hesitate to use stalling tactics if it perceived that the other was gaining a substantial advantage or not complying. An international mechanism for on-site monitoring, troop-movement notifications, and frequent briefings on agreement progress would help forestall unwarranted suspicions and bolster mutual confidence. Nonetheless, the temptations to cheat would be considerable.

Implications for the United States. Implementation of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and transition to independence for Namibia would be a significant and hard-won success for the United

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
States. Moreover, if UNITA made appreciable military gains from the process—but the agreement did not unravel—a weakened MPLA might be more inclined to negotiate with UNITA on sharing power.

On the other hand, implementation of the accords could be interrupted at any time. The MPLA would be increasingly tempted to abrogate if it perceived UNITA's relative strength to be growing, and Luanda probably would blame any UNITA gains on a real or imagined continuation of South African support for the rebels. Blame for an agreement that failed probably would fall on South Africa and the United States. If UNITA turned more toward pro-US Zaire to compensate for lost supply routes through Namibia, Angola might choose to retaliate against Zaire.

For its part, South Africa probably would derail the process if it became clear that the pro-Soviet South-West Africa People's Organization would dominate an independent Namibia or if UNITA unexpectedly met serious setbacks. Moreover, there is some risk that an effort to relax tensions through mutual troop withdrawals would, in fact, prompt an escalation of fighting. Were Angola to reintroduce Cuban troops or to invite in Soviet Bloc forces, for instance, South Africa could react violently.

Finally, even if a Cuban troop withdrawal were implemented, vexing problems would remain. The civil war in Angola probably would persist, and the Soviet role there would continue; Moscow's military deliveries and advisory assistance to the MPLA might even expand to help compensate for the departed Cubans.

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DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. Five years after the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola became an issue connected to Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435-78), the international plan for Namibian independence, and three years after talks between South Africa and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government broke down over the speed and completeness of the withdrawal, Luanda has begun to show some willingness to reconsider its position. Although final acceptance of a plan for Cuban withdrawal to which all parties can agree still appears remote, this Memorandum considers what impact implementation of such an agreement would have on the balance of forces in the Angolan civil war and on US interests

Setting the Scene: Strategic Interests and Trade-Offs

2. Each actor on the Angolan stage has its own strategic concerns, expectations of gains, and perceived risks in agreeing to a Cuban troop withdrawal plan. Prospects for successful implementation of any agreed plan thus depend on the strategic interests and tradeoffs of the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents as well as those of their South African, Cuban, and Soviet backers.

The Angolan Government

- 3. The MPLA regime is the player with the most rudimentary concern—survival in power—and the most to lose. Unable to ensure its own internal security or provide for its own military needs, the MPLA counts on retaining reliable, powerful patrons. Should its military capabilities be weakened greatly by a Cuban troop pullout, or should UNITA remain stronger than anticipated, the MPLA would risk serious setbacks or even outright capitulation
- 4. Nonetheless, key to Luanda's thinking is the assumption that a UNITA isolated from South Africa and other supporters would wither or at least become a containable security problem. The MPLA probably

calculates that the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia would greatly reduce the direct South African threat to Angola, diminish Pretoria's aid to UNITA, and lead eventually to a compatible government în Namibia under the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO in power in Windhoek, rather than in exile in Angola, would mean one less rationale for South African enmity against Luanda, and an independent Namibia would provide 1,200 kilometers of buffer between South Africa and Angola. Moreover, a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola would slash the large economic obligation caused by the expense of maintaining about 38,000 Cuban troops and advisers. For Luanda, lowered security expenditures would free more resources to help its declining economy to recover.

UNITA

- 5. UNITA's goals are withdrawal of all foreign military personnel supporting the MPLA and formation of a coalition government in which UNITA is strongly represented. UNITA President Jonas Savimbi's strategy is to press the MPLA government so hard that it is forced to share power with UNITA. To intensify sustained pressure on the MPLA government, economy, and armed forces, UNITA must retain its ability to receive some equipment and supplies from outside the country. In UNITA's view, were all Cuban, Soviet, and Bloc military personnel to leave Angola, the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola's (FAPLA) military capabilities would be severely diminished and the MPLA government rendered extremely vulnerable. For UNITA, Cuban withdrawal alone would offer an opportunity to turn the military balance in its favor, increasing UNITA's leverage for a government of national
- 6. On the other hand, UNITA is aware that an agreement on a Cuban withdrawal that also removed South Africa from Namibia would constrict the insurgent group's main channel for external assistance as well as Pretoria's ability to intervene militarily on its behalf. Should UNITA be greatly weakened by reduced access to its traditional backer, by unexpected FAPLA prowess or aggressiveness, or by military

7 SECRET reverses, it could be seriously set back in its campaign for international recognition and a share of power in Luanda

South Africa

7. The South African Government sees Cuban forces in Angola as a threat, ultimately, to South Africa, and it continues to aid UNITA and occupy Namibia mainly to protect the Republic's western border. In addition to seeking a Cuban withdrawal and at least a share of power for UNITA in Angola, Pretoria's goals include a compliant regime in any independent Namibia—one that would not be dominated by the pro-Soviet SWAPO, would not allow a Soviet Bloc or Cuban presence there, and would not permit infiltration into South Africa by insurgents of the African National Congress (ANC)

8. South Africa certainly perceives both benefits and risks in an agreement on a Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence. It might hope to gain some respite from international condemnation and more time to resolve its own internal political problems. It might even cling to a slim hope for relief from economic sanctions should it go through with a withdrawal agreement. Attractive as well would be elimination of the potential for Cuba to use Angola as a base for action against Namibia or South Africa. Also, South Africa would gain relief from the heavy financial burden of funding counterinsurgency operations against SWAPO, subsidizing the territorial government and security forces, and supporting UNITA.

9. On the other hand, Pretoria would be acutely aware that Soviet and Bloe military advisers would remain in Angola. Pretoria's ability to project power through the region via northern Namibia's Caprivi Strip would be lost. It probably would calculate that it would have to devote substantial resources to developing infrastructure and deploying troops to secure the Orange River frontier between South Africa and Namibia. Also, greatly reduced access to UNITA would limit South Africa's ability to influence Angolan affairs as a counter to the Soviet threat it perceives. Finally, the absence of the Cuban expeditionary force would weaken Pretoria's argument that it is facing Communist aggression, a rationale that helps justify its intervention throughout the region

Cuba

10. Fidel Castro regards Cuba's presence in Angola as a source of considerable personal prestige and political influence in southern Africa and in the Third

World generally. Castro—like the Soviets—will remain concerned about his image as a reliable ally as well as the risk of being outmaneuvered by the United States. Moreover, support for a socialist regime in Angola is, from Havana's perspective, an important manifestation of Cuba's commitment to socialist ideals and Marxist ideology. Also, Angolan payments for the Cuban troop presence—whether in hard currency, military equipment from the USSR, or access to Angolan timber and fishery resources—are an economic benefit for Havana. Finally, service in Angola has provided something of a safety valve for Cuba's unemployed labor, underemployed skilled workers, and troublemakers

11. The advantages to Havana of a withdrawal are few. Bringing the troops home would eliminate modest numbers of combat casualties, which might improve domestic morale. It would reduce public anxieties over the well being of relatives assigned to Angola, and over the spread of diseases, especially AIDS. Castro might also press to obtain a handsome final payoff from the Angolans or Soviets as a reward and face-saving acknowledgment for a job well done.

The Soviet Union

12. Moscow seeks to maintain a pro-Soviet regime in Angola, where it has prestige and a strategic foothold at stake. The Soviets might calculate that any gains to UNITA from a withdrawal agreement would not directly threaten the Luanda regime. Moreover, they probably would expect pro-Soviet SWAPO to dominate the new government in independent Namibia. Moscow almost certainly believes that Soviet support for a troop withdrawal agreement would garner international and regional prestige for Moscow by projecting the image of the Soviet Union as a superpower supportive of political resolutions to regional conflicts. Moreover, the Cuban troop withdrawal probably would reduce some of the financial burden Moscow undoubtedly incurs by helping the Cubans to keep their troops in Angola

13. Even if the USSR had a role in the negotiations, however, Moscow might fear that the United States would be perceived as the dominant promoter of peace in the region. Furthermore, Moscow probably would place little faith in any South African guarantees of compliance with a withdrawal agreement. Moscow would be concerned about a covert South African continuation of aid to UNITA, posing a greater threat to a relatively weakened MPLA. In addition, Moscow would fear the possibility of South Africa continuing to dominate an independent Namibia.

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Finally, the Soviets would be concerned that Cuban troop withdrawal could accelerate the expansion of <u>Western influence</u> in Angola at Moscow's expense.

The Withdrawal Scenario: Underlying Assumptions

14. Several key assumptions concerning the still-tobe-negotiated details of a Cuban troop withdrawal agreement underlie this analysis. We assume that the Governments of Angola, Cuba, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the United States have agreed not only to a two-phased Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, but also to a transition process based on UNSCR 435-78 that would result in an internationally recognized independence for Namibia. We also have assumed that Luanda has agreed not to replace the withdrawn Cubans with other Soviet or Bloc forces. Finally, we have prejudged at least initial compliance, assuming that if an agreement were signed all parties would intend to make it work. There would be pressure, especially in Africa, to see it implemented successfully, and opprobrium would attach to any party seen obstructing it

Phase One

15. Phase One of the withdrawal plan would last about one year, to be roughly coterminous with the transition period for Namibian independence. During that period, the Cuban Southern Troop Group (ATS—see annex A), as well as all other Cuban forces in the south, would gradually withdraw from Angola at a pace consistent with South African withdrawal from Namibia. We assume that at least some major equipment in use by the Cubans—armor, artillery, air defense missile launchers, and radars—probably would be left behind

16. As Cuban troop withdrawal began, the transition to independence in Namibia would get under way, based on UNSCR 435-78. South African forces would begin a phased withdrawal from Namibia, with the exception of Walvis Bay, which is recognized as South African territory. Within three months of a cease-fire, most South African forces would withdraw, monitored by a UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). South Africa would be allowed, however, to retain a maximum of 1,500 troops in Namibia, restricted to several designated bases. SWAPO would lay down its arms and gradually enter Namibia through specified border points. Elections to a constitutional assembly would take place about the seventh month. The UNTAG would take three to four months to certify

the election while the Assembly formulated a constitution. Independence would be declared, probably, at about the end of one year.

Phose Two

17. The second phase would begin at about the start of year two and continue for 12 to 18 months. During that time, all remaining Cuban forces would leave Angola according to a timetable. At the same time a new, independent Namibian government would be taking its first steps, and the South African Defense Force (SADF) 10,000- to 12,000-man contingent would have completely withdrawn from the former territory. Most SWAPO personnel would have returned to Namibia

The Players

18. Phase One of the Cuban troop withdrawal would not totally eliminate any players but would reduce gradually the role and immediate access to Angola of two-the South Africans and the Cubans. FAPLA deployments and freedom of movement would be unaffected. The ANC presence in Angola would be untouched. Soviet and Bloc advisers, technicians, and instructors would remain with no restraints on their numbers and activities, and the MPLA could seek additional military assistance. The residual 1,500man SADF contingent would withdraw from Namibia, but the status of the South-West African Territory Force (SWATF), 6,000 to 10,000 strong-excluding seconded South African personnel-would remain to be settled. An added player temporarily along the border in Namibia would be the UNTAG monitoring group. UNITA, unaddressed by either a Cuban troop withdrawal agreement or the UN Namibian plan, would maintain a strong presence in southeastern Angola and would continue to operate throughout the country.

19. In the second year, Phuse Two, only South Africa would be totally eliminated from maintaining an overt military presence in Namibia—except for Walvis Bay—and Angola. No Cuban military personnel would be in the south, but Cuban troops, advisers, technicans, and instructors legitimately still could be stationed in northern Angola until the deadline for their complete departure at the end of Phase Two

Phase One—Military Impact

20. Removal from Angola within one year of the 18,000 or so Cubans assigned to ATS in the south would present a logistic challenge. Availability of

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Contending Forces

UNITA has approximately 60,000 armed combatants of which 20,000 to 25,000 are well-trained soldiers organized in about 50 battalions. Most battalions are deployed in southeastern Angola, each having 350 to 450 men armed with light weapons; there also are a few "regular" battalions of up to 1,500 men. The remainder of UNITA's forces are guerrillas who operate in varying strength throughout the country. The guerrillas are organized in company-size formations of about 150 to 200 men or as smaller local militias. They frequently operate with the battalion

The Angolan Government forces (FAPLA) include at least 100,000 men under arms in the regular Army, other security forces, and a territorial militia. The Army consists of about 70 brigades that average about 1,000 men each and are reinforced on occasion with territorial units. There are a few mechanized brigades, but most Angolan brigades are infantry units with limited artillery and armor support. The Air Force includes about 200 operational fighters and helicopters, plus transport aircraft

The Soviet Union has supported the MPLA regime with more than 36 billion worth of military axistance since 1980, and it maintains about 1,200 Soviet military advisers incountry. There also are about 500 East European military advisers in Angola. Soviet and Bloe military assistance, including advisers, would not be covered by a negotiated agreement on withdrawal of Cuban force

transportation and adequate planning probably would determine the tempo of the Cuban withdrawal, and outside help would be essential for a timely return to Cuba. Most likely, this help would come from the Soviet Union. (5 NF)

21. Without at least implicit UNITA consent to the withdrawal agreement, all Cuban troop movements, whether by road, rail, or air, would be vulnerable to attack. UNITA could decide to harass the withdrawing Cubans in an effort to derail the process and prevent its isolation from outside backers. More likely, however, UNITA would not interfere seriously with the withdrawal, concluding that it would be better to be rid of the Cubans and face FAPLA alone

FAPLA

22. As the Cubans departed, the Angolan Government would have to decide how to compensate for their loss. Most Cuban forces are involved in air defense, garrison duty in major towns, and logistic

support. Luanda probably would decide that the SADF departure from Namibia—in particular the removal of its combat aircraft from forward airbases in northern Namibia—would greatly reduce if not eliminate the South African air threat against SWAPO-FAPLA forces as well as combat air support for UNITA. As a result, the importance of the Namibe-Menongue air defense line would diminish, and assets there would be free for deployment elsewhere


23. FAPLA could not easily raise new units to replace the Cuban infantry regiments removed from the south. Moreover, moving FAPLA brigades southward would leave openings in the north for UNITA to exploit. Over time, if FAPLA failed to replace the departed Cuban regiments, it probably would be restricted to holding little more in the south than a few district capital!

24. Lacking Cuban backup, FAPLA's offensive options would narrow. Angolan combat troops would have to assume additional garrison and logistic duties, leading to a reduced combat capability, especially for offensive operations. Although there is a slight chance that the Angolan Government could gamble on another major offensive, more than likely FAPLA would retrench in a defensive posture. Without the perceived safety net that Cuban units formerly provided, traditionally poor FAPLA troop morale probably would deteriorate further and desertion rates would rise, especially if UNITA harassed FAPLA's vulnerable supply lines, food shortages became pervasive, or UNITA launched a successful psychological warfare campaign

25. FAPLA probably would not benefit in any decisive way if the Cubans were to leave their equipment behind. FAPLA units already are unable to absorb all of their own equipment. In the unlikely event FAPLA were able to recruit and train new personnel to take over the Cuban equipment, FAPLA would quickly experience severe maintenance problems. Equipment left behind would most likely serve as reserve stocks to replace deadlined FAPLA weapons and vehicles or material lost to UNITA

28. A more critical factor is our assumption that Cuban technicians, specialists, and advisers—either in uniform or mufti—would be removed. These individuals perform vital rear-area service and support functions that few of the ill-educated Angolan troops can. Their services are essential to maintenance of air defense and other modern equipment and extremely important to FAPLA's logistic continuity. If, in fact, they were to remain, FAPLA's capabilities would not deteriorate as significantly

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UNITA

27. The transition to Namibian independence, and with it gradual reduction of SADF forces at Namibian bases, would greatly reduce South Africa's ability to provide materiel and combat support for UNITA. Neither UNITA's military capabilities nor its viability as an organization, however, totally depend on South African aid. UNITA would continue to conduct operations, although perhaps at a somewhat reduced but still fairly widespread level during Phase One. The level of activity that UNITA could sustain would depend on the level of insurgent stockpiles, resupply, or ability to capture large amounts of materiel from FAPLA

28. Logistic constraints and the effort to surmount them would tax UNITA's energy. The rebels capture more than half their arms and ammunition from government stocks and would step up this activity. Conservation would be enforced, other suppliers approached for increased deliveries, and potential new donors solicited. Almost certainly the SADF would have made large deliveries of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and fuel before the withdrawal-transition day.

29. Petroleum products would remain the single, hardest-to-deliver commodity. Fuel deliveries would become a logistic nightmare if they could not be made through Namibia. As its fuel supplies diminished, UNITA's momentum probably would slow and its use of portering would necessarily increase. Severe fuel shortages probably could be avoided for about six months, howevel

30. Pretoria probably would try to replace aerial resupply performed by the South African Air Force with covert South African or contractor flights from Zaire or Gabon. Alternatively, it is within the SADF's capability to fly the 2,500-kilometer or so round trip from South Africa to UNITA's headquarters at Jamba with minimal danger of detection, but such flights would be expensive, infrequent, politically sensitive, and perhaps risky

\$1. UNITA no doubt would seek alternative sources of supply by trying to attract new donors and by soliciting increased aid from old backers. Trainers, advisers, technicians, medical assistance, and supplies would be sought from other nations or private contractors. The amount of support obtained from alternative sources, however, probably would fall short of the level of assistance currently provided by Pretoria. Moreover, the loss of Namibia as a support base and the consequent geographic isolation would make it

more difficult for UNITA to receive deliveries. The importance of Zaire as an alternative staging area for supply operations would significantly increase

32. A change in backers also would introduce new problems, deficiencies, and costs. UNITA would have to divert additional energy into fundraising and cash-producing enterprises. Training, if provided outside Angola, might become less relevant and realistic. Medevac services would all but disappear for lack of adequate and proffered medical facilities in neighboring countries and due to the high risk tu pilots and drivers. Although UNITA could continue to market diamonds, ivory, and animal skins profitably, its logging enterprise would decline. At least some petroleum products, now reportedly received free from South Africa, would have to be purchased elsewhere

33. Without SADF operational military support, or a substitute for such assistance, the level and extent of UNITA's conventional operations would gradually decline. Without South African participation, the sophistication of some UNITA sabotage operations probably would diminish. Although UNITA's human intelligence collection probably would remain about the same, its ability to intercept government communications probably would suffer disruptions and attenuation, resulting in less timely and effective attacks on Angolan forces. Nonetheless, we judge that UNITA's forces would not lose their high morale or determination and would continue to keep up an active insurgency

Phase Two-Military Impact

34. Implementation of Phase Two presupposes that all parties had fulfilled Phase One obligations and that neither the MPLA nor South Africa had developed compelling concerns about the impact on its own security or was pressing for delay. Essentially, South Africa would have no obligations under Phase Two. Unless the new government of an independent Namibia were pro-South African and requested the reintroduction of South African troops or advisers, South Africa at this point would be excluded from Namibia, except for Walvis Bay. On the other hand, roughly 20,000 Cubans would remain in northern Angola, some of whom could be redeployed to the south if Luanda elected to violate the agreement. Presumably, the UNTAG would be phased out as Namibian independence approached

35. Were UNITA demonstrating a capacity to continue operations at high levels, the MPLA government might resist going forward with Phase Two. Luanda probably would want to retain the remaining Cubans—troops and advisers—as long as possible to preserve its

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options. Efforts to ensure that the departure was completed on time might be met with excuses about shortages of airlift or shipping. Whether there was evidence or not of South African complicity, Luanda would attribute UNITA's resilience to South African help. Luanda would be slarmed by any gains by UNITA, particularly north of the 13th parallel, and would charge South Africa with interference in Angolan affairs and noncompliance with the agreement.

FAPLA

36. The loss of Cuban backing probably would hurt FAPLA more than reduced outside support would hurt UNITA, at least over the period of Phase Two. Luanda probably would launch a major new recruitment campaign but fail to organize enough new Angolan units to replace the departing Cubans. FAPLA would be forced to take up largely defensive positions throughout the country. UNITA's better motivated and disciplined personnel probably would be better able to make the transition to altered circumstances than would FAPLA. Thus, the transition period would appear to offer UNITA opportunities to further undermine FAPLA morale by forcing FAPLA out of the countryside, cutting its logistic lines, and hitting key economic targets

37. If the 6,000 Cuban advisers departed along with Cuban units, FAPLA's capacity to train its troops in country—particularly specialists and officers—would decline. Diminishing maintenance would take its toll on FAPLA's vehicles and equipment. Planning, command, and control from the Ministry of Defense down to brigade level would begin to erode. FAPLA would either have to accept gradual debilitation or to negotiate for more Soviet, Bloc, or Third World military aid. Under the assumptions of our scenario, neither the Soviets nor their allies would provide combat forces, but the possibility of replacing Cuban advisers or technicians cannot be ruled out. Chances are, however, that at most a few thousand would be replaced.

38. Angolan Air Force capabilities also would decline as the 1,100 Cuban Air Force personnel were repatriated. Not only do Cubans spearhead the pilot corps: -flying many of the combat sorties against UNITA—but Cuban technicians probably are equally important to the logistic and maintenance side of the air force. FAPLA would have little choice but to appeal to other nations to provide this assistance, to hire contract personnel—possibly "civilianized" Cubans—or to accept a diminished air capability

39. Thus, the second phase of Cuban troop with-drawal would be nerve-wracking for the MPLA and its forces. Although they would not be left entirely on their own (Soviet and Bloc advisers would remain), the bulk of their foreign military underpinning since independence would be gone. With FAPLA morale sinking further, desertion rates would rise. More commanders might arrange local traces with UNITA, providing them with intelligence and ammunition in exchange for fewer attacks or even food

40. Key Angolan installations—mines, dams, bridges, ports, airfields, roads, rail yards, and the oil facilities—would become far more vulnerable to UNITA attack with the departure of their Guban defenders. Some FAPLA and militia troops could move in to fill gaps, but their skills and dedication are uneven. Some of FAPLA's best units probably would be diverted from combat to protect the oil facilities, and the MPLA might have to spend some of its "savings" reaped from the Cuban withdrawal to hire contract security services for the vital oil infrastructur

41. FAPLA, during Phase Two and beyond, would continue to enjoy the distinct advantage of a steady supply of military materiel from the USSR. As long as oil revenues held up and debt repayment did not lag, FAPLA also could purchase materiel from Western sources. But FAPLA—with the Cubans gone—probably could exploit this advantage even less than it does now due to in-country logistic limitations and inadenuate provision of basics, including food, to its troops

42. Any Western military assistance the MPLA might gain probably would be limited to commercial deals for specific pieces of equipment. Southern African Front-line states already are committed in Mozambique and probably would steer clear of new military involvement in Angola. Ethiopia gives priority to its own problems in the Horn, although provision of a token force is possible. Nigeria would offer sympathy but probably not troops. Both Ethiopia and Nigeria might provide some advisers and possibly limited transport assistance.

UNITA

43. UNITA's prospects during Phase Two would depend on how well it had husbanded resources, captured materiel, and managed to keep its outside supply pipeline open. If UNITA were handicapped by haphazard supply, it would have to cut back on conventional activity and concentrate on guerrilla tactics. Even under these circumstances, however, UNITA would not be reduced to an easily containable

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security threat. UNITA would benefit from a broad base of popular support, an improving combat force ratio, and traditional advantages such as terrain and surprise that often accrue to guerrillas. UNITA would strive to continue to operate throughout the country and probably would be able at the very least to keep the economy in turmoil.

- 44. A virtual cutoff of supply lines out of Namibia would prompt UNITA to relocate important parts of its military organization and activities to areas along the northern or northeastern border with Zaire. This option would depend heavily upon President Mobutu's willingness to support UNITA, and Mobutu would be concerned for his own security and would require that some deniability be maintained. Were the UNITA insurgency in the north to heat up considerably, however, we would expect the MPLA to try to retaliate against Zaire, possibly by sending armed Zairian dissidents to attack facilities in Shaba or Bas Zaire. Even if such retaliatory efforts were inept, the Zairian Government would be alarmed and might reevaluate aiding UNITA
- 45. Potential new suppliers probably would hesitate, awaiting clarification of the new military situation before committing themselves. Nonetheless, UNITA might prod conservative sympathizers such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, or Ivory Coast to provide more active support. Should the battlefield situation take a dramatic shift, a bandwagon effect would be likely.
- 46. Even if FAPLA were debilitated, UNITA prohably could not train enough personnel quickly to expand operations and occupy the countryside at large. Since 1976, UNITA has experienced a gradual but steady force expansion and has made the necessary structural and functional changes to use these forces well. UNITA might continue to train and absorb as many as 3,000 to 5,000 guerrillas a year, but larger numbers probably would exceed the insurgents' training capacity.

Summary: Outlook for the Military Balance

- 47. The chances are low that either the MPLA government or UNITA would hold a decisive military advantage at the end of a Cuban troop withdrawal. Unexpected events, such as the introduction of Soviet combat troops or the defection of entire FAPLA units, would have to occur to benefit either side in such a dramatic way. In relative terms, however, UNITA would be the net gainer, at least for the first year or two, since it would be able to continue its insurgency—albeit at somewhat reduced levels—while government forces would assume an increasingly defensive posture.
- 48. A Cuban troop withdrawal would place considerable strain on FAPLA, despite its continued access to

Soviet arms and advisers. The need to recruit, train, retain, supply, and command a larger defense force would not be satisfied, resulting in increased strains on the military infrastructure and a heavy combat load for the most capable units. There would be some increase in FAPLA personnel and a possible expansion of auxiliary organizations such as the militia. Nonetheless, unless significant numbers of foreign personnel were introduced, the military's logistic, air and ground combat, and air defense capabilities would decline. FAPLA probably would become primarily a defense-oriented force with diminished capacity to mount counterinsurgency operations or general offensives.

- 49. More than likely, UNITA's capabilities would decline as well, but it would remain a dangerous adversary. It would continue striking economic targets, denying larger portions of the countryside to the government, and inflicting continuous damage on a defensive FAPLA. The human advantages UNITA appears to enjoy—superior courage, leadership, motivation, and morale—as well as its skills at camouflage, movement, and surprise, would compensate for FAPLA's equipment advantage
- 50. UNITA's opportunities at the end of Phase Two would depend upon the adequacy of its supplies. We judge that UNITA probably would step up pressure in an effort to force FAPLA out of key garrisons in the east, south, and central areas. If UNITA were able to take full advantage, it might force FAPLA to concentrate on defending provincial capitals, perhaps even compelling the Angolan army to withdraw toward Luanda and the revenue-generating oil facilities. Even in strained circumstances short of a collapse of MPLA resolve, however, FAPLA probably could hold the coastal area from Benguela to the Congo River. The central plateau, heavily populated by Ovimbundus kin to many in UNITA's ranks, and the forested areas of the north, which are favorable for guerrilla warfare tactics, would be harder to hold
- 51. If UNITA managed to launch a major offensive at the end of Phase Two, evicting FAPLA from many key towns and locations, it probably would not result in a "march on Luanda." Nonetheless, it could lead the MPLA to negotiate with UNITA

Implications for Compliance

52. Despite the international condemnation that would follow noncompliance or abrogation, neither South Africa nor the Angolan Government would hesitate to use stalling tactics should it perceive that the other was gaining a decisive advantage or was not complying. More than likely, either side would first

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attempt to adjudicate complaints through the UNTAG or the facilitators of a Cuban troop withdrawal agreement. Delays pending clarification of troop or insurgent movements, as well as continued hostilities, probably would occur in the early months of Phase One. An international mechanism for on-site monitoring troop movement notifications, and frequent briefings on agreement progress would help forestall unwarranted suspicions and reduce distrus

53. The expectations of both the MPLA and South Africa are likely to cause unilateral halts. The MPLA almost certainly would perceive South Africa's hand behind any continuing UNITA operations. For its part, Pretoria might blame any Increase in ANC activity inside the Republic on Angolan support and therefore delay the Namibian process. South Africa certainly would draw attention to any SWAPO efforts to affect the outcome of Namibian elections through violence or intimidation

54. Technical delays and quibbling would be likely, and even abrogation of the agreement by the MPLA or South Africa could not be ruled out should either see its potential gains draining away. Should SWAPO win a dominant position in the Namibian Constitutional Assembly, for example, South Africa would be tempted to abrogate. South Africa would be most likely to take this step early in Phase One before its troops had been completely removed. The SADF has the capability to reinsert troops quickly at a later stage should it decide to do so, but after Phase One it would have no means available short of violating Namibia's sovereignty by a costly invasion. For its part, the MPLA would be more likely to abrogate the Cuban troop withdrawal agreement early in Phase Two to ayoid giving up all Cuban troops and advisers should it perceive a stronger than expected UNITA or a potentially threatening outcome to Namibian elections.

55. South Africa would find ways to continue providing at least some supplies to UNITA. Occasional overflights of remote parts of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, or Zaire probably would be undetected, or at least unchallenged. Some retired SADF members now resident in Namibia, or South African sympathizers in the Namibian territorial forces, might find lucrative ways to maintain South Africa's contacts with UNITA. Occasional UNTAG patrols along the Namibian border monitoring SWAPO repatriation could do little to deter such activit

56. Without agreed-upon procedures for accountability, much room would remain for FAPLA and Cuba to play a "shell game" with their military personnel, especially advisers and technicians. Cuban

military personnel could be "civilianized," for example, or become Angolan citizens of convenience

57. The United States would be able to monitor a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola only partially. With national technical means we would do recsonably well observing the movement and departure of Cuban military units, particularly if they took associated heavy equipment with them. We could do this very well if provided with troop lists and notification of when and how these groups would depart. Monitoring the withdrawal of individual Cubans serving in rear area support, advisory, staff, school, and headquarters positions would be very difficult. Monitoring South African resupply of UNITA also would be extremely hard

Implications for the United States

58. Implementation of a Cuban troop withdrawal agreement and transition to independence for Namibia would represent a significant and hard-won foreign policy success for the United States. Moreover, successful implementation of this agreement would open up opportunities for further enhancement of US influence as leaders in the region looked to Washington to take on other difficult negotiations, such as reconciliation between rebels and the regime in Mozambique or even in South Africa itself. The danger, of course, would be unrealistically high expectations of the US ability to delive

59. On the other hand, the fragility of any troop withdrawal agreement would pose specific risks and potential costs to the United States.

- The international community would look to the United States to overcome any stalling tactics by either side. Blame for an agreement that failed probably would fall on the United States and South Africa.
- There is some risk that an effort to relax tensions through mutual troop withdrawals would, in fact, prompt an escalation of fighting. For instance, were the MPLA to reintroduce Cuban troops or to invite in Soviet Bloc forces, South Africa could react violently.
- —If a weak Namibian Government requested a prolonged UN military presence as insurance against outside interference, the United States could be asked to shoulder the financial burden. Reintroduction of South African troops at any time would challenge the UN to expel them, and the United States probably would be expected to take the lead

14 SECRET 60. The reduction of Cuban and South African involvement in Angola could improve prospects for reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. Provided that the agreement did not unravel, a relatively weakened MPLA probably would be more inclined to negotiate with UNITA on sharing power, for instance. Nonetheless, vexing problems would remain:

- The civil war in Angola probably would persist even if negotiations were under way.
- The Soviet role in Luanda would continue, and Soviet military deliveries and advisory efforts might even expand.
- Pro-Western Zaire probably would come under increased threat of retaliation from Angola as UNITA sought greater use of Zairian territory to compensate for reductions in South African supplies.
- South Africa would still be able to act disruptively in Angola and Namibia

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ANNEX A

Cuban Forces in Angola

| ters and along the Benguela rail line. In northern Angola, Cuban forces guard the capital at Luanda as well as vital oil-producing facilities in Cabinda and Soyo. The combat elements of the Cuban expeditionary force, according to satellite photography and informa- |
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| Under the Cuban headquarters in Luanda, a subor- dinate headquarters in Huambo controls the Southern |

Cuban Roles and Organization

Cuban military forces ensured the victory of the MPLA regime in the postindependence civil war in the 1970s and have since acted to maintain the security of the government. On two occasions since 1980, the Cubans have augmented their contingent in Angola following increased threats to Luanda by either the South Africans or UNITA. Until the late 1970s, Cuban forces performed a direct combat role and participated in the fighting against UNITA insurgents and against South African incursions. Since then, as the intensity of the conflict has escalated and the scale of South African intervention has increased, Hayana has reduced its role and increasingly turned the fighting over to the Angolan Army

The current deployment of Cuban military units in Angola reflects their backup and security roles. Cuban combat units are stationed at static defensive positions along strategic lines of communication and key political, economic, and military facilities. In southern Angola, Cuban ground combat units are deployed primarily along the Namibe-Menongue rail line. Cuban air and air defense elements also are stationed in southern Angola to protect Cuban garrisons from South African air attacks and to fly occasional combat missions in support of Angolan forces. In central Angola, combat units are stationed at provincial cen-

Under the Cuban headquarters in Luanda, a subordinate headquarters in Huambo controls the Southern Troop Group (Agrupacion de Tropas del Sur—ATS) in central and southern Angola (Angolan Military Regions IV, V, and VI). The ATS includes combat units along the Namibe-Menongue rail line, the Huambo area in central Angola, and the air and air defense brigade. Luanda has proposed withdrawal of the ATS, which is tasked primarily with defending a rear line of defense against South African incursion, during Phase One in exchange for a South African withdrawal from Namibia. The remainder of the Cuban force—generally stationed in the northern part of the country and to be removed during Phase Two—is composed of independent units assigned to guard key economic facilities and governmental administrative centers from attack by UNITA insurgents

In addition to the combat component of the force, the Cubans also provide advisers and instructors assigned to Angolan brigades, headquarters, and training centers or schools. Cuban military personnel also man various headquarters and support units in rear areas and may perform services for both the Cuban and Angolan armed forces

Recent Changes in the Force

Since 1985, when the Intelligence Community last produced a comprehensive assessment of the Cuban

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forces in Angola, there have been several developments affecting estimates of Cuban strength in Angola:

- There has been a modest but steady augmentation of Cuban forces as some incomplete or understrength units were fleshed out. The apparent strengthening of Cuban forces in important economic areas, such as oil-producing Cabinda Province, added to our estimate.
- Since late 1986, the Cubans have abandoned two garrisons in central and northern Angola and several camps along the Luanda-Huambo highway. Some units probably relocated to higher priority positions like Kuito where they guard an important segment of the main supply line to southeastern Angola. Despite our extensive search of satellite photography, the present locations of two armored formations, formerly based at Malanje and Luena, have not been determined. We believe their constituent elements are still in country.

If recent reports of Cuban redeployments and possible reinforcement in Angola are true, the Cuban backup and security role may be changing

The cumulative effect of these developments is to increase slightly our overall estimate of the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola from 36,000 to about 38,000 as of mid-November 1987, and to refine our estimates of various force components. We now believe that there are fewer military advisers than we estimated before, but that there are more support units assigned.

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¹ See Interagency Intelligence Assessment 85-10009. The Cuban Presence in Angola (15 November 1985)

Counting Cubans

Combat Units. We believe that the combat component of the Cuban military contingent in Angola infantry regiments, fighter squadrons, missile and radar units, direct support elements, and the unlocated armored formations—is nearly 32,000-men strong.

We are most confident of our estimate for observed Cuban ground, air, and air defense formations in Angola, which include some 20,600 men, or about 54 percent of the total. This estimate is based on identification of Cuban units on satellite photography. Cuban combat and combat support units in Angola have unique imagery signatures and we are confident that we can distinguish the ground, air, and air defense units from equivalent Angolan formations. We believe these units to be manned at full strength in accordance with known Cuban organizational practices. In addition, there are about 2,800 men in units currently unlocated.

Other reporting and information on the organization of Cuban military forces indicate that the combat formations are complemented by various organic support units. For example, a Cuban combat regiment would normally have assigned maintenance, signal, transportation, supply and service units. Although these support units are not readily detectable on satellite photography, we believe they exist and estimate them at about 8,400 mer

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By this analysis, combat elements of the Cuban ATS—that portion of the overall force subject to Phase-One withdrawal—would total over 18,000 men, including some 14,000 men in Military Regions V and VI, generally deployed along the Namibe-Menongue rail line between the 16th and 13th parallels, and about 4,000 in Military Region IV north of the 13th parallel. The Angolans have said publicly that the ATS includes 15,000 troops stationed along the Namibe-Menongue rail line and another 5,000 troops north of the 13th parallel

Military Advisers. We have somewhat less confidence in our estimate of nearly 6,000 men not assigned to Cuban combat formations who serve in advisory, training, higher headquarters staff, and support roles. There is only fragmentary reporting on these elements and, because they are not visible on satellite photography, our estimate represents an internally consistent "best guess."


Cuban military personnel reportedly are assigned as advisers to headquarters of Angolan military regions and to Angolan brigades. Cuban instructors, according to various reports, are also present at 10, and probably as many as 30, Angolan training centers and military academies. Cuban military personnel also man strategic telecommunication facilities, and the Cuban military probably has a technical component to service aircraft, naval craft, and electronic equipment.

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ANNEX B

US Ability To Monitor and Verify a Troop Withdrawal Agreement



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NED SNIE 11-86

Prospects for the Angolan Civil War in 1987

Special National Intelligence Estimate Memorandum to Holders

Secret

SNIE 71-86
February 1947

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

SNIE 71-86

PROSPECTS FOR THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR IN 1987

Information available as of I February 1967 was used in the preparation of this Memorandom to Holders, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 6 February 1967.

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
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SCOPE NOTE

The military dimension continues to dominate the situation in Angola and both sides are promising new military initiatives. This Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 71-86, Angola: Short-Term Prospects for UNITA, published in February 1986, focuses on the changes in the military situation as a result of the fighting last year, new strategies considered by the two sides, our assessment of the most likely outcome of both the fighting and political activity this year, and the roles of external forces in Angola

The 1986 Estimate looked at the implications of what was expected to be the most significant military development of the year—a major government offensive against UNITA-held territory in southeastern Angola. The anticipated offensive did not materialize as expected, and the implications discussed in the Estimate were moot. In a sense, last year was a hiatus in the progress of the conflict and, as anticipated, neither side made gains that altered the military picture decisively. The government remains committed to a military solution and has not, as anticipated, made any realistic approaches to UNITA for reconciliation.

Despite the unprecedented scale of preparation during 1986, Luanda apparently became embroiled in an internal debate over the timing and scope of the offensive, postponed and rescheduled the operation on several occasions, and ultimately decided in favor of a more cautious but sustained approach. None of the reasons that explain the lack of an offensive—logistic shortfalls, UNITA operations in the north, and threat of South African intervention—were unfamiliar. In retrospect, however, they were not given sufficient weight, although logistic shortfalls, among other reasons, was cited as a reason the offensive might be delayed and slow to develop.

The various factors considered in assessing the implications of the offensive remain generally valid. The government, as expected, continues to be focused on Mavinga as the general objective of its operations and deployments. Preparatory moves continue to be oriented in that direction. UNITA also expected the offensive and, as anticipated, adopted a strategy that attempted to derail the buildup, although the insurgents apparently now are considering some changes. The principal outside backers, the Soviets and Cubans for the government side and

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South Africa for the insurgents, played their roles much as anticipated in the Estimate and hewed to established patterns. Recent indications that Pretoria is considering some limits on its involvement were generally anticipated, with the expectation that South Africa's actions would be carefully calculated and limited to a measured response

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Military initiatives by either side in the coming year are not likely to produce a resolution of the conflict or swing the initiative decisively in either direction

Both Luanda and UNITA have reoriented their strategies for the campaigns this year. UNITA apparently is planning to put more emphasis on guerrilla warfare to increase pressure on the government. The insurgents plan to increase activity in central and northern Angola but anticipate losing some territory to the government in the southeast. UNITA, however, probably will make a stand at Mavinga if it is threatened. The government wants to keep the pressure on the insurgents and plans large, cautious advances with carefully consolidated gains. The government intends to minimize its risks in the belief that time is on its side

Key Factors

There are several key factors that will affect the ability of either side to carry through with its plans:

- UNITA probably can increase its activity in central and northern Angola where it has previous experience, but operations near the capital or against the oil industry will be difficult. Logistic support for expanded guerrilla activity will be difficult.
- The government's intention to launch slow-moving, multibrigade operations takes advantage of its strength in conventional weaponry. The road-bound government forces, however, depend on a vulnerable supply line and will fight in a trackless region where UNITA controls the countryside. Moreover, UNITA has had appreciable success in blunting government airpower and armor advantages.
- Degree of popular support, Army morale, leadership resolve, and state of the economy bear strongly on the situation. Changes in these factors this year probably will not be sufficient to cause a decisive swing in events.
- South Africa's commitment to UNITA will remain strong, although there are indications that Pretoria is considering limitations on its involvement because of increasing risks, costs, and other priorities. Nevertheless, if the insurgents were to be in serious danger, South Africa most likely would intervene to remove the immediate threat.





— Angola's Soviet and Cuban backers are no doubt concerned by developments in Angola, but, as long as the regime or their influence is not in immediate danger, they probably will continue with their traditional roles of supplier and backer. A serious deterioration in the security situation or major South African intervention would most likely prompt increased or more direct involvement

Alternative Outcomes

Uncertainties over the influence of the key factors on the military initiatives by either side suggest that alternative outcomes are possible.

More Likely. Neither side is likely to gain a decisive advantage. Steady government pressure in the southeast is likely to produce some territorial gains; Mavinga may be threatened, but UNITA headquarters at Jamba most likely will remain secure:

- Insurgent activity probably will increase in central and northern Angola, but not to the extent that Luanda will be forced into a major pullback from the southeast.
- The Soviet and Cuban commitment is likely to continue at about present levels as will South African aid to the insurgents. A serious threat to Mavinga, however, probably would prompt a South African intervention in considerable force.
- There is an increased chance for small-scale conflict along the Angola-Zaire border this year, but Luanda is not likely to sponsor a major attack. Increased Zairian insecurities, however, are most likely to stimulate new requests for security assistance from its Western supporter.

Less Likely. The situation could tilt more favorably toward either side although it is highly unlikely that the shift will be decisive:

- Careful military moves by Luanda combined with less than expected insurgent resistance could allow government forces to move faster and farther. A serious threat to Mavinga and a major South African intervention could provoke a direct confrontation with Cuban troops. In the event of a clash, it is not likely that either side would immediately push toward a major escalation of the conflict.
- On the other hand, successful UNITA harassment of the ponderous government columns combined with a significant increase in northern guerrilla activity would present Luanda with the dilemma of whether or not to abandon its southeastern





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operations to enhance defenses around the capital or vital oil facilities. A deterioration in the security situation probably would, as in the past, lead to increased Soviet and Cuban support in arms or Cuban troop augmentation

Diplomatic Arena

Luanda's concentration on a military solution, in our view, underestimates UNITA's political and military strengths and South Africa's commitment and makes serious movement toward reconciliation with UNITA virtually nil. UNITA's price for cooperation on the reopening of the Benguela Railroad is not likely to be acceptable to Luanda

Implications for the United States. Luanda apparently is counting on a favorable change in US policy and is not likely to be receptive to new initiatives during the period of this Estimate. Although the regime probably will keep informal lines of communication open, the conditions it has attached to resumption of serious discussions over a US-brokered regional settlement probably will continue to stall negotiations.

Luanda most likely will continue its diplomatic efforts to focus regional and international criticism on US support for UNITA. Luanda also is likely to complement its diplomatic efforts with a public relations campaign to offset UNITA's efforts to gain support

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DISCUSSION

- Since publication of SNIE 71-86 in February 1986, there have been several developments in the Angolan civil war that will affect the course of the conflict:
 - Luanda failed to launch the expected major offensive and debated its options for dealing with UNITA. The year ended with the positions of the combatants relatively unchanged.
 - UNSTA attempted to preempt government operations and distract Luanda's concentration on the southeast. Recently the insurgents have chosen to increase guerrilla operations, especially in the north.
 - South Africa is considering limitations on its involvement because of increasing risk and cost.

UNITA To Intensify Guerrilla Operations

- 2. Developments during the year in the southeast have prompted UNITA to consider reorienting its strategy to more directly pressure the government. The insurgents believe increased guerrilla operations in the north will produce gains and draw off government forces from the southeast. To do so, UNITA ing the Munhango and Lungue-Bungo approaches into smaller guerrilla formations. With its guerrilla strength enhanced, UNITA plans to increase its activity in central and western Angola as well as intensify operations against economic and administrative targets in the northern part of the country
- 3. UNITA anticipates it may lose some territory it has controlled since 1983, particularly in Moxico Province. The insurgents expect the government to continue the pressure in 1987, and UNITA will harass and resist the advancing government columns and supply lines. UNITA probably will, however, make a stand at Mavinga if it is threatened. To this end, the insurgents will maintain the strength of their conventional forces in the Cuito Cuanavale area and are organizing a reserve at Mavinga to defend a position they consider vital.

Growth of UNITA Insurgency

Following its defeat by Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and Cuban troops in early 1976, a few mosths after Angola's independence. UNITA withdrew into the bush. Savimbi and his retreating forces sought security in the sparsely populated southeast. At fire, only occasional operations were conducted, while the major effort was devoted to recruiting additional personnel, capturing or establishing new sources of supplies, and building political support domestically and abroad. The location of his redoubt was ideal for receiving help from South African forces in Namibia and from other countries. Meanwhile, FAPLA began integrating massive amounts of new Soviet equipment and reorganizing and training its forces for conventional operations.

The movement grew rapidly, reaching 20,000 to 25,000 men by 1981 and 35,000 by 1983, and in the process forced semiconventional battalions that began to be used in large-scale assaults on isolated government outposts, such as Cangamba in August 1983 and provincial capitals such as Sumbe in March 1984. Nevertheless, UNITA continued to place major emphasis on guerrilla operations and on expanding the areas where it could routinely operate. UNITA was conducting operations in 12 of Angola's 17 provinces by 1983

In the 1980s the government has regularly conducted offensive operations in the dry seasons, with UNITA increasing activity during the rainy seasons. UNITA occasionally sought to take and hold territory but more often became satisfied merely to demonstrate the government's lack of control. UNITA has from its first years sought to demonstrate to the local population its legitimacy and its capability to govern and provide services. By 1985 UNITA was routinely—conducting—operations in provinces north of Luanda

Luanda's Cautious Approach

4. Luanda appears prepared to carry on the main strategic themes worked out last year, most notably its efforts to apply steady pressure on the southeast. In Luanda's view, time is on its side; the government anticipates that a change in the US administration, as well as increasing internal conflict in South Africa and the effect of international sanctions, will force UNITA's principal backers to cut back on support. In

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Luanda's calculation, the best move in the near term is to sustain the pressure on the insurgents, minimize risks, and, at all costs, avoid a major defeat. Militarily, this means large, well-supported, but cautious advances with gains carefully consolidated before subsequent moves. Although Luanda is focused on a military solution to the conflict, politically, the government will trail the bait of reconciliation in hopes of generating dissension within insurgent ranks. Moreover, Luanda has reportedly devoted substantial resources to a public relations campaign to negate UNITA's effort to gain allies and international recognition

5. Recent government moves in the southeast, involving an unusual rainy season operation, appear to be the opening gambit in this strategy. According to government officials, Luanda chose to launch the attack during the November-April rainy season so as to tie down insurgent forces and forestall the usual seasonal UNITA gains. Government brigades crossed the Lungue-Bungo River in early December, established a bridgehead—including tactical surface-to-air missile defenses—but have been challenged by UNITA forces and have only advanced about 10 kilometers. Most of the government forces appear to be tied down in rear area security

Influence of Key Factors

6. Despite the intentions of the combatants to adopt new strategies, there are several factors that will affect the ability of either side to successfully early through with its plans.

UNITA's Military Performance

- 7. The reorganization into smaller guerrilla units probably will not present any significant difficulty, and UNITA will have less problem with small unit operations than it sometimes had with its larger conventional battalions. UNITA probably can increase its level of activity in central Angola, where it enjoys traditional tribal support, and in the north, where it has had three years of sustained operational experience and recently increased its activity. For UNITA to significantly increase the pressure on the government, however, it will have to threaten the capital—where the insurgents have not enjoyed major success before—and attack the oil industry, the government's economic buttress, which so far has nowed to be UNITA's most difficult target.
- 8. The insurgents, however, will find it more difficult logistically to support extended guerrilla operations. UNITA's logistic officers have admitted that northern operations have been one of their most

difficult problems and it is likely to be exacerbated by increased demands and the potential threat to the insurgent supply line in the southeast. UNITA, however, hopes to offset possible shortages by establishing supply lines through Zaire, and President Mobutu.ornhably will be compathetic to UNITA's request

Military Capabilities

- 9. Slow-moving, multibrigade, cautious, and well-supplied offensives will take advantage of Luanda's traditional strengths in firepower, airpower, equipment, and numbers. The government formations have demonstrated that they can make progress against UNITA in conventional operations, and they probably can continue to do so. Nevertheless, the government forces remain generally mad bound and, in the southeast, where there are few roads of any quality, government advances will tend to be channeled along a narrow frontage leaving the insurgents relatively free use of interior areas. In addition, the deeper they move into UNITA territory, the greater the demond on forces to guard the vital supply line
- 10. UNITA also is likely to have some success in blunting government advantages in weapons. Insurgent use of portable surface-to-air missiles last year apparently forced the government to cut back on close air support and adopt more restrictive tactics following losses of fighters and helicopters. Moreover, UNITA has formed a specially trained antitank unit that reportedly has been fielded successfully against government armored units. Countermeasures are likely, but UNITA has demonstrated that government forces are vulnerable.

The Internal Situation

11. The degree of popular support enjoyed by the government, Army morale, resolve of the leadership, and the economic situation bear as strongly on the situation as do more narrowly focused military factors. A major change in any of these factors this year sufficient to swing events decisively in either direction is not likely. The volatile situation makes more precise prediction difficult, however. Creation of mass support is an important element of insurgent operations and UNITA probably puts more effort into it than does the government. Surpicions of the various ethnic

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Oil Earnings

Oil accounts for more than 90 percent of total Angolan exports and the sharp decline in oil prices since 1985 cut Angolan earnings almost in half. Export earnings dropped from more than \$2.2 billion in 1985 to about \$1.2 to \$1.5 billion in 1986. In 1985 Angola paid about half of its earnings to its Communist backers for military support but last year was forced to request financial relief. Some debt payments were deferred, and Angola manufactured a moratorium of as long as two year.

groups run deep within Angolan society, however, and national support is difficult to obtain. Morale of the Angolan leadership is fickle and subject to wide mood swings. The Angolan Army has always suffered poor morale; desertions are a problem, although it seems to muddle through without mutiny or mass refusal to fight. The economy suffered a major blow last year when the drop in oil prices tarnished the only economic bright spot, but the government apparently believes it has suffered through the worst. The sharp slump in carnings affected the government's plans to revitalize the civilian economy and most of the plans are now on hold. Military deliveries were continued at a high level, but the decline in oil revenues forced the Soviets and the Cubans to defer some debt payments at increased direct cost to themselves.

South African Involvement

12. Pretoria's commitment to UNITA will remain strong. Material support and combat assistance most likely will continue through the period of this Estimate although there are indications that South Africa has considered putting limitations on its involvement because of increasing risks, limited resources, and other priorities. Pretorio, for example, is concerned by the growth in Angolan air defenses, which extend across most of southern Angola and cover a substantial part of the remainder. Resupply flights to UNITA forces in northern Angola may have been scaled back as a result. Nevertheless, if the insurgents were to be in serious danger, the South Africans probably would directly intervene in the combat to the extent necessary to remove the immediate threat

Soviet and Cuban Role

13. Angola's Soviet and Cuban backers are no doubt concerned by economic and military developments in Angola; however, neither the regime they support nor their influence is in immediate danger, and they probably believe the military situation is manageable. As long as this situation holds, Moscow and Havana are likely to continue their established roles of providing the bulk of Angola's weapons and equipment, guarding the main garrisons and key facilities, as well as intrusive advisory support and direction. Increased or more direct involvement probably would be prompted by a serious deterioration in the security situation marked either by UNITA gains or a major South African intervention into Angola.

Alternative Outcomes

14. Military initiatives by either side in the coming year are not likely to produce a resolution of the conflict or swing the initiative decisively in either direction. Nevertheless, uncertainties over the influence of the key factors suggest that alternative outcomes are possible.

More Likely

15. Without a significant change in the key factors—which is not likely—neither side will gain a decisive advantage. Steady government pressure in the southeast combined with changed UNITA tactics makes some government territorial gains likely; Caugamba and Lumbala N'Guimbo may be taken and Mavinga threatened, but UNITA headquarters at Jamba most likely will remain secure. Although penetration of UNITA territory along narrow axes will give the government some tactical advantages and propaganda bragging rights, the gains are not likely to be decisive or enduring

16. UNITA's intention to emphasize its guerrilla campaign makes increased activity in the northern part of the country likely. The insurgents probably will focus on its traditional objectives—government administrative centers, transportation routes, and economic targets—in central and northern Angola. The thireat to the oil facilities on the coast probably will increase. Nevertheless, UNITA's actions probably will not force Luanda into a major withdrawal from the contheast although the regime will be concerned.

17. While the level of Soviet and Cuban deliveries may fluctuate, the Soviet and Cuban commitment is likely to continue at about present levels with no significant change in the nature of their involvement, in the absence of a major South African intervention. Likewise. South African support to UNITA materiel and limited combat support—is likely to continue at about present levels with one reservation. Should



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Mavinga be seriously threatened. Pretoria, after careful evaluation, probably would intervene in considerable forc

18. There is an increased chance for small-scale conflict along the Angola-Zaire border this year. Luanda believes UNITA is routinely operating from inside Zaire, and has already conducted several small incursions while threatening mors. Luanda, however, is not likely to sponsor a major attack into Zaire in the near term. The border incidents and regional diplomatic efforts to bring pressure on Zaire probably will be unsuccessful in reducing Zairian support for UNITA. Increased Zairian insecurities, however, probably will stimulate new requests for security assistance from its Western supporters

Less Likely

19. Military successes, good fortune, and opportents' miscues could tilt the situation more favorably toward either side, although it is highly unlikely that the shift would be decisive this year

20. For Luanda, careful military moves and the consolidation of gains combined with less than expected insurgent resistance could allow government forces to move farther and faster than expected, particularly if UNITA operations in the north fail to distract the government. If the threat to Mavinga seriously threatens UNITA's forces, a major South African intervention could provoke a direct confrontation with Cuban troops and increase the risk to Soviet advisers. In the event of a clash, it is not likely that either side would immediately push toward a major escalation of the conflict. Both sides probably would look for a response that kept the military balance at minimum risk and cost

21. A more favorable scenario for UNITA would involve successful harassment of ponderous and slowmoving government forces in the southeast that become pinned down by needs of rear area security and desperately need reinforcement. If combined with a significant increase in activity in northern Angola, the government probably would be faced with the dilemma of abandoning or delaying southeastern operations to enhance defenses around the capital. Successful attacks on oil facilities in Cabinda and the northwest would jeopardize Luanda's ability to pay for the war, limit economic deterioration, and attract Western investment. As in the past, Soviet or Cuban support probably would be increased to include additional Soviet arms deliveries, augmentation of Cuban forces, and a possible Cuban combat role.

Diplomatic Arena

Prospects for Reconciliation

22. Luanda's concentration on a military solution underestimates UNITA's fundamental military and political strength and the depth of South Africa's commitment, which guarantees a continuation of the conflict and makes prospects for reconciliation virtually nil during the period of this Estimate. Publicly, Luanda maintains that amnesty for the rank and file is the only alternative, and private contacts with the UNITA leadership seem aimed at producing dissension in UNITA ranks rather than establishing an opening.

Benguela Initiative

23. The Angolan Government supports regional interest in the reopening of the Benguela Railroad as an alternative to routes through South Africa. The line running from the Zairian and Zambiam mines to an Angolan seaport has been effectively closed for more than a decade by UNITA sabotage, and UNITA's cooperation would be required if the line were to be refurbished and reopened. UNITA would levy a hefty price, and Luanda is not likely to agree to UNITA's conditions. Moreover, South Africa opposes the initiative and probably has made its views clear to UNITA.

Implications for the United States

24. Luanda apparently is counting on a change to an administration that it believes will be more friendly and is not likely to be receptive to new initiatives during the period of this Estimate. Luanda charges that the United States, by supporting Savimbi, has abandoned the role of honest broker and has demanded diplomatic recognition and end of aid to UNITA as conditions for resumption of talks on a regional settlement that ties Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435 to a Cuban troop withdrawal. Senior Angolan officials have spoken harshly about US policies; one characterized US actions as "an act of war." Privately, the Angolans have repeated the same themes. Although the regime will continue to keep lines of communication open, its actions probably will continue to stall negotiations

25. Luanda most likely will continue its diplomatic efforts to focus regional and international criticism on US support for UNITA. The government moved rapidly to increase its diplomatic exchanges in Western Europe following Savimbi's recent trip to France and is likely to complement its diplomatic efforts with a public relations campaign to offset UNITA's efforts to gain support

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Contending Forces

UNITA probably has about 60,000 armed combatants of which 20,000 to 25,000 are well-trained soldiers organized in about 50 battalions, most of which have been deployed in southeastern Angola. The remainder are guerrillas that operate in varying strength throughout the country. Most of the battalions have \$50 to 450 men armed with light weapons including mortars and recoilless rifles, and there are a few "regular" battalions of up to 1,500 men. The guerrillas-company-size formations of about 150 to 200 men or smaller local militias-frequently operate with the regular forces. In addition, UNITA has intelligence, communications, sabotage, logistics, and other support units. The UNITA leadership and its General Staff direct countrywide operations through regional "fronts," which are assigned a mix of regular and guerrilla contingents depending on the situation.

The Angolan Government has at least 100,000 men under arms in the regular Army, other security forces, and a territorial force or militia. The Army consists of about 66 brigades that average about 1,000 men each and are reinferced on occasion with territorial units. With the exception of a few mechanized brigades, most brigades are primarily infantry units with only limited artillery and armor support. The brigades are assigned to military regions, and theater-level operations may be controlled by a front. The Air Force includes about 200 operational fighters and helicopiers. Additional transport aircraft provide vital logistic support for isolated forward bases. Despite a Soviet-sponsored training program for Angolan pilots, Cubans

fly many of the combat missions, and a Soviet military transport aviation unit supplements airlift needs. Radar coverage extends over most of the country, and a substantial number of air defense missiles defend key bases and tactical formations. However, questions remain on the overall effectiveness of the system

The Angolan Army is backed by a 36,000-man Cuban military continuent—including some 28,000 combat treops—which guards rear bases, performs emential support services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations. The Cubans aid the Angolans in combat by piloting aircraft, manning much of the air defense system, and providing other combat support but have not been directly involved in major combat operations. The Soviets have some 1,200 military advisers overseeing a full range of Angolan military activity, including planning and directing combat operations, but Soviet policy discourages direct participation in combat.

South Africa has more than 20,000 troops in northern Namibia, most of which are Namibian territorial forces backed by a South African strike force. The Namibian territorials are carrying increasing responsibility for operations in Angola, supplemented by a South African "foreign legion" manned by black expatriate and a small number of "special forces" teams. Pretoria deploys its aircraft forward to Namibia as needed for operations in Angola. Angola has the advantage in number of supersonic fighters, but Pretoria has the edge in pilot skills and tactics

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Africa Supplement

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
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to

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Cuban Involvement in Angola

The Cuban government is clearly worried by the mounting problems it faces in Angola and has responded by increasing its forces there. What appeared last year to be an easy triumph for Cuban "internationalism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire. From the Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties are many and serious:

- -- Angola is experiencing deteriorating economic and social conditions.
- --Political instability was heightened by the uprising on May 27, and Cuban troops reportedly played a key role in putting down the revolt.
- -- There is increasing resentment among Angolans toward the Cuban presence.
- -- The defeat of the Katangan invaders has kindled fears of a Zairian military retaliation.

Cuba's involvement in Angola is extensive. In addition to combat troops, Havana has provided the Neto regime with a large number of military advisers tasked with organizing and training an air force, navy, army, militia, national police force, and a secret police force. Civilian advisers were sent to fill at least part of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era. These advisers include agricultural and livestock technicians, medical personnel to run and staff Angola's public health system, advisers to help restore sugar and coffee production, merchant marine and port advisers, and teams of construction personnel.

To help the MPLA broaden its political base, the Cubans sent experts in the formation of mass organizations

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and a vanguard party of political cadre. To complement the development of a political structure, advisers were also sent to develop a national education system. Some Angolans have apparently also been sent to Cuba for training.

This extensive presence became increasingly evident throughout the country, and the image of Cubans as a new breed of colonialists has spread. The Cubans are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to take command of a given situation instead of remaining in their role as advisers to their Angolan counterparts. Angolan resentment also stems from the Cuban and Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the country and the fact that their presence has not brought any economic progress or resulted in the elimination of the insurgent threat.

Reinforcement During May

So far, the Cuban response to the deteriorating situation has been escalation. In mid-April and early May the Cuban government began calling up reservists for service in Africa.

period. All apparently were asked to volunteer for one year of service in Angola.

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estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Cubans were sent to Angola in May. The ships and aircraft traveling to Angola in May could have carried this number. This would increase the estimated size of the Cuban presence in Angola to a level between 13,000 and 18,500. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 are civilian technicians, many of whom are believed to be reservists who have had military training and could be mobilized in place if necessary.

Also underlining Havana's concern, Raul Castro, Cuba's Armed Forces Minister and number-two man in the Cuban leadership, made a hastily arranged and unannounced visit to Angola after the uprising in May. During the trip, he reportedly inspected the critical military zones, including Cabinda, and Angola's borders with Zaire and Namibia. The communique issued after his visit pledged continued Cuban support for the beleaguered Neto regime and suggests that the Cubans are not yet ready to start looking for a way out.

Outlook for the Near Term

The fresh Cuban troops arriving from Cuba will probably enable the Angolan government to check the insurgency in Cabinda and northern Angola over the near term. There have been several reports indicating that an influx of Cuban troops into Cabinda has occurred in recent weeks. Some minor successes against UNITA also may be achieved. Over the long term, however, the Cuban MPLA forces will probably be unable to effectively neutralize the insurgent threat without a much larger military force.

Cuban involvement in Angola has been much greater than either Havana or Moscow anticipated, but the rapid reinforcement indicates that the limit of Havana's support has not yet been reached. Despite the apparent addition of some 3,000 to 4,000 Cubans, Havana still faces the likelihood of a steadily worsening situation accompanied by pressures for additional military and technical support. With few options available, Castro may escalate further; he probably would be willing to raise the number of combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000. In the meantime, Cuba probably will press some East European nations and the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African nations for greater moral support.

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Economic Considerations

The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on Cuban policymakers. The estimated 13,000 to 18,500 men now stationed in Angola represent only a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and an economic drain of about \$40-45 million annually—only 0.5 percent of total GNP—assuming average worker productivity and zero Cuban unemployment. Actual maintenance costs are probably even less. The diversion of merchant vessels for logistic support involves at most 10 percent of the Cuban fleet and a financial loss of \$15 million annually if these vessels were available for charter.

Virtually all other costs of the Cuban involvement are borne by the USSR. Moscow has replaced--probably on a grant basis--most of the military equipment which Havana has sent to Angola. Much of this replacement stock sent to Cuba is newer and in some cases more sophisticated. However, most of the military equipment being used in Angola was sent there directly from the USSR. The Soviets have provided Soviet planes and pilots to facilitate Cuban logistics and have leased two longer range IL-62s to Cuba

This has enabled Havana to continue its civil air service on Cubana's current routes without interruption.

While the real economic cost is relatively small, Havana is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the Cuban populace's exaggerated perception of the cost of the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of Havana's overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the highly visible callup of forces has coincided with a sharp economic The Cuban leaders have consistently and correctly maintained in all of their public announcements that the island's economic decline is due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace apparently views the Angolan adventure as a major cause of Cuba's economic difficulties. Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular support rather than repression and does pay close attention to mass attitudes. Out of respect for public opinion, he has never told the Cuban people the full story of the intervention in Angola.

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Outlook for the Longer Term

If Havana is faced with continued demands for a significant expansion of its forces, the Cuban leadership may find itself forced to reassess its policy. In such a situation, the attitude of the USSR toward a worsening Angolan situation will weigh heavily upon Cuba's actions. The Cuban presence there is dependent upon the continued full backing of Moscow. Cuba does not possess the military capabilities or the economic strength to go it alone. Even more important, Cuba itself is economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR. But their different roles in Angola may cause Moscow and Havana to develop different views on the most appropriate policy to follow. Thus, there is potential for friction—but not conflict—between the two.

For example, the Soviets might balk at providing financial and material support for a major expansion of the Cuban presence. At the same time the USSR will probably refrain from saying how the Cubans should use their own resources to finance the increase. In the absence of strong Soviet pressure for a specific policy, the Cuban decision would be influenced primarily by Fidel Castro's views and secondarily by economic implications and political pressures within the Cuban leadership.

Castro's natural inclination would be to stick it out with Neto. The Cuban leader probably senses that a defeat would seriously erode Cuban influence on the continent. Furthermore, Castro probably realizes that an even more negative reaction would be provoked by a sudden switch of Cuba's support from Neto to another leader or faction. Finally, Castro is a confirmed revolutionary, convinced that supporting other revolutionaries—whether they are guerrilla fighters or legitimate governments—is a moral obligation.

Pressures for a policy shift can be expected to build within the Cuban leadership if problems continue to mount in Angola and the Cuban economy fails to reverse its decline. The individuals most likely to argue against further commitments are the members of the "old communist" faction, a group whose origins lie in the pre-Castro communist party. The group's main spokesman is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a Political Bureau member

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who is regarded as the number-three man in the Cuban hierarchy. Rodriguez has a major input into foreign policy decisions and has significant influence upon Fidel. The position against involvement also would be argued by a less influential group consisting of technocrats and economists whose positions result from their responsibility for the health of the Cuban economy.

The position of the military would be represented by Raul Castro, the Armed Forces Minister and second only to Fidel in the leadership. Raul's recommendations will probably have the greatest influence on Fidel's decisions. The younger Castro probably would be more willing than other members of the hierarchy to commit additional military resources to Angola. Nevertheless, he is unlikely to continue the tactics of escalation if the military situation continues to worsen. Given that situation, Raul Castro would probably be convinced that a negotiated settlement was necessary. If Raul were to weigh in on the side of those arguing against increased support for Angola, Fidel most probably would decide that a policy change was in order

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| Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs | |

A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by the Communist Activities Branch, Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch, International Security Issues Division, OGI, on

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Summary

Information available as of I November 1983 was used in this report. After nearly three decades, arms transfers remain the Soviet Union's primary and most effective means of gaining entry and extending its influence in the Third World. As a result of the rapid growth and commercialization of its military sales program in recent years, Moscow's earnings from arms transfers now surpass all other Soviet commercial ties with the non-Communist less developed countries (LDCstaccounting for about 15 percent of total annual hard currency earnings)

The USSR concluded just over \$9 billion worth of new military agreements with non-Communist LDC governments in 1982—up sharply from the year before—as Kremlin leaders took steps to recoup lost momentum and prestige in the Middle East and to strengthen military ties with New Deihi. As part of these initiatives, Moscow displayed an increased willingness to extend concessionary credit terms on new purchases and to provide preferred clients with a wider selection of some of its most up-to-date weapons systems. Iraq, Syria, and India were the main beneficiaries, accounting for nearly 90 percent of all Soviet arms accords signed in 1982. Relatively smaller, but significant, new Soviet arms commitments also were extended to Angola, Mozambique, Kuwait, Peru, and Nicaragua.

Preliminary results for 1983 indicate that the value of new Soviet arms agreements will fall well below recent annual levels and are likely to total only some \$3-5 billion, with India, Angola, and possibly Libya the principal customers. The drop appears to result from the need of major buyers to absorb large outstanding equipment orders and from financial constraints faced by some of Moscow's oil-exporting clients

Fast European military agreements in 1982 fell back from the record set in 1981, but still managed to top the \$1 billion mark for the second consecutive year. The Iran-Iraq war again was the major factor, with some Eastern Bloc suppliers handling orders from both combatants

Warsaw Pact deliveries of weapons, related material, and services remained heavy in 1982 and are estimated to be worth at least \$7.7 billion. Following previous patterns, deliveries were concentrated in the Middle East. Syria and Iraq, which restocked depleted inventories of air and ground equipment, accounted for nearly half of all Warsaw Pact deliveries. Military shipments to Angola, Mozambique, India, and Nicaragua also showed large increases from the year before

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The provision of more sophisticated weapons to LDC armed forces has led to an icnreased need for Soviet Bloc training and servicing. In 1982 a record 20,000 Soviet and East European military specialists were stationed in the non-Communist Third World—twice the number abroad just five years before. The 1983 figure for Soviet military presence abroad will be even higher as a result of the dispatch of several thousand additional air-defense-related technicians to Syria

The precarious situations that threaten wider conflict in the Middle East are likely to provide Moscow greater latitudes of action in the coming months. This, along with the promise of new major arms deals with key Soviet clients and the introduction of new Soviet weapons into Third World inventories during 1983, signals continued success for Moscow's enduring military transfer program

Explanation of Terms

This annual report is based on data from a variety of sources, including unclassified publications. It recounts Warsaw Pact military transfers to non-Communist less developed countries. The term military transfers includes both the sale and grant of military equipment and related services, such as advisory support, training, and construction of military facilities. Military transfers encompass signed agreements, commitments, or accords which constitute a formal declaration of intent. The terms deliveries and shipments are used to indicate the actual movement of foreign military goods and services to the recipient country

The data on military transfers reflect the latest information available and supersede data in our previous publications. Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Soviet trade prices that are usually quoted in rubles and converted into US dollars at current rates

The non-Communist less developed countries referred to in this report include all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; all countries of East Asia except Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and the Communist states of Kampuchea, Laos, and Victnam; Malta, Portugal, and Spain in Europe; all countries in Latin America except Cuba: and all countries in the Middle Fast and South Asia except Israel.







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
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
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410(2) for 1980-82 may understate actual deliceries by as much as two billion because of increased Soviet efforts to canceal military cargo shipments.

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Figure 2 Soviet and East European Military Deliveries, 1955-82



Total \$63.8 Billion

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Soviet and East European Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs

Perspective

For nearly three decades the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have pressed to gain influence in non-Communist Third World countries through military assistance programs. While experiencing some reverses, such as in Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, the permanence and resolve of the Kremlin's "penetration" strategy cannot be disputed. Indeed, the growing instability and armed conflict in the Third World since the early 1970s have provided not only fertile ground for new Soviet successes (Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua) but the opportunity to earn needed hard currency from LDC purchases of sems and related services.

Moscow found early on that arms transfers were the most direct and fastest route to influence in the LDCs. Newly independent Third World states often could obtain economic aid from the West but not the military assistance that many clamored for most. Offering a wide assortment of weaponry, along with rapid delivery, training, and generous repayment terms, the USSR soon parlayed its initial arms deals with Afghanistan and Egypt into a \$500 million a year program. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts spurred rapid growth in Soviet military transfers and, together with the sharp rise in international oil prices, led Moscow to concentrate on Middle Eastern clients. By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had become the world's second-largest supplier of military equipment. The soaring demand for new and better armaments by oil-rich nations in the Middle East and others with access to Arab wealth and Soviet willingness to make available many modern weapons on short notice set the stage for full-scale competition with Western arms suppliers. Moscow temporarily overtook the United States as the leading arms provider to the Third World in 1980-81, concluding agreements worth more than \$20 billion, or about a half again as much as the United States

| Table 1 | | Billion US 5 |
|----------------|----------------------|--------------|
| USSR: Military | Agreements With LDCs | |

| 1970-72 (annual average) | 1.5 |
|--------------------------|---------|
| 1973 | 2.9 |
| 1974 | 5.7 |
| 1975 | 3.2 |
| 1976 | 6. i |
| 1977 | o'è |
| 1978 | 2.5 |
| 1979 | 8.4 |
| 1980 | 14.2 |
| 1981 | 6.4 |
| 1987 | 9.1 |
| 1983 • | 3.0-5.0 |
| Estimated | |

The escalation of OPEC petroleum prices beginning in 1973 coincided with a rapid rise in Soviet military equipment prices, as Moscow capitalized on the new found Arab wealth. To boost its increasingly commercially oriented arms sales campaign, the USSR added more and larger carriers to its merchant fleet and in 1975-76 began a construction program that would triple the size of its principal arms export facility in the Black Sea. The results have been impressive: the volume and value of Soviet arms deliveries more than doubled in 1978-82, compared with the previous five-year period. During this period almost three-fourths of the arms delivered—valued at \$23 billion—went to hard currency Middle-East customers.

Soviet Military Agreements: The Recent Record Soviet arms agreements climbed to \$9.1 billion in 1982, 40 percent higher than the year before and well above the average for 1973-81 (table 1). Agreements





Serret

remained heavily concentrated among a few prominent clients—Iraq, Syria, and India—who accounted for nearly 90 percent of the new orders. Accords with Libya, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Angola, and Peru accounted for most of the remainder. For 1983, Soviet arms commitments to non-Communist LDCs are expected to drop back to \$3-5 billion, as major Middle Eastern buyers pause to absorb large military orders placed in 1980-82. A large new arms pledge to Angola and ongoing negotiations with India, Libya, and Ethiopia for additional modern weapons are likely to generate the bulk of Moscow's 1983 arms agreements.

Moscow Adjusts Program. Moscow adjusted its military transfer practices in 1982 both to bolster its flagging influence in the Middle East and to accommodate the worsening economic climate and increased competition from Western arms suppliers. The greater willingness to offer more of its advanced weaponry at more concessionary terms and with some debt rescheduling were prominent features of agreements negotiated in 1982. In fact, over the last two years more new Soviet modern weapon systems have been promised or sold to LDC clients than in any period since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (table 2). Moscow's greater willingness to make available for export more equipment from its current family of modern weapons reflects the realization that arms offerings had to be upgraded to meet LDC demands for more advanced systems—even at the risk of compromising military technology information. Although not conclusive, there is evidence suggesting that the large recent-year sales of late-model MIG fighters and armored vehicles to cash-paying Middle Fastern customers have caused some delays in promised exports to Eastern Bioc allies

The military resupply accords signed with Iraq and Syria in 1982 underscored Moscow's desire not only to recoup lost influence and prestige but, in the case of Iraq, to prevent further erosion of its arms market to France and other Western suppliers. The softer repayment terms and inclusion of newer model tanks, more sophisticated fighter aircraft, and air defense missile systems contained in the latest Iraqi and Syrian agreements represent a change of course for Moscowin dealing with its major Arab clients

Table 2
Advanced Soviet Weapons Systems
Recently Offered or Sold to LDCs


| Country | Weapon Systems |
|---------|---|
| Angola | SA-8 antiaircraft missile system |
| India | Kresta-class guided missile cruisers |
| | SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems |
| | AT-5 antitank missile system |
| | M1G-27, -29, -32 fighters |
| | AN-32 transport aircraft |
| | Helix ASW helicopters |
| | T-72 tanks (improved models) |
| Itaq | MIG-27 fighters |
| | SA-8 antiaircraft missile system |
| | MI-17 helicopters |
| | Împroved armoi (T-725, BiviFs) |
| | Improved radar and communications |
| Kuwait | SA-8 antiaircraft missile system |
| Libya | SA-8 antiaircraft missile system |
| | MIG-27 fighters |
| | Haze ASW helicopters |
| | Improved armored vehicles |
| | Improved electronic equipment |
| Syria | SA-5 and SA-8 antiaircraft missile systems |
| | SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems |
| | MIG-27 fighters |
| | M-17 helicopters |
| | Haze ASW fielicopters |
| | Improved armor, radar, and communications |

New agreements with India last year showed yet another advance in Soviet arms export policy—the licensed sale of military production technology heretofore not available to countries outside the Warsaw Pact. About a third of the \$3 billion in new Soviet-Indian agreements last year will cover licenses to produce MIG-27 aircraft in India. Although a follow-on to the MIG-21 production program in India, the MIG-27 represents a significant advance in Soviet









technology transfer to a non-Communist country, both in terms of hardware sophistication and fabrication techniques. India will become the only other country to produce the swing-wine, high-performance ground attack arera.

The granting of softer financial arrangements to Iraq. India, and Syria last year marked a shift, if not a reversal, in the USSR's commercial arms sales policy instituted in the mid-1970s/1.00 wing OPEC's initial





petroleum price hikes in 1973/74. Moscow progressively instituted sharp increases in the prices charged for its weapons and military services and furthermore demanded repayment in hard currency from all but a very few select clients. This was particularly the case for arms transfers to the radical Middle Eastern oil-producing states and those countries receiving Arab financial assistance. Most of Syria's agreements with the Soviet Union, for example, have been funded from Baghdad Pact contributions.

The apparent return to a more concessional policy on arms sales not only underlines the political importance Moscow places on the program, but demonstrates how quickly the program can be adjusted to accommodate Soviet foreign policy initiatives and changing economic conditions. The improved sales terms awarded to Iraq and India almost certainly were prompted in large part by those countries' recent efforts to lessen their dependence on the USSR for military support. Iraqi purchases of Western military equipment since the start of its war against Iran now amount to over \$12 billion-about four times the purchases of Soviet equipment-and includes much more advanced weaponry than that previously supplied by Moscow. The Soviet response of offering comparable equipment at cheaper prices and at better terms to key recipients illustrates Moscow's resolve to maintain a competitive edge in arms sales and also thwart Western inroads into strategically important markets.

Arms Deliveries Also Surge. The volume of Soviet military deliveries increased dramatically in 1982 and remained at peak levels through the first six months of 1983, spurred largely by record backlogs and heavy resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. The estimated value of Soviet military deliveries in 1982, based on observed shipments, amounted to just over \$6 billion (table 3). Increased efforts to conceal Soviet unloadings, including more nighttime deliveries, denied a full accounting of transfers, especially to Iraq and Syria. As a result, we believe the value of Soviet deliveries may be understated perhaps by as much as \$1-2 billion, or one-third of the total

Syria and Iraq accounted for almost one-half of all ground weapons, aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles delivered by the USSR over the past 18 months.

| Table 3 | Million US \$ |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| USSR: Estimated Value of Military | |
| Deliveries to Major Clients, 1982 | |

| Total | | | 6,080 |
|---------|---|---|---------|
| Algeria | • | | 840 |
| India | | • | 905 |
| Iraq | | | 840 • |
| Libya | | | .685 |
| Syria | | | 1,800 - |
| Other | | | 950 |

* Values based on partial delivery information

Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua also experienced sharp increases in Soviet military deliveries. Increased threats from South Africa led Moscow to bolster the defenses of its southern African patrons with record shipments to Angola that included the country's first guided-mistile patrol boats and T-62 medium tanks, as well as two more squadrons of MiG-21 fighters. Capabilities have been bolstered more recently by the arrival of Mi-24 helicopter gunships and SA-8 mobil air defense missile systems, which presumably will be manned by Cuban personnel. Moreover, to better protect Mozambique's southern flank, Moscow introduced several types of ground equipment, including new armored personnel carriers, tanks, and tracked bridging equipment.

Soviet-sponsored deliveries to Nicaragua jumped from \$6 million in 1981 to \$50 million last year in response to intensified rebel activities. Following previous patterns, Soviet merchant ships delivered only military support items, such as trucks, with lethal Soviet hardware routed to Nicaraguan ports via Algerian and Bulgarian arms carriers. Major items received in 1982 included additional T-55 tanks. Managua's first DM-21 mobile rocket launchers, and mobile radio intercept stations to locate guerrilla

Secret





Table 4
Eastern Europe: Arms Agreements With LDCs

Million US \$

| | Annual Average 1970-77 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | Jan-Jun 1981 |
|----------------|------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-----------------|
| Total | 337 | 518 | 746 | 827 | 2,399 | 1,222 | 521 |
| Bulgaria | 11 | 160 | 2 | 162 | 247 | 126 | 222 |
| Czechoslovakia | 189 | 82 | 420 | 94 | 385 | 268 | 80 |
| East Germany | 18 | 100 | 10 | 209 | 68 | 319 | 97 |
| Hungary | 46 | 39 | 29 | 78 | 347 | 141 | 45 |
| Poland | 5? | 111 | 100 | 130 | 512 | 9,3 | 7 |
| Romania | 21 | 26 | 185 | 154 | 840 | 275 | 70 |

communications sites. Cuba and East Germany provided antiaircraft guns and transport vehicles, respectively, from their own stocks. The pace of overall nullitary deliveries quickened in the first half of 1983, with the USSR supplying AN-26 transport aircraft, MI-8 helicopters, and military trucks for the Nicaraguan Army's anti-insurgent campaign.

Cuba reportedly doubled the size of its military/security continuent during the early part of 1983.

A Profitable Program. The financial returns derived from military transfers surpass those from all other Soviet commercial relations with Third World countries. Hard currency returns from military sales during 1980-82 are estimated to have been about \$7-8 billion per year, or about 15 percent of Moscow's total hard currency earnings. These new totals are larger than earlier estimates because of new findings that indicate earnings from follow-on sales, support packages, military construction projects, and technical services are much higher than earlier thought. The huge backlog of orders for Soviet weaponry, together with increased demand for costly new hardware and military technical services, ensure steady if not growing income from arms transfers

Fastern Europe: Augmenting the Soviet Arms Program

East European military transfers add an important unmension to the USSR's arms export program, generally complementing Soviet shipments of more sophisticated fighter aircraft, naval combatants, and surface-to-air missiles, by supplying large quantities of older model ground weapons and combat/transer aircraft. The Eastern Bloc countries also serve as key sources of military training and provide technical services as well.

Although the value of new agreements was down from the 1981 peak, East European suppliers enjoyed another good year in 1982 by capitalizing on the continuing heavy domands generated by the Iran-Iraq war (table 4). About one-half of the \$1.2 billion in new East European arms accords in 1982 were divided between the two combatants, with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland accepting orders from both sides. Since the fighting erupted in September 1980, East European countries have garnered more than \$2 billion in arms contracts from Iran and Iraq. With no prospect in the near term for a decrease in the fighting between Iran and Iraq, East European suppliers should be able to sustain their relatively high levels of arms sales.







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Table 5
Eastern Europe: Military Deliveries
to Regions and Major Recipients

| Million | 115 | 1 |
|---------|-----|---|

| | Annual Average 1970-77 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1881 | 1982 | 1983 Jan-Jun |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-----------------|
| Total | 209 | 551 | 641 | 555 | 1,242 | 1,622 | 677 |
| Middle East/North Africa | 167 | 413 | 509 | 465 | 1,132 | 1,520 | 636 |
| Algeria | 0 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | Ò | 3 |
| Egypt | 22 | 4 | 10 | iO | NEGI. | 0 | 24 |
| iran | NEGL | ı | 0 | 0 | 4 | 60 | 2 |
| Iraq | 44 | 95 | 74 | 126 | 609 | 822 | 106 |
| Libya | 44 | 184 | 155 | (0) | 355 | 314 | 427 |
| North Yemen | NEGL | 2 | 100 | NA | 80 | 91 | 1 |
| Syria | 52 | 99 | 145 | 181 | 56 | 158 | 40 |
| Other | 5 | 3 | 0 | 22 | 3 | 75 | 33 |
| Asia | 21 | 0 | 46 | 25 | 31 | 22 | 18 |
| india | 17 | O | 45 | 25 | 29 | . 16 | 9 |
| Chher | 4 | 0 | 1 | NA | 2 | 6 | 9 |
| Latin America | NEGI. | - 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 22 |
| Nicaragus | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 " | G. | 26 | 22 |
| Other | NEGL. | ō | 0 | 0 | 6 | D | 0 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 21 | 138 | 86 | 62 | 73 | 54 | i . |
| Angola | 10 | 52 | 25 | 4 | 25 | | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 4 | 41 | 25 | 7 | 5 | 0 | O . |
| Mozambique | 1 | 22 | 19 | 29 | .2 | 10 | |
| Tanzania | î " | 18 | 14 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 0 |
| Other | 5 | 5 | 3 | 12 | 31 | 13 | g |

East European arms deliveries reached a record \$1.6 billion in 1982, \$380 million higher than in 1981 (table 5). Iraq alone received materiel worth more than \$800 million, mostly expendable items, such as artillery ammunition, small arms, and spare parts. Preliminary data for the first six months of 1983 suggest that Libya was the largest recipient of East European military equipment, some of which was likely earmarked for Libyan-backed rebels in Chad.

Military Technical Services: Higher Level of Support Technical services continue to be a key element of Warsaw Pact military programs. Paralleling the upswing in arms transfers, some 20,000 Warsaw Pact—along with 38,000 to 45,000 Cuban—military

personnel were posted to 34 LDCs in 1982 (table 6). This level was increased in 1983 by the addition of several thousand Soviet personnel in Syria

Most of the 25-percent increase in the Soviet overseas presence during 1982 was directed to Middle Eastern clients:

Moscow sent about 500 more technicians and soldiers to Syria, primarily to man the new SA-5 missile installations. This augmentation raised Soviet military presence to about 3,500—the largest Soviet mulitary advisory group in the non-Communist Third World community. Early this year, Moscow dispatched another 3,500 military personnel, mostly for air defense activities.









Table 6 Military Technicians in LDCs, 1982

Number of persons

| | Total | USSR | Eastern Europe | Cuba |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|
| Total 4 | 57,780-64,980 | 17,450 | 2,630 | 37-700-44,900 |
| Middle East-North Africa | 11,800 | 10,4356 | 1,365 | NA NA |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 41,385-48,585 | 4,440 | 1,250 | 35,695-42,895 |
| Latin America | 2,245 | 225 | | 2.005 |
| South Asia | 2,350 | 2,350 | NA | 0 |

^{*} Numbers are sounded to the nearest fire.

- The Soviet presence in Iraq doubled to 1,000 following the full-scale resumption of military deliveries last summer.
- Another 500 Soviets went to North Yemen, raising the number there to 1,200—a threefold increase since 1981.

Large Soviet contingents also continued to provide advice, technical support, and instruction in Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Angola, and Ethiopia

Looking Ahend

Arms transfer initiatives taken since the beginning of 1982 to bolster Moscow's position with key LDC allies seem to be continuing in 1983. A prime example of the Kremlin's increased willingness to provide top-of-the-line weaponry was spotlighted in October with the delivery of the Soviet's latest tactical missile system—the SS-21—to Syria

We expect Soviet arms deliveries to hit a new high in 1983 and remain heavy through 1985—driven largely by the record order backlogs built up over the past several years. Iraq and Syria continue to account for

nearly half of total shipments, while transfers to Libya, India, Ethiopia, and Angola also should show higher totals for 1983. Current deliveries continue to be characterized by high proportions of late-model, sophisticated weaponry for these high profile clients.

While arms deliveries should remain strong, the level of new Soviet military commitments over the next few years will be governed largely by political dynamics in the Middle East and by the procurement cycles of Moscow's major arms recipients. As indicated earlier, Soviet arms agreements for 1983 will probably show a steep decline from the \$9.1 billion recorded in 1982.

Angola has been the only recipient of major new Soviet arms pledges thus far


Libya and India are negotiating major purchases, but the discussions will likely extend into 1984 before any agreements are signed. Given the frequency of African and Middle Eastern LDC military trade delegation visits to Moscow and East European capitals during 1983, we expect a number of modest follow-on arms accords will almost certainly result

7





h In early 1983 an estimated 3,500 additional Soviet technicians were dispatched to Syria in conjunction with the new SA-5 missile installations



In Central America, Soviet Bloc and Cuban efforts will remain locused on strenghening Nicaraguan military capabilities. Although no new arms agreements were reported during the first half of 1983, outstanding, that my compatinents, the continued shuttling of Nicaraguan architects delegations to Hayang and Moscow, and embartassment over Grenada suggest that administrate military support will be porthologing

Stepped-up military actions by the anti-Sandinista forces punctuated by the first air- strikes of the conflict have triggered public statements by Managua that it will seek to acquire combat aircraft to protect its airspace. Such aims uncertaints have been unverpated for some time, given the improvements to









Swiret

Nicaraguan airfields and the training of Nicaraguan pilots in Cuba and Eastern Europe since 1979. Because of their fears of further provoking the United States, Havana and Moscow probably would accede to such a request but only if they felt the regime were in imminent danger of collapse

Over the longer term, we believe the changes in Soviet arms transfers policies seen recently have positioned the Soviet Union to better react to new opportunities to supply military hardware and technical services to Third World requesters. The recent export of more sophisticated Soviet weapons on attractive terms should mute longstanding LDC complaints about receiving outmoded Soviet equipment. In addition, the further expansion of Nikolayev South-the main Soviet arms export terminal in the Black Sea -will improve Moscow's capability to deliver larger volumes of heavy weapons and equipment on short notice. These and other refinements, including high-level personnel changes in its foreign-assistance apparatus, underline the continued priority the Kremlin places on arms transfers as a viable instrument of foreign

East European arms suppliers should also be able to capitalize on their recent successes in the coming years. Aggressive marketing tactics, along with attractive prices and quick turnaround on orders have contributed to a reputation of being a reliable alternative source of equipment and technical expertise





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Appendix A

Warsaw Pact Military Transfer Programs in 1982: A Regional Analysis

Table A-1
Middle East-North Africa: Soviet Bloc
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and
Military Presence During 1982

Million CS &

| • | Total • | | USSR | USSR | | pe | Soviet and East European Military | |
|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Presence b | |
| Total | 6,839 | 5,971 | 5,706 | 4.451 | 1,133 | 1,520 | 11,800 | |
| Algeria | 3 | 840 | Ü | 840 | 3 | 0 | 1,515 | |
| Cyprus | NA. | NA | 0 | 0 | NA. | 0 | 0 | |
| Egypt | 0 | i2 | o · | 12 | Ω | 0 | 0 | |
| Greece | 75 | 15 | 0 | ŋ | 75 | 75 | 0 | |
| iran | 2.4 | 160 | 11 | 100 | 207 | 60 | 250 | |
| Iraq | 3,388 | 1,660 | 3,003 | 838 | 385 | 822 | 1.160 | |
| Jordan | ı · | 85 | 1 | 85 | 0 | a | 35 | |
| Kuwait | 258 | NA. | 258 | 5.4 | NA. | 0 | U | |
| Lebanon | 2 | 0 | O | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| Libya | 748 | 998 | 386 | 684 | 362 | 314 | 2,800 | |
| Morocco | 40 | O | Negl | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | |
| North Yemen | 58 | 130 | 35 | 39 | 23 | ė į | 1,200 | |
| South Yemen | NA NA | 53 | 0 | 53 | MA | NA. | 1,100 | |
| Syria | 2,048 | 1,958 | 2.012 | 1,800 | 36 | 158 | OOR,E | |

[•] Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.

The Middle East-North Africa: The Major Soriet Target

The Middle East continued to be the focus of Soviet Bloc military transfers in 1982, accounting for two-thirds of all new arms accords (table A-1). The stalemated war in the Persian Gulf and the crisis in Lebanon last year presented opportunities for Moscow and its allies not only to recoup prestige and influence lost over the last three years but also to play a more active role in regional affairs. New Warsaw Pact arms agreements with Middle Eastern countries

reached a near-record \$6.8 billion and promised an array of weapon systems never before sent to LDCs:

 Iraq was promised at least \$3 billion worth of updated armaments, including MIG-27 ground attack aircraft, more advanced air defense equipment, and late model T-72 tanks.









b Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more.

- Syria received an additional \$2 billion in military equipment credits to replenish and upgrade its inventories depleted during the Lebanon debacle, replacements to include the first Soviet export of MIG-23 Flogger G interceptors, SA-5 surface-toair missiles, and MI-17 helicopters.
- Libya purchased \$750 million in military equipment, despite some problems over past-due payments.
- Kuwait signed its second deal with Moscow, worth
 \$260 million, after a hiatus of five years

East European arms suppliers enjoyed another profitable year in the Middle East, even though orders were only half the 1981 record of \$2.4 billion. Iran and Iraq again were the major buyers, with a combined total of almost \$600 million in new contracts, mostly for high expenditure items such as munitions, small arms, spares, and transport vehicles. East Germany's \$200 million agreement to supply military spare parts and support equipment to Iran was the largest single transaction. Elsewhere, Libya authorized Czechoslovakia to proceed with construction of a \$200 million tank repair facility, and the new socialist government in Greece signed its first military accord with a Communist state—Romania—in seven years.

The volume of Soviet and East European arms deliveries to the region reached new highe in 1982, sperred by heavy resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. Algeria received near-record shipments of Soviet equipment, the result of the \$3 billion purchase agreement signed in 1980

Soviet military transfers to the Middle East proceeded apace in 1983. Indeed, based on deliveries monitored through June, arms and related equipment transfers for the year should top last year's total. Overall arms commitments to the region, however, may drop in value. Ongoing negotiations with Libya over another multibillion-dollar purchase may be finalized this year if Colonel Qadhafi shows some restraint in support of the Chadian rebels. Improved Soviet relations with Syria and Iraq could tempt Moscow to expand its military commitments in the face of the growing threats against both regimes. Even so, it is

doubtful that 1983 Soviet arms pledges will come close to matching the emergency relief seen the year before

Country Highlights

Algeria. Algeria signed no new arms accords in 1982 with Moscow, underscoring its determination to diversify its arms sources and reduce its dependence on the USSR for military equipment. The absence of new accords may also reflect Algerian concern with the disappointing performance of Soviet MIG fighters and SAM batteries in the Lebanese war. Nevertheless, some \$840 million in deliveries were received under the \$3 billion 1980 accord. First-time deliveries to Algeria in 1982 included:

- · SA-8 mobile surface-to-air missile batteries.
- SA-3 missile batteries that will improve mediumaltitude air defense capabilities.
- 152-mm self-propelled guns.
- MIG-23 Flogger B fighters equipped with a better engine, avionics, and armaments than the strippeddown model normally exported to LDCs.

Iran. While Tehran has come to depend on the supply of Soviet-type weaponry from North Korea and radical Arab countries, Moscow continues to maintain a significant but low-keyed arms supply relationship with Iran. We believe that some \$100 million worth of spare parts, munitions, and ordnance were shipped everland from the USSR last year. A new \$11 million contract for additional Soviet equipment was signed in November 1982

Cut off from its traditional sources of major weapons by an embargo, Iran experienced more success last year with alternate suppliers—North Korea, Libya, Syria, and several East European countries—in filling its essential war needs.

- East Germany agreed to supply \$200 million worth of nonlethal equipment.
- North Korea signed \$65 million worth of new military contracts and shipped \$360 million in arms to Iran, including T-62 tanks, BM-10 rocket launchers, artillery pieces and mortars, and large quantities of AT-3 antitank and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.







 Libya and Syria both increased their support last year, providing Soviet-model tanks, artillery, infantry weapons, and other equipment worth over \$350 million

Iraq. The estimated \$3 billion in new Iraqi military agreements with the USSR in 1982 represented a substantial paring down of a \$10 billion wish list submitted to Moscow earlier in the year. Following several exchanges of high-level delegations, Moscow agreed in April to sell an estimated \$2 billion worth of advanced MIGs, new air defense systems and ground equipment. After the Iranian summer offensive, Baghdad requested additional military assistance: the USSR eventually agreed in December to supply another \$1 billion in arms, including MIG-27 ground attack aircraft and large numbers of advanced model T-72 tanks. The latest accord also included an easing of payment terms, underscoring the shift in Moscow's military transfer program from the hard commercial terms of past years. Eastern Europe supplemented Soviet support with \$385 million worth of new millitary agreements, including 25 used MIG-21s from Poland

The Warsaw Pact accounted for the majority of warrelated deliveries to Iraq last year, even though shipments from Western countries continued to mount. The lifting of the Soviet embarge caused Soviet arms transfers to triple in volume in 1982. More than 100 Soviet merchant ships deposited more than 150,000 metric tons of military careo at Kuwaiti and Jordanien ports for transit to Iraq

a minimum value of \$840 million, with the actual amount believed to be much higher. Soviet deliveries included Iraq's initial receipt of MIG-25s, some 65 other fighter aircraft, and more than 200 T-72 tanks. Deliveries from Eastern Europe climbed to a record \$820 million as a result of orders placed in 1981. Equipment delivered by the East Europeans consisted largely of older, less sophisticated weapons and transport vehicles

Libya. Libyan difficulties in meeting its repayment obligations to the Soviet Union apparently were not serious enough to damage the mutually beneficial

arms relationship. Moscow sold \$385 million worth of military equipment to Libya in 1982, raising total agreements signed since the 1973 Middle East war to more than \$15 billion. Pending large new agreements, together with a \$7 billion backlog of undelivered orders, ensures large-scale deliveries of Soviet weapons well into the middle of the decade. Much of the equipment is intended to upgrade Libya's already overstocked arsenal, but some is also earmarked for Third World dissident groups and governments friendly to Libya. The \$685 million in Soviet deliveries in 1982 included Libva's first SA-8 surface-to-air missile systems.

Large purchases of Soviet equipment continue to be supplemented with contracts from Eastern Europe. In 1982 Libya placed \$360 million in new orders with East European countries, some of which was designated to further implement ambitious Libyan plans for a domestic military production capability. (A \$650 million deal with Yugoslavia for an explosives factory is not included in the total.)

Syria. Moscow eased the considerable strain in USSR-Syrian relations caused by its limited arms support during Israel's drive into Lebanon by rapidly replenishing Syrian equipment losses and significantly upgrading Syrian defenses with better quality Soviet weapons. The new defense paci, worth at least \$2 billion, provides for the introduction of:

- The USSR's most advanced version of its MIG-23 interceptor (Flogger G), making Syria the first LDC to receive this fighter.
- The first SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems outside the Soviet Union (construction for the sites at Dumayr and Homs began in December 1982; the facilities are to be manned by Soviet technicians).
- MI-17 helicopters (advanced version of the MI-8 with more speed and a larger payload) to provide heliborne support to commando operations.
- Additional SA-R and SA-9 surface-to-air missile batteries.
- More sophisticated command and control systems and electronic countermeasure couloment to jam Israeli radar

13





Moscow more than doubled its military advisory presence in 1982 to about 3,800 and further underscored its increased support of the Assad regime with a greater show of Soviet naval units off the Syrian and Lebanese coasts. Late in the year, the USSR reportedly agreed to ease terms for the arms ordered in the aftermath of the fighting with Israel by deferring payments until 1984 or beyond.

Soviet efforts to mend fences showed signs of success by yearend. Syrian officials changed the tone of their public comments, putting Soviet-Syrian relations on a more positive note.

The USSR, meanwhite, refused to sign a more explicit mutual defense pact with Syria for fear of being drawn into a military confrontation with Israel or the United States

New East European arms accords with Damascus consisted of a \$36 million contract with Bulgaria for military support materials and a small contract with Czechoslovakia for military trucks. Prague delivered \$130 million in arms ordered under contracts concluded in the late 1970s, including L-39 trainer aircraft, BMP armored vehicles, and a large number of support vehicles

Jordan. Moscow fellowed up its 1981 arms breakthrough in Jordan with prompt delivery of most of the air defense equipment ordered and the deputation of the first Soviet military technicians to Jordan.

We expect King Hussein to continue to fend off Soviet offers to expand military supply relations. Follow-on orders to supplement the SA-8 purchase are expected, but these are likely to remain small

Kuwait, Kuwaiti relations with the USSR were bolstered by a \$260 million arms deal in 1982—the first in five years. The March agreement, which calls for the introduction of the SA-8 air defense missile system and additional heavy artillery, is viewed as a continuation of Kuwait's policy to appear relatively independent of any one superpower for arms, rather than an attempt to reduce its reliance on Western sources. According to the US Embassy in Kuwait, Kuwaiti military officers opposed the SA-8 purchase. Western arms continue to flow into the country at the rate of \$100 million or more annually and remain the bulwark of Kuwait's defenses.

In anticipation of the delivery of the new SA-8 system, Moscow also received approval to train Kuwaiti air defense personnel in the USSR. Kuwait apparently also agreed to permit a small contingent of Soviet military technicians to enter the country to instruct Kuwaiti units on the SA-8 system. Until now, Kuwait has relied on Soviet-trained Arab allies, such as Iraq, for technical assistance

Morocco. The Polisario's use or advanced Soviet squipment against Moroccan forces and Moscow's heavy military support to Algeria and Libya kept political relations with the USSR cool. Relations with East European countries, however, showed improvement with the signing of a \$40 million military agreement with Romania—Rabat's largest arms accord with a Communist country. The pact, an outgrowth of a close relationship that has developed over the past 20 years, calls for delivery of 122-mm rocket launchers, ZPU-2 antiaircraft guns, grenade launchers, and 7.62-mm machineguns

North Yemen. North Yemen's dependence on Soviet military equipment continued to deepen as the USSR agreed to provide Sana 335 million in additional military assistance early in 1982. The accord calls for MI-8 helicopters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that additional SU-22 fighters and Sana's first T-72 tanks may also be included. Although down in volume from the year before, Soviet arms deliveries in 1982 substantially upgraded South Yemen's military capabilities with the receipt of its first Osa-II missile attack craft, Yevgenya-class minesweepers, and 50 new BMP infantry combat vehicles. Sana obtained another deferment of its urms payments to the Soviet Union last year, complementing the rollover granted in 1981





East European countries continued to supplement Soviet agreements with new accords:

- \$10 million from Czechoslovakia for four L-39 jet trainers.
- \$12 million from *East Germany* for vehicles and unidentified materials.
- \$1 million from Romania for uniforms.
 Poland and East Germany were responsible for most of the \$90 million of East European arms shipped to North Yemen in 1982.

South Yemen. No new military agreements were concluded with Moscow, and Soviet arms deliveries dropped to their iowest level in five years (\$53 million) as shipments under earlier arms orders wound down. US Embassy reporting indicates that both the economic and military debts owed to the USSR (estimated at \$1 to \$1.5 billion) were deferred by Moscow for another five years







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Table A-2 Asia: Soviet Bloc Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and Military Presence During 1982

Million US \$

| , | Total * | | USSR | | Eastern Euro | ope . | Soviet and East |
|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------------|
| | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | European Military Presence b |
| Total | 3,162 | 1,142 | 3,131 | 1,120 | 31 | 22 | 2,350 |
| Alghanistan | 175 | 160 | 169 | 154 | 6 | 6 | 2.000 |
| Bangladesh | 8 | Ð | . 8 | 0 | û | 0 | 0 |
| India | 2,979 | 982 | 2,954 | 966 | 25 | 16 | 350 |
| Pakistan | VIC: | 0 | · o | 0 | NEGL | 0 | ű |

^{*}Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known. Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.

South Asia: Deepening Soviet Involvement in India

The USSR committed \$3.1 billion in new military support to South Asian countries in 1982, nearly 95 percent of which was carmarked for across-the-board upgrading of the Indian defense establishment (table A-2). Moscow again emphasized its special relationship with New Dehli by offering to provide some of its most sophisticated conventional weapons and by agreeing to provide advanced weapons production technology to improve India's growing domestic armaments industry.

Country Highlights

Afghanistan. Despite some slippage in 1982, the USSR moved forward with its plan to expand and upgrade the Afghan defense establishment. The Afghan Air Force continues to receive the most attention. In 1982 the USSR transferred 14 SU-22 fighter-bombers and 15 MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Government. Only a few of these aircraft represented replacements for battle losses. Moscow also agreed last year to supply the Afghan Air Force with two squadrons of MI-24/25 helicopter gunships, which reportedly will be used to support combined

Soviet-Afghan troop operations against the rebels located around the capital

Along with the infusion of new and better aircraft, the USSR is investing heavily in improving Afghanistan's military infrastructure. Soviet building projects earmarked for the Afghans include several NCO and officer training schools, new barracks, a military vehicle repair shop, and a large medical treatment course.

More evidence of East European military cooperation surfaced last year For the first time, Hungary was noted as a supplier of military equipment, although no details were available on the types of goods being supplied. Bulgaria delivered substantial amounts of quartermaster goods, and Czechoslovakia reportedly accepted 100 Afghan officers and enlisted personnel for instruction in the remain of tanks and heavy equipment

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b Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more.

[·] Number directly associated with the Afghan armed forces.



Figure 5, Soviet Military Delegation to New Delki

Wide World

Defini Indian Defense Minister Venkataraman welcomes his Soviet counterpart General Ustinov
and Admiral Gorshkov to New Delhi in March
1982. Minister of Defense Ustinov headed, a 140mun Soviet military trade delegation—the largest and must overtivious to visit a mort-bloc
country.

India. Apparently alarmed over India's recent arms diversification efforts with Western suppliers, Moscow took unprecedented steps in 1982 to revitalize its military-assistance relationship. In March, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov visited New Delhi as head of the largest and highest ranking Soviet military delegation ever sent to a non-Communist country. According to the Indian press, the delegation of 83 members (including the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff) offered to sell the Indians some of Moscow's most advanced weapon systems at concessional prices and terms. Moreover, the Soviet arms proposals included advanced military production technology and licenses to produce a range of Soviet hardware in India- - Moscow's first substantial offer to export sophisticated military technology outside the Warsaw Pact.

versions of T-72 tanks and BMP armored fighting vehicles (and probably production technology for both).

• The Air Force will receive several hundred domesti

The Army will receive hundreds of "improved"

 The Air Force will receive several hundred domestically produced MIG-27 ground attack fighters, the latter the result of a licensing agreement

India's equipment orders this year raised the value of Soviet arms accords signed since Prime Minister Gandhi's return to power in 1980 to almost \$6 billion, 50 percent more than the value recorded over the previous two decades. In contrast, highly publicized purchases from Western suppliers during the same period have amounted to just over \$2 billion. The commitments already made by Moscow since 1980, coupled with large, new agreements we expect to be signed over the next few years, will effectively ensure the continued dominance of the USSR in India's military modernization and expansion program. By playing Moscow against its Western competitors, New Delhi has garnered not only modern weapons and production technology from both the Soviets and the West but also substantial price and financing concessions

Follow on discussions resulted in the signing of a series of new arms accords worth an estimated \$3 billion. Each of the three Indian armed services will benefit over the next five years:

 The Navy will add at least nine surface combatants and four F-class submarines over the next five years to its Indian Ocean fleet.

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Table A-3
Latin America: Soviet Bloc and Cuban
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded
and Military Presence during 1982

| 1/2112mm | 110 | * |
|----------|-----|---|

| * ** ** **** | Total • | | USSR | | Eastern Euro | ope | Cuba | Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military | |
|--------------|------------|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|--|---------------|
| | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Presence h |
| Total | 167 | 176 | 141 | 140 | 24 | 26 | 2 | 10 | 2,240 (2,005) |
| Argentina | NA. | · -0 · | 0 | Ö | NA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Grenada | NEGI. | NEGL | 0 | 0 | D | O | NEGL | SEGI. | 5 (5) |
| Nicaragua | 61 | 86 | 35 | 50 | 24 · | 26 | 2 | 10 | 2,090 (2,000) |
| Peru | 106 | 90 [~] | 106 | 90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 150 |
| Salinane | V. | NEGT | | O | n | e | NA. | V. | NA. |

*Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the utiliar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.
* Presence figures are rounded to the nearest five and represent the

Presence figures are rounded to the nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military personnel included in the total.

The Caribbean and Central America: Expanded Commitments

Soviet Bloc efforts to support radical regimes in the Caribbean and Central America led to some \$60 million in new regional military agreements in 1982, backstopping the \$105 million in accords signed the previous year (table A-3). Nicaragua accounted for virtually all these accords, pushing arms deliveries to a record level last year (\$50 million worth) and expanding foreign advisory and technical support. Although small by contrast, Cuban assistance to Grenada—highlighted by a new arms delivery and further progress on military-related constructionkept Havana's close relationship with that leftist government intact until the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop in October 1983. Suriname, a country Castro had unsuccessfully courted in the past, received its first Communist-supplied materiel in 1982-small arms and ammunition

Country Highlights

Grenada. Cuba continued to support the leftist regime with arms and construction assistance until its demise in October 1983. Just prior to the downfall, Havana delivered:

- At least five armored personnel carriers.
- . Sixty to 100 army trucks.
- · Field artillery.
- · Small arms and ammunition

Cuba also stepped up the pace of construction as Point Salines International Airport scheduled for completion in 1983. Although ostensibly a commercial facility, it also could accommodate jet fighters and military







transport aircraft. Cuba also neared completion on a large military camp at Calivigny, for use by the Cubans to train Grenadian troops. In contrast, the USSR maintained its low profile, providing only a small police training program

Nicaragua. In the face of the increased threat to the Sandinista regime, Cuba and the Soviet Bloc pledged additional military support in 1982, including agreements for arms and the dispatch of additional military personnel to Nicaragua. Valued at about \$60 million, these accords reflect:

- Soviet commitments (an estimated \$35 million) for tanks, other ground force weapons, and MI-8 helicopters.
- East German accords (\$25 million) for trucks and other nonlethal materiel.

The value of military deliveries from Soviet Bloc and Cuban sources spiraled to an estimated \$85 million in 1982. Key deliveries included:

 A dozen BM-21 rocke, launchers (Nicaragua's first) provided by the USSR via Algeria in April.

 Abou: 25 additional T-55 tanks from the USSR, doubling the size of the armor inventory.
 Two AN-26 transport aircraft, purchased under a December 1981 agreement to help establish a transport capability, arrived in Cuba in late November but were not transshipped to Nicaragua until early 1983.

Nicaragua remains highly dependent on foreign technicians and advisers. The Cubans, whose military presence rose to as many as 2,000 during 1982, train Nicaraguan troops, advise Nicaraguan officers in counterinsurgency operations, and construct airfields

and other facilities.

Despite Managua's past denials that it plans to acquire combat aircraft, airfield construction in Nicaragua and pilot training in Cuba and Eastern Europe suggest that fighter planes eventually will be based in Nicaragua. At least six airfields are being constructed or improved to handle jet fighters, and the first Nicaraguan pilots sent to Bulgaria in mid-1980 have completed basic training

Nicaraguan-owned 1970-215 are now
oased in Cuca. The recent aerial strikes against
Nicaraguan targets by antigovernment rebeis may
provide Managua and its Soviet-Cuban supporters
with the justification to speed up delivery of combat
aircraft

Suriname. Suriname's new Foreign Minister broadened relations with Cuba in 1982 as part of his oftenstated policy to recrient the country away from total dependence on the West. As a result, Suriname received small arms from Cuba—the first such delivery from a Communist country—and sent at least 10 of its military officers to train in Cuba

South America-Limited Gains for Noscow

The USSR's longstanding efforts to expand military supply relationships in South America again met with little success in 1982. Soviet efforts to exploit the Falklands-induced rift between Argentina and some major Western suppliers by offering to sell Buenos Aires military equipment were unsuccessful. Peru remained the Soviets' only arms client on the southern continent, signing new agreements last year worth more than \$105 million

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Country Highlights

Argentina. The USSR attempted to capitalize on the Falklands conflict to add Argentina to its list of arms clients. Despite repeated offers, however, Buenos Aires refused to buy Soviet weapons for political and technical reasons. East European suppliers fared little better: only Romania has signed a military accord with Argentina, and that was a minor agreement concluded in January 1982 for artillery tubes.

Peru. The USSR's role as an aircraft supplier to Peru and its involvement in the maintenance of Sovietsupplied armaments remained the basic bond between the two countries in 1982. Moscow won another \$105 million in contracts for MI-8 helicopters, land armaments, some munitions, spare parts, and technical support. Arms deliveries in 1982—which included additional SU-22 fighter/trainers and MI-8 helicopters-were worth about \$90 million, pushing total Soviet military shipments to Peru since 1975 to more than \$1.1 billion. Lima, nonetheless, has persistently resisted Soviet efforts to gain influence through military assistance by emphasizing the commercial nature of the relationship and limiting the presence and activities of Soviet advisers. Moscow's desire to maintain its position in Peru was reflected in its willingness in mid-1983 to refinance Lima's military debt.





Table A-4 Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet Bloc and Cuban Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and Military Presence During 1982

Million US \$

| | Total - | | USSR | | Eastern Europe | | Soviet, East European, | |
|-------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | Agreements | Deliveries | and Cuban Military Presence b | |
| Total | 172 | 420 | 138 | 366 | 34 | 54 - | 41,340- 48,540 | (35,695- 42,895) |
| Angola | 119 | 201 | 100 | 180 | 19 | 21 1 | 26,700- 31,700 | (25,000- |
| Denin | | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | 0 | 60 | (20) |
| Botswana | NA . | NA | N4 | NA | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1007 |
| Burundi | 0 | 3 | 0 . | 3 | 0 | 0 | 30 | |
| Cameroon | SA | NA | 0 | 0 | NA. | NA. | 0 | |
| Cape Verde | 0 | 0 | U | Ü | 0 | 0 | 20 | (NA) |
| Congo | 0 | o · | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 810 | (790) |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0 | 0 | Ù | 0 | 0 | a | 15 | (NA) |
| Fthiopia | 10 | 110 | 10 | !10 | 0 | G | 11.300- 13,300 | (9,000- 11,000) |
| Guinea | .:2 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | (15) |
| Guinea Bissau | NA . | 9 | 0 | 9 | NA | NA | 115 | (50) |
| Madagascar | Ū | 0 | 0 | 0 | Đ | O | 160 | (NA) |
| Mali | 1 | 1 | ì | i | 0 | e | 150 | 1 |
| Mozambique | 12 | 70 | 2 | 60 | 10 | 10 | -006,1 | (800- 1,000) |
| Nigeria | .6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | a | 10 | *** |
| Sau Tome/Principe | . 0 | 0 | 0 | ò | 0 | 0 | 50 | (50) |
| Scychelles | 0 | ì | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 | (50) |
| Sierra Leone | . 0 | 0 | O | Ù | Ð | Ü | 10 | (10) |
| Sudan | 5 | 0 | Ð | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1101 |
| Tunzania | 0 | 12 | Ú | 2 | | 10 | 120 | |
| ∠ambu | NA. | 13 | 0 | υ | | 13 | 110 | |

Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military personnel included in the total.

Most of the Cubans are located in Cabinda and support the Cuban military force in Appelo.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Established Clients

Although Warsaw Pact military agreements with Sub-Saharan clients identified in 1982 totaled only \$170 million—less than 10 percent of the value of 1981 accords---we believe actual commitments were much greater because of new, but undefined, Soviet

arms agreements with Angola and Mozambique (table A-4). Moscow's military assistance relationships in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be focused on a

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Cuban military forces in Angola.

We believe a new large military agreement was concluded in

^{1982,} however, details are not yet known.

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narrow range of countries notable for their strategic locations and radical politics. Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Guinea accounted for virtually all observed military accords concluded last year.

Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1982 amounted to \$420 million, down considerably from the levels of the late 1970s. Reduced transfers to Ethiopia—Moscow's largest regional client—accounted for much of the decline. In southern Africa, the growing threat from UNITA guerrillas and South Africa sent arms deliveries to Angola and Mozambique sharply higher. Cuba sent more troops to Angola for the same reason. The Cuban augmentation, coupled with more Fast European arrivals, raised the regional presence of Wafsaw Pact and Cuban troops, technicians, and advisers to at least 41,000 personnel.

Despite Moscow's dominant position in the Sub-Saharan arms market, the Soviets failed to obtain more strategic concessions. Congo, Guinea, and Madagascar continue to withhold access to naval and air facilities that Moscow desires for reconnaissance activities. Ethiopia, aithough allowing the USSR limited use of a Soviet-built facility on Dahlak Island, again refused Soviet requests for full control over the island.

Country Highlights

Angala. Military setbacks and heavy government casualties stemming from more aggressive actions by UNITA guerrillas and South African treeps precipitated sharp increases in Soviet and Cuban support to Angola last year. Moscow delivered a record \$180 million worth of identified military equipment in 1982, more than twice the level of excent years. This increase largely reflects the arrival of more advanced, higher cost weapons, including Angola's first Osa-II missile attack craft, T-62 tanks, and BMP armored reconnaissance vehicles, as well as two more squadrons of MIG-21 fighters and various early warning radar stations. Additional T-55 tanks, armored per sonnel carriers, artillery, and hundreds of military transport vehicles rounded out Soviet equipment

deliveries for the year. Cuba delivered its first weapons to Angola in five years, including tanks and artillery, to replace some of the losses sustained by Cuban forces in skirmishes with UNITA insurgents. Havana also raised the number of Cuban troops to an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 to stiffen southern defenses and man some advanced equipment provided by the USSR

Ethiopia. Ethiopia's nearly \$2 billion in backlogged military orders from the USSR was largely responsible for the lack of new agreements. Only one accord with Moscow—a \$10 million deal for 300 military trucks—was signed in 1982. Moreover, the estimated \$110 million in new Soviet equipment deliveries, which included tanks, APCs, artillery, heavy transport vehicles, and additional coast natrol craft marked a six-year low.

Mutual concessions by Ethiopia and the USSR during Chairman Mengistu's October 1982 visit to Moscow appear to have strengthened the bonds between the two countries and paved the way for additional assistance. In return for Mengistu's agreement to move forward with the establishment of an Ethiopian Communist party, the USSR promised further relief of Ethiopia's large military debt (estimated at \$2-3 billion) and pledged additional arms. Specific agreements apparently were not concluded. The Ethiopian leadership has become increasingly concerned about the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigre.

Guinea. Moscow continued to provide the bulk of Guinea's military equipment in 1982, signing a \$20 million agreement for improved versions of the MIG-21 fighter and pilot training. Elements in Guinea's military would like to shift some purchases to Western suppliers, but financial and political constraints preclude such a move







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Mozambique. Mozambican's expanding ties with Western powers apparently did not adversely affect its relationships with Communist countries in 1982. Although some Mozambican officials questioned the wisdom of relying on Communist countries for military equipment and services, these reservations have not yet become serious enough to damage the ties forged during Frelimo's long liberation struggle. Moscow and Maputo concluded a large, new arms accord in the first half of 1982. Although no information on the size and scope of the agreement is available, subsequent deliveries of light armored vehicles and bridging equipment suggest that it is tailored to heip the Mozambican armed forces cope with the South African-supported insurgents. Hungary also concluded a \$10 million military accord last year, bringing identified attirme military agreements with Warsaw Pact countries to \$440 million

Zambia. The good will generated by Moscow's sale of \$250 million worth of military equipment in the mid-1970s is being eroded by Lusska's difficulty in meeting scheduled payments. The USSR has accepted cobalt in partial settlement, but Zambia was still in arrears at yearend. No new military agreements were signed with the USSR in 1982, and no new equipment arrived

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Appendix B

Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With LDCs: Agreements Concluded and Equipment Delivered, 1955-82

Million US \$

| | Agreem Conclus | | Equipment Delivered | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|--|
| | USSR | Eastern Europe | USSR | Eastern Europe | |
| Total | 78,477 | 9,357 | 50,8 <i>ž</i> U | 7,018 | |
| Africa-Sub-Saharan | 7,475 | 686 | 5,463 | 607 | |
| Angola • | 782 | 222 | 774 | 204 | |
| Benin | 143 | : | 183 | · | |
| Botswana | 7 | o | 7 | 0 | |
| Burundi | 38 | 2 | 17 | ` , . | |
| Cameroon | NEGL | NA | NEGL | NEG1 | |
| Cape Verde | 65 | 0 | 58 | 0 | |
| Central African Republic | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | |
| Chad | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | |
| Congo | 126 | 4 | 74 | 4 | |
| Equatorial Guinea | 25 | 0 | 21 | . C | |
| Ethiopia | 3,942 | 109 | 2,252 | 109 | |
| Gabon | 0 | NA | 0 | | |
| Gambia | NEGL | . 5 | NEGL | 0 | |
| Ghana | 10 | 14 | 10 | 12 | |
| Guinca | 129 | 4 | 97 | 4 | |
| Guinea Bissau | 42 | 1 | 36 | 1 | |
| Кспув | NEGL | 0 | NEGL | 0 | |
| Liberia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Madagascar | 110 | 5 | 99 | 5 | |
| Mali | 161 | 0 | 132 | 0 | |
| Mozambique | 318 | 123 | 290 | 93 | |
| Nigeria | 214 | 22 | 186 | 19 | |
| Rwanda | 0 | Ü | 0 | 0 | |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2 | Û | 2 | 0 | |
| Senegal | 0 | NA | Ô | NA NA | |
| Seychalles | 8 | | 8 | 0 | |
| Sierra Leone | 2 | NEGL | 2 | NEGL | |
| Somalia | 402 | 16 | 402 | 16 | |
| | | | | | |

| | Agreements Concluded | | Equipment Delivered | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| | USSR | Eastern Europe | USSR | Eastern Europe |
| Sudan | 100 | 18 | 100 | 11 |
| Tanzania | 340 | ز و | 337 | 75 |
| Togo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Uganda | 144 | 11 | 123 | 11 |
| Zaire | 0 | NEGL | . 0 | NEGL |
| Zambia | 251 | 41 | 244 | 41 |
| Zimbabwe | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia-East | 890 | 223 | 884 | 223 |
| Burma | NEGL | 1 | NEGL | 1 |
| Indonesia | 878 | 217 | 872 | 217 |
| Kampuchea 4 | 12 | 2 | 12 | . 2 |
| Philippines | ູວ່ | 1 | 0 | - ı · |
| South Korea | 0 | 2 | n | 2 |
| Thailand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Asia-South | 12,937 | 439 | 7,032 | 376 |
| Alghanistan d | 2,887 | 90 | 1,271 | 42 |
| Bangladesh | 75 | NEGL | 67 | NEGL |
| fedia | 9,912 | 314 | 5,631 | 299 |
| Maldive Islands | NEGL | 0 | NEGL | U |
| Nepai | 2 | 0 | | 0 |
| Pakistan | 48 | 35 | 48 | 35 |
| Sri Lanka | 13 | 0 | 13 | 0 |
| Europe | 28 | 9 | ··· - · · · | |
| Spain | 28 | 0 | 0 | |
| Latin America | 1,535 | 39 | 1,185 | íi |
| Argentina | 0 | NA | 0 | 0 |
| Colo-ni : | i | 7 | 1 | 7 |
| Grenada | 1 | 0 | · 1 | 0 |
| Honduras | 0 | NEGL | 0 | NEGL |
| Nicaragua | 137 | 31 | 56 | 3 |
| Peru | 1,396 | 1 . | 1,127 | . 1 |

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Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With LDCs: Agreements Concluded and Equipment Delivered, 1955-82 (continued)

Million US \$

| | Agreem Conclud | | Equipme Delivere | | | Agreements Concluded | | Equipme Delivere | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | USSR | Eastern Europe | USSR | Eastern Europe | | USSR | Eastern Europe | USSR | Eastern Europe |
| Middle East/ | 55,612 | 7,969 | 42,256 | 5,801 | Libya f | 15.129 | 2,449 | 8,107 | 1.463 |
| North Africa | | | | | Mauritania | . 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Algeria | 4,945 | 108 | 4,115 | 105 | Morocco | 74 | 73 | 43 | 33 |
| Cyprus ^c | 18 | 34 | 18 | 4 | North Yemen | 982 | 129 | 897 | 310 |
| Egypt | 4,141 | 929 | 4,141 | 510 | Oman | 0 | 0 | 07/ | 0 |
| Greece | 1 | 24 | 1. | 84 | South Yemen | 1.157 | 24 | 1.089 | 24 |
| Iran | 1,955 | 260 | 1,820 | 67 | Syria | 13.766 | | | - |
| Iraq | 12,890 | 2.621 | 9,452 | 2.146 | Tunisia | 13.60 | 1,040 | 12.417 | 1.039 |
| Jordan | 226 | 0 | 85 | 9 | _ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuwait | 109 | NA | 52 | _ | Turkey | 7 | Ū | 7 | 0 |
| | | | | 0 | United Arab Emirates | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Lebanon | 12 | 12 | 12 | :0 | | | | | |

^{*}Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates. Because of rounding, components may not add to totale shown.

*Excludes \$151 million worth of Soviet committents and \$1 million worth of Romanian commitments to Angola made before independence in November 1975. The USSR recommitted \$59 million of the original amount in March 1976 when the Neto regime assumed power.





Aid transactions prior to formation of the Communist government in 1975.
 Excludes Soviet equipment transfers used exclusively by Societ

^{*} Excludes Soviet equipment transfer some frequency of the test European delivery total of \$1,463 million, \$68 million was delivered on Soviet account under the Soviet-Libyan arms accord of 1974.



The · National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

WEDNESDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1977

VOLUME 4, NUMBER 272

Angola: Continuation of Soviet Role

The USSR continues to play a forminant rate in Angela, despits speculation that its influence may have waned following the abortive attempt in May to everthrow President Net's regime. It has a large contingent of advisors in Angela—probably about 500—piaced all important government offices as well as the police and the military.

reportedly has produced some friction with the Angolans, and there are ingreater East European role in Angola in order to reduce their visibility.

Neto has always publicly praised the Soviets and the Cabara for their commitment to Angole, absolving them of any complicity in the uprising last M by the first faction of the ruling Popular Movement. He severtheless has repeatedly stated that foreigners were involved in the plot. This has led to pernistent rumors that Neto suspects that the Soviets—poublely operating through the Portuguese Communist Party—were behind the surrising.

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during his trip to Moscow
last month he cautioned President
Brezheev against farther Soviet interference in Angola's internal sifiair and
told him Angola would pursue its own
course in foreign affairs.
While the Soviets probably had some
contacts with the dissidents, there is no
hard evidence that they encouraged them
or that they had prior knowledge of the
plot.

Neto says his decision to improve relations with Western and nonaligned (See Angola...Page 3)

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(b)(1)(b)(3) THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

WEDNESDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1977

AFRICA

Angola...


From Page 1 states was partially motivated by his suspicions of the Soviets. It presumably also stemmed from a desire to enhance the legitimacy of his regime. By playing up his suspicions about the Soviets, Neto probably hopes to project a more "nonsligned" image, thereby increasing the chances of attracting Western economic and technical assistance, Unsimalshed Soviet Presence

Soviet influence in Angola nonetheless may have grown in recent months

Soviets are playing an increasingly important role in the government. They are described as in virtual control of the police, the army, the railroads, aviation, and fishing. Although the Soviets have advisers in every government ministry, the Cubans apparently have even greater in-

fluence at the operating level.

The Sovieta may also be improving their position in the Angolan military nmand structure.



The Soviets have sought so on low profile in Angola. They are less population of the sought their The Soviets have sought to maintain a presence in the country is less visible-particularly outside of Luanda.

Soviet, as well as Cuban, monopoliza-tion of the few remaining laxuries in the country is greatly resented. The Soviets tend to keep to themselves—even when appearing in public-and are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ig-

noring African sensibilities.
Resentment of the Soviets probably also stoms from the fact that they have not been willing to expend the resources that would be needed to restore the economy or neutralize the insurgent threat. Even the limited Soviet technical assistance effort must eventually be

repaid in hard currency. The realization that increasing numbers of Communist advisers and soldiers may be necessary to guarantee the future of the Neto regime

has only reinforced Angolan frustrations.

The major fishing agreement concluded between the USSR and Angola earlier this year has also been a source of friction. The agreement permits Soviet fishing boats to retain most of what they catch in Angolan waters. The Angolans complain that only the poorest part of the catch is delivered to them, and they often cite the agroement as an example of Soviet ex-ploitation.

Military and Economic Agreements Since 1975, the USSR and East European countries have signed agreements with Angela worth over \$350 million for all types of arms and equipment. About three-quarters of this hardware was delivered in 1975 and 1976, when the Popular Movement was fighting for con-trol of Angola and consolidating its power. Agroements concluded thus far in 1977, valued at about \$40 million, cover helicopters, transport aircraft, several thousand motor vehicles, and quartermaster supplies. Most of this equipment has been delivered.

Defense Minister Carreira's recent trip to Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia-reportedly to purchase trucks, ammunition, light arms, and spare parts for heavier military equipment—may reflect an attempt to shift some of the economic and technical assistance burden from the Soviets and the Cubana to the East Europeans.



A Soviet-made BM-21 rocket launcher during a parade in Luanda

Almost every East European state is now involved in supporting the Neto government, mostly by providing technicians to replace the Portuguese who fled during the 1975 civil war. The East Germans, followed by the Bulgarlans, are playing a leading role in providing technical essistance. East Germans are involved in training the police and have shipped \$10 million in relief goods to Angola. In addition, about 600 young East German Communist Party members reportedly went to Angola recently, presumably to assist in the coffee harvest.

Yugoslavia was one of the first governments to recognize the Neto regime and has recently concluded a number of economic, technical, and military assistance agreements with Angola. Nato most likely has been in-fluenced by the nonsligned approach of President Tito and probably would like to project a similar image. Given his increased dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans, however, he probably lacks the freedom to move years far in this direction.

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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Attack

South African military forces yesterday attacked guerrilla bases in Angola belonging to the South-West Africa People's Organization. South African Defense Minister Botha said last night that incursions by heavily armed SWAPO guerrillas into northern Namibia had compelled South Africa to act and that Pretoria's acceptance of the Western settlement package for Namibia would not prevent it from continuing to defend peaceable Namibians from terrorism.

The commander of South African forces in Namibia, General Geldenhuys, announced last night that regular South African forces had completed a limited military offensive targeted at SWAPO installations and equipment in Angola. According to unidentified military sources in Johannesburg, between 300 and 700 South African soldiers participated in the operation.

Geldenhuys stated that strict precautions were taken to ensure that the local population and Angolan troops did not become involved. He said his forces were pulling out. No casualty figures have been released.

Geldenhuys did not reveal the specific targets of yesterday's operation. The Angolans have asserted that South African planes bombed Cassinga, a major SWAPO training camp located 250 kilometers north of the Namibian border, and that South African paratroopers occupied the camp.

South African forces have staged several hot-pursuit ratus against SWAPO forces in Angola, but these have previously been restricted to border areas. A decision to operate as far north as Cassinga--where several thousand SWAPO guerrillas, recruits, and refugees, as well as some Cuban military advisers, are based--would signal a major change in South African tactics.

The timing of the operation—on the day following adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution that disregards the Western proposal and calls for international support of SWAPO's armed struggle—suggests that Prime Minister Vorster wants to show that South Africa will not tolerate SWAPO's apparent strategy of stepping up the insurgency while continuing negotiations with the Western contact group. SWAPO is trying to gain modifications of the settlement package that are unacceptable to Pretoria.

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 5 May 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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Angola: Impact of the UNITA Insurgency on the Regime

An Intelligence Assessment



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Angola: Impact of the UNITA Insurgency on the Regime

An Intelligence Assessment


Information available as of 18 November 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report.

This assessment was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome
directed to

This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the Offices of Soviet Analysis, East Asian Analysis, and Near East-South Asia Analysis and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa

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| | A military breakthrough by either side in the Angolan conflict seems unlikely. Furthermore, a negotiated settlement probably cannot be attained unless a resolution of the Namibia problem—or some less predictable development—results in a withdrawal of the Cuban troops who back the hardliners in Luanda |
| | Over the coming months, Angolan attitudes on Cuban withdrawal and negotiations with UNITA will be influenced by both Pretoria and Washington. A collapse of the protracted Namibia settlement effort, continued South African raids into Angola, or repeal of the Clark Amendment probably would strengthen the hardliners in Luanda and drive the Popular Movement even further into the Soviet-Cuban camp |
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| Angola: | |
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The Regime's Factional Legacy

The Angolan Government is beset with severe problems. The economy is in disrepair, the populace is restive, and factional differences are intensifying within the ruling party. A major cause of these problems is the government's continuing inability to crush Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

The Marxist regime in Luanda has never had broad popular support. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola needed massive Cuban backing to take power at independence in 1975, and it continues to depend on heavy Cuban and Soviet support today

The Popular Movement, despite its Marxist trappings, is primarily an ethnically and regionally based party. Its main backing comes from the 1.7 million members of the Kimbundu tribe and some smaller groups the Kimbundu dominates. Geographically, the party is strongest in the region north of the Benguela Railroad—especially in and around the capital and other urban areas—and in the southwest

Most of the country's 150,000 to 200,000 mulattoes and 10,000 to 30,000 whites also support the Popular Movement. Although blacks comprise 98 percent of Angola's population, mulattoes retain a disproportionate amount of influence in the ruling party—a legacy of the colonial era, when they were the best-educated nonwhite group in the country

The two most important factions within the Popular Movement are a mulatto-dominated "Neto faction"—which includes President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a black—and a black nationalist faction known as the Catete group, named for the city, just south of Luanda, that is the home of several prominent Angolans. The Neto faction, named for the late President, Agostinho Neto, has dominated the party



Jonas Savimbi (c)

since independence, but the black nationalists have been increasingly trying to assert themselves over the past two years

There are indications that factions exist in the Angolan Army similar to those in the ruling party, but information is lacking on their size. Defense Minister Pedro Maria Tonha, a black, appears to have a foot in both the Neto faction and the black nationalist camp. There have been periodic reports of coup plotting by various groups in the military

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The Neto Faction. The dominant mulatto-led group tends to be dogmatically Marxist and pro-Soviet, and takes hardline positions on key issues. It:

- Opposes any substantial reduction in the Cuban presence.
- Rejects the notion of a negotiated compromise with UNITA that would bring Savimbi or any of his senior aides into the government.
- Opposes any diminution in Angolan backing for the Namibian insurgents of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). (Southern Angola is the primary staging area for SWAPO's guerrilla operations inside Namibia, and the Angolan military provides SWAPO with essential logistic support

The most influential mulatto leader is the party's General Secretary, Lucio Lara. Another key mulatto is former Defense Minister Iko Carreira, now on an extended stay in the Soviet Union.

The dominant faction is resented both within and outside the party. Discontent is widespread as a result of the country's sharp economic decline since independence, the privileged position of the mulattoes, and the pervasive role of foreign Communists—22,000 to 27,000 Cuban military personnel, 6,000 to 7,500 Cuban civilians, and 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet and East German advisers. These advisers—especially the Cubans—play a central role in running both the Angolan armed forces and the civilian economy, and their presence is crucial to the mulatto-led group's hold on power

The Nationalist Faction. The regime's other major faction—the black nationalist Catete group—is less ideological than the mulatto-led wing and less wedded to Moscow and Havana.

¹ The mulatto Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, does not appear to be at the center of power. His frequent statements on the Popular Movement's attitude toward negotiations with Savimbi's insurgents and on conditions that might lead to an eventual departure of Cuban troops from Apacda numbabland not accurately reflect the government's position.

the nationalists would like to see a substantial reduction of Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola and have expressed interest in seeking negotiations and reconciliation with UNITA. They also favor a reduction in Angolan support to SWAPO, hoping South Africa would then curtail the military incursions against SWAPO bases and Angolan targets in southern Angola that have caused considerable disruption and damage in that part of the country

The nationalists seem to have concluded that such policy changes are necessary if there is to be any prospect for improving the poor economic and security conditions that are responsible for much of the popular resentment toward the regime. Black nationalist leaders such as Minister of Health Mendes de Carvalho and Minister of State Security Kundi Paiama, have exploited issues such as the Cuban presence, food shortages, and corruption to build the group's following among the urban poor

President dos Santos, although a member of the dominant faction, seems to share the nationalists' interest in a rapprochement with UNITA. Neither dos Santos nor the nationalists, however, appear to have enough support within the faction-ridden government and the armed forces to move in this direction.

The only figure in the party with enough authority to seek an accommodation with UNITA appears to have been President Neto, who reportedly was planning to make such a move before his death in late 1979. An attempt now by dos Santos to negotiate with Savimbi could easily touch off a violent power struggle. In such a situation Cuban forces would probably step in on behalf of the hardliners, as they did when a coup was attempted in 1977 by Nito Alves, a black nationalist leader

The hardliners might be willing to negotiate an agreement under which lower level members of the UNITA hierarchy would be brought into the ruling party and the government, but they are not prepared to grant a governing role to Savimbi or his top

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lieutenants. Even some of the black nationalists may share the hardliners' concern that the adroit and charismatic Savimbi, if admitted into the regime, might be able to expand his role and gain a dominant position

Status of the Insurgency
UNITA forces continue to operate relatively freely in most of southern Angola, where they dominate rural areas and hold several towns. The rebels also operate in the more heavily populated central part of the country, but they do not control the urban areas there.

The insurgents have succeeded in stepping up their operations to some extent. They have won several significant victories over government forces during the past year in Cuando-Cubango Province, UNITA's stronghold, but they have not been able to expand their area of operations significantly. They are impeded by their lack of an ethnic base outside the south and by logistical and supply problems

Most of UNITA's military successes continue to come from guerrilla operations. Savimbi asserts that he has formed at least 10 conventional units, but we do not believe UNITA has the materiel or the logistical capability to support more than a small number of such units. Savimbi's claims that his forces have a substantial conventional capability probably are aimed at eliciting US and other foreign support.

The Benguela Railroad in central Angola, formerly a major transportation link for Angola and its neighbors to the east, remains a key target of UNITA's guerrilla attacks. Success in shutting down the railroad has been a trump card for Savimbi, providing tangible evidence of UNITA's potency

The rebels sabotage the rail line and damage rolling stock at will, preventing the Luanda regime from using most of the 1,350-kilometer railroad. The attacks also force neighboring Zaire and Zambia to use alternative routes for most of their foreign trade, thus increasing their dependence on transportation links through South Africa as well as depriving Luanda of much-needed foreign exchange.

The UNITA insurgency has disrupted much of Angola's agricultural and other production, as well as its transportation.' Food shortages have become common, and the fighting has forced as many as several hundred thousand Angolans from their home areas. The government and its Soviet and Cuban patrons have been able to do little to alleviate the resulting disruptions

UNITA's Strengths and Weaknesses
UNITA's 10,000 to 12,000 armed fighters, while
heavily outnumbered by government and Cuban
forces, enjoy strong leadership, a well-organized hierarchy and chain of command, and a high level of
discipline and commitment. In contrast, the government's 35,000 regulars and several thousand militiamen are generally ill fed and poorly equipped, and
they seem to have little enthusiasm for the war.
Despite Soviet and Cuban support, Angolans have
done virtually all of the fighting in recent years

Savimbi himself remains a key factor. The 47-year-old UNITA leader is a strong willed and inspirational figure who—at least until recently—has shown a remarkable ability to gain material and moral support from foreign sources even though few governments acknowledge UNITA's legitimacy. Savimbi's death or capture could cripple the insurgency; UNITA does not seem to have other leaders who could match his stature and effectiveness

In addition to the military aid and training it has received from foreign donors, UNITA has captured a variety of arms—including SA-7 missiles and automatic weapons—from Angolan Government forces.

This is the insurgents' primary source of weapons.

Foreign Support. South Africa is Savimbi's most important source of aid at present. It provides UNITA with small arms, a variety of other equipment, and logistic assistance. UNITA pays for some

² Agricultural, mining, and manufacturing output, except in the Western-operated oil industry, remain well below the levels reached before independence from Portugal

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| South Africa's military strikes into southern Angola also aid Savimbi's rebels by tying down and bloodying government forces. UNITA's insurgency in turn serves South African purposes by weakening Luanda's ability to support SWAPO's guerrilla incursions into Namibia | | | | |
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The Ovimbundu, with around 2.3 million of Angola's

7 million population, are the country's largest tribal

grouping. Most of UNITA's top leadership is Ovim-

Savimbi's claim that UNITA is backed by well over half of the population is probably an exaggeration.

Support for UNITA is concentrated mainly in the

bundu, although other tribes are also represented.

lightly populated southern provinces of Cuando-Cubango and Moxico and in the more populous central provinces of Bie and Huambo. Even in the south, UNITA's following is uncertain in urban areas. The Popular Movement has established a presence—backed up in some cases by Cuban forces—in most of the main southern towns, and tribal allegiances in these towns have begun to break down

Savimbi's Views

Savimbi in recent years has championed pro-Western positions, a free market economy, and free elections. In the past, however, he has sometimes touted socialist and radical views, and UNITA recently has been emphasizing a black power theme. Savimbi is fundamentally a skillful politician who says what potential supporters at home or abroad seem to want to hear.

Savimbi's basic objective is to force the Luanda regime to grant him and his organization a role in the Angolan Government. In the past, he has claimed that Cuban troops must be removed from the country before he will negotiate with the government, but he is probably more flexible on this score than this suggests

Although Savimbi recognizes that the departure of all or most of the Cubans is probably essential if he is to have any chance of gaining a foothold in the regime, Savimbi probably would respond affirmatively if the government were to invite him to negotiate under present conditions. The Popular Movement is unlikely to do so, however, so long as the hardline faction remains in control

Outlook

Savimbi's insurgents will probably continue to concentrate primarily on guerrilla rather than conventional warfare. Their attacks on transportation links and other targets will keep the country in turmoil and prevent the government from carrying out an economic recovery program. Nonetheless, they probably will not be able to expand their zone of operations appreciably any time soon, given Angola's tribal alignments and the decline in UNITA's foreign support

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
Savimbi has periodically threatened to sabotage Gulf Oil's drilling installations in the Cabinda exclave, arguing that revenues from the firm's operations enable Luanda to pay for Cuban and Soviet military support. He is unlikely to make good on these threats, however, given the distance between Cabinda and UNITA's main areas of operation and—more fundamentally—Savimbi's relucioned to Intagonize the United State

In view of the decline in support from other foreign sources, Savimbi is likely to become increasingly dependent on South African military aid. Pretoria, for its part, will almost certainly continue to support UNITA in the absence of a settlement of the Namibia problem. Indeed, South Africa may increase its assistance as Savimbi's other backing dries up

Even if the Namibia question is resolved, Pretoria probably would continue to assist Savimbi as a way of keeping the Luanda regime on the defensive. Moreover, UNITA's organizational strength and Savimbi's popular support in southern Angola would probably enable him to continue his insurgency even if he lost all outside backing. Without foreign support, however, the pressure he could bring to bear on the regime would be greatly reduced


The departure of Cuban forces from Angola, as a result of a Namibia settlement or some less predictable development, would dramatically improve the prospects for a shift in the balance of forces within the Popular Movement in favor of those who are interested in an accommodation with UNITA. The chances for such a reconciliation will remain poor as long as Cuban troops remain on hand to suppose the hard-liners within the regime

Over the coming months, Angolan attitudes on Cuban withdrawal and negotiations with UNITA will be influenced by both Pretoria and Washington. A collapse of the effort to reach a settlement on Namibia, major new South African raids into Angola, or repeal of the Clark Amendment barring US aid to Angolan insurgents would be likely to strengthen the hardliners in Luanda and drive the Popular Movement and further into the Soviet and Cuban camp



Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

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The National Intelligence



Published by the Director of Control Intelligence for Named Principals Only

MONDAY DECEMBER 29, 1975

SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA: South Africa is in a dilemmal set to whether to withdraw its forces from Angola. Prenote must weigh the political adventages of withdrawal against possible damage to the military campaigns of the National Union

(Page 1)

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 301



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Pretoria Weighs Political Pros, Military Cons of Quitting Angola

The summit of the Organization of African Unity that opens in Addis Ababa on January 10 has put South Africa in a dilemma on its Angolan policy.

President Keunde

sion in principle has been taken to withdraw South African forces soon, preferably before the summit. The decipreserved output the summit. I me decision apparently was taken to permit the National Front and National Union to deny at the summit that South African troops were aiding them in Angola.

Pretoria knows that its aid is a political liability to the two groups, but the South liability to the two groups, but the South Africans also fear that a sudden withdrawal would seriously weaken the military forces of the National Front and National Union. Pretoria apparently hopes that, in the two weeks before the summit converes, military gains can be made that will give the National Front and National Union political twerage over the Popular Movement.

Pretoria's dilemma is shared by Zambian President Kaunda. When informed of the South African decision to

bian President Kaunda. When informed of the South African decision to withdraw, Kaunda agreed with the political desirability of the more, but expressed concern over the military consequences. He urged the South Africans to withdraw in such a way that the Popular Movement could not reoccupy large amounts of territory.

It is not clear how OAU members would react to a South African amounce—

(See Angole . . . Page 2)

TOP SECRET CW-2641-196-2 Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

C00489526

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

MONDAY DECEMBER 29, 1975

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Angola . . .

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From Page 1
ment of withdrawal. Two more Africas
governments, Ghana and Burundi,
recognized Agostinho Neto's Luandabased government lest week, raising the
sumber of Popular Movement supporters
in the OAU to 17. Both governments,
along with others such as Nigeria,
recognized the Popular Movement
because of South African support for its
rival, even though both governments are
against Soviet involvement in Angola.
Kasnela, who views the Soviet presence
with alarm, believes that there is esough
support among OAU members to prevent
outright recognition of the Neto regime in
Addis Abeba.

Kaunda says he has reached agrorment with Tanzanian President Nyerare and Mozambican President Machel, both of whom recognize the Popular Movement, whom recognize the Popular Movement, to present proposale at the summit that will enable the OAU to work for a political settlement in Angola and avoid a serious spitt within the organization. Kaunda claims the three will propose that the OAU:

• Condems the presence of South Africas troops in Angola

Condemn the presence of African troops in Angola.
 Demand the withdrawal foreign military personnel.
 Stop further supplies to the invested in the fighting.
 Call for a cosse-fire.
 Call for a government of as asked.

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25



/ Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

Thé | National Intelligence

Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

THURSDAY 6 JULY 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 155

Angola: Drive Against Insurgents

Cuban and Angelan Government forces apparently have renewed their campaign in southern Angela against geerriliss of Jones Sevindr's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. UNITA believes the Cuban and government troops plan to punh south through Cuando Cubango Province to try to restore government control along the Namiblan border. Previous such campaigns in the guerrilla-dominated prevince have guerrilly been unsuccessful

the ottentive is decided by all support and consists of a two-pronged thrust from Menongue and Longa. One government column is reported to have advanced to a position south of Chinndo, while the other is said to have selzed two UNITA



positions and to be some 20 killometer sents of kito.

UNITA claims that it has inflicted (See Angole., .Page 4)

TOP SECRET

3154-004-4

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

THURGDAY 8 JULY 1978 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGITE! DAILY Angola. . . .

From Page 1
heavy casualties on a Cuban force moving toward Cainado, and that it has destroyed six enemy tanks and it to ther vehicles.

Angolan Government and Cuban forces have attempted several similar offensives against the guerrillas in Cuando Cubango during the past year; the most recent one was early last month. These operations have generally failed to inflict significant casualties on the guerrillas and have not seriously disrupted UNITA activities in the area. TOP SECRET 'Approved for Release: 2013/09/25



Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

The National Intelligence

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

THURSDAY DECEMBER 4, 1975

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 282

The Daily Summary

ANGOLA: South Africa reportedly is increasing its military support to the National Dirion and the National Front in an apparent attempt to help the two factoris return to the ottensive (S NF/OC) (Page 1)



South Africa is increasing its already substantial military support to the National Union for the Total independence of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Pretoria appears to be trying to help the two groups return to the offensive even at the risk of further publicity about its in-

South Africa is senting 10 to 15 C-130 supply flights per day to the National Union stronghold of Silve Days Union stronghold of Silva Porto in cen-tral Angola. The South Africans hope to have three well-equipped forces operating out of Silva Porto some time this week.

At least one of the forces presumably

National Union lost to the Popular Move-ment several days ago. Another force may possibly move against Henrique de Car-valho, which has become the Popular Movement's major base in eastern Angola and from which it launched its recent altack on Luso,

the National 1)
Union's drive northward near the coast 1)
has been stalled. South Africally are 3)
leading this drive and attribute its stalling to Cuban rocket crews supporting the Popular Movement forces and to the fact that the National Union drive has reached

that the National Union drive has reached into areas where the population long has supported the Popular Movement.

the South Africans surfered "heavy casualties" in operations against the Popular Movement late last month in central Angola.

South African leaders are sensitive to the adverse publicity about the presence of South African soldiers in Angola. Pretoria is trying to mask the extent of its involvement and its casualties by claiming its forces are engaged in hot pursuit of Namihian insurgents operating out of southern Angola.

(See Angola., Page 4) involvement and its casualties by claiming

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

TOP SECRET CW-2641-177-4

C00489530

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

4 THURSDAY DECEMBER 4, 1975

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25