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CEACO --- MEAB 81-168 ---

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PAGE 001

TOT: 312252Z AUG 81

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BRIEF 312252Z DIRECTOR 017670

TO: [REDACTED]

ROUTINE MEA BRIEF.

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF CU MEAB 81-168 FOR 31 AUGUST.

FROM: NFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

CONTENTS:

1. [REDACTED]
2. SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: CALCULATIONS BEHIND INCURSION.
3. [REDACTED]

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2. SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA LAST WEEK REFLECT PRETORIA'S RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN THE BUFFER ALONG THE NAMIBIAN BORDER AND ITS BELIEF THAT FOREIGN REACTION WILL BE LIMITED. [REDACTED]

PRETORIA CLAIMS THE ANGOLANS HAVE BEEN IMPROVING THEIR AIR DEFENSES IN THE SOUTH, AND IT DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE ANGOLAN BASES OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION TO PREVENT THE INSURGENTS FROM MOVING UP TO THE BORDER. [REDACTED]

SOUTH AFRICA'S TACTICS MAY HAVE BEEN MODELED AFTER ISRAELI ACTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. LARGE-SCALE SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS ARE AIMED AT KEEPING THE INSURGENTS OFF BALANCE. RADAR AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT SITES--WHICH PRETORIA KNOWS ARE OFTEN MANNED BY CUBANS--HAVE BEEN ATTACKED TO ASSURE SOUTH AFRICAN DOMINATION OF THE AIR. [REDACTED]

MOST OF THE RECENT FIGHTING HAS BEEN INITIATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS INSIDE ANGOLA, DESPITE PRETORIA'S CLAIM THAT IT IS MERELY FOLLOWING A POLICY OF "HOT PURSUIT." SWAPO ACTIVITY WITHIN NAMIBIA HAS BEEN AT A LOW LEVEL. THE QUALITY OF SWAPO'S SOVIET EQUIPMENT HAS IMPROVED OVER TIME, HOWEVER, AND THE INSURGENTS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING BETTER--AT LEAST IN DEFENDING THEIR BASES IN ANGOLA. [REDACTED]

PRETORIA APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT IT MUST WEAKEN SWAPO MILITARILY, SINCE THE SOUTH AFRICAN - SPONSORED DEMOCRATIC TURNHALL ALLIANCE HAS PROVED UNABLE TO COMPETE POLITICALLY IN NAMIBIA. THE MULTIRACIAL COALITION HAS ENCOUNTERED STRONG WHITE OPPOSITION TO ITS PLANS FOR EASING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND HAS FAILED TO GAIN SUPPORT AMONG BLACKS. [REDACTED]

BY ENGAGING IN OPERATIONS THAT HIGHLIGHT COMMUNIST AND ANGOLAN BACKING FOR SWAPO, PRETORIA MAY BE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WESTERN SPONSORS OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA THAT THE ISSUE OF THE INSURGENTS' EXTERNAL SUPPORT MUST BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. [REDACTED]

THE SOUTH AFRICANS EVIDENTLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MAJOR INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS ARE LIKELY. THERE WAS ONLY LIMITED FOREIGN CRITICISM OF THEIR OPERATIONS INTO ANGOLA IN JULY AND OF THEIR MORE RECENT MOVES AGAINST BLACK SQUATTERS NEAR CAPE TOWN. [REDACTED]

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
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
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Director of
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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
25 August 1983

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CPAS NID 83-200 IX


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
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
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Special Analysis

ANGOLA: UNITA's Military Prospects

UNITA's recent capture of Cangamba consolidates the insurgents' hold on southeastern Angola. Their battlefield successes, however, have not yet persuaded Luanda to negotiate, and UNITA plans to keep up the military pressure. Despite the growing belief in Pretoria that UNITA ultimately can achieve a military victory, the lightly armed insurgents probably cannot challenge the Cuban and Angolan forces holding the major cities and key garrisons. [REDACTED]

UNITA announced on 1 August that it was launching an offensive as part of its campaign to bring Luanda to the negotiating table. The insurgents assert that only negotiations between the contending parties will end the civil war. The offensive apparently is aimed at consolidating the insurgents' hold on the southeast, sustaining their campaign in central Angola, and expanding small-scale operations north to the Zairian border. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] UNITA [REDACTED] captured Cangamba on 14 August, following a 12-day siege. Cangamba was the most strongly defended garrison attacked by UNITA since last November, when the insurgents began their recent series of offensives. [REDACTED]

To capture Cangamba, UNITA says it committed three of its brigades, or about 5,000 troops. There probably were 1,000 to 2,000 Angolan troops and possibly a small number of Cubans at Cangamba. [REDACTED]

Luanda claims it was forced to retreat by South African airstrikes, a charge Pretoria vehemently denies. [REDACTED] bomb damage at Cangamba, but it is unclear which side was responsible. Both Luanda and Pretoria had aircraft capable of striking Cangamba in the region, and Angolan fighter-bombers probably provided air support during the battle. [REDACTED]

By capturing Cangamba, the insurgents secured their supply lines to the north. In the fighting, however, they suffered substantially higher casualties than in past operations. [REDACTED]

UNITA also claims recently to have captured several small towns in the north between Malange and Saurimo and to have continued

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guerrilla operations in central Angola. UNITA's plans for this year reportedly gave priority to isolating the northeast and to attacking the diamond mines there [redacted]

Reactions in Luanda and in Pretoria

The loss of Cangamba will cause further alarm in the regime, which already was shaken by what it viewed as a combined threat in the south from South African forces and from the insurgents. [redacted] the Angolans, with Soviet assistance, have flown additional artillery from Luanda to Lubango, probably to reinforce their defenses against the South Africans. [redacted]

The Soviets and the Cubans apparently also are concerned about the progressive deterioration of the security situation. The Soviets are continuing military shipments to Luanda and have completed an airlift of urgently needed military equipment. [redacted] late last month [redacted] 800 more Cuban troops were sent to strengthen the security forces in Luanda [redacted]

South Africa provides substantial and probably increasing material support to the insurgents, but Pretoria has not provided direct combat assistance in the past. By keeping up pressure in the buffer zone, the South Africans pin down Cuban and Angolan forces that otherwise could be used against the insurgents [redacted]

UNITA's victory at Cangamba will strengthen the growing belief in the South African Government that the insurgents ultimately may win on the battlefield. [redacted]

[redacted] South Africa's anticipation that a more friendly government in Angola may be in the offing probably will make Pretoria less willing to negotiate with Luanda on issues relating to Namibia's independence [redacted]

Outlook

The insurgents claim to have about 30,000 armed troops, half of which are organized in lightly armed battalions and brigades. Most of these forces still are far from Luanda [redacted]

UNITA is neither equipped nor organized to conduct sustained attacks against the larger Angolan and Cuban garrisons guarding Menongue, Huambo, and other key cities—or to try to take Luanda. The insurgents, however, can intensify their activity throughout the countryside and increase Luanda's dependence on Cuban and Soviet support [redacted]

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25 August 1983

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DIRECTOR 901968

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MESSAGE

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF OCPAS MEA 89-254 FOR 01 NOVEMBER 1989.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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1. ANGOLA-CUBA: WITHDRAWAL MEETS DEADLINE

1. ANGOLA-CUBA: WITHDRAWAL MEETS DEADLINE

CUBA HAS MOVED ITS FORCES TO THE NORTHERN HALF OF ANGOLA AND CUT ITS TROOP STRENGTH BY 25,000 SOLDIERS TO MEET THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. THE LAST CUBAN BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH HAS LEFT ITS GARRISON IN LUBANGO AND HAS BEGUN ARRIVING IN LOBITO, NORTH OF THE 13TH PARALLEL. AFTER INITIALLY WITHDRAWING 3,000 MEN IN JANUARY, CUBA HAS WITHDRAWN ABOUT 3,100 MEN A MONTH SINCE APRIL.

COMMENT: THE REDUCTION AND REALIGNMENT OF CUBAN COMBAT UNITS

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LEAVES HAVANA WITH SIX TANK BRIGADES AND AT LEAST 25,000 TROOPS IN ANGOLA, AS COMPARED WITH NINE TANKS BRIGADES AND ROUGHLY DOUBLE THE TROOPS BEFORE THE WITHDRAWALS BEGAN. SO FAR, THE PROCESS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY SMOOTH, DESPITE A BRIEF INTERRUPTION IN APRIL CAUSED BY AN OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING IN NAMIBIA AND PERIODIC CLASHES WITH UNITA INSURGENTS. TO MEET THE NEXT DEADLINE IN APRIL, WHICH CALLS FOR A REDUCTION OF ANOTHER SOME 7,000 MEN, THE CUBANS PROBABLY WILL PULL OUT ANOTHER BRIGADE OR TWO AND CONSOLIDATE THE BULK OF THEIR FORCES IN RECENTLY PREPARED ENCLAVES ON THE COAST.

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
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
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Africa

**REGIONAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

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21 July 1977

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AFRICA
21 July 1977

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to

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[REDACTED]

Angola: Implications of May 27 Uprising

Angolan President Neto's purge of left-wing dissidents following the attempt to overthrow his government in May has enhanced his control of the ruling party and may pave the way for a cautious opening to the West. Neto apparently has asserted the Soviets were implicated in the uprising, and relations with the USSR have reportedly become strained. Neto's options are limited by his continued dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans. In any event, his recent political gains will be fleeting if effective action is not taken soon to check the insurgency and alleviate serious food shortages as well as other economic problems.

The purge that followed suppression of the uprising has been extensive. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as many as 1,000 dissidents in the party, the government, and the military have been executed and another 2,000 detained. Investigations are said to be continuing.

Soviet Complicity Charged

Despite public statements praising the USSR and Cuba for their commitment to Angola and absolving them of any complicity in the uprising, many senior Angolan officials--including Neto himself--have indicated [REDACTED] that the Soviets manipulated events from behind the scenes. [REDACTED] the Neto government has said it now has considerable evidence that the Soviets--working through the Portuguese Communist Party--were behind the revolt.

[REDACTED] Neto expelled four Soviet officials a week after the uprising and ordered the Soviet ambassador to give him a bill for all military assistance Moscow has provided Angola. Neto plans to repay the "loan" in hard currency and coffee.

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One payment reportedly has already been made. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Neto may have been promoting the anti-Soviet stories to demonstrate greater ideological independence from Moscow and to encourage Western assistance.

Soviet visibility has reportedly decreased dramatically since the uprising. Soviet articles and propaganda, which had appeared daily, are reportedly now banned from government-controlled media. The Soviets--who usually avoided most public places--have now even stopped visiting the few bars and restaurants they used to frequent in Luanda.

Implications for Neto

The elimination of the threat from dissident leader Alves and his left-wing supporters improves Neto's prospects for adopting more moderate and nonaligned policies. Neto and his closest advisers would probably like to:

- Accelerate the transformation of the ruling party from a nominally Marxist-Leninist movement to a more broadly based political party.
 - Continue and expand a multiracial approach to the development of Angola.
 - Postpone planned nationalizations and perhaps even return some businesses to their original owners.
 - Pursue a more pragmatic economic policy by encouraging Western assistance and permitting the return of some Portuguese.
 - Reduce Angola's dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans through an opening to the West.
- [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Given the substantial investment the Cubans and the Soviets have made in Angola, it is unlikely either would oppose modest foreign policy changes by Angola. Neto's continued dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans as well as the many economic and military restraints on his government, however, will probably restrict his freedom of maneuver considerably.

Neto realizes that another uprising could erupt soon unless progress is quickly made in bringing the economy under control and alleviating serious food shortages. The government reportedly has had little success in rebuilding local industries. Transportation and distribution facilities throughout the country are almost at a standstill.

The food situation in Luanda and other cities appears to have improved recently, although fruit, milk, and most vegetables are still in short supply in Luanda. Tons of Argentine beef reportedly appeared suddenly in Luanda last month, and fish and eggs are now available almost every day.

The noticeable improvement in the food situation only days after the uprising lends some credibility to Neto's charges that dissidents had been committing economic sabotage and disrupting food supplies to the cities.

Neto established a national commission to deal with the food supply problem last month and has announced a new government campaign to increase productivity--particularly among the farmers--but it is unlikely these actions will have much effect. Farmers have been reluctant to grow more food than their families require because surpluses they take to market are often seized by the government to feed the army. The government will probably continue to rely heavily on imports.

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Threats to the Regime

Insurgent forces led by Jonas Savimbi in southern Angola continue to control the countryside in roughly a third to a half of the nation. Savimbi's forces, consisting of about 10,000 to 12,000 regulars and some 8,000 trainees, have become increasingly active. They most recently launched a major incursion into northeastern Angola near the border with Zaire and are planning several new initiatives.

Other insurgent groups operate in the north, but with only limited success. The recent influx of Cuban troops appears to have checked the insurgent threat in the exclave of Cabinda.

The Cubans are now almost certainly being assigned even greater internal security functions. Cuban bodyguards have reportedly been assigned to Neto as well as to several senior members of his cabinet. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Cuban troops had to be dispatched in May from Luanda to the diamond-mining province of Lunda in east-central Angola to restore order there. The Cubans are said to have arrested many government soldiers and civilians who had been involved in smuggling operations; several army units were transferred or disarmed.


Public resentment against the enhanced Cuban role reportedly is mounting. The Cubans apparently recognize the problem and have taken steps to reduce social contacts with the Angolans as part of a general effort to maintain a lower profile throughout the country. Cuban troops are no longer patrolling the main streets in Luanda, although they are still very much in evidence at the port and the airport. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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Africa
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REGIONAL AND
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7 July 1973

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7 July 1977
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to

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7 July 1977

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Angola: After the Coup

Angolan President Neto appears to have survived the attempt on May 27 to overthrow his government, but any strengthening of his position as a result of subsequent purges may only be temporary. Despite persistent rumors of Soviet complicity in the uprising, we have no convincing evidence that Moscow was involved. The Cubans, who according to recent reports sent about 3,300 new troops to Angola last month, appear to have played an instrumental role in putting down the revolt.

Nito Alves, the leader of the faction that staged the uprising, is still at large. Several important dissident leaders, however, have been arrested, including Jose van Dunem and Jacob Caetano, a senior military officer--popularly known as "Monstro Immortal."

Five of the country's 16 provincial governors and the minister of commerce were removed from office.

Two members of the Popular Movement's Central Committee were also dismissed and four others implicated in the uprising.

The removal of many in the party, the government, and the military hostile to the regime has undoubtedly strengthened Neto's position in the short run. Neto will probably have considerable difficulty, however, in finding qualified people to replace those who have been purged, particularly from top military posts.

Neto has consistently maintained that foreigners were involved in the plot against his government. Several Portuguese have been arrested, including two leftist leaders of the Portuguese revolution who fled to Angola when more moderate officers regained control of the government in 1975. Nine others were expelled.

Alleged Soviet Involvement


In a speech shortly after the uprising, Neto accused "certain embassies" of conspiring with the Alves faction

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and, even though he absolved the Soviets and Cubans of complicity, there have been persistent rumors [redacted] [redacted] alleging Soviet involvement in the revolt.



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Although Moscow had cultivated Alves when he was a member of the government, both the Soviets and Cubans seem deeply committed to the Neto regime and neither is likely to support any action that would further undermine Neto's fragile position. Frictions presumably have developed between the Soviets and the Cubans over Angola but they probably reflect more a difference in style than substance.

Despite Alves' reputation as a charismatic leader and an accomplished orator, he is generally regarded as "short on brains" and we doubt the Soviets would back someone who would have difficulty forming a new government or running the country.

[redacted] rumors of Soviet support for Alves may actually have been started by Neto himself in an effort to discredit Alves' image as a black nationalist.

The Cuban Role

It now appears that the Cubans played a key role in putting down the uprising.

[redacted] the Cubans received orders to put down the revolt five hours after the fighting had broken out.

[redacted] the Cubans delayed several hours because they were trying to augment their forces with enough loyal government troops to mask their direct intervention. [redacted] contrary to what many senior Popular Movement officials believe--that the Soviets were just as involved as the Cubans, albeit less visibly, in suppressing the revolt.

Cuban soldiers reportedly were told to assume that all Angolan troops, police, and security officials they encountered were suspect and that all headquarters were in hostile hands. Recapture of Radio Luanda was a primary objective and, according to subsequent accounts, as many as 20 Cuban soldiers may have been killed in the fighting there.

The Cubans detained and interrogated all Angolan soldiers they encountered, marking those who were loyal with a white stripe on their shoulders. Anyone resisting

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arrest was shot. Angolan troops for the most part offered little resistance; most redefected, although some fled north out of the city or to slum areas where support for Alves was strongest.

By nightfall, the Cubans had regained control of Luanda with the exception of a few slum areas which were ringed by tanks.

we estimate that the number of Cuban and Angolan casualties totaled well into the hundreds.

The uprising undoubtedly gave insurgent forces fresh hopes for eventual victory over the Neto regime. Although the Cabindan separatist guerrillas have suffered a series of recent defeats--which can be attributed primarily to Cuban reinforcements--Jonas Savimbi's National Union guerrillas pose an increasingly serious military threat to the Neto regime.


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Latin America

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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22 September 1977
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LATIN AMERICA
22 September 1977

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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22 September 1977

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Cuba: Castro's Firm Commitment to Foreign Development Assistance

It is an international duty, the duty of socialists and the duty of revolutionaries . . . to cooperate, however modestly, with other countries that are poorer than we.

Africa is the weakest link in the chain of imperialism.

Fidel Castro, April 1977

The Cuban Government has been sending both military and civilian advisers trained in a broad range of capacities to African countries since the early 1960s. It was not until the large-scale Cuban involvement in Angola became public knowledge, however, that the local media began stressing Cuba's "Afro-Caribbean heritage." Remarks made by Fidel Castro during his recent speaking marathon set the tone for Cuba's African commitment and indicate that the Cuban policy will continue for years.

There is a growing body of evidence that Fidel Castro's firm dedication to the "socialization of Africa" is still in its adolescence and that the maturation process will be a long one.

[redacted] Cuba, far from seeing Angola as a quagmire, intends to remain there until that country is economically viable and can serve as a showcase in Africa. The Cubans, [redacted] are aware of the economic and political costs, but they are willing to pay the price. [redacted] nothing would cause a Cuban withdrawal from Africa except the request of a host government.

Castro is putting his money where his mouth is. In a recent speech, he announced that the number of

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Cuban civilian technicians serving in less developed countries will be increased from 4,100 to 6,000 by year's end. Some recent statistics:

- Next March, 1,000 Cuban teachers will be sent to Angola for two-year tours. They will form the "Che Guevara Internationalist Teacher-Trainee Detachment." An additional 2,000 may be sent the following year.
- Cuban physicians are now serving in 17 different countries.
- Civilian aid personnel who agree to serve five-year tours in Angola will be permitted to take their families with them.
- Cuban advisers being sent to Congo (Brazzaville) reportedly now sign four-year renewable contracts.

The Cuban Government also has an extensive educational program for Third World students in Cuba. In an address marking the opening of the Cuban school year on 1 September, Castro said, "Cuba needs university graduates, and other countries also need university graduates. If those countries are very poor, then we will offer our assistance and we will not charge anything for it."

there are at least 1,000 Angolans studying in Cuba. Twelve hundred Mozambican students (and some of their teachers) will arrive shortly to continue their studies. Three hundred Congolese students are studying in Cuba, and Havana has recently offered 80 scholarships to Tanzanian students to study medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy. Students from Vietnam and Guinea are also in Cuba.

There have been recent indications that the Cuban people are concerned about Castro's growing foreign assistance program. Partly to allay these fears, Castro has taken to the hustings to reassure his people. While acknowledging his country's limited financial resources, he has emphasized that Cuba's foreign assistance programs are not taxing the economy and that

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the present austerity is the result of low sugar prices rather than of Cuba's aid projects in the less developed countries.



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Angola: Fitful Movement Toward the West



A Research Paper

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ALA 84-10121
December 1984
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Angola: Fitful Movement Toward the West

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations [redacted]

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa
Division, ALA [redacted]

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ALA 84-10121
December 1984

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**Angola: Fitful Movement
Toward the West**

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 19 November 1984
was used in this report.*

The Marxist regime in Angola headed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is dependent on critical aid from the Soviet Bloc and Cuba to survive against an insurgency that now infects three-fourths of its territory. That dependence, we believe, is likely to remain as long as the insurgent threat remains serious. We nevertheless find from a review of the regime's statements and, to a lesser degree, its actions over the past several years that the Angolan leadership is increasingly united in a desire to loosen its ties to the East and establish more substantial relations with the West.

Although there are differing reasons for a tilt to the West among the ruling elite, we believe that the dos Santos regime wants to move in this direction because:

- It finds the model of a "nonaligned" socialist and nationalist regime with an independent foreign policy appealing because it would allow Angola to keep its political dignity amid economic dependence on the West and security dependence on the East.
- It would like to acquire large amounts of Western aid, technical assistance, and investment—over and above its already critical hard currency oil revenues—to revive Angola's moribund economy.
- It seeks US political support to press South Africa to cease its direct attacks on Angola and its indirect intervention through Pretoria's aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
- It wants West European help in persuading Washington and Pretoria to stop making a settlement in Namibia contingent on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
- It seeks a sharp reduction of Cuban and Soviet Bloc influence in Angolan internal affairs.

Over the past three years, Luanda has taken several cautious political steps and made direct approaches to the West to explore the possibility of initiating a more evenhanded policy. These have included engaging in direct negotiations with the United States and South Africa and making numerous overtures—especially to Portugal, France, Brazil, and Italy—to cultivate political and economic relations.

Despite the differences that have so deeply divided the regime in the past, we believe that President dos Santos has developed a consensus behind this policy that allows him to proceed cautiously toward enhancing ties with the West. His key constraint, we believe, is the imperative that he not move so fast that he threatens Soviet Bloc and Cuban military support as long as it remains critical to his regime's survival.

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The Soviets and Cubans, for their part, have attempted to limit Luanda's move toward the West by manipulating political figures at senior levels of the regime and by using their military and economic assistance as a tool to influence the government, the military, and the economy. Moscow's carrot-and-stick tactics in turn have heightened Angolan unhappiness with Cuban and Soviet Bloc aid, which they believe is overpriced, heavyhanded, and of poor quality. Nevertheless, continuing military pressure on Luanda from South Africa and UNITA has left Angola increasingly dependent on Moscow and Havana.

The pace of Angola's opening to the West has also been checked by the limited Western response to Angolan appeals for aid, trade, and investment. Although Western companies have increased their participation in Angola's oil sector and there has been a modest increase in Western trade and assistance, these have not been enough to rejuvenate the country's economy or to displace the nearly 10,000-man Soviet Bloc and Cuban civilian advisory presence in Angola.

Although Luanda has improved its political ties with the West, it has not been able to realize its principal objectives. Western pressure probably played a role in convincing South Africa to undertake a partial pullback from its occupation of southern Angola, but Luanda has failed to break South Africa's insistence on a linkage between a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and a settlement in Namibia. Nor has Luanda been able to use its new ties with the West to bring relief from the expanding UNITA insurgency.

The MPLA regime's desire to cut back its ties with the Soviets and Cubans serves the US goal of mediating a Namibian settlement that opens the door for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Indeed, Luanda's increasingly open expressions of dissatisfaction with its fate as a Soviet dependent represent a potential erosion in the Soviet position on southern Africa—particularly when coupled with the more obvious reorientation of Mozambique's policies away from Moscow in early 1984. Nevertheless, UNITA's mounting pressure and the ever-present South African threat limit how far and fast the regime can move—either in the short term toward a package southern African settlement or in its long-term quest for a more balanced position between East and West.



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
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~~Secret~~**Scope Note**

This research paper reviews Angola's halting efforts over the past several years to establish new ties with the West and examines what we believe are the elements of Luanda's long-range foreign policy agenda. Although the dos Santos regime's foreign policies are now dominated by pressing national security objectives—namely, maintaining critical Soviet and Cuban military assistance to combat military pressure from the UNITA insurgency and South Africa—this study suggests the direction the dos Santos regime might take if the immediate pressure on it were relaxed.

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Angola: Fitful Movement Toward the West

Introduction

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime is today heavily dependent on the Soviet Bloc and Cuba because of the critical assistance in arms and manpower they provide against the growing UNITA insurgency. Although this relationship is an uncomfortable one for most of the regime's leaders who dislike Moscow and Havana's deep intrusion into Angola's life, it is likely that the dependency will continue until the threat from both the domestic insurgency and South Africa subsides.

we believe that many key members of the regime would like to loosen, although not end, their ties to Moscow and Havana and to move somewhat closer to the West in an effort to achieve what they consider a more genuine degree of nonalignment.

The Lure of an Alternative Model

Many Angolan officials, especially the regime's senior members, had extensive exposure during their long struggle for power to countries like Algeria, Zambia, Congo, and Yugoslavia and found their model compelling. To the Angolans, these countries represent one-party, socialist regimes not tied closely either to Washington or Moscow—attributes consistent with Angola's principles of nationalism and socialism. The regime's interest in a more middle-of-the-road approach was expressed by a number of its senior officials. According to a Western diplomatic report, Angola's Foreign Minister in mid-1977—a post then filled by now President Jose Eduardo dos Santos—told a Belgian diplomat that his country sought "active nonalignment" and claimed that Angola refused to be "integrated into any bloc." Later in the same year, the MPLA party congress, although emphasizing the importance of ties with the "socialist bloc," also stressed the goal of obtaining strict nonalignment "in the Yugoslav sense."

After some apparent hesitation, President Neto endorsed a more balanced international approach with increasing enthusiasm until his death in 1979.

In early 1979, the regime was at pains, according to one informed observer, to cultivate special ties with Yugoslavia and Romania.

Luanda's desire to achieve a more genuine degree of nonalignment is now a standard feature in Angolan foreign policy pronouncements. Senior Angolan officials who make frequent trips to a variety of non-aligned states appear to hold Yugoslavia and Algeria in particularly high regard. Dos Santos, who became President after Neto's death in 1979,

would prefer a status similar to that of Algeria, according to a generally reliable source. Since then, he has also cited Yugoslavia as a model. He has made several trips to Belgrade since assuming the presidency, including two trips in 1984, during which he publicly praised Yugoslavia as a model for Angolan foreign policy. For its part, Belgrade was a staunch supporter of the MPLA during the independence struggle and appears to believe it has a unique relationship with Angola. It provides medical care for government cadre and gives the regime political, economic, and military assistance.

Quest for Western Ties

We believe that the MPLA came to power deeply wary of economic and political ties with the West.

the regime was in no haste to resume diplomatic relations with Western Europe.

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~~Secret~~**Motives**

The government began to develop formal relations with a growing number of Western countries by the late 1970s as President Neto became increasingly disenchanted with his socialist backers, because, we believe, of the poor quality of aid they offered and their political meddling in Angola's internal affairs.

Angola was interested in a major opening to the West, although it would still look to Cuba for critical military assistance. One key step was the publication in 1979 of a new foreign investment law that covered most aspects of economic activity. Within a framework of "socialist pragmatism," the law allowed repatriation of profits, provided guarantees of compensation in the event of nationalization, and granted a number of exemptions from tax and customs duties.

Angola's opening to the West appeared to diminish after Neto's death but regained momentum in late 1980 after an MPLA party congress evidently decided formally to expand cooperation with the West. A variety of reporting in subsequent months reflected the regime's new commitment:

- According to diplomatic reports, Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge told the French Foreign Minister in January 1981 that Angola had recently decided to expand ties with France and cited the then recent party congress as authorizing the move. The emphasis in the discussion was on economic and technical relations.

Another key reason that Angola sought closer Western ties almost certainly was its strong desire to relieve military pressure, both real and potential, from South Africa, UNITA, and—Luanda believed—the United States.

the Angolan leadership was extremely worried about the southern African policy of the Reagan administration. Luanda believed its fears were confirmed in early 1981 when the State Department asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which in effect bans US covert action in Angola. In our view, this move prompted the Angolans to place a high priority on influencing Washington's European allies to forestall a possible American reintervention in the Angolan civil war. Luanda's concern about American intentions also apparently prompted dos Santos to seek direct contact with the United States in December 1981.

Angola sought influence in the West to use as a tool against Washington and Pretoria on other issues as well, and, we believe, it singled out France—a member of the Western Contact Group on Namibia (along with Britain, Canada, West Germany, and the United States)—whose new socialist government seemed likely to be especially sympathetic to the Angolan position—as a special target in its lobbying effort. One key goal was to pressure Washington and Pretoria to cease linking the proposal for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the UN-approved plan for granting Namibia independence. Another was to persuade West European countries to cease all aid to

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UNITA. After a major South African invasion of southern Angola in August 1981, Luanda also tried to bring West European pressure on Pretoria to withdraw its forces. [redacted]

By mid-1982 Angola's effort to cultivate the West was well under way. Senior Angolan officials had held high-level meetings with officials from a variety of West European capitals and appeared to focus especially on France, Portugal, Italy, and Brazil. Standard features in these meetings were a request for diplomatic support against South Africa and the United States and a long list of Angolan requests for economic assistance. They sought Western economic cooperation in some cases in areas where the Soviet Bloc and Cuba played a dominant role. In Portugal, France, Brazil, and possibly other Western countries, Angolan officials also sought various forms of military assistance, ranging from training to the provision of hardware. [redacted] The government also secured involvement from British, French, Italian, Yugoslav, Brazilian, Portuguese, and US firms in offshore oil exploration. [redacted]

Results

We believe that Luanda views the results of its efforts to court and cajole the West into an enhanced political and economic commitment to Angola as being, at best, mixed. Trade with the West has increased but has not supplanted Angola's dependence on the Soviet Bloc for many of the goods it needs to import. The only economic sector that has significantly expanded in the first half of the 1980s as a result of Western involvement has been oil production. To a lesser degree, [redacted]

Western and Japanese firms have relieved the regime's dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Bloc in the fishing industry. [redacted]

In our view, the regime's inability to engage more Western economic involvement has been the result of several factors. In some cases, the Soviets and Cubans have actively sought to discredit Western businessmen as spies and agents of insurgent groups, according to reliable reporting. Perhaps more important, the civil war has inhibited investment in agriculture and

¹ See the appendix for a description and analysis of Angola's quest for better relations with selected Western countries. [redacted]

threatens to shut down the Western-dominated mining industry. With the sabotage of an oil refinery in Luanda in late 1982 and the destruction of an oil facility in Cobinda in mid-1984, even the oil sector is proving vulnerable to UNITA attack. [redacted]

Outside of the mining and oil sectors, the climate for Western investment is not very hospitable. [redacted] ventures are still subject to redtape, the whims of corrupt and incompetent officials, and [redacted] from countries that may have fallen into passing disfavor with the regime—occasional politically inspired hostility. Imports, meanwhile, remain limited by Angola's chronic hard currency shortages because of the financial demands of the war against UNITA. [redacted]

Improved political ties with the West have also failed, so far, to realize Luanda's principal objectives. Largely because of US pressure on South Africa, Pretoria has ceased its direct attacks on Angola and has staged a partial pullback from Angolan territory. Western countries, however, have not forcefully pressed South Africa to drop its insistence that implementation of a UN-approved plan for Namibian independence be accompanied by a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Although the regime continues to negotiate with the United States and South Africa for a Namibian settlement and an end to Pretoria's direct and indirect military pressure, it is also being forced to negotiate the key question of the Cuban troop presence in Angola it has long sought to avoid. [redacted]

Desire To Disengage From Moscow and Havana

Luanda, in our view, has been driven to explore closer ties with the West in part by a growing dislike of its dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba. On the one hand, the regime realized that it needs Soviet Bloc and Cuban military support to survive against increasingly acute military pressure from the South African-backed UNITA insurgency and to withstand the threat of another South African invasion of its

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territory. On the other, by the late 1970s, a deeply rooted hostile impulse toward the Soviet Bloc and Cuba pervaded much of the ruling party, the government, the military, and Angolan society [redacted]

Disenchanted Leaders

Luanda's initial thrust away from the Soviet Bloc and Cuba was led by Angola's late President Neto. An avowed Marxist, Neto initially appeared to seek close, almost exclusive ties only with the Soviet Bloc. We believe, however, that his foreign policy views significantly changed before his death [redacted]

[redacted] many in the MPLA, including Neto, suspected that the Soviets had backed an unsuccessful coup against him in 1977—a suspicion we are unable to substantiate—even though the Cubans, after some delay, used their forces to put it down. Neto also complained frequently about the quality and quantity of Soviet and Cuban aid and appeared to be seeking better relations with the West. When Neto died in Moscow during an official visit in 1979, we believe that many in the government suspected that the Soviets had killed him [redacted]

The decline of Soviet prestige at senior levels of the government appears to have been arrested temporarily after the assumption of the Presidency by dos Santos. Dos Santos had been trained as an engineer in the Soviet Union, had a Soviet wife—whom he has since divorced—and apparently did not initially share Neto's distrust of Moscow [redacted]

By 1981, however, we believe dos Santos had adopted his predecessor's more critical view of Moscow and Havana [redacted] he went against the expressed wish of his Soviet advisers to seek more diplomatic contact with the United States and France [redacted]

Dos Santos's hostility has apparently grown since then. In January 1984 [redacted] he complained [redacted] he Soviets were treating Angola like a colony. In April, [redacted] he decried the total penetration of the MPLA Central Committee by Cuban agents or toadies. [redacted] dos Santos complained in June that the Soviets were exploiting Angola rather than contributing to the country's development. Although some of dos Santos's statements may have been made to convince a non-Soviet Bloc audience of his receptivity to Western blandishments, we believe they reflect the desire of the majority of the Angolan leadership to slacken—although by no means end—the country's relations with its Communist protectors [redacted]

Problems With Aid

One of the most serious causes of strain in Luanda's relations with Havana and Moscow has centered on Cuban and Soviet Bloc involvement in the Angolan economy [redacted] the Angolans have long had a litany of complaints about Soviet aid: it is insufficient, shoddy, overpriced, exploitive, and delivered with a heavy hand. Soviet Bloc and Cuban advisers are typically viewed as corrupt, crude, patronizing, and incompetent [redacted]

Luanda has responded by trying to limit Soviet Bloc and Cuban participation in their economy. As early as 1979, the government attempted to diminish Cuban influence by sending a large number of advisers home, [redacted]

[redacted] Angola refused to renew a fishing agreement with Cuba and turned instead to Italy, Spain, and Japan for assistance. [redacted]

[redacted] the Angolans have sought to limit Soviet access to their fishing grounds and have resisted signing a long-term fishing agreement with Moscow [redacted]

Angola has sought to block or to set strict limits on Eastern Bloc participation in other economic sectors. It has attempted to limit Soviet involvement in the petroleum sector to the provision of onshore pipelines [redacted]

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and storage facilities [redacted] exploration and drilling have largely been undertaken as Angolan joint ventures with Western firms. Angola also has turned West instead of East for assistance in diamond mining, apparently keeping the Soviet Bloc largely out of that sector. In civilian aviation, we believe Angolan authorities have tried purchasing Western aircraft rather than Soviet equipment, which is inefficient and requires too many Soviet advisers [redacted]

Angola also has balked at Soviet involvement in long-term capital aid projects [redacted]

[redacted] member of an Angolan delegation in Moscow in late 1982 was tricked by the Soviets into signing an agreement to proceed with the construction of the Capanda hydroelectric dam on the Cuanza River rather than an agreement to proceed with a feasibility study, which the delegation's leader had intended to sign. The Angolans evidently preferred aid in agricultural and light industry instead of Soviet involvement in a major industrial project [redacted]

[redacted] Luanda has subsequently resisted completing arrangements for the dam. [redacted]

Another major source of irritation has been Soviet and Cuban dunning of Luanda for payment of its debt for commercial and military transactions [redacted]

[redacted] Angola repeatedly has asked that portions of its debt be deferred, renegotiated, or forgiven. Frequently, bitter debates also have arisen over the cost, quality, and terms of both military and nonmilitary assistance [redacted]

[redacted] Luanda decided in May 1983 to treat a portion of its debt to the Soviets as a grant and simply refused to repay it. [redacted]

Moscow has used its ability to grant or withhold arms, ammunition, spare parts, and other material requested by Luanda as a carrot and stick to manipulate Angolan Government policy. In a meeting with Soviet officials in Moscow in early 1982, the Soviets denied an Angolan request for sophisticated antiaircraft weapons and refused many requests for subsidies, according to diplomatic reporting. In the face of an expanding UNITA insurgency and repeated South African attacks deep into Angolan territory, Moscow

finally stepped up its military assistance to Angola and apparently made concessions on aid terms. [redacted]

Moscow and Havana Hold On

We believe Moscow and Havana view Luanda's quest for better Western ties with a mixture of hostility and pragmatism. On a tactical level, they undoubtedly see the necessity of some ties. Western oil companies provide hard currency that allows Luanda to purchase military equipment and services from Moscow and its allies. The West also provides technical assistance and financial aid that the Soviet Bloc is unable to furnish; for example, Moscow has subcontracted a large por-

We also believe that the Soviets and Cubans resigned themselves in 1984—after several years of resistance—to Luanda's effort to negotiate a package settlement with the United States and South Africa on Namibia. They apparently have not offered the process any encouragement, however, and we suspect they have strongly discouraged compromises with the West or Pretoria that they feel might jeopardize the regime's survival, or its ties with Moscow and Havana. [redacted]

Soviet and Cuban pragmatism appears to have sharp limits, nevertheless, and runs counter to their instinct to keep tight control over a regime they regard largely as a client. We believe the main thrust of their policy toward Angola remains bent largely on discouraging, rather than promoting, contact with the West. Their tactics for doing so have varied with circumstances. [redacted]

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~~Secret~~**Military Constraints**

The most powerful tool Moscow and Havana have in keeping Luanda loyal has been the weight of their military relationship. Because of military pressure from South Africa and UNITA, that relationship has grown significantly even as Luanda began its fitful drive to improve relations with the West. Pretoria's large-scale invasion of southern Angola in 1981 resulted in South African occupation of a large tract of territory that served as a base for frequent strikes farther to the north. In addition, the UNITA insurgency began to spread to three-fourths of Angola's territory in late 1982 and increased even more dramatically in effectiveness in August 1983 after UNITA's capture of the Cuban and Angolan garrison at Cangamba [redacted]

The response has included a major infusion of sophisticated Soviet weaponry into Angola since 1982. Luanda has acquired advanced early warning radar systems, sophisticated antiaircraft missiles and artillery, 14 MIG-23s, about 80 to 90 more MIG-21s, at least 12 Mi-25 attack helicopters, at least five SU-22s and a wide variety of support equipment. [redacted]

Along with these new weapon systems have come increased numbers of Soviet and Cuban military advisers [redacted] the Mi-25s are flown by Cuban pilots with Angolan copilots. Some MIG-21s and all MIG-23s and SU-22s are apparently flown by Cubans. The Soviets also have expanded significantly their fleet of AN-26 transport aircraft, which Soviet pilots use to provide logistic support for Angolan and Cuban forces. In addition, the Cuban expeditionary force has increased steadily since mid-1981 as South African and UNITA pressure has grown, raising the total to about 35,000. [redacted]

Political Machinations

The Soviets and Cubans have attempted to manipulate the MPLA by backing a Mulatto-dominated faction in the party headed by veteran ideologue Lucio Lara [redacted] This group has supported positions favored by Moscow and Havana: maintaining strong ties with the Eastern Bloc, pursuing a military victory against

UNITA, providing unwavering support to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in its struggle to take over Namibia, and resisting South African aggression on Angolan territory [redacted]

In our view, some members of the hardline group, including Lara, are nationalists who dislike their country's heavy dependence on Moscow and Havana but believe that a close military relationship with them is necessary to the regime's survival until Namibia has been made independent and the threat from UNITA is largely ended. Other hardliners—who and how many is not clear—probably are controlled to varying degrees by the Soviets, Cubans, or East German [redacted]

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The Soviets and Cubans also have attempted to reduce the influence of individuals and groups they believe oppose them and their friends within the MPLA. Their key target, until its demise in the past year or so, was a faction identified in a variety of reporting as the "Catete group," a loose coalition of black nationalists—many of whom were born in the town of Catete in eastern Angola. This faction had long been openly hostile to Moscow, Havana, and the hardline Mulattoes. The Catete group also urged a negotiated settlement with UNITA leader Savimbi and favored stronger ties with the West [redacted]

Through a series of moves between 1982 and this year—the downgrading of both Catete and Lara faction members, the creation of special governmental bodies that report to him, and the arrest or ouster of high officials who attacked him personally—dos Santos has strengthened his own power base so that he has become the dominant figure in the MPLA. At the same time, in our judgment, he has adopted many of the policy positions of the now largely defunct Catete group, and his effort to increase his relations with the West is apparently backed by a consensus within the MPLA. Even so, we believe Soviet and Cuban pressure in the past three years has forced dos Santos to be cautious about loosening Angola's military relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, although it remains in peril from UNITA and, indirectly, from South Africa [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets and Cubans have sought to denigrate a number of close associates of the President who they believe are friendly to the West. In one recent instance, we believe Moscow launched a campaign of disinformation designed to implicate Kito Rodriques, one of dos Santos's key backers and an architect and principal

participant in Luanda's negotiations with South Africa, in an oil scandal. We also believe they have been critical of presidential adviser Jose Maria and Vice Foreign Minister Venancio da Moura [redacted]

Continuing Price of Dependence

One result of Cuban and Soviet Bloc pressure has been that Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisers continue to perform numerous technical assistance functions—more, we believe, than the regime would like [redacted] such advisers in a variety of government ministries, although their numbers may have diminished somewhat since the early 1980s. We believe Moscow retains about 1,500 civilian advisers and economic technicians in Angola while the Cuban and East European civilian advisory presence is roughly 8,000. Soviet Bloc and Cuban advisers still conduct numerous training programs for Angolan youth and sponsor a variety of aid projects and joint ventures throughout the country. A Soviet fishing fleet also continues to overfish Angolan territorial waters. [redacted]

Angola also continues to pay a political price that tends to compromise its independence in international relations:

- Luanda dutifully supports the Soviet Union in international forums; it followed the Soviet lead in boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, for example.
- Angolan's media still lavish praise on Luanda's Communist allies.
- Luanda routinely exchanges political, military, and "people's" delegations with Moscow, Havana, and Eastern Europe.
- Angolan military facilities continue to service Soviet aircraft and naval vessels that patrol the South Atlantic. [redacted]

Prospects for Nonalignment

Dos Santos's Views and Role

We believe the evidence is strong that dos Santos remains personally committed to nonalignment and

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all that this implies—an economic and political rapprochement with the West and a slackening, although by no means an ending, of ties with the East:

[redacted] he hoped foreign investment would save his country. He claimed that he intended to select the best investment offers without worrying about maintaining a balance between East and West.

- During his trip to Western Europe in September, the major theme of his meetings with Western leaders was expanded economic relations, according to diplomatic reports.
- By taking the Foreign Ministry portfolio in late October, he has become more directly involved in the Namibian negotiations and, in our view, is more firmly identified with the effort to reach a modus vivendi with South Africa and a rapprochement with the West [redacted]

Opposition to the opening to the West and to a reduction in Cuban and Soviet influence has apparently diminished among senior officials in the MPLA. The Mulatto-led hardliners appear to lack the power—and perhaps, in the case of some, the desire—to thwart dos Santos's efforts toward greater nonalignment. They probably still serve as a drag, nevertheless, on how fast the regime can go in striking a compromise with the West, and we believe they hold a veto over how far Luanda will go to reach an understanding with Pretoria or, especially, UNITA [redacted]

In addition to dos Santos and some senior party leaders, the impulse for a move away from the Soviet Bloc and toward the West appears to be firmly rooted in the party rank and file, the government, the military, and among many of the Angolan people. Economic planners, according to a variety of reporting, continue to have a strong preference for dealing with the West over the Soviet Bloc. Military leaders—especially groups of younger officers sometimes described as the "Young Captains"—frequently have expressed a desire to jettison their Cuban and Soviet advisers, according to a wide variety of reporting dating back to the early 1980s and continuing to the present [redacted]

Outlook

We believe the dos Santos government is attempting to obtain a package Namibian settlement that it believes would curtail South African support for UNITA, rid southern Angola of South African military forces, reduce the Cuban troop presence in Angola, and end South African occupation of Namibia. In our view, the Angolans probably believe that, if those goals are achieved, they would be able to neutralize UNITA through a combination of military coercion and negotiations. [redacted]

Under those conditions, we believe that Angola would court even more assiduously Western aid, trade, and investment. Although the West's ability to provide aid would undoubtedly not match Angolan desires, we believe trade and assistance from the West would increase significantly over a five- to 10-year period as internal security and communication improved [redacted]

At the same time, we would expect the regime to attempt to maintain good relations with the Soviet Bloc. It would, however, attempt to contain and in many areas roll back Cuban and Soviet Bloc economic and political penetration [redacted]

So long as the Angolan civil war continues, however, Luanda will make only slow progress in building on the limited concrete gains of the past four years. Under these circumstances, the regime will be unable to reduce significantly its dependence on the Soviets and Cubans for its survival. We believe Luanda will, even in these conditions, continue to seek ways to relieve its dependence on Moscow and Havana and to expand its ties with the West. So long as the war continues, however, Luanda's alternatives will remain severely limited. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

Luanda's fitful movement toward the West and the MPLA regime's desire to cut back its ties with the Soviets and Cubans serve the US goal of mediating a

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Namibian settlement that opens the door for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Indeed, Luanda's increasingly open expressions of dissatisfaction with its fate as a Soviet dependent represent an erosion in the Soviet position in southern Africa—particularly when coupled with the more obvious reorientation of Mozambique's policies away from Moscow in early 1984 [redacted]

Nevertheless, UNITA's mounting pressure and the ever-present South African threat limit how far and fast the regime can move—either in the short term toward a package southern African settlement or in its long-term quest for nonalignment. In a sense, Luanda's dilemma in realigning its foreign relations gives truth to the adage that actions speak louder than words: even as Luanda talked in the early 1980s of improving its ties with the West, its unswerving support of SWAPO attacks in Namibia at least partially provoked the military pressure on Angola that makes it so difficult for Luanda to move now to reduce its dependency on Moscow and Havana [redacted]

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Appendix

Probing the West

Thwarted Rapprochement With Portugal

Political relations between Portugal and Angola have foundered badly since Luanda's ardent courtship, which began in 1981, ended abruptly in early 1983 following Angolan charges that Lisbon harbors representatives of UNITA. Although Luanda and Lisbon recently have held two separate rounds of high-level talks designed to improve bilateral relations [redacted]

[redacted] By the end of the year, Portugal also had agreed to participate in still other economic projects, including the financing and construction of a dam expansion project on the Cuanza River [redacted]

Throughout 1982 and early 1983, the two countries discussed other ways to expand mutual cooperation and credit facilities. [redacted]

the Angolans also pressed Lisbon for counterinsurgency training in Portugal and the dispatch of a military team to Angola [redacted]

Blossoming Relations

Portugal was one of the first Western countries to which Luanda turned in 1981 for diplomatic support, investment capital, and technical advisers. The Angolans found the Portuguese receptive—lured, we believe, by the potential economic benefit, a lingering sense of responsibility toward its former colony, and the desire to resume the role of an international actor of consequence. In March 1982 the two sides signed an aid protocol in Luanda covering agreements on science, culture, health, agriculture, transportation, petroleum, and other areas of cooperation [redacted]

A Pall Sets In

The first problems in the burgeoning relationship arose over rumors in the Portuguese press that South Africa, with the tacit approval of the Portuguese Government, was plotting with Angolan dissidents in Lisbon to overthrow the government in Luanda. Although the Portuguese adamantly denied the story, it cast a pall over the growing rapprochement [redacted]

Bilateral ties began to deteriorate sharply [redacted]

when UNITA established a front organization in Lisbon in early 1983. In the wake of an escalating insurgency that was spreading into eastern Angola, Luanda seized on the opening of the UNITA front to begin attacking Lisbon in the press and in private for its "aid" to the insurgents. [redacted]

The relationship progressed further the next month when Portuguese President Eanes was received warmly during a visit to Luanda. The two governments signed more cooperation agreements—on tourism, technical aid, university exchanges, and transportation [redacted]

Other problems also began to beset the relationship. A socialist government came to power in Portugal in June 1983 headed by Mario Soares, who knew and was impressed by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, [redacted]

In May 1982 an Angolan delegation headed by economic czar Lopo do Nascimento visited Lisbon where it discussed a possible Portuguese oil-exploration program in Angola, requested that Portugal provide mining technicians, and discussed other programs for aid [redacted]

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according to a source of the US Embassy in Lisbon. Prime Minister Soares soon seriously offended the Angolan Government by attempting to mediate between UNITA and the MPLA, according to a diplomatic report. Another problem may have been that President Eanes—who was at odds with the Soares government—had led the Angolans to believe they would receive more aid than Soares was willing to offer. Moreover, as one of Europe's poorest countries, Portugal had only limited resources to invest in Angola regardless of the ambitions of the Portuguese Government. At the height of the courtship in mid-1982, Angolan imports from Portugal had declined significantly over the same period in 1981.

Portugal also apparently had not provided as many technical advisers as Luanda expected at the height of the rapprochement. The chill over UNITA probably had been the main reason why the number of Portuguese advisers was still relatively small, but Soviet and Cuban disinformation also may have had some effect. The Portuguese believed that Moscow and Havana were attempting to undermine Lisbon's position by claiming Portuguese advisers were American spies or agents of the insurgents. The Soviets and Cubans complained vigorously to the Angolans about their opening to the West.

By late 1983 Angola announced it would undertake "economic reprisals" against Portugal and formed a high-level committee to review all technical assistance agreements with Lisbon. Angolan enterprises were told to look elsewhere for purchases, and the Portuguese oil company PETROGAL was excluded from participation in an offshore oil development project, contrary to previous promises. The Angolans considered severing diplomatic relations and moving their Embassy from Lisbon to Madrid. They began to court Spain in mid-1983, apparently as an alternative source of Western aid and assistance and we believe to pressure Lisbon further. Plans to shift the Embassy apparently have been scrapped.

Partial Restoration

Lisbon was perplexed by Luanda's about-face. Portugal denied that it had any

official contact with UNITA and, after a period of puzzling over how to react, began a sustained effort to revive relations. Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama traveled to Luanda in February 1984 where he was lectured by Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge about his country's alleged support for UNITA.

Relations seemed to improve briefly last spring. In April a Portuguese official announced that Lisbon would increase its existing line of credit to Angola by \$60 million to finance consumer goods and that Portugal was negotiating an increased line of credit equal to \$50 million for the purchase of other goods. The offer of new aid apparently brought a brief respite in Angolan press attacks on Portugal. In May, however, dos Santos personally criticized the Soares government in a public interview, leaving Lisbon once again bewildered.

Current Relations

Subsequent high-level political exchanges have apparently been fruitless. A meeting in September between an Angolan Politburo member and Soares, according to a Western diplomatic report, provided an opportunity for Soares to stress again his interest in better ties as well as to make the point that his government would not muzzle the Portuguese press or abridge the rights of Portuguese citizens. President Eanes, without the approval of the Soares government, also sent an emissary to dos Santos in mid-September to express a desire for better relations. Eanes's overture, however, was greeted with strong expressions of anger over Portuguese support for UNITA.

Bilateral trade has improved. Portuguese exports to Angola during the first half of 1984 were four times higher than in the same period of 1982 and twice as high as in the same period of 1983. According to

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recent public statements by dos Santos, economic and trade relations are "normal," although the Portuguese were excluded from the Luanda trade fair in October.

[redacted]

Discussions about Portuguese military aid to Angola that began in 1982 have proved unproductive. Although the Portuguese might have played a limited advisory role in training the Angolan Army, Lisbon did not, in our view, have the will or ability to take over the role of the Cubans. The only military assistance the Portuguese apparently provide is given unofficially by a group of some 60 to 80 reserve or retired, leftwing military officers and mechanics who serve in Angola in a training capacity [redacted]

The recent showing of a documentary on Portuguese television favorable to Savimbi is likely to be another stumblingblock in bilateral relations. Angola had strenuously opposed its showing, and, under pressure from the Portuguese Communist Party and the government, its airing had been delayed three times. Soares has publicly expressed his disapproval of the showing, but we doubt that his protest will lessen Angolan resentment [redacted]

Prospects

Lisbon will be likely to continue to seek closer ties with Luanda, but we do not believe that the Soares government will take any significant measures against UNITA representatives in Portugal. Portuguese law prohibits the kind of repression of UNITA sympathizers—many of whom have dual Angolan-Portuguese citizenship—that Angola demands. Soares, an ardent defender of human rights, would be unlikely to stretch the law for the sake of improving relations with Luanda. Even a move to take legal measures to curb UNITA activities could pit Soares against the press, the opposition Center Democrats, and members of his own coalition partner, the Social Democrats [redacted]

We see little prospect that the rapprochement will develop as both sides had hoped in 1982. With UNITA representatives still operating freely in Portugal, we believe that Luanda will continue to maintain a chill in its relations with Lisbon. In the two years since UNITA began its dramatic expansion through-out three-fourths of Angola, the insurgents' isolation

from external aid and refuge has become an even more important goal in Luanda's foreign policy [redacted]

We believe, however, that modest trade relations between Angola and Portugal are likely to continue growing despite the strained political ties. Aid ties are likely to remain limited both by political difficulties and, in the longer run, by Portugal's resources [redacted]

Cultivating France

France is one of the key European countries Angola has cultivated in its quest for expanded Western ties. The relationship has yielded economic benefits, but only limited political fruit [redacted]

Political Goals

In the first years after coming to power, the MPLA regime was cool to France, believing that Paris was continuing to supply UNITA with arms. The two countries established relations in 1977, but Angola delayed sending an ambassador to Paris until early 1980, mainly because of French involvement in suppressing the Angolan-backed dissident invasions of Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978 [redacted]

Angolan relations with France began to improve in early 1981 during a visit to Luanda by French Foreign Minister Francois Poncet. According to a Western diplomatic report, the Angolans told him that the MPLA congress in December 1980 decided to develop relations with France in economic and technical fields. The Angolans, moreover, avoided raising past disagreements that had retarded improved relations [redacted]

The relationship started to pick up even more after President Mitterrand took office in May 1981. He and several of his top advisers were concerned about Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa and believed that subtle diplomacy, economic support, and occasional military assistance could wean "progressive" regimes—most notably Angola—from their

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Communist patrons. As a result, the new government shifted the direction of France's African policy by proclaiming a greater distance between itself and South Africa [redacted]

Luanda apparently attempted to trade on the new French policy by prompting Paris to pressure the United States to abandon the idea of linking a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to a settlement in Namibia. As a member of the five-nation Western "Contact" Group charged by the United Nations to find a settlement in Namibia, Paris appeared particularly well positioned to play such a role [redacted]

Although we believe French policymakers largely ignored Angolan political advice, the Angolans may believe their pressure on France succeeded. French officials publicly condemned linkage, and, in late 1983, Paris—apparently at the initiative of Foreign Minister Cheysson—dropped out of participation in the Contact Group. The French action, however, did not lead to the removal of the concept of linkage from the ongoing negotiations on southern Africa [redacted]

The bilateral political relationship, meanwhile, has not been particularly close. The reason, we believe, may be traceable in part to Angolan bungling. The Angolans, for example, angered Paris when they issued a "communiqué" during the visit of a senior French delegation to Luanda in 1981 that they had failed to clear with their guests. [redacted]

The French appear divided over how best to promote a regional settlement. The Foreign Ministry's preference for distancing France from any effort to link a Cuban withdrawal to a Namibian settlement reflects a belief that such efforts constitute external interference in Angolan affairs and give South Africa a pretext to remain in Namibia. On the other hand, US Embassy reporting indicates that key Mitterrand aides believe that a prior understanding on the Cuban troop issue may be necessary to reach a settlement on

Namibia and that concerted Western pressure may move Luanda toward a compromise. To increase that pressure, we believe that France may be giving some limited assistance to UNITA. [redacted]

One result of French restraint has been Paris's reluctance to sell arms to Angola [redacted]. Luanda has attempted to purchase French military hardware, especially helicopters. Although France may have sold Angola some helicopters—which are also necessary to Luanda's oil industry—we believe Paris has generally resisted arms sales for political reasons [redacted]

Economic Cooperation

The Angolans have had more success with France as a key source of investment and economic and technical assistance. The two countries signed a cooperation agreement in 1980 and have since implemented it in a variety of areas [redacted]. Angola and France subsequently signed four aid protocols funded at \$300 million each. These are largely for export credits and are insured up to 85 percent by a French Government agency [redacted]

Among the projects funded have been a technical aid program for reviving Angola's nearly defunct coffee industry, two technical schools to train mechanics and electricians, and a fish-processing plant. We believe the two countries have also undertaken a variety of other aid projects and have provided a limited number of scholarships for Angolan students to study in France [redacted]

Angola also plans to invite France to participate in a project that will expand the country's civilian air traffic control system [redacted]

French trade with Angola is largely one sided in France's favor. France is second only to Portugal as a source of Angola's imports from non-Communist

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[redacted]

By far the most significant French economic involvement in Angola has been in oil exploration and production. A French company, Elf-Aquitaine, is the operator of a foreign consortium that is lifting oil from an offshore field. Elf is expanding its exploration in this block with credit from a consortium of French banks arranged in the spring of 1984.

Elf also has a 25-percent share in another offshore field, and another French company, TOTAL, has a 17.5-percent share in a third field.

[redacted]
[redacted]

Angola, meanwhile, apparently hopes its economic cooperation with France will expand even further. According to a diplomatic report, the Angolan Finance Minister invited the French to participate in a long list of projects during a trip to Paris in July 1983. According to other diplomatic reporting, the French were astonished by the emphasis President dos Santos and his delegation placed on bilateral economic ties during an unofficial visit to France in September. Planning Minister do Nascimento presented the French with a request for financial help for a list of projects, and dos Santos paid calls on a French aerospace firm and the head of Elf-Aquitaine.

[redacted]

Prospects

The French-Angolan relationship is likely to remain at its current state indefinitely. Even if Luanda were to learn of French military assistance to UNITA, it might choose to overlook it in order to preserve the economic benefits derived from the relationship through the oil connection and French-financed exports. Moreover, we believe the MPLA regime will overlook its disappointment over the failure of French political pressure to moderate Pretoria's policies or to unlink the issue of Cuban troops in Angola from a settlement in Namibia.

Courting Brazil and Argentina

Luanda sought close relations with Brasilia immediately after independence in an attempt to establish a fruitful trade and aid relationship. At a time when it was largely ignoring the West, Angola apparently looked to Brazil because it was a major Third World power that accepted without criticism Angola's continuing dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba and because the two countries shared the same language and had a long history of bilateral trade. Moreover, from Angola's standpoint, Brazil was a potential source of replacements for some of the 400,000 Portuguese managers, technicians, and workers who left Angola at the time of independence. For its part, Brazil was pursuing an ambitious foreign policy at the time designed to gain influence in the Third World—especially in lusophone Africa—and then thought it had financial resources to invest in such a policy.

The relationship has nevertheless not yielded the results that both sides had expected at the time of independence. When Angola's expectations were not met, Luanda turned to Argentina in late 1982 as an alternative source of aid.

Angolan-Brazilian Expectations

The economic relationship with Brazil was well established although Angola was still under Portuguese rule, but this had largely lapsed by the 1960s. In April 1976, however, Brazil sought a new beginning by sending a trade mission to Luanda that sold \$40 million in trucks and buses to Angola and bought Angolan coffee.

Several months later, Brazil extended a \$310 million line of credit to Angola to finance exports.

By 1980 Angola's trade with Brazil began to come into balance as Luanda began swapping oil for a growing amount of Brazilian imports.

The political relationship also produced at least some of the limited benefits Luanda apparently sought. Brasilia could be counted on to denounce South

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Africa's escalating aggression against Angola and to support Namibian independence. If there was an Angolan complaint, it was probably that Brasilia did not denounce South Africa as vocally or as long as Luanda would have liked. [redacted]

Stagnation

By late 1981 the bilateral relationship appeared to be stagnating. Brazilian exports to Angola were beginning a decline, and [redacted] Luanda had largely depleted Brazilian credits by early 1982. Apparently in an effort to revive the relationship, a senior Angolan delegation led by then Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge visited Brasilia in February 1982 where [redacted] requested at least \$500 million in new credit to finance continuing trade and expressed an interest in purchasing Brazilian military hardware. [redacted]

Brasilia apparently demurred on military sales but considered providing \$500 million in new credit after Jorge's visit, although the ultimate amount granted for trade is not clear. [redacted] the two countries subsequently engaged in various forms of commercial swaps and that Brazil may have extended credit for several loans. [redacted]

Several months after Jorge's visit, the aid relationship appeared to take a dramatic leap forward when Brazil agreed to participate with the Soviet Union in building the massive Capanda hydroelectric project. A Brazilian firm was slated to provide engineering services, build the powerhouse, and install transmission lines for the project. Of the total cost of \$2 billion, Brazil was to invest some \$450 million—in return for partial payment in oil. [redacted]

Brazilian firms, meanwhile, were aggressively pursuing new areas of commerce in Angola. Brazil's state petroleum company, Petrobras, participated with the Angolan state oil company and Belgian and British firms in exploring for offshore oil in an offshore Angolan oilfield, according to press accounts. A Brazilian supermarket chain sold food supplies to about

one-sixth of Angola's population. Brazilian firms were also involved in hotel construction and were bidding to supply storage tanks for the oil refinery in Luanda. [redacted]

Since the peak in Brazilian-Angolan relations in 1982, the economic relationship has continued to provide Angola only small benefit. Brazilian exports to Angola have continued to decline, and Angolan exports of oil to Brazil increased dramatically in 1983, causing a continuing trade imbalance. The Capanda hydroelectric project has so far not materialized because of Angolan foot-dragging. [redacted] the Angolans feel that the Soviets forced the project on them and therefore they have been hesitant to start it. [redacted]

Brazil, meanwhile, appears to remain interested in cultivating Angola despite Luanda's hesitance in moving ahead with the Capanda project. [redacted] Brazil is now willing to sell arms to Angola and is willing to issue a credit line of up to \$60 million to finance the sale. [redacted]

[redacted] interested in the sale as a way of lessening his government's dependence on Soviet arms. Brazil also announced the renewal of a \$250 million line of credit to Angola following a September 1984 visit to Rio de Janeiro by Angolan economic czar Lopo do Nascimento. [redacted]

Argentina. We believe that Angola began to eye Argentina as an alternative source of aid in late 1982 and began to court better relations with Buenos Aires in early 1983. [redacted] source, Paulo [redacted] October 1983 commercial relations it could provide [redacted]

[redacted] Luanda was disappointed that its commercial relations with Brazil had not developed as the Angolans had expected and that the level of Brazilian economic assistance had remained low. [redacted]

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The relationship, however, has been slow to develop. The two countries have not established embassies, although they have exchanged trade delegations. Trade has been modest and Argentina's interest in Angola appears slight. A senior Angolan economic figure nevertheless traveled to Buenos Aires in September, where we believe he made a renewed pitch for increased aid and trade.

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Angola at a Critical Juncture (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

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September 1984

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Angola at a Critical Juncture (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
[redacted] Office of African and Latin
[redacted] Affairs, with a contribution by [redacted]
[redacted] Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations. (U)

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA,
on 351-7287 [redacted]

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Angola at a Critical Juncture (U)

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 29 August 1984
was used in this report.*

Over the past year, the beleaguered Angolan Government has simultaneously pursued a major diplomatic dialogue with the South Africans and the West and prepared for a massive offensive against National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that could begin soon. Both elements of this two-track effort are designed, in our judgment, to provide badly needed relief on four key fronts:

- The escalating UNITA insurgency.
- South African military pressure.
- A costly Communist military presence that is both indispensable and threatening to Angolan sovereignty.
- A devastated economy that cannot improve so long as the first three problems remain unresolved.

The diplomatic offensive, which has produced an agreement by the South Africans to depart southern Angola, has eased some of the pressure on the Marxist regime in Luanda. Movement on negotiations has faltered in recent weeks because of the tough conditions posed by South Africa and the unyielding refusal of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to compromise on the issue of a military standdown.

Preparations have apparently been under way for at least a year for a major military effort against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. A variety of reliable sources indicate Angola, after serious military setbacks in 1983, sent envoys to Moscow and Havana to obtain—apparently successfully—a significant increase in military assistance. Subsequently, the Soviets have provided Angola an array of new hardware, including MIG-23 and SU-22 advanced fighter aircraft, MI-24 armed helicopters, and new antiaircraft systems. Cuba has, we believe, augmented its forces in Angola with about 5,000 men—raising its total military contingent to as many as 35,000 troops. The Angolans have also reinforced garrisons and built up regional airfields in UNITA-threatened areas throughout Angola.

According to [redacted] Luanda plans to use its new muscle in a major offensive against UNITA. We believe that Cuban ground troops will augment Angolan forces as necessary and will play an active role in flying fighter aircraft. Improvements to regional airfields throughout Angola since August 1983 and dispersal of fighter aircraft and helicopters—which in Angola are primarily Cuban piloted—indicate the Cuban air operations will be more extensive than before. The offensive appears designed to cut off UNITA's supply lines to the north, to ease the pressure in areas threatened by the insurgents in central Angola, and to attack Savimbi's base near the Namibian border in southeastern Angola.

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Reporting [] has convinced us that the Angolan leadership is increasingly confident of its military capabilities and that some leaders in Luanda believe the offensive will inflict a damaging blow to UNITA, compelling Savimbi to negotiate on near-surrender terms. Moreover, if the negotiation track with Pretoria leads to Namibian independence, these leaders apparently believe that South Africa's will and ability to continue to support Savimbi will be weakened, thus making UNITA an even more manageable problem.

Luanda has apparently obtained grudging support from the Soviets and Cubans for their diplomatic efforts. Senior Angolan officials have discussed their plans with Cuban President Castro, who appears willing to go along. We have less evidence of the Soviet attitude, but limited diplomatic reporting indicates they also, in the wake of a decisive campaign against UNITA, may go along with a Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for Namibian independence.

The results of the offensive, however, will probably be more modest than the Angolans expect. The critical factor may be the Cuban role. If the Cubans take on a major ground combat role—which we doubt because of the domestic impact of increased casualties—the prospects for success will increase significantly. With heavy backup help on the ground and a major role in air combat, Havana could ensure that the operation netted some credible results.

If the results prove credible, but not decisive, we believe Luanda—probably with tepid support from Cuba and the Soviets—might still be willing to accept a Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for Pretoria's agreement to implement UN Resolution 435. Under these circumstances, Luanda may also decide to open negotiations with a less-than-defeated Savimbi, something black nationalists within the regime have long sought.

Luanda's two-pronged strategy carries obvious risks. SWAPO, for example, continues to balk on the issue of a cease-fire with South Africa. Moreover, a successful Angolan offensive against UNITA would sharpen the debate in Pretoria over the wisdom of South Africa's accommodation with Angola and could lead Pretoria to intensify its support for Savimbi's guerrillas.

Should the offensive become an unqualified failure, President dos Santos's credibility at home and with his Soviet and Cuban backers would be damaged. In such a case, the diplomatic offensive could stall as well, leaving Angolan Government officials fearful of allowing the Cubans to depart after UNITA had just taken Luanda's best shot.

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
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Figure 1
Angolan Government Offensive



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Angola at a Critical Juncture (U)

Major Policy Shift

During the past year the Marxist regime in Angola has engaged in an unprecedented series of negotiations with South Africa, reaching an initial agreement with Pretoria in February. Since then, Luanda has contributed military forces to a joint monitoring commission with South Africa that seeks to prevent South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas from infiltrating northern Namibia from Angolan soil. South Africa has reciprocated by withdrawing most of its forces from Angola and ceasing direct attacks against Angolan military and economic targets.

In our view, Angola's determined effort at negotiating is part of a change in strategy over the last two years away from a policy of confrontation, even at the price of enduring South African occupation of south central Angola. Previously the Angolan Government hoped that international pressure would force Pretoria to vacate Namibia and cease aiding the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency. Although Angola had been willing to talk to South Africa before, discussions had been fruitless because Luanda was unwilling to do anything that would thwart SWAPO's ability to infiltrate northern Namibia. Luanda's decision to restrain SWAPO—a clear compromise of its "African liberationist duty"—represents a significant shift in policy.

Since making its initial compromise with Pretoria, Luanda's diplomatic strategy has focused on promoting a dialogue between Pretoria and SWAPO and on pressing them, with assistance from the West, to negotiate seriously. In dealing with South Africa, Luanda has dragged its feet on meeting Pretoria's key demand that the joint Angolan-South African force monitoring SWAPO in southern Angola be continued in some form once South Africa completes its withdrawal from Angola.

Similarly, Luanda also has put strong pressure on SWAPO to be flexible in its negotiations with Pretoria. According to diplomatic sources, this effort has

strained the regime's once cordial relationship with the Namibian insurgents. Some senior Angolans apparently were especially critical of SWAPO President Sam Nujoma's unwillingness to agree to an unconditional cease-fire at a meeting with the South Africans in Cape Verde on 25 July.

Luanda's Diplomatic Offensive

Angola's willingness to compromise, in our view, stems from its need to deal decisively with problems that increasingly have frustrated the government leadership over the last several years. A variety of generally reliable sources indicate that President dos Santos and his key advisers—who appear to have a firm grip on power in Luanda—believe they have four urgent problems:

- The UNITA insurgency that has expanded to the northern province over the last year and now threatens most of the country.
 - The potential of renewed direct South African attacks from Namibia.
 - A massive, costly, and unpopular Cuban and Soviet Bloc presence that compromises Angolan sovereignty.
 - Economic stagnation that results from the insurgency and government mismanagement.
- The regime appears increasingly unified on how to approach these problems and seems to believe that if it can dispose of the first two, either politically or militarily, it will then be able to send home Cuban troops and turn to rehabilitating its economy.

The regime, we believe, sees the diplomatic effort as an important device to make a cease-fire and then a Namibia settlement palatable to both Pretoria and SWAPO. It does not, however, apparently see negotiations as the sole solution to its problems.

Angola also hopes in the near future to deal a major military blow to UNITA as a key second element in its strategy. For

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many hardliners in the government—who are largely excluded from dos Santos's group of close advisers—the military track probably is the preferred approach because of their distrust of South Africa and the United States.

Military Offensive Against UNITA

sources indicate that the Angolan military and its foreign backers have been planning since last year—when the government suffered serious setbacks at UNITA's hand—the largest ever offensive against UNITA. (See appendix for a more detailed review of the military situation in Angola.) The Angolans acquired a massive amount of Soviet hardware for the purpose, including new fighter aircraft and helicopters. They have been reinforced by about 5,000 additional Cuban troops since mid-1983. They have trained and deployed new military units, and, with heavy Soviet and Cuban assistance, have built up fortifications around key military bases and airfields throughout the country.

the offensive could start soon, continue through the end of the year, and strike at UNITA concentrations throughout central and southern Angola, including Jonas Savimbi's stronghold and headquarters in the extreme southeast.

the offensive will involve simultaneous operations in six areas in central, southern, and eastern Angola by 16 Angolan brigades and several thousand SWAPO troops acting in support of the Angolans.

the offensive will receive more extensive air support than past operations. We do not know the overall strength of the forces involved, but we believe the Angolan contribution probably will amount to at least 25,000 troops, or more than half the estimated strength of the regular army.

The offensive most likely will wind down in November or December when Angola's rainy season begins. In the past, larger Angolan military operations have ended when the rains began and movement on Angola's rudimentary and largely unimproved road system became more difficult. In 1982, for example, a move

on Savimbi's forces in Cuando Cubango Province was called off late in the year after the rains hampered the movement of troops and supplies.

Cuban Role. The Cubans apparently are increasing their combat role in Angola.

Cuban forces were more numerous and more active in several Angolan operations after February in eastern Angola.

We believe the Cubans will continue their more active role in this offensive but will stop short of an all-out effort. The Cubans probably will reinforce Angolan troops where necessary to accomplish specific objectives, stiffen Angolan attacks, and provide additional firepower. The number of Angolan troops we believe will be deployed in the field, however, means that the defenses of major base camps, airfields, support areas, and provincial centers would be greatly weakened unless Cuban units remained behind. Moreover, the Cubans have long been reluctant to take the increased casualties that would result from major participation in ground combat operations.

A much more active role apparently is intended for Cuban air elements serving in Angola. Improvements to regional airfields throughout Angola since August 1983 and dispersal of fighter aircraft and helicopters—which in Angola are primarily Cuban piloted—indicate the Cuban air operations will be more extensive than before.

Use of air support in operations against the insurgents has been growing. In October and November 1983, MI-24 armed helicopters based at Malange were used for the first time in the effort to recapture Mussende and Andulo. Since January, aircraft and helicopters based at Luena have supported Angola's efforts to sustain its garrison in Luau. Without continuous air support, Luau probably would have fallen to the insurgents several months ago despite a major UNITA effort to capture the town.

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UNITA's Response. UNITA insurgents have proved adept at avoiding direct combat in past government offensives and have usually chosen to ambush or raid rear elements. The scope of this offensive, however, and the danger to vital insurgent interests suggest that in some regions UNITA will have to stand and fight. Government operations in the east and southeast present the most immediate dangers to insurgent bases and to supply lines to forces in the north. Severing these links would hinder UNITA's ability to expand its areas of operation and potentially could set the insurgent effort back several years.

During earlier government offensives in eastern Angola this year, the insurgents have directly resisted the government efforts. Since February, Angolan forces have tried at least twice to recapture the Cazombo salient. UNITA claims to have beaten back the Angolan attacks.

Cazombo is still controlled by the insurgents. The government efforts and indispensable Cuban air support, however, probably were responsible for saving Luau from capture, and the net result apparently has been a standoff.

The government operations elsewhere in central and southern Angola may disrupt the insurgents, but UNITA—which we assume is aware of the planned government offensive—probably will be able to evade the government sweeps. UNITA probably will continue with plans for its own publicly announced offensive and even intensify its efforts farther north to divert government forces. UNITA also may move up its timetable for raids within Luanda, including terrorist attacks.

The South Africans disparage Angolan fighting and organizational abilities—even with expanded Cuban support—and see only a slim chance of success for the Angolans. Nevertheless, the South Africans do see the potential for serious harm to UNITA even if the Angolans only partially achieve their objectives.

Luanda Confident

A variety of reporting has convinced us that the leadership has developed new confidence in Angola's enhanced military prowess. Buoyed by the addition of new hardware to their inventory and their credible

performance against a South African offensive earlier this year, Angolan leaders evidently believe the offensive will strike a crippling blow to the insurgents and compel them to negotiate with the regime on near-surrender terms. They also apparently believe that Angola can block another South African invasion of their territory.

Although we doubt Luanda has yet devised a precise scenario for steps to take in the event of a successful offensive against UNITA, we believe it would be more willing to exchange a Cuban troop withdrawal for implementation of UN Resolution 435, a plan that senior Angolan officials apparently have discussed with Cuban President Fidel Castro. dos Santos sent emissaries to Havana over the past few months seeking approval for a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops. Although we do not know the precise outcome of these talks, Castro has shown some recent flexibility and we believe he may have acquiesced.

It is less clear how Luanda hopes to deal with the question of continued South African support to UNITA—support it demands be cut before it allows a Cuban troop withdrawal. We believe, however, that Luanda probably would see the problem as more manageable in the wake of a successful strike against UNITA. According to a variety of sources, many in the leadership assume that Pretoria's will and ability to aid Savimbi will be significantly reduced once it begins pulling out of Namibia.

the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Central Committee has agreed to open talks with UNITA after its planned offensive if the insurgents are still a threat.

Angola's strategy carries obvious risks. One key problem is getting SWAPO—whose agreement on a cease-fire is necessary before South Africa will complete its withdrawal from southern Angola—to abandon the hard line it took at the 25 July meeting with the South Africans and in all earlier talks. Another

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major problem may be that Angola's military offensive might drive South Africa from the bargaining table. In addition, Angola's fight and talk strategy could collapse if the offensive fails to make any headway against Savimbi's forces. [redacted]

SWAPO Balking

According to [redacted], SWAPO is seriously divided over how deeply to become engaged in the negotiation process with South Africa. By committing itself to a cease-fire, SWAPO believes that it would lose the slow but grinding momentum of its insurgency in northern Namibia without any assurance that a political settlement was imminent. By engaging in talks with Pretoria, it fears that implementation of UN Resolution 435, which it believes will eventually place SWAPO in power, will be pushed aside. SWAPO also fears that negotiations outside the framework of the UN plan might trap it in a process that would reduce SWAPO to the status of another internal Namibian party [redacted]

SWAPO's performance in recent talks with South Africa suggests that hardliners who favor unswerving adherence to the UN plan appear to be in control. These hardliners, apparently led by SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, believe that SWAPO's sources of support are sufficiently diverse and reliable to allow it to withstand Luanda's determined pressure to come to an agreement. According to one diplomatic report citing a knowledgeable Angolan source, SWAPO may have had the support of the Soviets in the hardline position it took at the Cape Verde talks [redacted]

Possible Backlash in Pretoria

A successful Angolan offensive against UNITA, especially if it included well-publicized strikes at Savimbi's stronghold, would sharpen the debate we believe already exists within the South African Government over the wisdom of an accommodation with Angola. [redacted]

Pretoria's powerful military establishment apparently has given only grudging approval to the negotiations with Angola, which have been championed by South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha. The military—[redacted]—is, we believe, suspicious of Botha's motives and believes his initiatives might harm South African interests. Many

in the military, moreover, probably think that negotiations with Angola should only be tactical in the nature and would prefer a policy of support for Savimbi. [redacted]

Recent events suggest that senior defense officials in the South African Government—enough to lend sufficient political weight to the enterprise—are willing for now to countenance some compromise with Angola, even at Savimbi's expense. We suspect, however, that they would strongly resist any deal that exchanged a cutoff of aid to UNITA for an Angolan promise of a phased Cuban troop withdrawal. Moreover, it is by no means certain that Prime Minister P. W. Botha would be willing or able to override their objections. In the wake of a major Angolan offensive near the Namibia border, the military might dig in its heels further and press for a show of military strength along the border that could sour South African-Angolan talks [redacted]

If the Offensive Sputters

Disappointing military results would weaken the case for a Cuban troop withdrawal—namely, that Luanda is capable of putting down UNITA without the Cubans—that dos Santos must make to Havana, Moscow, and the hardliners within his own regime. Savimbi, moreover, publicly claims he is planning his own offensive, which, if successful, could further upset the regime's plans by reinforcing Luanda's sense of vulnerability to a takeover [redacted]

A military failure might lead Luanda to revert to its previous policy of doggedly fighting on, hoping that UNITA and South Africa will eventually grow weary. Another possible but less likely response to a failed offensive would be to open talks with Savimbi on the basis of rough military and political equality. [redacted]

[redacted] hardliners within the regime have, with Cuban and Soviet support, long opposed such a move, others around dos Santos apparently have favored it [redacted]

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~~Secret~~**Soviet and Cuban Spoiler Role?**

Even if the negotiations and offensive yield positive results, dos Santos still would face two skeptical allies in a position to undercut him. The Soviet and Cuban role in Angola's current two-pronged strategy has been confined largely to military support. Both Havana and Moscow apparently were not consulted when Luanda decided to negotiate with Pretoria in March [redacted]

[redacted] Since then, we believe the Cubans and Soviets have acquiesced to Luanda's diplomatic effort but have attempted to toughen Angola's negotiating position—most notably during a hurried visit by dos Santos to Havana in March—although they apparently have not tried actively to scuttle the talks [redacted]

Castro, after a period of recrimination, now appears to be willing to go along with Angola's request for flexibility on Cuban troop withdrawal. How much and how long he will be willing to compromise, however, is uncertain. His real conditions for a Cuban troop withdrawal may be as tough as those taken publicly—that is, South African withdrawal from Angola, implementation of UN Resolution 435, and the end of South African aid to Savimbi. Moreover, even if the withdrawal process were to begin, Castro could reverse course. We believe, nevertheless, that he would like to find an honorable way to withdraw his troops from the war, which has become sufficiently unpopular in Cuba to give him an incentive for supporting a compromise [redacted]

The Soviets appear now to give at least tepid support to Angola's negotiations but disapprove of the regime making too many concessions. According to a Western diplomatic source, the Soviet Ambassador in Luanda claimed in July that the coming Angolan offensive against UNITA might allow the regime to consider withdrawing some Cubans from Angola, especially if Pretoria agreed to cut off aid to Savimbi. As with Cuba, however, Moscow's enthusiasm for compromise may be limited [redacted]

[redacted] it has viewed the negotiations with South Africa with skepticism—especially as they have affected SWAPO [redacted]

Apart from maintaining its basic relationship with Luanda, we believe that Moscow's keenest interest—that for which it would expend the greatest capital—probably would be to seek a Namibia settlement in which SWAPO would come to power unfettered by restrictions imposed by Pretoria [redacted]

Prospects

We believe that it is critical to Luanda's negotiating strategy that it achieve some meaningful results in its approaching military offensive against UNITA. In our estimation, at least some military successes are necessary for dos Santos to retain Central Committee support for his negotiating strategy, as well as to convince Moscow and Havana that Luanda is strong enough to permit a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops. Success for Luanda probably means:

- The large offensives in Cuando Cubango province and the Cazombo salient must hurt Savimbi in his stronghold and interrupt his supply lines to the north. Retaking the towns of Mavinga or Cazombo could be cited as strong evidence of an Angolan resurgence.
- The smaller sweep operations in central Angola, particularly in the Huambo area, should halt the steady growth of UNITA activity, perhaps even reversing UNITA's recent move into northern Angola.
- In addition, the MPLA regime probably wants to strike an important psychological and symbolic blow by an air attack against Savimbi's "capital" at Jamba. Savimbi's recent practice of hosting press tours and much ballyhooed hostage exchanges at his headquarters clearly challenges Luanda's sovereignty, and invites retaliation [redacted]

While the Soviet and Cuban buildup over the last year clearly has strengthened government forces, we believe that significant changes on the battlefield are possible, but not likely. A critical factor will be the

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Cuban role. If the Cubans take on a major ground combat role—which we doubt because of the domestic impact of increased casualties—the prospects for success improve significantly. If, on the other hand, the Angolans continue to carry the brunt of the fighting, the military gains—apart, perhaps, from a possible airstrike by Cuban-piloted MIGs against Jamba—probably would be minor and short lived. [redacted]

If bolstered by a successful offensive, we believe Luanda would be prepared—and allowed by Castro—to follow through on a commitment to a phased Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for South African implementation of UN resolution 435, in the belief that Pretoria's departure from Namibia would sever its logistic ties to UNITA and enable Angola with a declining number of Cuban troops to cope with a weakened insurgency [redacted]

If the results prove credible, but not decisive, we believe Luanda—probably with tepid support from Cuba and the Soviets—might still be willing to accept a Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for Pretoria's agreement to implement UN Resolution 435. Under these circumstances, Luanda may also decide to open negotiations with a less-than-defeated Savimbi, something black nationalists within the regime have long sought. [redacted]

If the offensive does not produce the kind of clear-cut military success Luanda appears to expect, dos Santos probably will lose standing, both within his own regime and with his Soviet and Cuban allies. In this case, we would expect Angola's diplomatic offensive to stall as well, as Luanda would become more apprehensive that any movement on Cuban troop withdrawal would leave the MPLA regime too vulnerable to UNITA, which had already taken Luanda's best shot. [redacted]

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Appendix

Military Situation

Plans for Offensive

[redacted] the Angolan Army, with substantial Cuban and Soviet encouragement or support, has set in train a major military effort directed against the UNITA insurgents. [redacted] this offensive would be the largest single effort yet made by the Angolans to block insurgent expansion and to reclaim territory lost to UNITA. [redacted]

Two of the six operations in the planned offensive will be directed toward reclaiming insurgent-controlled territory in the east and southeast. [redacted]

[redacted] one force will attempt to recapture the Cazombo salient, taken by Savimbi late last year. The second operation in southeastern Cuando Cubango province will move into the region that has for years been a UNITA stronghold and support base. [redacted]

To recapture the Cazombo salient, the Angolans, [redacted] have collected four of their eight brigades in eastern Angola at their base at Luena. [redacted]

Recapture of the salient would take back a small portion of the border with Zaire that UNITA now controls and invalidate UNITA's claim to the entire border with Zambia. Moreover, UNITA could be forced to fall back from Luau, which has been under siege since January, and cut back its operations along the Benguela rail line between Luena and Luau. [redacted]

In Cuando Cubango province, three Angolan motorized brigades [redacted] will move on Savate, Kito, and Mavinga. Air support will be provided from the large air base at Menongue although recent improvements to Cuito Cuanavale suggest this airfield may also be used. This operation would directly threaten UNITA's well-developed base area in the southeast—we have identified at least 30 insurgent base camps, training bases, and supply

points [redacted]—as well as the supply lines from there to Savimbi's forces operating in northern Angola. Furthermore, Mavinga was the setting for UNITA's highly publicized party congress in 1982, and its loss would be a dramatic embarrassment to the insurgents. [redacted]

It is also likely that the operations in this region will feature airstrikes on Savimbi's headquarters at Jamba in the extreme southeast. Aircraft flying from Menongue or Cuito Cuanavale are within range of Jamba. [redacted]

[redacted] however, Savimbi's headquarters is well dispersed and not easy for pilots to identify in the generally featureless terrain [redacted]

Elsewhere in central and southern Angola, the operations appear directed at improving the security around important roads and transportation links that have been under guerrilla pressure. Moreover, the two operations north of the Benguela may be intended to disrupt UNITA's plans for an offensive of its own in the northwest. [redacted]

[redacted] two Angolan brigades and a SWAPO brigade will operate in the vicinity of Andulo, and in a nearby operation three Angolan brigades will attempt to secure the area near Quibala and Mussende. These areas have been the scene of continuous fighting over the last few years. Mussende and Andulo, [redacted] were captured by the insurgents in mid-1983 but were recaptured by government troops in October and November, the last major government operation in the region. UNITA has also threatened Quibala several times—most recently in June this year. [redacted]

South of the Benguela rail line, two Angolan brigades will operate around Caconda on the road linking Huambo with Lubango, two major garrison areas. We

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have little information on UNITA operations in this area, but its guerrilla forces probably have been attacking traffic along the road.

Buildup for the Offensive

Luanda's buildup and preparation for this offensive apparently began in mid-1983 after a series of serious reverses at the hands of UNITA troops. UNITA began its push late in the previous year, and by mid-1983 insurgent forces claimed control of Angola's southeastern quadrant, had isolated Huambo—Angola's second-largest city—and were for the first time pushing their conventional battalions north of the Benguela rail line. Luanda's increasing difficulties were capped by UNITA operations in August 1983 during which a well-defended Angolan garrison at Cangamba was captured by insurgent forces and the government troops routed. Luanda was shaken by the UNITA victory, and the loss of this garrison was a psychological as well as a military blow.

In late August 1983, Savimbi announced plans for another major offensive that would intensify insurgent operations throughout the country and extend the conflict to as yet untouched areas. Savimbi promised that his offensive would be two to three times larger than the campaign that led to the capture of Cangamba.

At the same time that the UNITA threat was growing, the South Africans continued to occupy a buffer zone in southern Angola. Luanda has been preoccupied by the South African threat since August 1981, when South Africa killed almost 1,000 Angolan troops and established the buffer zone. Ever since, large portions of the Angolan Army and Cuban forces have been tied down in static defensive positions on or south of the Mocamedes rail line.

In an apparent response to these multiple problems, a high-level Angolan delegation visited Moscow in early September 1983 to ask for more arms, according to

diplomatic sources. The Angolans also told Havana in September they might ask for more troops, and the Cubans said publicly that more troops would be sent if needed.

Cuban Reinforcements. More Cuban troops, apparently were forthcoming.

Cuba sent 800 more troops in mid-1983 to stiffen the defenses in Luanda.

The Cubans shipped to Luanda in September a number of tanks sufficient for two tank battalions along with the crews to man them. The Cubans also reportedly sent air defense specialists, probably to man additional Soviet-supplied antiaircraft weapons such as the 20 SA-6 surface-to-air missile launchers delivered in September.

In late 1983, Havana began to withdraw the bulk of its combat forces from Ethiopia.

Cuban troops withdrawn from Ethiopia were sent home, and their replacements sent to Angola.

The garrisons in northern and eastern Angola where the new UNITA threat was developing showed major elements of two new Cuban brigades at Malange and Luena. Other Cuban garrisons in Angola showed no apparent reduction in forces, and we believe the brigades seen at Malange and Luena probably were organized from the additional troops sent to Angola. Another Cuban brigade at Caala in central Angola was also seen for the first time in late 1983, but the advanced state of garrison construction indicated the unit had been there for some time.

the new Cuban units in Angola.

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estimates of the extent and disposition of the draw-down in Ethiopia, we believe the Cubans have augmented their forces in Angola since mid-1983 by about 5,000 men for a total military contingent of as many as 35,000 troops [redacted]

Soviet Arms Deliveries. There was also a major increase in Soviet arms deliveries to Angola after mid-1983. In the first six months of the year, 10 Soviet arms carriers delivered about 6,000 tons of equipment, but in the second half of 1983 thirty ships delivered almost 35,000 tons. In the first six months of this year, 14 Soviet-flag ships delivered about 26,000 tons, fewer than the previous period but still a substantial number [redacted]

Soviet arms delivered last year included substantial numbers of antiaircraft weapons, apparently reflecting the concern at that time about the threat from South African air attacks. The Soviets delivered 20 SA-6 air defense missile launchers, 15 SA-3 launchers (sufficient for five SA-3 sites), as well as additional light antiaircraft guns. Delivery of 12 MI-24 armed helicopters and 22 MI-8 transport helicopters, fulfilling longstanding orders, nevertheless, did improve the government's ability to provide close air support to its troops [redacted]

Soviet deliveries so far in 1984 have given a substantial boost to the aircraft inventories in Angola, including 14 MIG-23s (two are trainer versions) in January, about 60 MIG-21s since April and five SU-22 fighter-bombers in August [redacted]

[redacted] indicated there were about 30 operational MIG-21s in Angola not counting the new deliveries. The first operational deployment of the MIG-23s probably took place in July when one [redacted] Lubango airfield in southern Angola. By late July, 12 of the MIG-21s delivered this year had been assembled [redacted]

In addition, Soviet deliveries to the ground forces this year have included about 45 medium tanks; 40 armored personnel carriers; 20 scout cars; 60 artillery pieces and other weapons; and probably ammunition, spare parts, and other supplies. Cuba has also delivered weapons, but these may have been for use by


their own forces. East European countries have supplied Angola with ammunition and other military-associated goods. East Germany, for example, has delivered about 1,000 trucks [redacted]

Rebuilding Defenses [redacted] Angolan garrisons since mid-1983 shows that there has been a major effort to improve facilities and defenses at garrisons and provincial centers in northern and eastern Angola (see figure 2). Forces in these areas had been drawn down in the early 1980s when Luanda believed it was threatened primarily in southern Angola and in the central highlands [redacted]

Since mid-1983, substantial improvements have been made to provincial airfields at Luena, Malange, Menongue, Huambo, Bie, and Saurimo (see figure 3). Smaller regional airfields at Waku Kungo and, most recently, Cuito Cuanavale have also been improved. The improvements have included protected parking areas for aircraft, additional perimeter defenses, and, in some cases, resurfacing of the runways. In addition to the physical improvements, there were also signs of a concurrent buildup of ground combat units at these airfields and garrisons. Fighter aircraft and helicopters were deployed in small numbers to these airfields beginning in late 1983 [redacted]


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
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REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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**AFRICA
SUPPLEMENT
30 June 1977
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
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to

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Cuban merchant ship "Topaz Islands" enroute to Angola in mid-May

Cuban Involvement in Angola

The Cuban government is clearly worried by the mounting problems it faces in Angola and has responded by increasing its forces there. What appeared last year to be an easy triumph for Cuban "internationalism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire. From the Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties are many and serious:


- Angola is experiencing deteriorating economic and social conditions.
- Political instability was heightened by the uprising on May 27, and Cuban troops reportedly played a key role in putting down the revolt.
- There is increasing resentment among Angolans toward the Cuban presence.
- The defeat of the Katangan invaders has kindled fears of a Zairian military retaliation.

Cuba's involvement in Angola is extensive. In addition to combat troops, Havana has provided the Neto regime with a large number of military advisers tasked with organizing and training an air force, navy, army, militia, national police force, and a secret police force. Civilian advisers were sent to fill at least part of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era. These advisers include agricultural and livestock technicians, medical personnel to run and staff Angola's public health system, advisers to help restore sugar and coffee production, merchant marine and port advisers, and teams of construction personnel.

To help the MPLA broaden its political base, the Cubans sent experts in the formation of mass organizations

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and a vanguard party of political cadre. To complement the development of a political structure, advisers were also sent to develop a national education system. Some Angolans have apparently also been sent to Cuba for training.

This extensive presence became increasingly evident throughout the country, and the image of Cubans as a new breed of colonialists has spread. The Cubans are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to take command of a given situation instead of remaining in their role as advisers to their Angolan counterparts. Angolan resentment also stems from the Cuban and Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the country and the fact that their presence has not brought any economic progress or resulted in the elimination of the insurgent threat.

Reinforcement During May

So far, the Cuban response to the deteriorating situation has been escalation. In mid-April and early May the Cuban government began calling up reservists for service in Africa.

[redacted] not less than 4,000 reservists were activated during this period. All apparently were asked to volunteer for one year of service in Angola.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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an
estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Cubans were sent to Angola in May. The ships and aircraft traveling to Angola in May could have carried this number. This would increase the estimated size of the Cuban presence in Angola to a level between 13,000 and 18,500. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 are civilian technicians, many of whom are believed to be reservists who have had military training and could be mobilized in place if necessary.

Also underlining Havana's concern, Raul Castro, Cuba's Armed Forces Minister and number-two man in the Cuban leadership, made a hastily arranged and unannounced visit to Angola after the uprising in May. During the trip, he reportedly inspected the critical military zones, including Cabinda, and Angola's borders with Zaire and Namibia. The communique issued after his visit pledged continued Cuban support for the beleaguered Neto regime and suggests that the Cubans are not yet ready to start looking for a way out.

Outlook for the Near Term

The fresh Cuban troops arriving from Cuba will probably enable the Angolan government to check the insurgency in Cabinda and northern Angola over the near term. There have been several reports indicating that an influx of Cuban troops into Cabinda has occurred in recent weeks. Some minor successes against UNITA also may be achieved. Over the long term, however, the Cuban MPLA forces will probably be unable to effectively neutralize the insurgent threat without a much larger military force.

Cuban involvement in Angola has been much greater than either Havana or Moscow anticipated, but the rapid reinforcement indicates that the limit of Havana's support has not yet been reached. Despite the apparent addition of some 3,000 to 4,000 Cubans, Havana still faces the likelihood of a steadily worsening situation accompanied by pressures for additional military and technical support. With few options available, Castro may escalate further; he probably would be willing to raise the number of combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000. In the meantime, Cuba probably will press some East European nations and the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African nations for greater moral support.

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Economic Considerations

The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on Cuban policymakers. The estimated 13,000 to 18,500 men now stationed in Angola represent only a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and an economic drain of about \$40-45 million annually--only 0.5 percent of total GNP--assuming average worker productivity and zero Cuban unemployment. Actual maintenance costs are probably even less. The diversion of merchant vessels for logistic support involves at most 10 percent of the Cuban fleet and a financial loss of \$15 million annually if these vessels were available for charter.

Virtually all other costs of the Cuban involvement are borne by the USSR. Moscow has replaced--probably on a grant basis--most of the military equipment which Havana has sent to Angola. Much of this replacement stock sent to Cuba is newer and in some cases more sophisticated. However, most of the military equipment being used in Angola was sent there directly from the USSR. The Soviets have provided Soviet planes and pilots to facilitate Cuban logistics and have leased two long-range IL-62s to Cuba. This has enabled Havana to continue its civil air service on Cubana's current routes without interruption.

While the real economic cost is relatively small, Havana is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the Cuban populace's exaggerated perception of the cost of the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of Havana's overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the highly visible callup of forces has coincided with a sharp economic decline. The Cuban leaders have consistently and correctly maintained in all of their public announcements that the island's economic decline is due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace apparently views the Angolan adventure as a major cause of Cuba's economic difficulties. Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular support rather than repression and does pay close attention to mass attitudes. Out of respect for public opinion, he has never told the Cuban people the full story of the intervention in Angola.

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Outlook for the Longer Term

If Havana is faced with continued demands for a significant expansion of its forces, the Cuban leadership may find itself forced to reassess its policy. In such a situation, the attitude of the USSR toward a worsening Angolan situation will weigh heavily upon Cuba's actions. The Cuban presence there is dependent upon the continued full backing of Moscow. Cuba does not possess the military capabilities or the economic strength to go it alone. Even more important, Cuba itself is economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR. But their different roles in Angola may cause Moscow and Havana to develop different views on the most appropriate policy to follow. Thus, there is potential for friction--but not conflict--between the two.

For example, the Soviets might balk at providing financial and material support for a major expansion of the Cuban presence. At the same time the USSR will probably refrain from saying how the Cubans should use their own resources to finance the increase. In the absence of strong Soviet pressure for a specific policy, the Cuban decision would be influenced primarily by Fidel Castro's views and secondarily by economic implications and political pressures within the Cuban leadership.

Castro's natural inclination would be to stick it out with Neto. The Cuban leader probably senses that a defeat would seriously erode Cuban influence on the continent. Furthermore, Castro probably realizes that an even more negative reaction would be provoked by a sudden switch of Cuba's support from Neto to another leader or faction. Finally, Castro is a confirmed revolutionary, convinced that supporting other revolutionaries--whether they are guerrilla fighters or legitimate governments--is a moral obligation.

Pressures for a policy shift can be expected to build within the Cuban leadership if problems continue to mount in Angola and the Cuban economy fails to reverse its decline. The individuals most likely to argue against further commitments are the members of the "old communist" faction, a group whose origins lie in the pre-Castro communist party. The group's main spokesman is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a Political Bureau member

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who is regarded as the number-three man in the Cuban hierarchy. Rodriguez has a major input into foreign policy decisions and has significant influence upon Fidel. The position against involvement also would be argued by a less influential group consisting of technocrats and economists whose positions result from their responsibility for the health of the Cuban economy.

The position of the military would be represented by Raul Castro, the Armed Forces Minister and second only to Fidel in the leadership. Raul's recommendations will probably have the greatest influence on Fidel's decisions. The younger Castro probably would be more willing than other members of the hierarchy to commit additional military resources to Angola. Nevertheless, he is unlikely to continue the tactics of escalation if the military situation continues to worsen. Given that situation, Raul Castro would probably be convinced that a negotiated settlement was necessary. If Raul were to weigh in on the side of those arguing against increased support for Angola, Fidel most probably would decide that a policy change was in order.


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

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Intelligence Checklist

December 5, 1975

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


Intelligence Checklist

December 5, 1975

ANGOLA: *The Popular Movement is continuing to receive substantial support from Cuba, the USSR, and other communist countries.*


We now believe there may be as many as 4,000 Cubans supporting the war effort in Angola.



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Intelligence Checklist

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

Meanwhile, on the military front, Popular Movement forces--probably led by Cubans--are continuing to gain ground in northern Angola and are now within 45 miles of the National Front's main base of operations in that region. Most of the estimated 600 to 800 Zairian troops that have been stationed in the threatened area have fled northward.

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Intelligence Checklist For Congress

September 4, 1975

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Intelligence Checklist For Congress


ANGOLA: With just over two months remaining until independence, three liberation movements are still contending for control. In recent weeks, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has made significant political and military gains.

Both the Popular Movement, which holds the capital of Luanda, and the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola are known to be building up forces between Luanda and the Front's stronghold at Caxito, some 40 miles to the northeast. Claims by the National Front that its troops have advanced to within 10 miles of the capital are not confirmed, however.

At ANNEX today we discuss Soviet aid to the Popular Movement.

* * * * *

Should a Member wish to discuss a CHECK LIST item in greater detail or be briefed on any current situation, such a briefing may be arranged by contacting the CIA Office of Legislative Counsel on Members also are invited to suggest subjects they would like covered in the CHECK LIST.



ANGOLAN NATIONALIST GROUPS

Group	Leader	Military Strength	Major Backers	Comment
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)	Agostinho Neto	8-10,000 in Angola proper; 2-3,000 in Cabinda	USSR, Congo	Strong Marxist orientation; Neto well-known throughout third world.
National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA)	Holden Roberto	8-10,000 in Angola proper; approximately same number in training in Zaire; 2-300 in Cabinda	Zaire, China	Pre-Western; poorly defined political philosophy.
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Jonas Savimbi	3,000 in Angola proper; 3-4,000 undergoing training; 200 in Cabinda	No major backers; seeking support	Pro-Western; moderate; largely inactive and little known outside Angola during the anti-Portuguese insurgency.

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Intelligence Checklist For Congress

ANNEX


ANGOLA: THE SOVIET CONNECTION

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is one of three liberation movements battling for control of the Portuguese colony, which is scheduled to become independent this November. Moscow is pursuing a policy of uncompromising support for the Popular Movement. It is not only training Popular Movement troops, but more important, is delivering military equipment. These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but they have considerable impact on troubled Angola.

Moscow has sharply increased military shipments during the past year because it calculated that developments in Portugal would foster change in Angola, change which the Soviets wanted to be in position to exploit. Even before the increased shipments began, the Popular Movement had amassed an impressive array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was well stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade launchers, and some heavier items, such as 500 mortars, 500 recoilless rifles, and 100 122-mm. rockets.

The new deliveries have continued the flow of some of this equipment and have added several other items, including armored cars, 152 trucks, 6 anti-aircraft vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and anti-tank missiles. With the receipt of this materiel, the Popular Movement is far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.

--continued



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Intelligence Checklist For Congress

Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular Movement both in the USSR and in Congo. Thousands of Popular Movement troops have received training in the USSR since the early 1960s; hundreds are there now. A few members of the Movement have been sent to East Germany to be trained in intelligence and security subjects. It is no surprise that Popular Movement troops are better organized and better led than those of its major rival, the National Front.

There have been shadowy reports of Soviet military advisers and Congolese troops in Angola assisting the Popular Movement. What seems more likely is that the Soviets have asked Cuba to help out with advisers and technicians. Eight Cuban "tourists" arrived in Luanda on August 3.

The Soviets also are probably using the Portuguese Communists as a channel for getting political advice and guidance to the Popular Movement. As far as we know, there are no Soviet officials in Luanda or elsewhere in Angola. Moreover, the ties between the Popular Movement and the Portuguese Communists are close. The Popular Movement was originally an offshoot of the Portuguese Communist Party. Agostinho Neto, the Popular Movement's leader, is an old friend of Portuguese Communist chief Cunhal and seems to share his outlook on Marxism and Moscow.

Moscow's relative generosity to the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards which await those who associate themselves with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope that with an amenable government in Luanda, they will be able to exert a major influence on events in southern Africa, hamper Western access to Angola's mineral and oil resources, and limit Chinese advances in the region.

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MEAB 80-205

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DIRECTOR 791266

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BRIEF 220038Z DIRECTOR 791266

TO: [REDACTED]

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF CO MEAB 80-205 FOR 21 OCTOBER 1980.
FROM: NFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.
THERE WAS NO MEAB 204 FOR 20 OCTOBER.

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. CUBA: PRESENCE ABROAD (FROM PA LAR 80-024).

1. [REDACTED]

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TOT: 2200382 OCT 80

DIRECTOR 791266

THE FOLLOWING ON CUBAN PRESENCE ABROAD IS TAKEN
FROM THE 17 OCT LATIN AMERICA REVIEW PA LAH 80-024 [REDACTED]

REDUCTIONS IN ANGOLA.

//RECENT REPORTING SUGGESTS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION
OF CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS IN ANGOLA, BUT WE CANNOT CONFIRM
THIS. WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT CUBA HAS LOWERED
SOMEWHAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ITS MILITARY PERSONNEL
THERE BY NOT REPLACING ALL THE SOLDIERS WHO HAVE COM-
PLETED THEIR TOURS. IN ADDITION, SOME COMBAT TROOPS
REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MILITARY ADVISERS,
TECHNICIANS, AND AIR DEFENSE SPECIALISTS. WE BELIEVE
THAT ABOUT 15,000 TO 19,000 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL
REMAIN IN ANGOLA.// [REDACTED]

// CUBA APPARENTLY ALSO HAS REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ITS
CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA. THIS REFLECTS THE DEPARTURE OF THE
CUBAN FISHING FLEET, A NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTION WORKERS,
AND OTHER PERSONNEL. CUBA ANNOUNCED ON 14 OCTOBER,
HOWEVER, THAT 1,000 CONSTRUCTION WORKERS AND 700 OTHER
CIVILIAN WORKERS WILL TRAVEL TO ANGOLA BY THE END OF
THIS YEAR.// [REDACTED]

PRESENCE ELSEWHERE.

//CUBA'S OVERALL CIVILIAN PRESENCE ELSEWHERE CONTINUES
TO GROW, AS HAVANA LOOKS FOR NEW MARKETS FOR ITS EXPORT-
ABLE SERVICES. CUBA'S MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION ABROAD,
LEVIPARAH, RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT 15,000 TO 20,000 CUBAN
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WILL BE STATIONED IN MORE THAN 10

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COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA BY 1981.//

//THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED ITS CIVILIAN PRESENCE SINCE JUNE IN MOZAMBIQUE, ETHIOPIA, AND NICARAGUA AND HAS SENT A VERY SMALL CONTINGENT TO AFGHANISTAN TO PROVIDE SECURITY TRAINING TO POLICE. WE EXPECT TO SEE MODEST CUBAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE SEYCHELLES AND UGANDA BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. IN ADDITION, SINCE JUNE CUBA HAS SIGNED WIDE-RANGING ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH GUINEA, MADAGASCAR, LIBYA, JAMAICA, AND SOUTH YEMEN.//


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STAFF NOTES:

Middle East
Africa
South Asia


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No. 0845/75
August 21, 1975

~~SECRET~~**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

CONTENTS

USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's
Sugar Daddy. 7



Aug 21, 1975

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~~SECRET~~USSR-Angola*The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy*

Moscow is pursuing a policy of uncompromising support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. It is not only training Popular Movement troops, but more important, is delivering military equipment. These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but they have considerable impact on troubled Angola. Moscow has sharply increased shipments during the past year, almost certainly because it calculated that the revolution in Portugal would foster a change in the status quo in Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be in a position to exploit.

Even before the increased shipments began, the Popular Movement had amassed an impressive array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was well stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade launchers, and some heavier items, such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoilless rifles, and 122-mm. rockets.

The new deliveries have continued the flow of some of this equipment and have added several other types of materiel, including armored cars, trucks, tracked armored anti-aircraft vehicles, armored personnel carriers, RPG-7 anti-tank launchers, anti-tank wire-guided missiles, and rocket launchers. With the receipt of this materiel, the Popular Movement is far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.

(Continued)

Aug 21, 1975

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[REDACTED]

Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular Movement both within the USSR and in Congo. Thousands of Popular Movement troops have received training in the USSR since the early 1960s; hundreds of trainees are now in the Soviet Union. A few members of the Movement have been sent to East Germany to be trained in intelligence and security subjects. It is no surprise that Popular Movement troops are better organized and better led than those of its major rival, the National Front.

There have been reports of Soviet military advisers and Congolese troops in Angola assisting the Popular Movement, but these reports are sketchy and unconfirmed. What seems more likely is that the Soviets have asked Cuba to help out with advisers and technicians.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Soviets are probably using the Portuguese Communists as the channel for getting political advice and guidance to the Popular Movement. As far as we know, there are no Soviet officials in Luanda or Angola. Moreover, the ties between the Popular Movement and the Portuguese Communists are close. The Popular Movement was originally an offshoot of the Portuguese Communist Party.

(Continued)

Aug 21, 1975

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Agostinho Neto, the Popular Movement's leader, is an old acquaintance of Cunhal and seems to share his outlook on Marxism and Moscow.

The Soviets probably see Neto as the kind of liberation movement leader they prefer to work with. Their relative generosity to the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards which await those who associate themselves with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope that with an amenable government in Luanda, they will be able to exert a major influence on events in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances in the region.

The Soviets presumably have not lost sight of the strategic or economic opportunities that might flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's Popular Movement. But it is hard to see how much, if anything, Moscow would actually gain from bases in Angola. With the opening of the Suez Canal the south Atlantic seafaring lanes are even less important to the Soviet navy than they have been. Bases in Angola could not add significantly to any current Soviet military activity, and Angola would be strategically important to Moscow only if the Soviets contemplated a major new increase of their activities in the south Atlantic. This seems highly unlikely.

The Soviets themselves have no need for Angolan or Cabindan resources, but they might want to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients. The Soviets may also want to hinder Western access to the minerals in the area.

The Soviets probably do not expect any immediate return on their investment. While their arms and equipment have helped the Popular Movement to assert control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some other areas, they have not--and probably cannot--overcome the Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses. The Popular Movement's essentially urban character, its relatively limited personnel resources, and

(Continued)

Aug 21, 1975

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Neto's doctrinaire and unappealing personality make significant inroads into the countryside strongholds of the National Front or National Union unlikely, no matter how much equipment the Soviets send.

On the other hand, neither of the other two groups (or both in concert for that matter) appears able to defeat the Popular Movement decisively on its territory. Since there is no support whatsoever for a partition agreement, a protracted war of attrition seems in the offing, and Moscow wants to make sure the Popular Movement is well provisioned for the ordeal.

Aug 21, 1975

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TOT: 010625Z FEB 86

DIRECTOR 716852

BRIEF 010625Z DIRECTOR 716852
TO: [REDACTED] LATIN AMERICA BRIEF.

OUTGOING
MESSAGE

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 86-026 FOR 01 FEBRUARY 1986.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

CONTENTS

2. USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA: SUPPORT FOR LUANDA

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TOT: 010625Z FEB 86

DIRECTOR 716852

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2. USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA: SUPPORT FOR LUANDA

//THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS THIS WEEK MADE A POINT OF REAFFIRMING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WHILE INSURGENT LEADER SAVIMBI WAS IN THE US. [REDACTED]

//A SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD WESTERN REPORTERS THURSDAY THAT MOSCOW MIGHT CONSIDER INCREASING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA IF THE US AIDS SAVIMBI. [REDACTED]

//EARLIER, FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HOSTED HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN AND ANGOLAN DELEGATIONS FOR TALKS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. AN IZVESTIYA ARTICLE ON THE DISCUSSIONS CITES SOVIET AND CUBAN TREATY COMMITMENTS TO ANGOLA. THE ARTICLE CALLS FOR THE UN AND THIRD WORLD ORGANIZATIONS TO PLAY A LARGE ROLE IN PROMOTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. IT SUPPORTS ANGOLA'S PROPOSALS OF 1984--WHICH CALL FOR CESSATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND A UN-BACKED SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA AS PREREQUISITES FOR POSSIBLE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL--AS A BASIS FOR A REGIONAL AGREEMENT. [REDACTED]

//ALSO THIS WEEK, THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THAT THE USSR WILL GIVE ANGOLA AN UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF AID FOR VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL AND

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AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: //MOSCOW AND HAVANA ARE PRESUMABLY TRYING TO REASSURE ANGOLA--AND WARN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE US--THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC BACKING IF THE US SUPPORTS UNITA. THE TIMING OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT WERE ALMOST CERTAINLY INTENDED TO OFFSET ANY FAVORABLE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO SAVIMBI'S TRIP TO THE US. THE ECONOMIC AID ANNOUNCED IS PROBABLY IN FULFILLMENT OF A 1982 COMMITMENT. [REDACTED]

//THE HIGHLIGHTING OF THE ROLE OF THE UN, THE OAU, AND THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE REITERATION OF THE ANGOLAN PROPOSALS SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW, HAVANA, AND LUANDA SEE LITTLE PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS IN THE US-BACKED REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO DEFEAT THE UNITA INSURGENCY WHILE SEEKING TO ISOLATE THE US AND SOUTH AFRICAN POSITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, LUANDA IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US, IF ONLY TO KEEP LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN. [REDACTED]

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TDT: 162204Z AUG 82

DIRECTOR 303792

MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF OCPAS MEAB 82-158 16 AUGUST.

FROM: ODI/O/CPAS.

CONTENTS:

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2. SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

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TOT: 162204Z AUG 82

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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2. SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

**SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA MAY
HAVE PENETRATED BEYOND KASSINGA, 250 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE
NAMIBIAN BORDER.**

SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND FORCES ATTACKED BASES OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION AT MUPA ON 22 JULY AND AT CUELAJ ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY. SOUTH AFRICA SO FAR HAS PUBLICLY ADMITTED LOSING 29 MEN--IS IN A DOWNED HELICOPTER-- AND CLAIMED TO HAVE KILLED 418 GUERRILLAS AND CAPTURED A

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DIRECTOR 303792

LARGE CACHE OF SOVIET-MADE ARMS. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY COMMAND IN NAMIBIA SAYS THE OPERATION HAS GONE NORTH OF KASSINGA AND IS STILL IN PROGRESS. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: // THE CURRENT OPERATION APPEARS TO BE SIMILAR IN SCALE--SOMEWHAT OVER 1,000 MEN--TO OTHER DRY SEASON GROUND STRIKES BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AGAINST SWAPO BASES IN RECENT YEARS. AS WITH PREVIOUS RAIDS, PRETORIA SAYS IT WANTS TO DISRUPT SWAPO'S ABILITY TO INFILTRATE NAMIBIA. SWAPO BASES WERE MOVED NORTH FOLLOWING SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND ATTACKS LAST YEAR, AND THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR PRETORIA'S DECISION TO SEND ITS FORCES SO DEEP INTO ANGOLA. [REDACTED]

THE OPERATION MAY BE DESIGNED TO REMIND THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT OF THE PRICE IT PAYS FOR SUPPORTING SWAPO AND TO PERSUADE LUANDA TO AGREE TO THE REMOVAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA--THE ISSUE THAT POSES THE LAST MAJOR HURDLE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON NAMIBIA. THE BUILDUP IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA PROBABLY ALSO IS DESIGNED TO INDICATE HEAVIER ATTACKS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. ALTHOUGH CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA MAY BE LIMITED, PRETORIA COULD INCREASE ITS ATTACKS IN RESPONSE TO SWAPO OR ANGOLAN MILITARY MOVES OR TO RETALIATE FOR INCREASED SOUTH AFRICAN CASUALTIES. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 90-066 FOR 21 MARCH 1990.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

ITEM

ANGOLA: CUBANS AND UNITA CLASH AGAIN [REDACTED]

THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE YESTERDAY ANNOUNCED THAT ONE CUBAN SOLDIER HAD BEEN KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED SATURDAY WHEN UNITA AMBUSHED A SUPPLY CONVOY IN CENTRAL ANGOLA. HAVANA BLAMED THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA FOR FAILING TO RESTRAIN UNITA AND PROMISED TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE INSURGENTS. THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT MENTION ANY POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE CONVOY WAS AMBUSHED ON THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE TO CENTRAL ANGOLA AND THE SOUTHEAST, WHERE THE GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN A MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA. CUBAN AIRCRAFT PROBABLY HAVE ALREADY STRUCK BACK AT INSURGENTS, WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO CLOSE DOWN SUPPLY LINES IN THE REGION. HAVANA HAS LONG LINKED CONTINUED WITHDRAWALS TO THE SAFETY OF ITS SOLDIERS; IT MAY HAVE HELD BACK FROM THREATENING A DELAY TO AVOID DISTURBING THE CELEBRATION OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED WITH THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. HAVANA SUSPENDED THE WITHDRAWAL FOR A MONTH AFTER A UNITA ATTACK IN JANUARY; IT MAY BE RELUCTANT TO DO SO AGAIN BECAUSE THE PROCESS IS BEHIND SCHEDULE AND ANOTHER DELAY WOULD SERIOUSLY DISRUPT IT. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE [REDACTED]

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2. USSR-ANGOLA: [] SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV AND ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO SIGNED A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN MOSCOW ON FRIDAY.Y

[] THE USSR HAS CONCLUDED SUCH TREATIES WITH ONLY A FEW THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES--INDIA, EGYPT, IRAQ, AND SOMALIA. THE TEXT OF THE NEW TREATY HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED, BUT A TASS SUMMARY

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INDICATES THAT IT GENERALLY FOLLOWS THE FORMAT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE OTHER TREATIES WITH THIRD-WORLD STATES, OUTLINING A COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE IN A WIDE VARIETY OF FIELDS.4

[REDACTED] NETO'S TALKS IN MOSCOW HAVE APPARENTLY FOCUSED ON STRENGTHENING PARTY TIES AND ON THE NEEDS OF ANGOLA'S ECONOMY. THE ANGOLANS SEEM ANXIOUS TO SEE MOSCOW PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN THEIR COUNTRY'S POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT, BUT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA LIMITS THE AMOUNT OF USEFUL ASSISTANCE THE SOVIETS CAN PROVIDE.4

[REDACTED] ANGOLA NEEDS ACCESS TO THE WEST IF IT IS TO BENEFIT FULLY FROM ITS OIL, AGRICULTURAL, AND MINERAL RESOURCES. NETO HAS IN FACT BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO EXPAND TIES WITH THE WEST--MOST RECENTLY EXCHANGING AMBASSADORS WITH SWEDEN AND RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL.4

[REDACTED] THE TREATY APPARENTLY PROVIDES FOR STRENGTHENING MILITARY COOPERATION--IMPLYING CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY AID. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT UNDER THIS CLAUSE THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO GAIN ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES IN ANGOLA. //THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT NETO WILL NOT AGREE WITH SUCH ACCESS.//4

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IN SIGNING THE TREATY, MOSCOW CERTAINLY HAS AN EYE TO THE REST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, ESPECIALLY THE INSURGENT MOVEMENTS IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA.

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2. ANGOLA: FORCES OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA HAVE RECENTLY CLASHED WITH TROOPS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA IN A WIDE AREA NORTH AND EAST OF LUANDA AND IN THE EXCLAVE OF CABINDA. IT WAS THE THIRD ROUND OF MAJOR FIGHTING IN TWO MONTHS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONALIST GROUPS AND THE FIRST OUTSIDE LUANDA.Y

THE CLASHES IN ANGOLA PROPER APPARENTLY RESULTED FROM A COORDINATED OFFENSIVE BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT AIMED AT DRIVING THE NATIONAL FRONT OUT OF AREAS WHERE THE MOVEMENT'S ETHNIC SUPPORT PREDOMINATES AND AT DISRUPTING THE FRONT'S SUPPLY ROUTES FROM NORTHERN ANGOLA INTO LUANDA. THE FRONT IS SETTING UP A MAJOR BASE IN NORTHWESTERN ANGOLA IN AN AREA WHERE IT HAS STRONG TRIBAL SUPPORT. THE BASE IS TO REPLACE THE EXTENSIVE TRAINING AND SUPPORT FACILITIES LONG MAINTAINED BY THE FRONT IN NEIGHBORING ZAIRE.Y

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THE FIGHTING IN CABINDA, WHICH IS ADMINISTERED AS A DISTRICT OF ANGOLA, REPORTEDLY WAS RESTRICTED TO THE CAPITAL. THE SMALL CABINDAN SEPARATIST GROUP WAS NOT INVOLVED.//THE OPERATIONS OF GULF OIL, WHICH PRODUCED 150,000 BARRELS A DAY IN CABINDA LAST YEAR, WERE APPARENTLY NOT AFFECTED. THE COMPANY HAS EVACUATED DEPENDENTS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL.//4

THE POPULAR MOVEMENT, WHICH A FEW MONTHS AGO APPEARED MILITARILY WEAKER THAN THE FRONT, SCORED SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN THE LATEST FIGHTING; IT HAD ALSO COME OUT ON TOP IN THE CLASHES THAT OCCURRED IN LUANDA IN LATE APRIL. THE GROUP IS NOW WELL SUPPLIED WITH ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, ITS PRINCIPAL FOREIGN PATRON, AND ITS TROOPS ARE PERFORMING MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THOSE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT. THE FRONT, HOWEVER, IS TRYING TO EVEN THE SCORE IN AREAS WHERE IT HAS STRONG TRIBAL SUPPORT.4

IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, BOTH GROUPS HAVE BEEN COURTING THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA, THE SMALLEST OF THE THREE LIBERATION GROUPS IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. UNION PRESIDENT JONAS SAVIMBI HAS REFUSED TO BE

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DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT, SEEKING INSTEAD TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE LEADERS OF ALL THREE GROUPS TO DISCUSS THEIR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. SUCH A MEETING REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN SET FOR MID-JUNE IN KENYA.4

CLEARLY, HOWEVER, NEITHER HOLDEN ROBERTO, WHO HEADS THE NATIONAL FRONT, NOR POPULAR MOVEMENT LEADER AGOSTINHO NETO IS WILLING TO SHARE POLITICAL POWER. ANY COMPROMISE THEY MIGHT AGREE TO IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BUYING TIME IN PREPARATION FOR A FINAL SHOWDOWN. THE 24,000 PORTUGUESE TROOPS—MOST OF WHOM ARE STATIONED IN AND AROUND LUANDA—ARE SPREAD THIN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND MAY NOT BE ABLE OR WILLING TO INTERVENE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS IN THE EVENT THE FIGHTING CONTINUES TO SPREAD.

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
Intelligence Checklist

March 2, 1976

23

CI IC 76-042 JX

The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress



Intelligence Checklist

USSR/WEST AFRICA: *The Soviets have provided MIG aircraft to Angola and Congo.*

The presence of MIG-21 fighters in Angola has been confirmed.

[redacted] as many as eight of these jet aircraft at Luanda airport.



[redacted] nine MIG-17s and one MIG-15 were delivered to Congo in late January during the Soviet airlift to

--continued

Intelligence Checklist

Angola. The aircraft are Congo's first fighters, and reportedly were delivered under terms of an arms accord reached last October.

The USSR has long been Congo's chief military supplier. In 1975, Brazzaville ordered \$23 million in arms from the USSR, almost double the amount ordered over the past ten years. The Chinese also have provided significant military as well as economic aid to Congo.



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USSR Review

Supplement
8 March 1979

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RPUR 79-007C

8 March 1979

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USSR REVIEW
SUPPLEMENT

8 March 1979

CONTENTS

Challenge to Soviet Policy in Africa

1

The Soviet Union's poor economic performance and deficiencies of the Soviet military assistance program could diminish Soviet prospects in several African countries.

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Challenge to Soviet Policy in Africa

Developments in Africa over the last few months could test Soviet policy in a way that Moscow is traditionally least able to handle. In the past, Moscow has made gains in Nigeria, Angola, and Ethiopia by responding to their needs for military assistance and thus keeping in power a regime sympathetic in varying degrees to the Soviet Union and somewhat responsive to its influence. Security concerns in several countries where Soviet influence has increased are becoming less pressing, and some recipients of Soviet military largess are increasingly interested in economic development. Poor economic performance by the Soviets will aggravate problems caused by the deficiencies of the Soviet military assistance program and will particularly diminish Soviet prospects in areas where military assistance is accorded a lower priority.

Nigeria

Nigeria, which challenged the Soviet Union at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in Khartoum last July because of its military activities in Africa, has become particularly critical of Soviet economic assistance in Africa. The Nigerians believe that the Soviets concentrate on giving military assistance to countries whose survival is threatened but do not follow up with economic development assistance that is needed over the long haul. Those countries that would prefer to remain socialist, according to the Nigerians, thus turn to the West for what Moscow is unwilling to supply, which often leads to the eventual expulsion of the Soviets. The Nigerians have cited Guinea, Sudan, Egypt and Somalia as examples of this trend and predict it will continue in Angola and Mozambique and even in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe when the enthusiasm of "military brotherhood" has waned. Nigeria itself could soon be added to the list. The Soviet-Nigerian relationship has deteriorated in part because of problems in their military assistance relationship, a phenomenon that accelerated because of Soviet deficiencies in aiding economic development. The

8 March 1979

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- Nigerians particularly complain about poor Soviet performance in construction of the AJAOKUTA steel mill and an oil pipeline. [REDACTED]

Angola

Dependent on Soviet assistance to deal with the UNITA insurgency, Angola has not been publicly critical of Moscow's military or economic assistance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some Angolan dissatisfaction with the Soviets on both counts, and the Neto government is already exploring the possibility of diversifying its sources of economic assistance. Neto has made overtures to the United States, relations with France and Portugal have improved, and an association with the EC under the Lome Convention is being examined. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


Neto has also tried to come to grips with Angola's dependency on the Soviet Union by improving ties with Zaire and China. Angola's relations with Zaire have improved since the Shaba invasion, and both sides, looking for economic benefits, have agreed to reopen the Benguela Railroad. Neto clearly hopes that improved relations with Zairian President Mobutu would lead Kinshasa to curtail its assistance to UNITA in return for Angolan control over the Katangese. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

8 March 1979

Ethiopia

The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship is a marriage of convenience that has been plagued by mutual suspicions and differences over policy. During the past year, both sides have tried to minimize the tension in their relationship in order to concentrate on military objectives--expulsion of the Somalis from the Ogaden and suppression of the Eritrean insurgents. While insurgency remains a problem in both areas, Ethiopian leader Mengistu has probably weathered the worst and appears more confident of his ability to deal with remaining problems. The shift in emphasis from military affairs to economic development in Ethiopia will present new challenges to the Soviets. 

Even during the worst of military situations in the Ogaden, Mengistu and the Ethiopians were privately critical of the Soviet role in Ethiopian economic development. They have complained about the price the Soviets paid for Ethiopian coffee as well as allegedly inflated Soviet prices for civil aircraft. Mengistu wants Ethiopia to seek the best possible economic deal for itself--regardless of its ideological, political, and military relationship with the USSR. 



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Aside from the agreement with Ethiopia, there have been no recent changes in Soviet policy suggesting that Moscow will be more responsive in the short run to the economic needs of its principal African clients. [redacted]

[redacted] the demands for aid from Ethiopia and Angola alone cannot be met. [redacted]

[redacted]



One of Moscow's repeated deficiencies in Third World relationships has been that its aid has traditionally avoided hard currency expenditures and has emphasized high-visibility industrial projects in the state sector of recipient states. Aid has also been channelled primarily to countries undergoing a sociopolitical transformation of an "anti-imperialist" nature; in effect aid was directed at political, not economic, goals. This has offered short-term payoffs but fostered long-term setbacks. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

8 March 1979

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8 March 1979

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CIA - CI - BRIEF

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF CIMEAB 76-031.4

2. ANGOLA: THE FIRST OFFICIAL SOVIET MILITARY RECEPTION TO BE HELD ON ANGOLAN SOIL REPORTEDLY OCCURRED IN LUANDA ON MONDAY. ACCORDING TO A WESTERN PRESS REPORT CITING THE JOURNAL DE ANGOLA, SOVIET OFFICERS IN LUANDA HELD THE AFFAIR IN HONOR OF THE 58TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE RED ARMY. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES WERE IN ATTENDANCE, ALONG WITH MOST OF THE OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. PRESIDENT NETO, IN A SPEECH TO THE GATHERING, NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY

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TO PUBLICLY THANK THE SOVIET ARMY AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE, WHICH "WE SHALL NOT FORGET NEITHER NOW NOR IN THE FUTURE." HE ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE AID PROVIDED BY CUBA, GUINEA-BISSAU, AND GUINEA.

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
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National Intelligence Daily

Friday
23 July 1982

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
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23 July 1982


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
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South Africa - Angola: *Probable Air Attacks* 11

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23 July 1982



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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Probable Air Attacks

[redacted] 14 Mirage fighters at Ondangua airfield in northern Namibia--at least twice the number observed on Tuesday--apparently being readied for bombing missions. Luanda's claim yesterday that the South Africans bombed the Angolan town of Cahama has not been confirmed. Pretoria on Tuesday officially warned the UN Secretary General that it would retaliate if guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization carried out alleged plans to increase military activity. [redacted]

Comment: South Africa may believe SWAPO or Angolan units are attempting to move toward Namibia, and its warning may have been intended to set the political stage for operations that probably are already under way. A South African air attack may be intended to signal Luanda that, at least until the negotiations on Namibia are completed, Pretoria does not intend to relinquish control over Angolan territory it has dominated since August 1981. Angola is certain to cite any attack by South Africa to buttress its argument that Cuban troops cannot be removed as part of a settlement on Namibia as long as Pretoria's forces are in Namibia. [redacted]

[redacted]

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23 July 1982

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PAGE 001
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DIRECTOR 140304

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BRIEF 100110Z DIRECTOR 140304
TO: [REDACTED] ROUTINE MEA BRIEF.

CIA/CO ----- MEAB 82-027 -----

MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA BRIEF CO MEAB 82-027 FOR 9 FEBRUARY 1982.
FROM: NFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. USSR=MOZAMBIQUE! CONCERN OVER NAMIBIA

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
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DIRECTOR 140304



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PAGE 003

TOT: 100110Z FEB 82

DIRECTOR 140304

3. USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: CONCERN OVER NAMIBIA.

THE USSR IS INCREASING ITS EFFORTS TO DISRUPT A JS-SPONSORED SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A VISIT LAST MONTH TO MOZAMBIQUE BY PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL AIDE FOR THIRD WORLD ISSUES AND ONE BY POLITBURO-CANDIDATE MEMBER RASHIDOV IN MID-NOVEMBER. RASHIDOV WAS THE HIGHEST LEVEL SOVIET OFFICIAL TO VISIT MOZAMBIQUE SINCE EARLY 1977. [REDACTED]

TASS, MEANTHILE, HAS GIVEN EXTENSIVE PLAY TO THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN COMMUNIQUE OVER THE WEEKEND ON THE CONDITIONS FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTRUING IT AS SEPARATING THE ISSUE OF THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA FROM A SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE COMMUNIQUE REITERATES LONG HELD POSITIONS. [REDACTED]

COMMENTS WACHTEL SO FAR HAS NOT PLAYED A DISRUPTIVE ROLE IN FRONTLINE DISCUSSIONS ON NAMIBIA AND IS UNLIKELY

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TOT: 100110Z FEB 82

DIRECTOR 140304

TO BE PERSUADED BY THE SOVIETS TO DO SO SOON. NEVERTHE-
LESS, HE IS WAGING AN UPHILL BATTLE AGAINST THE SOUTH
AFRICAN - BACKED NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT THAT EVENTU-
ALLY MAY COMPEL HIM TO MOVE CLOSER TO MOSCOW ON THE
NAMIBIAN ISSUE IN EXCHANGE FOR SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID.

THE
RECENT HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET CONTACTS WITH NACHEL REFLECT
MOSCOW'S CONCERNS IN SEVERAL AREAS, ONE OF WHICH IS THAT
THE WEST IS MAKING SOME HEADWAY WITH HIM ON THE NAMIBIA
ISSUE. THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN COM-
MUNIQUE IS ANOTHER INDICATION THE SOVIETS ARE WORRIED
THAT A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT WILL INVOLVE A REDUCTION OF
CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA.

END OF MESSAGE

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
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National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
14 July 1982

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CPAS NID 82-1631X

14 July 1982

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
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Special Analysis

USSR - Southern Africa: <i>Changing Soviet Relations</i>	 11
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14 July 1982



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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR - SOUTHERN AFRICA: Changing Soviet Relations

[REDACTED]

The possible diminution of Soviet influence in Angola, should a settlement on Namibia be achieved, and instability in Mozambique have prompted Moscow to take steps to protect its position in southern Africa. The deteriorating situation in Mozambique may present the USSR with opportunities to increase significantly its influence there if it is willing to underwrite the growing costs of supporting the regime. [REDACTED]

Angolan President dos Santos's continued willingness to deal with the US on Namibia and related issues has intensified Soviet anxiety over his intentions, particularly because this might affect the Cuban troop presence in Angola. [REDACTED] Moscow is concerned that dos Santos might call for the removal of most of the Cubans in exchange for a security guarantee for Angola's southern border. The departure of the Cubans, coupled with better ties with Western countries, would jeopardize Soviet influence in Luanda. [REDACTED]

Dos Santos's handling of the Namibia problem and his efforts to improve ties to the West reportedly have intensified factional dissension in the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. If the President's efforts show progress, he may face a coup attempt by his party's pro-Soviet faction, which stands to lose the most if his policy initiatives succeed. [REDACTED]

The Soviets may hesitate to encourage a coup. It would risk Moscow's position if it were to fail and would jeopardize the USSR's equities among the other Frontline States. [REDACTED]

A pro-Soviet coup plot in Luanda could develop without direct Soviet instigation, and, if it succeeded, Moscow presumably would endorse it. For now, however,

--continued

~~Top Secret~~

14 July 1982

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]

the USSR will try to retain its influence in Angola by using its connections with the hardliners in the ruling party to impede the negotiations on Namibia. [redacted]

Decisions Ahead in Mozambique

Soviet-Mozambican relations have become strained over the past year, largely because of President Machel's dissatisfaction with Soviet assistance and his overtures to the West. [redacted]

[redacted]

Moscow may view the insurgent threat as another opportunity to enhance its influence in Maputo. If Machel is impelled to ask for major increases in military assistance--possibly including Cuban combat troops--the USSR might try to extract concessions from the regime. The Soviets might hope to secure air and naval facilities, which so far have been refused, and to make further use of Mozambique as a channel of support to South African guerrillas. [redacted]

A secondary consideration for Moscow would be that a large Cuban military presence in Mozambique would cause Pretoria to veto any settlement on Namibia, with the Cubans leaving Angola only to reappear in Mozambique.

--continued

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]

14 July 1982

~~Top Secret~~

Although President Castro probably would be reluctant to introduce Cuban combat troops into a potentially dangerous military situation, he probably would accede to a Soviet request. [REDACTED]

A major Soviet military assistance commitment would entail new costs and risks, especially if it included Cuban forces. South Africa, for example, probably would intensify its efforts to undermine the Machel regime. This would raise the military and political costs in southern Africa for both Moscow and Havana. [REDACTED]

Moscow also would have to bear new financial costs. Unlike Angola, Mozambique has few resources with which to pay for such support. It is already in arrears for much of the roughly \$200 million in Soviet military assistance that has been delivered. [REDACTED]

Prospects

The USSR's financial problems have caused it to reduce assistance to other clients, and a decision to expand its involvement in Mozambique in a major way would underline Moscow's determination to play a leading role in southern Africa. The USSR's sustained interest in exploiting the opposition of the Frontline States to South Africa and in supporting the guerrillas there, as well as its uncertain future in Angola, suggest Moscow is likely to increase assistance to Mozambique. [REDACTED]

~~Top Secret~~

14 July 1982

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NI/ 77-015C-M

22 June 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Involvement in Angola

SUMMARY

Cuban support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began in the early 1960s. Until 1975, however, the number of Cubans serving with the MPLA probably never went beyond a few hundred. The Cuban intervention began on a large scale in September 1975. By March 1976, the Cuban presence had reached an estimated 20,000. With the civil war essentially ended, Havana began a gradual withdrawal of its combat forces. By September, however, the withdrawal was apparently stopped as a result of increased insurgent activity. From September 1976 to May 1977, the total Cuban presence probably remained fairly constant at an estimated level of 10,000 to 14,500.

The Castro regime is clearly worried by the deteriorating situation in Angola. The difficulties are considerable. Angola is experiencing worsening economic and social conditions; political instability was aggravated by the attempted coup on May 27--a coup suppressed by Cuban, not Angolan troops; the Cuban presence is increasingly resented by Angolans; and the defeat of the Katangan invaders has kindled fears of a Zairian military retaliation.

Even though Cuba's military involvement in Angola has been greater than either Moscow or Havana anticipated, it is unlikely that the limit of Cuba's support has been reached. If necessary, Castro probably would be willing to raise the

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number of combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000 if he was assured of continued Soviet support. If Havana were faced with a need for an expansion significantly beyond this number, the Cuban leadership might be forced to reassess its policy. Continued commitment would be unlikely without strong Soviet support and some signs of military progress against the insurgents. Without these ingredients, the Castro regime would probably begin to encourage a negotiated solution.

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SECRET**DISCUSSION**

1. Cuban support for the MPLA began in the early 1960s as an extension to Africa of the Castro regime's policy of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America. Havana's connection with the MPLA was never broken. For more than a decade, the Cubans have been sending arms, supplies, and advisers to MPLA bases in Africa, training MPLA representatives in Cuba, and giving the MPLA strong propaganda support. Until September 1975, however, the level of Cuban support had been low. The number of Cubans serving with the MPLA probably never exceeded a few hundred during this entire period and for most of the time probably was between 20 and 40 men.

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6. With the civil war essentially ended in early 1976, Cuban leaders began to make a number of public and private statements in April and May indicating that a gradual withdrawal of Cuban forces had started or would begin soon. Havana suppressed all details of the withdrawal, however, to keep its options open and avoid the restraint of a set schedule.

7. By September, however, the withdrawal hit a snag following the MPLA's inability to consolidate its gains in the face of a persistent insurgency in northern and southern Angola. From mid-1976 to early May 1977, the Cuban presence remained fairly static at a level estimated to be between 10,000 and 14,500 personnel. Although some military personnel were probably withdrawn during the latter half of 1976, most were apparently replaced by civilian technicians. There are probably 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban civilian technicians in Angola. Most of them, however, are believed to be reservists who have had military training and could be mobilized in place should circumstances require it.

8. In addition to combat troops, the Cuban government provided the Neto regime with a large number of military advisers tasked with organizing and training an air force, navy, militia, national police force, and a secret police force.

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9. Civilian advisers were sent to fill at least part of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era. These advisers include agricultural and livestock technicians, medical personnel, advisers to help restore sugar and coffee production, merchant marine and ports advisers, and teams of construction personnel to assist in the construction of public buildings, roads, airfields, and in the creation of a construction industry. Havana also sent three fleets of fishing boats to operate out of Angolan ports.

10. To help the MPLA broaden its political base, the Cubans sent experts in the formation of mass organizations and a vanguard party of political cadre. To complement the development of a political structure, advisers were also sent to develop a national education system. Some Angolans have apparently also been sent to Cuba for training.

11. This extensive presence became increasingly evident throughout the country and the image of Cubans as a new breed of colonialists has spread. The Cubans are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to take command of a given situation instead of acting as advisers. Angolan resentment also stems from the Cuban and Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the country and the fact that their presence has not brought any economic progress or resulted in the elimination of the insurgent threat.

The Situation Today

12. The Cuban government is clearly worried by the mounting problems it faces in Angola. What appeared last year as a relatively easy triumph for Cuban "internationalism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire. From the Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties are many and serious:

- Angola is experiencing deteriorating economic and social conditions;
- political instability was heightened by the uprising on May 27--the Cubans reportedly played a critical role in putting down the revolt;

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--there is increasing resentment among Angolans toward the Cuban presence; and

--the defeat of the Katangan invaders has kindled fears of a Zairian military retaliation.

13. So far, the Cuban response has been escalation. In mid-April and early May of this year the Cuban government began activating reservists for service in Africa.


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The Outlook

19. The fresh troops arriving from Cuba will probably enable Neto to survive the current crisis. Their presence probably will enable the Angolan government to bring the insurgency in Cabinda and northern Angola under control. There have been several reports indicating that an influx of Cuban troops into Cabinda has occurred in recent weeks. Some minor success against Jonas Savimbo's UNITA forces in the south also may be achieved. Over the long term, however, the Cuban/MPLA forces will probably be unable to effectively neutralize the insurgent threat without a much larger military force.

20. Even though Cuba's military involvement in Angola has been much greater than either Havana or Moscow anticipated, the rapid reinforcement indicates that the limit of Havana's support has not yet been reached. Despite the apparent addition of some 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, Cuba still faces the likelihood of a steadily worsening situation accompanied by pressures for additional military and technical support. With few options available, Castro may escalate further; he probably would be willing to raise the number of combat troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000. In the meantime Cuba will probably press some East European nations and the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African nations for greater moral support.

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21. The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on Cuban policymakers. The estimated 13,000 to 18,500 men now stationed in Angola represent only a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and an economic drain of about \$40 million to \$45 million annually--only 0.5 percent of total GNP--assuming average worker productivity and zero Cuban unemployment.

22. Virtually all other costs of the Cuban involvement are borne by the USSR. Moscow has replaced--probably on a grant basis--most of the military equipment which Havana has sent to Angola. Most of the equipment used in Angola, however, has been furnished directly by the Soviet Union. The

23. While the real economic cost is relatively small, Havana is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the Cuban populace's exaggerated perceptions of the cost of the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of Havana's overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the highly visible call-up of forces has coincided with a sharp economic downturn. The Cuban leaders have consistently and correctly maintained in all of their public announcements that the island's economic downturn is due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace apparently views the Angolan adventure as a major cause of Cuba's economic difficulties. Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular support rather than repression and does pay close attention to mass attitudes. Out of respect for public opinion, he has never told the Cuban people the full story of the intervention in Angola.

24. If Havana is faced with continued demands for a significant expansion of its forces, the Cuban leadership may find itself forced to reassess its policy. USSR's attitude toward a worsening Angolan situation will weigh heavily upon Cuba's actions. The Cuban presence

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there is dependent upon the continued full backing of Moscow. Cuba does not possess the military capabilities or the economic strength to go it alone. Even more important, Cuba itself is economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR. But their different roles in Angola may cause Moscow and Havana to develop different views on the most appropriate policy to follow. Thus, there is potential for friction--but not conflict--between the two.

25. The most likely Soviet reaction, however, will be to balk at providing financial and material support for a major expansion of the Cuban presence. At the same time, the USSR will probably refrain from attempting to dictate whether the Cubans should utilize their own resources to finance the increase. In the absence of strong Soviet pressure for a specific policy, the Cuban decision would be influenced primarily by Fidel Castro's views and secondarily by economic implications and political pressures within the Cuban leadership.

26. Castro's natural inclination would be to stick it out with President Neto. The Cuban leader probably senses that a defeat would seriously erode Cuban influence on the continent and undermine his campaign to become a major leader in the Third World. Furthermore, Castro probably realizes that an even more negative reaction would be provoked by a sudden switch of Cuba's support from Neto to another leader or faction. Finally, Castro is a confirmed revolutionary, convinced that supporting other revolutionaries--be they guerrilla fighters or legitimate governments--is a moral obligation.

27. Pressures for a policy shift can be expected to build within the Cuban leadership if problems continue to mount in Angola and the Cuban economy fails to reverse its decline. The individuals most likely to argue against further commitments are the members of the "old Communist" faction, a group whose origins lie in the pre-Castro Communist Party. The group's main spokesman is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a Political Bureau member who is regarded as the number three man in the Cuban hierarchy. Rodriguez is a key factor in foreign policy decisions and has significant influence upon Fidel. The position against involvement also would be argued by a less influential group consisting of technocrats and economists whose positions result from their responsibility for the health of the Cuban economy.

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
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28. The position of the military will be represented by Raul Castro. His recommendations will probably have the greatest influence on Fidel's decisions. The younger Castro probably would be more willing than other members of the hierarchy to commit additional military resources to Angola. Nevertheless, he is unlikely to continue the tactics of escalation if the military situation continues to worsen, especially if the Cuban forces suffer heavy casualties. Given that situation, Raul Castro would probably decide that a negotiated settlement was necessary. If Raul were to weigh in on the side of those arguing against increased support for Angola, Fidel most probably would agree that a policy change was in order.

29. Thus, the Cubans are still committed to the Neto regime. An additional 3,000 to 4,000 troops were sent to Angola in May and Raul Castro pledged continued support during his visit in June. The Castro regime would probably be willing to raise the number of troops by an additional 5,000 to 7,000 if necessary. A further commitment, however, would be unlikely without strong Soviet support and some military progress against the insurgents. Without those ingredients the Cuban leadership would probably be forced to seek a negotiated solution.

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PROGRAM~~Top Secret~~(b)(1)
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Intelligence
Memorandum*****Cuban Military Withdrawal from Angola: Cuban Intentions
and US Monitoring Capabilities***~~Top Secret~~

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
May 1976

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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



28 May 1976

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

SUBJECT: Cuban Military Withdrawal from Angola: Cuban Intentions and US Monitoring Capabilities

Key Points

- Recent statements by Cuban leaders about withdrawing troops from Angola are probably designed to combat mounting international criticism of Cuba's role there.
- Castro's message to Swedish Prime Minister Palme appears to be part of a concerted Cuban effort to gain maximum benefit from intended withdrawals of troops.
- The USSR almost certainly has encouraged Cuba to move in this direction.
- Despite the ambiguities in the Cuban statements, we believe that a phased reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola is likely. The current high-level and well-orchestrated campaign to gain favorable publicity for a withdrawal would not have been undertaken if Havana did not intend to comply at least partially.

* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

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- Castro is leaving himself considerable room for maneuver, however, and Cuban forces are not likely to withdraw at a rate which Castro believes would threaten the survivability of the Neto regime in Luanda.
- By focusing on military personnel, Cuba has left open the question of whether civilian personnel might not be sent to Angola to take up the slack. We believe that there will be, at least in part, an offsetting infusion of civilian personnel and that the total Cuban presence in Angola may not drop as much or as fast as Cuba is now implying.
- Recent US estimates of between 13,000 and 15,000 Cubans in Angola may have been low.
- These figures were computed without the benefit of comprehensive reporting of passenger data on Cuban air and sea movements to Angola.
- [redacted] these US estimates are low and there are as many as 20,000 Cubans in Angola.
- While this suggests there is considerable room for error in our estimates, we cannot confirm or refute the higher figure the Cubans have been using.
- This raises the possibility that Havana, by claiming to have more military personnel in

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Angola than is actually there, could withdraw a smaller number of them and still assert that it had substantially reduced its forces.

- A reduction at the rate of 200-250 troops per week -- or even somewhat higher -- probably would not cause serious problems for the Neto regime at least through the remainder of this year; this could still leave up to 10,000 Cuban troops in Angola.
- The intelligence community, [redacted] [redacted] should be able to determine whether a withdrawal is in fact occurring.*
- Our ability to provide precise and timely quantification of the numbers of Cubans withdrawn, however, is highly problematical.
- Under the best of circumstances there could be a considerable time lag in obtaining sufficient information to permit precision.
- The same problem of quantification would arise in attempting to determine the number of Cubans who might enter Angola.

* For a fuller discussion on this matter see Section II of the memorandum beginning at paragraph 15.

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- We strongly doubt that Cuba will be willing to enter into any arrangement that would make monitoring easier. Uncertainties concerning the specifics of the withdrawal would serve Castro's interests.

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~~TOP SECRET~~THE DETAILS**I. CUBAN INTENTIONS**Background

1. Fidel Castro's oral message, delivered by the Cuban Ambassador in Stockholm, to Swedish Prime Minister Palme appears to be part of a concerted diplomatic effort by the Cuban government to assume the initiative against criticism of its activities in southern Africa.

- In separate conversations with the British ambassador in Havana in late April, Castro and Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said that some Cuban forces had already been withdrawn from Angola, and that plans were being worked out with Angolan officials for a further reduction. Both Cuban leaders made it clear, however, that an unspecified number of troops would stay in Angola.
- Rodriguez reportedly told Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes in mid-April that Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola.
- The French embassy in Havana informed Paris, apparently in early May, that high-level Cuban officials, including First Deputy Prime Minister Raul Castro, claimed that Cuban troops will be withdrawn from Angola at the rate of 250 per week. No date was given for the beginning of the repatriation.
- When President Geisel visited London early in May, Brazilian officials also spoke of of a planned Cuban withdrawal of 250 troops a week, but they may have obtained the figure from the French.
- In a press conference on May 20 in Tokyo, Rodriguez sought to play down Cuban military activities abroad, and in meetings with

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Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa on May 18 and 19, he stated that Cuba has begun to withdraw its troops from Angola. Rodriguez also told Miyazawa that by the end of 1977 an advisory group of about 200 Cubans would remain.

- Speaking to foreign journalists in Havana on May 25, President Dorticos reportedly said that Cuba would withdraw 200 soldiers a week from Angola. He apparently provided no other details.
- In the oral message to Palme, Castro apparently claimed: that Cuban troops are being withdrawn at the rate of 200 per week, to go higher later this year; that by the end of 1976 half of the troops would have departed; and that in 1977 only a few would be left.
- On May 26 Rodriguez, in an interview in Mexico City, stated that Cuba would withdraw its troops from Angola when the Angolan government requested it.

Factors Affecting a Cuban Withdrawal from Angola

2. The Soviet Factor. The USSR has almost certainly encouraged Cuba to lower its profile in Angola and elsewhere in southern Africa as much as possible without jeopardizing Soviet-Cuban gains there. Rodriguez has been a frequent visitor to the Kremlin in recent weeks, and Raul Castro spent about 10 days there in early May. Diplomatic sources in Havana claim that Soviet leaders, including Gromyko and Suslov, advised Rodriguez that Cuba should go slow in promoting revolution in Africa and elsewhere in the third world. Gromyko is reported to have argued that national liberation movements should be backed only if they have a significant political or military base and that even then any support should be balanced against the requirements of detente.

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3. The Soviets have long argued that there is no contradiction or incompatibility between support for revolutionary struggles and detente, and that detente actually accelerates the liberation process. Nevertheless, they have become increasingly concerned over the negative impact of Cuban-Soviet activity in Angola and southern Africa on the USSR's relationship with Washington and on some of the black African states themselves. By strongly backing the MPLA in the Angolan war, Moscow furthered its revolutionary credentials and gained a new foothold in Africa. But Moscow probably will not want to provide highly visible support to other revolutionary movements in southern Africa before they are strong enough to be assured of success. Thus, it seems highly probable that Moscow advised restraint on the Castro regime in Africa, at least for the time being, in the hope that such a move would be interpreted by the West as evidence of Soviet-Cuban reasonableness and responsible international behavior.*

4. Another factor in Soviet eyes may have been a concern that Castro, emboldened by his success in Angola, would complicate Moscow's position in southern Africa by moving quickly to undertake provocative military moves beyond Angola's borders. The Soviets, however, almost certainly do not want Cuba to disengage completely from Angola. No matter what differences there may be between the Soviets and Cubans over Angola, Moscow realizes that Angola has pressing security and technical needs that can only be met by the continued presence of a sizable number of Cubans.

5. International Factors. Cuba's current diplomatic and propaganda campaign in regard to troop reductions probably is designed to reduce mounting international pressure on Cuba and criticism of

* The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that this memorandum overstates Moscow's concerns about the effect of Cuban activities in Angola on detente and its relationship with the West. Over the years, the Soviets have made clear that detente expressly excludes their activities in the third world.

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its role in Angola. Castro is concerned with the negative reactions to his African policies, and some months ago began to take steps to repair the damage Angola has caused to bilateral relations.

- Castro is aware that several black African leaders, particularly President Kaunda in Zambia, have expressed concern about direct Cuban military intervention elsewhere in southern Africa.
- He most likely is concerned that the OAS meeting in Chile in early June could be used as an occasion by certain hemisphere foreign ministers to censure Cuba.
- Similarly, he is anxious to head off possible criticism of Cuba at the conference of non-aligned nations in Sri Lanka in August, and he may hope that promises to begin withdrawing troops from Angola will lead the conference to express approval of Cuba's intervention in Angola.
- In public statements and private conversations with Japanese leaders in Tokyo last month, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez obviously hoped to allay concerns there about Cuban intentions. Japan is Cuba's second largest trading partner, and the Cubans already were worried, in the wake of Angola, about sharp declines in Japanese sugar purchases and the prohibition on imports of Cuban nickel.
- Castro also realizes that several West European governments that are among Cuba's major trading partners and aid donors are under increasing domestic pressure to reduce their ties with Castro because of Angola.
- In Sweden, Cuba's largest West European aid donor, the parliament on May 18 voted to reduce next year's aid proposals for Cuba by about 40 percent. The Palme government is

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apparently concerned about a political backlash and has asked Castro to postpone a planned trip there until after the national elections in September.

6. Angolan Factors. For its part, the Angolan government probably sees many reasons why a substantial force of Cuban troops should remain in Angola. Although large-scale fighting in Angola ended three months ago, the country is still in considerable disarray. The regime faces a serious law and order problem and is still being harassed by remnants of Savimbi's National Union in southern and central Angola and some continuing dissidence in the enclave of Cabinda. The Neto government clearly would not want large numbers of Cuban troops to depart until it has gained better control of the country. It also needs Cuban help in building a reliable Angolan security force, a project that is likely to take some time.

7. At the same time, however, there are indications that some reduction in the large Cuban presence in Angola might be welcomed. Popular resentment against the Cubans appears to have mounted in recent weeks, in large part because of the misbehavior and high-handedness of some of the Cuban troops. Moreover, some elements within the MPLA leadership, possibly Neto himself, may well have concluded that the large Cuban presence complicates Angola's efforts to pursue a policy of nonalignment and to establish economic ties to the West. The MPLA may therefore have decided that a phased reduction in the Cuban military presence would improve the Luanda regime's image without seriously weakening its internal security.

8. Internal Cuban Factors. Opposition among the Cuban populace to Cuba's commitment in Angola does not appear to be a factor underlying the current Cuban diplomatic campaign. Thus far, the Cuban media have not mentioned any of the demarches by Cuban leaders including Rodriguez' statements in Tokyo and Castro's message to Palme. A [redacted] source reported recently that the popular concern that surfaced in Cuba last fall has abated now that the Angolan operation has ended in victory, but there is

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still discontent among families with relatives in Angola. Some reservists refuse to go there when called to active duty, but they are largely offset by those who now volunteer.

The Nature of a Cuban Withdrawal

9. Differences and omissions in the various accounts of how Cuban troops will be withdrawn from Angola strongly suggest that Havana wants to commit itself specifically to as little as possible, while at the same time winning maximum propaganda mileage from its demarche. It would be unprecedented for Castro to pledge to carry out a policy on a matter vital to Cuban interests without leaving himself considerable room for maneuver. Castro does not want to appear to be giving in to US pressures or to be compromising his revolutionary credentials. Rodriguez's statement in Mexico City on May 26 may well reflect such a sensitivity.

10. Havana's investment of human energies and material resources has been greater in Angola than anywhere else outside of Cuba during the 17 years that Castro has been in power, and he is not likely to withdraw willingly from this commitment unless he is certain that the Neto government can manage with reduced Cuban military assistance. This theme, in contrast to Havana's diplomatic campaign emphasizing troop withdrawals, was reflected by [redacted] who claimed that a Cuban official [redacted] said in late April that Cuban troops would stay in Angola indefinitely and that Cuba will maintain a permanent force of 10,000 to 12,000 troops in Angola, and use that country as a staging area for projecting Cuban influence elsewhere in Africa.

11. A Phased Reduction Likely. Despite the ambiguities in the situation, we believe that a phased reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola is planned and may already be underway. The current high-level and well-orchestrated campaign to gain favorable publicity for a gradual withdrawal would

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not have been undertaken if Havana did not intend to comply at least partially. We have some fragmentary indications that Cuban troops are being repatriated. A rate of withdrawal consistent with those described by Cuban leaders is well within the capability of the Havana-Luanda airlift now being flown exclusively by Aeroflot IL-62s. The aircraft can carry 150 passengers on each trip, and they are now covering the route on a schedule of about two round-trips per week. We know that the Cubans have rotated some forces in Angola in recent months, and this makes it difficult to determine the net reduction, if any, that has occurred.

12. But even if the Cubans should withdraw troops from Angola at the rate of 200 per week or even higher, it would not necessarily mean that the total number of Cuban personnel in Angola would decline accordingly. A steady reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola probably would be offset at least in part by a stepped-up infusion of Cuban "civilian" advisers. The Cubans told the French for instance, that as they withdraw troops from Angola, they will increase technical assistance. Similarly, Castro told the British ambassador in Havana in late April of his intention to replace Cuban troops "progressively by civilians." Since a large number of the Cuban troops serving in Angola are reservists, Havana could easily juggle the figures by deactivating certain units while keeping the same personnel in Angola as civilians. In short, by focusing on Cuban military personnel, Castro is leaving himself considerable latitude to maintain a sizable Cuban presence in Angola -- a presence, moreover, which could carry out many of the tasks now done by Cuban military personnel.

13. The Question of Numbers. Recent US estimates of between 13,000 and 15,000 Cubans in Angola may have been low. They were computed without benefit of continuous, comprehensive reporting on how many moved by sea or on how many were aboard flights to Angola. The Cubans told the French that US estimates are low and that the figure for troops alone is 20,000. Castro also

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[redacted]
told the British ambassador that the total was higher than published US figures. [redacted]
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
We cannot confirm or refute the higher figures the Cubans have been using. All of the foregoing suggests that there is considerable room for error in our estimates of the number of Cubans in Angola, and this raises the possibility that Havana, by claiming to have more military personnel in Angola than is actually there, could withdraw a smaller number of them and still assert that it had reduced its forces by half. In any event, a phased reduction at the rate of 200-250 Cubans per week -- or even somewhat higher -- probably would not cause serious problems for the Neto regime at least through the remainder of this year; this could still leave up to 10,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

14. We believe that the Castro government is unlikely to cooperate in making reliable figures on Cuban troop reductions or its total military presence in Angola easy to acquire. Castro would not permit any monitoring of Cuban troops arriving back in Cuba, and he probably would strongly oppose surveillance by foreign governments on the ground in Angola. According to a Reuters correspondent, President Dorticós told foreign journalists in Havana on May 25 that the "US would make a mistake by demanding evidence of the withdrawal." Castro probably will be anxious for news of troop withdrawals to be disseminated widely in the international media, however, and probably believes that he can provide "evidence" of his good intentions by periodically leaking his own figures to Western governments.

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


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


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
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


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SATURDAY JUNE 12, 1976

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 138

USSR-Angola: Military Ties

The Soviets sought to use the visit to the USSR late last month of Angolan Prime Minister Nsamenang to establish close military ties with Angola.

Moscow may hope that it could eventually obtain use of Angolan ports and airfields as staging areas for long-range operations.

The Angolans may have been less cooperative than the Soviets had hoped. President Neto probably would be willing to permit normal port-call and bunkering rights, but might be reluctant to provide access if he thought it would result in permanent Soviet facilities in Angola.

The joint communique issued at the close of Nsamenang's week-long visit said that a wide-ranging, comprehensive series of agreements in the economic, commercial, cultural, and diplomatic fields had been concluded and that a declaration on the "fundamentals of friendly relations and cooperation" had been signed. Concerning military assistance, the communique noted only that an agreement had been reached on certain unspecified measures designed to strengthen Angola's "defense capabilities."

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

AFRICA

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Namibia: Insurgency Prospects

The South-West African People's Organization, Namibia's liberation movement, poses little threat at present to South African control of Namibia, but is growing in size and military potential as a guerrilla force operating from bases in neighboring black African states.

The military strength of SWAPO has reportedly increased over the past year from about 300 to an estimated 700 to 900 guerrillas. Some reports have put its strength as high as 2,000. An unknown number of guerrillas remain in Zambia, their sanctuary for the past decade; SWAPO now has additional personnel in Angola and some in training in Tanzania.

Their prospects have brightened considerably in the wake of the Angolan war. Until recently, the movement had never received significant military aid. There have been reports, however, that it may soon receive significant help from the USSR, Cuba, and Angola.

SWAPO has received modest shipments of Soviet small arms this year, and reportedly has an agreement with Cuba for guerrilla training and perhaps other aid. Such training will likely be conducted in Angola. The Angolan government is also believed to be supplying some weapons.

Infiltration

Angola's support is significant because it opens the entire northern Namibia border, 1,760 kilometers (1,100 miles) in length, to infiltration. In mid-April some 300 SWAPO troops were reportedly flown into Angola from training bases in Tanzania.

In the past, most cross-border activity was in the Caprivi Strip area opposite the Zambian border, but in recent months there have been a number of terrorist incidents in the Ovambo homeland, which borders on Angola.

SWAPO is suspected of murdering the chief minister of Ovamboland last August. Since late last year, there have been 17 killings, 21 abductions, and 10 armed robberies in Ovamboland, some of which were probably the result of SWAPO activity.

The South African government says there have been more than 60 separate incidents perpetrated by SWAPO guerrillas over the past year, resulting in 20 deaths, including eight soldiers. In response, South Africa last month set up a buffer zone one kilometer (six-tenths of a mile) deep along the Angolan border in Ovamboland. Pretoria has now extended this zone to cover the entire length of the border.


On infrequent occasions, guerrillas have penetrated the border zones and made their way farther south, where they have conducted terrorist attacks against whites. Recently two SWAPO activists arrested by the police were convicted of "terrorist activities" and given death sentences.

Factionalism

Like most other African liberation movements, SWAPO suffers from factionalism, which has grown more serious in recent months as a result of political infighting within the leadership.

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma was reportedly the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt in early April, and a number of dissident SWAPO leaders have been detained by Zambian authorities. As a result, the SWAPO leadership is in a state of disarray, which may be impairing its operational capabilities.

South Africa has traditionally maintained only a small military force—approximately 1,200 men—along the northern border to support the paramilitary police in border security operations. This has changed dramati-



caly over the past three years because of the South African military's ambitions to replace the police on the border, and as a consequence of the Angolan war.

In 1973, the army was given primary responsibility for border security. The following year a special military area known as the First Military Region was created encompassing a wide strip along the border.

Troop Strength

South African troop strength on the border is believed to have doubled or tripled during the second half of 1975 to support operations in Angola. At the height of South African involvement there, a force of up to 2,000 troops was actively involved in combat.

South African troops were withdrawn from Angola by the end of March, but an 8,000- to 10,000-man reserve division had been mobilized in South Africa and sent to the Namibia-Angola border area during the latter stages of the Angolan war. South African forces in the border area are now estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 troops.

After the Angolan war ended, South Africa divided its First Military Region. Region 1 is now believed to contain Ovamboland and Kavango, and Region 2 covers the Caprivi Strip. The military regions serve as administrative headquarters for the border zone.

Combat troops come under the command of the General Officer Commanding Task Force. The task force and Military Region 1 are headquartered at Rundu; Military Region 2 may be headquartered at Mpacha. The task force

commander is a recently promoted major general who commanded the South African expeditionary force in Angola.

A major logistics base to support South Africa's border operations is at Grootfontein.

The remainder of the territory comprises the South African Army's South-West Africa Command. This consists of a small 150-man headquarters unit in Windhoek chiefly responsible for reserve units. The enclave of Walvis Bay, which is technically a part of South Africa, has a 1,000-man garrison.

Over the past ten years, South Africa has constructed a number of outposts in the northern part of the territory in anticipation of border security problems. These bases have good all-weather air strips. Most have headquarters and communications buildings, and storage for fuel and other supplies. Some have aircraft revetments, bunkers, and other fixed defenses.

Known bases on or near the northern border are located at Rundu, Ruacana, Ondangwa, Mpacha, and Katima Mulilo. There are undoubtedly others.

Pretoria's Capabilities

South African forces now located in Namibia are capable of minimizing SWAPO activity and preventing that group from establishing an insurgency on Namibian soil. They cannot completely stop SWAPO, however, from infiltrating individuals, or small groups of insurgents, to carry out terrorist attacks.

Pretoria has recently designated the Ovamboland, Kavango, and Caprivi Strip areas as special security zones where the military will have police powers—in effect placing the areas under martial law. Civilians are being removed from the kilometer-wide corridor along the border, creating a no-man's land where intruders will be shot on sight.

These moves are designed to give the military all the authority it needs in an attempt to seal the border. South African forces on the border are capable of defeating any attack launched from Angola by local or Cuban forces.

SWAPO is likely to increase its attempts to carry out insurgency in Namibia. With more materiel and training support available, there will probably be an increase in SWAPO strength and capabilities.

An appreciable increase in the SWAPO guerrilla threat will be slow in coming, however. Divisions within the movement will continue to prevent effective utilization of its resources. South African forces on the northern border, together with the new security measures, will make SWAPO infiltration attempts more difficult.



South African troops on Namibia's northern border



The
National Intelligence
Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

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THURSDAY DECEMBER 18, 1975

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 294

Angola Groups Renew Efforts At Diplomacy

Seek Support In Africa Prior to OAU Summit

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola have redoubled their efforts to win support for their respective regimes prior to an Organization of African Unity summit meeting, almost certain to be postponed until next year.

National Union president Jonas Savimbi met with Zairian President Mobutu on Tuesday and then left for Uganda. Savimbi goes to Dakar tomorrow for talks with Senegalese President Senghor, who has been neutral on Angola and has called for an end to all foreign intervention there.

Savimbi then intends to visit Cameroon and Ivory Coast, whose leaders agree with Senghor.

Savimbi may seek an invitation to speak at the UN, where he would denounce Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola.

A top Popular Movement leader, Nascimento, left Luanda Tuesday night for a visit to Nigeria to cement the ties that have developed since Nigeria extended recognition to the Popular Movement's regime. Lagos recently decided to extend non-military aid to the Popular Movement.

The Nigerians apparently still believe, however, that a government of national unity can be formed in Angola, and Nascimento probably will try to convince them otherwise. The Popular Movement realizes that Nigeria has a major voice in African affairs.

The Nascimento delegation took along four South African soldiers captured in recent fighting in central Angola. The South Africans are to add weight to the Popular Movement's case that it is the victim of foreign aggression. Nigeria's recognition of the Popular Movement was prompted by South African support for the National Union.

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday 21 April 1978

NIDC 78/093C

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~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 21 April 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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Angola

~~NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

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[REDACTED]


Angola

[REDACTED] Angolar. President Neto returned to Luanda yesterday following a one-month, nonofficial visit to the USSR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet press coverage on the eve of Neto's departure was bland but underscored Soviet support for Angola and the liberation struggle in southern Africa. While in Moscow, Neto met with President Brezhnev and other senior Soviet officials, probably to discuss military and economic assistance.

[REDACTED]



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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
2 August 1979

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CO NID 79-1801X

2 August 1979

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
~~Top Secret~~**Contents**

Angola: Initial Delivery of SA-3 Missiles . . . 12

The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section, will often contain materials that update other articles in the *Daily*.

~~Top Secret~~

2 August 1979

~~Top Secret~~
[REDACTED]**ANGOLA: Initial Delivery of SA-3 Missiles**

The USSR made its first delivery of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles to Angola late last month. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] additional equipment also may have been delivered. Angola will use the medium-altitude SA-3 missiles to strengthen its air defenses--which until now have been comprised of artillery, machineguns, and low-altitude SA-7 surface-to-air missiles--against South Africa. Cuban personnel probably will be responsible for manning the installations, at least until Angolans can be trained to take over the operation. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

2 August 1979



Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

CTA/CPAS...NID-88-482IX...

National Intelligence Daily

**Wednesday
1 June 1988**


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CPAS NID 88-127 IX

1 June 1988

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~~Top Secret~~**Contents****Special Analysis****Angola-South Africa: Cuba Seeking Air Superiority**

14


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1 June 1988

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Angola and Namibia Air Defense, Late May 1988

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1 June 1988

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Special Analysis

ANGOLA-
SOUTH AFRICA:

Cuba Seeking Air Superiority

Cuba's substantial augmentation of its air and air defenses forces in southern Angola has allowed it to aggressively challenge South Africa to a potential air war. Pretoria has made adjustments, but it fears that its options have narrowed and that Cuba has the advantage.

Havana has covered the movement of its ground forces into southern Angola with an equivalent buildup of air defenses. Since early March, Cuban commanders have moved radars, missile launchers, and antiaircraft artillery south to protect their ground troops and have consolidated fighter aircraft strength at regional airbases. Some of the air defense units—a regiment of mobile SA-6s, enough troops for a regiment of Soviet-delivered SA-3s, and additional radars—are new to Angola, having been moved from Cuba as part of the recent augmentation.

the Cubans are rushing to complete a major airbase at Cahama that will extend the reach of Cuban aircraft. The Soviets have recently delivered 12 MIG-23 fighter aircraft to improve Cuban air strength and to replace recent losses.

South Africa's Response

South Africa, is concerned about its numerical weakness, some technical shortcomings, and what it sees as growing Cuban aggressiveness. Pretoria is well aware that its losses, unlike those for Cuba and Angola, are difficult to replace; it almost certainly is developing new tactics.

continued

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1 June 1988

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Pretoria probably is most concerned with the weaknesses of its air defenses in northern Namibia as well as increased risks to its aircraft operating over southern Angola. Limited radar coverage in Namibia provides little early warning, and small numbers of air defense weapons allow only the most important facilities to be protected.

[redacted] Pretoria—after losing a Mirage in air combat late last year—was concerned that its older air-to-air missiles were less effective than Cuban missiles in aerial engagements.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Outlook

The main strength of the Cuban air and air defense force lies in its size, redundancy, and breadth of coverage. Multiple layers of aircraft, missile, and artillery weapons defend virtually all potential Cuban and Angolan military targets. Moreover, Cuban air cover in southern Angola or northern Namibia will be greatly expanded when the airfield at Cahama is finished, possibly by late this month. From Cahama, the Cubans will have the range to threaten previously unchallenged Namibian airspace.

Nevertheless, the Cuban and Angolan air defense network has major weaknesses. Control of the extensive system traditionally has been a problem and was a major factor in the Cuban shootdown of its own aircraft in April. Moreover, Angolan air defense troops are not uniformly well trained, and the Cubans have yet to be seriously tested in combat.

South African military commanders rely on the experience, training, and skills of its pilots and airmen to counter the superior numbers South Africa faces. There is no indication Pretoria will back away from an engagement with a numerically superior force, but it will be chary of participating in a war of attrition. To husband its resources, South Africa will limit its attacks to times and places where it can enjoy an advantage. A major miscalculation, however, may jeopardize South Africa's heretofore unchallenged freedom of operations in the region.

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1 June 1988



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Monday
28 March 1988

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



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

28 March 1988

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~~Top Secret~~**Contents****Special Analyses****Cuba-Angola: Implications of Operations in Southwest** 12~~Top Secret~~

28 March 1988

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~~Top Secret~~

25 March 1988

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~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****CUBA-ANGOLA:****Implications of Operations in Southwest**

Cuban armored, artillery, and air defense units have made their deepest penetration into southwestern Angola, increasing the likelihood of a direct conflict with South African forces. Havana and Luanda have several options for military operations in the area, but the current movements shift their forces closer to the border to threaten South African military operations in southern Angola.

Cuban and Angolan Government forces have moved to Humbe—less than 60 miles (some 90 kilometers) north of the Namibian border.

Cuban Objectives Unclear

Cuban forces have in the past confined their operations to areas north of the 16th parallel. Havana and Luanda probably have concluded recently that their lines must be pushed closer to the Namibian border if they are to curtail South African military operations in southern Angola and keep open SWAPO infiltration lines into northern Namibia. A stronger Cuban presence in the region might also encourage Angolan Government forces to move forward to clear the border area.

The Cuban deployment—although it avoids conventional South African units to the east—also may presage a more active Cuban role in Angola in which Cuban as well as Angolan forces will seek out and engage South African units in Angola. This would be a marked departure from Havana's longtime policy of confining its forces to the defense of installations in the safer rear areas.

For now, Havana may be reluctant to provoke a major escalation of the conflict. Fidel Castro might risk an incursion into Namibia, however, if he believed that it would bring a quick military success and strengthen his hand in negotiations on a Cuban force withdrawal from Angola.

Meanwhile, Cubans are now near the maximum range of air cover from Cuban aircraft based at Matala, and the push into the southwest may slow unless the Cubans can occupy and improve airfields closer to the Namibian border.

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~~Top Secret~~**South African Reaction**

Pretoria almost certainly regards the deployments as a threat to its security interests in the region. The South Africans have long operated almost at will in southern Cuanene Province, trying to intercept SWAPO guerrillas before they can infiltrate northern Namibia. [redacted]

Pretoria has reacted cautiously so far. In part because the deployments represent an unprecedented military challenge. South Africa is likely to respond militarily if Cuban and Angolan forces attempt to move farther south toward Ondjiva. [redacted]

[redacted] Pretoria is likely to rely at least initially on its airpower or move long-range artillery into the area. [redacted]

Unsubstantiated Angolan press reports claim South African aircraft recently conducted several ground attack missions in the area. Air and artillery strikes may temporarily disrupt supply lines, but they are unlikely to dislodge the Cuban and Angolan forces. Eventually, Pretoria probably will be compelled to deploy to the region conventional units, including armor. [redacted]

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28 March 1988

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TOT: 302234Z DEC 80

DIRECTOR 838407

~~SECRET~~BRIEF 302234Z DIRECTOR 838407
TO: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF.

(NOFORN IN SLANTS).

LATIN AMERICA BRIEF CO LAB 80-251 FOR 30 DEC 1980.

FROM: NFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

THERE WAS NO LAB 80-250 FOR 29 DEC 80.

CUBA: INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA.

THE FOLLOWING ON CUBA: INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA
IS TAKEN FROM THE 19 DECEMBER LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 80-029.

HAVANA CONTINUES TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE
IN AFRICA DESPITE SOME OCCASIONAL SETBACKS. PRESIDENT
CASTRO'S RELATIVE SUCCESS IS LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS
ABILITY TO ANTICIPATE THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND TO RESPOND QUICKLY WITH ASSISTANCE. CUBA'S SERIOUS
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAVE NOT PREVENTED MANY SUB-SAHARAN
COUNTRIES FROM VIEWING IT AS AN ATTRACTIVE DEVELOPMENT

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TOT: 302234Z DEC 80

DIRECTOR 838407

MODEL. HAVANA'S ENTREE IS ALSO AIDED BY ITS SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE REGION, AND BY ITS LONG-STANDING OPPOSITION TO COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID. [] []

HAVING ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SEVEN AFRICAN STATES DURING THE PAST 20 MONTHS, HAVANA NOW HAS TIES WITH 37 OUT OF THE 46 SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION TO ASSESSING LOCAL CONDITIONS, THIS DIPLOMATIC NETWORK IDENTIFIES AND CULTIVATES GROUPS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CASTRO REGIME--WHETHER THEY ARE PART OF OR OPPOSED TO THE RULING GOVERNMENT. MOREOVER, HAVANA HOPES TO BUTTRESS ITS CLAIMS TO BE NONALIGNED BY ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF DIFFERING IDEOLOGIES. []

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

IN THE EARLY 1970S, THE CASTRO REGIME SOUGHT TO LESSEN ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION BY ATTEMPTING TO CULTIVATE FRIENDS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT WITH OFFERS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IN ANGOLA, HAVANA SUPPORTED AGOSTINHO NETO'S GUERRILLA FORCES WITH ARMS AND TRAINING; AFTER THE PORTUGUESE LEFT IN 1975, THE CUBANS SENT MILITARY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST NETO'S FORCES IN ABSORBING LARGE AMOUNTS OF SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONRY. THIS EFFORT QUICKLY TURNED INTO A MAJOR COMMITMENT THAT AT ITS PEAK INVOLVED SOME 36,000 CUBAN TROOPS. IN 1977, CASTRO SENT SOME 10 TO 13,000 TROOPS TO HELP DEFEND THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN ETHIOPIA. []

SINCE THE ETHIOPIAN INVOLVEMENT, CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN AFRICA HAVE REMAINED FAIRLY STABLE AT ABOUT 30,000, BUT THE CIVILIAN PRESENCE HAS CONTINUED TO GROW. OVER THE LAST YEAR, THREE ADDITIONAL STATES ACCEPTED CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS FOR THE FIRST TIME, RAISING THE TOTAL TO ABOUT 7,000 PERSONNEL IN 17 COUNTRIES. [] []

NEW PROGRAMS

FOLLOWING THE ONE-WEEK VISIT TO HAVANA THIS FALL OF PAULO MUWANGA, CHAIRMAN OF UGANDA'S RULING MILITARY

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TOT: 302234Z DEC 80

DIRECTOR 838407

COMMISSION. CUBA AND UGANDA SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. CUBA SENT 20 HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL SPECIALISTS TO UGANDA AND GRANTED 200 SCHOLARSHIPS TO UGANDAN STUDENTS FOR STUDY ON THE ISLE OF YOUTH, WHERE THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN CHILDREN ALREADY ARE ENROLLED IN WORK-STUDY PROGRAMS. ALTHOUGH MUWANGA'S VISIT ALSO SPARKED RUMORS OF THE IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF CUBAN TROOPS, NONE ARE YET KNOWN TO HAVE ARRIVED. THE EXPECTED REDUCTION OR REMOVAL OF TANZANIAN FORCES FOLLOWING LAST WEEK'S NATIONAL ELECTION, HOWEVER, COULD RESULT IN THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS. [REDACTED]

HAVANA EXPECTS TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN THE SEYCHELLES SHORTLY. A SMALL NUMBER OF SEYCHELLOIS STUDENTS ALREADY ARE ATTENDING SCHOOL IN CUBA, AND VICTORIA HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT A FEW CUBAN DOCTORS. RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC PRESSURE, PRESIDENT RENE THUS FAR HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT CUBAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL. [REDACTED]

IN RECENT MONTHS, CUBA HAS ATTEMPTED TO SHORE UP RELATIONS WITH SOME OF ITS ESTABLISHED AFRICAN ALLIES BY PLAYING HOST TO A NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING DELEGATIONS AND BY SIGNING SEVERAL PROTOCOLS INCREASING BILATERAL COOPERATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MADAGASCAR (MALAGASY REPUBLIC), BENIN, AND SIERRA LEONE RECENTLY VISITED CUBA, AS DID MEMBERS OF ETHIOPIA'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OF THE CUBA - CAPE VERDE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE. IN AUGUST, BURUNDI SIGNED A PROTOCOL FOR ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, AND TWO MONTHS LATER GUINEA-BISSAU SIGNED A SIMILAR AGREEMENT. THE ACCESSION OF JOAO BERNARDO VIEIRA TO THE PRESIDENCY IN GUINEA-BISSAU MAY LEAD TO EVEN CLOSER TIES, AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN 1978, VIEIRA RECEIVED ADVANCED MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA. [REDACTED]

OTHER SUCCESSES

HAVANA'S WELL-KNOWN SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAS AIDED CUBAN EXPANSIONISM. CASTRO'S LONGTIME BACKING OF JOSHUA NKOMO'S FACTION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN ZIM-

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GABWE AND HIS LIMITED AID TO ROBERT MUGABE WERE MAJOR FACTORS IN GAINING AN EMBASSY IN SALISBURY. HAVANA IS ALSO ATTRACTIVE TO MANY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION BECAUSE OF ITS STAUNCH OPPOSITION TO COLONIALISM AND APARTHEID. [REDACTED]

MOREOVER, THE CASTRO REGIME HAS SOUGHT DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH GOVERNMENTS OF OPPOSING IDEOLOGIES, IN PART TO ESTABLISH ITS NONALIGNED CREDENTIALS. RELATIONS RECENTLY WERE ESTABLISHED WITH WESTERN-ORIENTED COUNTRIES SUCH AS TOGO, RWANDA, AND ZAIRE. IN ZAIRE, HOWEVER, HAVANA PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT A DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE WILL AFFORD GREATER ACCESS TO REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IF THE CURRENT REGIME IS OVERTHROWN. [REDACTED]

TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIETS, LIBYANS, AND ETHIOPIANS, HAVANA HAS BEEN MANEUVERING TO GAIN GREATER INFLUENCE IN LIBERIA--SO FAR WITH ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS. THE CUBANS SHOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO OFFER ASSISTANCE AS SOON AS THEIR CHANCERY IS OPENED IN MONROVIA. [REDACTED]

RECENT SETBACKS

CUBAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS NOT KEPT SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS SIERRA LEONE AND GUINEA, FROM DRIFTING AWAY. SIERRA LEONE, A LONGTIME AID RECIPIENT, EARLIER THIS YEAR EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION OVER THE COSTS OF MAINTAINING A MISSION IN HAVANA AND THREATENED TO CLOSE ITS EMBASSY THERE. THE RELATIONSHIP DETERIORATED FURTHER AFTER FREETOWN REFUSED TO GRANT HAVANA OBSERVER STATUS AT THE ANNUAL SUMMIT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. WHEN SIERRA LEONE'S FOREIGN MINISTER WENT AHEAD WITH HIS SCHEDULED TRIP TO CUBA, HOWEVER, CASTRO USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROPOSE A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT TO DEFRAY DIPLOMATIC EXPENSES--AN OFFER THAT APPARENTLY HAS PROMPTED FREETOWN TO RECONSIDER CLOSING ITS MISSION. [REDACTED]

THE DESIRE OF GUINEA'S SEKOU TOURE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND HIS SEEMING TURN TOWARD THE WEST HAVE CREATED OTHER PROBLEMS. TOURE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS CAMPAIGNED AGGRESSIVELY TO GET THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

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TO CONDEMN THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, A MOVE THAT HAVANA HAS HAD TO RESIST. ALTHOUGH TOURE HAS MODERATED HIS WESTERN TILT, HIS DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE NAM COULD GENERATE FURTHER FRICTIONS WITH HAVANA. [REDACTED]

GABON, NEVER A CLOSE ALLY OF THE CASTRO REGIME, BROKE RELATIONS LAST AUGUST, PARTLY BECAUSE CUBAN DIPLOMATS WERE IN CONTACT WITH GABONESE STUDENTS. LIBREVILLE ALSO VIEWS THE SIZABLE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AS POTENTIALLY THREATENING. HAVANA IS CONCERNED THAT LIBREVILLE'S MOVE COULD PROVOKE OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS TO CHARGE CUBA WITH MEDDLING IN THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OR ENCOURAGE THEM TO PROTEST THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA. [REDACTED]

THE CUBANS ALSO SUFFERED A MINOR SETBACK IN SUDAN RECENTLY, WHEN ONE OF THEIR DIPLOMATS ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN KHARTOUM WITH THE ANNOUNCED INTENTION OF OPENING AN EMBASSY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THEY DECLARED HIM PERSONA NON GRATA, AND HE LEFT SHORTLY THEREAFTER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

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The National Intelligence Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

THURSDAY 25 MAY 1978

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 122

TOP SECRET

Cuba: Intentions in Africa

The Cuban Government believes that the situation in Africa and internationally favors continuation of Cuban assistance to selected African countries and perhaps even an increase in military and political aid.

is that the US is so "psychologically paralyzed" by its experiences in Vietnam that it would not intervene militarily in Africa even if it wanted to because the US public would not support such a policy.

We believe that Cuba has indeed concluded that US hands are tied and that the US cannot take meaningful action to blunt Cuban activities in Africa. Fear of possible US-directed activities to counter Cuban aims there clearly has not seriously

constrained Havana during the past six months.

Recent public statements by Cuban officials and articles in the media have been tough-worded. Foreign Minister Malmerca, for example, told the opening session of the nonaligned movement's coordinating bureau in Havana on 18 May that Cuba places the "highest priority on independence for Namibia and Zimbabwe," and that the nonaligned countries must give their "unrestricted support" to the Patriotic Front. He stressed that the nonaligned countries "have the obligation" to offer "all the assistance" Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana may need because those countries face a constant threat of military attack from South Africa and Rhodesia.

Portugal-Angola: Efforts to Improve Relations

Angolan President Neto and Portuguese President Eanes have renewed their efforts to improve bilateral relations.

the Neto regime wants Western countries to play a larger role in Angola, possibly in the hopes that this might lead to some reduction in the Cuban presence in Angola and eventually to a reassessment by the West of its support for Jonas Savimbi's insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Although the Portuguese con-

cluded earlier this year that Angola was hopelessly under the control of Cuba and the USSR, they now believe Neto sincerely wants closer ties with the West, and Portugal in particular. Preliminary contacts have produced no concrete results, but strong mutual interests augur for a continued dialogue.

(See Portugal-Angola...Page 2)

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Portugal-
Angola. . .

From Page 1

Angolan officials are quick to point out that they are not seeking Portuguese to replace the Cubans, but rather to complement them. Neto, like most Angolans, would probably prefer a reduction in the number of Cubans, but he recognizes the essential contribution Cubans are making to military security, public health, education, and agriculture in his country.

The Cubans, and to a lesser degree the Soviets, probably would not oppose the Angolans improving relations with the West as long as the Angolan party officials maintained firm control over all local Western activities. Neto appears to be under increasing pressure, however, from militant pro-Soviets in the party to abandon the Western "option," and this could impede implementation of such plans.

Many Portuguese—especially former colonists—are anxious to establish themselves in Angola. Increasing—though still relatively small—numbers of Portuguese are negotiating their own arrangements with the Angolan Government in the absence of a government-level agreement. Most appear to be clustered in Luanda and involved in commercial activities.

Eanes apparently believes expanded ties must build on these existing contacts and that Neto's dependence on the Cubans and Soviets now rules out any dramatic Angolan turn to the West. Neto may, however, find it possible to react positively to discreet Western proposals for economic and technical arrangements if they avoid political issues and appearances of a Western conspiracy.

The apparent receptiveness of Neto and other Angolan leaders to Eanes' suggestion that Portugal play an intermediary role between Angola and the West injects a note of urgency into the reconciliation effort from the Portuguese point of view. Eanes questions how long Neto will remain in power and expects Neto's successor to be more pro-Soviet. Unhappy with the Portuguese Government's performance in Angolan matters, Eanes has decided to take a personal lead.

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BRIEF 190216Z DIRECTOR 174485
TO: ROUTINE MEA BRIEF.

MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF CO MEAB 82-053 FOR 18 MARCH 1982

FROM: DUI/OFFICE/CURRENT PUBLICATIONS ANALYTICAL STAFF

CONTENTS:

CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA//END OF YEAR REPORT

1. THE FOLLOWING ON CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA: END-OF-YEAR
REPORT WAS TAKEN FROM THE AFRICAN REVIEW OF 13 JAN 1982 (ALA 82-
801):////AT THE END OF 1981, SOME 70,000 CUBANS WERE SERVING OVERSEAS
IN 28 COUNTRIES, MAINLY IN AFRICA. THE NUMBER OF CUBANS OVERSEAS
HAS DOUBLED SINCE 1976 AND WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AS HAVANA SEEKS
NEW MARKETS FOR ITS LABOR FORCE TO EARN HARD CURRENCY.////THE ACCOMPANYING TABLE IS A COMPILATION OF CUBA'S MILITARY
AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA, EXCLUDING DIPLOMATS. THE FIGURES
REFLECTING REPORTING AVAILABLE AS OF 10 DECEMBER 1981, SHOULD BE~~SECRET~~

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VIEWED AS ESTIMATES.

GENERAL TRENDS

//CUBA IN 1981 CONTINUED ITS STEADY GROWTH IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES BY SIGNING TECHNICAL OR ECONOMIC COOPERATION/ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS WITH BURUNDI, MOZAMBIQUE, ALGERIA, ETHIOPIA, GUINEA, AND ANGOLA. SEVERAL OF THESE AGREEMENTS CALL FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS PLANNED AND BUILT BY CUBAN LABOR. ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF ALL CIVILIAN WORKERS ABROAD ARE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

ACTIVITIES.//

//THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA IN AUGUST REPORTEDLY CAUSED HAVANA TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE THERE (SEE TABLE). WE NOW BELIEVE THAT ABOUT 18,000 TO 19,000 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE IN ANGOLA WHEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION BEGAN IN LATE AUGUST. AT THAT TIME INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES RANGED FROM 15,000 TO 21,000. AT LEAST 2,000 AND POSSIBLY AS MANY AS 6,000 ADDITIONAL CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL PROBABLY WERE SENT TO ANGOLA FOLLOWING THE INCURSION, RAISING OUR PRESENT ESTIMATE TO 20,000 TO 25,000. THE RANGE RESULTS MOSTLY FROM UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER TROOP ROTATION CONTINUED DURING THIS PERIOD, AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION PENDING ANALYSIS OF CONTINUING MOVEMENTS OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL BETWEEN CUBA AND ANGOLA.//

//THE NUMBER OF CUBAN CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA PROBABLY REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT AT 5,000 TO 6,500 DURING 1981. ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS SIGNED BY HAVANA AND LUANDA IN OCTOBER CALL FOR EXPANSION OF COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD AS WELL AS THE TRAINING OF ANGOLAN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. WORK ON 2,000 DWELLINGS IN THE INTERIOR WAS SCHEDULED TO START IN OCTOBER. A JOINT CUBAN-ANGOLAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, TECHNO-SIRON ENTERPRISES, RECENTLY BEGAN OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, CUBAN-ANGOLAN RELATIONS REMAIN UNDER SOME STRAIN, MAINLY BECAUSE THE CUBANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO STEN ANGOLA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE AND HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES OR ANGOLAN INSURGENTS.//

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//THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA REMAINED STABLE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, BUT WE EXPECT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL THIS YEAR. LIBYA REPORTEDLY PLANS A LARGE GRANT TO ETHIOPIA. CHAIRMAN MENGISTU WANTS TO USE THE MONEY TO FINANCE CUBAN AID PROJECTS, WHICH HAS GIVEN CONSIDERABLE IMPETUS TO HAVANA TO REACH NEW COOPERATION AGREEMENTS. UNTIL RECENTLY, MOST OF CUBA'S CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN ETHIOPIA WERE DONATED ON THE DIRECT ORDERS OF FIDEL CASTRO. ALTHOUGH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN JUNE, CUBA DID NOT REPLY TO THE ETHIOPIAN REQUESTS UNTIL NEWS OF THE LIBYAN GRANT REACHED HAVANA. IN LATE SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, A LARGE CUBAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION REPORTEDLY WAS SENT TO ETHIOPIA TO PLAN FOR LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS. CUBA REPORTEDLY WILL HELP ETHIOPIA DEVELOP ITS SUGAR INDUSTRY, SEND ADVISERS TO THE AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK SECTORS, AND MAY CONSTRUCT SOME HOUSING.//

//CUBAN CIVILIAN COOPERATION WITH MOZAMBIQUE INCREASED DURING THE YEAR. TO HANDLE THIS GROWTH, THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION (CECE--THE AGENCY IN CUBA THAT ADMINISTERS CUBAN ASSISTANCE ABROAD) OPENED AN OFFICE IN MAPUTO. CUBANS REPORTEDLY SERVE AS ADVISERS IN ALL MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND INSTITUTIONS. CUBA ALSO PROVIDES TEACHERS, CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL, FISHING EXPERTS, AND PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS AND ADMINISTRATORS. CUBA ALSO MAY HAVE INCREASED ITS MILITARY PRESENCE SINCE JUNE, PROBABLY SENDING ADVISERS TO THE MOZAMBIKAN SECURITY FORCES TO HELP SUPPRESS THE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE INSURGENT FORCE OPERATING IN THE COUNTRY. CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY ALSO BE HELPING SECURE BORDER AREAS AGAINST INFILTRATION.//

//CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH MADAGASCAR DETERIORATED DURING THE YEAR; THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR HAS LEFT AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY CUBAN PERSONNEL REMAIN. NIGERIA RECENTLY EXPERIENCED FINANCIAL TROUBLE WITH A PROJECT ON SUGAR PRODUCTION THAT INVOLVED CUBA AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE CUBANS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN WITHDRAWN WHILE NIGERIA LOOKS FOR NEW PARTNERS.//

//CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA

COUNTRY	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	COMMENT	TOTAL

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ANGOLA	20,000- 25,000	5,000- 6,500	25,000- 31,500
BENIN	20	30	30
BURUNDI		20	MEDICAL & TECHNICIANS 20
CAPE VERDE	12	10	22
CONGO (1)	500	100- 200	500- 700
ETHIOPIA	11,000- 13,000	500- 800	11,000- 13,000
GUINEA (2)		200- 225	CONSTRUCTION: 200- MEDICAL 225
GUINEA-BISSAU	50	100- 150	150- 200
MALI		6	MEDICAL TEAM 6
MOZAMBIQUE	?	500- 700	500- 700
SAO TOME	30-50	200	MEDICS: 230- AGRICULTURE 250
SEYCHELLES (2)		6-14	SECURITY ADVISERS, 6-14 MEDICS
TANZANIA		80	SUGAR TECHS. 80
UGANDA (2)	2-3	10	HEALTH AND 12-13 AGRICULTURE

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
TOTAL	31,014-	0,902-	38,576-
	28,635	0,945	47,580

(1) EXCLUDES MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES IN THE
ANGULAN ENCLAVE OF CABINDA. THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE
ESTIMATE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA.//

(2) WE EXPECT THE CUBAN CIVILIAN PRESENCE TO INCREASE.//

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CIA/RP/77-10193

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27 July 1977

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**MICROFILMED**

Activities of the Cuban Military in Angola

From March 1976 to June 1977


KEY POINTS

Cuban combat forces in Angola during the past 15 months have been heavily involved in joint operations with government forces in attempting to extend the regime's authority throughout the countryside.

-Operations undertaken include the attempted opening of the Benguela Railroad and the protection of important elements of the Angolan economy, such as the oil industry in Cabinda and the coffee-producing regions of the north.

-Despite these efforts, the overall security situation has deteriorated throughout major portions of the countryside.

The Cubans have not succeeded in converting the Angolan military forces (FAPLA) from an insurgent force to a conventional military force, and they are not optimistic that they will be able to do so in the near future.

This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within CIA. Questions and comments may be addressed to 

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SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:	
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AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON	
December 31, 1985	
(unless impossible, insert date or event)	

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-The Cubans are disillusioned with the capabilities and potential of FAPLA.

-Growing security requirements are hampering Cuban participation in the training of FAPLA.

Havana's broad-based Angolan involvement has tested a wide range of Cuban military capabilities..


-A large number of regular and reserve personnel have gained valuable combat experience in conventional and counterinsurgency operations.

-Cuba's civil airline and its expanding merchant fleet have contributed heavily to the military effort by carrying out efficient transatlantic logistics operations.

The Cuban military presence has recently been augmented by upwards of 5,000 men (raising the total Cuban presence in Angola to as many as 18,500), and it may well increase even further given the expansion of anti-government insurgency and the continuing ineffectiveness of FAPLA.

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Introduction

Since early 1976, when UNITA and FNLA military forces ceased to pose a conventional military threat to the MPLA and the South African expeditionary group withdrew from southern Angola, Cuba has maintained a large military presence in Angola. Cuba's armed forces have performed a wide range of duties in the region, highlighted by a primary role in security activities and a major effort to create an effective Angolan army. On a lesser scale, the Cubans have been involved in creating an embryonic Angolan airforce and navy. The greater than anticipated responsibility for internal security stems largely from the ineptitude and corruption within the Angolan military and police services.

There are a number of additional aspects related to the Cuban presence in Angola. Cubans are providing training, limited amounts of hardware, and logistic support to SWAPO insurgents operating from southern Angola into neighboring Namibia. Similar aid is reportedly being channeled to ZAPU. Moreover, despite official Cuban denials, the Cubans were involved in the preparations for the Kantangan attack against Zaire in March 1977. In addition, Cuban military personnel are gaining combat experience in both conventional and counterinsurgency operations.

FAPLA/Cuban Counterinsurgency Efforts Against UNITA

The initial FAPLA/Cuban drives against UNITA in May and June 1976 were aimed at extending their control beyond the urban centers of Bie (formerly Silva Porto), Huambo, and Luena (formerly Luso), located along the Benguela railroad, and preventing UNITA from disrupting traffic on this vital transport link. A joint FAPLA/Cuban force of 5,000 to 6,000 men using T-34 tanks and armored cars reportedly participated in these efforts. Close air support was afforded by Soviet-supplied aircraft piloted by Cubans. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MIG-21 jet fighter aircraft, including 7 MIG-21s (11shbed), 3 Fresco, and 1 Midget, were present at Huambo Airfield. This was the first time that these aircraft had been [REDACTED] beyond their home base at Luanda, where they were [REDACTED] in late February-early March 1976.

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The use of aircraft became increasingly important for counterinsurgency operations in southern Angola. Fighter aircraft from regional airbases such as Luena and Menongue (formerly Serpa Pinto) bombed and strafed suspected enemy concentrations or positions prior to ground force attacks. The persistent ambushing of government convoys and the lack of adequate surface transportation routes increased the importance of air operations ferrying FAPLA/Cuban troops and resupplying isolated garrisons. As a result, Soviet AN-12 (Cub) transports were dispatched from the USSR to Angola to help move supplies from Luanda to airfields in the interior. This was in addition to the use of AN-26s which were already in Angola's air inventory.

By July the focus of counterinsurgency operations had shifted farther south with the emphasis on attempting to clear UNITA from Cunene Province. In August a second offensive, dubbed "Operation Kakauenga," was initiated farther eastward in Cuando-Cubango Province. These operations continued into the fall, with the additional objective of establishing base camps and operational zones for SWAPO insurgents along the Namibian border.

Despite the Cuban-FAPLA actions, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces demonstrated a continuing ability to disrupt the Benguela Railroad and to counter the FAPLA/Cuban effort to pacify those areas that have traditionally supported his movement. From late September through November, UNITA actually went on the offensive and forced government and Cuban troops to evacuate eastern Moxico Province, including a withdrawal from the garrison at Lumbala (formerly Gago Coutinho) to Luena. N'Giva (formerly Pereira de Eca) was attacked and reportedly held for three days in mid-November by UNITA before being recaptured by FAPLA/Cuban forces following intense artillery shelling and air raids.

Cuban and government efforts to open and secure the Benguela Railroad reportedly have been largely ineffective, and portions of the 600-mile line remains inoperable. Furthermore, major garrisons such as Huambo and Luena have come under frequent rocket attacks by UNITA. Several non-UNITA sources have echoed Savimbi's claim that the joint FAPLA/Cuban offensives have been ineffectual. [redacted] who spent six months with UNITA states that most of Angola along the Benguela Railroad and to the south, with the exception of the major towns,

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is under defacto UNITA control. He maintains that UNITA's force is well armed and disciplined and enjoys the support of the bulk of the population in these regions.

Because of the failure to neutralize UNITA opposition or open the Benguela and southern railroads, FAPLA/Cuban forces have been unable to extend the effective authority of the MPLA government to the countryside. Their failure to check UNITA has resulted in deteriorating morale among those members of Havana's expeditionary force stationed in the south. Extended tours of duty and growing friction with the Angolan populace are additional factors contributing to the lowering of Cuban morale.

Cabinda--Keeping the Oil Flowing

Cabinda, with its refinery and offshore oil wells, poses a particular problem for its FAPLA/Cuban defenders. The focus of Cuban military personnel in the exclave has been on ensuring the continued operation of the Gulf Oil Company facility, the main source of foreign exchange for the government. The bulk of FAPLA/Cuban forces are deployed in defensive positions in and around Cabinda City and the refinery 10 kilometers north of the city. [redacted] defensive positions with artillery and tanks guarding the approaches of the city. In April 1977, [redacted] 12 revetted hardstands had been added at the airfield on the outskirts of Cabinda City. This development suggests that fighter aircraft may soon be sent to Cabinda.

Beyond Cabinda City and the Gulf installation, FAPLA units, generally in company strength and with Cuban advisers, are posted at isolated garrisons within the heavily forested interior of the exclave.

Despite repeated claims by FLEC that it controls more than two thirds of the province, much of the territory is probably not controlled by either side.

Most of FLEC's operations are limited to ambushes, shelling of garrisons, and mining of roads. An exception was the isolation of the government forces at Dingo for several days before Cubans could reinforce the garrison in early

May of this year. By late May and June, the government, aided by about 1,800 additional Cuban troops was attempting to regain the initiative in the exclave. Two towns occupied by FLEC were recaptured, and FLEC was driven from its provisional headquarters near the Zairian border. These setbacks reportedly have been compounded by FLEC's internal dissension and dwindling amounts of military supplies.

FNLA--Harassment in the North

In the spring of 1976, remnants of the FNLA army operating from the densely forested region of northern Angola and Bas-Zaire Province in Zaire, continued to resist FAPLA/Cuban efforts at pacification. The goals and tactics of the FNLA appear to mirror those of UNITA and FLEC. The primary objective of FNLA was to prevent the MPLA from extending its control: tactics employed included ambushing of FAPLA/Cuban convoys on roads in the north, attempting to sabotage the coffee economy in the Uige Plateau, and restricting the movement of FAPLA/Cuban elements to urban areas.

As in the south, the vulnerability of military convoys to ambushes has compelled the FAPLA/Cuban command to use transport aircraft to resupply its troops. An additional supply line was established by using former Portuguese landing craft to move equipment from Luanda to the port at Sovo, (formerly Santo Antonio Do Zaire) at the mouth of the Zaire River from where supplies were sent to various FAPLA and Cuban units. The major airbase in the north is the former Portuguese facility at N'gaze. As was the case at Huambo, revetted hardstands capable of accommodating fighter aircraft were identified for the first time in April 1976.

Evaluating Counterinsurgency Campaigns

The largest counterinsurgency campaigns undertaken by the FAPLA/Cuban forces have been against UNITA. These offensives failed to reach their basic objective and in early 1977 encountered strong opposition, leaving government forces largely restricted to a defensive posture within garrisons. In northern Angola, the attempts to eradicate the remnants of the FNLA

have been equally unsuccessful. Favorable terrain conditions and the ability to take sanctuary in Zaire have aided the FNLA insurgents. Only in Cabinda has the FAPLA/Cuban military effort achieved its more limited goal of defending the Gulf facilities from sabotage and ensuring the continued operation of this vital installation. Even here, however, the FAPLA/Cuban presence is largely confined to urban areas.

Developing Angola's Security Capabilities

A second objective of Cuban military personnel in Angola is the conversion of the MPLA military from an insurgent force to a conventional military institution. An agreement reportedly was reached between Castro and Neto in March 1976 calling for an expanded training role for Cuban military personnel in Angola. In the largest undertaking, the Cubans are providing the FAPLA ground forces with basic training for NCOs and officer candidates and are instructing personnel on the array of weapons provided by the Soviets, ranging from small calibre arms to heavy equipment such as tanks and rocket launchers.

While limited numbers of Angolans are sent to Havana for specialized instruction, most training is conducted within Angola at former Portuguese military installations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet-type motorized rifle obstacle courses and a training aid commonly seen at army facilities throughout Cuba have been observed at numerous military installations throughout Angola. Other more conventional training aids, such as small-arms firing ranges and driver-training courses, have also been observed.

Limited reporting suggests that the results of the Cuban training program have been far from satisfactory from Havana's point of view. The majority of FAPLA recruits, drawn from the unemployed masses of Angola's urban centers, are illiterate and poorly motivated. Cubans complain that the typical FAPLA soldier lacks the ability and motivation to acquire even rudimentary military skills, let alone the proficiency to operate and maintain sophisticated military hardware. A second problem has been the increased demand for the use of Cuban military personnel and Soviet-supplied hardware in the campaigns against opponents of the MPLA government.

Very few details are available on the training of pilots and support personnel of the FAPLA air arm. Although some pilots are sent to the Soviet Union for instruction and others are being trained by Nigerians, Cuban pilots, when not engaged in combat missions, are helping to train Angolan pilots, primarily at the Angolan international airfield at Luanda where the majority of the aircraft and helicopters of the airforce are based.

The airforce training program is probably on a small scale and is not expected to meet with any major success. The remarks of various Cuban officials indicate their belief that Cuban advisers/pilots will be needed for a long period and that there are few Angolans who possess the skills needed to become pilots.

The Cubans have also given specialized training to Angolan security personnel, including those responsible for protecting President Neto, and they have helped maintain law and order in Luanda and other regions of Angola. In addition, the Cubans have reportedly participated in efforts to restore Angola's economy. Cuban military personnel, for example, participated in the coffee and sugar harvests in northern Angola and in attempts to reestablish order in the diamond production area in the northeast.

Assisting Black African Nationalists: The SWAPO Connection

Cuban military personnel in Angola have also given direct support to the insurgent forces of SWAPO that are operating from southern Angola against Namibia. SWAPO defectors have claimed that Cuban cooperation increased following Sam Nujoma's visit to Havana in October 1976. During October and November, joint FAPLA/Cuban/SWAPO offensives were launched in an attempt to remove UNITA elements and the local populace from regions in southern Angola contiguous to the Namibian border. The purpose of these campaigns was to create "safe areas" where SWAPO base camps could be established for training and for preparing for operations into Namibia.

A training and logistics base was reportedly established in the south-central area of Angola, approximately 240 kilometers north of the Namibia border. The decision to create a base so far from the border probably reflects a genuine Cuban

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respect for the combat ability of the South African armed forces and concern over potential South African retaliation against SWAPO facilities. The main logistics, supply, and training base for SWAPO was set up at Jamba, which is located on a spur of the southern railroad that connects with the port of Mocamedes. Military equipment for SWAPO is delivered by ship to Mocamedes, moved by rail to Jamba, and then trucked to N'Giva for distribution to base camps along the Namibian border. Basic training and weapons training has reportedly been conducted at Menongue, another MPLA-held city on the southern railroad.

A number of base camps from which SWAPO units infiltrate Namibia were established closer to the border.

Testing of Cuban Military Capabilities

The Angolan episode, viewed solely in a military context, has provided counterinsurgency and conventional combat experience for both regular and reserve personnel of the Cuban armed forces. The amount of equipment and manpower committed to this venture has probably far surpassed the original estimate of officials in both Havana and Luanda. As a result, Cuban capabilities, ranging from transoceanic movement of men and hardware to combined-arms operations in an unfamiliar environment, have been thoroughly tested.

The initial challenge of transporting Havana's expeditionary force across the Atlantic to Angola was met successfully Cuba's merchant marine and the national airline--Cubana--fulfilled difficult assignments, on time and without accident. Between May 1976 and April 1977, at least 12 vessels were involved in convoy activities and conducted 23 voyages. There was a surge in military shipments in May 1977, when six ships loaded arms, vehicles, and troops at Mariel, and sailed for

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Angola. (The time spent in loading these ships in Cuba was markedly less than had been the case previously.) Charter Cubana airline flights using Bristol Britannia and IL-18 (COOT) aircraft were begun as early as September 1975. Carrying capacity was expanded dramatically by employing leased Aeroflot IL-62 aircraft: 155 flights were made between Havana and Luanda from January 1976 through early June 1977. Finally, regularly scheduled Cubana airline service began in June 1976 on a weekly basis using Bristol Britannias.

Although Cubans have previously served in an advisory capacity elsewhere on the African continent, Angola provided the first large-scale battle-testing of regular Cuban armor, artillery, and infantry units. The combat scenarios have ranged from the conventional combined-arms offensives to counterinsurgency search and destroy patrols. Cuban pilots have not engaged in air-to-air combat, but have furnished close air support to FAPLA/Cuban ground forces. Perhaps the greatest challenge has involved logistics. A severely damaged communications and transportation network coupled with harassment of surface routes in certain regions by insurgents has complicated the supply effort. Certain isolated garrisons rely solely upon aircraft for supplies.

Summary

Castro apparently underestimated the Cuban manpower and resources that would be required to maintain and support the Neto regime in Angola after the civil war. While Cuban manpower and firepower proved decisive in gaining victory for the MPLA in conventional warfare, Havana's efforts to counter the insurgency threat of FLEC, FNLA, and UNITA have not had corresponding successes. An anticipated reduction in Cuban combat forces and a gradual replacement of troops by civilian advisers has been scrapped due to a deteriorating security situation. Havana's troop strength, in fact, has increased by as many as 5,000 men since May, raising the total number of Cuban civilian and military personnel to as many as 18,500.


Increased Cuban participation in maintaining security has also been made necessary by the mediocre performance by FAPLA and other Angolan security personnel. The prospect for improved performance by FAPLA, resulting from Cuban and other

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
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Communist countries' training programs, appears slim in the near future. As a result, the need for continued participation by Cuban personnel in military and security matters will continue for an indefinite period.


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Angolan Mig-21 with Cuban camouflaging



View of downtown Luanda



Angolan Mig-17 in concrete revetment



Director of
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For further information on Africa, contact [redacted] Director, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [redacted]

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Africa

Africans look to the United States with both hope and skepticism for solutions to *three principal issues*:

- *The Angola-Namibia conundrum.*
- *South Africa's apartheid system.*
- *The continent's unhill steep climb for economic viability.*

Black-ruled states view Pretoria as the crux of the interrelated problems of troubled southern Africa. US efforts to mediate an agreement calling for a withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola and independence for Namibia has raised hopes that progress with Pretoria is possible, even though all parties apparently realize the process of implementation is likely to be rocky. *Excepting Angola, South Africa has an economic stranglehold on the regional states—Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique—and this dependence lessens the pressure they can exert on Pretoria to alter its policies of racial segregation.* The carrot and stick approach used by Pretoria with its neighbors is characterized by its current dealings with Mozambique. Here South Africa is offering economic cooperation while backing RENAMO insurgents in a bid to divert the Chissano regime from the antiapartheid struggle and to disrupt the rehabilitation of transportation routes that could ease regional dependence on Pretoria. Meanwhile, *the South African Government is becoming more impervious to US influence because of white rightwing resistance to reform in the face of international pressure for more sanctions and disinvestment.*

Many Africans perceive US interest in Africa to be flagging, apart from southern Africa and humanitarian concern with famine, refugees, and AIDS. They

are distressed by *declining levels of US development and security assistance* just as their struggle against economic decline, political instability, and persistent insurgencies appears to be growing more difficult:

- From their perspective, *Washington seems to be abandoning them* despite their pursuit of corrective—and politically risky—economic policies urged by the IMF and Western donors.
- Compounding their difficulties, *France, which has propped up Chad and other French-speaking African states, may be scaling back its commitment* because of budgetary constraints.

Some African leaders, unable to find what they believe to be sufficient assistance elsewhere, will continue to seek arms from the Soviets and to accept often unfulfilled aid offers from Libya and Iran, countries that are probing for greater influence at Western expense. Even if an Angolan-Namibian settlement sticks, Moscow most likely will continue substantial military deliveries to Angola—as long as the UNITA insurgency remains viable—as well as to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia. Washington has little influence with Addis Ababa, which resists Soviet advice to negotiate an end to longstanding insurgencies. Neighboring Somalia, increasingly beset by its own guerrillas, probably will seek new US aid and diplomatic support in exchange for continued US military access.

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North Atlantic Ocean

Mediterranean Sea

Red Sea

Indian Ocean

South Atlantic Ocean

Major trouble spot (White box)

Former French colony (Light gray box)

Frontline State (Hatched box)

Chad-Libya: uneasy cease-fire

Sudan: southern insurgency

Ethiopia: major insurgencies

Somalia: northern rebellion

Uganda: ethnic rebellions

Angola: civil war

Namibia: possible independence

Mozambique: insurgency

South Africa: racial crisis

Organization of African Unity (OAU) headquarters

Continentwide grouping of 51 members. Takes common stands on African issues. Current OAU Chairman: Mali's President Traoré.

Scale: 0 to 1000 Kilometers / 0 to 1000 Miles


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
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Spread of Drought, AIDS, and Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa



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Angola's Uncertain Path Toward Regional Peace

US-brokered talks hold out the possibility of a withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola's 13-year-old civil war and the termination of Pretoria's 73-year rule of Namibia. Washington's goals have been:

- To end the Angolan conflict through the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops and to establish a power-sharing arrangement that would permit the Western-oriented National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to participate in the government.
- To secure the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the subsequent independence of that country under UN auspices.
- To reduce—and, if possible, to eliminate—Soviet and Soviet-proxy political, military, and economic influence in southern Africa.

Foreign Involvement in Conflict

The civil war dates from 1975, when Portugal granted independence to Angola and UNITA challenged the Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government, placed in power by Cuban combat troops and supported by Soviet military assistance. The conflict has been complicated by the presence in Angola of South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas fighting the South African occupation of Namibia, thereby affording Pretoria a pretext for cross-border attacks.

Neither the MPLA regime nor UNITA has gained a decisive edge. Angola's major offensive in the fall of 1987 against UNITA's southeastern stronghold was turned back by UNITA and South African forces. High Angolan losses prompted Cuban troops, who traditionally had served as a defensive reserve, to join in the fighting:

- Cuban President Castro upped the ante by sending another 15,000 troops—including some of his finest units—to Angola, bringing total Cuban forces to about 50,000 and forcing South African forces back into Namibia.

- Castro calculates that these moves have strengthened his position in the three-way talks, but the buildup clearly has enhanced prospects for a major Cuban-South African confrontation along the border if negotiations fail.

In response to the Cuban deployment, UNITA leader Savimbi is determined to step up hit-and-run attacks elsewhere, in the belief that government troops—stretched thin by operations in southern Angola—will be hard pressed to cover the entire country. The insurgents have launched a guerrilla campaign in the northern and central provinces and increased attacks on economic targets, including powerlines, transportation routes, a hydroelectric complex, and petroleum storage tanks.

Moves Toward Settlement

Another consequence of the Cuban buildup in the southwest has been to generate a new impetus toward a regional settlement:

- Pretoria, evidently surprised by the magnitude of Cuban moves near the Namibian border, suddenly proved more tractable in talks with the Angolans and Cubans.
- The three parties have agreed in principle to implement UN Resolution 435 providing for Namibian independence and to develop a mutually agreed timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

Despite progress on negotiating the withdrawal of foreign troops, the MPLA government continues to reject talks with UNITA. Luanda realizes that the insurgency retains the support of Angola's largest tribe, the Ovimbundu, and fears that Savimbi—a more charismatic and dynamic leader than Angolan President dos Santos or other Angolan Politburo members—would quickly dominate any coalition government. Rather than negotiate with Savimbi, dos Santos has offered amnesty to the UNITA rank and file and tried to create schisms within the leadership to weaken the insurgents' military effectiveness.

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Economic Factors

The regime's difficulties are compounded by the *woeful state of the economy*:


- Although steady increases in oil production will push foreign exchange earnings up to about \$2.5 billion this year from \$1.9 billion in 1987, *guerrilla attacks and government mismanagement have strangled internal distribution and drastically cut food production.*
- *Nonoil exports, such as diamonds, coffee, and cotton, have fallen precipitously.*

Because of the staggering economy and the costs of the war, *Luanda's debt to the Soviet Union has ballooned* from about \$2.1 billion at the end of 1985 to more than \$4.5 billion in 1988. Almost all Soviet aid is in the form of *military hardware*. Moscow has proved a niggardly supplier of *economic assistance* and, indeed, has encouraged the Angolans to seek help from the West.

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
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Soviet and Cuban Military Presence in Angola, October 1988



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
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National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
17 August 1983


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

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


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Recent Actions in Angola

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17 August 1983

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Angola appears shaken by recent South African and UNITA activities, and the Soviets are engaged in an airlift of military equipment to Luanda. [redacted]

Luanda has announced that South Africa has increased its forces in southern Angola and sent ground troops into the UNITA-controlled southeast. Angola also claims that South African aircraft bombed positions near Mulondo and Quiteve over the weekend and provided air support to UNITA forces attempting to capture Cangamba. [redacted]

South Africa recently told the US that it is continuing sweeps against SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola but plans no large-scale offensives soon. [redacted] South African mechanized infantry units remain at Xangongo and Calueque. [redacted]

[redacted] Luanda's allegations of South African airstrikes at Cangamba have been denied by Pretoria. [redacted]


Comment: UNITA apparently is consolidating its hold on the southeast by attacking the few sizable Angolan garrisons remaining in the region. The outcome of the battle at Cangamba is unclear, but casualties were heavy. [redacted]

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17 August 1983

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**National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)**

Friday
3 June 1983

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
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
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


South Africa-Angola: Military Activity 6






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**SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Military Activity**


//The allegation by Pretoria yesterday of a buildup of SWAPO and Cuban forces in southern Angola may be intended to prepare the way for a major South African attack.

 South African sweep operations that began in southern Angola early last month are continuing. A mechanized infantry company has been seen at Mupa, and substantial damage is evident in the town of Evale. South Africa

 is continuing to bring supplies to Ngiva and Xangongo.// 

Comment: //The absence of Mirage fighter-bombers—which normally would provide cover for attacks deep into Angola—and Luanda's silence about recent South African operations suggest that Pretoria's forces have remained largely within the buffer zone. On the other hand,

 South Africa may be beginning to extend its salient westward. The South Africans may have as many as 3,500 men in southern Angola and could launch a major attack with little warning.// 

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