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Angolan Military Cooperation with African States (U)

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ANGOLAN MILITARY COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN STATES (U)

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PREFACE

~~(S)~~ This study catalogs the wide network of security-related ties established by Angola with other African states and African organizations since independence in 1975. It is designed to provide a data base for other researchers who may find such a compendium useful. It also calls attention to the fact that, despite Angola's heavy dependence on Soviet Bloc military assistance, Communist relationships are by no means Angola's only military ties.

(U) For comparative purposes or specific Order of Battle information see Ground Order of Battle: Angola (U), DDB-1100-A0-series; Naval Order of Battle, Volume IV-Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB-1200-104-series; Air Order of Battle, Volume IV-Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB-1300-104-series; and Military Intelligence Summary, Volume IV-Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB-2680-104-series; and Foreign Military Assistance, Volume VI - Africa South of the Sahara (U), DDB-1940-1-series.

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SUMMARY

~~(C)~~ Despite its dependence on foreign Communist military assistance, Angola also has established military ties on the African Continent. These involve Angolan assistance to African states, Angolan aid received from African states, and other military ties that do not include military assistance. To some extent these relationships reflect the Marxist orientation of the MPLA government in that they exist chiefly with leftist African states.*

~~(C)~~ The closest bilateral military relationships have been formed with Zambia and Marxist Mozambique, fellow members of the Front Line States (FLS); with the Congo, like Angola a Marxist state, and with which it shares a short common border; and with Cape Verde and with Sao Tome and Principe, two distant fellow Lusophone nations sharing the important common experience of a struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Lesser security ties exist or have existed with numerous other states and within regional groupings. Military links have been negligible with Ethiopia, another large Marxist state dependent on massive amounts of Cuban and Soviet assistance, indicating that these ties tend to center more on regional and cultural affiliation than on political ideology.

~~(C)~~ This network of African security ties—wide though it is—does little to mitigate Angola's dependence on the Soviet Bloc for military assistance. And, the quantitative difference between Luanda's Communist and non-Communist military relationships is staggering. While Soviet/Cuban aid is vital to the MPLA's survival, other nations' military links are significant mainly for their regional political ramifications. Angola, however, may see these ties as a step toward the distant goal of eventually reducing dependence on the Soviets. On the other hand, it is quite possible that some of these ties have been encouraged by Angola's Soviet and Cuban mentors in order to reduce the appearance of Angola subservience to them; in any case, such links probably could not be pursued without Soviet/Cuban acquiescence.


~~(C)~~ It is also interesting to note that while links with Mozambique and Zambia, fellow Front Line States, are to be expected, the reason for strong ties with the Congo and Cape Verde is less obvious and possibly even surprising.

~~(C)~~ Finally, this network of Angolan military ties in Africa may illustrate the beginning of intra-African cooperation that will become significant later. Unless an outside power becomes a driving influence behind the scenes, however, growth in such cooperation will be constrained by the limited financial and human resources and the competing interests of the cooperating states themselves.

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* ~~(C)~~ Angola also has provided significant military assistance to African insurgent groups and received aid from them. Because this paper is concerned primarily with interstate military ties, assistance to and from insurgent groups is summarized only in the appendix.

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(U) Angolan Military Cooperation in Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

~~(S/NF)~~ The Angolan People's Republic (RPA) is, among African countries, one of the most dependent on foreign military assistance. The regime of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola--Labor Party (MPLA) was installed in 1975 with direct Cuban and Soviet military support that was crucial in defeating rival contenders for power in a nearly year-long conflict. Currently, the MPLA is still dependent on 25,000-30,000 Cuban troops, up to 500 Soviet military advisers, and an estimated 500 East German military and security personnel, as well as lesser numbers of military technicians from other Communist states. These advisers and troops are necessary to prop up the MPLA regime in the face of internal disputes and shallow popularity; to transform the Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA) from an essentially guerrilla army into a conventional force able to use sophisticated weapons and capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations; and to help Angola defend against South African attacks. Likewise, the Cubans and Soviets give critical assistance to the FAPLA in its efforts to contain the vigorous insurgency being waged by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

~~(C)~~ Nevertheless, despite Angola's abject dependence on foreign Communist military assistance, Luanda is not without other security ties, namely, on the African continent. Since independence, Angola has established ongoing security relationships or had at least transient security-related ties with numerous African states. (See map) These links fall easily into three categories: foreign military assistance provided by Angola to other African states; foreign military assistance received from African states; and military ties (including formal military agreements) that fall short of actual assistance.

2. ANGOLAN MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ (b)(3)50 USC 403 Angola has provided notable military assistance to other African states. No military assistance was provided by Angola during its first year of independence, quite naturally, since the civil war was still raging; FAPLA capabilities were fully taxed (few Angolans had received enough training under the Portuguese, Soviets, or Cubans to serve as instructors); the FAPLA was being converted to a regular armed force; and the large Soviet and Cuban military aid organization was still being emplaced. (Even today, FAPLA assistance to other African states may be provided in conjunction with Soviet and Cuban personnel in Angola.) Almost immediately after the RPA's first anniversary, however, the initial reports of such Angolan military aid were noted. In December 1976, Mozambican officers were getting unspecified training in Angola; at the same time, and for a period of several months, arms and possibly other supplies also were flown from Angola to Mozambique. Since the flights originated in Angola, it is likely that Angolan, rather than Cuban, Soviet, or other Communist equipment was being provided--albeit with Moscow's blessing. A year later, in November 1977, Angola also provided holding and physical screening facilities for Mozambican military trainees en route to Cuba. No recent military aid to Mozambique has been noted, however.

~~(S/NF)~~ Another early provision of arms aid involved the shipment of Soviet arms to the Government of Chad Armed Forces prior to March 1977. The equipment, which included rocket launchers, armored personnel carriers, trucks and small arms, may have come from Angola. Angola again provided security aid to Chad when Angolan aircraft were requested by Congo in November 1979 to fly its troops to Chad to join the African peacekeeping force there. In March of the following year, Angolan aircraft returned those troops to Congo.

~~(S/NF/NN/NC~~ (b)(3)50 USC 1 There is reason to believe that other Angolan help also was offered to the Congo. By 1979, for instance, the Congo apparently was receiving financial support for its military budget, if not direct military assistance, from Luanda, and in November of that year an unknown number of Congolese soldiers were reportedly being trained in Angola.

~~(S/NF/NN/NC~~ (b)(3)50 Any military equipment supplied by Angola, of course, is not indigenously produced but is being resold or transferred from items obtained abroad, chiefly in Communist states. Angola itself produces no military equipment. A rare example of a specific item sold is a Dassault Mystere-Falcon 20 light transport made available to Guinea-Bissau in 1978 by the Angolan Ministry of Defense. Likewise, military training provided by Angola to other African armed forces is undoubtedly given by combined Cuban-Angolan instructor staffs because Angolan capabilities in this area are still limited. Bissau's former federation partner, Cape Verde, for instance, recently sent to Angola about 50 soldiers who could be receiving such training. Earlier security assistance to Cape Verde has involved the dispatch of Toyota vehicles from the Angolan Interior Ministry to its Cape Verdian counterpart.

~~(S/NF/NN/NC~~ (b)(3)50 Military aid exchanges between the two largest Marxist armed forces in Africa--Angola and Ethiopia--have been slight. At some point between 1977 and early 1979, Cuban MiG-21 and helicopter pilots and their aircraft (which were taken from the Angolan inventory) reportedly were sent from Angola to Ethiopia. The number of aircraft and length of deployment is unknown but such deployments may have continued in 1980. Earlier, in February 1978, the Angolan national airline was ordered to study the opening of a scheduled air route to Ethiopia to obviate the necessity of secrecy in military flights between the two nations. In addition, during the 1977-78 Ogaden war, Cuban troops were transferred from Angola to Ethiopia, and other Cubans en route to Ethiopia transited Angola. Although primarily a Cuban-Soviet-Ethiopian operation, there was obviously some Angolan cooperation, if not support.

~~(S/NF)~~ Angola's only other military aid involvement in East Africa came during the Tanzanian-Ugandan war of 1978-79. Angola sent arms and ammunition to Tanzania during the dispute; reports that Angola sent troops are erroneous.

~~(S/NF/NN/NC~~ (b)(3)50 Two reported instances of Angola security aid seem quite definitely to involve the dispatch of troops, however. In 1980, for instance, a combined FAPLA-FLNC (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo)* force of 600-1,000 troops may have traveled overland to Lusaka to deter an alleged coup attempt against Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

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* ~~(C)~~ The FLNC is an insurgent group of Zairian exiles located in Angola and Zambia and seeking to overthrow the regime of Zairian President Mobutu Sese

(Continued)

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3)-50 The other such instance, and Angola's most significant extension of military aid, was the dispatch in 1978 of a sizable security force to Sao Tome and Principe. The Angolan troops, apparently led or advised by Cubans, now total about 1,000. In addition to providing security for the regime, as requested by Sao Tome President Manuel Pinto da Costa, the unit is reportedly engaged in a "plan of reconnaissance"--possibly an aerial survey--of both the nation's islands. Training for Sao Tomean forces is doubtless also involved. The Angolan force is thought still to be in Sao Tome and will probably remain there until the nascent Sao Tomean units are believed by their government to be capable of protecting the current regime. In the meantime, the Angolan unit is the main guarantor of the Sao Tomean regime's stability. The Sao Tomeans may also have sent some trainees to receive pilot training from Romanian instructors at the Angolan aviation school.

3. ANGOLAN MILITARY AID FROM AFRICAN STATES

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ (b)(3)-50 USC 403 Numerous African states have provided military assistance to Angola, beginning immediately at independence in November 1975. At that point, assistance that had been provided by other African States to the MPLA as an insurgent movement simply continued as state-to-state military aid.* Angolan officials have made numerous public reference over the years to military aid from Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Congo, and Mozambique during the period straddling independence. The exact nature of the aid is not known, but reportedly Nigeria provided monetary and unspecified military aid (probably some advisers); Guinea sent "a regiment" or battalion of "inadequate" commandos who nevertheless apparently did see combat; Guinea-Bissau sent antiaircraft weapons and up to 400 troops who did no fighting (nor did 1,000 Congolese troops in-country at the time); and Mozambique sent military equipment and possibly troops. An unconfirmed report indicates that Somalia may have sent a few pilots and/or flight instructors to Angola at the same time. The Congolese assistance began before independence, in fact, when that country provided a haven for MPLA personnel directing their fight against Portuguese rule. Congo also served as a vital entrepot for Cuban troops and Cuban/Soviet supplies en route to the MPLA during the critical preindependence months when MPLA and Cuban troops fought rival Angolan guerrilla groups for control.

~~(S/NF)~~ In the intervening years, some of these countries have continued to provide security assistance to Angola. Nigeria, for instance, provided training to the Angolan People's Police from 1976 until possibly 1978. The training has been conducted both in Angola and in Nigeria. Other aid is the subject of tenuous reports: Nigerian military equipment sent to Angola since independence has probably been for the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); allegations of Nigerian troops assisting the FAPLA in the late 1970s are probably UNITA propaganda or distortions of the fact of police assistance mentioned above; and a press report in early 1982 that Nigerians are aiding the Angolan Navy seems to have no factual basis. However, Nigeria and the Front

(Continued)
Seko. Angola provides the FLNC a safehaven and limited military aid; in return, some FLNC personnel assist the FAPLA in combating Angolan insurgents. See the appendix.

*~~(C)~~ The African troops or advisers who were sent during this point were referred to as an "International Brigade," but few saw combat.

Line States have discussed the possibility of creating an African military force to replace the Cubans in Angola, but no decision has been made on the issue. This and similar Moroccan (1978) and Liberian (1982) proposals for a multilateral force are very unlikely to develop because of the political and military complexities standing in the way. (Angola has, however, received multilateral assistance in the form of reimbursement from the OAU Liberation Committee for Angolan costs in maintaining SWAPO camps.)

~~(S/NF)~~ Other early military aid donors have also continued to offer aid. Guinea-Bissau, for instance, agreed in 1980 to accept up to 50 Angolan military veterans annually for prosthetic treatment at a Bissau hospital. Congolese troops remained in Cabinda, guarding the Congo-Cabinda border area possibly as late as early 1978. Although unorthodox in that it turned Angolan border security duties over to a neighboring state, the Congolese effort would have freed Angolan and Cuban troops in the enclave for active operations against the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Moreover, the border is an area of frequent FLEC activity which affected Congolese security as well (FLEC kidnapped several French technicians from Congolese territory in 1977), so Congo's assistance was in its own interest. Also, Angola's Guard was not created until the Congolese Ministry of Defense also provided construction workers for an Angolan Defense Ministry project in 1978. Additionally, in 1980 some Angolan troops may have been receiving training in Congo. Further, vestiges of the pre-independence logistic support received from the Congo continue, as that country provides at any one time billeting for up to 800 transiting and recuperating Cuban troops from Cabinda. Cape Verde, another early aid donor, reportedly sent about 50 troops to Angola in 1983, probably to be trained, but they could be meant as a gesture of solidarity with Angola in the face of South African threats and may perform a security function there. Finally, Mozambique may have sold several used Noratlas transports to Angola.

~~(S/NF)~~ Very little military aid has been provided by African states that were not early aid donors. In 1977 Ghana apparently discussed with Angola the provision of military aid, but nothing ever came of the offer. Tanzanian troops in Angola were reported in 1979, but there is no foundation for the report. A Malagasy offer of two MiG-21 jet fighter aircraft for use by Angola, made during the 1982 OAU Summit in Tripoli, did not materialize.

4. OTHER ANGOLAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES

~~(C)~~ Angola's military ties in Africa are defined not merely in terms of military assistance, but have been manifested also in the exchange of working groups on security issues and of observers of military maneuvers, as well as in the signing of formal defense pacts. (See table) Attache exchanges are not known between Angola and other African states, although there apparently are non-Communist (as well as Soviet Bloc) military attaches in-country.

~~(C)~~ Perhaps the earliest example of this kind of military cooperation was a visit to Angola by the Guinean Minister of Defense barely a month after Angola's independence. The contents of the talks are not known, but may have dealt with the continuation of Guinean assistance that had been provided to the MPLA before independence or with aspects of Soviet naval aviation or naval deployments to West Africa. (Both Conakry, Guinea, and Luanda, Angola, have been home ports for portions of the Soviet West African naval force, and Luanda

Table

Formal Angolan Security Agreements With African States (U)

Country	Type	Date
Cape Verde	General cooperation agreement with security component.	15 Dec 1976 (signed); 3 Nov 1980 (ratified)
Cape Verde	Agreement of cooperation on defense and security.	February 1981 (signed)
Congo	Agreement between each state's armed forces.	September 1982
Front Line States	Mutual defense pact.	Subject of 1979 FLS meeting; status unknown
Zambia	"Defense pact" involving "joint security force to fight Rhodesian and South African raids".	May 1979 (signed; presumably not effected)

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succeeded Conakry in 1977 as the deploying airfield in the South Atlantic for Soviet Tu-95/BEAR D long-range reconnaissance aircraft.) Distance and lack of significant common interests have kept this Angolan-Guinean relationship from growing, particularly as Conakry has softened its pro-Soviet stance in recent years and looked increasingly to the West for economic assistance.

~~(S)~~ By contrast, Cape Verde, also distant from Angola but sharing a common language and colonial heritage, has had perhaps the most continuous formal security ties with Luanda, beginning with the signing of a general cooperation agreement, including a security component, in late 1976. The agreement was eventually ratified in 1980. It was followed almost immediately by the signing of another agreement of cooperation on defense and security in early 1981. Since then, visits have been exchanged frequently between high-ranking delegations from the Defense, Security, and Interior Ministries of the two states. Other than the presence of a senior Cape Verdean military delegation observing Angolan maneuvers in 1979, however, little substantive bilateral cooperation has been noted. There is reason to believe, however, that Angolan-Cape Verdean security talks have not been mere formalities. In November 1980 the Government of Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde's federation partner, was

overthrown. Not only did the coup oust Cape Verdeans from their leadership role in the federation and end prospects for continuing the federation, but the sudden isolation of Cape Verde and the unclear policy toward Cape Verde of the new Bissauan regime cast a pall of unease over moderate Cape Verdean leaders worried about their own tenure. The pact with Angola mentioned above, suddenly ratified 4 years after its 1976 signing, probably served to reassure the worried Cape Verdeans--although there is no direct evidence that the pact included mutual defense provisions. Angolans and Cape Verdeans may also have discussed security issues in the context of meetings of the five African Lusophone states, held occasionally since they acquired independence in the mid-1970s.

~~(S/NF)~~ The early outlines of bilateral security cooperation with Mozambique, another Lusophone state, are not known, but by at least January 1978 Luanda was serving as a stopover for deliveries of military equipment en route to Maputo. The following year Mozambique, too, sent observers to Angolan maneuvers. By the fall of 1980, relations had progressed, probably because South African attacks on Cassinga, Angola, in 1978 and threats to Mozambique caused each country to look for possible regional defense partners. In August, Mozambique was to send several brigade commanders to Angola on an exchange program. In October of that year a spate of visits exchanged by security and defense ministers, reportedly including four trips in a 2-day period, bespoke extreme mutual concern with the security situation in southern Africa. This was followed later that year by a joint Angolan-Mozambican operation, possibly directed against the two states' dissident elements in Europe. Since 1980, bilateral security exchanges seem to have tapered off, but cooperation is continuing in regional security groups and possibly within meetings of African Lusophone states.

~~(S)~~ The Congo is a less obvious candidate for close military partnership with Angola. Neither Lusophone nor a member of the FLS, the Congo is, however, a fellow Marxist state whose armed forces are similarly heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. Moreover, approximately 100 miles of border are shared by the Congo and the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and a Cabindan separatist group creates security problems on both sides of the border.

~~(S/NF)~~ Formal Angolan-Congolese postindependence cooperation began at least as early as 1978 with a visit by the Congolese Minister of Defense. Occasional cabinet-level visits dealing with security topics have occurred since. After South Africa's Operation Protea into Angola in 1981, a Zairian report indicated the Congolese Worker's Party, the Congo's sole political party, had decided to establish a battalion to intervene in Angola whenever Angola thought it necessary. The formation of the battalion has not been confirmed. Probably the most significant link, however, judged on the basis of frequency of contacts, has been working-level visits by militia and, especially, air force delegations. The content of this cooperation is not known.

~~(S/NF)~~ Cooperation with Zambia, now one of Angola's closest FLS partners, did not begin immediately after independence. Mutual suspicions (of Zambia's support for UNITA before and after independence; of the MPLA's introduction of large numbers of Cubans into southern Africa) delayed cooperation, although Angola may have joined Zambia in regional security groupings as early as 1977.

A report that year indicated that Angola requested security assistance from Zambia, but the provision of this aid cannot be confirmed. By at least May 1979, however, Presidents Agostinho Neto and Kenneth Kaunda had signed a defense pact and decided to establish a joint security force to defend against Rhodesian and South African raids on their territories. It is unlikely that the force moved beyond rhetorical stages, but the pact is probably the basis for the frequent (possibly quarterly) ministerial-level bilateral security meetings that had begun by August 1979 and continue to occur. The focus of these sessions is probably on genuinely bilateral problems dealing with the security situation on their common border, more than on the South African threat. Angola is concerned that Zambia may be overlooking UNITA safehavens in sparsely patrolled western Zambia; Zambia is bothered by FAPLA and UNITA incursions into western Zambia and by the strain placed on Zambian resources by refugees fleeing conflict in Angola. Angolan-Zambian security concerns are also addressed in the Southern African Interstate Defense and Security Committee established by Mozambique and Tanzania, and which Angola had joined by November 1979. These concerns are also discussed among Angola, Zambia, and Zaire in tripartite security talks they have held occasionally following the 1978 invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province.

5. CONCLUSIONS

~~(C)~~ Although Angola has been independent only 8 years, inherited no armed forces from its colonial administrator, and is itself heavily dependent on foreign military aid, it has already developed a surprisingly wide network of security ties with other Sub-Saharan African states. These involve the provision by Angola of military assistance to other states, the receipt of African military aid by Angola, and an increasing web of security agreements on the continent.

~~(C)~~ Angolan military aid to African states has been modest, in international terms. Although much of the information is fragmentary and vague (as is information on Angola generally), the dollar amounts involved are probably quite small. Angola could not provide large amounts of security assistance, because Angola's own military potential is still being developed, but Angolan aid would probably be modest in any case, because of the preference of many African states for assistance from developed countries with a proven record for administering aid programs. In terms of Sub-Saharan Africa, where all intraregional aid is small, however, Angola's assistance is worthy of note. A wide range of countries is involved and in one case, Sao Tome, Angola is probably the chief military aid donor and guarantor of the regime's stability.

~~(C)~~ For similar reasons, military assistance to Angola from other African states is also small. At least two generalizations can be drawn from the information available. First, most African aid donors to Angola have been West African states rather than southern African neighbors. This seems logical because Angola's neighbors have been either ideological opponents (Zaire, during Angola's early years of independence), colonies (Rhodesia, until 1980), or involved with internal security problems of their own (Zimbabwe, Mozambique), as well as subject to South African retaliation. Second, most aid donors to Angola began providing aid during the 1975-76 period of what the MPLA calls it "second war of independence" against South Africa and rival insurgent groups. Few who did not support the MPLA then have sent aid since. Two

reasons may apply: first, early donors may have been motivated by a desire to forestall excessive MPLA dependence on Cuban/Soviet assistance; and second, they saw their aid as essential to defeating an impending South African victory. Since 1976, however, that latter urgency has disappeared; it has also become clear that no African military aid is needed to supplement massive the assistance Angola receives from its main supporters. Moreover, it would be impossible in any case for African assistance to supplant the MPLA's Communist patrons.

~~(S)~~ Equally interesting is the development by Angola of a web of security ties short of actual military assistance—exchanges of exercise observers, working groups, or ministerial delegations, and even the signing of several military pacts. None of these ties is likely to reduce Angola's dependence on Cuba or the Soviet Union any time soon, but Angola may well see them as proof of its continued sovereignty and the basis of an eventually genuine non-alignment. On the other hand, these ties probably could not have been established without Soviet/Cuban acquiescence—a measure of the harmlessness the ties pose to Angola's status as a Soviet client. Some of these links, particularly those with Marxist or leftist regimes, may well be encouraged by the Soviet Union and Cuba to mitigate the appearance of excessive Angolan dependence on them. Over the long term, however, military ties such as these among African states, supplemented by assistance provided and received, are probably harbingers of a trend of regional interdependence that will continue to grow slowly as African states see a need for improved military capabilities. (In this regard, such regional military cooperation could provide a framework for exploitation by the Soviet Union if it should decide to rally African forces against South Africa.) Because the indicators are such early ones, however, it is difficult to draw specific inferences about the growth of African regional interdependence in security matters. Nevertheless, external actors will remain of major importance. The greatest constraint on the growth of African self-reliance will be posed by limited financial and other resources and by the competing interests of the cooperating states themselves.

APPENDIX

Summary of Angolan Military Cooperation with African Insurgent Groups (U)

~~(S)~~ A large proportion of Angola's military cooperation in Africa has been with African insurgent groups rather than with other states. That involvement with insurgent groups is summarized below.

a. ~~(S)~~ SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization)

Angola:

- Serves as a safehaven for SWAPO troops fleeing South African forces in Namibia.
- Provides military camps and training facilities, as well as refugee camps. Some of the latter may have military functions.
- Provides security for SWAPO camps, in some cases by collocating SWAPO at FAPLA/Cuban camps but also by attempting to secure and protect from South African raids the Angolan territory where SWAPO is located.
- Stores arms and military equipment received from SWAPO suppliers.
- Facilitates travel of SWAPO combatants into and out of Angola.
- Facilitates training and advice to SWAPO by third country military personnel in Angola (e.g., Soviets, East Germans, Cubans).
- Provides uniforms and probably other quartermaster stores.

In return, SWAPO troops have for several years augmented FAPLA and Cuban units in counterinsurgency and local security operations in southern Angola.

b. ~~(S)~~ FLNC (National Front for the Liberation of the Congo)

Angola:

- Stores and distributes arms and military equipment received from FLNC suppliers.
- Provides training, combat experience, personal weapons, and subsistence for FLNC personnel who assist or serve in FAPLA.
- For FLNC personnel who do not serve in or assist FAPLA, provides uniforms, food, and training.

- Facilitates Cuban military advisory assistance to FLNC.

- Facilitates travel of FLNC personnel to Cuba.

In return, some FLNC personnel and possibly FLNC units have joined FAPLA and participated in operations in Angola. Moreover, prior to independence, capable FLNC military forces provided important aid to FAPLA in its struggle for dominance.

c. ~~(S)~~ ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union)

Angolan aid was provided chiefly before Zimbabwe's independence (1980), but reports imply some assistance to ZAPU continues or has been reinstituted.

Angola:

- Provided military training camps.

- Facilitated assistance to ZAPU by third countries.

d. ~~(S)~~ ANC (African National Congress of South Africa)

Angola:

- Provides military training camps and detention camps.

- Stores arms received from ANC suppliers.

e. ~~(S)~~ PRP (Popular Revolutionary Party) and MNC (Congolese National Movement)

Angola:

- Provides military camp in Angola.

- Provides military training by FAPLA and Cuban instructors.

f. ~~(S)~~ It is possible that small amounts of military assistance are provided to other groups as well.

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ANGOLA

SITUATION REPORT.

~~(C)~~ Lisbon's acting High Commissioner in Angola announced on 14 August that Portugal had resumed administrative control over the war-torn province.

~~(C)~~ Citing the continued violence between the three warring liberation groups, Gen Macedo observed that the transitional government is incapable of functioning and that in accordance with the Alvor Agreement, power in the territory would be exercised, until independence, by the High Commissioner. Although none of the liberation groups has yet commented on the move, it seems likely that UNITA and FNLA will accept it while the MPLA, which holds sway in Luanda and reportedly was considering proclaiming independence prior to 11 November, may object. The declaration, which may reflect the growth of moderate political strength in Lisbon, raises the possibility of conflict between MPLA troops and the Portuguese in Luanda.


~~(S/NFD)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) Meanwhile, on 14 August a combined FNLA and UNITA force seized the port city of Lobito, 350 miles south of Luanda. MPLA troops are still holding out at Benguela, 12 miles south of Lobito. FNLA plans call for their forces to continue to apply pressure on Luanda while simultaneously, in conjunction with UNITA, enlarging their area of control in southern Angola.

(Continued)

~~(S/NFD)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Zaire's President Mobutu is now providing materiel to UNITA forces. On the 12th, three aircraft loaded with military equipment arrived in Nova Lisboa and another was scheduled to arrive the next day. Mobutu is also continuing his support to the FNLA. Besides receiving materiel and advisory support from Zaire, the FNLA reportedly has approximately 50 foreign commandos in the Ambriz area. This is in addition to the some 40 or so Portuguese troops who reportedly served with FNLA at the Luanda fortress. Twelve of the commandos in Ambriz are said to be Brazilian and further Brazilian aid may be forthcoming.

~~(S/NFD)~~ In an unrelated development, South African troops have reportedly engaged FNLA and MPLA troops in separate incidents in the south. The South African troops are deployed to protect economic development projects in extreme southwestern Angola near the Namibia border. Large numbers of additional South African troops are reported deployed on the Namibia side for possible contingencies. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)

SOURCES: CIA TDFIRDB 315/08645-75, 315/08646-75, and 315/08662-75 14 Aug 75 ~~(S/NFD)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Consul Luanda 1144 14 Aug 75 ~~(C)~~; Press (various, (U)



PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 2004-75
AS OF: 1400 EDT
15 August 1975
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DIADIN 2076-75
22 AUGUST 1975

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ANGOLA

SITUATION REPORT.

~~(C)~~ Fighting is expected to escalate with the liberation movements' receipt of more foreign military assistance.

~~(C)~~ The Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) continues to hold Caxito, some 40 miles north of Luanda, but is apparently being pressed by forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). South of the capital at Lobito, FNLA assisted by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is expecting reinforcements before trying to wrest control of the port city from the MPLA. The latter group also continues to strengthen its military domination over Luanda and areas to the east.

~~(C)~~ In the capital itself, UNITA and MPLA officials are meeting, presumably to discuss tentative arrangements for a cease-fire. MPLA is beginning to establish paramilitary people's-defense committees composed of armed civilians and is striving to tighten population control. Meanwhile, food stocks are dwindling but have not yet reached critical levels.

~~(S/NFD)~~ (b)(3)-50 USC 403-3(c) In Lisbon, the government has announced the appointment of Col Goncalves Ribera as permanent high commissioner in Angola. He is considered to be a political moderate and is reportedly acceptable to the three liberation groups. The Portuguese are continuing to search for some method to achieve a compromise in the territory and are said to have sent two

(Continued)

envoys to Zambia to secure President Kaunda's assent to a peace plan. It would establish a five- or six-man junta leading a coalition government of the three movements instead of holding elections prior to independence in November. Other Zambian officials have rejected the proposal, but Kaunda is expected to consider it. UNITA, which under the Portuguese proposal would be the first group to declare a cease-fire, also opposes the scheme. Similar delegations from Lisbon are being sent to heads of state in Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. Another initiative from Lisbon reportedly includes the promotion of dialogue between the three groups, the reintroduction of Portuguese administration of defense, legislative power in a transitional government, and the evacuation of MPLA military from Luanda. The former proposal appears to be more realistic.

~~(S/NFD,~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) In other military developments, two companies totaling 270 Zairian paratroopers were flown into Caxito to support the FNLA last week. Fourteen were wounded and airlifted out to Kinshasa on 14 August, and some 70 were reportedly killed in battle with the MPLA. Mortars, ammunition, uniforms, and jeeps with machine-gun mountings were among the equipment provided by Zaire to the FNLA by the 15th. UNITA has begun to receive Chinese small arms from Tanzania and Zambia in addition to materiel already arranged for from Zaire, and the MPLA is continuing to take delivery of large quantities of weapons from Moscow through Tanzania and the Republic of the Congo. A June 1975 Soviet arms shipment by way of Tanzania is said to have included two tanks and an assortment of small ordnance. A mid-August arms shipment from the USSR to the Congo for the MPLA is believed to have included KALASHNIKOV assualt rifles and ammunition. Additionally, a few Soviet military advisers may have accompanied this delivery. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification~~

(Continued)

~~of originator)~~

SOURCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424 211415Z Aug 75 ~~(S/NFD/BUO/CD);~~
CIA 191243Z Aug 75 (S/NFD/(b)(3):50 USC 403-1 TDFIR 314/03993-75
19 Aug 75, 314/03989-75 and 314/04108-75 20 Aug 75
~~(S/NFD);~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 TDFIRDB 315/08860-75 20 Aug 75
~~(S/NFD);~~ (b) (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 1205 20 Aug 75 ~~(C);~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 4799 22 Aug 75 ~~(S)~~

PREPARED BY:
(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 2076-75
AS OF: 1410 EDT
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
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
ANGOLA

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


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ANGOLA

SITUATION REPORT.



~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/NOINTEL)~~ Meanwhile, a usually reliable source has placed the number of Soviet advisers in Angola at between 300 and 350.

(Continued)

They are said to be training Popular Movement army officers and helicopter pilots as well as flight and maintenance crews. They are also conducting an intelligence course, training naval gunners, and supervising the unloading and disposition of Soviet materiel. They are not, however, believed to be in the field. This number of advisers is higher than the 170 we estimate to be in the country but is within the total -- 405 -- thought to be in Angola and the Congo. ~~(XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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
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SOVIET PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE

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USSR – ANGOLA

DIADIN 2958-75
14 NOVEMBER 1975

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USSR – ANGOLA

SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN)~~ High-resolution photo-reconnaissance satellite coverage of Angola is reccurring at an unusually high rate.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN)~~ COSMOS 779 has covered four sites in the territory since 10 November. Camera events on the 12th and 13th included coverage of reserve airfields at Cacolo and Rocados, respectively. Two other pictures taken on the 10th and 12th contained no known significant installations. The activity on the 10th was directed at an area in southeastern Angola that has been photographed at least four times since 20 April. The reason for the high Soviet interest in this particular site is not known.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN)~~ Since 7 September, the Soviets have conducted at least 10 camera events in Angola, further emphasizing the stepped-up rate of coverage there. Only four other missions were detected for the area earlier this year, three in April and one in May.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN)~~ Coverage in September included Sa da Bandeira, a former Portuguese light-bomber and fighter-capable airfield and barracks area that is controlled now by nationalist forces opposing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The MPLA base at Henrique de Carvalho, which has a heavy bomber-capable airfield, was also covered. Camaxilo, a reserve field near the Zaire border in an MPLA-controlled area, was photographed on the 7th.

(Continued)

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN)~~ Photographs obtained by these satellites indicate that the feasibility of these sites for support of logistic or air operations is being assessed. They also show that the Soviets are closely monitoring the use of airfields in non-MPLA-controlled areas.

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DIADIN 2958-75
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~~S E C R E T UMBRA/ALPHA/NOCONTRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) 5110
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 325-2E (AS OF 1935 EST 21 NOV 77)
CUBA-ANGOLA: PROBLEMS. (U)
1. ~~(S/NF/UMBRA/ALPHA/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) CUBA'S AMBASSADOR TO ANGOLA, MANUEL AGRAMONTE-SANCHEZ, REPORTS THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM BESETTING HAVANA'S FORCES IN ANGOLA -- WHICH HE NUMBERS AT 20,000 -- IS RACIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CUBANS AND ANGOLANS. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT FAIR-SKINNED CUBANS HAVE BEEN PEGGED BY NATIVES AS BEING IN THE SAME PRIVILEGED POSITION AS ANGOLAN MULATTOES IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD. THUS, RACIAL CONNOTATIONS HAVE INFLAMED RELATIVELY MINOR INCIDENTS.
2. ~~(S/NF/UMBRA/ALPHA/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) THE CUBAN COMMENTED THAT THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES SEEM TO LACK "MATURITY AND EXPERIENCE" IN THE TASK OF BUILDING A SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE AMBASSADOR NONETHELESS SPOKE OF HAVANA'S RESOLVE TO MAKE ANGOLA A SUCCESS ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO SPECULATION THAT CUBA MIGHT SOON GIVE UP ON TRANSFORMING THE COUNTRY.
3. ~~(S/NF/UMBRA/ALPHA/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) THE CUBAN DIPLOMAT OPINED THAT THE SAVIMBI-LED UNITA FORCES HAD BEEN PRESSING THE NETO GOVERNMENT AND THAT FIGHTING WAS IN PROGRESS THROUGHOUT ANGOLA. THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT MENTION AN EARLY NOVEMBER INCIDENT IN WHICH 15 CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY A BAZOOKA. THE INCIDENT WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE CUBAN SOURCE AS HAVING BEEN RECEIVED BY SENIOR CUBAN OFFICIALS WITH SADNESS AND EMOTION. SUCH ATTACKS -- QUITE LIKELY CARRIED OUT BY UNITA AS PART OF AN ANTI-CUBAN CAMPAIGN -- HAVE WEAKENED CUBAN MORALE.
4. ~~(S/NF/UMBRA/ALPHA/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) AGRAMONTE-SANCHEZ GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE FUTURE POLICY LINE HAVANA MIGHT TAKE, HE CONCEDED THAT A SYMBOLIC WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM ANGOLA MIGHT OCCUR. INHERENT IN THE DIPLOMAT'S REMARKS WAS THE CONCERN THAT CUBA WAS INVOLVED OVER THE LONG HAUL, AND COULD NOT REMOVE LARGE NUMBERS OF FORCES

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WITHOUT UNDOING ALL THAT HAD BEEN DONE THUS FAR.

5. (S/NFD) [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 403 1/1 REPORTS OF CONTINUED PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA REFLECT THE REALITY OF CUBAN AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PITFALLS UNFORESEEN AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS. WHILE HAVANA QUICKLY MANAGED THE VICTORY ON THE CONVENTIONAL FRONT THAT INSTALLED THE NETO MPLA GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA, THE PROBLEM OF RESIDUAL PRESENCE WAS NEVER FULLY ADDRESSED OR PLANNED. NOW, THE LINGERING CUBAN PRESENCE -- APART FROM ITS OBVIOUS DRAIN ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE IN CUBA -- HAS NEGATIVE POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS FACED WITH HARD CHOICES IN ANGOLA: THE ANSWER TO SHORT-RANGE PROBLEMS IS TO MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE THERE. THIS HAS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, HOWEVER, AND WILL ACTUALLY WORK AGAINST CUBA SO LONG AS THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT REMAINS HIGH.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

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SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIAIT: 335-2E (AS OF 2215 EST 2 DEC 77)
ANGOLA: CUBAN OPERATIONS. (S/NOFORN)

1. (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/PINAC) (b)(3) 50 USC PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA), DR. JONAS SAVIMBI, ASSESSES THE CUBAN MILITARY STRENGTH IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AT 12,000 TO 13,000. THE CUBAN TROOPS REPORTEDLY ARE DEPLOYED AGAINST UNITA FORCES AS FOLLOWS: HUAMBO (6,000); LUBANGO (4,200-5,200); LUSO (1,000); AND NOVA LISBOA (822).

2. (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/PINAC) (b)(3) 50 USC SAVIMBI REPORTS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE CUBAN EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE UNITA FORCES IN THE CAIUNDO-CUANGAR AREA HAS FAILED, THE CUBAN COMMAND IS PLANNING AN OPERATION INVOLVING THE RECAPTURE OF "IMPORTANT LOCATIONS" IN CUANDO-CUBANGO PROVINCE, NAMELY CUITO CUANAVALE, LUPIRE, LONGO AND MAVINGA. THE ANGOLAN MILITARY REPORTEDLY WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION. THIS GIVES FURTHER CREDENCE TO REPORTING THAT THE CUBAN COMMAND WANTS TO MAINTAIN UNIT INTEGRITY AND NOT COMBINE FORCES WITH ANGOLAN UNITS, REFLECTING A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE DISCIPLINE AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ANGOLAN TROOPS.

3. (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) THIS OPERATION PROBABLY WILL BE INITIATED FROM MENONGUE AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO REPRESENT ANY MORE OF A THREAT TO UNITA THAN PREVIOUS INITIATIVES. THE OPERATION WILL MOST LIKELY BE CONVENTIONAL, BECAUSE THE LOCATION OF ITS OBJECTIVES ALONG A ROAD SYSTEM CONNECTED OUT OF MENONGUE WILL PERMIT THE CUBAN FORCES TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO THESE LOCATIONS WITH SUFFICIENT BACKUP BOARD TO WARD OFF ANY POSSIBLE UNITA COUNTERATTACKS. NEVERTHELESS, CUBAN UNITS STILL HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATED THE ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY OR THE TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY DEFEAT THE UNITA MOVEMENT. THIS BOLSTERS SAVIMBI'S CONFIDENCE THAT UNITA WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP THE CUBANS OFF BALANCE IN THEIR PRESENT OFFENSIVE WITH "CLASSIC GUERRILLA TACTICS."

4. (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/PINAC) (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) CUBAN FORCES OPERATING OUT OF HUAMBO AND LUBANGO REPORTEDLY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SQUEEZE UNITA

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IN A PINCER MOVEMENT. UNITA FORCES IN THE HUAMBO AREA ARE DEPLOYED IN SMALL, HIGHLY MOBILE UNITS, EACH CONSISTING OF 10 TO 15 MEN, AND SHUN LARGE CUBAN UNITS. IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER THE UNITA GUERRILLA TACTICS, THE NUMBER OF CUBAN UNITS REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN INCREASED. THEY ARE TO BE DEPLOYED IN 50-MAN GROUPS FOR QUICK REACTION AND BETTER MOBILITY. CUBAN FORCES OPERATING OUT OF LUBANGO, WHILE BEING DEPLOYED TOWARD HUAMBO, ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE VERY SUCCESSFUL AGAINST THE UNITA FORCES OPERATING IN HUILA PROVINCE. SAVIMBI IS ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT UNITA WAS COMPELLED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA AROUND NGIVA AS A RESULT OF A CUBAN OPERATION REPORTEDLY ASSISTED BY FORCES FROM THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION.

5. ~~(S/NF/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-(G) A SUCCESSFUL UNITA OPERATION WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST CATOTA IN EARLY NOVEMBER. APPROXIMATELY 350 CUBANS WERE STATIONED THERE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE ROAD LINK BETWEEN BIE AND MENONGUE. CATOTA IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT CONTROLS THE NORTHERN SUPPLY ROUTE TO MENONGUE, POTENTIALLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC LOCATION IN CENTRAL-SOUTHERN ANGOLA. IF CUBAN AND ANGOLAN FORCES CAN BE PREVENTED FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF MENONGUE'S LOCATION, UNITA IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. ~~(S/NF/NOCONTRACT)~~ RECENT EVENTS INDICATE THAT UNITA HAS RECEIVED NEW WEAPONS FROM ZAIRE THAT MAY BE PART OF THE ESTIMATED 25 TONS OF MILITARY AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT BEING SUPPLIED BY FRANCE. FURTHERMORE, MOROCCO REPORTEDLY HAS PROVIDED UNITA WITH A MOBILE 25-KW RADIO BROADCAST STATION FOR DELIVERY AFTER FRENCH TECHNICIANS HAVE BEEN RECRUITED AND TRAINED IN MOROCCO. A MASS COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY WILL ALLOW SAVIMBI TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTENSIVE ANIMOSITY THAT THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE AND MILITARY HAVE TOWARD THE CUBANS.

7. ~~(S/NF/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATE AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TIME FOR THE CUBAN COMMAND, WHICH IS NOT READY TO RISK LARGE COMBAT LOSSES AGAINST UNITA. HOWEVER, IF HAVANA INCREASES ITS STRENGTH IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, STICKS TO ITS POLICY OF MAINTAINING UNIT INTEGRITY, DIRECTS ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA -- RATHER THAN SIMPLY OCCUPYING TOWNS AND VILLAGES -- AND ACCEPTS INCREASED LOSSES, ITS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST UNITA MAY INCREASE. NONETHELESS, EVEN THESE POLICIES WILL NOT WIN THE STRUGGLE, THOUGH THEY MAY CONVINCE SAVIMBI THAT A TOTAL

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GUERRILLA VICTORY IS NOT POSSIBLE SO LONG AS CUBA WITH SOVIET SUPPORT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE STRUGGLE. WE MAY CONCLUDE THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WORKED OUT WITH PRESIDENT NETO REMAINS THE BEST SOLUTION.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

[redacted]

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DIADIN 770-76
9 MARCH 1976

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
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SITUATION REPORT



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
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SOUTHERN AFRICA

SITUATION REPORT.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORNTIES)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(Continued)

9 Mar 76 DIADIN 770-76

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manner. President Kaunda of Zambia has also indicated that any support to UNITA must be given in utmost secrecy.

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ In Southeastern Africa, Tanzania has offered to increase its support for Rhodesian nationalist guerrillas in Mozambique. Tanzania has agreed to furnish 60 army officers to Mozambique to train Rhodesian insurgents and to send an infantry battalion to help guard the border with Rhodesia. The Tanzanian Government has also agreed to immediately furnish antiaircraft weapons and is considering sending artillery, including SA-2/GUIDELINE missiles. President Nyerere has authorised, in principle, the dispatch of Tanzanian forces for combat in Rhodesia, but conditions for such deployment were not disclosed. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 770-76
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Intelligence Appraisal

CUBA: THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY (U)

31 MARCH 1977

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
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
CUBA - AFRICA

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CASTRO MAKES THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY (U)



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CUBA: THIRD-WORLD JOURNEY. (U)

Summary

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ President Fidel Castro's monthlong swing through Africa and the Arabian Peninsula included stops in Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ His East African mission was notable in that potential adversaries were courted on consecutive legs of the itinerary without engendering negative publicity. Public reaction to his whirlwind travels was uniformly effusive. He even engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Somalia and Ethiopia.

~~(S/NOFORN/~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1 ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ While there is speculation that he may have been looking for economic assistance from North African and Middle Eastern states, it seems that the odyssey was designed to impress on the countries of the region -- which comprise a significant portion of the nonaligned movement -- Castro's revolutionary credentials and, more importantly, a willingness to aid regimes with technology and materiel. Castro also may have wanted to evaluate Cuban presence in the area. Havana has personnel in Somalia and Tanzania, but relations with Ethiopia have not yet developed to the point that advisers have been posted. One motivation for visiting Addis Ababa may have been to offer such assistance.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ For political as well as economic reasons, Castro sees Africa as a fertile field for assistance. Havana has taken pains not to become embroiled in regional rivalries, maintaining friendly ties with adversaries wherever possible. Cuba's message to African states is very likely embellished with its not unimpressive track record. It has maintained its opposition to the

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US for almost two decades and seems to be on the verge of gaining official acceptance through Washington's willingness to consider rapprochement.

Discussion

North Africa

~~(S/NOFORN/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 ~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Castro made a one-day stop in Algeria and then left for Libya to attempt a reconciliation with that country's Chairman Col Qadhafi. He made ceremonial appearances at national celebrations, including the People's National Congress, which ratified Qadhafi as its secretary general.

~~(S/NOFORN/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 ~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban leaders were reportedly convinced that such nations as Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria held promise for economic assistance for Havana's beleagured economy. To improve chances for this, Castro first had to try to eradicate the residue of ill will -- remaining from a 1973 incident in Algeria -- between himself and Qadhafi. At the 1973 nonaligned conference, the Libyan strong man made a public display of leaving the room when Castro began to speak, saying that the Cuban leader was a "puppet" of the Soviets and could not be a member of the nonaligned movement. This most recent Castro-Qadhafi meeting stressed the ability of the two nations to pursue different paths within the movement, an indication of their continuing disagreement.

~~(S/NOFORN/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 ~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ No real change in the attitude of the Libyan strong man toward Castro seems to have emerged from the visit. President Castro came to Tripoli convinced that Chairman Qadhafi was unbalanced and reportedly left with the same impression. Qadhafi quite likely still considers Castro a tool of the Soviets, although he may be willing to tolerate him, given Cuba's proven fighting ability in Angola. Moreover, Qadhafi is said to be anxious to establish links

with the small Caribbean states, and he would probably consider this difficult unless he improves relations with Havana.

Arabian Peninsula

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ On 10 March, Castro flew to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), apparently to make concrete commitments to that regime. Cuba already has 350 military advisers aiding the PDRY in militia training; a similarly sized civilian contingent is also there. Cuban involvement with Aden began in 1972, and it has burgeoned into the largest of Havana's programs in the Middle East. The purpose of the visit to South Yemen was most likely to demonstrate solidarity with the needs of that government as well as to make an on-site inspection of Cuba's presence there.

East Africa

Somalia

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Castro made two consecutive stops to nations that have competing objectives in the subregion. Stopping first in Somalia, where Cuban presence complements a larger Soviet one, he very likely reviewed joint Somali-Cuban agreements, which have resulted in deployment of some 300 Cuban advisory personnel. Some of them have been training Issas tribesmen expelled from the neighboring French Territory of Afars and Issas (FTAI), which both Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa are anxious to gain control of, especially the Indian Ocean port of Djibouti. When the French leave the territory this summer, a struggle for control of the port will very likely ensue.

Ethiopia

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Castro next flew to neighboring Ethiopia with the probable intent of offering aid to Addis Ababa as well

as getting both Somalia and Ethiopia to try to reconcile their differences. Cuba's embassy there has only been staffed for the past 10 months, although diplomatic relations were established in mid-1975. Recently, however, Cuba has stepped up its contact with the military regime. In late February, shortly after Ethiopian strong man Mengistu purged rival military officers, a five-man delegation visited Addis Ababa. During the well publicized visit, Arnaldo Ochoa, the Cuban general heading the delegation, was reported to have been sharply critical of the Eritrean guerrilla movement, a former recipient of limited Cuban aid.

Tanzania

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/UNINTEL)~~ Castro next flew to Tanzania. Some 300 to 500 Cuban advisers, primarily providing civilian assistance to the Nyerere government, are in that country. They are helping the Tanzanians on sugar-harvesting technology at the Ruipa project. One aspect of the Castro-Nyerere talks might have been to interest the east African leader in Cuban military advisory support to "Patriotic Front" guerrillas targeted against Rhodesia.

Mozambique

~~(S/NOFORN/UNINTEL)~~ Cuban assistance to the guerrilla factions in Mozambique now totals about 1,000 personnel, including 600 military. Though President Castro and Mozambican President Samora Machel attempted to give the impression of mutual warmth and friendship, official communiques gave no details on specific Cuban assistance contemplated for the Maputo government. The joint statement covered a wide range of issues, including criticism of alleged US "colonialism" in Puerto Rico and the government of army Gen Augusto Pinochet in Chile.

Angola

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Angola, ceremonial visits were made to places associated with the Angolan civil war which, without the massive assistance rendered

by Havana, very likely would have been lost by the MPLA. In a public address to Angolan throngs, Castro stated vociferously that his country would aid Angola so long as Luanda needed it, reiterating that there would be "no limit" to the amount available to the administration of Agostinho Neto. The official portion of the Castro visit ended 30 March, and the Cuban leader left Angola the next day.

Outlook

~~(S/NOFORN/~~(b)(3):50 USC 403-1~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ This is only the third extended trip for Castro in his 18 years of rule. If he continues with a stopover in the USSR, it could be his longest ever. There is something of the showman in the Castro style this trip, perhaps an indication that he believed the time was right for such a sojourn and that the countries visited would welcome him with open arms. Had Cuban leaders made this same journey a few years ago, the greetings might not have been so prolific. Just four years ago, Castro was facing third world criticism that his revolutionary zeal had eroded and that he was only a "lackey" of Moscow.

~~(S/NOFORN/~~(b)(3):50 USC 403-1~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ In a larger sense, Castro's trip demonstrates the success of his foreign policy, especially its African approach. It appears that Havana is now more subtle and sophisticated in his dealings on the African Continent, apparently mindful of tensions there as well as regional and tribal rivalries. Furthermore, a coherency has evolved in that policy; most programs of assistance are viewed by the Cubans in terms of continental aspects of the aid rather than being based solely on the need of a particular regime.

~~(S/NOFORN/~~(b)(3):50 USC 403-1~~/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban orientation toward East Africa has another more direct benefit for the Castro government. In furthering the spread of Cuban presence throughout the region, Havana also gains leverage in

the third world nonaligned movement. Leaders like Julius Nyerere and Samora Machel are formidable allies for the Cuban leader to have when he presides over the next nonaligned summit in Havana in 1979. Potential adversaries, such as Libya's Qadhafi, have not been neutralized, but at least now they might appreciate the Cuban revolutionary program, as a result of Castro's personal diplomacy. Moreover, it is hard to denigrate the impact of Cuban presence in areas of the third world, where liberation movements have succeeded against "imperialist" forces.

~~(S/NOFORN,~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Part of the Cuban mission to Africa involves longer term plans for the eventual removal of the Ian Smith government in Rhodesia. Last year, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Machel of Mozambique were known to oppose large-scale Cuban participation in the guerrilla campaign against Rhodesia. Castro's visit to Tanzania more than likely addressed the projected Cuban role in the Rhodesian struggle over the long haul.

~~(S/NOFORN,~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Castro may have also attempted to make his African policies more multinational to overcome possible criticism that he was intervening in internal African political matters. He would be hard pressed to disguise his Soviet alliances, however, and will at best only divert attention from the role Moscow plays.

~~(S/NOFORN,~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Most interesting about the Castro trip was the widespread acclaim with which the Cuban President was greeted. Crowds were large -- perhaps filled by governmental manipulation -- but, nonetheless, effusive in their praise. The ease with which he visited countries, at times on very short notice, demonstrated that he has achieved something of a superstar status among leaders of the newly independent African states. Cuba's Angolan success and the renewed revolutionary image that it has attained are the probable bases for these feelings.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-3(c) ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Another manifestation of the Castro success was his attempts to conduct shuttle diplomacy between feuding regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia. One source suggests that the sole objective of the visit to Addis Ababa was to promote reconciliation between those governments. Reportedly, the two sides agreed to hold such talks at a later date and at a neutral site. On the larger aspects of Cuban diplomatic and military initiatives in the East African region, Castro is said to have proffered his analysis of problems facing the "progressive" states there, suggesting that Cuba might aid the nations of the region in uniting them against the threats of "imperialism."

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Fidel Castro's journey to African and Middle Eastern members of the third world may mark the start of an increased effort to implement his goal to present a united "anti-imperialist" front. Obviously, Cuba gains from these initiatives, promoting itself as the leader of the nonaligned movement. Nevertheless, it remains tied to the USSR in its dealings with these nations, and it will have to eradicate the impression that it is merely fronting for Moscow. Overall, Cuban and Soviet objectives merge in Africa, and it is difficult for Havana to convince some governments that it is pursuing its own interests. Whether Fidel Castro has had success in dispelling doubts about his independence from Moscow or whether this is an impediment to Cuban-African relations is still moot. In any event, the Cuban leader apparently has now established himself as an important force in the nonaligned movement. ~~(XGDS-1 and 2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

ANGOLA: NETO BESIEGED WITH PROBLEMS(U)

15 JUNE 1977

(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

[redacted]

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
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ANGOLA:

NETO BESIEGED WITH PROBLEMS (U)



ANGOLA

DIAIAPPR 194-77
15 JUNE 1977

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FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL



PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

PRESIDENT AGOSTINHO NETO

UNCLASSIFIED

ANGOLA: NETO BESIEGED WITH PROBLEMS (U)

Summary

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Angolan President Agostinho Neto is fighting for his political life and the economic survival of Angola, and present indications show that he is losing. His primary base of political support in Luanda and within the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is deteriorating. This became evident when he ousted Nito Alves from the Movement's central committee, resulting in a revolt against his government that jeopardized his political, military, and public support.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The economy continues its downward slide, and public dissatisfaction is increasing. Revitalizing the economy, however, is dependent upon a satisfactory conclusion to the internal insurgency being waged on three fronts. Neto has been unsuccessful in his efforts against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, National Front for the Liberation of Angola, and Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda insurgencies and, in fact, appears to be losing. Soviet materiel aid and Cuban troops and equipment have not been very effective in quelling the insurgency. Consequently, Neto's prospects for survival as President of Angola are not good because of his continuing loss of political support, unsuccessful efforts against the insurgent groups, and his inability to get the economy moving.

Background

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Neto's reaction to the revolt that took place in the capital of Luanda on 27 May indicates that he is losing control of the situation. Since the revolt was put down, there has been a countrywide purge of government officials, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) officers, and other individuals.

OPPOSITION TO NETO MOUNTING



JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI

PRESIDENT: UNITA



HOLDEN ALVARO ROBERTO

PRESIDENT: FNLA



NITO ALVES

FORMER MINISTER
OF THE INTERIOR,
MPLA GOVERNMENT


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~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) The catalytic event that evolved into a revolt against the Neto government was the ousting of former interior minister Nito Alves from the MPLA central committee. Reportedly, the "lower classes" were profoundly shocked by this action. Neto, however, is supposed to have anticipated the negative reaction to Alves' explusion, but felt that he had no alternative. He reportedly believed that it was necessary to "supplant" Alves' appeal to the masses before the MPLA central committee meeting set for this fall.

~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Alves' rise to influence was said to have stemmed from his selection to accompany President Neto to the Lusaka conference of 1974, where the differences separating the central committee, dissident active revolt (RA), and the eastern revolt of MPLA were thrashed out. Although the conference failed to pull the rival factions together, Alves had new political stature and returned to Luanda where he was utilized to organize the poor through public appearances and later by radio broadcasts. In his efforts to win support of the "fringe" elements of the Angolan population, Alves is reported to have "encouraged racism, physical attacks on whites, and wealthy people, and forceful expropriation of the "ill-gotten" gains of private citizens during the colonial period."

~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Alves subsequently developed a strong following among the "lower classes" and eventually was chosen to be interior minister, which put him in contact with the people in neighborhood communities at the regional and provincial levels. In this capacity, he continued his diatribes against whites, mulattoes, Portuguese, and property owners. Eventually, his encouragement of racism and a drive for power led him to speak out against Neto and other MPLA leaders, resulting in his position being abolished last October and finally to his ouster from the central committee on 20 May.

AREAS OF INSURGENT OPERATIONS



CI-AO-1 9/76

Discussion


~~(S/RNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT,~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Although it can be argued that Alves presented the opportunity for Neto to consolidate his position, the combined political, economic, and military situation seemed to dictate that Alves' ouster was a serious mistake, highlighted by the revolt on 27 May and the present purge. Reportedly, Alves support in Luanda and the outer areas, as well as in the military, is growing stronger as conditions in Angola worsen. The extent of his support among the masses or in the military, however, is still not clear. The RA faction of MPLA is also said to be getting stronger, with many people saying openly that RA leaders may well be their salvation in view of the growing chaos and "misadministration." The news media are now becoming more critical of what is happening. A provincial commissar is reported to have attacked Neto's government, calling the ministers "corrupt and incompetent" and adding that visits by the "incompetent ministers and their lackeys have produced nothing but words." It is further reported that the food situation is critical. Crops are not being planted, children are dying of malnutrition, and the educational system in Luanda is essentially only for the children of East European diplomats.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The base of Neto's political support is in the capital and within MPLA, both of which show signs of collapsing. Identified as supporters of the revolt were elements within MPLA, the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), members of the MPLA Youth Organization, the National Union of Angolan Workers, and the Angolan Women's Organization. This suggests the potential of "grassroot" elements uniting with political and military factions against Neto's government in his own "backyard." Consequently, it is questionable as to whether he still has a power base there. He remains in control because the revolt was not focused solely on "his overthrow" but to demonstrate against the regime for its treatment of Alves. Another indicator of

public discontent was an antigovernment demonstration in the northern town of Samba-Caju on 10 April touched off by the shooting of two popular defense committee officials by FAPLA militiamen. The demonstrators protested against harassment by FAPLA troops and demanded that Neto visit the town. Some of them are supposed to have chanted "down with communism". Although FAPLA units were ordered not to fire on the civilians, it is reported that they would do so in the event of a similar demonstration in order "to make the people respect the law."

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In regards to the economy, its vitality is virtually nil. Recently, a Swedish delegation led by Minister for Development Cooperation Ola Ullsten Heineback visited Luanda and departed with an appreciation of Angola's "severe problems and need for assistance." Heineback commented that the upshot of the visit was that the Angolans "needed everything." The central concern expressed by the Angolans, he said, "is to stabilize the country, to be left alone, and to get on with rebuilding an economy that they admit remains shattered." The economy has little momentum of its own, except that provided by the Gulf Oil Company in the Cabinda enclave. It is stagnating because it lacks an infrastructure and cannot function with political instability and internecine fighting. Even a stable Angolan regime without an internal insurgency would face years of hardship in attempting to cope with the problems of merging African provincialism with modern technology. Consequently, Angola's economy will not reach a "take-off" position until the distant future. Before it approaches that point, political stability and termination of the internal insurgencies are needed.





~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In addition to the UNITA insurgency, the FNLA continues to operate in northern Angola as does the FLEC in the Cabinda enclave. Both groups exert considerable pressure on government forces and consequently prevent them from controlling their respective areas of responsibility. In addition to the three-front insurgency involving UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC, dissidence is developing near Luanda, an area previously believed secure for MPLA. Although there does not yet appear to be a formal organization and membership cannot be determined, this fourth front appears to involve government, military, and civilian factions.

Outlook

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ As Neto's position deteriorates, a sense of futility and fatigue appears to be emerging within the military and among the populace. Neto is no longer perceived as capable of


handling the problems facing Angola. If military efforts against the insurgents continue to fail and public discontent expands, Neto's survival and perhaps even that of the MPLA in its present form are doubtful. Soviet materiel aid and Cuban troop and equipment support obviously are failing to meet the requirements necessary to defeat the three insurgent groups confronting Neto. Furthermore, the Soviets and Cubans have not been able to cope with the economic situation. Their efforts so far have been concentrated on the military challenge while virtually ignoring the economic dislocations. The rapid state of economic decline suggests that the Soviet and Cuban commitment will have to increase significantly in order to prevent further erosion of the MPLA's position and support for Neto. The recent deployment of additional Cuban forces probably reflects this situation and indicates an emphasis on seeking a military solution to what essentially is a political-economic problem.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Neto's ability to maintain his political support and to consolidate MPLA control over the countryside is doubtful. As his political support continues to erode and the people become more discontented with the military and economic situations, Neto will probably lose his ability to stay in power. The USSR and Cuba apparently have not determined the extent of their pledge to Neto and may allow him to fall from power as a natural course of events, while continuing their commitment to Angola. A new leader, however, would be faced with the same problems, and, although there might be some inital hope for a better performance, no appreciable improvement is possible until some fundamental policy changes deal with resolving the military situation. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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Intelligence Appraisal

Angola: Trends in the UNITA Insurgency (U)

15 MARCH 1984

COPY NO. 168

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
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(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)
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Intelligence Appraisal

Angola:
Trends in the UNITA Insurgency (U)

DIAIAPPR 30-84

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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Angola: Trends in the UNITA Insurgency (U)

Summary

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 40 A review of statistics on the insurgency that now affects most of the Angolan countryside confirms often sketchy and biased reports on recent trends in the conflict between the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government's Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Nearly all the figures used for this appraisal were taken from an equal number of insurgent and government reports. For the most part, specific numerical indications as well as general accounts of the internal Angolan situation describe a conflict in which the level of hostilities has continued to rise and which now affects even larger expanses of territory. Without dramatic military or diplomatic developments, hostilities are expected to last for several years. Consequently, Luanda will quite likely urge its Soviet and Cuban allies to provide additional materiel assistance and become more active in counterinsurgency operations.

Discussion

Casualties

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) One of the most striking developments in the last 3 years is the dramatic increase in FAPLA casualties. The growing number of fatalities suffered by government forces confirms most reports from the same period, which pointed to consistent FAPLA reverses in encounters with UNITA. Nevertheless, large discrepancies between the number of FAPLA killed and wounded remain unexplained. In military hostilities, wounded personnel are expected to outnumber those killed.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 The number of FAPLA wounded seems abnormally low, raising doubts about the accuracy of battlefield reports. In early 1980, a reliable source said UNITA leaders estimated the insurgents' battlefield accounts were about 75-percent accurate, noting that the guerrillas' reports were known to be exaggerated occasionally. Where possible, UNITA's intelligence coordinators tried to compare guerrilla-supplied statistics with information obtained from intercepted FAPLA messages. If recent FAPLA casualties were adjusted downward to reflect this distortion, they would still represent a significant upward trend. Alternatively, the guerrillas probably do not always know the precise number of wounded government personnel, especially if the latter escape or retreat before an engagement is ended. Consequently, information on many more wounded FAPLA personnel may not have surfaced in some reports. FAPLA casualties for 1983 indicate the past year's fighting has taken its toll on about 18 percent of Angola's roughly 35,000-man army. The urgency with which Luanda spent the latter half of 1983 scouring the country for recruits and recently called up 16-year-old Angolan males to register for military service suggests these statistics, though incomplete, are reasonably accurate.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~(S/NF/NC)~~ (b)(1) 1.4 (c)


Statistics of the UNITA Insurgency


Casualties	1983	1982	1981	1980	1979
Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA)					
Killed	6,404	2,951	1,536	1,730	786
Wounded	391	300	960	176	92
Captured (By UNITA)	431	105	147	13	49
People's Militia (ODP)					
Killed	597	518	369	282	114
Wounded	218	271	300	183	12
Captured	130	214	87	20	16
Civilians					
Killed	501	1,296	710	391	57
Wounded	390	557	685	142	81
Captured	368	1,247	578	114	82
UNITA Insurgents					
Killed	448	216	145	270	118
Wounded	577	120	224	65	217
Captured	30	25	68	63	4
Cubans					
Killed	534	252	—	—	—
Wounded	71	51	—	—	—
Captured	1	—	—	—	—

	1983		1982		1981		1980		1979	
Weapons Captured	**By UNITA**	**FAPLA**	**UNITA**	**FAPLA**	**UNITA**	**FAPLA**	**UNITA**	**FAPLA**	**UNITA**	**FAPLA**
Pistols, rifles, machineguns	5,131	39	3,134	52	681	40	953	115	762	21
Mortars, RPGs, recoilless weapons	926	4	307	3	158	10	68	5	—	4
Artillery pieces, AAA, SAMs	140	—	47	—	7	1	52	1	—	—
Mines, grenades	1,052	9	52	1	177	6	203	8	17	—
Trucks, vehicles	6	—	81	—	120	1	148	—	26	—
Radios	108	—	100	—	23	—	13	—	4	—

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ [redacted] (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)





~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 In many respects, civilian casualties would be a more worrisome statistic, especially for Luanda. Until 1983, trends in the civilian sector matched those experienced by Angola's armed forces. Nevertheless, the striking drop in the 1983 figures raises questions similar to those prompted by FAPLA statistics. Whether the drop in civilian losses simply reflects changes in government and insurgent reports is not clear since they might have been released for propaganda purposes. Alternatively, the 1983 civilian casualty figures may reflect changing UNITA tactics stemming from a politically motivated decision to reduce the frequency of its attacks on economically important civilian targets and to concentrate instead on military installations. Another explanation could be a large exodus from the countryside by civilians seeking refuge in the cities, thereby reducing the number of civilians likely to be killed or injured in the insurgency.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 Casualties sustained by UNITA also are mounting proportionately and as quickly as those by government forces and Cuban personnel. This trend confirms reports that UNITA has increased the frequency of its operations and continues to deploy conventionally organized, battalion-size units in large attacks on isolated but bigger government outposts. In fact, the insurgents may have suffered as much as 10 percent of their 1983 casualties during the August battle for Cangamba, where 3,000 insurgents besieged and, after 2 weeks of heavy fighting, overran a 1,500-man FAPLA garrison.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 4 The size of UNITA's losses at Cangamba has prompted speculation about the likelihood of the insurgents launching similar attacks in coming months. Insofar as known statistics are reliable, UNITA's 1983 losses represent some 3 percent of an estimated 35,000-man armed force, which reportedly continues to be resupplied and enlarged by a steady stream of recruits. Moreover, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi recently said the insurgents plan to mount attacks against larger towns and cities despite expectations that these assaults will take a heavier toll of guerrilla casualties. The late January attack against the eastern town of Luau also underscores UNITA's announced intentions.

Weapons Captured


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(U) Fleet of Soviet-Made Vehicles Captured by UNITA.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 1(i) UNITA'S plans to mount more frequent and larger operations will greatly hinge on the insurgents' ability to acquire more weapons, whether captured from government forces or obtained from outside sources. During the late 1970s, France, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, China, and South Africa were instrumental in providing UNITA with military and financial support. In recent years, most of these sources have reportedly dried up, and UNITA's external aid is now thought to come almost solely from South Africa. Pretoria probably has not compensated for the entire amount of assistance once provided by six states formerly sympathetic to UNITA's cause or for the vastly increased amount needed to sustain UNITA's expanded operations. Because of diminishing outside support, UNITA in the late 1970s took measures to become more self-sufficient. In early 1981, a reliable source said, as of the previous June, UNITA was capturing about half of its weapons and ammunition from FAPLA while the remainder was acquired from foreign suppliers.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



(U) UNITA Continues to Expand its Area of Operations.

By late 1980, UNITA was relying on captured weapons for more than 50 percent of its needs. This increase was reportedly due to both UNITA's greater success against FAPLA and the cutbacks in weapons from outside sources. Whether UNITA continues to obtain weapons at the same rate is not clear. If so, the acquisitions would help the insurgents keep pace with the growth in the number of their armed members, estimated to have increased by as much as 10,000 in the last 3 years.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) For the last 2 years, the number of individual weapons captured by UNITA has very closely paralleled the number of FAPLA fatalities inflicted by the insurgents. Although this parallel may not have a bearing on the reliability of various reports, it suggests some internal consistency over many years. An equally striking, potentially more significant trend emerges from the growing number of artillery and antiaircraft weapons captured by UNITA forces in the last few years. Several sources indicate the insurgents are using these weapons with their semiconventional battalions during attacks on larger government garrisons. The caliber of weapons covers a fairly large spectrum and includes guns up to at least 76 mm. A more precise breakdown of weapons reportedly captured in 1983 reveals 22 BM-21 GRAD 122-mm multiple rocket launchers, as well as 32 14.5-mm and 46 12.7-mm antiaircraft guns.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) Most, if not all, BM-21s were captured in 1983. No evidence, however,

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) UNITA Insurgents Seize FAPLA Weapons After an Attack.

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Soviet-Made 14.5mm Antiaircraft Gun Captured by UNITA Guerrillas.

suggests UNITA has used them. On the other hand, the insurgents quite likely have used the antiaircraft weapons to shoot down an undetermined number of FAPLA helicopters and an occasional transport over the last 2 years. UNITA recently downed what may have been one of Luanda's recently acquired Mi-24/HIND helicopters. Whether antiaircraft weapons or one of several SA-7/GRAIL surface-to-air missile launchers captured by the insurgents brought down the helicopter is not clear. Moreover, some recent UNITA successes against FAPLA tanks and armored cars may be due to the use of captured B-10 82-mm recoilless weapons, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, or antitank mines — all of which the insurgents have acquired in past years. Nevertheless, UNITA will have to obtain more advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons before it can pose a serious threat to heavily defended provincial capitals. Current trends suggest they could soon acquire the necessary capability.

Outlook

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i) Most recent assessments of the Angolan insurgency predict a continuation of the general trends prevailing over the past few years. The most important trend is

FAPLA's persistent inability to locate, engage, or defeat great numbers of UNITA guerrillas. Despite occasional, unconfirmed government reports, FAPLA has yet to inflict a single major defeat on the insurgents in recent years. Moreover, Cuban forces have been augmented in each of the last 3 years, and Soviet arms deliveries in 1985 far exceeded those of previous years.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC,~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 If casualty and weapon statistics continue to mount, Moscow will come under increasing pressure to provide Luanda with additional military assistance. Likewise, Havana's 30,000-man expeditionary force is likely to assume an even more active role in counterinsurgency operations. Barring a coup in Luanda, major battlefield reversals for FAPLA or UNITA, or a diplomatic breakthrough, hostilities in Angola are expected to last for several years. Despite the shortcomings inherent in relying on combat statistics, a further monitoring of these reports can supplement verification of what are otherwise likely to be biased accounts of the ebb and flow of the Angolan insurgency. (Classified by DoD Dir S-5200.17 (M-2); ~~declassify on: OADR~~)

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The Angola-Namibia Border Region: Potential For Military Movement (U)

Defense Research Assessment

Defense Intelligence Agency

DDB-2000-141 89
March 1989

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The Angola-Namibia Border Region: Potential for Military Movement (U)

A Defense Research Assessment

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC 424 *Defense Intelligence Agency*

Product Manager: (b)(3):10 USC 424
Global Analysis Division
(b)(3):10 USC 424

Information Cutoff Date: 17 October 1988

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~~Declassify on: [illegible]~~

DDB-2000-141-89

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The Angola-Namibia Border Region: Potential for Military Movement (U)

KEY JUDGMENTS

(S) Currently, military forces of the Cuban Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the South-West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa all are thought to be present in the Angola Namibia border region. Movement of these forces will be constrained by the nature of the terrain and by climatic conditions as well as by existing lines of communication and availability of airfields.

- About 70 percent of the border region terrain is unfavorable for vehicular cross-country movement. Large-scale military movements are largely dependent upon existing lines of communication (LOCs). Any Cuban movements will likely use existing LOCs.

- Border region LOCs are sparse, most are unable to sustain continuous or heavy movement, and are subject to seasonal flooding and washout which render them impassable.

- Oppressive desert climate and onslaught of the wet season (October or November-April) are additional factors limiting potential military operations.

- Border region LOCs are sparse; most are unable to sustain continuous or heavy movement, and are subject to seasonal flooding and washout which render them impassable.

- Cuban movement from southwestern Angola, either southward into Namibia, or eastward into UNITA-held territory, is considered unlikely.

- Angolan airfields in the region are being upgraded and would play an important role in supporting any Cuban/FAPLA movement southward

- Cuban movement eastward along the Angola side of the border is unlikely due to unfavorable terrain and lack of roads. Cuban movement southward, then eastward through Namibia, is unlikely for political-military reasons and because of inhospitable terrain, although existing LOCs are more favorable in this area.

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


Figure 1. (S) Angola-Namibia Border Study Region.

The Angola-Namibia Border Region: Potential for Military Movement (U)

Introduction


(S) Recent events along the Angola-Namibia border have demonstrated the importance of this remote area. Currently, troops of the Cuban Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa forces are thought to be present in the border region. Any movement of these forces will be governed by the nature of the terrain and the potential this affords for vehicular cross-country movement, as well as by climatic conditions, existing lines of communication, and availability of airfields. For purposes of this assessment, the study area will consist of the region extending from 15 degrees South latitude to 20 degrees South latitude. The study area extends north-south approximately 550 kilometers, and from the South Atlantic coastline inland and eastward for approximately 1,400 kilometers through the Caprivi Strip (figure 1).

Cross-Country Movement

(S) Overall, conditions for cross-country movement (CCM) of tracked or wheeled vehicles over unprepared terrain surfaces across 70 percent or more of the study area are most unfavorable. (This assessment equates to rating categories of POOR and UNSUITED on Cross-Country Movement Map, figure 2). In addition, most of the more favorable terrain surfaces comprising flat to rolling interior plains become seasonally difficult and locally impassable due to wet soils and flooding. In most areas, prevailing terrain conditions would require a heavy dependence upon existing roads for large-scale through movement or maneuvers throughout most of the year.

(S) The coastal area of Angola, north of the border with Namibia, is occupied by the northern reaches of the Namib Desert. From the coast inland, for about 50 kilometers, the terrain consists mainly of low, loose sand dunes, many of which have short, steep slopes. The interdune areas are locally rough and often contain boulders. Vegetation is generally lacking. The overall potential for CCM in this area would be considered POOR. Slopes are generally 40 percent or steeper. Tracked vehicles would be slowed by loose sand and the steep slopes of the dunes, but some movement would be possible in the interdune areas. The potential for CCM of wheeled vehicles would be somewhat similar to that of tracked vehicles, but would be limited to parts of interdune areas unless the vehicles were equipped with special tires. Movement of foot troops cross-country would be fairly easy, but could be slowed by the loose sand associated with the dunes.

(S) From approximately 50 to 250 kilometers inland from the Angola coast, the terrain consists of variable, mostly irregular relief that includes escarpments, severely dissected plains, rugged microrelief, and numerous cliffs. This area is largely UNSUITED for all vehicular CCM. Slopes are generally 45 percent or steeper. The area is crossed by a few widely spaced streams and many smaller streams, all of which have steep banks. Streams may be flooded for a few hours to a day or two following heavy rains. Soils tend to be firm most of the year, but become soft or miry for brief periods following heavy rains. Vegetation tends to be chiefly savanna (grassland with scattered trees and shrubs) or deciduous forest. Attempted CCM of tracked vehicles would be severely restricted by steep-banked streams in areas of low to moderate relief. Movement would probably be confined to interstream areas, but would be hindered



ANGOLA NAMIBIA BORDER AREA

CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT

GOOD

Flat to gently rolling plains with scattered hills locally stony ground and some cliffs in Angola, surfaces mostly clear except for scattered hillocks and small pans and areas of low sand dunes in Namib Desert slopes generally less than 10%, soils mostly sandy or gravelly and firm occasionally slippery vegetation mostly grasslands low brush and open forest

FAIR

Flat to gently rolling or moderately sloping plains and hills slopes generally less than 30% but steeper locally moderately dissected areas, some cliffs some low steep sand dunes in Angola, widely spaced hillocks and low ridges, surfaces locally gullied or dissected with many steep banked streams mainly intermittent in the east and shallow grassy drainageways, soils mostly firm, except occasionally soft or miry in the east (November to March) and where flooded near streams for short periods January through May, vegetation mainly grassland with scrub and forest patches, vegetation lacking in parts of Angola, elsewhere mostly grasslands some cultivated areas and open to dense forest stands

POOR

Dissected plains hills, and scattered mountains with some narrow valleys and ravines, numerous low escarpments and rugged microrelief in some areas, slopes generally 10 to 30% or steeper, some flat to rolling, poorly drained plains with numerous shallow depressions and grassy drainageways, numerous streams, some with adjacent marshes many steep banked, deep and seasonally high with flooding of adjacent areas December to June, soils firm most of the year, in places soft, miry, or flooded elsewhere after heavy showers and during rainy season vegetation ranges from scattered thorny brush and sparse grasslands in Angola to grassland, savannah, cropland and dense forest patches elsewhere

UNSUITED

Hills mountains and severely dissected plains rugged microrelief and numerous cliffs and escarpments in places shifting sand dunes in the Namib Desert slopes generally 30 to 45% or steeper elsewhere marshes swamps and periodically flooded flat plains and bottom lands numerous streams in most areas banked or bogged by marshy or soft miry floodplains soils firm but often rocky on slopes and elevations surfaces of intersecting basins and valley floors often rough or boulder strewn interfluvial areas usually form gravelly and discontinuous vegetation ranges from barren dunes and slopes to open forest grasslands and dense deciduous forests

Scale
0 125 250 Statute Miles
0 125 250 Kilometers

[illegible]

Figure 2.

[illegible] precluded by [illegible] soft soils and flooded streams. In areas of moderate to high relief, movement would generally be precluded by steep slopes but would be locally feasible in valleys. CCM of wheeled vehicles is probably precluded in most places but may be locally feasible in small savanna areas. Movement of foot troops cross-country would be slowed by the steep slopes of the dissected terrain and in some places precluded by escarpments.

⟷ Within Angola, in the area extending eastward from approximately 250 kilometers inland and south to the border, the terrain consists mainly of hills, extensive dissected upland plains, scattered mountains, numerous low escarpments, and some areas of rugged microrelief. The overall potential for vehicular cross-country movement in this area is POOR. Vegetation consists primarily of scattered grasses, thick spiny shrubs, and trees that range in size from scrub to full grown (generally less than 10 meters high). Vegetative spacing ranges from scattered to moderately dense. CCM for tracked vehicles would be moderately to severely hindered by trees and shrubs and precluded in some places by dense vegetation. Movement would be fairly easy in grass-covered areas. Many shallow, closely spaced drainageways can be found in this area. Drainageways tend to be flooded or to have soft soils most years from December to June. Soils are generally firm the remainder of the year. From December to June, movement would be precluded by the closely spaced drainageways that are either flooded or contain miry conditions. CCM of wheeled vehicles would be severely hindered or precluded. Movement of foot troops cross-country would be slowed by scrub, thorns, and spiny shrubs. On-foot movement is difficult or impossible when drainageways are flooded, but when dry, the drainageways can be utilized as axes for movement. Overall CCM conditions are perennially UNSUITED along numerous larger streams and rivers, including the Rio Cuando.

⟷ South of the border, extending up to 250 kilometers inland from the Namibian coast, is a band of terrain that is largely UNSUITED for vehicular cross-country movement. The area [illegible] extensive shifting sand dunes ranging from [illegible] meters up to 240 meters in height, [illegible] the Namib Desert. Some interdune areas contain firm sand and gravel surfaces. Farther east, the band includes mountains, steep hills, numerous shore escarpments, deep valleys, and gorges. Prevailing slopes are usually at least 30 percent and may exceed 45 percent. CCM of tracked and wheeled vehicles would generally be precluded by loose sand and steep slopes. CCM might be locally feasible on the firm surfaces of interdune areas. The movement of foot troops cross-country would be severely slowed by loose sand and steep slopes.

⟷ In Namibia, CCM conditions overall are POOR in an area extending south from the border and eastward from 250 kilometers inland, including the Caprivi Strip and portions of northern Botswana. Terrain in this extensive area consists of moderately to steeply sloping plains and hills with short escarpments, ravines, and deep stream valleys. Slopes are generally 10 to 30 percent, some locally greater. Numerous shallow, grassy drainageways are extensively flooded or contain miry soils most years, from early January through May. Cross-country movement will be hindered, if not precluded, when drainageways are flooded. Vegetation consists mainly of grasslands, savanna, croplands, and in some locales dense forest patches and thick thorn scrub. CCM of tracked vehicles would be hindered by trees, scrub, loose sands, and dunes. Movement would be precluded in patches of thick vegetation, in loose sandy areas, and when soils are wet and soft. CCM of wheeled vehicles would be severely hindered by trees or scrub and precluded in patches of thick vegetation, in loose sandy areas, and when drainageways are flooded. Movement of foot troops cross-country would be severely hindered or precluded along drainageways when flooded. Areas such as the Etosha Pan (Namibia) the Okovano Swamp (Botswana), and the Makgadikgadi Salt Pans (Botswana) are all perennially UNSUITED for cross-country movement.

⟷ Within the study area, in Namibia, sizable areas in the west and along the southern fringes have favorable conditions for vehicular cross

[illegible] generally soft and muddy up to 7 months of the year. Streams tend to be intermittent and widely spaced. Vegetation consists primarily of sparse thorn scrub, shrubs, desert shrubs, and grasses. Most slopes are less than 10 percent. Soils are generally firm but occasionally may become slippery for a few days after rains from early November through March. CCM of tracked vehicles is generally unrestricted in direction for long distances. Obstacles such as hillocks can be easily bypassed. CCM also would be easy across dry pans but hindered in places by loose sands and by trees in open forest patches. Movement would be severely hindered locally when soils are wet. CCM of wheeled vehicles would also be possible in most places for long distances. Movement would be restricted by thorn scrub, scrub, and patches of open forest, and severely restricted locally by loose sand and wet soils. The movement of foot troops cross-country would generally be unrestricted, although moderately slowed in areas of thorn scrub and soft soils.

Climate

(~~S~~) There are three climatic types within the Angolan-Namibian border region. A band of low-latitude desert extends aproximately 200 kilometers inland from the coast. To the east, a band of low-latitude steppe occupies most of the remainder of Namibia and portions of western Angola east of the desert. The third band has a tropical savanna climate that encompasses the Caprivi Strip of Namibia and extends northward to cover the eastern half of Angola.

(~~S~~) Within Angola there is a distinct wet season (October or November through April) and a dry season (May through September or October). The three winter months (June, July, and August) are virtually rainless. Rainfall along coastal areas is usually less than 50 millimeters per year. Rainfall in steppe areas ranges from 250 to 500 millimeters or locally more, per year. In the tropical savanna areas, rainfall may reach or exceed 1,000 millimeters per year. Afternoon temperatures are generally warm to hot throughout the [illegible] ranges from 2° to 32° C. Lowest temperatures occur during the winter months when mean daily minimums are usually between 4 and 18° C. Relative humidity is high during the entire year along the coast and during the rainy season elsewhere. Cloudiness is at a maximum from November through March, averaging 50 to 95 percent. During the winter, cloudiness is extensive along the coast, but interior regions have clear skies. Thunderstorms along the coast occur less than 5 days per year, but thunderstorm activity does occur more frequently in interior regions. (See table 1 for climatic conditions representative of the southern region of Angola.)

(~~S~~) Within Namibia, the usual winter weather (June through August) is pleasant and dry. Visibility is generally good all year, but is restricted at times by fog along the coast. Precipitation in coastal areas (most occurs November through March) is usually less than 125 millimeters, while areas in the interior steppe may receive 250 to 500 millimeters or more per year. During the summer (December through February), skies are generally cloudy in northeastern Namibia, but elsewhere sunshine is abundant. Skies are predominantly clear during the winter. Thunderstorms are rare along the coast, but become more frequent to the east. Summer is the period of maximum cloudiness and precipitation in most areas. Relative humidity is consistently high along the coast throughout the year, but decreases towards the interior, where humidities are low during the winter. (See table 2 for climatic conditions representative of the northern region of Namibia.)

Lines of Communication

(~~S~~) The 1,385-kilometer Angola-Namibia border lies midway between 15 degrees and 20 degrees South latitude, and encompasses a wide variety of terrain, vegetation, and extremes of climate and rainfall. This, together with the sparse LOC network and lack of all-weather roads, makes any military operation and overland movement and resupply difficult. The border area can be

Table 1
Climate of Xangongo (Vila Rocadas) Angola (U)

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	YEAR
Temperature													
Ext Maximum (F)	97	98	93	98	91	86	89	95	98	102	100	98	102
Mean Maximum (F)	88	86	85	86	85	82	82	87	92	94	90	90	87
Mean Minimum (F)	65	65	65	61	55	48	49	53	59	63	61	65	59
Ext Minimum (F)	53	50	51	50	41	36	36	42	46	51	56	54	36
Num Days Max > 90° F	7	8	7	4	3	0	0	8	28	30	16	13	124
Precipitation													
Max Amount (In)	11 9	13 5	10 9	4 8	.3	0	0	X	2	2 2	8	6 9	41
Mean Amount (In)	5 4	5 5	6 1	1 9	X	0	0	X	X	7	2 8	3 3	25 7
Min Amount (In)	1 7	4	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	13 5
Max 24-Hour (In)	4 9	2 7	3 2	2 1	3	0	0	X	2	1 5	1 8	2 7	4 9
Num Days ≥ 0 004 (In)	11	11	14	7	X	0	0	X	1	2	9	8	63
Num Days w/thunderstorms	7	8	11	4	X	X	0	0	1	3	8	6	48
Humidity (%)													
Mean Relative - 07L	79	77	85	83	71	63	60	51	47	51	67	74	67
13L	49	46	49	44	29	26	26	21	17	21	37	40	34
Cloudiness													
Mean (%) - 07L	73	63	65	48	17	18	16	14	18	38	49	67	40
13L	63	54	58	53	23	19	13	10	15	28	50	61	37
Ceiling/Visibility (%)													
Freq < 1000F/2 5M-07L	2	2	5	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	4	2	2
13L	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X
Freq < 650F/1 25M-07L	2	2	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
13L	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

NOTE X = Less than 0 05 inch, less than 0 5 day, or less than 0 5 percent

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divided into four distinct geographic sectors as follows (see figure 5).

Sector 1: Cunene River Sector

(~~S~~) This region until recently has been relatively insignificant politically and militarily. The terrain consists of inhospitable coastal desert and arid interior mountains. There are few roads in this sector, and these are mostly unsurfaced and in poor to fair condition. A major north-south road, paved and in fair condition, which extends from Lubango, crosses the Cunene River at Rocadas (a major bottleneck) and passes through Ngiva into Namibia.

(~~S~~) On the Namibian side there are no surfaced roads, the few unimproved tracks are trafficable by conventional vehicles only with difficulty. Rainfall is generally light, and there is little seasonal change in trafficability, although road segments may be washed out in the rainy season from November-April.

(~~S~~) Sector 1 is unsuited for either insurgent or counterinsurgent operations. Other than in the eastern part of Angola, adverse terrain and lack of roads limit most ground military activities. Aside from tracked equipment, few LOCs could be used by vehicles, including those with four-wheel-drive.

Sector 2: Central Straight-Line Sector

(~~S~~) This region is the most significant politically and militarily. The terrain consists of flat to rolling savanna with low-lying drainageways flooding during November-April. The road network

Table 2
Climate of Tsumeb Namibia (U)

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	YEAR
Temperature													
Extreme Max (F)	[illegible]	[illegible]	101	96	94	90	87	92	100	102	103	101	103
Mean Max (F)	88	86	85	83	80	76	76	81	89	92	90	89	85
Mean Min (F)	65	65	63	59	51	46	46	51	60	65	65	63	58
Ext Minimum (F)	49	50	44	44	34	26	25	35	37	46	53	46	25
Num Days Max ≥ 90° F	13	10	9	7	1	0	0	3	14	19	15	15	106
Precipitation													
Max Amount (In)	14 6	14 6	10	7 3	2 3	5	3	X	8	3 2	6.6	8 2	38 2
Mean Amount (In)	4 6	5 1	3 2	1 6	2	X	X	X	1	7	2 1	3 5	21 1
Min Amount (In)	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.1	9.2
Max 24-Hour (In)	2 9	4 8	3 1	4 8	.8	3	.1	X	6	1 3	2 7	3 2	4 8
Num Days ≥ 0 004 (In)	15	14	12	6	2	X	X	X	1	5	9	13	75
Num Days w/thunderstorms	11	9	7	3	1	X	X	X	1	5	7	11	55
Humidity (%)													
Mean Relative	51	56	58	50	39	36	34	27	20	26	36	56	41
Cloudiness													
Mean (%) 08L	40	50	40	20	10	10	10	10	10	30	30	40	25
14L	50	50	50	30	20	10	0	10	10	30	40	40	28
Ceiling/Visibility (%)													
Freq < 1500ft/3Mi-13L	13	20	6	5	1	0	0	0	0	1	4	10	5
Freq < 300ft/1Mi-13L	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X

NOTE X = Less than 0 05 inch, less than 0 5 day, or less than 0.5 percent.

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on the Angolan side is sparse and in poor condition, although the road from Lubango through Ngiva into Namibia is paved. Two other roads of significance are an improved earth road from Capelongo through Cassinga to Ngiva, and an improved earth road from Menongue paralleling the Cubango River. The road south from Menongue, along the Okavango River, is also a major LOC.

(U) On the Namibian side, the road network is good and can support heavy traffic. A paved road, extending from the border at Oshikango, via Ondangua to Grootfontein, is in good condition and can sustain heavy traffic year-round. Also in very good condition is the road from Ondangua west to Oshakati and Ruacana. Elsewhere on the Namibian side, roads are improved or unimproved dirt and often impassable during November-April.

(U) Sector 2 is suited for insurgent and counterinsurgent operations. However, the marked seasonal difference during the pronounced wet and dry seasons affects operations. During the dry season military traffic on the roads, as well as cross-country movement on foot or in four-wheel-drive and tracked vehicles, is generally fair to good. In wet weather, all movement is restricted when many roads become impassable, soils muddy, and low areas flooded.

Sector 3: Okavango River Sector

(U) This region is the site of considerable insurgent and counterinsurgent activity. The terrain consists mainly of flat to rolling savanna. Dirt roads parallel the Okavango River on both sides of the border. The road on the Angolan side is in extremely poor condition, and travel, even in four-wheel-drive vehicles, is arduous and time consuming, and not possible at all during November-April. Away from the river, most of the very sparse network consists of little more than dirt tracks.




Figure 3. (U) Border Sectors and Lines of Communication.

(U) On the Namibian side, the road network is adequate for moderate levels of usage. The Rundu-Grootfontein road is paved; it is an all-weather road able to carry heavy military traffic. There are no physical barriers to crossing the Okavango River at any time of year.

(U) Sector 3 is similar to Sector 2 with regard to on-road and cross-country movement, although rainy season flooding is less pronounced.

Sector 4: Caprivi Sector

(U) This region is the site of intermittent insurgent and counterinsurgent activity. The terrain consists of flat savanna, dry in the west and wet in the east, where flooding is prevalent November-April. On the Angolan side, the dirt road along the Okavango River ends at Mucusso. There is a dirt road in poor condition along the Cuando River, in Angola, and a gravel road along the Zambezi River, in Zambia.

(U) On the Namibian side, a partially paved all-weather road links Katima Mulilo with Rundu. All other roads in the sector are unsurfaced and subject to flooding.

(U) The effect of seasonal extremes on both road and cross-country movement is more pronounced in Sector 4. Cross-country movement on foot or by vehicle is severely restricted during the rainy season as large areas of this sector are under water when the Zambezi River floods.

Airfields

(U) Airfields (see figure 4 and table 3) would play an important supporting role in any large-scale movement of Cuban/FAPLA forces




Figure 4. (U) Selected Angola and Namibia Airfields.

south of 15 degrees latitude. Angola has upgraded five airfields in the vicinity of the Mocamedes-Menongue railway. Three of these — Mocamedes, Lubango, and Menongue — were well-established jet fighter bases but lacked facilities, and passive and active protection. These deficiencies have been remedied with revetments for aircraft and equipment, and a range of ADA and SAM sites. Two other airfields, Matala and Cuito Cuanavale, have been upgraded to similar standards, and so close a gap in the chain and extend air support operations further into UNITA territory in the southeast. Rapid improvements to airfields along the Lubango-Ngiva road have also taken place. A sixth jet-fighter-capable airfield has been established at Cahama, less than 140 nautical miles from the South African airbase at Ondangwa. Cahama will permit interceptor and ground-attack aircraft considerably longer operational time over targets in southwest Angola. Two additional forward bases at Ngiva and Xangongo could support resupply, ground attack, and attack helicopter operations in the Cunene Dam area and block any advancing South African forces along the Lubango-Ngiva LOC. Having been decisively defeated in past FAPLA offensives against UNITA by South African Air Force (SAAF) intervention, the Angolan government has developed a line of airfields intended to reduce the impact of any intervention by the SAAF on future FAPLA operations.

Cuban Threat From Angola: An Eastward Move Against UNITA or Southward into Namibia

~~(S/WN)~~ Cuban ground forces in southwestern Angola have been augmented since December 1987 and now are a heavy armor and mechanized

Table 3
Selected Airfields (U)

Airfield Name BE Number	Latitude Longitude	Elevation in Meters	Length Width (Meters)	Runway Surface	Runway Capacity
Angola					
Cahama 1179CA8005 80000	16 15 03S 014 17 53E	1189	2500 30	Asphalt	C130
Cassinga South 1151 08854 80106	15 14 10S 016 03 02E	1405	2464 60	Laterite	C130
Cuito Cuanavale 1151-08028 80075	15 10 02S 019 10 04E	1250	2655 30	Bitumen	C130
Lubango 1150-08011 80050	14-55-28S 013-34-36E	1750	2804 50	Asphalt	C141
Matala 1151-08015 80106	14-43-40S 015-01-22E	1256	2469 47	Asphalt	C9
Menongue East 1151-08818 80065	14-39-20S 017-43-20E	1407	3500 43	Asphalt	C141
Mocamedes New 1150-08831 80065	15-15-33S 012-08-54E	64	2525 45	Asphalt	C-141
Ngiva 1179-08006 80082	17 02 35S 015-41-30E	1110	2475 30	Asphalt	C130
Xangongo 1179-08005 80106	16-45-15S 014-58-07E	1108	2000 25	Graded earth (runway improvement in progress)	C130
Namibia					
Grootfontein 1178-08001 80081	19-36-08S 018-07-33E	1413	3569 46	Asphalt	C141
Mpacha 1177-08067 80082	17-38-03S 024-10-50E	985	2286 23	Asphalt	C9
Omega 1178-08835 80090	18-01-50S 022-11-23E	914	1695 30	Asphalt	C130
Ondangwa 1179-08002 80063	17-52-42S 015-57-00E	1095	2972 30	Asphalt	C9
Operet 1178-08806 80106	18-36-32S 017-09-18E	1097	1347 16	Asphalt	C47
Oshakati 1179-08827 80112	17-47-55S 015-42-05E	1096	1551 28	Asphalt	C130
Ruacana 1179-08801 80092	17-25-05S 014-22-20E	1148	2210 30	Asphalt	C130
Rundu 1178-08005 80092	17-57-10S 019-43-25E	1097	2790 30	Asphalt (runway improvement in progress)	C9

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[illegible] SA-8 [illegible] SA-13 [illegible] SA-7 [illegible] surface-to-air missile [illegible] radar and communications equipment. Cuban forces also operate MiG-21 FISHBED, MiG-23 FLOGGER, MI-17 HIP and MI-24 HIND aircraft. Cuban forces in southwestern Angola are estimated to number in excess of 15,000.

~~(S/NF)~~ There are three general routes for east to west and west to east movement between Military Regions 5 and 6 (figure 51). These are along the Jamba-Menongue rail and road network, by means of cross-country movement or southward into Namibia and then along east-west Namibian highways. Cuban military movement of forces from west to east and from east to west between Military Regions 5 and 6 has been constrained by two factors: the rail and road network, and the overriding need to provide convoy escorts and air cover to all rail and road marches. Cuban forces in Angola customarily have not traveled cross country in military maneuvers, primarily because the Cuban defensive role has not required any large-scale cross-country campaigns. In this regard, Cuban doctrine requires Cuban forces to provide adequate logistical support to Cuban ground elements and air superiority in support of Cuban tactical units. The augmentation of Cuban air and air defense forces since December 1987 was designed to provide these two elements to Cuban ground units, which have been reinforced and moved into the southwestern area of Angola.

~~(S/NF)~~ During 1988 Cuban troop movements supported Cuban political objectives, which were focused on driving South African forces out of southern Angola. Cuban objectives since the initial involvement of Cuban forces in Angola have encompassed defense of Angolan or Cuban forces against South African and UNITA attacks, and not closing with or destroying UNITA forces. Cuban ground forces were not directly involved in the Soviet-led campaign against Mavinga during late 1987. Cuban forces were committed in significant numbers to the defense of Cuito Cuanavale only after the Angolan offensive had been turned back and South African forces had moved on Cuito Cuanavale. In this defense, Cuban forces were moved to Cuito Cuanavale. After the situation there had been stabilized, Cuban forces were moved west [illegible] the southwest was accomplished. Both of these movements were carried out using the existing rail and road network.

~~(S/NF)~~ Cuba's public and private justification for involvement in Angola rests on supporting a Marxist ally against South African hegemony. If Cuban forces were to invade Namibia and then turn east toward Mavinga and UNITA-held territory, Cuban status as a reliable Third World ally would be enhanced, but the change in role from protector to aggressor could cause diplomatic problems for Havana. Cuban legitimacy as a defender against South African imperialism would be challenged in some Third World capitals. Additionally, there probably would be a general South African mobilization and full-scale military response.

~~(S/NF)~~ Two factors that mitigate against a cross-country Cuban drive toward Mavinga or other UNITA-held territory in the southeast are current resource constraints on logistic support and air cover for such a move. Cuba's logistic system is in place to support movements along the Jamba-to-Menongue axis. In addition, fighter-capable airfields at Matala and Menongue would provide staging areas for air cover of Cuban movements along this axis.

~~(S/NF)~~ The most probable axis of advance for any major movement of Cuban forces from the southwest to the southeast would be along the Jamba-to-Menongue axis. The likelihood of Cuban movement cross-country toward Mavinga and UNITA-held territory to the southeast is low. The likelihood of major Cuban movement into Namibia to use the Namibian road net in an attack on UNITA territory is also low.

~~(S/NF)~~ Cuban political and military objectives to date have not included offensive actions against UNITA, and Cuban forces are therefore not expected to turn eastward toward Mavinga or toward UNITA-controlled territory. The uncertain nature of Cuban logistic resources and air superiority east and south of Cuito Cuanavale adds to the unlikelihood of such an attack. Finally, prevailing terrain and limited lines of communication would make any such eastward movement difficult.




Figure 5. (U) Angolan Military Regions.

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
(U) [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(U) Each classified title and heading in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424

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
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Summary

~~(C)~~ *Somalian President Maj Gen Mohammed Siad Barre's decision on 13 November to break all diplomatic ties with Havana, to reduce drastically the Soviet diplomatic personnel in his country, and to expel all Soviet military and Cuban advisers, is a setback for the African policies of Cuba and the USSR. With strong Soviet support, Cuba has pursued a policy in sub-Saharan Africa so close to perceived Soviet diplomatic goals that many observers believe the Cubans are acting as Soviet surrogates.*

~~(C)~~ *Cuba has become a major influence in Africa since it boldly intervened in Angola in late 1975 with the dispatch of thousands of combat troops. Cuba will continue as a major participant in the effort to construct anti-imperialist and socialist countries throughout the continent although, as a result of increasing international and domestic constraints, it has lost some freedom of action formerly enjoyed.*

Discussion

Cuban Perceptions

(U) President Fidel Castro believes that it is possible to build socialist societies without the necessity of passing through the various capitalist stages. He believes this to be particularly true in sub-Sahara Africa. Castro also constantly stresses his country's distinctive ties to Africa with special reference to the debt owed for the cultural heritage received from those African slaves who were shipped to Cuba. An avowed lifelong revolutionary, Castro considers it a personal duty to help build socialist societies in Africa, thus freeing the continent from colonial imperialist bonds, using Cuba's ouster of US "imperialists" as the model.

(U) Cuba professes that its interest in supporting socialist movements is solely based on international solidarity. It simultaneously disclaims all national or colonial exploitative interests. Nevertheless, the nation undoubtedly has an ultimate interest in channeling some African resources, particularly Cabindian oil, to bolster its own faltering economy, which currently depends principally on one low-yield product, sugar.

(U) High Cuban officials frequently have declared publicly that Havana has a right to conduct its foreign policy, to make agreements, and to give assistance, both technical and military, to friendly governments and groups. Furthermore, Cuban officials have steadfastly maintained Cuba's right, as a sovereign nation, to support revolutionary governments and movements. Havana wants to demonstrate its commitment to these causes, and above all it has resisted pressure from any quarter to lessen the Cuban presence in other nations.

(U) Many countries in the nonaligned movement are increasingly perceiving Cuba, also a member of the movement, as a promoter of Soviet policies. Visible proof of the country's close ties to the USSR is evidenced by its numerous high-level visits to Moscow for consultations on a wide range of issues, by its unreserved public support for the USSR, and by its heavy dependence on the USSR for daily existence. Castro, however, constantly stresses the generous aid provided without strings by Moscow and has strongly denied that Cuba is a Soviet surrogate. Indeed, the relationship is apparently more a matter of Moscow asking the cooperation of its ally, Fidel Castro. While ideologically disposed to render aid to revolutionary governments and groups, Castro, because of financial and logistic limitations, is unable to do so.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although it is not possible to determine if any substantial differences on African policy exist between Cuba and the USSR, based on past events, the Cubans appear more predisposed to support

revolutionary movements than do the Soviets. For cultural and revolutionary reasons, the Cubans reportedly consider themselves better suited to advance the socialist cause throughout Africa. The Cubans, backed by Soviet economic, diplomatic, and materiel support, confidently expect to be in the forefront in the wars for liberation in Africa.

(U) The difficulties that are currently being experienced in Angola have made Havana wary of direct involvement in other similar situations such as the intensely bitter dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. In Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and countries that are fighting for black liberation forces, Havana has realized the enormous and long-term problems involved in building socialist economic and political structures within man-made national boundaries. The very low levels of indigenous educational, economic, political, and technical skills that exist in such countries compound these nation-building difficulties.

International Constraints

(U) In 1975, Cuba had a relatively free hand to intervene in Angola. Among other factors, very few observers expected Havana to be able to react as decisively as it did. The Cubans correctly assessed that Western powers, particularly the United States, would not be able to respond in time to stop Havana's actions. In addition, South Africa, the only power that could have successfully opposed the intervention, was receiving heavy diplomatic pressures from all sides. As a result, South Africa had to withdraw from active military participation in Angola by early 1975.

(U) Cuba can also be influenced by two groups of countries -- the Organization of African States (OAU) and the nonaligned movement. Should conservative and moderate forces within the OAU muster enough support to condemn Cuban involvement in Africa, particularly of a military nature, then Havana will have lost the important acquiescence

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SELECTED CUBAN-AFRICAN VISITS
Heads of Liberation Movements, Foreign Ministers, and
High-Level Party Officials
1 January 1977 - December 1977 (U)

Date	Country Visited
1-18 February	Cuban Communist Party (PCC) officials Jorge Risquet (member, Secretariat) and Armando Acosta, a key official who is Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's (CC) Department of Mass Organizations, visited Maputo, Mozambique, to attend the Third Congress of the Mozambique Liberation Front. On 13 February, they went to Madagascar, where they met with high Malagasy officials.
17-24 February	MAJ Michel Alladaye, Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Politburo of the Party of the Peoples Revolution of Benin, visited Cuba. He met with Fidel Castro and Carlos Rodriguez, Vice President of the Council of Ministers in charge of foreign economic and diplomatic relations.
20-27 February	Armando Acosta and Maj Gen Arnaldo Ochoa, then head of the Western Army, visited Ethiopia.
1 March-2 April	President Fidel Castro visited: Algeria (1 March); Libya (1-10 March) South Yemen (10-12 March); Somalia (12-14 March); Ethiopia (14-16 March); South Yemen (16-17 March); Tanzania (17-21 March); Mozambique (21-23 March); Angola (23-31 March); Algeria (31 March-2 April); German Democratic Republic (2-4 April); and the USSR (4-8 April).
Mid-May	A Congolese Workers Party delegation headed by Central Committee member Jean Pierre Bombe visited Cuba.
Late May	Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure received a Cuban delegation headed by PCC-CC member Facundo Martinez Valliant.
1-26 June	Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca visited Nigeria, where he also met Sam Nujoma, President of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO); Benin; Guinea; and Zambia.
Early-mid July	Cuban Vice President Army Gen Raul Castro made a quick visit to Angola after the Angolan Government supressed a revolt on 27 May.
28 July-2 August	Joshua Nkomo, President of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and co-President of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, visited Cuba where he met Fidel Castro and other high-level Cuban officials.
Mid-late August	Army Gen Raul Castro stopped off in Luanda after visiting the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, and Algeria. When he returned to Cuba, he brought Angolan President Agostinho Neto with him.

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Late August	Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca attended the International Conference Against Apartheid held in Lagos, Nigeria.
Late August	Angolan President Agostinho Neto made a low-key unofficial visit to Cuba for a few days.
September	A Cuban delegation led by Raul Valdes Vivo, a key official who is Chief of the PCC-CC's General Department of Foreign Relations, went to Ethiopia in early- or mid-September to take part in the ceremonies for that country's third anniversary. In late September, he went to Madagascar.
9-13 September	Samora Machel, President of the Mozambique Liberation Front and of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique visited Cuba. He met with Fidel Castro and other high-level Cuban officials.
15-19 October	LTC Feleke Gedle Giorgis, Etmiopian Minister of Foreign Relations, made a low-key visit to Cuba. He met with Fidel Castro and other key officials.
17-24 October	Oliver Tambo, Chairman of the African National Congress of South Africa, visited Cuba. He received a warm reception and met with Fidel Castro and other high-level officials.
27-29 October	Zambian Foreign Minister Siteke Mwale made a low-key visit to Cuba. He met with Foreign Minister Malmierca and Fidel Castro.
Late October	Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, visited Cuba. He met with Fidel Castro. Cuba agreed to the opening of SWAPO office in Cuba.
End of October	LTC Mengistu Haile Mariam, President of Ethiopia, made a secret visit to Havana.
Late October-Early November	Several high-level Cuban officials visited Angola to discuss Cuban aid to Angola. On 5 November, the Cuban and Angolan ministers signed several agreements, in one of which the Cubans promised to double the number of civilian advisers in Angola during 1978.
Early November	Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Fernandez de Cossio visited Zambia and Mozambique. In Mozambique he held several meetings to begin implementing a Cuban-Mozambican cooperation agreement that was signed in September by Presidents Castro and Samora Machel.
Mid-late November	Raul Valdes Vivo visited Zambia, where he met with President Kenneth Kaunda; and Tanzania, where he met with President Julius Nyerere.
Early December	Raul Castro attends the first MPLA Congress in Luanda.

it has received from that group. In an effort to forestall such an eventuality, Cuba has been actively currying favor among most African countries and movements. Fidel Castro, Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca, and other key foreign policy officials, have met with almost all the major moderate and radical leaders. Furthermore, several technical and medical teams have been dispatched to countries requesting such assistance.

~~(c)~~ The Nonaligned Conference scheduled for the summer of 1979 in Cuba is receiving renewed attention. As an enthusiastic practitioner of personal diplomacy, President Castro undoubtedly views the selection of Havana for the conference site as a personal recognition of his position as a preeminent leader in the nonaligned movement. However, recent public pronouncements suggest that the Nonaligned Conference be moved to a more neutral country. Should many member countries publicly question Cuba's nonaligned credentials, the nation's image will be severely tarnished. To prevent this, Cuba recently has been actively seeking support from African moderate and revolutionary countries for holding the conference in Havana.

Domestic Constraints

~~(C)~~ Since no significant domestic or external threats to Cuba currently exist, the country's military forces deployed abroad could probably be at least doubled above present levels. Nevertheless, Cuba's foreign policy is now restrained by economic and other domestic factors.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuba's merchant marine has been seriously affected by the nation's commitments to Angola and Ethiopia. Most of the ships have been diverted to transporting men and supplies to and from Angola and Ethiopia, which has strained the merchant marine and further congested the Cuban ports, already seriously overcrowded before Angola. The importation of consumer goods has suffered accordingly. The value of the consumers' ration card

has dropped by one-half during the past six months -- a sharp contrast to Fidel Castro's frequent speeches stressing the nation's allegedly good economic conditions and downplaying the economic consequences of foreign intervention.

~~(S/NFINTEL/NOFORN)~~ Although the USSR is trying to lessen the impact on the domestic economy by reimbursing Havana for its involvement, an existing manpower drain cannot be so easily rectified. Thousands of reservists and civilians who are being sent abroad are also needed for developing the country's failing agricultural and industrial programs. The more diligent and patriotic Cubans probably filled the initial increments going to Angola; thus, the loss of these more motivated personnel was more than "one man, one job" in a country where workers have been criticized for not working hard enough. The consequences of this loss will increase as the large-scale Cuban involvement continues. For example, according to one press report, Cuba's 5 November agreement to double its civilian advisers in Angola in 1978 over the previous year's levels elicited the comment from a high-level Cuban official that the commitment will be met with difficulty.

~~(S/NFINTEL/NOFORN)~~ While internal popular opinion before 1975 had not inhibited Cuban foreign policy, the nature of the Angolan commitment, encompassing for the first time large-scale overseas participation, is such that reportedly the public now views the country's extensive involvement as a considerable drain. Many Cubans now are reluctantly -- and some openly -- refusing to serve in military units in Angola, despite personal consequences such as arrest and loss of jobs; morale is said to be very low among the vast majority of Cubans in Africa. Casualties have added to this existing low morale; reports indicate the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has specifically targeted Cubans in the field.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Castro realizes the dangers of expanding foreign commitments, both military and economic, in the face of rising resentment on the part of citizen-soldier reservists, who constitute some 70 percent of the Cuban forces in Angola. Willing to defend their homeland, Cubans find it much more difficult to justify the defense of "international solidarity" on a distant and comparatively backward continent when basic returns are not apparent for the foreseeable future.

Outlook

~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN)~~ Cuban sources have made clear in private and public statements that until the present time, the large-scale Cuban military involvement in Angola is an exception. The Angolan involvement was impelled in large part because Cuba had given extensive support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) since 1965 and therefore the leadership had close personal ties with the MPLA leaders. Castro has publicly declared that the only condition under which he would send additional large numbers of combat troops would be an attack on Angola by a foreign country, and that his nation would regard such an action as an attack against itself. Cuban caution about greatly expanding its military commitments is indicated by Havana's decision to respond to only a few of many requests that have been received for technical military aid.

~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN)~~ The overall goal of Cuba's African policy remains the same -- that of "liberating" the continent from all "imperialist" and "colonialist" powers. Cubans are actively participating in a large number of activities in sub-Sahara Africa. Clandestine sources report that the Cubans are choosing sides among the contending black liberation forces and that Cuban military training has increased, particularly for the South-West African Peoples Organization. The net result is that the African liberation movements will be more capable militarily to pursue their goals. Whereas Havana in the past apparently donated military and technical assistance

to recipient countries, in the future a charge will be made for at least technical aid. Furthermore, the Cubans continue to give the anti-apartheid and anti-Western forces unlimited propaganda and moral support, particularly in such forums as the International Conference on Apartheid and the United Nations. Thus, Cuba will continue to pursue what it views as its mission -- to become a primary participant in the struggle that will determine the future of the African subcontinent. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the Originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[redacted]

[redacted]IAPPR 4-76
[redacted] JANUARY 1976

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SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)

MICROFILMED

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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
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SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)




AFRICA

DIAIAPPR 4-76
9 JANUARY 1976

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SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY TRAINING AND MATERIEL ASSISTANCE TO BLACK AFRICA IN 1975



CI-F-1-R/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIGURE 1

~~SECRET~~

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SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)

Summary

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ During 1975, there has been a shift toward greater Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The USSR has developed naval and air facilities in Somalia and has continued deployments of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea. A substantial shipment of arms and military equipment to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has also demonstrated an increasing Soviet resolve and willingness to support their clients and to pursue objectives in the area. Overall, Moscow has demonstrated an alertness to the opportunities for extended influence and currently is providing military aid in some form to 17 Black African countries. This effort, which is being continued at a relatively low cost to the USSR, has met some success.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Past Soviet efforts have often been marked by insensitivity and ineptitude, but their recent activity reflects greater professionalism, a sense of urgency, and an increased military presence. Although the short-term outlook appears favorable to the USSR, newly independent African states are wary of foreign domination, and Moscow will very likely suffer some setbacks as it seeks greater influence in the highly nationalistic environment of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Discussion

~~(C)~~ Current Soviet military involvement in Africa is the outgrowth of Moscow's long-range policy of using military assistance to gain military, political, and economic objectives in the region. These include access to strategic military facilities, an increase in Soviet political influence to the detriment of China and the West, and access to raw materials. Furthermore, these goals are being met with some success at a relatively low cost in terms of Soviet money, materiel, and manpower.

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES
FROM 1974 TO 1975
(Million US Dollars)

	USSR	PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ANGOLA	90.0*	UNK
BURUNDI	-	1.0
CAMEROON	-	4.0
CENTRAL AFR REP.	1.0	-
CHAD	1.5	-
CONGO	0.5	5.5
EQ. GUINEA	4.0	-
GABON	-	C.3
GAMBIA	0.1	-
GUINEA	24.0	-
GUINEA-BISSAU	5.0	negligible
MALI	8.4	-
MOZAMBIQUE	12.0	3.0
NIGERIA	39.2	-
SOMALI REP.	94.0	-
SUDAN	11.0	-
TANZANIA	2.0	5.0
UGANDA	47.6	-
ZAIRE	-	7.0
ZAMBIA	4.0	3.0
	$344.3	$28.8

*This figure is only for 1975.

~~(SECRET/NOFORN)~~

FIGURE 2

~~SECRET~~

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ At the present time, the Soviets are providing military assistance in some form to 17 sub-Saharan countries (figure 1). More than $340 million worth of military hardware has been delivered to these countries since January 1974 (figure 2). In addition, more than 2,000 Soviet military advisors are located in Black African countries (figure 3). Cuba, the USSR's ally and surrogate, also has 7,900 advisors and troops in Black Africa, mainly in the Angolan area.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Sino-Soviet competition also provides additional rationale for the growing Soviet presence in sub-Saharan Africa. The People's Republic of China is currently providing military equipment and training assistance to 14 nations (figure 1). Nearly 1,000 Chinese military advisors are in sub-Saharan countries, and $28 million in military hardware has been delivered there since January 1974.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A comparison of Soviet and Chinese military aid programs for 1974 -- the most recent year with complete data -- shows the USSR to be clearly the leader in military assistance, but the Chinese lead the Soviets in economic aid. In comparison to total Soviet aid to less developed nations, last year's assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was at small cost to Moscow. Military deliveries there were less than five percent of Moscow's total military assistance to all less developed nations in 1974. However, the Soviet effort in Angola will substantially increase Moscow's military assistance to Black Africa; Peking's aid to Angola has been minimal.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet economic and military involvement in sub-Saharan Africa focuses on three countries -- Guinea, Somalia, and Angola. Guinea is the recipient of Moscow's largest economic aid program in the region, a $92 million bauxite project. An estimated 110 Soviet military advisors are currently in this West African country, and $48 million in arms have been delivered since 1969.

~~SECRET~~

FIGURE 3

SOVIET AND CHINESE TRAINING PROGRAMS IN 1975

	USSR	PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Military Advisors in Sub-Saharan African Countries	2,006	969
Black African Military Trainees Abroad	2,786	800

~~(SECRET/NOFORN)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The USSR has been accorded certain military privileges in Guinea in return for its assistance. Since the summer of 1973 the Soviets have made repeated deployments of TU-95/BEAR D naval reconnaissance aircraft, consisting of two aircraft each, to the Conakry airfield. This has provided the USSR with a reconnaissance capability over the entire Middle and South Atlantic, which is particularly effective when carried on in conjunction with similar aircraft deployed from Cuba. Since November 1970, the USSR has also maintained an almost continuous naval presence near the port of Conakry.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In East Africa, Somalia is the main center of Soviet activity. This country, which has received $165 million in military equipment since 1961, is Moscow's single largest military investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Soviet military advisors have increased from 300 in 1972 to the current number of 1,000 in 1974. The USSR is continuing the development of facilities in the Berbera area for both Somali and Soviet use, and Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft operating from Somali airfields, including the one under construction at Berbera, give Moscow the potential to cover the entire Indian Ocean area. Substantial Soviet military assistance to Uganda and recent initiatives in Tanzania have also enhanced Moscow's presence in East Africa.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Southern Africa, the USSR is actively supporting Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) forces in the Angolan civil war. As a part of this effort, some 44 Soviet flights involving both civil and military aircraft have taken place since 1 November. Additionally, at least nine Soviet ships have delivered substantial quantities of arms and equipment to Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, as well as Luanda since Angola drifted into independence on 11 November.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet political and military support for the MPLA's bid for power and the introduction of

an estimated 7,500 Cuban personnel is unprecedented in modern African history. Moscow apparently considers the benefits to be well worth the danger inherent in its open involvement. Soviet presence and influence in Angola would not only permit the USSR to threaten vital lines of communication and gain access to a wealth of natural resources but would also establish a base for Soviet subversion, which would present a clear danger to the remaining white minority regimes in southern Africa. Use of Angolan facilities would enhance Moscow's strategic position and project a Soviet presence into the South Atlantic.

~~(C)~~ Soviet involvement in sub-Saharan Africa has not been a complete success. Soviet activities have frequently been marked by insensitive treatment of Africans both on the continent and in the USSR, a preoccupation with Chinese penetration, small and inefficient aid programs, and inept clandestine ventures. The Soviets have often projected a negative image that continues to cause several major African leaders to distrust their motives. Moscow is somewhat aware of these failings, and its recent activities have reflected greater professionalism, a sense of urgency, and a growing military presence. In the words of President Nyerere of Tanzania, "the second scramble for Africa is under way."

Outlook

~~(C)~~ While the Soviets appear to have gained some short-term advantages, African states have traditionally turned against foreign powers seeking influence no matter how attractive their aid programs. In the highly nationalistic environment of sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviets will very likely continue to suffer

some setbacks. Angola is undoubtedly a test case that could determine future Soviet policy in Africa and to other areas of the Third World. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIAIAPPR 76-76
29 MARCH 1976

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[redacted]

USSR: SOVIET WEST AFRICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE ANGOLA CRISIS (U)

SIX PAGES ARE DENIED IN FULL AND ARE NOT INCLUDED.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

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
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USSR: SOVIET WEST AFRICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE ANGOLA CRISIS (U)




DIAIAPPR 76-76
29 MARCH 1976

USSR: SOVIET WEST AFRICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE ANGOLA CRISIS (U)

Summary

(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)




Background


~~(C)~~ An abortive Portuguese-mounted seaborne commando raid against the Guinean Government in November 1970 set the stage for a Soviet military

The cut-off date for information in this appraisal is 19 Mar 76.

presence in West Africa centered on Conakry. Responding to President Sekou Toure's request for protection, the Soviets established a standing naval patrol in the Conakry area and obtained privileged access to Guinean airfields.


~~(C)~~ The Soviet naval presence normally consisted of two combatants and a tanker until mid-1972, when the patrol was reduced to one combatant -- either a destroyer or tank landing ship, usually the latter -- and a supporting oiler. The Soviets have enjoyed naval access to the port of Conakry, which they have made an interim replenishment stop for ships in transit to the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Indian Ocean. There has been no obvious pattern in the number of days a ship remains on patrol in the Conakry area; some have spent as few as six, others more than 100.






Combatants Deploy South


~~(S)~~ The Soviet naval presence off West Africa on 11 Nov 75, when Angola drifted into independence, consisted of one ALLIGATOR-class tank landing ship (LST), KRIMSKIJ KOMSOMOLETS (pendant number 435), in Conakry. The LST was assigned to the Conakry patrol on departing the Mediterranean in late September.





Oiler Augmentation

~~(S)~~ During the Angolan hostilities, the USSR used fleet and fleet-subordinated merchant oilers to extend the patrol periods and operating ranges of their surface naval units, and to sustain their military airlift.





~~(C)~~ With their present tanker rotation schedule, and access to Conakry for other logistic needs, the Soviets are well able to support a continuous high tempo of naval and air activity in West Africa.

Soviet Naval Air Reaction



[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DIAWIS 15-76
9 APRIL 1976

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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
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
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Latin American Highlights

VENEZUELA REASSESSES RELATIONS WITH CUBA




~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Recent reports of a Cuban presence in neighboring Guyana has brought the issue of Havana's foreign involvement even closer to Venezuela. Although no real proof of Cuban-Guyana military activities exists, the Perez administration nevertheless believes that Castro's forces are expanding their operations there. Conservatives and military officers are bringing pressure on Perez to take a stronger defensive stance against feared Cuban-led Guyana forces along the border. Moreover, opposition parties now have a political basis for questioning the President's long-standing policy of rapprochement toward Havana.

(Continued)

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Perez is primarily concerned that Cuba will upset the regional political and military balance in Central and South America, resulting in a deeper split in Latin American unity. This would prejudice Venezuela's leadership position in promoting Latin unity and would be a personal defeat for the President.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The timing of Cuba's foreign involvements has also created problems at a moment when it had been considered favorable for harmonious relations within the Latin American community. Significantly, Prime Minister Castro's proposed presence at the Panamanian Summit has caused its cancellation, as most of the invited heads of state preferred to avoid him.



~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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
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Latin America

CONVOY TRANSPORTS TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT BETWEEN CUBA AND ANGOLA

~~(S)~~ Recent photographs of a Cuban convoy, probably en route to Angola, show three ships riding high in the water with 93 vehicles, mostly cargo trucks, on deck. Probable sanitary facilities and field kitchens were also observed, suggesting that each is transporting troops as well.



CUBAN SHIP TOPAZ ISLANDS EAST BOUND TO ANGOLA

mostly cargo trucks

~~(S)~~ The vehicles included 18 tanker trucks, 44 2.5-ton trucks, eight trucks of 3.5- to four-ton capacity, 16 trucks of 7.5- to 12-ton capacity, six vans, and one bus. This mix does not provide any specific clue as to the type of units being transported. The 2.5-ton trucks can be associated with virtually any military unit, and the larger capacity trucks could be found in engineer units or used in a general-support transportation role. Other equipment was probably below deck. At least some of the personnel on board are probably associated with this equipment and will be employed in support activity rather than an actual combat role.

seventh convoy

~~(S)~~ This convoy is the seventh since the start of Cuba's Angolan involvement and the second of four to depart the island in May. In the past, the Cubans have supplied principally men to Angola while the USSR provided equipment. About one-third of the equipment observed on the decks of the latest convoy was probably manufactured prior to 1967. This indicates the Cubans are supplying their older equipment to Angola and will receive newer models from the Soviets. ~~(GDS 31 Dec 83)~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

3 Jun 77

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DIAWIS 40

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Weekly Intelligence Summary (U)

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


Latin America


CUBA MAY BE INCREASING TROOPS IN ANGOLA (S/NOFORN)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Recent imagery confirmed that the three Cuban military transports that arrived in Angola in September are configured for carrying troops. Section containers believed to be sanitary facilities, as well as probable field kitchens and mess tables, were noted on both port and starboard sides of the ships, indicating Cuban troops were on board. The hatch covers were open on the initial rigging pass and closed on subsequent passes. This procedure was noted during previous surveillance flights, suggesting ventilation was being provided to spaces belowdeck. *El Jique* arrived at Mocamedes on 7 September, the *13 De Marzo* arrived at Luanda on the 8th, and the *Jigüani* was expected to arrive in Angola about the 22d. These ships are of the same class and are estimated to carry from 1,200 to 1,500 troops each.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ There is some indication of mobilization of Cuban troops for Angola and




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(U) CUBAN MILITARY TRANSPORT EL JIGUE

2 Oct 81




U CUBAN MILITARY TRANSPORT JIGUANI

Augmentation of the estimated 19,000 to 21,000 Cuban troops in Angola by as much as 3,000 men. In an official announcement about the recent South African raid into Angola, Havana pledged "all available means" to protect its southern lines. This could be a veiled indication that Cuban troops will once again engage in combat. The arriving troops, even if they are Angolan veterans, will probably defend garrisons initially, thus enabling government troops to participate in the fighting.

(Classified by multiple sources, review on 15 Sep 01)

2 Oct 81

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(U) CUBAN MILITARY TRANSPORT 13 DE MARZO

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIAWIS 41-83

Iraq

DEFENSE
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Weekly Intelligence Summary

14 OCTOBER 1983

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~~FROM:~~
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Kremlin Is Concerned About Status of Angolan Government (S)

(S) Moscow appears increasingly worried about the viability of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' pro-Soviet government in the face of growing rebel resistance.

(S) Members of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) have had increasing success lately on the battlefield and are pressuring the Cuban troops and Soviet advisers in Angola. In some Soviet circles, it is believed that without the Cuban troops, the government would fall to rebel forces.


(S/NF) An Angolan delegation, led by the defense minister, went to Moscow in early September reportedly to request more military aid. Unconfirmed reports have noted a recent and sizable increase in the number of Soviet, East German, and Cuban personnel in Angola. In addition, the Soviets have deployed more An-12/CUB transport aircraft to Angola.

(S) After 8 years of civil war in Angola and extensive Soviet aid to Luanda, Moscow has reason to be concerned that the dos Santos government appears to be losing ground to the rebel forces. The USSR seems to believe that to maintain its position in Angola, and hence southern Africa, it has no current alternative to increasing military assistance. However, UNITA's continued success may force the Kremlin to reassess its strategy there. (Classified by multiple sources; ~~declassify on OADR~~)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

USSR Increases Military Assistance to Angola (S)

(b)(1) 1.4(c)



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Defense Research Comment

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Angola: Prospects For A FAPLA Offensive (U)

(U) Since its major defeat at the Lomba River, in October 1987, the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) has attempted to regain the tactical initiative. Recent developments have marginally improved Luanda's prospects in the overall military balance. By the end of August 1988, all South African forces had withdrawn from Angola. In September 1988, FAPLA units occupied three towns formerly held by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrillas.

(S/NF/WN) Despite these developments, DIA does not believe that FAPLA will attempt a large-scale offensive in the near term. FAPLA units deployed to Cuito Cuanavale, the forward support base for FAPLA's previous offensives, do not have sufficient personnel or materiel to support a major offensive operation within the next few months. Moreover, the rainy season, which began in October, diminishes even more the likelihood that Luanda will attempt a major operation in the southeast before April or May, when the next dry season begins.

Background

(C) During the 12-year Angolan civil war, government forces have conducted episodic, large-scale offensives. Over the past few years, the objectives of these large operations have been the capture of UNITA-held towns and guerrilla bases and the interdiction of supply lines in the southeast in hopes of defeating or at least weakening the insurgent movement. The largest of these offensive operations occurred in 1985 and 1987.

(S/NF/WN) Events in August and September 1988 temporarily shifted the tactical situation in favor of Luanda. In early August, FAPLA attacked the Benguela rail line towns of Munhango and Cangumbe, in Military Regions 3 and 4. After 6 weeks of repeated effort, government forces occupied these central Angolan towns, which had been seized by UNITA, in late 1987, in the wake of FAPLA's defeat. The three-pronged FAPLA attack included three FAPLA brigades attacking from Cuemba in the west, two brigades attacking from Luena in the east, and one brigade attacking from Sautar in the north. FAPLA had to redeploy units from other areas in order to make up adequate forces to attack these towns.

(S/NF/WN) In another limited offensive in September, from one to two FAPLA brigades occupied the Cassinga-Techamutete area, in southern Angola's Military Region 5. UNITA had held this area for a month despite large concentrations of both FAPLA and Cuban troops nearby. These victories have demonstrated a limited recovery of FAPLA's offensive capability following last year's defeat.


(S/NF/WN) More recently, UNITA insurgents escalated attacks in northwestern and south-central Angola. In late October, UNITA commandos attacked targets in Huambo, the nation's second largest city, destroying fuel tanks and other facilities. In early November,

[redacted]

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~~(C)~~ *FAPLA forces seized the towns of Munhango, Cangumbe, and Cassinga-Techamutete, in September, in efforts to regain the tactical initiative.*

UNITA elements attacked the Cuban headquarters in Luena, killing an unspecified number of troops.

~~(C)~~ Several developments connected with the US-mediated negotiations among Cuba, Angola, and South Africa appear to favor Luanda. In November 1987, Cuba began to send additional troops to Angola and to redeploy its expeditionary forces, placing the bulk of Cuban troops in southern Angola, close to the Namibian border. Although initiated in

response to the failure of FAPLA's 1987 offensive, this augmentation and redeployment successfully pressured Pretoria. The Cuban move contributed to the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and prompted a cease-fire between Cuban-Angolan and South African forces. Further negotiations could establish a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola and a date for implementing the independence of Namibia under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. Namibian independence would result in the withdrawal of South African troops, making it more difficult for Pretoria to provide aid to UNITA. Since UNITA is not a participant in the negotiations, its forces do not observe the cease-fire and are continuing to attack government forces throughout Angola.

(S/NF) Removal of all foreign forces from Angola would tip the military balance in favor of UNITA. The departure of 52,000 Cuban troops would place considerable pressure on FAPLA to recruit, train, equip, and command replacement forces, as well as maintain sophisticated equipment. The inability of Angola's MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government to fill the vacuum created by the Cuban exodus would narrow the offensive options of FAPLA, its military arm. FAPLA activity would shift to a defensive posture as it assumed the garrison and logistic duties vacated by the Cubans. FAPLA's ability to mount counterinsurgency operations and general offensives would thus diminish. Conversely, UNITA attacks throughout the country would increase as the combat force ratio shifted in favor of UNITA. UNITA would reduce conventional activity, concentrating on guerrilla action as foreign support diminished.

Foreign Forces In-Country (U)

	Advisers	Combat Troops
Cuba	6,000	46,000
USSR	1,200	
East Germany	1,000	
North Korea	2,000	
Total	10,200	46,000


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Indicators of a FAPLA Offensive

(S/NF/WN) The preparation, execution, and goals of the 1985 and 1987 FAPLA offensives are similar and can provide an analytical base for reviewing prospects for a new FAPLA offensive in the southeast in the near term. In preparation for previous offensives, supplies and materiel were airlifted into the rear support areas of Munhango and Luena, delivered overland by large truck convoys, and stockpiled at the forward support areas at Cuito Cuanavale and Lucusse. Hundreds of sorties of Soviet-piloted CANDID (Il-76) and CUB (An-12) aircraft delivered troop reinforcements, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment. The number of supply flights to these airbases increased significantly 6 months before the initiation of the offensives and continued in intensity until the offensives began.

(S/NF/WN) Previous offensives started late in the dry season because of extensive preparation times. A total of six to eight reinforced FAPLA brigades were committed to the main and supporting attacks. The key indicator of large-scale operations in the southeast was activity at Cuito Cuanavale, the forward support base for the main attack. The reinforcement of troops and stockpiling of materiel were detected early in the dry season. Identification of troop movements, reconnaissance activity, and patrolling unmasked the start of the operations. FAPLA combat operations and supply efforts elsewhere in Angola decreased as support was channelled to the attacks in the southeast. Angola's foreign supporters participated in the campaigns. The Soviet advisers in Angola planned both the 1985 and 1987 offensives. Further, the Cubans provided logistic and rear area security support as well as limited command and control of the tactical formations during the movements to contact.

(S) The goals and objectives of the 1985 and 1987 offensives were to capture the key UNITA-held town of Mavinga, challenge control of UNITA-held territory, and interdict South African logistic support for the insurgent movement. FAPLA failed to obtain its objectives during its offensives. In fact, the Luanda



~~(S)~~ *The two-pronged 1985 and 1987 FAPLA offensives required an extensive logistics buildup. Offensive operations were slow-moving and subject to UNITA harassment; they were stopped on both fronts.*


government suffered its greatest defeat in the 1987 offensive, before rallying at Cuito Cuanavale with the aid of Cuban forces.

Balance of Forces on Cuito Cuanavale Front[1] (U)

	Major Units	Personnel
FAPLA	8 Infantry Brigades	11,000
Cuban	4 Tactical Groups	3,000
Total		14,000
UNITA	3 Regular Battalions	11,000
	6 Semi-Regular Battalions	
	4 Irregular Columns	
	6 Field Artillery Battalions	
	9 Commando Groups	
	28 Specialized Units	
Total		11,000

[1] Military Region 6

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WINTEL~~



~~(S)~~ *FAPLA armor destroyed in the 1987 offensive near the Lomba River.*

Outlook

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Over the next 6 months, FAPLA most likely will restrict its activity to limited offensive operations, consolidating its most recent gains along the Benguela Railroad and reacting to repeated UNITA guerrilla attacks in the remainder of the country. At present, FAPLA does not appear ready to conduct a large-scale offensive in the southeast. Although adequate equipment and materiel could be airlifted to Menongue and Luena during the rainy season, an offensive will not begin until the start of the dry season, in April or May 1989, at the earliest. The MPLA government will continue attempts to reduce UNITA's capability by isolating it from its foreign supporters. The MPLA government will follow up with a series of limited offensives to reduce UNITA to a manageable threat while large-scale Cuban support is still available. However, the MPLA program is not likely to succeed unless FAPLA dramatically improves its capabilities across the board.

Defense Intelligence Agency

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIRECTORATE FOR RESEARCH

POOR ORIGINAL

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

The Angolan War: Impact of Foreign Force Withdrawal On the Tactical Situation (U)

POOR QUALITY PAGE

~~(C)~~ *In August 1987, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA) launched a major, Soviet-planned offensive to capture Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) stronghold of Mavinga, in southeastern Angola. This offensive failed, when UNITA, with South African assistance, inflicted a major defeat on FAPLA forces.*

~~(C)~~ *As the magnitude of the Angolan defeat became apparent, Cuba deployed an additional 15,000 troops to southwestern Angola to challenge South African military dominance in that region. South Africa and Cuba then apparently evaluated their involvement in a potentially costly conflict and began to participate more seriously in US-brokered peace talks, which led to an agreement on Cuban Troop Withdrawal (CTW) and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.*

~~(S)~~ *The successful conclusion of negotiations has near-term implications for the military situation in Angola. Specifically, DIA expects that the capabilities of both FAPLA and UNITA will begin to deteriorate with the 1 April start date for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region. On balance, however, because of FAPLA's greater dependence on Cuban support, UNITA's capability should deteriorate less, thus strengthening its position relative to FAPLA.*

~~(S)~~ *As a result of the cumulative negative effect of CTW on FAPLA's capabilities, Luanda could find it increasingly difficult to mount a major offensive against UNITA. But, barring a reversal of CTW, the 1989 dry season could well be the last good opportunity for FAPLA to launch a major offensive in the southeast.*

~~(S)~~ *Such an offensive would, however, most likely fail. A failure might demonstrate to the Angolan government that it cannot defeat UNITA on the battlefield. A failure also might encourage the Angolan Government to give serious reconsideration to its negative stand on reconciliation with UNITA.*

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(b)(3) 50 USC 403 3(c)

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Background

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DIA [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
14 February 1989
RM-10-89

POOR QUALITY PAGE

~~(S)~~ In August 1987, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA) launched a major, Soviet planned offensive to capture Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) stronghold of Mavinga, in southeastern Angola. Capture of Mavinga would challenge UNITA's control of the region and threaten South African logistic support to UNITA guerrillas operating in northern and central Angola. Although initially successful, FAPLA's offensive was hindered by logistic deficiencies and eventually bogged down against well-organized insurgent resistance. UNITA, with South African assistance, counterattacked and pushed the government forces back to their starting point at Cuito- Cuanavale, achieving a significant victory.

~~(S)~~ As the magnitude of the government's defeat became apparent, in November, Angolan President Dos Santos asked President Castro for a quantitative and qualitative increase in personnel and equipment. Consequently, starting later that month Cuba sent an additional 15,000 combat personnel to Angola, deploying them with their equipment, to southwestern Angola. This action focused South Africa's attention from Mavinga to the threat to its forces in southwestern Angola.

~~(S)~~ In response, South Africa gradually augmented its forces in northwestern Namibia, leaving behind a limited presence, including two batteries of long-range artillery in the vicinity of Cuito Cuanavale, to delay a renewed FAPLA buildup. Eventually, as a result of progress in negotiations, South Africa withdrew all its forces from Angola in August 1988.

~~(S)~~ These events provided new impetus to ongoing negotiations. Pretoria, Havana, and Luanda participated in US-brokered talks concerning Cuban Troop Withdrawal (CTW) and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 during this period. On 22 December 1988, the participants agreed on a timetable for CTW and the implementation schedule for Resolution 435.

~~(S)~~ Currently, the Angolan government has approximately 20,000 troops deployed to southern Angola (Military Regions 5 and 6), bringing the total of Angolan and Cuban forces there to about 35,000. Approximately 20,000 South African Defense Force (SADF)/South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) are present in northwest Namibia. At least 14,000 UNITA guerrillas operate in southern Angola.

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted]

Impact On Force Capabilities

[redacted]

DIA [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
14 February 1989
RM-10-89

~~(S)~~ Both UNITA's and Luanda's military capabilities will begin to deteriorate during 1989 as foreign forces withdraw from the region. On balance, however, because of FAPLA's greater dependence on Cuban support, UNITA's capability should deteriorate less, strengthening its position relative to FAPLA.

—FAPLA

POOR QUALITY PAGE

~~(S)~~ The Angolan Army is a fairly well-equipped but poorly trained and motivated light infantry force of between 60 to 70 brigades, totalling approximately 70,000 personnel. Of this total, only approximately 25 are even marginally combat-effective. These brigades consist of about 1,200 personnel each and are assigned to Military Regions (MRs) 3,4,5 and 6. They are generally augmented by tank and artillery assets. The remaining brigades have little offensive capability, are undermanned and poorly equipped, and are deployed to northern Angola.

~~(S)~~ FAPLA will focus its efforts during the next 6 months on enhancing its ability to maintain the current level of fighting while gradually assuming responsibility for tasks currently performed by Cuban personnel. FAPLA will have to recruit at least an additional 15,000 personnel above and beyond normal requirements to accomplish this and man locations currently garrisoned by Cuban personnel. However, Angola, even with Cuban assistance, does not have the ability to support a 25 percent increase in manpower with training and equipment.

—UNITA

~~(S/NF/WN/NO)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ Although South Africa has agreed officially to stop supporting UNITA, it will probably continue to provide limited assistance. South Africa's ability to support Savimbi with conventional forces will still exist, but without bases in Namibia reinsertion of units will be much more difficult.

~~WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED~~ ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ At present, UNITA is trying to plan and prepare for the cutoff or

degradation of logistic support by refocusing on a guerrilla strategy. In the near term, UNITA will retain the ability to conduct insurgent operations throughout the country using captured or existing stocks.

Prospects

~~(S)~~ The withdrawal of foreign forces also has implications for the tactical situation in Angola during the next 6 months. Savimbi will most likely attempt to exploit the negative impact of CTW on government forces by continuing to pressure FAPLA throughout Angola. Specifically, UNITA will attack FAPLA garrisons along the Benguela Railroad. This would force FAPLA to continue to deploy its better brigades and distract Luanda from the southeast.

~~(S)~~ UNITA also may continue to pressure FAPLA in the Cazombo Salient, where FAPLA currently has only three beleaguered garrisons. Insurgent activity has virtually cut off land routes to these garrisons, forcing FAPLA to resupply by air. Taking these garrisons would add a significant amount of land to UNITA-held territory, further increase the pressure on the FAPLA garrisons at Lucusse, and make it difficult for FAPLA to conduct offensive operations in this region during the dry season.

~~(S)~~ UNITA attacks will probably continue into the May-October 1989 dry season, with particular emphasis on disrupting convoys attempting to supply forward staging areas for a 1989 FAPLA offensive. UNITA probably will not attempt to capture a major town, although a town along the Benguela, in central Angola, such as Cuemba, could fall due to the effects of local guerrilla activity.

~~(S)~~ Staged withdrawal of Cuban troops most likely will have a cumulative negative effect on FAPLA's capabilities, making it increasingly difficult for Luanda to mount a major offensive against UNITA in the southeast. Although Cuba probably will not participate directly in another offensive, FAPLA would still receive certain collateral benefits from the remaining Cuban presence. Therefore, barring a reversal in CTW, 1989 could well be the last opportunity for a major FAPLA offensive. The critical date will be 1 August 1989, when the Cubans must withdraw north of the 15th parallel, hindering them from participating directly in offensive operations south of Cuito-Cuanavale.

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-3(c)

~~(S)~~ FAPLA has begun previous campaigns in the middle or towards the end

POOR QUALITY PAGE

of the dry season, generally during the July-August time frame. Due to the lead time required for an adequate logistical buildup and past practice (as well as the timing of CTW), a 1989 FAPLA offensive will probably begin by early July. Political considerations may dictate that the offensive again focus on the southeast and an attempt to take Mavinga. Although rhetoric may indicate that the military objective is UNITA headquarters at Jamba, this would be tactically unrealistic. Based on these factors, FAPLA must begin preparing for an offensive during the latter part of the October-April rainy season. As part of this preparation FAPLA needs to stockpile large quantities of supplies, ammunition, and fuel; construct additional bridging over the Cuito River; and increase forces at Cuito-Cuanavale by an additional 2 to 4 brigades.

~~(S)~~ Insurgent activity during the present rainy season will play a major role in determining FAPLA's ability to prepare successfully for this offensive. Continued widespread UNITA attacks, particularly along the Benguela Railroad, may inhibit FAPLA's ability to mass sufficient forces to stage a major offensive.

~~(S)~~ If able to overcome UNITA pressure, FAPLA will probably attack with four reinforced brigades. In order to launch this offensive with sufficient forces, Luanda must redeploy at least two brigades to MR 6 from another MR, most likely MR 4. This attack could follow the same general axis as in 1987. It is unlikely, however, that FAPLA will also be able to launch a diversionary attack from Lucusse. Luanda might also engage in offensive operations against the town of Savate, in south central Angola --- which could serve as a starting point for a second front in the south. Such an attack would, however, depend on FAPLA's ability to redeploy additional units from MR 5 or MR 4.

~~(S)~~ Savimbi's forces would withdraw in front of this attack while attempting to interdict lines of communication. This harassment could take a toll on FAPLA, forcing the Angolan forces to stop short of Mavinga, probably at the Lomba River. At this point, having concentrated forces due to the slowness of FAPLA's advance, UNITA could counterattack, forcing FAPLA to withdraw towards Cuito-Cuanavale. Although UNITA could harass FAPLA during this withdrawal, their lack of armored vehicles might prevent a vigorous pursuit.

~~(S)~~ More than likely, UNITA will not make a major push to take Cuito-Cuanavale. UNITA will be deterred by Cuito-Cuanavale's fortifications

POOR QUALITY PAGE

UNITA might attempt to eliminate the FAPLA garrisons in the Cazombo Salient. By doing this, UNITA would attack FAPLA at a point where supply lines are extended and its tactical position isolated and vulnerable. Luanda would have difficulty supplying and reinforcing these garrisons due to the necessity of supporting the forces at Cuito-Cuanavale. Such an offensive would be consistent with Savimbi's apparent long-term strategy of attacking weakness rather than strength. UNITA could also increase pressure along the Benguela Railroad. Capturing one or more of the towns along the Benguela would serve the dual purpose of facilitating UNITA logistic support for its units operating in the North and diverting FAPLA forces from the Cuito-Cuanavale front to respond to these attacks. Historically, threats to towns along the Benguela Railroad have easily diverted FAPLA from operations elsewhere in Angola.

Conclusion

~~(S)~~ A failed government offensive in 1989 may encourage the Angolan government to consider national reconciliation more seriously. Perhaps Luanda would come to grips with the fact that FAPLA cannot defeat UNITA. Luanda currently has difficulty recruiting sufficient soldiers in some areas of the country, and personnel losses resulting from another failed offensive would only exacerbate this trend. Also morale and discipline problems would become even more acute, making future effective offensive operations unlikely. Further, other black African states would have a better basis for pressuring Luanda to negotiate with Savimbi to reduce regional instability caused by continued fighting. These factors might combine to encourage the Angolan government to secure the best deal it can at the negotiating table.

~~WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS~~

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

DIA [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
14 February 1989
RM-10-89

CTW Timetable (U)

Date	Personnel Withdrawn
By 1 November 1989	25,000 (50 percent)
By 1 April 1990	33,000 (66 percent)
By 1 October 1990	38,000 (76 percent)
By 1 July 1991	50,000 (100 percent)

NOTES:
Total duration of the withdrawal is 27 months starting from 1 April 1989.

Prior to 1 April 1989 (beginning date of implementation of UNSCR 435) Cuba will have withdrawn 3,000 personnel.
Cuba must redeploy all of its personnel north of the 15th parallel by 1 August 1989 and north of the 13th parallel by 1 October 1989.

UNCLASSIFIED

Defense Intelligence Agency
Middle East/Africa Division
Directorate for Research

Questions and comments on this memorandum may be addressed to MAJ Glickson (DISTS 981-1781, Commercial (202) 373-4406, AUTOVON 243-4406).

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~UMBRA~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

PSGNO 13 (88XX) CRN #03/09/81# #C9:72#
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~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~UMBRA NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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CIADIN 245-2E (AS OF: 2037 EDT 2 SEP 81)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
)
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: SITUATION REPORT. (U)
)
1. ~~(S)~~ SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY OPERATION INTO ANGOLA, WHICH BEGAN ON 24 AUGUST, APPEARS TO BE WINDING DOWN. APPARENTLY THE WITHDRAWAL IS BEING SLOWED BY NUMEROUS MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. ADDITIONALLY, IT COULD BE SLOWED BY EFFORTS TO HAUL CAPTURED SOVIET EQUIPMENT ACROSS THE BORDER: 200 TONS OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSORTED EQUIPMENT; SEVERAL T-34 TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES; SEVERAL HUNDRED SOVIET-BUILT HEAVY-DUTY TRUCKS; AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS.
2. ~~(S)~~ THE SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND FORCE OF BETWEEN 4,000 AND 5,000 MEN HAD REPORTEDLY PENETRATED ABOUT 125 KM INTO ANGOLA AS FAR NORTH AS NUPA IN THE EAST AND ABOUT 19 KM SOUTH OF CAHAMA IN THE WEST.
3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ COMPLEMENTING THE GROUND FORCE MAY HAVE BEEN THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF AIR POWER USED THUS FAR BY SOUTH AFRICA IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLAS. THIS INDICATES THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH MORE THAN JUST SWAPO. THE AIR FORCE APPARENTLY STAGED OUT OF BOTH GROOTFONTEIN AND ONDANGUA AIRFIELDS. AT ONE TIME GROOTFONTEIN HAD 6 CANBERRAS, 5 BUCCANEERS, 24 MIRAGES, AND 5 TRANSPORT PLANES SUPPORTING OPERATIONS. THERE ARE ONLY EIGHT CANBERRAS AND SIX BUCCANEERS IN THE TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN INVENTORY. ADDITIONALLY, MIRAGES AND HELICOPTERS WERE REPORTED AT ONDANGUA.
4. ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) CAHAMA WAS REPORTEDLY DESTROYED BY THE AIR FORCE, WHICH FLEW MISSIONS AS FAR NORTH AS CHIBEMBA. INDICATIONS ARE THAT AT LEAST ONE AND POSSIBLY TWO SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT, A HELICOPTER AND AN IMPALA JET, WERE LOST. ALTHOUGH ANGOLA CLAIMS IT SHOT DOWN FIVE SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT.
5. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ IN SUMMARIZING THE OPERATION, SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN MAGNUS MALAN ANNOUNCED IN CAPE TOWN ON 1

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~UMBRA NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~WINTEL KOPORN NOCON TRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

MSGNO 13 (88XX) CRN *03/09/81* *09:22*
SEPTEMBER THAT RUSSIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED AND AT LEAST ONE, A WARRANT OFFICER, WAS TAKEN PRISONER. OTHER REPORTS INDICATE THAT FOUR SOVIETS WERE KILLED, INCLUDING TWO WIVES. THE SOVIET OFFICERS KILLED WERE TWO LIEUTENANT COLONELS, ONE AN ARTILLERY ADVISER, AND THE OTHER AN ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSAR. ADDITIONALLY, SOUTH AFRICA CLAIMS THAT 260 OF 450 ENEMY SOLDIERS KILLED IN THE ROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WERE ANGOLAN REGULARS AND THAT 10 OF ITS OWN TROOPS, INCLUDING 2 OFFICERS, WERE KILLED.

6. ~~(S/WINTEL/KOPORN/NOCON TRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

5. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ ACCORDING TO A HAVANA PRESS REPORT, CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD GO INTO ACTION IF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES APPROACHED THEIR POSITIONS. THE CUBANS ARE GENERALLY LOCATED NORTH OF THE MOCAMEDES-MENONGUE RAIL LINE.

6. ~~(C)~~ THIS LATEST SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATION WAS UNDOUBTEDLY BASED ON GOOD INTELLIGENCE AND WAS WELL PLANNED. IT WAS PROBABLY DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIR DEFENSE FACILITIES IN THE AREA AND TO INFLICT MAXIMUM DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES ON SWAPO, AND IT APPEARS TO HAVE DONE SO. SOUTH AFRICA WILL PROBABLY COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA BY THIS WEEKEND OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. ONCE OUT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO RETURN AFTER A PERIOD OF MONTHS IF THEY BELIEVE A LUCRATIVE TARGET EXISTS. UNTIL THEN, LIMITED (COMPANY SIZE OR SMALLER) CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~DRCVW 2 SEP 81~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~WINTEL KOPORN NOCON TRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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Moscow Reassesses Its Options in Angola (U)

A Defense Research Report

Defense Intelligence Agency

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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March 1989

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WNINTEL (WN)	Warning Notice-Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
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NOFORN (NF)	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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FGI	Foreign Government Information

~~Secret~~

~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

Moscow Reassesses Its Options in Angola (U)

A Defense Research Report

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document Prepared by the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency

Author: (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC 424

Information Cutoff Date: 31 December 1988

Classified by multiple sources
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

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Moscow Reassesses Its Options in Angola (U)

SUMMARY

~~(U)~~ The tripartite accord for a settlement of the war in Angola that was signed in December 1988 by representatives of Cuba, Angola, and South Africa, with the mediation and sponsorship of the United States, presages a new phase of reduced tension in the region's political-military affairs. A withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and a transition to independence for Namibia are the chief foci of the agreement. Hard bargaining has resulted in a timetable for the Cuban troop withdrawal (27 months) and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian independence.


~~(S/NF)~~ Although Soviet officials did not participate directly in the negotiations that spawned the recent agreement, they played an important backstage role. In line with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's professed desire to resolve regional conflicts peacefully, the Soviets want to convey the impression that they are playing a constructive role in ending the 13-year-old Angolan war. However, they may hesitate to give full support to the peace settlement if it fails to ensure the survival of the Marxist regime in Luanda after the Cuban troops withdraw. The USSR alleges that an internal settlement in Angola is a matter for the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgent organization to work out, but neither the Kremlin nor the MPLA would favor a role for UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA.

~~(S/NF)~~ Moscow's hopes to break the back of UNITA were dashed with the failure of the Soviet-planned and -supported offensive against the Angolan insurgents in 1987 — the largest such offensive to date. Nevertheless, the Soviets did not slacken the flow of supplies to Angolan Government troops. In addition to providing a continuous flow of aircraft, armored vehicles, air defense equipment, and other supplies, the USSR helped to bring fresh Cuban troops to Angola on Soviet ships and aircraft. The extensive Cuban troop presence in Angola obviated the need for Soviet combat forces to buttress the Marxist regime of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

~~(S/NF)~~ Moscow's role in Angola has been quite different from its role in Afghanistan. Soviet combat forces were not involved in the Angolan fighting, and Soviet advisers generally kept their distance from the front lines of the battlefield. A number of factors that have propelled Moscow toward a negotiated settlement of the Afghan war — mounting Soviet casualties, declining morale in the Soviet Army, possible domestic considerations, and the hostility of Islamic countries and China — are either absent or have negligible importance in Angola.

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
(S) Moscow's role in forging an agreement on Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola and independence for Namibia has not extended to seeking internal reconciliation between the Angolan Government and insurgents led by Jonas Savimbi

~~Secret~~

Moscow Reassesses Its Options in Angola (U)

The Soviet Stake in Angola

~~(S-NF-WN-NC)~~ Moscow's primary objectives in Angola have remained relatively constant over time, preserving the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in power, continuing Soviet military access to the country's ports and airfields, and staking out a position from which to play a role in a post-apartheid South Africa. Angola's capital, Luanda, is one of the largest and best natural harbors on the Atlantic coast of Africa and serves as the primary operational and support base for the Soviet Navy's West Africa Patrol. So-



~~(S/NF)~~ At least 1,200 Soviet military advisers are in Angola. They provide technical assistance to government forces and occasionally have accompanied them into battle. The Soviet Military Advisory Group played a major role in planning and coordinating the 1987 offensive against guerrillas of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The value of Soviet military hardware furnished to Angola during the past decade totals about $8 billion and in recent years has averaged more than $1 billion annually. Most Soviet shipborne military deliveries to Angola arrive at Luanda and Namibe; airborne cargoes use Luanda and Lubango for the most part.


~~(S)~~ The military defeat that government forces sustained in 1987 in southeast Angola — UNITA's stronghold — did not endanger the regime, but Luanda's hold over much of the country remains tenuous at best. The MPLA could be weakened by a total Cuban troop withdrawal, but even after a peace settlement, the Cubans almost certainly will keep a residual force of several thousand troops in Angola. Negotiations leading to power sharing between the MPLA and UNITA could weaken the MPLA, with a concomitant decline in Soviet influence in Angola.

~~(S)~~ Aside from their desire to keep a friendly Marxist regime in Luanda, the Soviets regard a foothold in Angola as important to bolster their role in shaping the political future of southern Africa. Moscow-backed insurgents of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) receive sanctuary and assistance from Angola. If SWAPO comes to power under the Namibian elections tentatively scheduled for 1989, the Soviet Union will be well positioned to influence the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa.


~~(S/NF)~~ Even if a settlement of the Angolan civil war is negotiated, Moscow will maintain a military supply relationship with Luanda. This relationship, amounting to the presence of hundreds of advisers and a virtual Soviet monopoly on the provision of arms and equipment to Angola, will be essential to uphold the USSR's influence in the region. The Soviets want to preserve their naval and air access to southern Africa, as well as to protect their credibility as an ally. In addition, since Angola is an outlet for strategic raw materials found in the lower Congo basin, a Soviet military presence in the country could facilitate the interdiction of such cargoes to Western Europe in a period of crisis.

The 1987 Offensive and Its Aftermath

~~(S/NF-WN-NC)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)



~~Secret~~


(b)(1):1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S NF)~~ The Soviets may have pressed the MPLA to launch its 1987 offensive despite indications that government forces were too weak and undisciplined to prevail — Angolan Army morale is extremely low, most of its officers have minimal leadership skills, and many of its troops lack basic necessities. The government's subsequent defeat — with as many as 4,000 fatalities — is believed to have generated friction between the Soviets and Angolans, who faulted many of the Soviet strategic and tactical prescriptions.

~~(S NF WN/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 (b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S/NF WN/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 The Cuban buildup, Cuban deployments into extreme southwestern Angola, and skirmishes between Cuban and South African forces near the Angolan-Namibian border in the spring and summer of 1988 were key factors in Pretoria's decision to enter into negotiations that led to a July "agreement in principle" with Luanda and Havana. In accordance with the agreement, South Africa withdrew its troops from Angolan soil. The withdrawal was completed in late August.


Soviet Military Assistance to Angola

~~(S NF WN/NC)~~ (b)(1),1.4(c)

~~(S NF)~~ Soviet military assistance to Angola reached an all-time high of $1.5 billion in 1987, and deliveries — notably aircraft and air defense equipment — continued at a brisk pace in 1988. Angola has surpassed Ethiopia as the USSR's premier arms client in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the Soviets continue to subsidize Cuba's economy and to defray the costs of equipping Cuban forces in Angola.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ (b)(1),1.4(c)

Soviet Military Assistance to Angola Continues at an All-Time High ~~(S)~~



~~SECRET NOFORN~~

provement over earlier models in terms of speed and ordnance. Among the items that Angola has received since the end of 1987 are 12 MiG-23 FLOGGER fighters, 5 Mi-24 HIND and 12 Mi-8/17 HIP helicopters, 5 SA-3 GOA surface-to-air missile battalions (for Cuban forces), 40 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 60 T-54/-55 medium tanks, 40 artillery pieces, and 373 military trucks — part of a total order of 1,000 trucks, the last of which were scheduled for delivery by the end of 1988. A major portion of the weaponry is intended to replace equipment lost during the 1987 offensive.

(S-NF/WN/NC) (b)(3)-50 The Su-25/FROGFOOT attack jet entered Angola for the first time in 1988. Twelve of the aircraft have been delivered. The An-32/CLINE may be introduced in the immediate future. In addition to providing modern aircraft, tanks, and other offensive weapons, the Soviet Union has supplied some equipment for a Cuban- and Angolan-manned air defense network — which includes a full complement of Soviet surface-to-air missiles — across southwestern Angola. Much of the equipment for this network came from Cuba's own inventory, some of which the Soviets have replenished. This network, in conjunction with Cuban-piloted MiGs, jeopardized South African air superiority in the region. The Soviets reportedly have also equipped their Il-76/CANDID transport planes in Angola with devices to thwart surface-to-air missile attacks.

(S/WN/NF/NC) (b)(3)-50 Plummeting oil prices during 1985-86 severely affected Angola's ability to repay its military debt to the USSR, which now totals close to $5 billion. Moscow has provided little grant aid during the past decade; most aid takes the form of soft loans that Angola can service from its oil revenues. In June 1986 during a visit to Moscow by Angolan President dos Santos, the Kremlin reportedly agreed to defer payments on the debt's principal until 1989 and to continue to accept interest payments at a rate of 5 percent.

CONFIDENTIAL



(C) The FROGFOOT Ground Attack Aircraft. The FROGFOOT, which the Soviets have used widely in Afghanistan, was introduced into Angola in 1988.

(S-NF/WN/NC) (b)(3)-50 Although in arrears on its repayment schedule, Angola is one of the few Third World recipients of Soviet military assistance that can still meet at least part of its financial obligations. Soviet officials are exerting diplomatic pressure to secure payment, and the USSR may propose barter trade to help recoup at least part of the debt.

(S/NF) Moscow probably believes that the counterinsurgency war is unwinnable, but it apparently wants to continue to build up the Angolan military to enhance Luanda's negotiating position and to preserve Soviet credibility as an ally. Thus, despite the Angolan military's lack of progress in the field, the Soviets seem to have opted for reinforcement rather than retrenchment in terms of the level of their support to Angola.

Soviet-Angolan Economic Relations


(S/NF) Soviet generosity in furnishing military assistance to Angola has not been matched on the economic side. Moscow has extended some credits for fisheries and the mining industry, as well as for a hospital in Luanda and a satellite ground station. Angola also will purchase Soviet equipment for its long-delayed Capanda Dam project, for which the USSR provided a $750 million credit in 1982. Despite its close political and military links with the Soviet Bloc, Angola conducts the bulk of its foreign trade with Western nations. Admiration for the efficient operation of the country's Western-operated oil industry has spurred interest in expanding economic ties with the nonsocialist world. In October 1987, Angola applied for membership in the International Monetary Fund. Membership could enable the country to obtain credits to help pay off its debt to the USSR and to cover imports of food and other basic commodities so that Angola's own foreign exchange could purchase more weapons.

[redacted]

[redacted] Soviet support [redacted] Soviet assistance. The Soviets [redacted] trade, culminating in the Soviet visit [redacted] products [redacted] Soviet Head of State to Lisbon and Portugal [redacted] which not only yielded economic benefits [redacted] but also boosted the MPLA regime's political legitimacy abroad. Dos Santos is seeking the assistance of Western governments [redacted] as well as the IMF and, eventually, the World Bank [redacted] to implement an economic reorganization program that leans toward privatization in agriculture, cutbacks in state subsidies to non-oil industries, and monetary and price reforms. These measures underline the disdain of many Angolan officials for the Soviet Union as an economic model for the Third World. An improved price of oil would help to alleviate the country's catastrophic economic situation. However, military spending consumes about 40 percent of the government budget, and economic recovery will be impossible to achieve before the war ends.


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


~~(C)~~ *Soviet FLAT FACE Radar. This radar is among the air defense equipment that the USSR has delivered to Angola*


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


The Kremlin and the MPLA




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




~~(S/NF)~~ Dos Santos visited Moscow in November 1987 for the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The trip helped to counterbalance his September journey to Western Europe. The Soviets reportedly used the occasion to discuss Angola's impending effort at economic reform and to warn that dos Santos should not wholly discard the socialist model of development.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)





Moscow's Attitude Toward Negotiations on the Angolan War

~~(S)~~ As part of his effort to project an image of peaceful intentions, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev advocates negotiated solutions to regional conflicts. He cites the Geneva accord for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan as an example of this trend. However, most of the factors propelling Moscow toward a cessation of the Afghan war — mounting Soviet casualties, declining morale in the Soviet Army, domestic repercussions, and international condemnation of the Soviet occupation — are not applicable to Angola. Gorbachev professes to favor an Angolan settlement, but he seems cautious about pressing his Angolan and Cuban allies into an agreement that would jeopardize their perceived interests.

~~(S)~~ Before the failure of the 1987 offensive against UNITA, the Angolans and Cubans were floating a proposal for a phased withdrawal — over a period up to 4 years — of Cuban troops stationed south of the 13th parallel and retention of a residual force in the north, around Luanda, for an indefinite time. South Africa and the United States rejected this proposal. Cuba's military buildup in southwestern Angola in 1987 reflected a Soviet and Cuban desire to strengthen their negotiating position with South Africa. However, South Africa's subsequent buildup on the Namibian side of the border spurred a mutual US and Soviet interest in averting a full-scale military confrontation between South African and Cuban troops.

~~(S)~~ Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, the US architect of the Angola-Namibia negotiations, declared that the Soviets had to "put their weight behind" the effort to reach a settlement. Crocker helped to arrange talks between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, with the United States acting as a mediator. The Soviet Union participated as an unofficial observer. Talks were held in London in May, in Cairo in June, and in New York in July. The Soviets evidently applied backstage pressure on the Cuban and Angolan delegation, thereby facilitating the July 1988 "agreement in principle" that calls for "a staged total withdrawal of Cuban troops" from Angola and the granting of independence to Namibia.

~~(S)~~ The Soviet-backed Cuban troop reinforcement and Cuba's January 1988 commitment in principle to a total troop withdrawal paved the way for South Africa's willingness to participate in negotiations. Soviet policy, therefore, reflected a familiar pattern of alternating intimidation with accommodation.

(U) On 13 December 1988 in Brazzaville, capital of the Congo, representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an accord bringing peace to southern Africa. US mediation and Soviet pressure on the Angolan and Cuban representatives helped to seal the four-point agreement. It stipulated the parties would recommend to the UN Secretary General that 1 April 1989 should be the date to start implementing Security Council Resolution 435, that the tripartite accord would be formally signed in New York on 22 December 1988, that prisoners of war would be exchanged, and that a joint commission of the parties would resolve issues of interpreting and implementing the accord. The parties envisaged a phased Cuban troop withdrawal, first to northern Angola — above the 13th parallel — and then out of the country, in a process scheduled to take 27 months. The first 3,000 of the more than 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola would leave by 1 April 1989.

~~(S/NF)~~ Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, who played a key behind-the-scenes role in the Angolan peace process, has stated privately that the MPLA should initiate a dialog with UNITA for an internal settlement as a necessary corollary to the agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. However, Moscow officially claims that it has no leverage to pressure Luanda into negotiations with the insurgents, and it holds that an internal political settlement is a matter for the Angolans themselves to resolve.

The USSR is highly unlikely to curtail arms deliveries to the Angolan regime in an effort to force it into a dialog with UNITA. Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Luanda's representative at the United Nations, reiterated the position of the dos Santos regime when he announced on 11 August that "We do not see any possibility, not even remote, of a dialog with UNITA."

Outlook

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviet Union will continue to advocate a peaceful settlement of the Angolan conflict as part of Gorbachev's effort to alter Western perceptions of the Soviet threat to Third World areas. If negotiations on an internal settlement in Angola reach a stalemate, Moscow probably will count on a decline in, or cessation of, support for UNITA under the new US administration. A settlement could enable the Soviets to reduce the costs of maintaining their client regime in Angola by potentially dampening the US desire to support UNITA and by leading to the establishment of a pro-Soviet government under SWAPO in Namibia.

~~(S/NF)~~ The USSR will strive for the cessation of foreign — especially US — assistance to the Angolan insurgents, but it will continue to supply significant quantities of weapons to the MPLA regime. Under the rubric of noninterference in the domestic affairs of Angola, Moscow will insist that the composition of a post-accord government in Luanda is a matter for the MPLA and UNITA to work out between themselves. The Soviets may encourage the MPLA to pursue a "talk fight" strategy of the type conducted so skillfully by Hanoi during the Vietnam war, but they appear to share the MPLA's opposition to establishing a coalition government in Luanda, especially one that includes charismatic UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. The Soviets, in any event, will try to reinforce their influence in a postwar Angola by remaining the sole supplier of most of the regime's military equipment.

~~(S/NF)~~ In determining future policy toward Angola, the Soviets will have to weigh the interests of Cuban leader Fidel Castro against their own desire to project an image of diplomatic flexibility. Castro would oppose a total troop withdrawal if it meant the demise of the MPLA regime. During negotiations, the Cubans pressed hard for a prolonged withdrawal schedule, both to maximize support for the Angolan Army and to facilitate the reabsorption of some 50,000 military personnel into Cuban society. The Soviets will continue to cooperate closely with the Cubans in Angola as a way to bolster the USSR's own influence in the country and, by extension, in the region as a whole.


(U) Each classified title and heading in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) This document has been fully coordinated with the Directorates for Current Intelligence and Estimates.

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (b)(3):10 USC 424

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FROM DN-2G
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 184-1E (AS OF: 1218 EDT 3 JUL 77)
CUBA: ANGOLA BUILD-UP FOLLOW-UP. (U)

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1. [redacted]

2. (S/NOFORN) INFORMATION IS FAR FROM COMPLETE, BUT CURRENT DIA ESTIMATES FOR THE CUBAN BUILD-UP IN ANGOLA LIST AN INCREASE OF 4,000 TO 5,000 DURING THE MONTHS OF MAY AND JUNE BRINGING THE ESTIMATED TOTAL OF CUBAN TROOPS AND ADVISORS FROM 14,000 TO 20,000.
PREPARED BY: MS L. MORGINSON-EITZEN, ALERT CENTER
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Cuba's Role in Angola (U)

A Defense Research Assessment



Defense Intelligence Agency

DDB-2240-16-88
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Cuba's Role in Angola (U)

A Defense Research Assessment

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document Prepared by the West Europe/Latin America Division, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Information Cutoff Date: 1 November 1987

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Cuba's Role in Angola (U)

KEY JUDGMENTS

~~(S/NF)~~ This assessment examines Cuba's military role in Angola. First, it analyzes the size, character, and role of the Cuban presence in Angola. Second, it examines the motivations and constraints upon the Cuban military commitment there. It concludes by identifying trends in the Cuban presence and by presenting an outlook for the next 2 years. The following key judgments cover the major points.

- The present Cuban military commitment to Angola is dependent upon continuing Soviet support. Without Soviet support, Cuban presence and sustainability of operations in Angola would be greatly reduced, but would likely continue at a level of several thousand advisers.

- The size of the Cuban military presence in Angola has increased in increments from an initial force of less than 1,000 in late 1975 to near 38,000 in 1987. No near-term reduction is anticipated, in spite of reported Angolan desire for a measured reduction in the current Cuban troop levels.

- The functions of the Cuban military forces in Angola have evolved from a clandestine logistics role in early 1975, to an active combat role in late 1975 and the years immediately following independence, to a mixed static defensive role for ground units, with a limited combat role for fighter pilots. No significant change in the Cuban military role in Angola is anticipated in the next 2 years.

- Cuban and Soviet goals in Angola are convergent and operate in accordance with Moscow's worldwide objectives. The Cuban military presence in Angola is also motivated by Fidel Castro's personal ambition, and by his desire to export revolution and defend Marxist regimes.

- The Cuban military commitment to Angola is influenced primarily by Angolan- Soviet-Cuban relations, and, marginally, by social and economic conditions at home.

NOTE: ~~(S/NF)~~ During December 1987, after this report was written, an estimated 2,000 Cuban personnel, possibly from the 50th Division in Cuba, were transported to Angola. Additionally, a contingent of Cuban ground forces was also deployed to the Cuito Cuanavale area southeast of Menongue. It is unclear if these troops have increased the total number of Cubans in Angola, or if they have replaced other Cubans who may have departed Angola earlier. South Africa continues to provide logistical and artillery support to UNITA forces in the Cuito Cuanavale area.


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Cuba's Role in Angola (U)

Background

~~(S/NF)~~ During a September 1986 visit to Angola, Fidel Castro stated publicly his intentions and rationale for continuing Cuban military activity in Africa. He stated Cuban forces will remain in Angola as long as they are needed; Cuba stands firm in the struggle against apartheid and in support of Namibia's independence from South Africa; and when apartheid ceases to exist, there will be no need for any Cuban soldiers in Angola or in any other frontline country. In support of these claims, Castro noted that since 1975, 200,000 Cuban soldiers have served in Angola, that he is willing to rotate at least another 200,000 soldiers into Angola in support of this cause, and that there are now 30,000 Cuban troops deployed there. Privately, however, Castro would likely accept some reductions in the Cuban presence in Angola, if regional political negotiations could ensure a continuing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government. Fidel Castro, however, would not be likely to accept a total withdrawal of Cuban troops, because in Cuban regional foreign policy toward Africa, Angola is perceived as a gateway for present and projected political and military involvement in the strategic southern cone of Africa.

~~(S/NF)~~ Cuban military involvement in Angola has evolved significantly since the early 1960s. During the 1960s, Fidel Castro developed a personal friendship with Agostinho Neto, then the leader of the MPLA. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Castro provided Neto's forces with medical supplies, weapons, and military training — principally from bases in neighboring African countries. In the early years of the Cuban revolution, Cuba's foreign commitments were limited and focused on providing aid to developing Marxist governments and on the intangible political benefits, which were to be derived for Cuba from supporting ideologically compatible revolutionary movements. This period was characterized by a maximum Cuban effort to gain international recognition as a genuine Marxist state and, concurrently, to demonstrate Cuban political autonomy.

(U) During the early 1970s, Cuba was frustrated by its minimal diplomatic gains in more stable parts of the world, so it sought opportunities to establish relations with emerging new nations in Africa. Havana also expected limited reaction from the superpowers for this venture, since Africa at the time was in neither the US nor the Soviet sphere of influence. Africa also offered Cuba a good prospect for future economic opportunities.

(U) From 1974 through 1976, Cuba intensified its relationship with Angola. This involvement intensified first from 1974 to early 1975, following the Portuguese coup in April 1974 that presaged Angolan independence; next in mid-1975, because of increased threats to the MPLA from rival political factions; and again in late 1975, because of South African involvement. Angolan independence was declared on November 11, 1975. The first large-scale deployment of Cuban troops into Angola occurred during September 1975, when the Cuban expeditionary forces, delivered by Soviet air and sea transport, actively joined the MPLA in combating rival political factions. These rival political factions included the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (with its associated South African combat troops) and the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA).

(U) By 1976, the Cuban military role was shifting, as the MPLA, with large-scale Cuban and Soviet support, outlasted rival political factions. As the large-scale fighting drew down, Cuban combat soldiers remained in Angola to guarantee the MPLA's position and, by 1978, concentrated increasingly on defensive functions in support of the Angolan Government and the developing Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). The number of Cuban military personnel increased steadily until 1978, and then stabilized at the 20,000 level through 1981. Since the late 1970s, the direct combat role of Cuban ground forces has been limited.

(U) Two factors that govern the Cuban military presence in Angola today were set forth during the civil war period of the 1970s. First, the Soviet Union equips and assists the Cuban military forces in Angola. Second, while virtually all major political and military decisions in Cuban foreign relations are and have been made by Fidel Castro, including the initial decision to send Cuban troops to Angola, the continuing presence of Cuban forces in Angola creates an anomaly for Fidel Castro in that it allows the Soviet Union to influence directly Cuban decisions regarding Angolan affairs.

(S/NF) A recent factor has emerged that may influence Cuban military presence in Angola — the MPLA has indicated that Cuban forces at current levels are unaffordable and that the Angolan Government would favor a calculated reduction in the Cuban military presence. The Soviets and Cubans do not favor this move.

(S/NF/WN) Three final background comments may be helpful. First, over 80 percent of the estimated 46,000 Cuban military personnel serving outside of Cuba are in Angola. The principal countries where Cubans are assigned are shown below. When Cuban combat soldiers alone are considered, the 32,000 Cuban tactical troops in Angola account for up to 93 percent of the Cuban combat troops overseas. Second, the Cuban units in Angola are manned primarily by reservists and recruits. In general, the reservists are activated to fill higher skill level positions, while the recruits are assigned to the less demanding positions. The more experienced troops and units of the Cuban Armed Forces remain in Cuba. Moreover, duty in Angola is not desirable, and most Cuban soldiers try to avoid serving there. *Third*, the FAPLA engaged in a failed offensive against UNITA forces resulting in the largest setback for FAPLA forces since the MPLA came to power in the 1970s. This rout eclipses the setback of the 1985 offensive.

Cuban Military Personnel Overseas (U)
(Principal Countries)

Country	Military Advisers	Combat Troops
Angola	6,000	32,000
Ethiopia	1,500-2,000	1,500-2,000
Nicaragua	1,500-2,000	
Mozambique	800	
Congo	50	300-500[1]
South Yemen	500	
Subtotal	10,350-11,350	33,800-34,500
Total Military Advisers and Troops		44,150-45,850

[1] At any time there may be as many as an additional 1,200 Cuban troops in the Congo from Angola or transiting the Congo.

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Size, Characteristics, and Role of Cuban Military Forces in Angola


(S/NF/WN) (b)(3):50 The Intelligence Community estimates that as of December 1987, there were approximately 38,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola. This total reflects an increase of 2,000 since the last national estimate, in November 1985, and closely parallels information provided during the summer of 1987 by Cuban defector Brigadier General del Pino. Cuban military personnel perform various functions; 32,000 are combat troops serving in organized Cuban military units. The remaining 6,000 serve as military advisers and logistical support advisers to FAPLA units; some also serve as political-military affairs advisers to the MPLA government.

~~(S/NF)~~ Since 1985, the moderate increase in Cuban military personnel levels from 36,000 to 38,000 suggests that there is no need for more Cuban military personnel at this time. This moderate increase could also be explained by an apparent Cuban reluctance, at present, to increase the Cuban presence or, conversely, by Angolan reluctance to request additional Cuban forces, despite Cuban willingness to send more troops. In any event, Luanda and Havana have expressed no overriding need to change present Cuban troop levels in Angola. Cuban military force levels in Angola since 1975, shown below, indicate a relative stabilizing of troop levels since 1985. The increase from the 25,000 to 30,000-level in 1983 to 36,000 in 1985 most likely resulted from a significant expansion of the UNITA insurgency in Angola during that period, which strained the Angolan Armed Forces. An increase in South African military activity in the southern border areas of Angola, though to a lesser degree, would also help to explain this increase. In the absence of any unexpected surge in UNITA capabilities or direct South African threat to Cuban forces there is no identifiable need for dramatically increased Cuban force levels in Angola at the present time. Similarly, there is probably no plan in Havana to decrease significantly the number of Cuban military forces in Angola during the next 2 years.

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 The method of estimating the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola is and has been inexact. Intelligence collection on this subject is limited, with much of the information available having been derived from satellite photography. Prior to May 1987, very little information had been provided from knowledgeable Cuban sources. In May 1987, this changed with the defection of Cuban Brigadier General Rafael del Pino, an Air Force officer and former Commander of Cuban Air and Air Defense Forces in Angola. Of particular interest is his description of the command structure of Cuban military forces there, as shown below. His information closely

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Cuban Military Forces in Angola (U)



Cuban Military Organization in Angola (U)

Southern Command based at Huambo (there is no Northern Command)

Five reinforced infantry regiments located in:
- Huambo & Caala
- Lubango
- Matala
- Jamba (near Capelongo, not to be confused with UNITA headquarters in southeastern Angola)
- Menongue

DAAFAR brigade (Air and Air Defense)

Three MiG-23/FLOGGER squadrons, located in:
- Lubango
- Menongue
- Luanda

One MiG-21/FISHBED squadron located in Lubango

Three SA-3/GOA SAM regiments located in:
- Lubango
- Matala
- Menongue
- (An additional combined Cuban-Angolan unit is located at Namibe.)

Two Air Defense artillery regiments located in:
- Lubango
- Huambo

Six radar sites located in:
- Chibemba
- Lubango
- Matala
- Huambo
- Jamba[1] (near Capelongo)
- Menongue[2]

Two infantry regiments located in:

- Cabinda
- Luanda

Two tank brigades located in:

- Malange[2]
- Luena[2]

Independent helicopter regiment located at Huambo, consisting of:

- 10 Mi-17/HIP H
- 10 Mi-25/HIND

Transportation squadron consisting of 7 An-26/CURL

Military advisory group (the "olivos") with members located in:

- Schools
- Brigades
- Ministry of Defense at provincial level
- Military regions
- Operational groups

[1] Combined Cuban-Angolan site.
[2] Since relocated.


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parallels information held in current national-level data bases of the Cuban force structure in Angola. Concentrations of equipment that US intelligence analysts have used as evidence for the presence of task forces or brigades in specific locations, closely approximate the locations of regiments, brigades, groups, squadrons, and sites that Brigadier General del Pino has identified. Moreover, his information enhances the degree of confidence in figures for Cuban air and ground combat forces now serving in Angola. An evaluation of Brigadier General del Pino's information on Cuban air defense forces and military advisers is continuing.

(S/NF) A breakout of the current 32,000 Cuban combat soldiers in Angola by types of forces shows 26,100 ground combat personnel organized into a regimental and brigade structure with the following maneuver units: mechanized infantry battalions, motorized infantry battalions, armor battalions, and supporting administrative and logistical units. Additionally, there are 1,100 air force personnel and 4,800 air defense personnel. The air defense troops estimate may be somewhat high, as the exact Angolan, Cuban, and possibly Soviet personnel staffing or assignments at air defense sites cannot be confirmed. Cuban military personnel, however, because of their numbers, probably play a major role in the operation and maintenance of surface-to-air systems as well as air defense radar systems. The degree to which Angolan forces have been integrated into these systems is unclear.

(S/NF) Cuban ground and air defense forces in Angola today perform critical defensive missions. Deployed mainly in a band across central Angola, the Cuban forces provide security for major provincial towns and defend selected key installations such as oil facilities, airfields, bridges, principal highways, and rail lines. All locations are north of the 16th parallel, away from South African units in Namibia, and can be distinguished as four identifiable groups of forces. The first group consists of a line of garrisons in urban areas between the port of Namibe and the city of Menongue. The second extends in a line along the Benguela Railroad from Lobito to Kuito. The third is in the Luanda area, and the fourth is in the Cabinda region. By defending key terrain, the Cuban ground units free Angolan forces for combat duty. Major concentrations of Cuban combat forces are shown on the map. The air defense forces protect primarily against the threat of South African aircraft. While Cuban ground forces do not, as a rule, engage insurgent forces in battle, they have defended their positions when attacked. This defensive role likely will remain unchanged.

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(U) Concentrations of Cuban Forces.

(S/NF) FAPLA, with its estimated 98,000 forces, is unable to sustain an offensive against the estimated 60,000-strong UNITA forces, without strong Cuban support. The Cuban military presence is vital to the survival of the MPLA government. How the Cubans are a part of the overall military posture in Angola at the national level is indicated below. The extent to which the Cubans are necessary militarily is also revealed in the methodology of major weapon systems allocation. The preponderance of major combat equipment delivered by the Soviets to Angola comes under direct Cuban control. Cuban units retain much of this equipment in their defensive posture near urban areas to defend the MPLA political structure, and this equipment has not been

Contending Forces (U)

	Misc. Forces	Potential Combatants
UNITA		60,000
Semiregular and regular forces	25,000	
Irregular Forces	35,000	
South Africa		21,000[1]
South Africa Defense Forces in Namibia	9,000	
Southwest Africa Territorial Forces	12,000	
		81,000
FAPLA		70,000
Additional Angola Forces:		28,000
Militia — People Defense Organization (ODP)	10,000	
Border Guard	6,000	
Police	8,000	
Air Force/Air Defense	2,500	
Navy	1,500	
Cuban Military in Angola		38,000
Combat soldiers	32,000	
Advisers	6,000	
Cuban Civilians		6,000
		142,500

[1]Total available for deployment to Angola border area.

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available to the FAPLA combat forces. Cuban pilots have performed a more active role in the conflict, flying combat sorties against the UNITA insurgents. The level of activity in FAPLA-UNITA confrontations has generally been constrained by available weapon systems and transportation limitations. When UNITA and FAPLA units have met in battle, fighting has been largely UNITA light infantry forces against FAPLA reinforced light infantry forces; this has changed. More complex weapon systems were used in the 1987 offensive, albeit without success, by the FAPLA.

(S/NF/WNINTEL) The ongoing 1987 FAPLA offensive against UNITA forces in southeastern Angola is unusual for two reasons: first, for the unprecedented magnitude of logistical preparations noted, and second, for the large amount of Angolan-controlled vehicles and weapon systems appearing in the area. During late 1986 and early 1987, photography showed that some Cuban ground combat and support units that had been defending the Luanda-Huambo highway as well as units from the Malange area that had been defending the Malange-Luanda rail line and the Malange-Saurimo highway had redeployed. While they may have been relocated south to Kuito, further south to the Menongue area, or east to the Luena area, equipment appearing in these locations has not been positively identified as belonging to these units. If these units have moved in support of the FAPLA offensive, the Cubans

will likely carry out defensive missions in these areas, thereby freeing additional FAPLA troops for combat duty. Another possibility exists that, while many of the armor and combat vehicles in the current offensive are probably newly arrived equipment from recent Soviet deliveries, some also could have been turned over to the FAPLA from these Cuban units.

(S/NF/BYN/NC) The Cuban role in the fighter air support and transport air support of the offensive is clear. Cuban crews, in organized squadrons, fly Angolan aircraft and control as many as half of all Angolan tactical aircraft in training and combat missions. Cubans are believed to fly frequent combat sorties against the UNITA insurgents. Moreover, in the event of substantial direct South African air support to UNITA during the current offensive, Cuban pilots are expected to take the lead in air intercept operations against South African aircraft. Cuban and Soviet transport aircraft have also air-transported much of the equipment and materiel that has been prepositioned to support the offensive.

(S/NF) The ongoing FAPLA offensive against UNITA forces in the Mavinga area is an example of how the Angolan combat forces, Cuban combat forces, Cuban military advisers, and Soviet military advisers interact. Soviet advisers establish policy and make major military strategic and tactical decisions. The Angolans, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, plan and execute ground maneuver actions. The Cuban and Soviet advisers assist in positioning logistical assets for Angolan forces. Cuban advisers also assist Angolan maneuver unit commands in implementing their assigned combat missions. Cuban ground forces defend rear area installations, such as airfields and supply depots, and Cuban Air Force elements fly combat sorties.

Role of Cuban Military Advisers

(S/NF/BYN/NC) Activities of the estimated 6,000 Cuban military advisers in Angola are not well documented. They are organized in military advisory groups and assigned to FAPLA units. The advisers serve as instructors in a variety of military schools and as trainers and advisers in tactical units. They also serve with Angolan units as technicians, logistical advisers, and staff officers. In addition to duties with tactical units, the advisers serve in staff positions in military regional headquarters, in Ministry of Defense positions at the provincial level, and in national-level military headquarters.

Cuban Civil Role in Angola

(S/NF/BYN/NC) (b)(3):50 Cuban military advisers to the FAPLA and MPLA are augmented by an estimated 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers to the MPLA. These civilian advisers are significant to the overall military posture of Cubans serving in Angola because they are, to a large degree, an available pool of trained military personnel. This is apparent for three reasons. First, all Cubans in Angola, civilian and military, are subordinate to a single commander. Second, most civilian advisers have already completed their mandatory military service. Third, uniforms and small arms are stored in-country for issue to Cuban civilians, if required.

(S/NF) Civilian advisers are directly involved with public health projects, agricultural improvement programs, and road improvement programs, as well as with construction of schools, hospitals, airfields, and housing, which are all key to maintaining the failing infrastructure in Angola. Many also serve as economic and political advisers at virtually all levels of government, while others have undertaken ventures to develop or exploit Angolan natural resources for Cuban profit. There are approximately 400 Cuban teachers and education advisers in Angola, who plan and carry out urban and rural education programs. The Cubans supplement these programs with scholarships and invitations for Angolan students to study in Cuba from primary grades through postgraduate-level instruction. In 1984, Angolan students in Cuba numbered nearly 2,200.

Motivations

(S/NF) The Cuban military commitment to Angola today is motivated primarily by four factors. First, Fidel Castro sees Cuban action in Angola as a source of personal and national aggrandizement and influence. Second, Castro actively supports the export of revolution, while at the same time championing solidarity among Marxist regimes.

Third, Castro derives economic gain for Cuba from the Cuban participation in the Angolan conflict; and finally, Castro uses Angola to relieve social pressures at home, and as a place to train Cuban troops.

Personal Motivations

(S/NF) As the sole source of power in Cuba, Fidel Castro converts his personal goals into Cuban national objectives. Cuban international policies in Africa, and specifically in Angola, reflect Castro's personal opinion of what is best for Cuba, for his Cuban revolution, and for his personal place in history. In Cuban relations with Angola, Castro has benefited from common or complementary Soviet and Cuban objectives in Africa. These parallel objectives include maintaining Soviet military access to Angola, supporting the MPLA as a client regime, maintaining Soviet Bloc influence in the region, undermining Western initiatives that challenge this influence, and destabilizing the South African Government. Castro couches his support for the African National Congress (ANC) and Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in terms of antiapartheid rhetoric. In a larger sense, however, Castro has turned his Angolan commitment into a crusade against South African hegemony of Southern Africa in much the same manner as he has directed much of his energy against the United States since the 1960s.

(S/NF) Cuban active support for the export of revolution and solidarity among Marxist regimes has been important to Cuban military support of the MPLA in Angola. Castro's association with the MPLA has been forged over two decades. It has progressed from a cautious friendship between leaders, through a relationship of support to a revolutionary faction during civil war, and finally into a full-fledged alliance. This relationship is now well institutionalized in Havana and Luanda, and any change to this relationship, in Havana especially, would require a dramatic refocusing of Cuban priorities. Castro's persistent efforts to maintain solidarity among Marxist regimes also explains his intensive support to the MPLA.

Ideological Motivations

(S/NF) Castro also claims to be a key protector of Marxist regimes in the Third World. This claim brings Castro into an ideological confrontation with the MPLA government as it makes overtures to the West in search of economic support. Domestically, Castro has attempted to show himself as a Marxist-Leninist purist by rejecting any move toward openness or liberalization. In addition, Castro has undertaken a rectification campaign in Cuba, closing free markets and censoring public dissent. This campaign calls for still more public sacrifice, to increase the productivity of state enterprises, and admonishes and seeks to punish corrupt Cuban leaders as well as workers. Mounting social and economic pressures at home, and in Angola to a limited degree, have precipitated Castro's rectification campaign. The payoff for Cuba, however, is that Castro's campaign at home and his willingness to maintain an estimated 44,000 Cuban military and civilian personnel in Angola, afford him the opportunity to claim his self-declared role of protector of Marxism.

Economic Motivations

(S/NF) Economic motivations for Castro focus on three factors: Cuban access to Angolan oil revenue, access to Angolan national resources, and an opportunity to export excess Cuban labor and skilled workers.

(S/NF) When the MPLA came to power in Luanda, it gained access to Angola's oil revenues. During periods of oil prosperity, the MPLA was able to pay Havana in hard currency for Cuban civilian and military aid. Falling Angolan oil revenues and rising costs of the war for the MPLA have decreased Luanda's ability to pay directly for Cuban support and assistance. Cuba also benefits from Cuban exploitation of Angolan resources, such as hardwood logging operations in the Cabinda region and limited fishing operations. While the economic gain from hard currency payments by Luanda to Havana most likely is not the overriding factor in the ongoing Cuban military commitment to Angola, it remains a significant source of revenue for Havana.

Cuban Domestic Motivations

(S/NF) The export to Angola of excess Cuban labor and skilled and unskilled workers, who have

been absorbed by the Armed Forces, relieves, to a limited degree, unemployment pressures at home. While Angola provides for their basic necessities, and the Soviets equip the Cuban military forces, the more significant motivation for Havana is to make a token repayment to the Soviets for the economic assistance they give Cuba. Such Cuban military activities overseas partially compensate the Soviets for their estimated annual $4.5-billion infusion into the Cuban economy.

Constraints

(S/NF) There are two basic categories of constraints to be considered regarding the Cuban military commitment to Angola — internal and external.

Internal Constraints

(S/NF) From the Cuban perspective, there are few internal constraints on their military commitments to Angola. Although the Cuban economy is in dismal condition and popular discontent has surfaced at home, at least in part in response to the prolonged Cuban military presence in Angola, these factors are not seen by Castro as constraints, because he has not let them influence his commitment to the Cuban-Angolan-Soviet alliance. The Soviets continue to underwrite the presence of the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola and to subsidize the Cuban economy. Moreover, the Cuban Government, with an extensive internal security apparatus, is able to contain overt manifestations of the Cuban population's discontent. Neither the economic situation at home, nor the social discontent in Cuba or among Cubans in Angola, is expected to weaken Castro's control during the next 2 years.

External Constraints

(S/NF) There are, however, two significant external constraints which affect the Cuban military commitment in Angola. The decisionmaking process in the Angolan-Soviet-Cuban alliance, which is used to reach major decisions about the strategy and tactics of the war, limits Cuban choices. In this process, the MPLA government and Soviet advisers weigh their political and military alternatives in light of possible repercussions to their own domestic requirements and diplomatic and trade relations with the West. At times, Cuba does not have the same weight in the decisionmaking process and must lobby the Soviets and Angolans. On the diplomatic front, Raul Castro reportedly spent as much as 5 weeks in Angola during May and June 1987, apparently attempting to participate directly in discussions on the MPLA's position regarding possible changes in Cuban troop levels. This trip may have been in response to a Cuban perception that they were being excluded from major discussions that could impact on the status of Cuban troops in Angola, possibly due to the Angolan economic and military situation. In matters of trade relations, the hard currency raised by Angola to pay for its war is derived principally from trade with the West. Angola has a vested interest in maintaining this trade. Also, while war materiels come from the Soviets, Cubans, and Eastern Bloc states, Angola's food imports and commercial trading ties are primarily with the West. Angola and the Soviet Union have a vested interest in maintaining this trade as well.

(S/NF) The second constraint on the Cuban military commitment to Angola is that Cuba alone can not sustain Cuban troops abroad. The Soviets are the primary source of equipment, materiel, and repair parts that Cuba needs to sustain Cuban tactical readiness both at home and in Angola. Finally, Cuba would need Soviet Bloc assistance to augment its ability to transport additional Cuban troops into Angola, if substantial reinforcements were to be required.

Current Trends

(S/NF) There has been little significant change in the Cuban military role in Angola since 1985. Cuban ground and air defense forces continue in a defensive posture, while the Cuban Air Force pilots continue to fly combat support sorties and, in conjunction with Soviet transport aircraft crews, continue to augment Angolan air transport capabilities. The size of the Cuban military force in Angola has leveled off at approximately 38,000 personnel. The current military situation will not likely require any significant increase or decrease in the present Cuban troop levels in Angola. Cuban units will remain positioned primarily

in defense of the central and southern sectors of Angola above the 16th parallel, and additionally around Luanda and in the Cabinda region

(S/NF/NOFORN) (b)(3):50 The confidence level for the Intelligence Community's current estimated strength figures for Cubans in Angola is high for Cuban ground and air force elements in Angola. Strength estimates for air defense troop levels, however, may be further refined, possibly downward, if indications from Brigadier General del Pino can be corroborated.

(S/NF) The ongoing FAPLA offensive against UNITA positions in southeastern Angola presents two new developments: first, large-scale logistical preparations to support the operation and, second, the unprecedented concentration of Angolan armor and combat vehicles. The Cuban role in the offensive was limited, however, while some additional Cuban units may have deployed into the Kuito, Menongue, or Luena areas, there was no confirmation of any Cuban ground forces directly supporting the operation.

Outlook

(S/NF) While social and economic conditions in Cuba and among the Cubans in Angola are not good, conditions are not bad enough to precipitate any meaningful challenge to Fidel Castro's present policy of continuing military support to the MPLA government of Angola.

(S/NF) The outlook for Cuban forces in Angola for the next 2 years will hinge on the balance of combat achievements by UNITA and the FAPLA. To the extent that UNITA, with South African support, gains momentum, the FAPLA, with Cuban support, will attempt to offset UNITA gains. The opposite also applies. To the extent that the FAPLA, with Cuban troops in support, gains the initiative, UNITA, with South African support, will attempt to offset FAPLA gains.

(S/NF) In the absence of significant UNITA gains, the Cuban role in Angola will remain primarily defensive and Cuban troop levels in Angola will not likely change to any significant degree, as the Cuban presence is vital to continuing MPLA survival. Token Cuban drawdowns are possible in the next 2 years, but any substantive withdrawal of Cuban forces could cause the MPLA to fall, unless a political solution were to preclude UNITA initiative.

(S/NF) If the UNITA forces, with significant foreign assistance, gain the upper hand and seriously threaten the MPLA's existence, the Cuban combat forces could be expected to assume a direct combat role in the conflict.

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An Analysis of Cuba's Military Mobilization Capabilities (U)

DECEMBER 1982

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AN ANALYSIS OF CUBA'S MILITARY MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES (U)

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PREFACE

~~(S)~~ This report examines Cuba's ability to mobilize its reserve forces. Since the reservists are most heavily dedicated to the ground forces, this paper concentrates on that service. While manpower is the most important element of Cuba's reserve potential, some information on the mobilization of transport assets also has been included.

~~(S)~~ The majority of the information used in writing this Defense Intelligence Report came from recent refugees, most of whom had served with military units in the Havana area. The general procedures carried out there most likely are followed throughout the island.

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SUMMARY

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ One of the principal strengths of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) is the large role which reservists play in the execution of its various missions. This includes the traditional mission of defending their homeland or serving as combat forces or advisers overseas. Reservists are found in virtually every Cuban ground forces unit. Some units have only a cadre of regular personnel, which are greatly expanded by the augmentation of reservists. In the case of the deployments to Angola (1975 to the present) and Ethiopia (1978 to the present), the Cubans demonstrated the ability to bring together reservists from several units and, with minimum training, organize these personnel into new units.

~~(S)~~ The Cuban reserve system is well organized and effectively managed. It handles the administration of an estimated 1,500,000 reservists, several hundred thousand of whom can be quickly and effectively called up to serve in the military. As demonstrated in Cuba's Angolan and Ethiopian interventions, Cuba's reservists can perform almost as well as the regular troops, at least in the Third World. The reservists give Cuba a sufficient number of personnel to support several large overseas campaigns, but Moscow must provide needed material and logistic support. Overseas intervention can be carried out without seriously degrading the defenses of Cuba. This is because of the large number of well trained reservists and regular military.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Similarly, Havana could mobilize an initial force of several hundred thousand reservists, and eventually a total force (including regulars) approaching 1 million to defend the island during a time of perceived threat. The principal constraint on the Cuban defenses would be the impact on the economy of having so many people away from their regular employment, especially over a sustained period of time.

1. INTRODUCTION

~~(S)~~ Cuba, a country with just under 10,000,000 inhabitants, has been able to play a role in world politics well beyond the capabilities one would expect based on its size. Certainly, Havana's close ties and massive support, especially arms deliveries, from the USSR have given Cuba the needed capabilities to support its actions overseas and defend the island. The capabilities of Cuba's Soviet modeled military personnel system, particularly the reservists, give Havana the ability to involve itself in such operations as well as provide a credible defense for the island.

2. ORGANIZATION OF CUBAN GROUND FORCE UNITS

a. General

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ An interesting complexity of the Cuban ground forces is a lack of manning consistency among the units. This aspect makes it particularly difficult to assess the overall strength or understand just how reserve personnel are used to bring a unit to full strength. The ground forces readiness categories are outlined below:

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ There are probably three general categories of readiness for Cuba's ground forces units, two for regular units and one for reserve units. The status of a unit is determined by the percentage of active-duty personnel serving with the unit and equipment onhand. The Cubans do not refer to the different categories of units, but rather in the broader context of being regular or reserve. While a unit may have a certain percentage of positions filled by reservists, this percentage is not uniformly found among all subordinate units. In the case of Category I or II units, a division might have several regiments, one of which is basically reserve. That is, it is staffed by a regular cadre, and filled out by ready reservists. Also, a regiment or an independent artillery brigade may have several active battalions, and one which is composed mostly of reservists.

b. Active-Duty Units

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Category I - Immediately Operational. These divisions and independent artillery brigades are on fully operational status. At least 90 percent of the unit personnel are active-duty troops, and the units have all or almost all of their equipment onhand.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Category II - Operationally Active. These divisions are basically identical to Category I with 50 to 90 percent of their strength composed of active-duty personnel. These units have most of their equipment on site.

c. Reserve Units

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Category III - Ready Reserve. It is believed that most of these units have less than 35 percent of their personnel on active duty. The majority of these units are infantry, which probably draw heavily upon Cuba's nonmilitary transportation sector during mobilization. The few Category III units which approach 50 percent active-duty personnel are believed to have some equipment onhand.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Because of the size and high degree of readiness of the reserves, Cuba also has the ability to quickly form new units. These would be basically infantry units composed of lower echelon reservists probably having a cadre of active-duty personnel who are drawn from established forces. The newly created units would rely on nonmilitary transportation assests. As described later, many units sent to Africa were composed in this fashion.

3. CUBAN MILITARY COMMITMENT-LAW NO. 1255

~~(FOUO)~~ In August 1973, the Cubans rewrote their military conscription law. Cuban Law Number 1255 on General Military Service states that all Cuban males between the ages of 16 and 50 are eligible for military service (table 1). Reserve officers are kept on the rolls beyond this age limit. Also, women between 17 and 40 years who have technical skills useful to the military or vocational training are incorporated into the military registry. Active military service consists of fulfilling one's military obligation with units of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), Ministry of the Interior (MININT), or Youth Labor Army (EJT), a paramilitary civic action force. The period of active service for conscripts is 3 years. During an emergency (which is broadly defined), their active-duty service can be extended 6 months. Compulsory registration takes place during the year of the 16th birthday. Males between the ages of 17 and 28 can be drafted, and females may volunteer for service.

~~(FOUO)~~ The reserves consist of people eligible for active military service, but who are not on active duty. They receive military instruction in order to be prepared to fulfill their obligations. The Cuban law states that reservists are divided into two groups, based on their military experience. While there is some ambiguity in the Cuban laws, it is believed that the two groups are made up as follows. The First Group consists of those who have served at least 1 year on active duty, those who fought with the Rebel Army before it gained permanent status, and those who fought at the Bay of Pigs. The Second Group is all others, and it includes women who have special technical or professional skills and those who had been on active duty. These two groups are further divided into three orders based on age. The First Order is those up to 35 years of age, the Second Order is from 36 to 45 years, and the Third Order is from 46 to 50 years.

~~(FOUO)~~ Each of these categories has a specific maximum amount of time yearly for which a reservist can be called on to "attend special military meetings" in order to receive training instructions. It is believed that this includes their annual callup in addition to regular periodic reserve meetings. These are as follow:

First Group
- First Order - up to 2 months
- Second Order - up to 1 month
- Third Order - up to 20 days

Second Group
- First Order - up to 3 months
- Second Order - up to 15 days
- Third Order - up to 12 days

In addition, the members of the Second Group's First Order (e.g., those who have had no previous active military experience and are between 17 and 35 years) who complete 3 consecutive months in active duty are upgraded to the First Order of the First Group.

Table 1

Cuban Mobilization Capabilities

Age	Total Number of Males (thousands)	Maximum Number Fit For Military Service (thousands)
15-19	602	415
20-24	428	281
25-29	365	237
30-34	345	218
35-39	321	194
40-45	281	157
46-49	216	110
Total 16-49	2,558	1,612

Estimated Reserve Strengths

	First Group (those with prior service) (thousands)	Second Group (those with prior service) (thousands)	Total (thousands)
First Order (up to 35)	310*	748	1,058
Second Order (36 to 45)	71	263	334
Third Order (46 to 49)	4	84	88
	385	1,095	1,480


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* ~~(S)~~ This includes the 100,000 to 130,000 ready reservists ate which have been rounded off to 120,000.

4. THE ROLE OF MILITARY COMMITTEES IN RESERVE ADMINISTRATION

a. Organization of the Committees

(S) Cuban military mobilization is controlled at the national level by the Directorate of Organization and Mobilization of the General Staff which is headed by a brigadier general (diagram). Each of Cuba's 14 provinces has a military committee and these are further broken down to probably all of the 169 municipalities. The military committees are composed of military and civilians, and technically are part of the civilian government. Most, if not all of the heads of the provincial committees, are colonels or lieutenant colonels, while lieutenants to majors run the municipal committees.



Administration of Reserves

(S) The provincial and municipal committees are authorized some autonomy in the administration and processing of residents in their areas. Their duties include maintaining the records on reservists; the calling of reservists for military training, mobilization, or active-duty ("permanent positions in FAR"); and bringing to trial those who disobey the laws and regulations.

(S) Military committees are believed to be located in each of the 169 municipalities, which are roughly equivalent to US counties. In the case of Havana, and possibly other large cities, the municipal military committees may be further divided into districts.

(S) The mission of the municipal military committees is to keep records on all reservists living in their area. The military committees notify reservists for call up for active duty and keep track of any change in their status. If necessary, the reservists report to their military committee every 3 months to update their records.

b. Information Maintained on Reservists

~~(S)~~ Information maintained by the committee includes the reservist's name, address, phone number (if applicable), employer, next of kin, medical information, education, membership in organizations, military specialty, criminal record, military history, and military unit number to which the person is assigned. Each person who leaves active duty is expected to report to his local military committee to provide this information within 1 week after separation. Those entering the reserves after the completion of active duty retain the maximum rank maintained while on active duty.

c. Manning of the Committees

~~(C)~~ Municipal Military Committees are manned by an estimated 6 to 12 regular officers and enlisted personnel and about 20 to 40 reservists (probably all enlisted) whose mobilization billets are in that committee. (The civilian composition is unknown.) The enlisted personnel, probably regular as well as reservists, are used to notify the reservists who are under the military committee's jurisdiction, during time of callup.

d. Types of Reserve Callup

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ It appears that there are two general kinds of callup; these are for routine and emergency situations. During routine callup, the reservists are notified by telegram and are given a place and a time to report. Usually they are given notification at least several days in advance. The routine procedure is generally the one followed for the placing of reservists in permanent positions for service overseas. (Some reservists called up for Angola and Ethiopia were questioned in advance about their attitude and willingness toward performing an internationalist mission.) In the case of emergency callup, the reservists are notified verbally and told to be at a well-defined pickup point in 1 to 3 hours. Emergency callup is frequently practiced by Cuban reservists. These drills usually take place late at night, when there is little traffic to hinder movement, and to afford concealment from the noninvolved populace.

5. ASSIGNMENT OF RESERVE PERSONNEL TO MILITARY UNITS

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Representatives from military units (probably at the regimental or battalion level) send a manpower procurement officer to the local municipal committees to review all of the MR-1 forms, and select the reservists who possess the specialties needed by their unit. In the more populated areas of Cuba, such as Havana City Province and Havana Province each military committee may have a number of regiments vying for the reservists. As would be expected, there are problems with units trying to get the more qualified reservists from other units. It is believed that the units try to fill vacancies as they occur, with those units which have a higher readiness standing receiving priority in selecting personnel. As expected, those who have been recently released from active duty, or have special skills, are the most sought after reservists.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In addition to assigning personnel to presently established units, the Cuban reserve system is so large and apparently well administered, that it can create new units, probably drawing from the reservists who are not already

committed to the established units. It appears that a large percentage of Cuban units sent to Angola and possibly Ethiopia, especially after 1977, were drawn up in this fashion.

6. RESERVIST TRAINING

~~(S)~~ As noted, Cuba makes a conscientious effort to maintain its reservists at a high level of combat readiness. Those up to 35 years of age can spend 2 to 3 months on active duty. It is believed that the 100,000 to 130,000 ready reservists are called up for more than 30 days each year. A typical pattern is that a ready reservist is activated for one 6-week period yearly. For about a month of this time, his unit will probably deploy to one of Cuba's training areas for an exercise of at least regimental size. For a number of years, the Cubans have held major exercises during November and December at the Camaguey Military Training Area. These usually include units from a number of Cuban divisions, and a high percentage of those who have participated have been reservists.

~~(S)~~ Previously, there was reporting that the Cuban reservists also attended periodic drill periods, either weekly or monthly. There was no such information concerning this from the Mariel refugees.

7. RESERVE PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA

~~(S)~~ A very important aspect of Cuba's involvement in Angola and Ethiopia has been the heavy participation by reservists. (It is believed that the average tour overseas has been 18 to 24 months.) Of the estimated 110,000 Cubans who have served overseas, it is believed that approximately 75,000 have been reservists, the vast majority of whom have come from the First Order of the First Group. There has been some participation, however, from those of the Second Order of the First Group and the First Order of the Second Group.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~	(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ As stated, a variety of deployment methods have been noted. Those listed do not necessarily represent an exhaustive list, but rather show the diversity used by Havana to send thousands of troops to Angola. In no case have units as large as divisions been identified as being sent in their entirety. There are a few occasions when active regiments may have been sent; however, the most popular unit for assignment overseas appears to be the battalion. In many cases several battalions from different parent units were married into brigades for deployment. (These could be either active or reserve battalions.) Another pattern is that when an infantry regiment in Cuba had one of

its active battalions sent to Angola, if a reserve battalion existed in that regiment, it would be cal'ed to active duty to retain the active strength of the regiment. In some cases, battalions were made up by taking personnel from component elements. For example, the three battalions of an infantry regiment might each provide a company, the three of which would be formed into a battalion for Angolan service.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) As stated earlier, one of the primary missions of the Cuban ground forces units is to train reservists and maintain these personnel at a high state of readiness. An interesting occurrence with the Angolan deployments has been the heavy use of several units for predeployment training. Infantry Regiment MUN 2642 of Infantry Division MUN 3234 has been used extensively in this fashion, and several sources referred to it as an "Internationalist Training Brigade." Field Artillery Brigade MUN 3500, subordinate to the Western Army, and Air Defense Artillery Regiment MUN 4772 of Mechanized Infantry Division MUN 1270, were also used in a similar fashion. As stated earlier, the preponderance of the Mariel refugees came from western Cuba. Since each of the three above units which provided a training function is located in western Cuba, it would not be risky to presume that units in central and eastern Cuba were also used to train Angola-bound soldiers.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Another way in which Cuban troops were sent to Angola was in newly composed units. The bulk of these personnel were enlisted reservists who were called to active duty. These units were staffed by a cadre of selected enlisted personnel and officers; most of the officers were on active duty. The cadre personnel were probably drawn individually from active units. The fact that the reservists who were selected for these units were not assigned to one of Cuba's known active or reserve divisions or brigades, suggests that these were from a lower echelon of the reserves. This pattern became more prevalent after 1976, which suggests that Cuba felt comfortable sending lesser qualified personnel once their mission in Angola took on a more definite "peace-keeping" role.

8. HEAVY ROLE OF RESERVISTS IN AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Reporting from the Mariel refugees reflects the large role reservists play in manning air defense artillery. A recurring pattern is that each of the Cuban ADA units, which they call a regiment but actually equates more closely to a battalion, has six, six-gun batteries. Normally, two of the batteries are manned at full strength with active-duty personnel, while the other four batteries have a cadre of active-duty officers and selected enlisted, and the remainder of the billets are filled by reservists who are mobilized when needed.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) When one considers that Cuba has in excess of 1,700 towed ADA guns, Cuba could equip about 47 of these regiments/battalions (table 2). An estimated 13 of these units are subordinated to active divisions or independent brigades; of the remaining 34 units, many are probably dedicated to the defense of one installation. All of the ADA regiments/battalions are not subordinated to the ground forces. It is believed that the Air Defense Artillery component of the Air and Air Defense Force (DAAFAR) could contain 10 to 12 of these units. Also, while there is no evidence of ADA subordination to the Cuban Revolutionary Navy, the Navy could control ADA guns which protect their installations.

Table 2

Air Defense Artillery Assets*

Size of Guns (mm)	Approx Number	Btrys	Bns	Est Pers Per Bn	Total Pers
12.7	50	8	1	450	450
14.5	910	151	25	375	9,375
23	150	25	4	375	1,500
30	120	20	3	450	1,350
37	235	39	7	600	4,200
57	180	30	5	600	3,000
85	50	8	1	600	600
100	50	8	1	600(?)	600
	1,745	289	47		21,075

~~SECRET~~

*(U) Does not include self-propelled ADA guns.

9. MOBILIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION ASSETS

~~(C)~~ As in other socialist countries, the government-controlled, nonmilitary assets are subject to mobilization during military alerts. The official authorization for this is outlined in Cuban Law No. 1317, "Military Reserve Means and Equipment of the National Economy."

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In the Havana provinces, at least nine truck depots (table 3), which have an estimated total of 1,585 trucks, have been identified as having a reserve mobilization mission. (There are four other reported depots, with an estimated 1,185 vehicles, which have not been confirmed.) During callup, the civilian reservists who work at the truck depots are mobilized along with their vehicles. One report states that a large number of vehicles are deadlined because of lack of spare parts, tires, and a shortage of qualified heavy transport drivers. Also, some trucks break down because they are used to carry too heavy a load.

~~(C)~~ Transport Regiment MUN 1950 located at El Calvario, which is directly subordinated to Western Army Headquarters, controls all reserve transportation units in the Havana provinces. There, the truck drivers and mechanics are given their basic military issue. The organization of MUN 1950 includes a heavy cargo battalion, a mixed cargo battalion, a solid cargo company, and a POL cargo company. Both of the battalions have three companies, two of which are reserve. There is also a separate unidentified reserve battalion. Additionally, MUN 1950 has contingency plans for greatly expanding its strength by absorbing the previously mentioned civil motor transport companies.

Table 3

Selected Civilian Transport Companies In Havana
Subject to Mobilization

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

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10. CUBAN PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

a. Territorial Militia (MTT)

(U) The Territorial Militia was established on 1 May 1980 by Cuban President Fidel Castro. Originally created as a grass roots combat support organization, the MTTs are developing into being part of the Cuban defense establishment.

(U) According to official Cuban sources, MTT strength is approximately 500,000, although this figure has not been verified. MTTs are organized in each of Cuba's 169 municipalities with the ranking municipal political leader as chief of the unit. Units are organized into regiments, battalions, and companies with much of the financing coming from student groups, workers cooperatives, and other patriotic organizations.

(S) The military capabilities of the MTTs are limited but improving. They are tasked with defending their respective areas from invasion, and are solely defensive in nature. Since the MTTs incorporate those individuals not already in the active or reserve forces, this indicates the relatively low priority this group has for recruitment. It is not known if members of the MTT would be integrated into the regular forces during a national mobilization; however, it is speculated that this may be carried out on a very selective basis. Training, both individual and unit, is conducted in small unit tactics, drill and ceremonies, air defense, CBR, and basic marksmanship. The militia could provide harassing fire on enemy troops, but would provide no match for a regular combat force.

b. Youth Labor Army (EJT)

(U) The primary mission of the EJT is to contribute to the economic development of Cuba by engaging in civic action activities such as agricultural, industrial, construction, and transportation projects. It has as part of its mission the training of personnel for the reserves. It also is charged with assisting in the territorial defense of the country in time of national emergency. It should be noted, however, that the EJT has not been activated during recent mobilizations. The EJT, which has approximately 100,000 personnel, is considered capable of accomplishing its primary missions. Personnel receive limited military training, and the EJT has sufficient small arms for all of its personnel.

(U) The EJT is the principal paramilitary force within MINFAR. The Chief of the EJT is responsible to the First Deputy Minister and Chief of the General Staff of MINFAR. Subordinate EJT headquarters are located at the provincial level. Units are organized along military lines and report to their respective provincial headquarters. EJT units are distributed throughout the country in accordance with requirements of the economy. The heaviest concentration of the EJT is in the eastern half of Cuba.

c. Civil Defense and Other Forces

(S) In the event of hostilities, three other elements would come under military control. The 10,000-man National Revolutionary Police (PNR), with its 52,000 civilian auxiliaries, would be instrumental in insuring public order as well as in providing rear area security. The Civil Defense Force (50,000 peacetime strength, 100,000 in wartime), which MINFAR supervises, has the mission of protecting industrial zones and providing rear area security.

II. CONCLUSIONS

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The dedication of the Cuban Government to the defense of the island and "internationalist solidarity" is clearly illustrated by its heavy commitment to a large, capable, and quickly activated reserve corps. Through a massive registration system, Havana has a pool over 1,500,000 from which it can draw to augment its regular troops. This commitment to defense can also be seen in the transportation equipment which can and has been quickly mobilized for military use. Although reporting on transportation companies has only been obtained from the Havana areas, such units probably exist thoughout the island. (This is similar to the contribution made by Cubana Airlines, See DIR DDB-1300-216-82-SI, and the Cuban merchant marine in supporting overseas operations.)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces currently have a personnel strength of some 265,000. Of this total, about half are ready reservists, the majority of whom have had prior military experience, serve about 6 weeks each year on active duty, and can be mobilized in about 4 to 6 hours. Additionally, Cuba has some 310,000 other male reservists under the age of 35 who have had prior military experience (they are in the First Order, First Group) and 748,000 who have not served in the armed forces they are in the Second Order, First Group). All of these personnel are subject to mobilization to help defend the island or serve an internationalist mission.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The significance of the role played by the reservists is illustrated by their high level of participation in Africa. It has been stated by General Raul Castro that some 70 percent of Cuba's force in Angola and Ethiopia were reservists. While HUMINT is available from only a small cross section of African veterans, their reporting supports Castro's statement. This means that of the approximate 310,000 reservists in the First Order, First Group, about one-quarter of these have served in Africa. This illustrates the depth of manpower from which the Cubans have drawn and could exploit for future operations.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The flexibility of the Cuban reserve process has been illustrated by the apparent ability to draw upon lesser qualified reservists for service in Angola after the initial stages. This left the better troops free for defense of the island or movement to a more demanding arena overseas.

APPENDIX

Cuba - Vital Statistics

Total population 9,730,000
Total Physically Fit Males 1,610,000

Force Strength

Ground	100,000	(60,000 in Cuba, 11,000 officers; 49,000 enlisted. 40,000 overseas (4,000 officers; 8,000 enlisted, 28,000 activated reservists almost all enlisted)
Ready Reserve	100,000-130,000	(4,000 officers; 96,000-126,000 enlisted)
Navy	12,000	(1,450 officers; 11,050 enlisted)
Ready Reserve Unknown		
Air	18,500	(2,200 officers; 16,300 enlisted)
Ready Reserve	5,000	(Est) (400 officers; 4,600 enlisted)

Estimated Number of Conscripts*

Ground	57,000
Navy	11,050
Air	16,300
	84,350
Yearly callup**	28,000 (About 28 percent of Physically Fit Males)

Estimated Ground Reservists

First Group	310,000 (100,000-130,000 Ready Reservists)
Second Group	791,000

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*(U) Number of ground conscripts is determined by adding the enlisted serving on the island to the nonreserve enlisted overseas.

**(U) Yearly callup calculated by dividing the number of conscripts by three (number of years per enlistment.) It is estimated that the number who reenlist is balanced by the estimated 5 percent attrition rate.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications (U)

A Defense Research Report

Defense Intelligence Agency

DDB-2680-295-86
May 1986

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3673

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Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications (U)

A Defense Research Report

This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
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Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency

(6)(3) 10 USC 424

Information Cutoff Date: 1 March 1986

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Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications (U)

SUMMARY

The 1985 Offensive

(~~S~~) The 1985 Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) offensive in southeastern Angola was the latest and most significant in a series of annual dry season operations against the insurgents. This offensive was distinguished from others in recent years by an apparent marked increase in FAPLA effectiveness incorporating the use of new weapons and tactics. Government operations began in July but did not seriously threaten National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) positions until mid-August. An estimated 10,000 Angolan troops from 8 brigades, an unknown number of Soviet and Cuban advisers, and about 50 aircraft were involved.

(~~S~~) There were two main axes of advance: one east from the Luena-Luso road toward the Cazombo salient; the other southeast from Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga. The former axis was the more successful for FAPLA, but the latter operation was more important for military and political reasons. Angolan political objectives may have been to demonstrate an improved capacity to prosecute the war, discourage those in Luanda who favor negotiations with UNITA, test South African and Western reaction, and deliver a psychological blow to the guerrillas by capturing long-held UNITA territory. Luanda's military objectives probably included capturing major UNITA bases deep in insurgent territory, interdicting UNITA lines of communication (LOC) — both external supply lines to its strongholds in the southeast and LOCs to its guerrillas in the north and west, damaging UNITA's infrastructure as much as possible, testing new FAPLA tactics and equipment, and capturing towns with airstrips suitable for development as supply points or forward airfields.

Cubans and Soviets Involved

(~~S~~) Although there are unconfirmed reports of more direct Soviet involvement in this FAPLA offensive, evidence of a greater Soviet role is mainly circumstantial. That is, reported improvements in FAPLA capabilities over previous efforts probably are indicative of heavier Soviet and Cuban involvement in areas such as command and control and air operations.

(~~S~~) The more important operation along the Mavinga axis failed to achieve its objective, and FAPLA forces retreated after heavy fighting near the Lomba River some 20 kilometers northwest of Mavinga. Severe losses and the effects of the rainy season argue against further major FAPLA drives until at least May, although several intelligence reports indicate FAPLA had planned another drive on Mavinga during the rainy season. Government forces have occupied several towns in and around the Cazombo salient, however, and apparently intend to remain there. Whether they could survive a UNITA siege is problematical.

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(S NF) UNITA was surely tested by the offensive. It has admitted to 1,200 casualties including 400 killed in action), but it has been able to continue conducting operations at a high level in areas of Angola far from the offensive. UNITA resistance was able to slow severely the progress of FAPLA along the two axes of attack. FAPLA has not stated publicly its personnel losses at the hands of UNITA, but the figure could be over 1,000. The Angolans publicly admit losing at least 8 aircraft, but they may have lost more than 30. Both sides were weakened by such losses, but their capabilities have not been damaged significantly. UNITA probably suffered only a short-term setback that will not hinder seriously its ability to carry on its insurgent campaign nationwide, and FAPLA equipment losses probably already have been recouped by the largest Soviet airlift to Angola since the 1975-76 civil war.

South African Involvement

(S NF) South African forces played a significant role in support of UNITA. This included emergency resupply and medical evacuation missions, tactical airstrikes on FAPLA forces advancing on Mavinga, aerial reconnaissance, and possibly the reinforcement of UNITA with elements of unconventional warfare units such as the 32d Battalion.

(S NF) The South African Air Force was instrumental in blunting the FAPLA drive on Mavinga. At least two major air raids were conducted involving 12 to 20 aircraft each — a major effort in that military environment. The South African response indicates the seriousness with which both UNITA and Pretoria viewed the FAPLA operations.

Attempted Improvements

(S NF) The FAPLA offensive appears to have been a manifestation of an evolving Soviet-Cuban-Angolan strategy to use conventional military forces to deny UNITA safehavens in southeastern Angola and eventually choke off its lines of communication. A key feature of this strategy may be to make much greater use of air power operating from forward airfields to carry the war to UNITA rear areas. MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22, Mi-24/25, and Mi-8/17 aircraft were used in significant numbers for the first time. Continued improvements in the SAM and radar belt across southwestern and south-central Angola undoubtedly are meant to discourage South African air operations. Unfortunately for Luanda, this belt does not yet extend to the southeast, and South African aircraft can operate there relatively unhindered. There is no evidence that South African aircraft operating in this sector were challenged by Cuban- or possibly Soviet-piloted jet fighters, which would have been the only logical way to check the South African attacks. Prompt extension of the air defense network to the east is undoubtedly a high FAPLA priority.

Implications

(S NF) Both sides probably feel that as a result of lessons they learned in 1985, they will score successes in the 1986 dry-season campaign. UNITA has redeployed its best commanders and units to defend the southeast against an expected two-pronged attack. It also will remain active in other areas to tie down FAPLA troops far from the government's objectives. The FAPLA, in turn, feels it can build on its 1985 successes to begin its offensive earlier, to sustain extended operations, and to extend its air defense net east by retaking Mavinga. Although each side is likely to achieve some successes, a military victory ending the conflict or even reducing the insurgency to a manageable level is not expected.

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(U) UNITA prepares for FAPLA offensive

Angola: The 1985 Government Offensive and Its Implications (U)

Analysis of the 1985 Government Offensive

(S/NF) The recent Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) offensive in southeastern Angola was the latest in a series of annual dry-season operations against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. An estimated 10,000 troops from 8 brigades and about 50 aircraft were involved. There were two main axes of advance: east from the Luena-Luso road toward the Cazombo salient, and southeast from Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga. FAPLA troops reached and occupied Cazombo, and apparently intend to remain there. Whether they can survive a UNITA siege is problematical. The operation directed at Mavinga was more important for military and political reasons but failed to reach its objective. FAPLA forces were turned back by UNITA after heavy fighting near the Lomba River northwest of Mavinga. The onset of the rainy season argues against further major FAPLA drives until at least May.

(S/NF) Political objectives of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) may have been to demonstrate an improved capacity to prosecute the war, to discourage those in Luanda who favor negotiation with UNITA, to test South African (and Western) reactions, and to deliver a psychological blow to UNITA by capturing long-held UNITA locations.


(S/NF) Luanda's military objectives probably included capturing major UNITA bases deep in insurgent territory, interdicting UNITA supply lines from Namibia or lines of communication to its guerrillas in the north and west, damaging UNITA's infrastructure as much as possible; testing new tactics and equipment, and capturing towns with airstrips suitable for development as supply points or forward airfields.

(S/NF) The Soviets and Cubans probably hoped the offensive would ensure their continued influence in Luanda by strengthening the position of pro-Soviet Angolans who oppose both US influence there and MPLA concessions to UNITA, and by demonstrating the effectiveness of Soviet-Cuban military support.

(S/NF) UNITA was sorely tested by the offensive (it has admitted to 1,200 casualties, including 400 killed in action), but it has been able to continue conducting operations at a high level in areas of Angola far from the offensive. UNITA resistance was able to slow severely the progress of FAPLA along the two axes of attack. FAPLA has not admitted its personnel losses at the hands of UNITA; Savimbi claims to have inflicted 2,300 Angolan casualties in the south alone, but that figure is probably an exaggeration. Several Angolans privately acknowledge at least 1,000 casualties. The Angolans publicly admit losing at least 8 aircraft (Savimbi claims 22 were downed by UNITA; the Angolans may, in fact, have lost over 30 aircraft).

(S/NF) Early reports characterized FAPLA's ability to take Cazombo and to penetrate nearly to Mavinga as a major setback for UNITA, and as evidence that the movement needed to return to its previous use of small unit guerrilla warfare and to cease defending territory with larger semi-conventional units. However, there is no evidence UNITA ever departed from the primacy it accorded to guerrilla tactics when it began to create a limited number of "conventional" battalions.

3 6 8 0



Airfield in Cazombo Sabcat reoccupied by FAPLA troops in 1985 after the UNITA cratered the runway prior to abandoning the town

several years ago. Moreover, it is probably less the case that a conventionally defended Cazombo fell to FAPLA than that Cazombo was reoccupied after a UNITA tactical withdrawal covered by a minimal defense. In fact, UNITA asserts it continues to occupy the countryside in the salient and will expel FAPLA forces before the end of the rainy season. The defense that UNITA put up on the Lomba River on FAPLA's route to Mavinga was tenacious. UNITA headquarters is ahead and an economical withdrawal from Cazombo would have been difficult. Savimbi's shoot-out of press reports from the battle area is consistent with the public perception of UNITA's strategy of an effective defensive action against superior

South African forces played a significant role in supporting UNITA. This included strategic resupply and medical evacuation missions as tactical airstrikes on FAPLA forces advancing on Mavinga, aerial reconnaissance and possibly the reinforcement of UNITA forces with elements from conventional military units such as the 32nd Brigade.

The South African Air Force (SAAF) was instrumental in planning the FAPLA push on Mavinga. At least two major air raids were conducted involving [redacted] aircraft and a major effort in this military environment and considering the accepted norms of SAAF [redacted]. The South African [redacted] also flew

seriousness with which both UNITA and Pretoria viewed this year's FAPLA offensive

Role of the Soviets and Cubans in Combat Operations

(S/NF) Ambiguity surrounds claims by South Africa and UNITA of unprecedented levels of involvement in the campaign by Soviet and Cuban military personnel. Available information alleges the participation of 24 to 300 Soviet advisers. Evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the use of artillery as well as flying air-to-ground combat missions is fragmentary and unconfirmed. Other equally sketchy evidence indicates a much more restrained role in keeping with past practices. Nevertheless, South African reports that FAPLA units uncharacteristically kept moving when they took casualties, that resupply by air followed rapidly on advances made by tank units in Cazombo, that reconnaissance was improved, and that advancing FAPLA units occasionally bypassed UNITA positions rather than lose the initiative — all argue for a more direct Soviet role in command and control of recent operations.

(S/NF) Cuban participation appeared to be consistent with past practice. A tank company with Cuban crews reportedly participated in the drive on Cazombo; some Cubans may have been integrated into Angolan units; and Cubans flew most of the MiG-21 FISHBED and MiG-23 FLOGGER fighters, some Mi-24 25 HIND helicopters, and probably the Su-22 FITTERs. Both Cubans and Soviets probably were heavily involved in planning, coordinating, and advising operations. It is possible that this "advice" sometimes veered close to de facto operational command of units due to the extent of some Angolan commanders' dependence on their advisers.

Air Operations and Other Tactics Used

(S/NF) Last year's offensive against UNITA began in the last days of July, late into the dry season (farther north the rainy season apparently had already begun), but not later than other such operations in the past. According to the South Africans, the FAPLA offensive was better prepared and, at least initially, better executed than previous ones. This is likely the result of more direct Soviet participation in command and control functions. Air support played a larger role this year, both in types and in numbers of aircraft deployed. The main improvements were evidently in the areas of reconnaissance (presumably both air and ground) and in tactical air transport. For instance, government forces apparently were better informed on UNITA positions than in the past and used this intelligence to advantage in bypass operations around guerrilla strongpoints. Moreover, rapid advances on the ground by an armored unit in the drive toward Cazombo were followed up with effective resupply by helicopter.

(S/NF) However, sketchy evidence also indicates that in delivering ordnance and conducting flight operations in general pilots of Angolan Air Force (FAPA) aircraft lacked effectiveness and professionalism. For instance, bombing by unspecified MiG aircraft (probably MiG-21s) reportedly was inaccurate. UNITA claims Angolan planes bombed their own units near Mavinga, moreover, some bombing strafing runs allegedly had the appearance of random attacks on civilian population centers (although these also could have represented attempts to turn the populace against UNITA). Reports of aircraft crashing due to running out of fuel began to recur, and one helicopter was said to be captured when a panicked pilot set it down in UNITA held territory.

(S/NF) In the northern drive against Cazombo, four brigades were used. (This means probably no more than 4,000 to 5,000 troops actually were maneuvering there, although an equal number may have been involved in supporting operations.) The drive may have taken as long as 2 months to cover the 180-km route from the jumping-off point along the Luena-Luso road to Cazombo in the south, four brigades also were used in two prongs of two brigades each, meeting on the Lomba River after one column reportedly required help in the face of a UNITA attack. This drive likewise seemed to have deficiencies in transport. While for some units the jumping-off point (Menongue) was 520 km from Mavinga, most of the advance was over a government-held road to the last government stronghold only 120 km from the Lomba River near Mavinga. Yet, it may have taken FAPLA a month to cover the distance. The pace probably was slowed by determined UNITA resistance, but presumably transportation will require improvement next year. Primarily BTR APCs instead of tanks were used in the south but according to the South Africans, infantry could not consolidate the armor gains. UNITA's claims that napalm and "toxic chemicals

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were used have not been confirmed. If true, this tactic may be further evidence of an effort to deny the insurgents popular support.

Air Defense Against SAAF Incursions and Aid to UNITA

(~~S/NF~~) Antiaircraft defenses (consisting solely of Soviet supplied weapons systems) have been increased significantly in recent years. While they have not prevented SAAF reconnaissance, transport, paradrop, medevac, liaison, close air support, or combat air patrol missions, they have inhibited these operations by making them more risky and difficult or forcing detours around air defenses. The primary air defense aircraft are the MiG-21 FISHBED and MiG-23 FLOGGER. MiG-21s long have been deployed to airfields along the southern defense line (i.e., the route of the Namibe-Menongue railroad), but the movement of MiG-23s to Menongue last September, in addition to new and upgraded radars farther south at Mulondo and Cuito Cuanavale and the improvement of the forward airfield at the latter, gave Angola an added capability to detect and defend against SAAF aircraft. While the receipt of sophisticated air defense equipment in recent years has given the FAPA technological superiority, in theory, over South Africa's frontline fighters, the Angolans' effectiveness remains to be demonstrated. For instance, there was no observed fighter reaction to South African aircraft aiding UNITA during the FAPLA offensive. The Angolan Air Force maintenance capability is believed to be rather good, since it is primarily in the hands of Cubans and Soviets (and operational ready rates probably are good by African standards). Likewise, Cuban MiG-23 and MiG-21 pilots probably are well trained, but Angolan MiG-21 pilots are said to be extremely inexperienced and may not be flying combat missions in the air interceptor role routinely.


(~~S/NF~~) Angola's impressive array of surface-to-air missiles includes the SA-2, -3, -6, -7, -8, -9, and -13 systems. These include highly mobile and fixed systems, affording low-to-high altitude capabilities. The fixed-site SA-2 system, for instance, is old but is capable of intercepting aircraft out to about 50 km. At the other extreme, Angola probably has a large number of man-portable SA-7 missiles operated by squads of three or four men that are effective against helicopters and slow-flying aircraft at low altitudes. The SAM belt across southwestern Angola is believed to be operated primarily by Cubans although Angolans have received SAM-associated training and probably assist. Soviets also may be present in advisory or liaison capacities. While there is no direct evidence on how often the system is manned or on the quality of its operators, circumstantial evidence indicates the system is not yet fully operational. For instance, the only aircraft it has thus far downed is an Angolan civil Yak-40 COCKTAIL. Two South African aircraft have been downed by SA-7s, but it is not known if these SAMs were operated by SWAPO or Angolan troops. No SA-7s — the only SAMs then in the area — are known to have been fired during the fall offensive. An SA-9 fired at an SAAF Impala in 1983 lodged in its tail but failed to explode. There are conflicting claims as to whether on one occasion an SA-8 was fired at a South African aircraft. No other SAM firings are known to have taken place. Moreover, the SAM system reportedly is not yet fully integrated.

(~~S/NF~~) The Angolans also have a wide range of air defense artillery (ADA), ranging from heavy machineguns and 14.5mm ZPU-4s, with their visual detection systems, to radar-directed 57-mm S-60 ADA and 23-mm ZSU-23-4 self-propelled ADA. These probably are operated by both Cuban and Angolan personnel in defense of their units and installations, but no South African aircraft are known to have been hit by antiaircraft fire, and ADA was not noted in use against South African aircraft last fall. Nevertheless, one South African report minimizing the effectiveness of SA-8s in Angola specifically commented on the respect accorded Angolan antiaircraft artillery by South African pilots. Air warning radar sites have been increased in number and upgraded in the south, allowing for coverage into northern Namibia. Nevertheless, there is little integration of the air defense C³ network. Communications between the central air defense facility (Lubango) and subordinate radar and air defense assets are minimal and, as recently as last spring, single South African violations of Angolan airspace were registered by different Angolan facilities as separate violations.

(~~S/NF~~) The air defense network has grown significantly but has serious deficiencies in the quality of Angolan (although probably not Cuban) personnel and in systems integration. Moreover, although all of southern Angola is covered by air warning radars, SAM systems at present defend only a few point targets — primarily along the rail line — leaving significant gaps undefended or defended only by fighter aircraft whose pilots


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(U) Angolan Military Situation During 1985 Offensive

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~~157~~ *Battle area at Mavinga where UNITA with South African air support stopped FAPLA advance near Lomba River*

have not proven eager to engage South Africans. In recent years South African fighters have shot down two Angolan MiG-21s and there have been reports of MiGs returning to base after sighting South African aircraft.

Offensive Highlights Continuing Efforts to Improve Angolan Military Capabilities

[redacted] Over the past 2 years the Soviet Union has increased significantly its military as-

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sistance to the Government of Angola. In 1984 alone, it is believed the Soviets signed new arms agreements valued at over $2 billion. By way of comparison, total agreements signed in the prior 9 years were valued at $1.8 billion. Deliveries of military equipment from the USSR to Angola were valued at nearly $620 million in 1985. This included initial deliveries of 12 powerful Mi-24 HIND helicopter gunships, as well as 118 BTR-60P APCs. In addition, the Angolans embarked on a major upgrade of their air defense assets with the initial acquisition of the SA-6 and SA-8 systems.

The military buildup continued in 1984. Over $900 million worth of equipment was delivered — the highest level ever noted in the 10-year Soviet-Angolan military assistance relationship. This included initial deliveries of the MiG-23 FLOGGER fighter, the Su-22 FITTER ground-attack aircraft, the SA-2 SAM system, and the Mi-17 HIP H helicopter gunship — an advanced version of the Mi-8 HIP. Large quantities of military equipment were added to the stocks already held by the Angolans, including MiG-21 FISHBED fighters, 122-mm howitzers, antiaircraft guns, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and Mi-24/25 HIND helicopter gunships, as well as thousands of trucks from various Warsaw Pact countries. In 1985, the Angolans took delivery of additional Mi-24/25 HINDs, Su-22 FITTERs, and MiG-23 FLOGGERs. The latest deliveries of MiG-23s are assessed to be the G model, the version currently used by the Soviet Air Force. In addition, the Angolans have taken initial delivery of the SA-13 GASKIN system, which the Soviets have just begun exporting in earnest to favored Third World clients such as Syria, Iraq, and Cuba.

An intensive training program for large numbers of Angolans also has continued apace since 1976, but because of the difficulty of finding technically qualified personnel in sufficient numbers, the more sophisticated equipment — including most aircraft, SAM systems, and radars — will continue to be operated primarily by Cuban personnel. Possibly out of dissatisfaction with Soviet counterinsurgency training, the Angolans have turned to Portuguese military retirees to supplement Soviet instruction. The pattern of improvements in recent years has focused primarily on increasing Angola's air defenses, reflecting Angola's evident preoccupation with South Africa as its primary security threat. The most notable improvements in infrastructure have been the installation of air early warning radar net covering almost the entire country and of an HF-DF network probably designed to upgrade SIGINT collection on UNITA. Another effort to improve government intelligence on UNITA has been the creation at relatively little cost of Popular Vigilance Brigades (PVB) — neighborhood "eyes and ears" patterned after Cuban Committees for the Defense of Revolution — who monitor and report any unusual activity or strangers in their locality. Since there are no PVBs in UNITA-held territory, they are of no use in operations like those conducted last year. Land lines of communication probably have deteriorated significantly in the last 10 years due to UNITA's sabotage and to lack of maintenance, which is characteristic of the mismanaged Angolan economy.

Finally, the FAPLA has expanded its regular Army to an estimated 70,000 personnel over the last several years. While most of the added personnel have come from the incorporation of perhaps 20,000 militia into the active ranks, a heavy effort has been placed on recruiting youths from the ever-decreasing territory subject to government control. This siphoning of manpower, however, has had a detrimental effect on the Angolan economy.

Implications for UNITA

A larger role for Soviets and possibly Cubans in Angolan counterinsurgency operations will not change UNITA's overall strategy to persuade, by force or economic strangulation if necessary, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to share political power. It likely will result in increased UNITA calls for Western assistance and in restated emphasis on small-unit tactics vice conventional formations. Savimbi will direct clear and sustained appeals to South Africa, the US and other potential donors for materiel and diplomatic support. UNITA will attempt to highlight the East-West ramifications of the conflict and to raise the cost to Communist patrons of the MPLA by targeting Soviet and Cuban military personnel. While the movement will continue to conduct "spectaculars" in which relatively large Angolan garrisons or important towns are attacked by UNITA conventional battalions, the logistic support network for these forces will come under growing pressure from government forces, and growth in conventionally organized units may be delayed. Instead, small

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units less dependent for support on rear areas will retain preeminence for the foreseeable future. Support functions in the rear probably will be dispersed further and the now legendary headquarters at Jamba may become less prominent or be relocated. In addition to Cuban and Soviet personnel, Angolan aircraft and SAM or radar sites may become top priority sabotage targets, concurrent with the economic infrastructure that has thus far occupied that position. UNITA will continue to place importance on coopting FAPLA troops and subverting FAPLA morale and loyalty. If, in a worst case scenario, UNITA were cut off for a significant period from most outside support, it would be able to continue to exert pressure on the government for years.

Implications for South African Involvement

~~(S NF)~~ South Africa's ultimate goal is maintenance of its own internal security. South Africa sees the latest offensive against UNITA as part of a larger Soviet strategy eventually to threaten South Africa itself by firmly establishing a Marxist regime in Angola that offers support to anti-South African guerrillas, principally the African National Congress (ANC), and to South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) forces seeking to control an independent Namibia. Hence, South Africa's support for UNITA is designed to thwart that Soviet strategy. More immediately, UNITA serves as a surrogate force for Pretoria against SWAPO, impeding infiltration of the Namibian border and tying down large numbers of conventionally organized SWAPO troops. Faced with greater Cuban and Soviet military roles in Angolan counterinsurgency operations, South Africa will take a series of defensive/support measures designed to relieve pressure on UNITA. In decreasing order of probability these are: (1) an increase in special actions and in ground logistics, medical, and tactical advisory support, (2) additional air logistic support to include airdrop, airland, and medevac sorties; (3) close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) to stem FAPLA offensives against UNITA, (4) protective air cover in support of South African CAS and BAI sorties; and (5) ground troops (most likely irregulars such as the 32d Battalion) to act as a deterrent and a blocking force against FAPLA offensives. South African Defense Forces will refrain from directly engaging known Cuban or Soviet forces, and will seek to prevent chance engagements. However, they will fight if engaged.

Implications for Expanded Soviet Bloc/Cuban Involvement

~~(S NF)~~ Over the last 10 years the USSR and Cuba have demonstrated a continued commitment to the Marxist MPLA regime and a desire to retain a military presence in the region. The economic cost to the Soviets of their involvement has not been onerous thus far, because of Angola's ability to pay for much of its military aid with hard currency from oil revenue. It is expected that the Soviets will continue to replace materiel lost in counterinsurgency operations and perhaps to expand its advisory-staff/technician/trainer presence. Such limited, and perhaps temporary, involvement as occurred in last year's campaign (e.g., Soviets acting as brigade advisers — possibly as de facto commanders — and possibly as combat pilots) is likely to recur in the future. Serious consideration also may be given to expanding the Cuban presence. For instance, an additional 15,000 Cuban military personnel could be provided in relatively short order, and larger numbers eventually could be spared for Angolan duty. Moreover, a significant increase in casualties probably would not provoke Castro to decrease his support if he foresaw a reasonable prospect of success.

~~(S NF)~~ Continued Soviet support for a buildup of air and air defense forces is likely. Luanda and its patrons will attempt to extend operations to more forward air bases, and an effort to expand the air defense network in the southeast is to be expected. SA-5/GAMMONs may be added to the growing air defense inventory. Cuba and the Soviet Union may urge the MPLA to explore ways of defusing the UNITA threat through negotiations designed to divide and emasculate UNITA — indeed, there have been hints of such suggestions over the years — but those talks would be attempted first with UNITA leadership minus the charismatic Savimbi, and would not be allowed to threaten the Soviets' weighty influence in Luanda. For that reason, the Soviets and Cubans would urge against concessions involving the withdrawal of the Cuban military presence while UNITA retains its present impetus.

Implications for US Interests in the Region

~~(S NF)~~ US efforts to diminish Soviet influence in southern Africa, to secure the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and to lessen the

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chances for South African hostilities against its neighbors are jeopardized by an expansion of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola. The dos Santos government now may be more vulnerable to Soviet and Cuban pressures designed to reduce US influence with the regime. Moreover, Angola's evident decision to seek a military solution to the UNITA insurgency will necessitate a continued large Cuban military presence. Finally, South Africa, buffeted by US and world criticism for its internal policies, would be more likely to act unilaterally and less likely to heed US calls for restraint as it pursues an aggressive policy against neighbors who it believes support and harbor ANC and SWAPO operatives.

(S/NF) If the evidently heightened Soviet involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Angola is a harbinger of a new, more aggressive Soviet policy toward southern Africa, the US can anticipate serious challenges to its strategic and diplomatic interests there. For example, the US can expect that Mozambique would come under extreme pressure from the Soviets to renounce the Nkomati Accord and reaffirm its alliance with the Soviet camp.

(S/NF) On the other hand, if the recent offensive is seen in Luanda to have failed, the Soviets may suffer a loss of influence as moderate Angolan nationalists elbow out pro-Soviet hardliners and seek reconciliation with UNITA. Pro-Soviets already have lost some influence in the MPLA as a result of the party congress held in December. The US would be expected to assist any such reconciliation process by adjuring aid to UNITA and enhancing the level of US contacts with the MPLA.

(S/NF) In the likely event of a continued conflict, with no prospect of military victory for either side and either undiminished or increased Soviet influence in Angola and in the region, the situation may revert to hostilities putting South Africa against SWAPO. A South African reoccupation of southern Angola would be possible, and overt South African support for UNITA — with the possibility of limited, recurring armed contacts between Soviet and/or Cuban "advisers" and South African military forces — also could be in the offing.

Implications for the 1986 Offensive

(S/NF) Both sides probably feel that as a result of lessons they learned in 1985, the 1986 dry-season campaign will mark successes for them. UNITA claims it will be better informed and better prepared. It has redeployed its best commanders and semi-conventional units to the southeast to defend against an expected two-pronged attack east from Cuito Cuanavale and south from Lucusse. Although it is preparing to defend territory in the southeast, it also will be careful to avoid inflexibility; this year its guerrilla units will play an increased role harassing FAPLA resupply convoys and exposed units, and tying down FAPLA by creating security threats far

Contending Forces in Angola (U)

Government		Major Opponents	
FAPLA	74,000	UNITA	60,000
Army	(70,000)	Conventional	(25,000)
Navy	(1,500)	Irregular	(35,000)
Air/Air Defense	(2,500)	South Africa	0,000*
Militia	10,000+	Total	70,000
Border Guard	6,000		
Police	8,000		
SWAPO aiding FAPLA	3,500		
FLNC aiding FAPLA	4,000 est		
ANC aiding FAPLA	UNK		
Cuban combat troops	28,000		
Total	133,500		
Cuban military advisers	8,000		
Soviet advisers	1,000 est		

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*(S) Represents number of South African and Namibian troops in Namibia estimated to be available for combat, not the total number present there.

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from the area where the Angolans objectives are concentrated

(S/NF) The FAPLA, for its part, feels it can build on its 1985 successes to begin its offensive earlier, sustain extended operations deep in UNITA-held territory, and extend its air defense net east by retaking Mavinga

(S/NF) As pointed out previously, both sides are counting on support from foreign patrons, but those patrons will seek to minimize their combat roles

(S/NF) Neither side is likely to score a military victory ending the conflict but some major successes may be expected on both sides FAPLA may extend its forward positions and even retake Mavinga, it could force UNITA to abandon large areas, and it may even be able to stage raids on UNITA's capital Jamba UNITA, in turn will continue to conduct frequent operations in areas near the capital or the oilfields, and could succeed in enticing large FAPLA units into becoming overextended, enabling UNITA to inflict serious personnel and materiel losses

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(U) Contributions to this study were made by (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424

(U) This study has been fully coordinated with the Directorates for Estimates and Current Intelligence.

(U) Each classified title and heading in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

Defense Intelligence Estimative Memorandum

The Namibia-Angola Nexus: Outlook and Implications (U)

AUGUST 1981

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
DDE-2200-127-81
1 July 1981

Defense Intelligence Estimative Memorandum

The Namibia-Angola Nexus: Outlook and Implications (U)

This Memorandum has not been coordinated with the Service Intelligence Chiefs.

APPROVED:



Assistant Vice Director
for Estimates

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~~REVIEW ON 1 JULY 2001~~

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
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This estimate assesses prospects for settlement of the conflicts in Namibia and Angola over the next few years. It also addresses the outlook for continued involvement in these situations by the Soviets and their associates. Finally it examines the implications of regional developments for the United States and the West.

NOTE: The author of this estimate is (b)(3):10 USC 424 Comments or questions are invited and should be referred to (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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ZAIRE
CABINDA (ANGOLA)
TANZANIA
LUANDA
SHABA REGION
ANGOLA
BENGUELA RAIL ROAD
ZAMBIA
MOZAMBIQUE
OVAMBOLAND
ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
BOTSWANA
WALVIS BAY
WINDHOEK
PRETORIA
SWAZILAND
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO
Indian Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
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KEY JUDGMENTS

(U) Summary and Conclusion

A. ~~(C)~~ Although future developments in Namibia and Angola are difficult to assess, we believe that the fighting in both countries will continue for at least the next few years. Moreover, involvement by the Soviets and their associates will almost certainly persist.

B. ~~(C)~~ A peaceful settlement of the Namibian conflict would be difficult to achieve, and near-term prospects for this are not good. Fearing that Soviet-supported SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization) guerrillas would dominate a settlement at this time, South Africa will bargain stubbornly in any negotiations over the future of Namibia. Unless it is able to win highly favorable terms, South Africa will probably follow past practice and attempt to drag out negotiations. Pretoria wants time to strengthen Namibian institutions and groups that it hopes will offer an effective counterweight to SWAPO once independence is eventually granted.

C. ~~(C)~~ Prolongation of the insurgency, however, will:

-- lead to gradual escalation of the fighting as the guerrillas, however haltingly, increase their capabilities;
-- strengthen Soviet and Cuban influence within SWAPO and bolster the Marxist-Leninist faction within its leadership; and
-- encourage stepped-up South African military pressure on SWAPO in Angola and Zambia, opening futher opportunities in southern Africa for the Soviets and their associates.

Moreover, South African incursions in Angola may goad Moscow and Luanda into greater efforts to build up defenses in the southern part of the country, increasing risks of more serious conflict with South African forces.

D. ~~(C)~~ An early settlement to the Namibian conflict would help arrest these trends, but Namibia would still be unstable and vulnerable to outside intervention even if a peaceful transition to independence were worked out. Moreover, withdrawal of the 20,000 or so Cuban troops and military advisors in Angola would not necessarily take place as the result of a Namibian settlement. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the principal insurgent opposition to the Marxist-Leninist regime in Angola, would not be seriously weakened by any loss of support from South Africa occasioned by the removal of South African forces from Namibia.

political reconciliation between UNITA and the Angolan regime. Chances for this are slim but would be improved somewhat by a successful settlement in Namibia, particularly if the regime were also faced with clear prospects for a strengthened UNITA. Western efforts to develop stronger economic and political ties with Angola might work against reconciliation by reinforcing the regime's unwillingness to accommodate UNITA even though in the long run these efforts would likely reduce Angolan suspicions of the West and dependence on the USSR. On the other hand, Western support for UNITA would probably lead to an Angolan request for more help from the Soviets and Cubans, and might provoke an upsurge of Angolan support for guerrillas in the mineral-rich Shaba region of neighboring Zaire.

F. ~~(C)~~ US interests could well be adversely affected by developments in Namibia and Angola, especially if spreading turbulence disrupts the supply from southern Africa of any of the region's strategic minerals critical for certain defense and industrial applications in the West and Japan. Furthermore, economic ties with the West's two largest trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa--Nigeria and South Africa--could be impaired by regional instability stemming from the Namibian conflict. US policies that please one trading partner are likely to complicate relations with the other. The Soviets can be expected to exploit any African perceptions of Western "collaboration" with South Africa. Finally, a Western failure to sustain black African hopes for a peaceful solution in Namibia would result in drift toward direct confrontation between South Africa and its radical neighbors. This would increase Soviet influence in the region at the expense of the West.*

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* Note on Sources: Partly because the United States has no diplomatic representation in either Namibia or Angola, reliable information is scarce for both countries. In particular, the attitudes and intentions of key actors are not fully understood. This detracts from the confidence with which we can judge future possibilities. While this estimate takes these uncertainties into account in assessing prospects for both Namibia and Angola, there remains a wide latitude for unexpected developments.

(U) The Namibian Insurgency

1. ~~(S)~~ Unless a political settlement that includes SWAPO is worked out, the smouldering insurgency in Namibia will continue to intensify, however gradually. SWAPO's goal is to wrest control of Namibia from white-ruled South Africa, which has administered the territory since World War I. In the absence of a settlement, SWAPO's effectiveness will increase, albeit unsteadily and with occasional setbacks. It has grown from about 800 guerrillas in 1976 to some 7,000 today, although most are in base camps in neighboring Angola and, to a lesser extent, Zambia, with only several hundred operating inside Namibia at any one time. SWAPO's principal internal support comes from the Ovambo tribe, Namibia's largest ethnic group, whose members appear increasingly alienated from the local authorities and security forces imposed by the South African-dominated Namibian administration. Moreover, materiel and advisory assistance, primarily from the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans, will likely increase at a pace commensurate with SWAPO's ability to absorb equipment, receive training, and adopt new techniques.

2. ~~(S)~~ Nevertheless, at least for the next two or three years, South African and local Namibian security forces based in the territory--now numbering almost 25,000 personnel--will remain fully capable of restricting most guerrilla operations to Ovamboland and other areas in the northern part of the country, although there will probably be some increase in isolated incidents further south. While SWAPO will be able to inflict occasional damage upon South African forces, most of its activity will remain confined to terrorist attacks against soft civilian targets and symbols of government authority. Moreover, South Africa will remain prepared to step up air and ground raids against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia.

(U) South Africa and Negotiations

3. ~~(C)~~ Debate among South Africans about the Namibian issue will flare up from time to time as casualties increase and some groups question the wisdom of fighting a distant war while security problems at home are of growing concern. But at least for the next few years most whites will persevere in backing the South African government's determination to prevent a SWAPO takeover, especially one achieved by force. Whites fear that a SWAPO victory would:

-- precipitate an exodus of Namibian whites to South Africa;
-- bring the "onslaught" of Soviet-supported black radicalism to yet another South African boarder;
-- provide another base of operations for anti-South African guerrillas; and
-- offer a powerful example that would encourage South Africa's own black population to adopt violent methods for eliminating white minority rule.

Even though South Africa's ruling party recently won a national election and need not face white voters for another five years, these fears will limit Pretoria's willingness to accept proposals that might favor SWAPO.

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that by example jeopard[illegible] of a South Africa organized into semi-autonomous ethnic groups and surrounded by weak and compliant states. A SWAPO-controlled Namibia would not only provoke fresh conservative white opposition to Prime Minister Botha's efforts to deal with rising non-white demands at home, but would also discourage those South African blacks willing to work toward limited power sharing along ethnic lines. Botha has probably become even more concerned about losing support from his party's right wing since ultra-conservatives posted gains in the election. Especially if increased terrorist activity at home deepens white anxiety about security, Botha will continue to pursue hard-line policies on regional issues, including Namibia, to help placate conservatives and thereby reduce resistance to domestic reforms.

5. ~~(S)~~ The South African Government is probably not prepared to accept arrangements in Namibia that risk a dominant role for SWAPO or that depart sharply from the system of ethnically based institutions it has developed there, particularly at the provincial and local levels. While most top civilian and military officials recognize that SWAPO cannot be defeated militarily and will have to be accommodated eventually, they want more time to nurture Namibian groups and institutions that offer promise as counterweights. Unless Western states were willing to help relieve Botha's difficulties with conservative whites by establishing security ties and approving or at least condoning his domestic policies, South Africa will continue to play for time over the next one or two years in negotiating about Namibia's future. Short of a Western as old disputes are resolved.

(U) The Front Line States

6. ~~(C)~~ A proposal that established Pretoria along with key Western states as guarantors of Namibian neutrality and special rights for whites and other pro-South African ethnic groups would almost certainly be acceptable to Botha. SWAPO and the Front Line States*, on the other hand, would refuse to sanctify an official South African role in Namibia after independence even though they acknowledge Pretoria's enormous economic and military leverage throughout the region. As in the past, the Front Line States will accept compromises that would facilitate a peaceful settlement, but their willingness to pressure SWAPO has limits. Most of the Front Line governments believe that the insurgents and their political wing are supported by the majority of Namibians, and so would be most reluctant to promote proposals that run serious risks of permanently consigning SWAPO to a secondary position. Moreover, while the Front Line States may well come to accept the notion of special rights for whites and others in Namibia, at least for a specified period, they would probably reject explicit departures along ethnic lines from the "one man-one vote" principle for fear that a precedent would be set for South Africa itself.

* Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana. Nigeria, while distant from Namibia, is sometimes included among the Front Line States.

(U) Regional Implications

7. ~~(C)~~ The odds therefore are against a Namibian settlement anytime soon. With an intensification of the insurgency, Moscow's influence within SWAPO will become more pronounced as guerrilla dependence upon Soviet bloc aid increases and Marxist-Leninists within the leadership come to overshadow more moderate elements. Prolongation of the guerrilla struggle will deepen SWAPO suspicions of the West and dim chances for eventual reconciliation with whites and other pro-South African groups in Namibia.

8. ~~(S)~~ As part of its wider regional strategy for countering the insurgent threat, South Africa will probably step up efforts to unsettle Angola--greater support for anti-regime guerrilla groups, deeper cross-border raids on SWAPO bases, and even occasional strikes specifically against Angolan military and economic targets. Although these tactics could complicate relations between SWAPO and Angola, they probably will not lead to a loss of support for the insurgents and could well force an Angolan request--albeit reluctant--for a larger Soviet and Cuban presence in the country. Similarly, renewed South African military pressure on Zambia would probably result in greater dependence by that country upon the Soviets and their associates for arms and advisors.

9. ~~(C)~~ Early resolution of the Namibian conflict would limit opportunities for further Soviet inroads in the region and increase chances for a political environment favorable to the West. Even in the event that arrangements for a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia were agreed upon in the near future, however, the country will probably remain burdened by serious instability and tension.

10. ~~(C)~~ While speculation about any future election is especially hazardous because there is little information available on popular preferences and because the administration of voting could decisively affect the outcome, SWAPO would probably emerge from free and fair elections as the largest party. It would not win an overwhelming majority, however, and would likely need to cooperate with other groups to rule constitutionally, particularly if some groups were favored by guarantees written into the independence settlement. Yet there is little chance that SWAPO and the alliance of ethnic groups favored by South Africa could compatibly share power in a coalition government or that either would be satisfied with a "loyal opposition" role. To be sure, a sizable Western commitment of economic and military aid would ease anxieties and help integrate opposing forces, but Namibia under the best of conditions is not likely to replicate the orderly removal of white rule that took place recently in Zimbabwe. Unlike Zimbabwe, where a government that incorporates two former guerrilla groups is working tolerably well despite ethnic and personal rivalries, in Namibia sworn enemies and ideological adversaries--each considerably less secure and well led than the dominant group in Zimbabwe--would have to submerge their differences. Moreover, SWAPO could well turn to the Soviets and their associates for help despite the risk of forceful South African reaction. South Africa would not hesitate to use its powerful economic leverage to influence developments in the territory and--with or without international tolerance--would seriously consider reintroducing military forces there if it perceived that the position of its local allies were threatened or that anti-South African guerrillas were receiving support in Namibia.

(U) Angola

11. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The likely outlook for the People's Republic of Angola is for continued turbulence and heavy dependence on the Soviets and Cubans regardless of developments in Namibia. Removal of South African troops from Namibia as part of a settlement process would not necessarily presage a like removal of Cuban troops from Angola. A lasting Namibian settlement would bring an end to cross-border attacks into Angola, thereby permitting withdrawal of pernaps a few thousand Cuban forces from the country. The main threat to the Marxist-Leninst regime in Luanda is posed, however, not by South Africa but by 15,000-20,000 UNITA insurgents, who will almost certainly continue to challenge government authority in the central and southern part of the country. Contrary to the regime's public pronouncements, UNITA is not critically dependent upon the support it receives from South Africa through Namibia, although this support does include supplies, occasional sanctuary, intelligence liaison, and training and advisory assistance from time to time. If Angolan leaders indeed believe that UNITA is Pretoria's creature, a South African pullback from Namibia might lead them to miscalculate and request a withdrawal of the main body of Cuban troops and advisors. Assuming compliance by Havana and Moscow--which is questionable--the regime's survival would soon be in jeopardy. Only a large-scale reintroduction of Cuban or other modern forces could prevent a return to full-scale civil war throughout the country.

12. ~~(S)~~ Led by Jonas Savimbi, a charismatic figure who has extensive contacts in Western Europe and in several conservative African and Arab states, UNITA is backed principally by the Ovimbundu, the largest of Angola's three main tribes. Unless Savimbi were killed or otherwise removed from the scene, UNITA could sustain a significant insurgency using captured Cuban/Angolan stocks even should all external aid be cut off. Increased outside supplies, particularly of light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and of infantry support weapons, would allow expansion of the insurgency and perhaps permanent control of territory in remote areas. But UNITA's ethnic base beyond the Ovimbundu area is restricted and so long as Cuba and the Soviet Union remain committed to the Angolan regime, it alone will not be capable of overthrowing the regime. We believe that Moscow and Havana would step up support for the Angolan Government to help meet an increased threat from UNITA or other insurgents.

13. ~~(S)~~ Any relaxation of the UNITA insurgency would probably result from a political reconciliation between Savimbi and the regime in Luanda. Prospects for this are poor, however. The weak and fractious government of Soviet-educated President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos is unlikely to make bold decisions and negotiate with Savimbi, whose principal pre-condition for reconciliation is a sharp reduction of the Soviet/Cuban presence in Angola. The Luanda regime will also be wary about sharing power with Savimbi for fear that he would eventually dominate through force of personality.

14. ~~(S)~~ Nevertheless, chances for accommodation in Angola would be improved by a successful settlement in Namibia. With their fears of South Africa eased somewhat, the leaders in Luanda might resign themselves to negotiating if they came to realize fully that their difficulties with UNITA stem principally from indigenous opposition and not from outside machinations. Moreover, if the Dos Santos regime were faced with clear prospects for a substantially invigorated UNITA, it might attempt to

come to terms with Savimbi. More likely, however, the Marxist-Leninist leaders of Angola would respond to a growing threat from UNITA by again requesting more Soviet and Cuban help, particularly if they suspected that Western support for UNITA had increased.

15. ~~(S)~~ Restive elements within Angola's ruling party may well offer more hope for eventual reconciliation than do outside influences. Blacks belonging to the principal dissident faction resent domination of the party leadership by mulattoes and might at some time move to displace them, most likely in collaboration with blacks in the Angolan Army. A takeover by black nationalists would not necessarily herald a slackening of Marxist commitments within the Angolan Government, but it would open fresh opportunities for compromise with Savimbi, a black, particularly because any new leaders would want to show immediate economic progress by reducing the debilitating drain on Angola's resources caused by the insurgency.

16. ~~(C)~~ Angola and the Soviets. A black-led government in Angola that included Savimbi would almost certainly insist on withdrawal of Cuban troops and an end to use of local facilities by Soviet military ships and aircraft. The extensive Soviet and Cuban use of Angolan territory for supporting SWAPO and other southern African insurgent groups would also come into question. Moscow therefore would attempt to undermine any reconciliation process in the country that it did not control. The Soviets might for tactical reasons offer to mediate negotiations, but they would be wary of encouraging developments that would reduce Angolan dependence upon themselves and their friends. Furthermore, because of extensive Soviet, Cuban, and East European involvement in key Angolan institutions such as the party and security forces, Moscow is in a strong position to pre-empt anti-Soviet moves. Should the Soviets conclude that a political reversal in Angola were imminent, forceful action probably would be taken in an attempt to "preserve socialist gains."

17. ~~(S)~~ Angola and the West. Developments in Angola are only marginally susceptible to Western influence despite the regime's desire for greater economic ties with the West and a reduction of the Soviet/Cuban presence there. Difficult dilemmas and uncertainties attend most policy initiatives that might be undertaken. While more extensive economic and political ties between Western states and Angola in the long run would help erode deep mutual suspicions and counter Soviet influence, in the shorter term greater support from the West would ease pressures on the regime and probably reinforce its intransigence toward UNITA. On the other hand, Western efforts to weaken the regime by assisting UNITA or other guerrillas might prompt more compromise in Luanda regarding a Namibian settlement, and even encourage consideration of the need for talks with Savimbi. But distrust of the West would deepen and security dependence upon the Soviets and Cubans would be further entrenched.

(U) Implications for the United States

18. ~~(C)~~ Developments in Namibia and Angola over the next few years might affect US interests adversely. The supply of some strategic resources to the West and Japan from southern Africa could be interrupted by the spread of hostilities:

-- Angola, with Soviet encouragement, might retaliate against real or imagined Western aid to UNITA by renewing support for insurgents in the mineral-rich Shaba region of Zaire.
-- UNITA will remain capable of preventing Zairian mineral shipments along the rail line through Angola.
-- South African retaliatory raids or support for dissidents in neighboring states could temporarily disrupt mining operations or transportation routes.

Moreover, fragile regimes such as those in Zaire and Zambia are further weakened by the general regional atmosphere of uncertainty and crisis, raising the potential for new Soviet inroads in southern Africa.

19. ~~(C)~~ Economic ties with the United States' two largest trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa--Nigeria and South Africa--could be impaired by increased instability in the region. Although Nigeria will remain reluctant to jeopardize much-needed petroleum revenues and would probably not carry out threats to influence US policy toward Namibia by cutting off oil sales, it might take lesser punitive measures such as nationalizing US companies. South Africa, on the other hand, may well become the target of UN economic sanctions despite its ability to survive even effective enforcement for an extended period. US policies toward southern Africa that please one trading partner are likely to complicate relations with the other.

20. ~~(C)~~ Western efforts that move all concerned parties toward negotiated solutions to the Namibian and Angolan conflicts would work against the Soviets and reduce chances for regional disputes getting out of control. However, the susceptibility of the principal antagonists in southern Africa to Western influence is limited. A less critical approach towards South Africa's racial policies may be the only way for the West to coax Pretoria into more accommodation regarding Namibia. In recent years South Africa has moved steadily toward economic and military self-sufficiency, so punative measures would probably be ineffective and could well harden white attitudes against change. On the other hand, while black Africans look to the West--the United States in particular--for leadership in seeking a peaceful solution to the Namibian problem, closer Western ties with South Africa would antagonize the Front Line States and erode US credibility as an honest broker. The Western diplomatic task is made more difficult by efforts on the part of both South Africa and the USSR to portray local struggles in the region as the product of outside intervention. To gain outside support, Pretoria wants the Western powers to perceive southern Africa's conflicts strictly along East-West lines, and the Botha regime's regional strategy may even include actions that force neighboring radical states into greater dependence on Moscow, thereby reinforcing Western concerns about Soviet encroachment.


21. ~~(C)~~ For its part, the USSR will continue propaganda and disinformation efforts to convince black Africans of the West's "collaboration" with South Africa. These efforts will be increasingly successful to the extent that leaders in the Front Line States perceive:

-- Western moves toward more toleration of Pretoria's racial policies;

-- Western complicity with South African foot-dragging on Namibian negotiations; or
-- Western support for UNITA.

Failure to sustain African hopes for a peaceful solution in Namibia would result in drift toward direct Front Line confrontation with South Africa, accompanied by increasing Soviet influence in the region at the expense of the West.

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



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~~Top Secret~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

Angola: Trends in UNITA Insurgency (U)

DIAAPPR 10-85
26 FEB 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency Appraisal

Summary


~~(S/NF)~~ *The past year witnessed significant tactical modifications and innovations in the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency. Hostilities spread to all of Angola's northern provinces, causing a further deterioration in Luanda's internal security situation. Outside support for both the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and insurgent forces continued to grow. Luanda received initial shipments of fairly sophisticated Soviet weapons, and UNITA may be obtaining assistance from previously unavailable sources. Moreover, the level of military activity and casualties suffered by both government and guerrilla personnel appear to be higher than in previous years. The fluid military situation is largely responsible for thwarting US-sponsored diplomatic efforts to devise a peaceful settlement of hostilities in Angola and neighboring Namibia that would include the withdrawal of Cuba's 35,000-man expeditionary force.*

Discussion


~~(S/NF)~~ In the first half of 1984, UNITA activity spread into the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire and also reached several points along the Angola-Zaire border in Malanje and Lunda Norte provinces. This northern push resulted in initial attacks on major diamond mining facilities in the northeast and threatened previously unaffected coffee plantations in the northwestern corner of Angola.

~~(S/NF)~~ During the same time, UNITA commanders departed from past guerrilla practices and began to fight for control of larger areas of Angolan territory. Consequently, the insurgents now claim to rule most of the countryside in Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces, while government control there has been reduced to possession of the beleaguered provincial capitals. In 1984, UNITA repulsed at least two major counterinsurgency offensives designed to regain control of easternmost Angola and to interdict the insurgents' logistic lines to the north.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)




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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)




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(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Paralleling UNITA's enlarged support network and expanded area of operations, the past 3 years have witnessed a significant growth in the number of armed UNITA personnel, now estimated at 35,000 to 40,000. Part of this force has been organized into about 40 semiconventional battalions, each probably consisting of 500 men. The remainder of the insurgents operate as guerrilla units emphasizing small unit tactics and hit-and-run operations. UNITA's battalion-size units have been primarily committed to expanding the perimeters of UNITA-held territory. A few have been deployed to the north, in the general direction of Luanda. Occasional journalistic accounts suggest some of the southern-based units are transported by UNITA's fleet of several hundred trucks and use heavy mortars, field artillery pieces, and antiaircraft weapons. Some of these battalions have reportedly been organized into a brigade structure consisting of three infantry battalions and an artillery company.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Many of the weapons used by these units were probably captured from government forces in the past 2 or 3 years. Although UNITA continues to capture weapons, the numbers reported are probably imprecise.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) A comparison of UNITA and FAPLA reports issued during 1984 reveals discrepancies regarding significant trends in the war. According to UNITA accounts, civilians have rarely suffered the consequences of recent hostilities. Similarly, FAPLA reports give the impression that Cuban forces are infrequently affected by the insurgency. The most

glaring difference is in the total casualty figure recorded by each side. UNITA reports suggest a far more devastating conflict than FAPLA statistics indicate. These figures are not derived from UNITA or FAPLA public communiques, which frequently exaggerate. Classified UNITA and FAPLA reports, however, usually seem incomplete. They often cite hostile encounters and casualty figures for a particular time that are not reflected in opponent reports of the same period. Some of these discrepancies probably reflect dissimilar and incomplete after-action reports.

Angolan Insurgency Statistics for 1984

Casualties	Reported by UNITA	Reported by FAPLA	Total
Angolan Armed Forces (FAPLA)			
Killed	7,133	609	7,742
Wounded	276	690	966
Captured by UNITA	234	11	245
Peoples Militia (ODP)			
Killed	487	80	567
Wounded	7	69	76
Captured by UNITA	65	93	158
Civilians			
Killed	42	605	647
Wounded	18	520	538
Captured by UNITA	—	376	376
UNITA Insurgents			
Killed	920	551	1,471
Wounded	1,426	24	1,450
Captured by FAPLA	24	96	120
Cubans			
Killed	329	16	345
Wounded	8	22	30
Captured by UNITA	—	—	—

Weapons Captured	UNITA	FAPLA	UNITA	FAPLA
Pistols, Rifles, Machineguns	4,639	25	79	58
Mortars, RPGs, Recoilless Weapons	1,127	—	6	1
Artillery Pieces, AAA, SAMs	50	—	2	—
Mines and Grenades	—	—	—	12
Trucks, Vehicles	17	8	—	—
Radios	85	—	1	1

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) Because many FAPLA and UNITA reports are nonduplicative, most of the statistics generated by government and insurgent accounts should probably be combined. This has been done in previous assessments of the Angolan insurgency situation. In each instance, the totals reflected a steadily deteriorating security situation for the Luanda government and increasingly destructive hostilities. Moreover, the overall accuracy, if not the precision, of these statistics has consistently been corroborated by HUMINT reports on the insurgency.

Outlook

~~(S/NF)~~ *Prospects for a negotiated settlement still appear remote. Both sides continue to insist on terms or preconditions that are unacceptable to the other. However, neither FAPLA nor UNITA has acquired a military position from which to dictate terms of a resolution. Nonetheless, one or more rapidly unfolding events could dramatically alter the political-military situation. Among the most decisive developments would be a FAPLA-led coup; a major battlefield defeat in one of Angola's provincial capitals; or a series of setbacks for UNITA, including the death or capture of Savimbi and the loss of numerous base camps in southeastern Angola.*

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

Prepared by:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIADIN 196-76
18 JANUARY 1976

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cnl 2670-240-5

(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~Warning Notice~~
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
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
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
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This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

USSR

NAVAL ACTIVITY.



~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Soviet intelligence collector (AGI) VERTIKAL has been unlocated since 10 January. The absence of this ship during the recent high-interest rendezvous of the US carriers SARATOGA and KENNEDY in the vicinity of Rota suggests that the AGI may remain on a patrol off the west African coast. In the meantime, a modified KASHIN-class guided-missile destroyer maintains its station in the Gulf of Cadiz, apparently a stand-in for the normal AGI presence.

(Continued)

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)

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PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 196-76
AS OF: 1650 EST
18 January 1976
Distribution "F"

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L/NOFORN~~ 4626
SUBJ. DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DINS) (U)
DIADIN 125-6A (AS OF: 1740 EDT 5 MAY 78)
SOUTH AFRICA: AFTERMATH OF ANGOLA RAID. (U)
1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ ON 5 MAY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE BRIEFED MILITARY ATTACHES ON THE RESULTS OF THE 4-5 MAY RAIDS INTO ANGOLA. THE PRESENTATION BEGAN WITH A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF SWAPO (SOUTH-WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION) ACTIVITIES INSIDE NAMIBIA DATING BACK TO JANUARY. THE INTENSITY AND FREQUENCY OF THAT ACTIVITY WAS PREVIOUSLY CITED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS THE BASIS FOR THE RAIDS.
2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE BRIEFER ISPLAYED AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TWO SWAPO BASES THAT WERE ATTACKED. THE PHOTOGRAPHS, WHICH WILL QUITE LIKELY BE MADE AVAILABLE (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424 SHOWED TRENCHES AND FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. THE FIRST AND DEEPEST STRIKE WAS AGAINST CASSINGA, AN ABANDONED TOWN ABOUT

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NON-AGENCY

260 KILOMETERS INSIDE ANGOLA AND ABOUT 16 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE RAILHEAD AT TECHAMUTT. THE SADF DESCRIBED THIS BASE AS SWAPO'S FIELD HEADQUARTERS IN ANGOLA.

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE ATTACK ON THE SITE BEGAN WITH A TACTICAL AIRSTRIKE AT 0800 ON 4 MAY, AND WAS FOLLOWED BY AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT INVOLVING AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF PARATROOPS. ACCORDING TO THE SADF, FIGHTING WAS HEAVY WITH SWAPO SUFFERING HEAVY CASUALTIES. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SUFFERED LIGHT (UNSPECIFIED) CASUALTIES, CAPTURED CONSIDERABLE WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, DOCUMENTS, AND SOME PRISONERS. THE SADF BRIEFER INDICATED THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRENCH WARFARE, SWAPO FORCES WERE JOINED BY WOMEN IN THE CAMP. ALSO DURING THE FIGHTING, AN ARMORED COLUMN BELIEVED BY THE SADF TO INCLUDE MPLA AND CUBAN FORCES MOVED TOWARD THE AREA. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WERE CALLED IN TO NEUTRALIZE THE THREAT, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE USED. THERE APPARENTLY WAS NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE RAIDING PARTY AND THE MPLA/CUBAN CONTINGENT.

4. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE SECOND ATTACK WAS CLOSER TO THE BORDER AT CHETEQUERA, WEST OF CUAMOTO. THE SWAPO CAMP IS REPORTEDLY NORTH OF CHETEQUERA SOME 50 KILOMETERS INSIDE ANGOLA. THE ATTACK ON THIS CAMP BEGAN AT 0915 AND WAS SPEARHEADED BY AN ARMORED COLUMN COMPRISED OF AFRICA. AN AIRSTRIKE FOLLOWED AT 1330. FIGHTING WAS HEAVY WITH REPORTS OF CONSIDERABLE SWAPO LOSSES AND MINOR SADF CASUALTIES. AGAIN DOCUMENTS, AMMUNITION, WEAPONS, AND PRISONERS WERE CAPTURED. SADF FORCES REMAINED AT CHETEQUERA OVERNIGHT AND WITHDREW ON THE AFTERNOON OF 5 MAY. AT NO TIME DID THIS FORCE ENCOUNTER MPLA OR CUBAN FORCES.

5. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE SPOKESMAN DID NOT SPECIFY THE TYPE AIRCRAFT USED OR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED. IT WAS STRESSED THAT ALL STRIKES WERE DIRECTED AT SWAPO AND NOT AT MPLA OR CUBAN FORCES. ORDERS WERE REPORTEDLY GIVEN TO AVOID CIVILIANS, LEAVE MOST PRISONERS BEHIND, AND AVOID CARELESS FIRING. ALL POW'S WERE TO BE GIVEN SAFE CONDUCT PASSES AND ASKED TO RETURN TO NAMIBIA.

6. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ SADF SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZED THAT THE DECISION TO ACT WAS A POLITICAL ONE APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, AND MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS WILL PROBABLY SOON BE BRIEFED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. IT IS QUITE PROBABLE THAT THE RAIDS WERE INDEED APPROVED, IF NOT ACTUALLY CALLED FOR, BY THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, TO INCLUDE THE PRIME MINISTER. PRETORIA POSSIBLY CONCLUDED THAT PREVIOUSLY CAPTURED SWAPO DOCUMENTS OUTLINING A PLANNED OFFENSIVE WERE VALID AND THAT A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NON-AGENCY


78 0664230 PAGE 003 NC 0664230
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WAS WARRANTED.

7. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ SOUTH AFRICA COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN RESPONDING TO CRITICISM INSIDE NAMIBIA AND AT HOME THAT BY ACCEPTING THE WESTERN-DEVISED SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL IT WAS ABANDONING THE TERRITORY TO TERRORISM. THUS, THE RAIDS COULD SERVE TO UNDERSCORE PRETORIA'S DETERMINATION NOT TO WITHDRAW IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. IN ANY CASE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE POTENTIAL MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF THE RAIDS AT THIS TIME OUTWEIGH THE ALMOST CERTAIN STRONG CONDEMNATION FROM ABROAD.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~(GDS 84)~~





END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TWO PAGES ARE DENIED IN FULL AND ARE NOT INCLUDED.

[redacted]

DIADIN 219-76
20 JANUARY 1976

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

[redacted]

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
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~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i)

AIR AND SEALIFT IN HIGH GEAR



CUBA–ANGOLA

DIADIN 219-76
20 JANUARY 1976


~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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CUBA-ANGOLA

AIR AND SEA LIFT IN HIGH GEAR.




~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Nine Cuban cargo ships are reported en route to West Africa, each with a troop-carrying capacity of 300. Fifteen arrivals have been noted since September that carried materiel and an estimated 4,500 men.



PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 219-76
AS OF: 1555 EST
20 January 1976
Distribution "F"

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



Significant Determinants ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

- Moscow will view this development as proof of the correctness of its policy and will use it to encourage moderate African regimes to recognize and assist the MPLA effort (95% confidence). This, in turn, will permit the USSR to portray itself as a staunch ally of developing African nations, making it easier for these countries to accept Soviet, rather than Chinese, offers of assistance and to look more favorably on Soviet requests for access to military facilities (85% confidence).

- This development will encourage the continuation and extension of Soviet support for national liberation movements targeted against Rhodesia and South Africa (90% confidence). In this regard, Moscow will probably perceive that Western nations, particularly the US and Great Britain, will acquiesce into accepting continued Soviet sponsorship of subversive activity in southern Africa (80% confidence).

- Moscow will feel that its political interests in Angola are best served by reducing its own as well as Cuba's military profile now that the main military threat to MPLA forces has been removed (65% confidence). Soviet materiel support will continue, but at a lower level with the reduction in MPLA military activities (65% confidence). This will permit the USSR to continue to pursue its strategic interests in the region, but with less danger to detente and US-Soviet ties.

- The Soviet leadership will interpret this development as further evidence that the correlation of forces in the world is continuing to shift in Moscow's favor (95% confidence), and the USSR may be encouraged to take a more active role in supporting insurgent activity worldwide (60% confidence).

Significant Uncertainties ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

What cannot be determined at this time is the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to such factors as:

- The strategic need to secure military facilities in southern Africa.

- The potential economic benefits to be gained from access to resources and markets for Soviet-East European products in the region.


- The need to demonstrate suppor' for national liberation movements.

- The extent to which Moscow will pursue its competition with China in the Third World.

- Moscow's ability to control the MPLA if it is successful in expanding its control of the country.

- The need to support the MPLA as opposed to continuing the current state of Soviet-US relations.

- The outcome of Soviet-US discussions now under way in Moscow.



(b)(1)
1.5(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

(b)(1) 1.5(c)

Timeliness

- Information on Cuban and Soviet air and sea movements are timely and are received within a short period after arrival.

- Analysts are available to provide immediate responsiveness to user queries. Continuing reporting is provided by means of the Defense Intelligence Notices, which generally reach the user within eight hours after the receipt of information. The Special Defense Intelligence Notice addresses urgent, time-sensitive issues and is usually available to the consumer within one hour following receipt of information.

Problems

(b)(1),1.4(c)

Additional information on the amount and kinds of military hardware being delivered by both the Soviets and Cubans is also needed. More precise information is also needed on the number and role of Soviet advisers.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)


(b)(1) 1.5(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)

(b)(1) 1.5(c)

Timeliness

- Information on Cuban and Soviet air and sea movements are timely and are received within a short period after arrival.



(b)(1) 1.5(c)

DIADIN 2898-75
11 NOVEMBER 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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CW2661-13-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

USSR

SETBACKS IN AFRICA OVER MPLA SUPPORT.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Moscow's open support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has already resulted in diplomatic setbacks in Uganda and Zaire.

~~(C)~~ The USSR temporarily suspended diplomatic relations with Uganda on 11 November, primarily to preempt President Amin from doing so. On the 9th, Amin issued an ultimatum that a high-ranking Soviet official be sent to Kampala to explain the USSR's actions in Angola and attempts by its ambassador -- whom the President called a criminal -- to press Uganda to support the MPLA. He also threatened to expel all Soviet diplomats and advisers within two days if his demands were not met. The Ugandan leader was particularly outraged at Moscow's actions in view of his efforts to mediate the Angolan crisis in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

~~(C)~~ In announcing the suspension, Tass said that ties were temporarily severed because of "unfriendly actions" that insulted the USSR and its ambassador. The notice, however, expressed confidence that normal relations could be restored, a statement apparently made in the hope that a compromise could be reached that would make a complete break unnecessary. Amin, for his part, may feel insulted by being upstaged and therefore move to terminate ties altogether. In the meantime, the Ugandan Defense Council, under Amin's chairmanship, has called upon Moscow to replace its current ambassador with one not of an "imperialist" mentality. Since the diplomatic relations between the two countries are in a state of turmoil, the outcome of the dispute cannot be predicted at this time.

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Moscow's military assistance to Uganda, which dates to 1965, suffered a setback in 1971 when Amin overthrew the Obote government and began to deal exclusively with Western suppliers. Amid indications that Uganda was moving toward a nationalist, anti-Western stance, Moscow agreed in the fall of 1973 to that country's requests for training assistance and modern arms. Since then, at least $47 million in hardware has been delivered, including five MIG-17/FRESCOs and 25 MIG-21/FISHBEDs. Furthermore, several hundred Soviet advisers and technicians are in the country. Should they be asked to go, they would probably leave the aircraft behind. Concern over potential military adventures by the volatile Amin, however, could prompt them to render the aircraft inoperable.

Release

(b)(1),(b)(3);50 USC 403-1(i);1.4 (c)


~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Meanwhile, relations with Zaire have deteriorated rapidly and the breaking of formal ties by Kinshasa appears imminent. Moscow's charge accused Zaire last month of invading Angola and warned of possible repercussions. Foreign Minister Bula recently termed Moscow's demarche a "blatant intimidation" and a cover for its own intervention in African affairs. Zaire has asked the US, France, the UK, and China to inform the UN Security Council of the "grave Soviet menace to Zaire" posed by the USSR's recent airlift of arms into the Congo. According to Bula, Soviet missiles and long-range guns at Brazzaville present a danger to Zaire and Soviet aircraft are ready to intervene in Angola. The minister said his government

Release

(Continued)

supports the efforts of President Amin and the OAU in seeking a peaceful solution and called for a coalition government in Angola. Other African states, concerned over Soviet intervention in the day-old country, may follow suit in condemning Moscow's heavy-handedness on the continent.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 1.4 (c)



(U) On the 11th, the USSR acknowledged Angola's drift into independence by recognizing the MPLA's governmental entity, the People's Republic of Angola. In a message to Dr. Agostinho Neto, the new republic's President, Soviet President Podgorny expressed Moscow's willingness to establish relations and exchange diplomatic personnel. ~~(XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 2898-75
AS OF: 1840 EST
11 November 1975
Distribution "D"

[redacted]

DIADIN 2956-75
14 NOVEMBER 1975

~~SECRET~~

36

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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
~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

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ANGOLA

SOVIET AIRCRAFT LAND AT LUANDA.

(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) 1.4 (c)



~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Unconfirmed press reports indicate that 400 Soviet military personnel, including pilots, tank crews and advisers, arrived at Luanda's port on 13 November. However, no

(Continued)

14 Nov 75

DIADIN 2956-75

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

Soviet ships are known to have called there since the Soviet passenger ship UKRAINA departed Luanda on the 8th with refugees aboard. Prior to calling there, the ship was at Lisbon, and it is unlikely that large numbers of Soviet military personnel were aboard. Such significant Soviet involvement, coupled with the already large numbers of Cuban troops in the country, could turn the tide in the MPLA's favor. ~~(NODS 2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 2956-75
AS OF: 1750 EST
14 November 1975
Distribution "D"

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

DIADIN 3019-75
20 NOVEMBER 1975

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34

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



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
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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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SITUATION REPORT



ANGOLA


DIADIN 3019-75
20 NOVEMBER 1975

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SITUATION REPORT



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
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ANGOLA

SITUATION REPORT.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-(g),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)



PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 3019-75
AS OF: 1415 EST
20 November 1975
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DIADIN 3049-75
22 NOVEMBER 1975

31

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DW2662_317_3

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ANGOLA

SITUATION REPORT.

(C) Recent press reports of the capture of Russian troops in Angola have heightened concern over an increase in Soviet presence in the former Portuguese territory.

(C) A 21 November press notice from Lusaka Zambia reported the capture by the National Union of 20 Soviets, 35 Cubans, 5 Mozambicans, a Congolese and a Brazilian mercenary. The foreign troops were said to have been supporting Popular Movement forces defending the key northern Angolan resupply location of Malange. National Front and National Union forces were earlier reported to have taken the city from the Popular Movement on 13 November despite the latter's recent assertion that they retain control there.

(C) The National Union claim of capturing a group of foreign personnel in Malange may be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it draws attention to the existence of communist presence and assistance to the Popular Movement in Angola.

(C) Approximately 100 Soviet military advisers were believed to have been assisting Popular Movement forces in Angola at the time of independence on 11 November. Their roles included training Popular Movement troops in the use of modern weapons, advising on tactics and strategy against rival groups and supervising the delivery, assembly and maintenance of the large amount of Soviet weapons received just prior to independence. A separate organization of Soviet technicians is probably also servicing weapons bound for Popular Movement forces but initially received at Brazzaville, and Point Noire, Congo. This Soviet advisory group may now total 200.

OK OK OK OK

(Continued)

~~(C)~~ Should the Popular Movement have already received or soon possess MIG aircraft, the number of Soviet military personnel in Angola may rise to 400-500. The Popular Movement already lists an inventory of Soviet equipment that includes unknown numbers of armored cars, APC's, tanks, multiple rocket launchers, light field artillery, heavy mortars, and SA-7 defensive missiles. In addition some 2,000 Cubans are being used by the Popular Movement in a variety of advisory and assistance roles.

~~(C)~~ Recent apparent losses by Popular Movement troops to its rivals underscores the necessity for urgent resupply of Soviet equipment. The reported reverses may also have persuaded Moscow to accelerate delivery of fighter aircraft to the Popular Movement. In any case active communist presence and involvement in Angola are likely to accelerate as Moscow and Havana seek to secure for the Popular Movement a controlling voice in the future of the former Portuguese territory. ~~(GDS 31 Dec 81)~~

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 3049-75
AS OF: 1930 EST
22 November 1975
Distribution "F"

DIADIN 3068-75
25 NOVEMBER 1975

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

ANGOLA

SEABORNE COMMUNIST MILITARY AID.

~~(S)~~ Seaborne delivery of military assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola appears to be increasing.

~~(S)~~ The lightly loaded Soviet cargo ship KAPITAN L. BORISENKO left the Black Sea on 17 November carrying two MIG-21/FISHBED aircraft-associated crates, a shop van truck, and six canvas-covered possible tracked amphibious vehicles on deck. She is expected to arrive at Luanda or Pointe Noire, Congo, by the weekend. A second ship, OLGA VARENTSOVA, which left the Baltic on the 13th with cargo that includes over 200 trucks and jeeps, petroleum drums, and spare parts, should arrive in the region by the 27th. These arrivals will follow closely those of two other Soviet ships that have been in the Angola area since the 16th.

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 3068-75
AS OF: 1500 EST
25 November 1975
Distribution "G"

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

DIADIN 3158-75
4 DECEMBER 1975

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



CW2664-48-2

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ANGOLA

SOVIET SEABORNE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ANGOLA CONTINUE.

~~(S)~~ The pace of deliveries, which began in early May, was stepped up in late September and continued at an increased level through November. Since 7 May, at least 22 Soviet merchant ships have called at Pointe Noire, Congo, and at Angolan ports with confirmed or suspected military-associated cargo destined for the MPLA in Angola. Some five deliveries were made to Luanda, Angola, and at least three to Pointe Noire during November alone.

~~(S)~~ The arms-carrying merchant ships have operated from ports in Conakry, Guinea, Luanda, and Pointe Noire, all known for handling significant amounts of military-associated cargo. Cargo associated with the November shipments have included trucks, spare parts, petroleum, and possibly MIG-21/FISHBED aircraft. In addition to the Soviet merchant ships involved in these arms deliveries, two East German, three Yugoslavian, and five Cuban flag ships are known to have made deliveries to Pointe Noire or Angolan ports since May. There is, however, no reliable estimate on total tonnage delivered by this joint effort. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

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PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 3158-75
AS OF: 0605 EST
4 December 1975
Distribution "D"

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DIADIN 3241-75
11 DECEMBER 1975

~~SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE



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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
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This Notice is designed to provide intelligence in support of future decisions with respect to security policy or posture.

CUBA

DISCONTENT WITH ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT.

~~(S/NOFORN,~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Criticism has reportedly surfaced among families of men fighting in Angola.

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Diplomats in Havana have observed mounting discontent generated by rumors of the massive Cuban involvement, perhaps spurred by Voice of America broadcasts. Although the government has committed significant numbers of troops to "liberation" campaigns in various countries, this is the first time adverse public reactions to such activities has been noted.

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ In a possible reaction, Defense Minister Raul Castro told armed forces personnel that the US had no right to judge Cuban policy for Puerto Rico and "other peoples attacked by imperialism and reaction," an oblique reference to Havana's large commitment to aid the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Prime Minister Fidel Castro has yet to comment publicly on criticism of Cuba's Angolan adventure.

~~(S/NOFORN,~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~ Havana is most likely Moscow's surrogate in the Angolan fighting. Should Cuban casualties become public knowledge, this would probably intensify domestic criticism. Nevertheless, the Cuban Government's policy in Angola would most likely not be deterred. Moreover, domestic attention will be diverted to the upcoming First Communist Party Congress, which is already receiving saturation media coverage. During this conclave, Cuban leaders will concentrate on anti-US diatribes and play down their African involvement. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)

PREPARED BY:
(b)(3):10 USC 424

DIADIN 3241-75
AS OF: 1605 EST
11 December 1975
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DIAIAPPR 115-77

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Intelligence Appraisal

SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PODGORNY VISIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (U)

1 APRIL 1977

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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
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SOUTHERN AFRICA:

THE PODGORNY VISIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (U)




AFRICA

DIAIEPI: 115-77
11 APRIL 1977

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NATIONALISTS GET ARMS PLEDGE DURING PODGORNY'S THREE-COUNTRY TRIP



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SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE PODGORNY VISIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. (U)

Summary

~~(C)~~ *There are indications that African nationalist leaders have been successful in their appeals for more aid from the USSR in the struggle against southern African minority governments. On 28 March, Soviet President Podgorny concluded a two-hour meeting with nationalist leaders in Lusaka, Zambia. At that time, he distinguished between the type of aid to be delivered and the quantity. Despite this exercise in semantics, however, there is little question that the tempo of military action in southern Africa will increase gradually. Moscow's willingness to increase military aid to the Rhodesian liberation forces underscores the continued Soviet commitment to black African liberation movements.*

Discussion

~~(C)~~ As expected, a joint communique called for "liquidation of racism in southern Africa as one of the most important international tasks." A more meaningful part of the statement, however, pledged Soviet "permanent support" for the liberation struggle. Inclusion of First Deputy Minister of Defense Gen Sergei Sokolov, a foreign military aid specialist, in Podgorny's entourage clearly indicated Moscow's preconceived intentions to lend an ear to the nationalists' appeals.

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 403; (g),1.4 (c)

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AFRICAN NATIONALISTS TO GET SOVIET ARMS AID

GROUP	LEADER	ESTIMATED STRENGTH
ANC/SA	Oliver Tembo	200 - 300 1/
SWAPO	Sam Nujoma	3,600
PATRIOTIC FRONT	Joshua Nkomo Robert Mugabe	
ZANU-ZIPA		13,500 2/
ZAPU-ZPRA		4,200 3/


1/ All in training

2/ There are 1,500 ZANU-ZIPA in Rhodesia; 2,000 in Mozambique; 5,000 available in Mozambique undergoing training; and 5,000 in various Tanzanian training camps.

3/ There are 1,100 ZAPU-ZPRA in Zambia; 1,000 in Zambian training camps; 70 in Rhodesia; 30 in Botswana; and 2,000 recruits being trained, most of whom may be in Angola.


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~~(S)~~ It was reported that Sam Nujoma of the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) also attended the meeting and almost certainly was granted increased arms and training assistance for use in Namibia.

~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/ORIGINAL)~~






Outlook

~~(S)~~ Podgorny's performance, despite some differences of opinion with Tanzania's Julius Nyerere on issues unrelated to southern Africa, almost certainly will raise the USSR's standing in the eyes of the "front-line presidents" -- Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, and Mozambique -- and the nationalist leadership. Convinced that armed struggle is the only solution, several nationalist leaders, including Joshua Nkomo of the PF, have very recently concluded trips to a number of Western countries in search of aid. At best, they were accorded a cordial reception, pledges of diplomatic support, economic, or technical assistance, or both. In no case, however, did they receive the type of pledge given by Podgorny. Therefore, having been -- in their view at least -- shrugged off by the West, they may become more dependent on Soviet aid although its degree and duration is open to question.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~





PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DIAIAPPR 178-76
31 MAY 1976

MICROFILMED

CUBA: INTENTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (U)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
(i)

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
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CUBA: INTENTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (U)



DIAIAPPR 178-76
31 MAY 1976

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PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO
WEIGHS HIS OPTIONS




CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA: TO BE
WITHDRAWN?

CUBA: INTENTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (U)

Summary

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g) 1.4 (c)




Discussion


~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Castro's top foreign policy adviser, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, speaking recently in Tokyo, minimized his nation's intention to interfere in Rhodesia by sending combat troops. Rodriguez said a revolution should be "carried out under a country's own power," and not by the aid of foreign troops. He reaffirmed the Cuban policy of sending troops only at the request of the legitimate government of a country. Moreover, he stated that Cuban forces in Angola would be withdrawn only at the request of the Angolan Government.


~~(S/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOCONTRACT/NOINTEL)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g) 1.4 (c)



~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g), L4 (c)





~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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CUBA-ANGOLA: TENSIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS. (U)
1. (S/UNITED STATES ONLY/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) (b)(3):50 USC (b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g);1.4 (c)

[redacted]

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g):1.4 (c)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i)


3. ~~TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) THIS DISCORD WILL COMPOUND EXISTING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT ARE SERIOUSLY AGGRAVATED BY A SEVERE DROP IN COFFEE AND MINING PRODUCTION, AS WELL AS BY A SHORTAGE OF SKILLED MANPOWER, FOOD, AND OTHER CONSUMER GOODS. IT IS DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE NEAR TERM THE FRICTION WILL DEVELOP SUFFICIENTLY TO THRFATEN THE PRESECTIGOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH IT IS EROSIVE AND UNDERMINES THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NETO GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, THE RESENTMENT AND FRUSTRATION LACKS LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION AND ISITOO DIFFUSED TO BE VERY EFFECTIVE.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~(XGDS 1 & 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR)~~

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CUBA: WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U

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29 JUNE 1977


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CUBA: WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U)



DIAIAPPR 214-77
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CUBAN WORLDWIDE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL	NUMBER OF CIVILIAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS
ALGERIA 1/2/	UNKNOWN	10-20
ANGOLA 1/3/	-- 14,000-20,000	--
CONGO 4/	1,000-2,000	100-200
EQUITORIAL GUINEA	100-200	200-250
ETHIOPIA	50-100	NONE
GUINEA	250-400	250-430
GUINEA-BISSAU	300-400	80-100
GUYANA 2/	UNKNOWN	40-100
IRAQ 2/	UNKNOWN	NONE
JAMAICA	NONE	15
LAOS	NONE	50-100
MADAGASCAR	10-12	25
MOZAMBIQUE 1/	500-600	30-50
NIGERIA	NONE	UNKNOWN
PANAMA	NONE	12-24
PERU 2/	UNKNOWN	4
SIERRA LEONE	10	NONE
SOMALIA 1/	200-250	20-45
SOUTH YEMEN	350	350
TANZANIA	NONE	350-500
VIETNAM	NONE	200-300

1/ Cubans in Algeria train Polisario guerrillas targeted against Western Sahara; in Angola, SWAPO guerrillas targeted against Namibia; in Mozambique, guerrillas targeted against Rhodesia; in Somalia, guerrillas targeted against the Franch territory of Afars and Issas.

2/ Although there have been numerous conflicting reports about Cuban military involvement, there is no agreement within the intelligence community as to the number of Cuban military advisors in Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Peru.

3/ Estimates based on limited information. Totals include both military and civilians.

4/ Number is included in total for Angola. The military troops are based in Congo to ensure Angolan control of Cabinda and to police the Congo-Angola border. Ten to 20 military advisors are working with the Congolese Military.

SOURCE: DIA/CIA

~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

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CUBA: WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U)

Summary

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuban military as well as civilian advisory presence abroad has remained relatively stable since March 1977, except in Angola and Ethiopia, where a dramatic increase has occurred. Havana appears determined to continue these advisory and combat-support programs, and the Soviets seem inclined to maintain their logistic and materiel support. During this quarter, the political costs and risks have increased. Although Cuba's deployments will continue for the near term, Havana may be forced to reevaluate its international involvement and make considerable changes.

Discussion

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Ethiopia, a Cuban advisory presence began in May after President Fidel Castro's visit there two months earlier, and between 50 and 100 military advisers and doctors are working with the People's Militia; eventually, their number may reach several hundred. A protocol has been signed between Havana and Addis Ababa whereby the former has agreed in the near future to supply 100 to 150 physicians and medical personnel. It is doubtful, however (20 percent) that Cuban combat troops will be sent to Ethiopia.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Elsewhere in Africa, the Cuban military allegedly have been aiding Libya and Uganda during the past four months and working against the Mobutu regime in Zaire. To date, however, there is no evidence to support these allegations.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The last quarter has seen a sizable increase in the number of Cuban advisers and troops abroad. So long as the Soviet Union underwrites such programs and Castro is willing to use his people, this trend should continue, at least at present levels in the near term. During this recent period of expanded personnel deployments, the political cost and risks of these decisions have increased substantially. Limited reporting indicates that the Cuban people are tiring of fighting a foreign war, and even some officials are becoming disenchanted with their country's costly international involvement. In addition, a few of the governments Castro is supporting are in fact becoming more unstable, specifically those in Angola and Ethiopia.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A complicating factor may be Cuban rapprochement with the US. While Havana continues publicly to demand that the embargo be lifted before substantial talks with Washington can take place, increased troop and adviser augmentation abroad this quarter could well slow the process of gradual normalization of bilateral relations.

~~SECRET~~

Outlook

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although the nature of Cuban worldwide troop and military and civilian advisory presence appears to have become more complicated, costly, and risky in the past few months, it is likely (60 percent) that it will remain at its present level or increase some in the near term. US objections will not very likely (75 percent) sway Cuban policymakers, Soviet support will continue, and internal Cuban disenchantment will not appreciably affect (95 percent) official policy.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Survival of the Neto government in Angola will remain questionable and become increasingly dependent upon Cuban support. However, should the negative economic, political, and military factors continue to plague the Luanda regime over a longer period of time, there would have to be a serious reevaluation and perhaps radical changes in this area of Castro's foreign policy.
~~(XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

29 Jun 77

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DIA/APPR 181-77

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DIA

INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

CUBA: AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY (U)

6 JUNE 1977

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
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
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CUBA: AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY (U)



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6 JUNE 1977


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CUBA: AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY (U)

Summary

~~(TS~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(1);(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i);1.4 (c)




(b)(1) (b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g) 1.4 (c)

Discussion


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
(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g) (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i) 1.4 (c)



~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Havana's Angolan policy continues to be based on absolute support of the Neto government. In a May Day address, Neto claimed that the Angolan Army had the backing of 18,000 Cuban soldiers, and he would certainly lament diminished support to his administration during a period of stress. Castro gives every outward indication that Cuba will "fight on forever" there. In a French news magazine, Castro claimed that his government would consider any attacks on Angola -- from Zaire for example -- as an attack on Cuba itself. He also reiterated his country's resolute stance that it will remain in Angola "as long as necessary."

~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)





(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)




Outlook

~~(S/NFINTEL/NOFORN)~~ Havana has three options in Angola. It can maintain status quo support for Neto, stage a withdrawal of military forces, or increase support to the Luanda government. For the near term at least, it has chosen the last course, but the continued deterioration of the insurgent situation might subsequently change Cuba's willingness to provide additional support.

~~(S/NFINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i






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PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424


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DIAAPPR 70-85
9 DEC 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency
Appraisal

Angola: South African Support for UNITA (U)

Summary

(S) *The recent escalation of hostilities in Angola has revived speculation on the nature of the relationship between South Africa and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency. While the precise dimensions of the Pretoria-UNITA connection are unclear, evidence of stepped-up South African support for UNITA has political-military implications extending beyond the Southern African region. This trend could seriously undermine efforts to arrange a regionwide diplomatic settlement that will lead to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the independence of South African-administered Namibia. The increased South African aid to and direct involvement in the UNITA insurgency could also provoke the USSR and Cuba into playing more active roles in an effort to stem Luanda's generally deteriorating security situation.*

Discussion

(S/WN/NF/NC) (b)(3):50 (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)

[redacted]

(S) The precise dimensions of the UNITA-South African connection remain unclear. According to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who has readily and repeatedly acknowledged South African aid, the insurgents pay for all assistance Pretoria offers except for an estimated 4,000 gallons of fuel a day, used for the fleet of several hundred trucks that have been captured from Angolan Government forces. Pretoria, however, probably would not require UNITA to pay a "market price" for the assistance it provides. Such aid includes food, medical supplies and services, small arms and ammunition, military intelligence and special operations support, possibly training, and a few larger items seized during South African operations against South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas in southern Angola. Pretoria may regard evidence of UNITA's participation in South African operations against SWAPO in recent years as partial payment in kind.

(S) A persistent lack of detailed reports has made a precise estimate of the costs, quantity, and type of assistance Pretoria has offered to UNITA nearly impossible. An October 1984 Angolan press report claimed that South African aid to UNITA had been increased to

~~WNINTEL~~ NOFORN

(b)(3):50 USC

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$10 million annually. On 1 July, Luanda claimed that Pretoria had given UNITA $60 million in aid presumably since 1975. A sample of assistance South Africa has provided was offered in a 6 June Angolan communique announcing the capture of 40 tons of materiel airdropped by four South African aircraft over central Angola. Luanda claimed the equipment included some 500,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, more than 1,000 rounds of mortar shells, more than 1,000 mines, 6,000 kilograms of explosives, and a variety of other supplies.

(S) If Luanda's claim of a $60-million total is correct, then South African support for UNITA has amounted to at least $6 million a year since 1975. In early 1985, however, Jonas Savimbi claimed UNITA has an "annual income" of about $85 million. This figure could fluctuate, according to Savimbi, depending on the funds made available by sympathetic governments, presumably in Western Europe and the Middle East. In late 1984, one report asserted UNITA had received so much aid from the Shah of Iran that the insurgents had still not used it all. Savimbi has more recently stated that UNITA cannot afford to let its annual income fall below $30 million. UNITA reportedly sold some $4-million worth of diamonds and timber in 1983 as part of a larger effort to make the organization more self-sufficient. The insurgents are also said to have sold ivory and skins.

(S/WNINTEL) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)

(S) If Luanda's and UNITA's claims are both essentially correct, allowing for some exaggeration by each side, South African support may account for only 10 to 15 percent of the outside aid and even less of the total amount of materiel UNITA's 45,000 armed insurgents require annually. This assessment of Pretoria's support may not be unreasonable, since South Africa — faced with double-digit inflation, rising balance-of-payments deficits, and related problems — also must provide for its own 78,000-man army as well as a 20,000-member South-West Africa Territorial Force in Namibia.

(S) South Africa's combined defense and police budget for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1983 was estimated at a little over $3 billion, or about 18 percent of the central government budget. For the fiscal year ending 31 March 1984, Namibia's military budget was an estimated $65 million, or about 7 percent of the proposed central government budget. South Africa's ability to singlehandedly act as a major source of support for a third, large armed force therefore appears limited. Moreover, until 1984, Pretoria's support for the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency is likely to have placed additional limits on South Africa's capacity.

(S) Consequently, Pretoria's role may best be described as that of an instrumental source of support and a conduit for aid to UNITA, but not necessarily a critical or indispensable supplier. Nonetheless, South Africa's strategic location, its ability to supply UNITA rapidly in a timely fashion, and its demonstrated capacity for direct intervention — as it appears to have done in recent months — distinguishes Pretoria from all other sources of support to the insurgents. South Africa's ability to multiply UNITA's conventional forces and add an air dimension to the struggle makes its assistance unique. No other sympathetic government is geographically or politically placed to offer that support.

Outlook

(S) Recent statements by South African civilian and military officials suggest Pretoria's ties with UNITA have taken on a greater and more mutually beneficial geopolitical significance in the past few years. Although domestic economic conditions may place a ceiling on South African logistic support, Pretoria has explicitly committed itself to guaranteeing UNITA's survival. South Africa has already deployed air assets on the insurgents' behalf and has strongly implied that ground forces would also be sent to southern Angola if needed to turn back any government offensive threatening major UNITA bases.

(S) Soviet arms deliveries to Luanda in the past 2 years have, in principle, enabled the Angolan Government to launch more offensives like the one that recently pressed into UNITA-held territory. In fact, some reports

anticipate a similar assault in the next few months. However, whether recent government personnel and equipment losses will cause Luanda to question the value of such offensives against a few fixed positions remains unclear.

(S) Special domestic and international circumstances may have motivated Luanda to gamble large military assets on the achievement of primarily political objectives. A growing need to wage effective and protracted counterinsurgency warfare, as well as a reluctance to provoke greater South African intervention; could prompt Luanda to conduct low-level, nationwide operations rather than additional large but geographically limited campaigns. Alternatively, a blend of both approaches could emerge as Luanda searches for a more effective strategy of counterinsurgency warfare.

(S) If the US and other governments chose to extend support to UNITA, the significance of South African ties with UNITA could be diminished. This trend would be further reinforced by the extent to which such support to UNITA was funneled through states other than South Africa. Moreover, in the long run, were UNITA to come to power or dominate a coalition government in Luanda, regional economic ties are such that, of all states in Southern Africa, Angola is the least vulnerable to the kinds of economic pressure Pretoria exerts over nearly every other country south of the Zambezi River. Although a UNITA-led regime in Luanda would very likely maintain considerably closer relations with South Africa than most African governments, recent ties between Pretoria and the guerrillas would not guarantee the creation of a UNITA "puppet" government subservient to South Africa.

Prepared by: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MEMORANDUM

PREPARED BY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE FOR ESTIMATES

CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA (U)

3 MARCH 1976

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MEMORANDUM

CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA (U)

(b)(1),1.4(c)



APPROVED:

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

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
3 March 1976

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ESTIMATIVE TERMS AND DEGREES OF PROBABILITY

In this estimate, we have expressed major judgments in numeric form (e.g., chances out of ten or percentages), in order to convey to the reader their degree of probability more precisely than is possible in the traditional verbal form. Our confidence in the supporting evidence is taken into account in making these quantifications (see comments on completeness and reliability of evidence at the end of the estimate). All efforts at quantifying estimative judgments are highly subjective, however, and should be treated with reserve.

Readers are requested to provide the DIA Directorate for Estimates their views on the utility of this procedure together with any suggestions for its improvement or refinement.


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HAITI
Puerto Rico
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COSTA RICA
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TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
GUYANA
SURINAM
FRENCH GUIANA
COLOMBIA
GALAPAGOS IS.
ECUADOR
BRAZIL
PERU
BOLIVIA
PARAGUAY
EASTER I.
URUGUAY
CHILE
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FALKLAND IS.
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CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA (U)

This Defense Intelligence Estimates Memorandum reviews Latin American reaction to Cuban intervention in Angola and to the United States' relatively passive role there, and estimates the probable impact of these developments in Latin America over the next several years. It was produced in response to a request from the office of the Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. (U)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. (U) Cuba has provided large-scale and effective military support to forces in the Angolan civil war, in close collaboration with the Soviet Union.

B. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Latin American reaction to Cuba's military operations in Angola has generally been a mixture of criticism of Cuban intervention as a Soviet surrogate, surprise over the apparently high degree of Cuba's capabilities, and varied levels of concern over the implications that Castro's military victories in Angola might have for Latin America.

C. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuban successes in Angola will encourage Castro and Soviet leaders to give military support to "liberation movements" elsewhere, but the likelihood that Castro will find propitious opportunities for military intervention in Latin America in the next several years is very small (less than 10 percent). The probability that Castro will provide Latin American insurgents large-scale support short of military intervention is higher but still small (less than 20 percent). Havana and Moscow evidently believe that conditions in Latin America are not yet ripe for armed revolution and appear satisfied with their present policy of expanding state-to-state relations and developing broad "anti-imperialist" fronts.

NOTE: This Defense Intelligence Estimates Memorandum was prepared by (b)(3):10 USC 424

D. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

E. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Latin American military will continue to rely on the US "security shield" and to work closely with the United States, but they will be less confident that the US would provide needed defense support in the event of a Cuban/Soviet-supported threat. Some Latin American military are concerned over Cuba's demonstrated military capabilities, and this will stimulate new interest in arms procurement, force modernization, and collective security arrangements, especially among the smaller countries.

F. ~~(C)~~ Except for Guyana, no Latin American country is likely to turn to Cuba for significant military assistance in place of the United States or other Western powers (80 percent probability).

G. ~~(S)~~ Most Latin American countries will remain generally distrustful of Cuba and cautious in dealing with the Castro government. There is an 80 percent likelihood, however, that Castro's influence will increase in Guyana and a 70 percent chance that Cuba will retain fairly close ties with other former British colonies in the Caribbean over the next several years.

DISCUSSION

1. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Cuba has been providing large-scale military support to the Moscow-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the ongoing civil war in that country. Cuba's commitment of troops in mid-1975 apparently resulted from a combination of an MPLA plea for support, Soviet reluctance to send its own forces, Castro's desire to enhance his revolutionary image, and Soviet concurrence in and support for the Cuban operation. The MPLA reverses in late 1975, caused in part by the involvement of South African forces on the pro-Western side, led to the subsequently strong Cuban military buildup in Angola. In all, Cuba has sent more than 12,000 troops there, and many of them have engaged actively in combat roles.



Cuban Troops in Angola

2. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ The relative weight of Cuban initiative versus Soviet pressure on Cuba's decision to send troops is still not fully clear; however, Castro would not have committed such a large force without the firm and

sizable backing of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Cuban deployments, which have allowed the Soviets to maintain a lower profile in Angola, have almost certainly been coordinated with the Soviets (90 percent likelihood). Some Cuban personnel are used to operate the more sophisticated Soviet equipment provided to Angola.

Latin American Reaction to Cuban Intervention in Angola

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The reaction in Latin America to Cuba's military operations in Angola (aside from the far left, whose favorable response could be expected) has been essentially a mixture of criticism, surprise, and concern.

4. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Criticism of Cuban Intervention.*--With few exceptions, Latin American government leaders who have expressed a view have been critical of Cuba -- usually seen as a Soviet surrogate -- for its intervention in Angola. Various leaders, particularly in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay, see Cuba's military involvement in Angola as confirming their belief that Castro has not abandoned his insurgency-support policy; many of these same people had resisted the ending of the OAS sanctions against Cuba. Even in countries which have been developing closer ties with Cuba, however, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela, there has been private criticism of Cuba's Angolan venture. Government leaders in various countries are reassessing their attitude toward Cuba and will be more cautious in dealing with the Castro government.

5. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Only Guyana and Jamaica are known to have expressed sympathy for Cuba's intervention, ostensibly accepting Castro's claim that he was aiding a legitimate government threatened by aggression from South African forces. Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham's willingness to allow the refueling in his country of Cuban planes enroute to Angola is further explained by his close ties with Castro and his goal of establishing a Cuban-styled Marxist government with Castro's support.

6. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Surprise over Cuban Capabilities.*--The Cuban troops apparently have been effective and are credited with many victories over Western-backed forces in Angola. A number of Latin American leaders have been surprised by Cuba's ability to mount and sustain military operations on such a scale thousands of miles from home -- even with strong Soviet help. Government leaders in the smaller countries of Central America, traditionally the most sensitive to Cuban support for insurgency, are particularly impressed by the relatively large number of well-equipped and apparently well-trained Cuban military forces fighting in Angola.

7. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ *Concern over Cuban Intentions.*--Government and military leaders, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, have expressed concern over the implications that Cuba's military capabilities may have for their own security.

--Authorities in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua believe that Cuba's military operations in Angola demonstrate that it could engage in similar action in Latin America if the opportunity presented itself.

--Guatemalan officials have expressed concern that Cuba, possibly with the support of other Caribbean countries, might intervene in support of neighboring Belize, where Guatemala has been pressing its territorial claims.

--Panamanians are concerned over Castro's capability to intervene in their country. A Panamanian military official, who recently visited Cuba, has expressed apprehension over the potential danger of Cuban involvement in Panama, including a threat to the Panama Canal.

--Haitian leaders are particularly sensitive that Cuba may be planning aggression against their nation.

8. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Uneasiness is also being expressed in some of the larger South American countries. Some Argentine military leaders, for example, have voiced the opinion that their country needs a larger and more modern armed force to

be able to counter Cuba's military capabilities. Brazilians, who had opposed the ending of OAS sanctions against Cuba, believe that Castro is serving in Angola as a Soviet surrogate and would engage in similar activity anywhere in the world if Moscow ordered such action.

9. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Even the Venezuelans, who co-sponsored the July 1975 OAS "freedom-of-action" resolution permitting member states to resume ties with Cuba, have reacted very negatively to Cuba's Angolan involvement. Government officials are uneasy over Guyanese cooperation in the Cuban airlift to Angola because of possible implications for Venezuela's longstanding claim to a large section of Guyana. Senior military officers are reported to be concerned by Cuba's involvement in Angola and to believe that Cuba could well be encouraged to intervene in other areas of the world, particularly Latin America. Venezuelans believe, however, that the implications for Latin America will depend partly on the final assessment of Cuba's operations in Africa and partly on Castro's efforts to strengthen his influence in the Caribbean.

10. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Some Latin American leaders, on the other hand, have expressed little concern. Mexican government and military authorities, for example, have voiced the belief that Cuba's support for MPLA forces in Angola does not mean that Cuba would support insurgent movements in Mexico or elsewhere in Latin America. Guyanese authorities see no dangerous implications for their country, and Honduran officials have expressed relative indifference to Cuban involvement in Angola.

Cuban Operations in Latin America?

11. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Cuban successes in Angola will encourage Castro, as well as Soviet leaders, to give military support to "liberation movements" elsewhere. The likelihood that Castro will find propitious opportunities for military intervention in Latin America over the next several years, however, is very small (less than 10 percent). The probability that Castro will provide Latin American insurgents large-scale support short of military intervention is higher but still small (less than 20 percent).

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"imperialist" aggression. He has also stated publicly that he will respect the principle of nonintervention in Latin America.

Reaction to the Relatively Passive US Role in Angola

15. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

16. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)~~ Many Latin Americans, both civilian and military, are expressing increased doubts about the United States' willingness and ability to fulfill its international security commitments. These doubts have been most forcefully expressed in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Costa Rican President Oduber, for example, commented that the United States' passive role in Angola could be an indication of a US lack of willingness to help defend against a Cuban attack on Costa Rica or elsewhere in the hemisphere.

17. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Nevertheless, a basic Latin American respect for and reliance on US power are likely to remain fairly strong. In addition, many Latins make a distinction between the US reaction to events in a distant African country and the probable US reaction to a major Communist threat in the Hemisphere. They express the belief that Latin America has much greater security and economic importance to the United States, and that the US government would react strongly and effectively to defend a threatened Latin American country.

Implications for the Future

18. ~~(C)~~ Events in Angola and the US role there are likely to affect Latin American attitudes and policies in a number of related areas. In most cases, the result will tend to be damaging to US interests.

19. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Repercussions Among the Latin American Military.*--The Latin American military, while continuing to work closely with the United States, will be less confident that the US would provide needed defense support in the event of a Communist threat. Security forces are likely to reassess their capabilities to defend against possible Cuban intervention. There is a 70 percent probability that such a review would lead in some countries to a decision to acquire additional arms to modernize and enhance their defensive capability. While the Latin American military would prefer to rely on the US for arms and other security assistance, they would turn to other suppliers if the US were not forthcoming. In addition, there is about a 60 percent chance that some, in any case, will diversify their sources of arms for fear that the US would prove unreliable in a crisis situation.

20. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Concern over Cuban capabilities and intentions could also stimulate renewed Latin American interest in collective security arrangements (about a 50 percent chance). The United States would be considered a vital element in any such security pact, but the emphasis would probably be more on the "collective" feature of the security arrangement than has been the case in the past.

21. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Caution in Dealing with Cuba.*--Concern over the possible implications of Angola has already led a number of Latin American governments to reassess their ties with Castro. There is a 90 percent probability that this caution will persist for some time, bringing with it a dampening in recent Cuban successes in establishing close relations with a number of countries. Concern is likely to be especially high among the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean, which have traditionally been very sensitive to the threat from Cuba. Haiti, in particular, is upset over the possibility of Cuban aggression. Except for Guyana, no Latin American country is likely to turn to Cuba for significant military assistance in place of the United States or other Western powers (80 percent probability). Over the longer term, the Latin American attitude will depend on whether or not Castro provides large-scale support to "national liberation movements," particularly in Latin America.

22. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Encouragement to Extremists.*--The sizable Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA will encourage Latin

American extremists in the belief that they would receive similar backing if local conditions were considered propitious. This does not mean that a major revival of Latin American insurgency is about to take place. Castro, Soviet leaders, and local Communists recognize the present constraints on successful insurgency in most Latin American countries and the need to work for popular support and united fronts. The more radical groups that insist on insurgency have generally shown little capability to develop into a serious threat to governments in power.

23. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ *A Lessening Latin American Dependence.*-- Increased Latin American doubts regarding US leadership will most likely encourage the overall Latin American trend toward lessening dependence on the United States (80 percent probability). Latin countries will probably favor broadening and strengthening their ties with other countries and with multinational arrangements within the Third World and Latin American groupings. This could stimulate a strengthening of such organizations as the Latin American Economic System, which excludes the United States, and result in their increasing use in making demands on or resisting pressure from the United States. Except on very basic East-West issues, Latin Americans will tend even more than in the past to act independently of the United States in furtherance of their national and regional interests. Such developments are likely to further weaken the United States' ability to influence and gain the support of Latin American governments on matters of importance to the US (80 percent probability).

24. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ *Continued Cuban Influence in the Caribbean.*-- Several of the former British colonies are likely to continue their close ties with Havana (70 percent probability). Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham has identified Cuba as a model for transforming his country into a socialist one-party state. Concern over alleged threats from Brazil and Venezuela and his cooperation with Castro over Angola will likely lead Burnham to accept Cuban military assistance to his country (80 percent probability). Cuba's demonstrated military capabilities enhance in Burnham's eyes the value of ties with Cuba for assistance in the event of border problems with his neighbors.




Forbes Burnham

25. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Castro has devoted considerable effort in the past year toward reinforcing his relations with English-speaking Caribbean leaders, especially in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, which belong to the nonaligned movement. Cuba will continue to support regional solidarity and cooperation throughout the Caribbean basin. Havana hosted the first meeting of the recently created Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee, and efforts have been underway to grant Cuba membership in the Caribbean Common Market and Caribbean Development Bank. Should Castro be admitted, he would most likely seek to use such organizations to strengthen his ties in the region. Although relations between Cuba and several of the small former British colonies cooled in the wake of Castro's intervention in Angola, their proximity to Cuba and their shared regional interests enhance the likelihood that they will retain fairly close relations with the Castro government, to the possible detriment of US interests.

COMPLETENESS AND RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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
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
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ANGOLA RECEIVES ADDITIONAL CROSS-COUNTRY TRUCKS FROM THE USSR


~~(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

some 1,000 vehicles






URAL-375D 6X6 4 5-TON CARGO TRUCK



GAZ 66 4X4 TWO TON CARGO TRUCK



ZIL 131 6X6 3 5 TON CARGO TRUCK

~~(C)~~ The GAZ 66 is a compact cab over-engine two-ton 4X4 multipurpose vehicle powered by a 115 hp water cooled V8 gasoline engine. URAL 375D is a 4 5 ton 6X6 vehicle powered by a 180-hp water cooled V8 gasoline engine, and the ZIL 131 is a 3 5-ton 6X6 truck with a 150 hp water cooled V8 gasoline engine These three trucks are highly mobile and are versatile military type vehicles on which many types of equipment can be mounted (XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)

25 Oct 77

(b)(3):10 USC 424

MICROFILMED

DIAWIS 28-77

[redacted]

DIA

Weekly Intelligence Summary (U)

15 JULY 1977

~~NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

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Weekly Intelligence Summary

DIAWIS 28-77

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3
DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR~~



15 JULY 1977

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PROPIN	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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DIAWIS 28-77

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
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
Africa

ANGOLA RECEIVES SOVIET CROSS-COUNTRY TRUCKS


~~(S/WN/INTEL/NOFORN)~~ Some 466 Soviet trucks were shipped to Angola during June. The Angolan Ministry of Defense was allocated a total of 435 trucks -- 346 GAZ-66s, 80 ZIL-131s, and nine URAL-375Ds. The recipient of the remaining 31 vehicles is not known.




GAZ-66 MOUNTING TWIN BOX RADAR



GAZ-66 MOUNTING DDA DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT



ZIL-131 COMMUNICATIONS VAN



URAL-375 MOUNTING BM-21 ROCKET LAUNCHER

(continued)

widely used by military

~~(C)~~ The GAZ-66 is a compact cab-over-engine two-ton 4x4 multipurpose vehicle powered by a 115-horsepower water-cooled V8 gasoline engine. ZIL-131 is a 3.5-ton 6x6 truck with a 150-horsepower water-cooled V8 gasoline engine. URAL-375D is a 4.5-ton 6x6 vehicle powered by a 180-horsepower water-cooled V8 gasoline engine. These trucks are highly mobile and versatile, and many types of equipment have been mounted on their frames. Tactical trucks of these types are widely used by the Soviet military as artillery prime movers, communications vehicles, and for mounting decontamination equipment and rocket launchers. They also serve as troop and cargo carriers. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

CUBA'S WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT INCREASED DURING MARCH-JUNE QUARTER

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The relative stability of the Cuban military as well as civilian presence in most foreign countries since March has been offset by dramatic increases in Angola and Ethiopia. The Angolan situation has deteriorated, and President Neto's government has become increasingly threatened by intensified insurgent activity, economic deterioration, and factionalism within the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In response, Cuba has decided to reverse its proclaimed policy of troop withdrawal and is now reinforcing its fighting force in Angola. Cuban ship convoys have apparently taken military equipment -- and possibly additional troops -- to Luanda and Cabinda since May. Cuba has also been using the thrice-weekly Cubana civil air flights from Havana to Luanda to augment its forces. As many as 5,000 additional Cubans may have arrived recently in Angola, bringing the estimated total there to between 14,000 and 20,000 military and civilian personnel. Although no breakout by type is available, Havana's military-to-civilian conversion program and its claimed gradual drawdown of uniformed personnel in Angola have no doubt ended.

reinforcements to Angola

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In Ethiopia, a Cuban advisory presence began in May after President Castro's visit there two months earlier. Between 50 and 100 military advisers and doctors are working with the People's Militia. This number may eventually reach several hundred; a protocol has been signed between Havana and Addis Ababa whereby Cuba has agreed to supply 100 to 150 medical personnel in the near future. Cuban combat troops will probably not be sent to Ethiopia.

advisers in Ethiopia

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The growing Cuban military and civilian presence worldwide appears to have become more complicated, costly, and risky in the past few months. Nevertheless, so long as the USSR underwrites such activity and Castro is willing to use his people, this growth should continue, at least at present levels. US objections probably will not sway Cuban policymakers, and Soviet support will continue. Even though the Cuban people and some officials are reportedly becoming disenchanted with their country's costly international involvement, internal discontent will not appreciably affect official policy.

growth likely

(continued)

CUBAN WORLDWIDE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE

Country	Number of Military Personnel	Number of Civilian Technical Advisers
Algeria*/**	Unknown	10-20
Angola*/***	14,000-20,000	--
Congo****	1,000-2,000	100-200
Equatorial Guinea	100-200	200-250
Ethiopia	50-100	None
Guinea	250-400	250-430
Guinea-Bissau	300-400	80-100
Guyana**	Unknown	40-100
Iraq**	Unknown	None
Jamaica	None	15
Laos	None	50-100
Madagascar	10-12	25
Mozambique	500-600	30-50
Nigeria	None	Unknown
Panama	None	12-24
Peru**	Unknown	4
Sierra Leone	10	None
Somalia*	200-250	20-45
South Yemen	350	350
Tanzania	None	350-500
Vietnam	None	200-300

* Cubans in Algeria train Polisario guerrillas targeted against Western Sahara; in Angola, SWAPO guerrillas targeted against Namibia; in Mozambique, guerrillas targeted against Rhodesia; in Somalia, guerrillas targeted against the Republic of Djibouti.

** Although there have been numerous conflicting reports about Cuban military involvement, there is no agreement within the intelligence community as to the number of Cuban military advisers in Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Peru.

*** Estimates based on limited information. Totals include both military and civilians.

**** Number is included in total for Angola. The military troops are based in Congo to ensure Angolan control of Cabinda enclave and to police the Congo-Angola border. Ten to 20 military advisers are working with the Congolese military.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

15 Jul 77

(continued)

instability a factor

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The factor most likely to influence Cuba's growing presence abroad is the increasing instability of a few governments Castro is supporting, especially that of Angola. Survival of the Neto government is questionable, and the MPLA regime is becoming increasingly dependent upon Cuban support. Should the negative economic, political, and military factors continue to plague the government in Luanda, Cuba would have to undertake a serious reevaluation of the situation in Angola. This could lead to radical changes in this area of Castro's foreign policy. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

EDITOR'S NOTE: ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The June crash of a Cuban MIG-21/FISHBED reported on page 41 of the DIA *Weekly Intelligence Summary* dated 8 Jul 77 (DIAWIS 27-77) reduced Cuba's FISHBED inventory to 114 vice 85. ~~(XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

(M)

DIAIAPPR 95-76
5 APRIL 1976

~~SECRET~~

VENEZUELA: REASSESSMENT OF CUBAN RELATIONS (U)

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INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

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
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VENEZUELA: REASSESSMENT OF CUBAN RELATIONS (U)



VENEZUELA

DIAIAPPR 95-76
5 APRIL 1976

~~SECRET~~

VENEZUELA: REASSESSMENT OF CUBAN RELATIONS (U)

Summary

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g), 1.4 (c)




Discussion

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Venezuelan President Carlos Perez continues to describe his country's relationship with Cuba as normal, but only in public statements. Privately, the President is drastically changing his attitude toward Cuba and is disturbed by recent Cuban moves in Africa and Latin America.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~

(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g), 1.4 (c)




~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Recent reports of a Cuban presence in neighboring Guyana has brought the issue of Havana foreign involvement even closer to Venezuela. Although no real proof of Cuban-Guyana military activities exists, the Perez administration nevertheless believes that Castro's forces are expanding their operations there. Conservatives and military officers are bringing pressure on Perez to take a stronger defensive stance against feared Cuban-led Guyana forces along the border. Moreover, opposition parties now have a political basis for questioning the President's long-standing policy of rapprochement toward Havana.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Perez is primarily concerned that Cuba will upset the regional political and military balance in Central and South America, resulting in a deeper split in American unity. This would prejudice Venezuela's leadership position in promoting Latin unity and would be a personal defeat for the President.


~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The timing of Cuba's foreign involvements has also created problems at a time that had been considered favorable for harmonious relations between most of the Latin American community. Significantly, Prime Minister Castro's proposed presence at the Panamanian Summit has caused its cancellation, as most of the invited heads of state preferred to avoid him.

Outlook

~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)~~



~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g), 1.4 (c)



PREPARED BY:

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

[redacted]

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DIAIAPPR 94-77

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Appraisal

CUBA: CUBAN WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U)

18 MARCH 1977

[redacted]

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CUBA: CUBAN WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U)



CUBA

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRESENCE WORLDWIDE

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL	NUMBER OF CIVILIANS
Algeria 1/ 2/	N/A	10-20
Angola 1/ 3/	12,000-14000	1,000-3,000
Congo 4/	1,000-2,000	90-150
Equitorial Guinea	100-200	200-250
Guinea	250-300	50-100
Guinea-Bissau	300-400	80-100
Guyana 2/	N/A	40-100
Iraq 2/	N/A	---
Jamaica	---	13
Laos	---	100-200
Madagascar	6-10	25
Mexico	---	N/A
Mozambique 1/	600	400-500
Nigeria	---	N/A
Panama	---	60
Peru 2/	N/A	40-50
Sierra Leone	10	---
Somalia 1/	200-250	20-45
South Yemen 1/	350	350
Tanzania	---	350-500
Vietnam	---	300-500

1/ Cubans in Algeria train POLISARIO guerrillas for work in Spanish Sahara; in Angola, SWAPO guerrillas for work in Namibia; in Mozambique, guerrillas for work in Rhodesia; in Somalia, guerrillas for work in the French Territory of Afars and Issas; in South Yemen, guerrillas for work in Oman.

2/ Although there have been numerous conflicting reports about Cuban military involvement, there is no agreement within the intelligence community as to the number of Cuban military advisers in Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Peru.

3/ Estimates based on limited information.

4/ Number is included in total for Angola. The military troops are based in Congo to ensure Angolan control of Cabinda and to police the Congo-Angola border. Ten to 20 military advisers are working with the Congolese military.

~~SECRET~~

Figure 1

~~SECRET~~

CUBA: CUBAN WORLDWIDE INVOLVEMENT (U)

Summary

(U) Cuba's worldwide involvement stems from its foreign policy objective to expand the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and President Fidel Castro's zeal to strengthen his personal position as an international revolutionary leader. Cuban presence abroad began on a limited scale in the early 1960s and continued at that level until 1975, when thousands of combat troops were first deployed to Angola. Since then, Havana's involvement has increased, and it will probably continue to do so as long as Castro, or someone with his same outlook and goals, is Cuba's chief of state.

Discussion

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Shortly after the Castro government came to power in 1959, Havana began involvement with other nations. In the early 1960s, Cubans provided limited moral support, political indoctrination, and guerrilla training to the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the then Portuguese colony of Angola. Cuba's international revolutionary activities spread during the 1960s. In the Western Hemisphere, Cuban personnel were dispatched to the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Venezuela. However, all efforts to interfere in the affairs of neighboring states were thwarted. The high point of Cuban involvement in Latin American guerrilla activities came in 1966 and 1967 when Ernesto "Che" Guevara led a small band of Cuban and Bolivian insurgents in an effort to organize a counter-government movement.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ By 1964 in Africa, Ghana and Algeria served as centers for the spread of Cuban influence. About 30 Cuban instructors worked with

ESTIMATED VALUE OF CUBAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT SHIPMENTS (GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT)

RECIPIENT COUNTRY	VALUE (MILLION US DOLLARS) CUMULATIVE THROUGH END 1976	REMARKS
Algeria	3.0	1963 - $3.0; 1975 - N/A; none since
Angola	147.0*	1975 and 1976
Congo	Negl	1965 - negl; 1967 - negl; none since
Guinea	0.3	1966 - $0.3; 1972 - negl; none since
Panama	Negl	1976 - negl
Syria	Negl*	1973-1975; none since
Tanzania	Negl	1969 - negl; none since
Laos	N/A	1976

Negl - Less than $50,000.
N/A - Aid was given but value and type are not known.
* - Also includes estimated dollar value of combat troops.

(SECRET)

Figure 2

the MPLA in Cuba and the Congo. Cuba's largest commitment in the 1960s was to the Congolese cause where a reported 1,000 to 2,000 Cuban guerrillas fought in the independence struggles.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Because of increased international criticism and concern, improved foreign counter-guerrilla capability, and internal Cuban economic/organizational turmoil in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Cuban international guerrilla support subsided. But in 1973, the first Cuban military deployment occured when hundreds of Cuban troops were sent to Syria; all have returned to Cuba.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In the past few years, Havana has been increasing its worldwide involvement until, in late 1975, Cuba's foreign presence was dramatically augmented with the deployment of an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 combat troops and military advisers to Angola. In 1976, Cuban presence was also established in Mozambique, where more than 1,000 military and civilian personnel are presently believed to be stationed. The Cuban military in Mozambique are working with black guerrilla groups targeted against Rhodesia. Cuban advisory assistance also began in Madagascar earlier this year.

~~(C)~~ Military personnel advise local armed forces organizations, perform political indoctrination, train troops to operate and maintain Soviet equipment, train presidential security forces and guerrilla groups, and serve as security guards and combat troops (figure 1). Civilian advisers work in medical, political, economic, construction, agricultural, animal husbandry, health, forestry, fishing, and educational fields. The bulk of Cuban assistance consists of training or providing services and indoctrination. In some cases, however, equipment has also been given (figure 2).

~~(S/NOFORN,WN/CONTRACT/NATIONAL)~~ Cuba has been increasing its civilian-technical assistance programs abroad to developing countries. Initiated in the mid-1960s, these programs are an important part of Havana's effort to increase political influence in the Third World. Cuba now has more

CUBAN CONSULAR OR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

[illegible]	WESTERN EUROPE	EASTERN EUROPE / USSR	MIDDLE EAST/ NORTH AFRICA	EAST & SOUTH ASIA	AFRICA/SUB-[illegible]
[illegible]	Austria	Albania	Algeria	Afghanistan	Angola
[illegible]	Belgium	Bulgaria	Egypt	Bangladesh	Benin
[illegible]	Cyprus	Czechoslovakia	Iran	Cambodia	Burundi
[illegible]	Denmark	East Germany	Iraq	PRC	Cameroon
[illegible]	West Germany	Hungary	Kuwait	India	Cape Verde
[illegible]	Finland	Poland	Lebanon	Indonesia	Congo - B
[illegible]	France	Romania	Libya	Japan	Equatorial G.
[illegible]	Greece	USSR	Morocco	Laos	Ethiopia
[illegible]	Iceland	Yugoslavia	Nigeria	North Korea	Gabon
[illegible]	Italy		Syria	Malaysia	Ghana
[illegible]	Luxembourg		Yemen (Aden)	Mauritius	Guinea
[illegible]	Malta			Mongolia	Guinea-Bissau
[illegible]	Netherlands			Nepal	Liberia
[illegible]	Norway			Pakistan	Madagascar
[illegible]	Portugal			Philippines	Mali
[illegible]	Spain			Sri Lanka	Mauritania
[illegible]	Sweden			Vietnam	Mozambique
[illegible]	Switzerland				Sao Tome and Principe
[illegible]	Turkey				Senegal
[illegible]	United Kingdom				Sierra Leone
[illegible]	Vatican				Somalia
					Tanzania
					Uganda
					Upper Volta
					Zaire
					Zambia

[illegible]

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure 1

than 4,000 civilians throughout Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and Asia.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuba formerly gave limited economic-technical assistance to Barbados, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mali, Morocco, Zambia, and Syria. Assistance is no longer provided to these countries because projects were completed or canceled, a change of government occurred, or short-term natural disaster relief was satisfied.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuba also makes use of official channels in its attempts to influence other countries. In addition to official functions, Cuban diplomats and those with Havana's Prensa Latina news service often engage in intelligence-related activities and work to spread Cuban and communist influence. Figure 3 lists those countries with which Cuba has diplomatic relations, and figure 4 provides those where Cuba has a Prensa Latina office. These are normally located in the capital city of each nation.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The final method Havana uses to spread its ideology and influence throughout the world is to offer training and education in Cuba to foreigners. All levels of formal education, as well as technical and military training, are provided on the island to persons primarily from Third World countries. Detailed information about the numbers and nationalities of those involved is not presently available.

Outlook

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuban worldwide involvement has increased over the past 17 years. It will most likely continue to expand (90 percent) through the rest of this decade and into the next as long as Castro, or someone with his same outlook and goals, is Cuba's leader and the USSR continues to provide materiel and transport assistance. Castro regularly communicates with the Soviets through personal visits to the USSR and through the ranking Soviet officials permanently stationed in Cuba. No significant Cuban dispatch of personnel -- whether advisory or combat -- could be accomplished without approval of the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

PEDRA LATINA OUTREACH

AFRICA*	MIDDLE EAST*	WESTERN EUROPE	EASTERN EUROPE	ASIA	OTHERS
Algeria	Lebanon	Austria	Bulgaria	Japan	Australia
Angola	Egypt	Belgium	Czechoslovakia	S. Korea	Canada
Nigeria		Denmark	E. Germany	PRC	United States
[illegible]		France	Hungary	Vietnam	(New York)
[illegible]		W. Germany	Poland		
[illegible]		Ireland	Romania		
[illegible]		Italy	USSR		
[illegible]		Norway	Yugoslavia		
[illegible]		United Kingdom			
[illegible]					
[illegible]					
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* [illegible] list of offices is not available.

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Figure 2

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In spite of protests from the US and other nations, this involvement will continue to grow as Cuba becomes recognized as a more respectable member of the international community and has more to offer Third World nations.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Africa is, of course, the most fertile ground for future Cuban expansion. The white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa are the long-range targets of the Cubans and African nationalist movements. To that end, Cuban presence fronting both Rhodesia (in Mozambique) and Namibia (in Angola) has been designed to improve fighting capabilities of the insurgents.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In this hemisphere, Cuban interests center mainly in the Caribbean, especially with the leftward-leaning regimes in Jamaica and Guyana. Although Cuban troop deployments to Latin America seem unlikely for the near term, Havana advisory support to the regimes of Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and Guyana Prime Minister L.F.S. Burnham could take on an increasingly important role as those governments perceive that their Cuban connection is more acceptable in the eyes of their domestic constituencies.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuban presence counters US interests by furthering the spread of communist influence. Havana's involvement generally supplements and enhances Soviet influence. This is especially true in the Third World, where Cuba possesses an air of legitimacy and shares a rapport with lesser developed countries because of a common racial, religious, cultural, historical background that is not shared with the USSR. Cuban military and civilian technical assistance has its most practical, near-term impact on the countries where it is actually being given now. Cuban advisers contribute needed skills and training for the host country and provide intensive ideological indoctrination. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

DIAIAPPR 7-76
12 JANUARY 1976

RECENT SOVIET AIRLIFT ACTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

GWZ670-90-6

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
[redacted]

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
DECLASSIFY ON Date Cannot Be Determined

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RECENT SOVIET AIRLIFT ACTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)




USSR

DIAIAPPR 7-76
12 JANUARY 1976


~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)




RECENT SOVIET AIRLIFT ACTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)


Summary



Discussion



(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)



~~(S)~~ In these four operations, the use of civil or military aircraft has no apparent correlation with the function of the respective missions. The most suitable aircraft for each operation, rather than its military or civil status, appears to have been the criterion for selection. In the past, the Soviets have utilized aircraft that were painted in Aeroflot colors, and have filed civil flight plans for operations outside the Warsaw Pact area.

Outlook

~~(S)~~ These four airlifts reflect Moscow's growing global commitments and its continuing desire to increase its influence throughout the Third World. During this same period, the Soviets also conducted a small airlift to South Yemen in addition to a major operation supporting their own semiannual rotation of troops between the USSR and Soviet bases in Eastern Europe. [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),. [redacted] In coming years, Soviet air transport capabilities should be improved even more by the continued introduction of long-range jet aircraft and the expected development of a new long-range heavy transport aircraft. The addition of these new aircraft to the inventory will place additional areas of the world within easy reach of the Soviet transport air fleet. ~~(NODS 2 Declassify upon notification of originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~NOFORN~~
~~NOCONTRACT~~
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

This Document Contains
Special Intelligence Material

[redacted]

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ANGOLA:

UNITA Insurgency in 1988 (U)

Defense Intelligence Appraisal Series

27 February 1989

Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate for Current Intelligence

10 CJ

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

DIA/APPR 6-89

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1977

185

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INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

ANGOLA:
UNITA Insurgency in 1988 (U)

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
Prepared by the (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC Defense Intelligence Agency

Author: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~Top Secret~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)


CONGO
CABINDA
ZAIRE
ANGOLA
Soyo
Mbanza Congo
Quimbele
Tomboco
Ambrizete
Nzeto
ZAIRE
UIGE
Santa Combo
Buela
Alfandega
Uige
Puri
Negage
LUANDA
BENGO
CUANZA NORTE
Malanje
Cuango
Saurimo
CUANZA SUL
Sumbe
Atlantic Ocean
Lusu
Chicala
Cavimbe
Luena
Bailundo
Bie
Kuito
Lobito
Biopio
Benguela
Huambo
Chipeta
Cangonga
Munhango
Cuemba
Lucusse
Cazombo
Quingenge
BENGUELA
Babaera
Caconda
Cangamba
HUILA
Dongo
Menongue
Namibe
Techamutete
Lubango
Cuito
Cuanavale
Mavinga
Cahama
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA

Summary

~~(S)~~ *The 13-year-old Angolan civil war was marked by significant contrasts in 1988. In the early months, the conflict appeared to be taking on an increasingly conventional character, especially in the southeast. Unprecedented South African assistance for a National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) drive on a key government garrison threatened to involve Cuban troops in combat. Havana augmented its expeditionary force with 15,000 troops, and many of the new units subsequently advanced toward the northwestern Namibian border. At year's end, the conflict had reverted to a primarily guerrilla war between government forces and UNITA. Moreover, US-brokered negotiations calmed the tense situation along the southwestern Angolan border and set the stage for an eventual total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and South Africa's departure from Namibia. Efforts to build on recent diplomatic momentum by calling for a reconciliation between UNITA and Luanda have not yet shown progress, and the civil war will quite likely continue for at least another year.*

Discussion


~~(S/WN/NF)~~ As 1988 began, UNITA and South African elements, supported by air and artillery, continued the siege of the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) garrison at Cuito Cuanavale. The siege had begun in late November 1987 following FAPLA's disastrous dry-season offensive against the UNITA-held town of Mavinga. Three to four FAPLA brigades were thought to be pinned down at Cuito Cuanavale. In late December the garrison was reinforced by a Cuban tank battalion, as well as artillery, antiaircraft, and combat engineer elements, from the Cuban brigade based at Menongue.

~~(S)~~ The Cuban reinforcement of Cuito Cuanavale did not immediately break the siege. On 14 January an Angolan Defense Ministry communique reported a major assault on FAPLA positions on the outskirts of Cuito Cuanavale 2 days earlier. Luanda alleged on the 15th that two motorized South African "tactical groups," supported by artillery batteries and multiple rocket launchers, had attacked FAPLA positions west of town. Luanda's statement implied that fighting had continued on the 14th. The attacking force probably consisted largely of UNITA troops supported by South African artillery batteries

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~TS~~ (b) ~~NF/NC/~~ On 14 February UNITA

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (g)



~~(S)~~ In a late February press statement, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi suggested that the insurgents were reassessing their tactics in what had become a monthslong siege of Cuito Cuanavale. Savimbi told journalists that he was trying to decide whether to

occupy the town or to lure government forces into positions beyond their defensive perimeter, where his guerrilla forces could attack them piecemeal and inflict greater losses. UNITA's reluctance to stage an all-out assault on Cuito Cuanavale reflected a longstanding insurgent policy to minimize guerrilla losses, particularly for an objective whose value as a captured position would be more political than military.

~~(S WN/NF)~~ South Africa's willingness to join UNITA in a major offensive operation also suggested that Pretoria had decided to redefine the nature of its support to the insurgents. The move also implied that Pretoria was now prepared to assume a new and more aggressive role in the Angolan war. From October 1987 to mid-1988, Pretoria's commitment of 3,000 to 4,000 SADF personnel to southeastern Angola was perhaps the largest, most protracted military operation South Africa had conducted inside Angola since the beginning of the Angolan civil war in 1975. Many journalistic accounts cited the high costs of this operation, but by the time it was over in August, the SADF had probably sustained no more than 60 to 70 casualties and had lost only 6 armored vehicles, including 1 captured tank.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNITA Recruits in Training


~~(S)~~ In the early months of 1988, UNITA had also made an unprecedented commitment of its conventional and semiconventional units. Since early January, the insurgents had besieged the garrison at Cuemba, tying down three FAPLA brigades. One UNITA spokesman claimed that the siege was the second largest campaign his group had mounted. The one at Cuito Cuanavale was clearly the largest offensive operation the insurgents had conducted, possibly involving 8,000 UNITA troops.

~~(S)~~ One of UNITA's largest offensives previously was the 1983 siege of Cangamba, when the guerrillas committed, according to varying accounts, 3,000 to 5,000 troops. Thus, the UNITA spokesman's comment about Cuemba suggests that the insurgents had deployed more than 5,000, which coincided with the last months of the siege of Cuito Cuanavale. This commitment forced Luanda to dedicate at least six brigades to the Cuemba area, and these units were augmented with Cuban units from nearby garrisons, as well as a South-West Africa People's Organization brigade based in the area.


~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403- (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)


(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)

(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i),1.4(c)



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




(U) UNITA urban commandos also struck key economic and military facilities in several provincial capitals and cut off electricity supplies to Luanda. The entire capital lost electrical power on 8 May because of a commando raid that destroyed eight high-tension pylons carrying power from the Cambambe Dam. The insurgents claimed to have destroyed two transformers in what was alleged to be a 3-hour attack against a Cuban defended facility. As of 12 May, Luanda was still without electricity and had apparently been forced to rely on gas turbines to restore partial power.

~~(S/WN/NF)~~ That same month, the insurgents attacked key facilities in or near several provincial capitals. Imagery substantiated a reported UNITA attack on the airfield at Menongue. The insurgents claimed to have destroyed two MiG-23/FLOGGERs, one Mi-8/HIP, and a fuel depot in the attack. They reportedly also destroyed a hydroelectric facility serving Uige, as well as fuel tanks in Malanje and Mbanza Congo.


~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403



(U) On the 30th an explosive device detonated in Malanje caused minor damage to several government buildings. That same day, a bomb exploded outside the offices of the Angolan National Airline in Luanda, reportedly injuring at least 10 people and damaging the facade of the building. The government attributed these two incidents to UNITA as well. On 1 July UNITA claimed to have bombarded the air base at Menongue with an unidentified number and type of artillery rounds.

~~(S)~~ Throughout June, guerrilla forces overran numerous small government outposts in central and northwestern Angola. In late June they inflicted minor damage on an oil facility near Soyo. The insurgents also made a concerted effort to damage critical parts of the western end of the Benguela rail line and reportedly conducted at least two attacks against the Namibe-Menongue rail line west of Lubango. UNITA's military operations throughout May and June probably constituted the longest and most intense dry-season offensive the insurgents have conducted in the war.







(U) On 27 July UNITA commandos reportedly attacked the airport at Menongue, destroying several facilities and an Angolan National Airlines Boeing 707. The government denied losing a Boeing aircraft. On 3 August the insurgents claimed to have shot down a Soviet Il-76/CANDID as it approached Menongue. Neither this claim nor two previous UNITA claims of an Il-76 shootdown during the past 18 months have been substantiated.

(U) The insurgents also overran garrisons at several villages and small towns, including Chipeta, Chicala, and Bailundo, in late July. In the 25 July assault on Bailundo, three government territorial battalions were reportedly routed after a 6-hour battle.

~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403 (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)








~~(S/WN/NF)~~ FAPLA was not able to wrest the tactical initiative even briefly from UNITA until mid-September. On 17 September FAPLA units reoccupied the central Angolan town of Munhango, successfully capping a 6 week drive to oust guerrilla elements that had held it since December 1987. Imagery of 17 September showed that elements of a FAPLA brigade had entered Munhango, probably one of three that were moving east from Cuemba in previous weeks. Press briefings by government and UNITA officials claimed that large numbers of casualties had been inflicted in the fighting around Munhango. The insurgents also asserted that heavy fighting was continuing in the Munhango area.

~~(S/WN/NF)~~ Munhango has changed hands several times in the past 3 years, and UNITA was evidently determined to complicate FAPLA efforts to consolidate the recent gain. In previous campaigns, the insurgents had cut off logistic lines to Munhango before assaulting the weakened garrison during the rainy season. Without a buildup of government forces in the Cuito Cuanavale area, Luanda's area of interest became increasingly apparent. For the near term, Luanda would continue to focus most of its attention on consolidating its success in central Angola rather than on conducting still another large-scale campaign in the southeast.


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


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


(b)(3):50 USC 403

(b)(3):50 USC 403



~~(S)~~ In late November the intensity of hostilities in Angola diminished considerably, possibly because of several factors, including the diplomatic initiatives that were under way and the weather conditions. However, the guerrillas continued to operate throughout large areas of the countryside. They were particularly active against FAPLA outposts and lines of communication between Kuito and Munhango, Luena and Luau,and Malanje and Saurimo. In addition, they staged numerous attacks against government forces in western Cuanza Sul Province and in an area straddling southern Benguela and northwestern Huila Provinces.



Provinces on a heightened state of alert for several weeks in anticipation of a UNITA general offensive. No progress toward a negotiated settlement of the 13-year war had been made at that time, and Luanda believed that the insurgents would probably escalate hostilities in order to exploit the withdrawal of Cuban expeditionary forces from southern Angola that was to begin in 1989.

Outlook

~~(S)~~ Angola seems increasingly unable to cope with the guerrillas and their campaign of attrition. Nonetheless, the government is unlikely to consider serious negotiations with UNITA unless either Luanda or the insurgents achieve a major military breakthrough. Such a development seems unlikely until a sizable portion of Havana's 50,000-man expeditionary force has withdrawn.

~~(S)~~ Logistics and morale will become increasingly critical for both sides in the coming year. South Africa's mid-December announcement that it would cut off aid to UNITA probably did not significantly affect the 65,000-man insurgent force. The guerrillas are still capturing a large percentage of the weapons they require and other longstanding sources of outside aid may partly make up for the aid previously received from Pretoria. However, UNITA acknowledges that petroleum supplies could be a problem by year's end, and Savimbi is worried that possible food shortages and a reversion to guerrilla-type warfare could damage morale.

~~(S)~~ Luanda will probably have much more difficulty compensating for the departure of 25,000 Cuban personnel by the end of 1989. Such manpower problems could be compounded if reports that Moscow plans to reduce its support are carried out in the coming months. Moreover, the loss of Cuban support and Luanda's consequent need to use coercive recruitment practices will lower FAPLA morale.

~~(S)~~ Luanda will probably try to strike a major military blow against the insurgents before the departure of Cuban forces or any reduction in Soviet aid impair FAPLA's military capability. At the same time, UNITA, encouraged by the momentum of the past 12 months, will urge its guerrilla forces to continue pressing their military advantage. (DECL: OADR)

Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

DIA [redacted] (b)(3):10 USC 424
23 May 1989
RM-30-89

Research Memorandum

Directorate for Research

[redacted]

Angolan Ground Forces Personnel Strength (U)

~~(S)~~ *DIA has recently reassessed the Angolan Army's strength. This analysis suggests that Angolan ground force strength ranges between 50,000-55,000, as opposed to the previously accepted strength of 70,000. This total pertains only to the regular army and does not include other ground elements of the security forces such as the militia 35,000-40,000 personnel) or the border guards (6,000 personnel). Future publications will provide assessments of personnel strengths of these organizations.*

(S) Several factors have interacted during the past few years to significantly reduce the army's personnel strength. Luanda's forces suffered significant losses (as much as 15 percent of total manpower), during the failed 1987 offensive against the Union For the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. Since the offensive, combat losses and desertions have continued at a high rate. Angola's relatively small and sparsely distributed population (of 8 million), as well as the significant portion of the population that supports UNITA, hampers recruitment efforts. The Government's difficulty in recruiting has limited its ability to replace combat losses and desertions. The increasing demand for replacements consequently outstrips the available supply of potential recruits, and the army's size has slowly decreased.

Methodology

~~(S)~~ Because of the nature of the reporting, assessing combat strength in Angola poses unique challenges. Nevertheless, by evaluating available information the tactical situation it is possible to construct a viable methodology for estimating personnel strength. The basic maneuver unit of the Angolan Army is the light infantry brigade. There are some 70 brigades in the Angolan inventory (see Appendix A). Reporting indicates that a typical FAPLA brigade is authorized

~~Classified by Multiple Sources~~
~~Declassified on OADR~~

8 KDL

approximately 1,200 personnel. The brigade contains 3 infantry battalions comprising 350 personnel each and a headquarters element consisting of approximately 150 personnel. The headquarters element includes a small brigade staff and armor, artillery, or combat engineer assets attached to the brigade from higher echelons. The exact composition of these forces varies depending on the brigade. Combat support and combat service support personnel are assigned to battalion level.

~~(C)~~ For purposes of accountability, all Angolan Army maneuver, fire support, and combat support assets organic to echelons above brigade (i.e., military region, Ministry of Defense) are here assumed to be attached to the maneuver brigades. This accounts for the uncharacteristically large brigade "headquarters company." It also is likely that this procedure somewhat overcounts the totals of personnel in echelons above brigade.

~~(S)~~ As an analytic device, DIA has defined three types of FAPLA maneuver brigades. (The "average strength" used in calculating personnel totals represents a margin of error of plus or minus 5 percent.)

Type Brigade	Capability	Average Strength
A	Combat-ready	1,045-1,155
B	Marginally combat-ready	665-735
C	Non-combat-ready	285-315

~~(S)~~ TYPE A UNITS - These units generally operate against UNITA-held territory in southeastern Angola, although three brigades in Military Region 5 (in southwestern Angola) and the Presidential Brigade in Luanda are also in this category. These are first-line units that FAPLA maintains at close to full strength, normally at 90 percent fill, or approximately 1,100 personnel. They can conduct large-scale conventional offensive operations, more limited counterinsurgency operations, or can effectively defend fortified areas. This category includes nine brigades.

~~(S)~~ TYPE B UNITS - These units are marginally combat-ready and are generally deployed along the Benguela Railroad in central Angola. They have limited effective offensive capability against small insurgent forces. They seem to have more difficulty than type A units in coordinating multi-battalion actions or participating in larger operations with other brigades. DIA assesses that fill rates for these units average 60 percent, or approximately 700 personnel. Forty-five FAPLA brigades are in this category.

~~(S)~~ TYPE C UNITS - These are generally non-combat-ready units with

monitor UNITA activity and, in conjunction with other state security forces, restrict UNITA's freedom of movement. They are, however, generally unable to conduct successful offensive or defensive operations against even small UNITA elements. These units are deployed throughout the country but are located primarily in the northwest. DIA assesses fill rates for such units at approximately 25 percent, or 300 personnel. These units are often augmented with territorial forces and other security forces and may on occasion appear to be larger. Sixteen FAPLA brigades are in this category.

Type Brigade	Primary Location	Total Number of Brigades	Total Strengths[1]
A	MRs 5, 6, and 8	9	9,400-10,400
B	MRs 3, 4 and 7	45	29,900-33,100
C	MR 1	16	4,600-5,000
	Totals	70	43,900-48,500

[1]Totals are rounded to the nearest hundred.

Force Structure

~~(S)~~ DIA applied the methodology described above to the 70 FAPLA maneuver brigades on case-by-case basis. The result was a total ground combat force of 43,900-48,500 personnel. Since this accounts only for personnel assigned or attached to combat maneuver units, an extension of this methodology was required to consider combat service support personnel other than those assigned or attached to maneuver units.

~~(S)~~ Although little information exists on the composition of combat service support for the Angolan Army, some form of higher echelon logistics/maintenance organization apparently exists in each Military Region. Moreover, Cuban forces and Soviet and Cuban advisers provide a significant amount of logistics and maintenance support to the Angolan Army. Consequently, the army's support structure is smaller than might be expected. At least 11 permanent logistics sites have been identified. Although the logistics and maintenance functions may be performed by various distinct organizations at all echelons, in the absence of specific information and for purposes of analysis they have been categorized here under a single organization for each permanent logistics site. Maintenance units at MR level are little more than cannibalization centers that also process new equipment. DIA estimates these units to be battalion-size with an authorized personnel strength

these units to be battalion-size with an authorized personnel strength of up to 300 personnel. However, following the methodology described above, fill rates will vary. The best-manned (type A) units would contain 255 to 285 personnel. Type B units would have fill rates of 170 to 190 personnel, and type C units 70 to 80 personnel. This results in the following breakdown of logistics/ maintenance units: type A units exist in MRs 5, 6 and 8; type B units exist in MRs 2, 3, 4 (two sites), 7, 9, and 10; one type C unit exists in MR 1. Total strength of these units is about 2,100-2,300 personnel.

Unit Type	Location	Number of Logistics Maintenance Units	Total Strengths[1]
A	MRs 5, 6, 8	3	800-900
B	MR's 2, 3, 4 two sites, 7, 9, 10	7	1,200-1,300
C	MR 1	1	100
	Totals	11	2,100-2,300

[1]Totals are rounded to the nearest hundred.

~~(S)~~ Each MR apparently trains local recruits. Except for Luanda and Huambo, where advanced officer and specialty schools operate, regional training centers are probably small facilities based loosely on the Soviet model. Probably no more than company-size units of permanent cadre conduct training in most of these regional centers. However, because of the more substantial training conducted in Luanda and Huambo, larger training units of up to battalion-size could be stationed there. Again, the strength of these units corresponds to the category of the average combat maneuver unit in the region for which these units are responsible. This results in the following breakdown of training units: type A company size training units exist in MRs 4, 5, and 6, and battalion size training units exist in MRs 4 and 8; type B company-size units exist in MRs 2, 3, 7, 9, and 10; one type C company-size unit exists in MR 1. Total strength of these units is approximately 1,100 personnel. Soldiers actually in training in these facilities are not included in this figure. Since recruitment is probably unable to do more than maintain force strength, accessions into the army are considered to be balanced by desertions and combat losses.

Unit Type	Location	Training Units	Total Strengths
A (companies)	MR's 4, 5, 6	3	200-300
(battalions)	MR's 4 and 8	2	500-600
B (companies)	MRs 2, 3, 7, 9, 10	5	250-350
C (company)	MR 1	1	20-30
	Totals	11	970-1,280

~~(S)~~ Due to significant Soviet and Cuban assistance, planning staffs and combat service support units probably do not comprise a significant part of the army. These assets could be included in headquarters companies of 200 personnel for each MR, 100 personnel for each front, and a headquarters battalion of up to 800 personnel for the national headquarters. Total strength of these units is approximately 3,000-3,400 personnel.

~~(S)~~ The foregoing analysis results in a ground force of approximately 50,000-55,000. Desertions, combat losses, and FAPLA's irregular and ad hoc recruitment methods would make it difficult to maintain a constant strength.

Unit Type	Strength
Maneuver Brigades (with attachments)	43,900-48,500
Maintenance/Logistics	2,100-2,300
Training	970-1,280
Headquarters	3,000-3,400
Total	49,970-55,480

PROSPECTS

~~(S)~~ The assessed Army troop strength has serious implications for the Angolan Army"s ability to conduct effective operations against UNITA. At a strength of 70,000, this capability was questionable. With a maximum regular army strength of 55,000, Luanda's options are more limited. Even by adding the approximately 35,000-40,000 personnel from the militia ground force elements and various other state security forces, Luanda can achieve only a 1.5 to 1 ground force personnel ratio against the 65,000 UNITA insurgents operating in Angola.

~~(S)~~ An extensive inventory of Soviet-supplied material, large numbers of Cuban combat troops, and foreign military advisers continue to provide Luanda with an ability to apply superior combat power at critical points throughout much of Angola. However, a regular army

DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424
23 May 1989
RM-30-89

government's ability to focus on more than one or two major operations simultaneously. The Angolans lack the assets to defend effectively against countrywide UNITA operations and lack the combat power advantage to carry the ground war deep into the UNITA heartland.

Defense Intelligence Agency
(b)(3):10 USC 424

Questions and comments on this memorandum may be addressed to
(b)(3):10 USC 424

Appendix A. Angolan Maneuver Brigades by Category

Category	Unit	Military Region
A	19th Inf Bde	5
A	35th Inf Bde	5
A	2nd Inf Bde (Mech)	5
A	61st Inf Bde	5
A	13th Inf Bde	6
A	25th Inf Bde	6
A	36th Inf Bde	6
A	59th Inf Bde	6
A	Presidential Guard	8
B	31st Inf Bde	1
B	51st Inf Bde	1
B	43rd Inf Bde	2
B	34th Inf Bde	2
B	3rd Inf Bde	3
B	32nd Inf Bde	3
B	39th Inf Bde	3
B	63rd Inf Bde	3
B	67th Inf Bde	3
B	85th Inf Bde	3
B	18th Inf Bde (Air Assault)	4
B	21st Inf Bde	4
B	37th Inf Bde	4
B	48th Inf Bde	4
B	50th Inf Bde	4
B	55th Inf Bde	4
B	58th Inf Bde	4
B	150th Inf Bde	4
B	178th Inf Bde	4
B	66th Inf Bde	4
B	6th Inf Bde	6
B	8th Inf Bde	6
B	10th Inf Bde	6
B	53rd Inf Bde	6
B	167th Inf Bde	6
B	41st Inf Bde	7
B	49th Inf Bde	7
B	65th Inf Bde	7
B	98th Inf Bde	7
B	166th Inf Bde	7
B	U/I Inf Bde	7
B	U/I Inf Bde	7
B	60th Inf Bde	8
B	83rd Inf Bde	8
B	82nd Inf Bde	8
B	84th Inf Bde	8
B	33rd Inf Bde	9
B	74th Inf Bde	9
B	81st Inf Bde	9

B	179th Inf Bde	9
B	42nd Inf Bde	10
B	52nd Inf Bde	10
B	64th Inf Bde	10
B	75th Inf Bde	10
C	29th Inf Bde	1
C	44th Inf Bde	1
C	56th Inf Bde	1
C	70th Inf Bde	1
C	73rd Inf Bde	1
C	74th Inf Bde	1
C	82nd Inf Bde	1
C	97th Inf Bde	1
C	99th Inf Bde	1
C	45th Inf Bde	3
C	54th Inf Bde	3
C	57th Inf Bde	3
C	16th Inf Bde	4
C	100th Inf Bde	5
C	U/I Inf Bde	5
C	95th Inf Bde	10

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ANGOLA: ONE YEAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE (U)

24 NOVEMBER 1976

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
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ANGOLA: ONE YEAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE (U)



ANGOLA

DIAIAPPR 333-76
24 NOVEMBER 1976

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FIRST INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY FINDS NETO IN FIRMER CONTROL



AGOSTINHO NETO
PRESIDENT
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIGURE 1

ANGOLA: ONE YEAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE (U)

Summary

~~(C)~~ *On 11 November, the People's Republic of Angola celebrated its first anniversary of independence. The state was proclaimed last year in the midst of Angola's civil war. Portugal thereby adhered to the independence date it had established in early 1975. Despite the official end of the civil war, Angola is still beset by widespread insurgency. Luanda has undertaken an ambitious program of expanding and improving its armed forces to help counter this threat. Concomitantly, the prospects for the internal stability of the regime have been enhanced. All of this, however, has been at the expense of greater dependence on the USSR and Cuba.*

Discussion

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The internal policical situation in Angola has improved, and President Neto appears to have solidified his control in Luanda (figure 1). The threat posed by militant Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party faction leader, Nito Alves has diminished. At a plenary session held shortly before the independence day festivities, Neto was reconfirmed as head of the MPLA, and head of state. At this session there was also a movement to have Neto assume the position of Prime Minister.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In foreign affairs, Neto has followed the course of least resistance and moved closer to Moscow. Perhaps frustrated by his attempts to expand ties to the West and because of the need for continued political, economic, and military support, Neto last month signed a 20-year friendship treaty with the USSR. A cooperation agreement was also signed between the MPLA

ANGOLAN MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

FAPLA	Strength	Units/Equipment
Army	30,000	55 Battalions
Navy	1,000*	4 Patrol Boats and Several Small Craft
Air Force	1,000*	More Than 100 Aircraft
Militia	20,000	Companies and Battalions Throughout Country
Police Force	8,000	
Ex-Katangan Gendarmes	4,000	
Cuban Forces	10-12,000	24 Battalions

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* Conservative estimates. Marine and paratroop units may be under these separate services.

FIGURE 2

and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Angola is the fifth nonaligned country and the second African country to sign such a treaty. The agreement is similar to the one Moscow signed with Somalia in 1974, but some of the language makes it seem even more binding than the Somali treaty. For example, it rejects African socialism in favor of the "scientific socialism" of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Neto may have sought the treaty to insure the future stability of the Luanda regime, namely his continuance in power. A strong Soviet and Cuban presence in Luanda, committed to the present regime, would make his ouster by party rivals extremely difficult.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ A powerful Cuban force remains in the country and is not expected to diminish substantially (80%). Up to 14,500 Cuban personnel are believed to be in Angola; 10,000 to 12,000 of these are most likely military. The Cubans are the backbone of Angola's armed forces, known as the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), and are actively involved in counterinsurgency operations in various parts of the country (figure 2). They also provide security at key government installations, carry out technical and logistic support functions, and conduct large-scale military training programs for the FAPLA.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Angola is expanding its armed forces in order to combat the insurgency and to defend its borders. In fact, a five-year plan to improve the FAPLA was recently announced. The 30,000-man army, although poorly trained, is the most important branch of the armed forces. It has an estimated 55 lightly manned battalions and is dispersed throughout the vast reaches of Angola. Although the navy is a small force with a few patrol boats, the air force has over 100 aircraft including MIGs, light transports, and medium transport helicopters provided by the USSR. A militia with more than 20,000 members, an 8,000-man police force, and 4,000 former Katangan Gendarmes under FAPLA control are utilized for internal security.

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INSURGENCY STILL PLAGUES ANGOLA




FIGURE 3

CI-AO-1 9/76

Benguela Railroad

FLEC — General area of operations

FNLA — General area of operations

UNITA — General area of operations

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~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Three rival political movements are conducting guerrilla warfare against the Luanda government in three separate areas of Angola (figure 3). Most of the counterinsurgency effort has been in the south against the National Union for the Total Independenc of Angola (UNITA), which has the greatest strength (figure 4). UNITA operates over wide areas of central and southern Angola but controls only isolated pockets. It has however, prevented the government from reopening the important Benguela Railroad to international traffic. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) is based in Zaire and operates in northwestern Angola where it has traditional tribal support. The FNLA, with between 3,000 and 5,000 armed guerrillas, has been increasingly active since mid-year and has recently been attracting more government attention. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) -- the Cabindan separatist movement -- has 1,000 to 2,000 guerrillas and conducts sporadic operations in the enclave.

~~(C)~~ In southern African affairs, Angola has acquired status by becoming the fifth of the "front line states" -- the black governments most involved in the continuimg struggle for black majority rule (figure 5). This has helped to tip the balance in favor of the left-leaning regimes of Mozambique and Tanzania, as opposed to the more moderate governments of Zambia and Botswana.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Angola, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, is now moving to provide greater support to the South-West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO is building its base of operations in southern Angola to infiltrate Namibia (South-West Africa). It is believed to have 1,000 to 1,500 armed guerrillas, and an accelerated recruitment drive is under way. Once the Rhodesian problem is resolved, the liberation force will undoubtedly shift to Namibia and become a major contributing factor there.

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ANGOLAN INSURGENT GROUPS

Group	Strength	Leader	Foreign Support
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)	6,000 to 7,000	Jones Savimbi	South Africa, Zambia
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)	3,000 to 5,000	Holden Roberto	Zaire, France
FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)	1,000 to 2,000	Nzita Henriques Tiago	Zaire, France

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FIGURE 4

Outlook

~~(C)~~ Angola is probably looking forward (75%) to a gradually improving military/political situation despite the persistence of guerrilla activity. The Neto regime will enjoy greater stability but at the price of entrenching Soviet influence. Cuba will quite likely continue (80%) in its present role. Efforts to build a large, modern Angolan armed force will be pursued with heavy emphasis on training and the acquisition of additional Soviet weaponry. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

NETO BECOMES NEWEST "FRONTLINE" PRESIDENT



Kenneth Kaunda	Agostinho Neto	Julius Nyerere	Sir Seretse Khama	Samora Machel
Zambia	Angola	Tanzania	Botswana	Mozambique

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FIGURE 5

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MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AND THREAT ANALYSIS (U)

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MAY 1980

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PREFACE

1. PURPOSE. The IPAC MISTA summarizes highlights, key events or items of interest of the past month. It is designed to provide operating forces with an overview of significant events and to identify for them any trends that might have an impact on future activities and operations. Its contents are derived from IPAC analytical effort, using available sources of information.

2. DOCUMENT CURRENCY. Information is current as of April 1980. Cutoff dates for recurring items is the 15th of each month. Cutoff dates for non-recurring items is the 25th of each month.

3. PUBLICATION AUTHORITY. This product is recurring finished intelligence validated and registered for production in the Defense Intelligence Production Schedule (DIPS) in accordance with DIAM 57-1.

4. AUTHORS. IPAC analysts participating in the writing and editing of this product are identified in each section. Overall compilation and editing was done by CPT Francis M. Marshall, USA.

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BY E.C. LITTLEFIELD
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AFRICA

THE SOVIET PRESENCE (U)

Soviets score advances in sub-Saharan Africa

(S) The USSR has been working to increase its influence and presence in sub-Sahara Africa for a quarter century. Soviet efforts have been particularly concerted since 1975, and have been complemented by a spectacular increase in Cuban activities and a low-key but significant East European effort that are clearly more than coincidental. The USSR has suffered occasional setbacks in its sub-Saharan campaign, but its successes have outweighed its failures. There is no reason to expect Soviet activities in Africa to subside during the foreseeable future.

Influence largely gained through military assistance

(C) Claiming to be the "natural ally" of Black Africa, the Soviets have gained entry into the continent through the use of two related strategems: the initiation of military assistance relationships with established governments, and the support of African liberation movements. Moscow has largely neglected one lever for gaining influence in Africa that has been used effectively by France and China: economic assistance.

ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA, 1954-77


United States	$8.78 Billion
China	2.60 Billion
USSR	1.96 Billion

CIA Figure 10 UNCLASSIFIED

Military assistance mass

(B)(1) Classified IAW E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b), (6)

(b)(1),1.4 (e)



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Advisory and technical personnel grow yearly

(C) During the 1970's, the steady year-by-year increase in the presence of Soviet military advisors and technicians has been one of the more obvious reflections of Moscow's growing interest in Africa.

SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN AFRICA

YEAR	ADVISORS	COUNTRIES
1972	733	8
1974	1,345	8
1976	2,290	15
1978	2,992	16
1 Jan 80	3,110	16

CIA & DIA Figure 13

AFRICA: CURRENT ESTIMATED SOVIET ADVISORY STRENGTH

EAST AFRICA	1,410 (1,200 in Ethiopia)
SOUTHERN AFRICA	1,170 (600 in Angola)
CENTRAL AFRICA	150
WEST AFRICA	360
SUB-SAHARA AFRICA TOTAL	3,110

CIA/DIA Figure 14

Cubans and Eastern Europeans augment Soviet efforts

(B)(1) Classified IAW E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b), (6)

(b)(1),1.4 (e)

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AFRICA: THE SOVIET & CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE

1974	3,545
1975	11,775
1976	17,875
1977	20,535
1978	36,340
JAN 80	36,790

CIA/OIA

Figure 17 SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACTOR

Soviet objectives in Africa (S) We believe these to be the primary reasons for Soviet activities in Africa:

- *To increase Soviet influence in the Third World.
- *To challenge Western political and economic positions in Africa.
- *Long-term goal: to deny Western access to Africa's natural resources.
- *To eclipse Beijing's political and ideological position in Africa.
- *To establish military bases for strategic advantage over the West.

Soviet progress limited (S/NOFORN) The Soviets are making limited progress toward meeting their African goals. They have established genuinely close and comprehensive ties with a few states, but many nations on the continent are interested only in what Moscow can offer in the way of military aid. Most countries are basically distrustful of Soviet motives. Moscow is years away from threatening Western access to Africa's vital resources, and will find success difficult to achieve in this regard. Even Marxist Angola and Ethiopia recognize the need to develop and retain economic and trade links with the West in spite of their close Soviet ties.

Soviet eclipse the Chinese (S) On the surface, Moscow's greatest success in Africa has been its eclipsing of China as the most influential communist nation on the continent. However, Soviet predominance is based primarily on the capability to far outdo Beijing in providing military aid. Many of Africa's leftist-oriented nations feel a stronger political and ideological affinity for China than for the USSR, and Beijing's very effective economic assistance program may one day win over more friends than does Soviet military aid.

Soviet base rights record inconsistent

(B)(1) Classified IAW E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b), (6)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

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Mozambique, Madagascar and the Seychelles targeted for bases

(B)(1) Classified IAW E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b), (6)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Moscow could play the economic-aid card next

(S/NOFORN) With Moscow's current military assistance strategy making only limited gains, the possibility exists that the USSR might at some point decide to employ other weapons in its campaign for African predominance. Two weapons that come immediately to mind are economic assistance and campaigns of subversion in selected areas. If Moscow is able to financially afford a major increase in economic aid, likely targets of such assistance are the Black-ruled nations of Southern Africa, Uganda and Tanzania in East Africa, and Madagascar and the Seychelles in the Western Indian Ocean. Any near-term Soviet efforts to subvert nations of Western orientation would probably be on the Horn of Africa — targeted against Djibouti, Somalia, and possibly Sudan. All three nations — particularly Djibouti — are ripe for exploitation in the form of terrorist or guerrilla campaigns launched from neighboring Soviet client state Ethiopia. Should the current government in Djibouti, Mogadiscio, or Khartoum fall, several thousand Cuban combat troops are available in Ethiopia to provide assistance to a newly-established, "Progressive" regime ready to throw in its lot with Moscow.

The Soviets are filling a vacuum in Africa

(S/NOFORN) What the Soviets try or don't try, and the ratio of their successes to failures in Africa, depends a great deal on events outside the continent. A lack of Western resolve or projected capability not only encourages Soviet ventures, but decreases the resolve of Third World target countries to resist overtures and power plays from Moscow. In this regard, a lesson from Paris is perhaps apropos. Soviet influence is far less pervasive in Central and Western Africa — both areas where France practices activist political, economic, and military assistance policies.

Various/MSG Tom Dodson, USA

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African Security Review (U)

Number 1

Defense Intelligence Review Series

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Prepared by the Middle East/Africa Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency

Project Manager: (b)(3):10 USC 424
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
FOREWORD

(U) This is the first issue of a periodical designed to disseminate high-quality basic intelligence on African military topics to a wide variety of mid- and working-level consumers. *African Security Review* will appear twice a year and will solicit articles from analysts within and outside DIA. Topics crossing regional or functional boundaries are especially welcome. The articles, while brief, are designed to cover their topics in a comprehensive and authoritative manner, and the selection of topics reflects a high degree of analyst initiative. It is also intended that *African Security Review* be an ideal medium for the contributions of new or junior analysts or in which portions of larger works in progress may be published.


(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

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Djibouti
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
SOMALIA
Mogadishu

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Angola/Cuba – Cuban Fighter Pilots Apply Their Training to Angolan Conflict (U) 1

~~(SINF)~~ Cuban fighter tactics in Angola are similar to those noted in Cuba, but the Angolan environment has provided valuable opportunities not available in Cuba for pilots to gain exposure to combat situations.

South Africa/Indian Ocean – South Africa Pursues Interests in the Indian Ocean (U) 3

~~(C)~~ Itself an Indian Ocean littoral state, South Africa is interested in events in the island nations of the southwest Indian Ocean. The vulnerable states of the Comoros, Mauritius, and the Seychelles have been particularly wooed by Pretoria as a means of escape from the isolation imposed on it elsewhere.

Africa/Soviet Union – Kremlin Reconfiguration Touches African Policymakers (U) 5

~~(C)~~ In the aftermath of the 30 September 1988 Kremlin leadership reshuffle there have been some changes in the Soviets' policy-making apparatus for Africa. The most noteworthy change has occurred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Angola/Bolivia – Angola Looks Afar for Badly Needed Transport (U) 7

~~(SINF)~~ Angola has been leasing medium transport aircraft from the Bolivian Air Force to augment its own disrupted transport capabilities.

Sudan – Old Tactics Found Usable in African Insurgency (U) 9

~~(S)~~ Sudanese People's Liberation Army insurgents have been successfully using trench warfare in their offensive against government troops. The offensive use of this World War I tactic is an innovation not previously noted among African insurgents.

Mauritania – Navy A Success in Fisheries Protection Role (U) 11

~~(C)~~ Nouakchott has made dramatic improvements in its capability to protect its fisheries resources, one of the few West African countries to do so. African Coastal Security (ACS) funding from the United States has played a major role in this accomplishment.

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~~(S)~~ Intertribal rivalries that had been muted in the early years of independence have become more salient in recent years, hampering the professionalism and capabilities of the Defense Force.	
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~~(S)~~ One of the few bright spots in Mogadishu's counterinsurgent operations against the Somali National Movement has been its mobilization of Somali Airlines transports for military supply activities. However, should an aircraft be lost, Somalia would quickly seek foreign aid for replacement aircraft and direct air transport.	
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~~(C)~~ Tanzania has long provided assistance to the African National Congress operating against Pretoria. This assistance is likely to increase to compensate for the withdrawal of Angolan military aid to the ANC. South Africa has the capability to strike ANC targets in Tanzania if it feels threatened.	
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
CUBAN FIGHTER PILOTS APPLY THEIR TRAINING TO ANGOLAN CONFLICT (U)

~~(S/NF)~~ **Cuban fighter tactics in Angola are similar to those noted in Cuba, but the Angolan environment has provided valuable opportunities not available in Cuba for pilots to gain exposure to combat situations. Eventually, the Cubans may modify the training tactics they use in Cuba based on their Angolan experience.**


~~(S/NF)~~ The Cuban Air Force (FAR) contingent in Angola is believed to include about 70 MiG fighter pilots. While most MiGs flown in Cuba are MiG-21/FISHBEDs, most of the MiGs flown by the Cubans in Angola are MiG-23/FLOGGERs. Nevertheless, their tactics in Angola are generally the same as those seen in training contexts in Cuba. Flying in Angola is different, however, in that it offers the Cubans a chance to test their tactics in potentially hostile situations.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ The MiG-23s flown in Cuba are primarily air-to-air variant FLOGGER Bs and Gs as well as a lesser number of ground variants – probably Hs. In Angola, the Cubans fly mostly FLOGGER Gs, but also a few FLOGGER ground variants – probably Fs – recently delivered from Cuba. The Cubans also fly some FISHBEDs in Angola.

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


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~~(S/NF)~~ Flying tactics learned in Cuba have provided a base of knowledge for pilots sent to Angola. However, the unique characteristics of the Angolan environment may be teaching the Cubans new lessons that are modifying their flying tactics in Angola, although no radical innovations have been noted so far. Information on changes in tactics may yet become available, since the FAR will probably continue to play an important role in Angola until the scheduled withdrawal of Havana's Expeditionary Force in July 1991.

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SOUTH AFRICA PURSUES INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (U)

(S) South Africa is interested in events in the southwest Indian Ocean, but the vulnerable states of the Comoros, the Seychelles and Mauritius, have been particularly wooed by Pretoria as a means of escape from the isolation imposed on it elsewhere. Madagascar remains aloof from South Africa. South Africa faces modest competition for influence in the Southwest Indian Ocean from France and India.

(~~SNF~~) Itself an Indian Ocean littoral state, South Africa is interested in events in the island nations of the southwest Indian Ocean. Pretoria's interest is sharpened by its need to find markets for exports hurt by trade sanctions, investment opportunities, and a means for evading sanctions and embargoes, as well as by its perceived need to counter Soviet advances in the area. The small, isolated, and economically vulnerable islands of the Comoros, the Seychelles and Mauritius, have all been wooed by Pretoria, and have arrived at mutually beneficial arrangements with South Africa. Only much larger and more ideologically militant Madagascar remains aloof from the trend toward improved ties with Pretoria.

(~~SNF~~) South Africa's Navy retains only a limited capability to project power in the vicinity of these islands because it has reoriented almost exclusively toward coastal patrol and harbor defense missions. There is modest competition among South Africa, France, and India for political and economic influence in the Southwest Indian Ocean, particularly in the Comoros and Mauritius.

(~~SNF~~) **Comoros.** Although President Abdallah denies that diplomatic accords exist with Pretoria, privately he has admitted to an excellent working relationship. Ties between the two countries increased in 1987 and 1988. The relationship includes financial and arms assistance for Abdallah's Presidential Guard, as well as landing rights at Moroni for South African Airways. There have also been unsubstantiated reports that South Africa has used the Comoros as a transshipment point for arms to Iran and to Mozambican insurgents. South Africa and the Comoros have exchanged "trade representatives," and Pretoria has invested heavily in the Comoros in recent years. South Africa investments include hotels, roads, and a research farm north of Moroni. In addition, a South African electronics facility, believed to be a signals intelligence site, is located near Itsandra, north of the capital. Economic aid is channeled largely through the Presidential Guard to reduce international attention and conceal the extent of South African influence. Moroni has received OAU criticism for its ties to Pretoria.

(~~SNF~~) **Mauritius.** There are no confirmed security ties between Port Louis and Pretoria, but in 1987 a source of unknown reliability reported both ham-handed South African Defense Force attempts to interest the Mauritian police in communications gear (rejected by the Mauritians) and small sales by South African arms dealers. Economic ties between the two states have a long history and are still strong. Large-scale sugar cultivation was introduced in Natal by Franco-Mauritians, and many Mauritians emigrated there. (There are reportedly 30,000 in South Africa now.) Moreover, a large number of Franco-Mauritians received their university education in South Africa. No diplomatic relations are maintained, but Port Louis has a trade representative in Johannesburg. While Mauritius exports almost nothing to South Africa, Pretoria accounts for 10 percent of Mauritius' imports, which could not be shifted to other sources without a considerable rise in consumer prices. Moreover, South Africa provides major tourist-related investment and 14 percent of Mauritius' tourists. (Tourism is Port Louis' third-ranking source of foreign exchange.) South African Airways also provides important links from Mauritius to Hong Kong and Taiwan. (Three percent of the Mauritian population is of Chinese descent.)

(~~SNF~~) The Mauritians say they are seeking to reduce trade dependency on South Africa and deny that Mauritius is preparing to assist Pretoria's efforts to combat sanctions. On the other hand, Prime Minister Jugnauth has said, echoing several of Pretoria's other neighbors, that

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Foreign Military Activity in Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

Part II — Cuban Activity and the African Response

APRIL 1982

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FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)

Part II - Cuban Activity and the African Response

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PREFACE

~~(S)~~ This Defense Intelligence Report focuses on foreign military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Because the scope of this important subject is so broad, it had been planned to divide it into four parts, but subsequent assessment of the data has dictated expansion to five parts. Part I, published in June 1981, concentrated on Soviet military activities. Part II, presented here, addresses primarily Cuban military activities. Part III will address East European military activities; parts IV and V will deal with French and Asian (PRC, & North Korean) military activities, respectively. While the focus is on military activity, political and economic factors will be considered where appropriate.

(U) This study will discuss not only Cuban-Soviet relations, but also the independent motivations and benefits derived by Cuba from its actions. Moreover, it will consider the limitations on Cuban involvement and the responses made by African states to this activity.

(U) These five parts complement one another and provide the consumer with a reference aid and useful tool for understanding foreign military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa and how it affects the political-military dynamics of the region.

(U) Contributors to this study include (b)(3):10 USC 424

(U) For comparative purposes and for additional information, see Part I of this study, Soviet Activity and the African Response, DDB-2680-115-81, June 1981; Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet-Cuban Military Activities, DIAIAPPR 109-78, 2 May 1978; and Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet East European, and Cuban Military Activity, DIAIAPPR 40-80, 12 March 1980. See also Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, DDB-2300-5-81, September 1981; Military Strength Assessment: Sub-Saharan Africa, DDB-2600-1852D-81, December 1981, Military Intelligence Summary Vol IV, Sub-Saharan Africa, DDB-2680-104-81; June 1981; Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) Volume VI Africa South of the Sahara; DDB 1940-1A-81, October 1981; Military Intelligence Summary Vol VIII, Latin America, DDB-2680-108A-81, December 1981; Military Intelligence Summary Vol III, Middle East and North Africa, DDB-2680-103-81, March 1981.

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SUMMARY

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuba pursues a variety of goals and objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. It seeks to promote its position as a leading Third World state, to gain regional and international isolation of South Africa, and to consolidate pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet governments. Cuba seeks to accomplish these goals with military, political, and limited economic support to anti-Western or socialist-oriented states and groups.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Cuba's Africa policies are formulated by a few senior members of the revolutionary leadership headed by President Fidel Castro. This leadership also controls the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the organ for implementing foreign policy decisions. Moreover, these policies--support for the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), pursuit of international credibility, and the elimination of white minority governments--have blended with African aspirations.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The USSR and Cuba form an effective team. Castro is a revolutionary leader who suits the long-term goals of Moscow, that is, the destabilization of the West. Moscow is able to exert control over him because of the massive military and economic support it provides to Havana. For his part, Castro--in his capacity as a confirmed revolutionary--believes in extending "internationalist support" to sympathetic governments and movements in their fight against what is termed "racist imperialism."

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuban military and security assistance, including as many as 41,000 personnel, is the largest and most influential component of Havana's foreign aid program to Africa. It consists of combat troops--the largest component--military and security advisers, and some materiel. Because Cuban forces often train the host country's security forces, they can exert significant influence over the host governments.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Yet Cuba faces serious obstacles in its dealings with Sub-Saharan African states. Cuba can provide only limited financial aid, and African leaders realize their long-term economic needs will not be solved by a Cuban military presence. Cuba's blatant attempts to gain political leverage in the NAM, its high visibility around the continent, and the fear by African leaders of becoming overdependent on the Cubans--and by extension on the Soviets--will limit Cuban influence in the region.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuba has developed close relationships with those countries which have undergone radical and sometimes violent revolutions, especially Angola and Ethiopia. One can expect Cuba to continue support for liberation movements seeking to overthrow the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. At the same time, in states with a generally pro-West orientation where the potential for serious political instability exists, closer association between dissident groups and the Cuban leadership is a viable scenario.




Figure 1. (U) Sub-Saharan Africa.

1. INTRODUCTION

(U) President Fidel Castro's African policies are a major component of his efforts to attain the dominant leadership position in the Third World. His policies are composed of several idealistic and realpolitik threads. Castro's activities in Africa began in the 1960s, when he established ties with the Angolan Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and in 1966 when he sent several hundred military personnel to fight along side of Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the Congo. Between 1967 and the early 1970s, Havana paid little attention to the subcontiment, focusing instead on its own internal economic and political difficulties.

(U) Beginning in the early 1970s, however, Castro initiated a major effort to expand Cuba's activities in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1). Prior to 1972, Havana had diplomatic ties with only five countries in the region (Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania). Between 1972 and 1976, it established relations with 25 others. It now has diplomatic ties with 36 Sub-Saharan nations (table 1). In addition, since mid-1975, the Cuban leadership focused on southern Africa because it believed that region was the weakest link in a so-called imperialist chain. With the introduction of combat troops into Angola in late 1975, Cuba became a major force in southern Africa. Since 1976, Havana has provided combat troops to Ethiopia, established diplomatic relations with six other states, and increased its economic ties with other African nations, especially Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

2. CUBAN GOALS AND PERCEPTION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(U) Cuba purports to have three principal objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa:

-- The promotion of its position as a leading Third World state.

-- The regional and international isolation of South Africa and the eventual elimination of the white minority government.

-- The consolidation of pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet governments.

(U) Cuba's African relations are more readily understood if one takes into consideration its perception of itself and its own concept of those relations, particularly concerning Castro's perception of revolution. While acknowledging Moscow's life-sustaining support, the Cubans are convinced that the Soviet Union cannot insure Havana's survival. Rather, the Cubans believe that the best way for them to protect their own revolution is for other Third World nations to follow a similar revolutionary path. Specifically, Havana believes that the more the United States is occupied by other revolutionary groups, the less attention the United States will pay to Cuba. In addition, Cuba uses its diplomatic ties with over 130 countries, liberation movements, and international organizations as forums for rallying international support against the United States on a wide variety of issues. Hence, Cuba's active role in foreign relations not only stems from Castro's revolutionary elan; it is above all a continued effort to protect the Cuban model for the future.

TABLE 1
CUBAN-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (U)

Country	Date Relations Were Established With Present Cuban Government	Diplomatic Status in Host Country
Angola	11 Nov 75	Embassy — Ambassador
Benin	11 Feb 74	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Nigeria
Botswana	9 Dec 77	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Zambia
Burundi	2 Feb 74	Embassy — Ambassador
Cameroon	11 Aug 74	Embassy — Status of Ambassador not known
Cape Verde	8 Sep 75	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Guinea-Bissau
Chad	19 Oct 76	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in The Congo
Comoros	23 Dec 76	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Madagascar
Congo	10 May 64	Embassy — Ambassador
Equatorial Guinea	27 Dec 72	Embassy — Ambassador
Ethiopia	18 Jul 75	Embassy — Ambassador
Gabon	1 Apr 74	Embassy closed 13 Aug 80
Gambia	19 May 79	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Guinea-Bissau
Ghana	1961 Broken 27 Sep 66 — Reestablished May 74	Embassy — Ambassador
Guinea-Bissau	1 Oct 73	Embassy — Ambassador
Lesotho	14 Jun 79	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Mozambique
Liberia	About 19 Apr 74	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Sierra Leone
Madagascar	11 Apr 74	Embassy — Ambassador
Mali	1962 Closed Jan 70 — Reopened 13 Nov 72	Embassy — Ambassador
Mauritania	About 15 Aug 72	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Morocco
Mauritius	15 Oct 76	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Madagascar
Mozambique	25 Jun 75	Embassy — Ambassador
Niger	26 Apr 76	Embassy — Ambassador
Nigeria	28 Jun 74	Embassy — Ambassador
Rwanda	6 Sep 79	Status unknown. No Ambassador ever sent.
Sao Tome and Principe	11 Apr 76	Embassy — Ambassador
Senegal	10 Aug 74	Embassy — No Ambassador ever sent.
Seychelles	Apr 78	Embassy — Ambassador
Sierra Leone	24 Apr 72	Embassy — Ambassador
Tanzania	Jun 64	Embassy — Ambassador
Togo	22 Jun 79	Embassy — Ambassador — Resident in Zaire
Uganda	10 May 74	Embassy — Change at present
Upper Volta	15 Dec 75	Embassy — No Ambassador ever sent.
Zaire	15 Apr 74 — Suspended Apr 77. Reestablished Aug 79	Embassy — Ambassador
Zambia	About 19 Jul 72	Embassy — Ambassador
Zimbabwe	19 Apr 80	Embassy — Ambassador

(U) Cuba's ties with Sub-Saharan Africa are reinforced by its strong Afro-Cuban tradition. Cuba's African heritage facilitates Havana's acceptance by African nations. The feeling of belonging with the "non-white have-nots" of the world, of having only gained "independence" from its previous "imperialist, colonialist power" within the last two decades after a painful struggle, has greatly contributed to the Cuban willingness to help other poor nations in their struggles to build and develop their infrastructure.

(U) Cuba strongly believes in "proletarian internationalism" by extending "internationalist support" to sympathetic governments and movements in their fights against "racist imperialism." Therefore, Cuba claims it provides assistance even when it says it has no economic benefits to gain from such support. Since Cuba cannot extend much material aid, its "proletarian internationalism" is expressed primarily in the form of manpower-intensive developmental and military/security aid. This type of aid is easy to extend since Cuba has a surplus of relatively well-educated personnel who are underemployed and who, the leadership believes, should acquire some revolutionary credentials by aiding sympathetic foreign countries and movements.

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(U) A prime example of Cuba's willingness to extend proletarian aid is its large-scale program of training foreigners in Cuba. This training takes advantage of what Cuba has accomplished best as a revolutionary regime--the development of educational and health systems. However unsophisticated these two Cuban systems are by Western standards, both are far ahead of what most Sub-Saharan countries now have, and African personnel benefit greatly from this type of relatively cheap aid.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ At present, Cuba is training an estimated 15,000 personnel from about 30 countries most of them African in a variety of skills. An unknown number are receiving military, security, and intelligence training. Havana is also training personnel in insurgency and terrorist tactics, though how many is uncertain. Cuba is supplying training to thousands of secondary and university students in a wide variety of skills including education, construction, agriculture, and medicine. Through these training programs, the Cubans have gained prestige and influence with the leaders of many foreign countries. Furthermore, Cuba is training the future elite in several Sub-Saharan countries--notably Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Namibia--and thus is in an excellent position to influence those personnel in Marxist ideology. Because of their training, these personnel probably will be influential as their countries or liberation movements develop in the future.

(U) An additional factor is that Castro claims Cuba has responded only to requests for help made by either a legitimate government or liberation movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Cubans state they have refused to become involved in supporting ethnic or tribal requests for support

against legally, constituted black African regimes. Furthermore, Castro has insisted that the presence of Cubans in African countries, whether military or civilian, are the concern of only Cuba and the country involved. The Cubans emphasize that they have been invited in by the particular African country and that the Western nations do not have a right to question the legitimacy of the Cuban presence.

(U) The Cubans also argue they are not mercenaries, since they claim that they have little to gain by waging war. On the contrary, Havana claims it has always urged negotiations, especially in conflicts between the states of the Third World. For example, in spring 1977, Castro personally attempted to mediate the dispute between two states which claimed to be following the Marxist road, Ethiopia and Somalia. The fact that his mediation failed--a failure that he blamed on Somali President Siad Barre who had initiated hostilities--was one factor in Castro's decision to support Ethiopia in the Ogaden conflict.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A final factor in the Cuban perception of its African involvement is the degree to which the leaders are able to establish close personal ties with the revolutionary leadership of other countries. The Cubans have maintained very close ties with the dominant faction of the Angola MPLA leadership since the 1960s. Castro also has established close personal ties with Mozambican President Samora Machel and while his personal ties with Ethiopian President Mengistu were quite warm during the 1977-78 period, they have now apparently cooled.

3. CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS

~~(S)~~ Cuba's African policies are formulated by a few senior members of the revolutionary leadership who have controlled Havana's destinies since 1959. Although differences exist among them on specific issues, they agree on the basic tenets and goals. President Fidel Castro is the unchallenged leader. General Raul Castro, his younger brother, dominates the strongest agency, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR). He is more radical and pro-Soviet than his brother, is second in power, and heads a faction which has increased its influence in policy matters since the Cubans began sending troops to Angola in 1975.

~~(S)~~ The Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) determines foreign policy. It is the only body which formulates decisions concerning military and security matters. On the one hand, the Party's General Department of Foreign Relations is responsible for assuring that the Politburo's decisions are implemented. On the other, the Government's Ministry of Foreign Relations is the agency charged with administering this foreign policy. It has no substantive input, control, or influence over the activities of the Cuban military and security personnel overseas.

4. CUBAN-SOVIET COOPERATION

(U) President Castro's expansion into Sub-Saharan Africa that began in the early 1970s and his subsequent drive to become the principal Third World leader, were undertaken partly as a means to gain some leverage with the Soviet Union and to satisfy his own monumental ego. Castro has always feared that the Soviet Union would "sell out" Cuba to the United States if Havana became too much of a burden

for Moscow. Therefore, to improve his value to the Soviets, he began championing actively the Soviet model and praising their extensive support to his nation as an example of what Soviet support could do to maintain a revolutionary regime against a nearby "imperialist" country, the US.

(U) Yet, to consider the Cubans as just Soviet surrogates oversimplifies the relationship between the two countries. Furthermore, the use of that term often hides the eagerness with which Castro participates. The Soviets and the Cubans, whose cooperation is reinforced by a coincidence of goals and means, form a very effective team with an established division of labor.

(U) Both Moscow and Havana are determined to destabilize the West by fomenting changes directed against Western-oriented governments. Both countries argue that they are not seeking economic advantage in Africa and therefore, both can support without reservation the Black African drive against what they call Western economic imperialism and racism.

(U) Castro is a revolutionary leader who suits the long-term goals of Moscow. While Castro is a clever, pragmatic person who is personally committed to long-term revolutionary struggle, Moscow nevertheless is able to exert control over him because of the massive economic and military support it provides to Havana. Because of Cuba's cultural affinity with Africa, the Cubans can often relate much better to Africans than the Soviets can.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Given the strong personality of President Castro and the fact that he is clearly the very junior partner, it is somewhat surprising that Moscow and Havana have cooperated as well as they have. Castro is much more of a revolutionary than the Soviets and is more willing to take risks than they are. For example, Castro supported the MPLA in late 1975, first with advisers and then with several thousand combat troops--both with limited direct Soviet involvement. It was only after it became apparent that the Cubans needed help that the Soviets became directly involved by shipping additional military equipment to Angola and by providing long-range aircraft to enable Cuba to deploy more forces to support the MPLA.

(U) When compared to their overall budget expenditures, supporting revolutionary movements and governments has involved relatively little financial costs for Moscow and Havana. The benefits accrued by Moscow and Havana for this limited support have been numerous. Soviet support for Cuba has permitted Castro to be much more active and effective than he could have been on his own. Castro would not have received as much military and economic aid if it were not for his support of Moscow's goals. The Soviets, in turn, use Cuban troops instead of sacrificing their own personnel and raising the specter of a direct US-USSR confrontation in Black Africa.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Diplomatically, Castro has made important inroads which have benefitted the Soviets in international forums such as the UN and Nonaligned Movement (NAM), inroads the Soviets could not have accomplished alone. Militarily, the effectiveness of the close cooperation was demonstrated in Ethiopia in 1977-78 when the Cubans and Soviets coordinated the rapid transportation of about 17,000 Cuban troops while the Soviets shipped about $1 billion in arms. This cooperation enabled Ethiopia to decisively defeat the Somali invasion.

5. CUBAN MILITARY AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban military and security assistance is the largest and most influential component of Havana's foreign aid program in Africa. It consists of combat troops (the largest component), military and security advisers, as well as some materiel support. In December 1980, Castro publicly stated that more than 100,000 Cuban military personnel had served in Africa. The military is composed of personnel from the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces' three services: the Ground, Naval, and Air and Air Defense Forces. Since about 70 percent of the personnel sent overseas are reservists, the deployments appear to have little effect on the defense of Cuba as most of the regulars remain behind.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In spite of the relatively small number of people involved, the Cubans, through their internal security assistance program, are often able to exert significant influence over the host governments. The primary reason behind this influence is the fact that Cubans train the host country's internal security forces. At present, Cuban internal security assistance teams are in Angola, Benin, Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and possibly Ethiopia, the Seychelles, among others.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Cuba's military and security presence in Africa is now estimated at 36,000 to 41,000 personnel (table 2). Of these, at least 2,000 are from the Air and Air Defense Force, 100 are from the Navy, at least 400 are from MININT, with the remainder from the ground force. By far the the largest number are in Angola, where there are an estimated 20,000 to 25,000, and in Ethiopia, where there are 11,000 to 13,000. These two countries also have the only known Cuban troops with a combat role. The large presence of combat troops gives the Cubans an ability to deploy personnel throughout the region and to influence the internal politics of the host country. This is particularly true for the Cubans in Ethiopia, where they are not currently engaged in active combat.

TABLE 2
CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS/TECHNICIANS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)
(FEBRUARY 1982)

Angola	[redacted]
Benin	22
Cape Verde	4
Congo	350-750
Ethiopia	11,000-15,000
Guinea-Bissau	50
Madagascar	10
Mozambique	800
Sao Tome and Principe	50-60
Seychelles	4
Tanzania	10-12

(S/NOFORN/NFIINTEL) The Soviets have supplied most of the equipment for Cuban forces in Africa, as well as for the friendly governments and insurgent groups that Cuba has helped to train. Therefore, the Cubans have had to supply relatively little weaponry. Most of the weapons that the Cubans have supplied have gone to Angola and include over $160 million worth of arms, light artillery pieces, vehicles, and World War II T-34 tanks (table 3). The Soviets have replaced the equipment that the Cubans sent with more modern items.

(S/NOFORN/NFIINTEL) Cuba has also signed several treaties with African countries. It probably has treaties with Angola and Ethiopia that provide for mutual defense. It has concluded agreements to provide internal security assistance.

(S/NOFORN/NFIINTEL) Finally, Cuba has been training in Cuba an unknown number of personnel in a wide variety of military and internal security skills since at least the late 1960s. People have been trained in courses ranging from basic infantry to advanced staff level, as well as technical maintenance courses.

6. REGIONAL STUDIES

a. The Horn

(S/NOFORN/NFIINTEL) Since the mid-1970s Cuban military activities in the Horn have been tied to both the dispute over the Ogaden territory and the Ethiopian revolution. In 1974, Chairman Mengistu overthrew the Ethiopian monarchy and moved Ethiopia in a "socialist" and pro-Soviet direction. By that time, Cuba maintained diplomatic relations with both Ethiopia and neighboring Somalia, already a socialist country. In early 1977, President Castro attempted to improve ties between Ethiopia and Somalia by mediating their dispute over the Ogaden, a region of eastern Ethiopia claimed by President Siad Barre of Somalia as an integral part of the Somali state. Castro's efforts were unsuccessful and he, blaming Siad for the impasse, began to move closer to Chairman Mengistu. By mid-1977, in a show of support, Cuban military advisers began to arrive.*

(S/NOFORN/NFIINTEL) In late 1977, the Soviets and the Cubans began planning their military intervention in the Ogaden on behalf of the Ethiopians. Between late 1977 and early April 1978, the Cubans and the Soviets completed a well-planned and executed military intervention which featured:

--The transporting, mostly by air from Cuba, of about 17,000-18,000 military personnel.

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* (S) For additional details on the Ogaden dispute and Cuban military activity in general, see The Status of Cuban Military Forces in Ethiopia, IIM 81-10018, 2 September 1981, SECRET.

TABLE 3
THE VALUE OF CUBAN MILITARY AND MATERIEL
ASSISTANCE DELIVERED TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1975-81* (U)

COUNTRY	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	REMARKS
ANGOLA**	Agreement: $147 million Delivered: $ 30 million Grant: $147 million Equipment: incl 15 T-34 tanks, 70 u/i trucks, u/i unk armored personnel carriers; u/i unk small arms; military support and training. Deliveries completed circa 1976.	Agreement: Val terms, delivery and equipment unk.	Agreement: $15 million It was a sale. Equipment: incl 55 u/i medium tanks; 45 100-mm field artillery guns; 66 u/i trucks, 16 u/i tank trucks, & 5 An-2/COLT aircraft. Deliveries completed circa 1981.					Agreements and Deliveries total at least $162 million. Of this, Angola paid for only $15 million; the remainder Cuba donated.
ETHIOPIA**			Agreement: Value unk. Grant: all. Equipment: incl small arms and training. Deliveries completed circa 1978					Cuba donated all
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE					Agreement: Value unk. It was a sale. Equipment: incl technical/ training assistance.			
TANZANIA			Agreement: Value unk. It was a grant. Equipment: incl training assistance.					

* As noted in the text, the Cubans have provided training assistance, to include security assistance to many countries.
** The vast majority of the equipment which the Cubans are using in Angola and Ethiopia was provided by the Soviet Union, which shipped the equipment directly to the two countries.

--The transporting of sufficient military equipment from the Soviet Union to equip the Cuban combat force of about 12,000.

--The humiliating defeat of the logistically ill-prepared and less well-equipped Somali forces in the Ogaden through well-conceived and executed armored warfare.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The military operation demonstrated the effectiveness of joint Cuban-Soviet action. Although the Cuban national interests were not directly involved in the military operation, the use of Cuban combat troops increased Cuba's prestige within the socialist-oriented Third World and accomplished a Soviet goal of solidifying the Ethiopian regime.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Initially, Cuban-Ethiopian relations were very warm as Castro and Mengistu praised each other as revolutionary leaders. Nevertheless, since the 1977-78 high point, the ties between the two countries have cooled. This has been due to several factors, including:

--The refusal of Cuban troops to engage in any major combat operation in the Ogaden since 1978. Rather, the Ethiopians have had to carry the burden of skirmishing against the stubborn Somali-backed resistance fighters.

--The unwillingness of the Cuban troops to provide direct combat aid, especially combat troops, in Chairman Mengistu's efforts to defeat the recalcitrant, fractionalized Eritrean revolutionary groups.

--The inability of Mengistu to negotiate a settlement in Eritrea.

--The failure of Mengistu to institute a true Marxist-type political party and grass roots political structure in the country.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Currently, Cuban military presence consists of about 11,000 to 13,000 military and security personnel. An estimated 8,000 Cuban combat troops are in the country, mainly at three locations--Tatek, near Addis Ababa; Dire Dawa, a key transportation hub; and Jijiga, a strategic military town in the northern Ogaden. The Cuban field headquarters is at Arba (figure 2). About 3,000 to 5,000 Cuban military advisers, technicians, and support personnel now serve in Ethiopia, mainly in the central and eastern parts of the country. They work with the Ethiopian Air Force, Air Defense, and Army units.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban combat units in Ethiopia are organized into four brigades: one mechanized infantry, two armored, and one field artillery (figure 3). The brigades are the best-equipped units in the Cuban inventory (table 4).

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ The mechanized infantry brigade is stationed on the outskirts of the capital, where its primary mission is probably to protect the government from possible coup attempts. One armored brigade is at Dire Dawa,




Figure 2. (U) Ethiopia — Deployment of Cuban Combat Forces.

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


Figure 3. (U) Ethiopia — Organization of Cuban Combat Forces.

TABLE 4
MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN CUBAN COMBAT UNITS IN ETHIOPIA (U)

Units	Tanks	APCs	Artillery	Antiaircraft Weapons
2 armored brigades*	194 T-55s	42 BTR-60PBs 62 BMPs	36 D-30 122-mm howitzers 24 BM-21 122-mm rocket launchers	16 ZSU-23/4 self-propelled 23-mm guns 8 ZU-23/2 23-mm guns
1 artillery brigade		15 BTR-60PBs	24 M-46 130-mm field guns 12 BM-21 122-mm rocket launchers 12 D-30 122-mm howitzers	4 ZU-23/2 23-mm guns
1 mechanized infantry brigade	32 T-55s	106 BTR-60PBs	12 BM-21 122-mm rocket launchers 18 D-30 122-mm howitzers	8 ZSU-23/4 self-propelled 23-mm guns 4 ZU-23/2 23-mm guns

Equipment totals

T-55 medium tanks	226
BMP amphibious armored combat vehicles	62
BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers	163
M-46 130-mm field guns	24
D-30 122-mm howitzers	66
BM-21 122-mm rocket launchers	48
ZSU-23/4 23-mm self-propelled antiaircraft guns	24
ZU-23/2 23-mm antiaircraft guns	16

* Figures show the totals for the two armored brigades.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WINTEL~~

where it protects the rail line running from Djibouti. The other armored brigade and the field artillery brigade are at Jijiga. The units at Dire Dawa and Jijiga serve as a strategic reserve for Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden and as a deterrent to large-scale Somali attacks.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban units in Ethiopia have probably been involved in at least two out-of-country deployments. In June 1978, Soviet aircraft transported about 1,000 Cuban troops from Ethiopia to South Yemen, following a coup there. These troops returned to Ethiopia in October 1978. In March 1979, Soviet aircraft flew about 1,500 Cuban troops to South Yemen during a conflict between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and North Yemen. These troops returned to Ethiopia after less than a month.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Cuban civilian presence--surpassed only by that in Angola and Mozambique--is estimated at 600 to 800. It consists of a wide variety of personnel such as educators, agronomists, construction, medical, and other technical specialists. Finally, the Cubans are training many Ethiopians in Cuba, including some 1,200 receiving elementary education on the Isle of Youth. At least 1,000 are believed to be studying various skills throughout Cuban universities.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/MOZAMBIQUE)~~ Since the pullout of major Somali regular forces from the Ogaden in late 1980 and the subsequent weakening of Somali military capabilities, the Cuban forces have not been crucial to Ethiopia's defense. In addition, the size, location, and capabilities of the Ethiopian armed forces is sufficient to handle renewed Somali attacks. If there is another major Ethiopian offensive in Eritrea, it is unlikely that Cuban forces would participate. These factors indicate that the Cuban forces in Ethiopia may be of decreasing importance to Mengistu's military regime. In order for the Cubans to withdraw troops from Ethiopia, however, Moscow would have to approve. Yet in the next year or two, Mengistu may insist that the Cuban presence be reduced.

b. East Africa and the Indian Ocean

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ In East Africa, Cuban activity has been most evident in Tanzania. Diplomatic relations between Havana and Dar-es-Salaam go back to 1964, although relations between presidents Castro and Nyerere have fluctuated over the years. During the 1960s and early 1970s, when both countries were struggling for international recognition, relations appear to have been close. Recently they have cooled because both have been competing for a pivotal leadership position within the Third World and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). On the whole, President Nyerere favors a neutral orientation of the Third World while Castro has alienated some leading Third World states with his blatant pro-Soviet posture within the NAM. In particular, Nyerere has been upset at Castro's support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Tanzanian leader remains suspicious of Soviet intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ While Cuban military personnel may have been sent to Tanzania for training purposes in the mid-1970s, there are only 10-12 Cuban military or security personnel believed to be in Tanzania at this time. There are some 80 Cuban civilians in Tanzania. They are active in the fields of construction, health, agriculture, and education.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ President Nyerere will continue to balance his military dependence on the USSR with assistance from Eastern Europe, the People's Republic of China, and the West. While Cuban civilian aid to Tanzania will continue, it is likely that military assistance will be minimal as long as Nyerere and Castro continue their difference of opinion over the scope and direction of the nonaligned movement.

~~(C)~~ There has also been some Cuban activity in the Indian Ocean islands of the Seychelles and Madagascar, albeit on a limited scale. The Cubans established diplomatic relations in the Seychelles in April 1978; in September 1981, the now resident Ambassador presented his credentials to President Rene.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Currently, there are believed to be about four Cuban military or security personnel in the Seychelles. It is likely that this contingent advises the security forces of the Seychelles. In addition, some 6-20 Cuban civilians are engaged in technical, agricultural, or educational training.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ In Madagascar, Cuban military and security personnel may have been training presidential security officials from 1977 through mid-1981. Currently, there are 10 Cubans in Madagascar but their role is unclear. Cuban and Malagasy officials have signed several agreements in the last few years concerning technical assistance, and some 100 Cubans provide aid in agriculture, education, and health. In addition, an unknown number of Malagasy personnel have studied in Cuba.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Both Presidents Rene of the Seychelles and Ratsiraka of Madagascar desire to enhance their stature as Third World leaders and reduce the possibility of greater superpower confrontation in the Indian Ocean. Both receive military equipment from the USSR but neither has, to date, granted access rights to the Soviet Union, though Moscow continues to press for such rights. Each country also has extensive economic ties with the West. As both nations want to maintain their nonaligned credentials, the Cuban presence is an acceptable way to acquire security training while at the same time, work within the context of Third World nations.

c. Southern Africa

(1) General

(U) Cuban military activity and involvement in Southern Africa has been centered in Angola. However, the Cubans have been active elsewhere in the southern region of Africa as part of Castro's continuing commitment to socialist-oriented governments and liberation movements.*

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* (U) For additional background on past Cuban military activities in southern Africa, see Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military Activities, DIAIAPPR 109-78, 2 May 1978, SECRET; and Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military Activity, DIAIAPPR 40-80, 12 March 1980, SECRET.

(2) Mozambique

~~(S)~~ Mozambique is an excellent example of Castro's support to Marxist regimes. Diplomatic relations were established in mid-1975 just after Mozambique became independent. Fidel Castro and Samora Machel are good friends and have visited each other's country. In June 1981, Cuba awarded its Distinguished Service Medal to two high Mozambican security officials, an indicator of the close ties between the two states.

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Currently, it is estimated that some 800 Cuban military and security personnel are located in Mozambique. They provide intelligence and security assistance plus training to the Mozambique Armed Forces (MAF) on Soviet-supplied weaponry. In addition, the Cubans may be present with government forces in areas of conflict. Bandit gangs in the pay of the South African Government, that is anti-FRELIMO insurgents, have been blamed for the deaths of several Cubans in Mozambique, and it was rumored that 11 Cuban combat troops had died in early 1981 while fighting there.

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL)~~ Castro is also training a large contingent of Mozambicans in Cuba. While at least 1,200 youths are studying secondary education on the Isle of Youth, others are probably training in security and intelligence courses as well. Moreover, Havana has provided Maputo with 800-900 Cuban civilian technicians. Active since 1976, these technicians have worked in a wide variety of fields including fishing, construction, port maintenance, communications, and medicine.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Havana can be expected to continue to provide both military and civilian aid to Maputo. However, whether or not the level of military assistance will increase is unclear. If the National Resistance of Mozambique (NRM) insurgency intensifies--as is likely--the Machel regime may be forced to ask for additional Cuban advisers, and possibly troops, in order to remain in power. Yet to be effective against the insurgency, it is believed Cuba would need to deploy thousands of troops to Mozambique. This is a commitment Castro could be hesitant to make. The precarious state of the Mozambique economy severely limits the government's capability to fund such a venture and Moscow would likely be asked to pay the bill. The high visibility of the troops and the possibility of a protracted war would further complicate the Cuban presence. Yet Machel may become desperate enough in the next 6 months to seek additional assistance from any available source.

(3) Zambia

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In comparison with Mozambique, Cuba's relations with Zambia have been relatively low key. Diplomatic ties between Lusaka and Havana were cordial in the early 1970s, but, following the Cuban involvement in Angola, this relationship cooled. However, as part of President Kaunda's support for Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), an insurgent group seeking the independence of neighboring Rhodesia, he allowed some 25-75 Cubans to train ZAPU personnel in Zambia during 1976-78. The Cubans also provided some limited training to Zambian military personnel, principally in political indoctrination. Since early 1980, there have been no known Cuban military or security personnel in Zambia. President Kaunda has close historical and economic ties to the West

including South Africa, and has been wary that East West rivalries might find a stage in his country. These factors will continue to inhibit a close relationship with Cuba.

(4) Zimbabwe

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ While Cuba strongly supported the defeat of the white Rhodesian Government both in international forums and by training guerrillas in Zambia, Mozambique, and Cuba, it emphasized relations with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and not with Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)--the eventual winner. Since Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980, the Cubans have focused on courting Prime Minister Mugabe and improving relations with him. However, Cuba has not yet established either a military or a civilian technical presence in-country. Cuba will probably use its embassy in Salisbury to continue to develop ties with the Zimbabwe leadership. For his part, Mugabe, a strong socialist and pragmatic individual, will continue to seek military and civilian assistance from a wide variety of donors and Cuba could respond with offers in the future.

(5) Angola

~~(C)~~ Angola currently has the largest Cuban military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cuban activity in Angola is also linked to the independence struggle in neighboring Namibia. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is, with Cuban assistance, waging a military and political struggle in Namibia against South Africa. Southern Angola harbors the main SWAPO bases and training camps although South African incursions into Angola in 1981 have effectively pushed SWAPO bases and camps into Central Angola.*

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL)~~ Havana's ties with the leaders of the Marxist Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were forged in early 1960s, when it provided training and aid to the MPLA guerrillas opposing Portuguese rule. Since that time, the MPLA leadership, especially those associated with the late President Agostino Neto, have established close personal ties with key Cuban officials.

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL)~~ The MPLA, however, was just one of four insurgent groups that struggled for Angola's independence. The other three included the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), which now seeks the independence of Cabinda from Angolan control. Anticipating conflict among the four groups after the end of Portuguese rule, the Cubans stepped up their support for the MPLA in mid-1975. The Cubans had sent about 50 military advisers in early 1975, but by mid-November had sent additional advisers totaling a few thousand. Initially

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* (U) For additional details on activities in Angola and Namibia, see Angola: Soviet and Cuban Roles, DIAIAPPR 167-81, 21 October 1981, TOP SECRET; Conflict in Southern Africa: Regional and International Dimensions, SNIE 73-81, 10 December 1981, SECRET; The Namibia-Angola Nexus: Outlook and Implications, DIEM DDE-2200-127-81, August 1981, SECRET.

deployed to provide training, the Cuban advisers found themselves in combat by early November. After initial contact with the South African Defense Force (SADF), which was assisting UNITA in southern Angola, the Cubans dispatched additional thousands of personnel by planes and ships. This included the first combat forces, the Ministry of Interior's elite Special Troops. Until early January 1976, the Cubans transported all their troops on their airline, Cubana, and on their merchant fleet. The merchant fleet also transported some heavy military equipment, particularly tanks.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) After early 1976, the USSR shipped directly to Angola most of the military equipment which the Cuban and Angolan forces used. There is evidence that the Soviets did not anticipate the extent of either the escalating of the conflict or Castro's commitment. It was only when the Cubans faced defeat in Angola and their aging British planes were denied necessary landing rights that the Soviets committed two long-range transports to help ferry Cubans to Angola and also increased their materiel support.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA, together with the South African withdrawal from Angola under heavy international diplomatic pressure by January 1976, was fundamental to the defeat of those forces opposing the MPLA. By mid-March 1976, the Cubans and the MPLA claimed victory. The large-scale trooplift, however, did not end until late March 1976, by which time as many as 33,000 to 36,000 military personnel had been deployed to Angola.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(C/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) But in late August-early September 1981, the SADF conducted large-scale raids deep into southern Angola and damaged several Angolan/Cuban air defense installations as well as SWAPO military training camps. As a result of this action, the Cubans sent about 2,000 to 6,000 reinforcements to Angola, showing their continued support for the Angolan regime and freeing Angolan troops for combat duties.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) At present, the Cubans are believed to have 20,000 to 25,000 military and security personnel in Angola. These include at least 1,000 personnel manning air defense artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and radar/ground control intercept sites. Aircraft and helicopter pilots and maintenance personnel are also present. There are some naval personnel who are assigned to the main ports and probably number about 100. Previously, in 1976, the Cubans had sent some naval infantry who provided port security at Luanda.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) The largest contingent of Cuban military and security personnel in Angola is the ground force. It provides most of the combat and advisory/training personnel, but the numerical breakdown is not available. As of early 1981, they were probably organized into four brigades--two mechanized infantry and two infantry (figure 4). Their organizational structure and the degree of their integration with Angolan units remain unclear. Cuban military




Figure 4. (U) Angola — Deployment of Cuban Forces.

advisers and technicians are probably assisting military staffs at all levels, advising Angolan unit commanders, teaching in Angolan military schools, providing technical assistance and, advising or managing Angolan military or civilian logistics-related organizations.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ There are some Ministry of Interior (MININT) personnel in Angola, although the figures on their strength are not known. There are some Special Troops performing a variety of missions, such as personal security for key Cuban (and possibly Angolan) officials, and supervising the training of at least some of the foreign guerrilla groups training in Angola, to include SWAPO. Other MININT units who have sent personnel to Angola--and probably still have some there--include the Department of State Security (DSE - responsible for internal security), the Border Guard Forces (responsible for patrolling the coastlines) and the Police.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Between 1976 and 1979, the military deployment to Angola was a major Cuban achievement which won Cuba--and by extension the USSR--considerable prestige, and enhanced Castro's role as a revolutionary leader. Within the last 2 years, and particularly in 1981, the large Cuban military presence in Angola has become a drain on both Angola and Cuba, and friction is increasing between the two governments.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ This friction is due to several factors. First, much to the dismay of the Angolans, the Cubans have conducted only a few limited operations against UNITA, the strongest guerrilla insurgency opposed to the government. This has forced the poorly trained and ill-equipped Angolan forces to carry the brunt of the fighting against the improving UNITA forces. Second, relations between the Cuban and Angolan military forces have deteriorated, due partly to the cavalier attitude of the Cuban personnel, further reinforced by their occasional pillaging of local villages. Partly as a result of this, and partly because UNITA forces have targeted Cubans for attacks, the Cubans have been generally restricted to their barracks. Consequently, the morale of the Cuban military has suffered because of harsh discipline and restrictions on their movements.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ Third, in spite of Cuban and Angolan public claims that the Cuban presence is necessary to defend Angola against SADF incursions, the Cubans have actually avoided direct combat with the SADF, especially since late 1975. Since then, the SADF has conducted many raids into southern Angola to destroy SWAPO bases. In some of these raids, the SADF encountered Cubans--most recently in January 1982--killing and capturing a few. By early December 1981, the SADF publicly claimed that it had destroyed all SWAPO training camps within 150 kilometers of the Namibian border. Whether or not this is true remains uncertain. During the same period, UNITA had been able to enhance its control over southern Angola. The result is that the Angolan Government is acutely aware of the Cuban inability to stop these raids. It appears that the Cubans have avoided engaging the SADF because they fear that a decisive defeat at the hands of the South Africans would have major repercussions and severely damage their reputation for success--which in fact has been gained by fighting only poorly trained and ill-equipped African forces.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) This problem in Cuban-Angolan relations has been exacerbated by two additional factors. First, since the death of former President Agostino Neto in September 1980, no leader, including President Eduardo dos Santos, has had sufficient political support to unify the country. In fact, President dos Santos appears to be more dependent upon the Cubans for his survival than his predecessor. Nationalist factions have improved their strength, thus making the government less unified.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Second, the Angolan Government is paying Cuba for each military and civilian person. This is putting a severe financial strain on Luanda, and the drain--estimated at $274 million a year--is a major contributor to the country's disastrous economic state. This drain leaves the government with much less money to finance badly needed economic development programs.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Yet, under present conditions, the MPLA needs the Cubans. The argument that the Cuban military presence in Angola could be drawn down substantially if there were a peaceful solution of the Namibia situation has several flaws. It does not account for the real reason why foreign forces are needed in Angola, that is, the maintenance of the MPLA in power. The Launda-based regime refuses conciliation with groups representing different regimes, rival ethnic groups, and moderate ideologies. The Cuban military presence is important to the Angolan Government, especially since Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgency has become more active. If the Cubans were withdrawn, more Angolan forces would have to be diverted to asserting Luanda's control over the areas where the Cubans now have a military presence. This could make it easier for the UNITA forces to expand their control over larger areas of southern Angola.

(S/NOFORN) The fact that there are other insurgencies active in Angola complicates the Cuban position. For example, several thousand Angolan and Cuban troops are deployed to Cabinda province, an important oil-producing enclave in the north, to guard petroleum resources from insurgent attacks by FLEC. Ethnic heterogeneity and geographical isolation from Angola proper are factors supporting continued separatist activity and therefore, the need for a continued Cuban presence in the province.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) For the Cubans, Angola now presents a serious dilemma. Angola is the symbol--and symbols are very important--of Cuba's first military victory against "imperialism" in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, a defeat or anything that could be widely interpreted as a defeat would have a serious effect on Castro's drive to be the leading Third World revolutionary. Because the Angolan internal military situation has deteriorated, the country cannot be pacified without engaging the improved UNITA forces. Given the strength of UNITA's ethnic support in southern Angola, however, it is doubtful that the UNITA forces could be defeated even with a large-scale reinforcement. In addition, Angola now is important to Cuba as a source of badly needed foreign exchange. The estimated $274 million that Cuba receives every year, primarily from Angolan oil revenues, contradicts Cuba's widely publicized claim that it does not have an economic interest in Africa.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) If the Cuban troops were withdrawn as part of a peaceful settlement to the Namibia problem, the Cubans would lose an important position they now possess. Their large commitment of military forces in Angola allows them to train southern African insurgent groups. For example, the Cubans

are training some SWAPO personnel as well as the African National Congress (ANC), the group dedicated to the overthrow of the white South African Government. In addition, the Cubans have been involved in training opponents of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Any agreement which reduced the Cuban ability to train large numbers of personnel could reduce their influence with those organizations.

~~(S/NOFORN/WINTEL)~~ The Cuban civilian presence in Angola is now estimated at about 6,500. It includes several hundred medical personnel, several thousand construction personnel, and a wide variety of other specialists who are assigned to most Angolan Government agencies. Furthermore, many Angolans are being trained in Cuba. These include about 1,200 children enrolled in elementary school courses on the Isle of Youth, as well as an unknown number of personnel being trained in medical, educational, and technical skills.

(6) South Africa

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Related to the Cuban involvement in the Angola-Namibia situation is the Cuban support for the ANC of South Africa. Active for nearly 70 years, the ANC, follows a Marxist-Leninist ideology and seeks to establish a multiracial, socialist society in South Africa. The military wing of the ANC operates from exile and organizes increasingly effective guerrilla attacks against South African installations and property from camps in various southern Africa nations. Angola is one of the states where the ANC has established guerrilla training camps. Since at least 1976, the Cubans probably have been actively training ANC guerrillas in Angola. The ANC also has a representative in Havana, although he does not have diplomatic recognition. As long as the Cubans remain in Angola, they can be expected to continue their training of ANC military personnel.

d. Central Africa

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ To the north, President Mobutu Sese Seko, of Zaire, has strongly opposed Cuban military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Angola. As one of the more conservative and pro-West African leaders, Mobutu is generally suspicious of Soviet and Soviet-supported activities in the region. He has been fearful of Cuban support for the Angolan-based Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) which seeks to overthrow his regime.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ As of late 1981, Zairian relations with Cuba could be described as correct. Though diplomatic ties date to 1974, these were suspended in 1977 over Cuba's alleged involvement in the Shaba rebellion and were not resumed again until August 1979. In what appears to be an attempt at rapprochement, Cuba has offered, in recent months, bilateral cooperation in the fields of agriculture and public health. Zaire is in desperate need of such financial and technical aid, but it remains to be seen just how much the Cubans will be able to offer. For the foreseeable future, and as long as Mobutu remains in power, it is likely that Zaire will limit any substantial ties with Cuba as long as the FLNC remains based in Angola and continues its efforts to provoke an insurgency in Shaba Province.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The People's Republic of the Congo remains a key area of Cuban influence in Central Africa. Though the Congolese leadership has changed, Cuba has been providing military and security assistance to the Congolese since 1965. Under the current leadership of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Congo has long identified with Marxist-Leninist ideology and maintains close ties--despite some problems--with the Soviet Union.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Currently, there are some 550 to 750 permanent Cuban military and security personnel assisting the Congolese Armed Forces, although in 1978 the number of advisers was as high as 1,000 to 2,000. The Cubans have been involved with the Congolese presidential bodyguard and other security services since about 1966. In May 1976, a Cuban delegation composed of personnel from the foreign intelligence service spent 6 months with the Congolese Directorate of State Security. The delegation compiled a manual for the Congolese which outlined how the service should operate. It also provided a 4-month training course for directorate personnel focusing on counterintelligence and basic operational techniques. In addition, the delegation toured the country and advised the Congolese on methods for improving their border controls. Finally, the Cubans offered to provide further security training in Cuba, proposing that about 90 study border control, 26 study presidential security, and 12 receive communications training. Since the late 1970s, the Cubans have focused on training public security forces as well as technical training, such as aircraft maintenance.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ An additional Cuban military contingent of perhaps 1,200 in Congo plays an important role in supporting Cuban military presence in Angola. Since about late 1975, the Cubans have used Congolese facilities, particularly the air and naval facilities at Pointe Noire and the airfield at Brazzaville, both as a logistic base and as a rest and recreation area for their troops in Angola, including Cabinda. By 1979, the Cubans had established a military installation adjacent to the Point Noire Airfield for these purposes. Moreover, some of these Cuban personnel in Congo probably assist in maintaining security in Angola's adjacent province of Cabinda.

~~(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ There are now about 100 to 200 Cuban civilians in Congo, including medical personnel. In addition, there are an unknown number of Congolese training in Cuba in a wide variety of military and civilian subjects.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuban support to the regime of President Sassou-Nguesso can be expected to continue. Although reports have indicated some past friction between the Cuban personnel and the local population, the situation has apparently improved. Important military ties to the Soviet Union coupled with possible Soviet pressure on the Congo's president to help support the Cuban operations in Angola, indicate a continued Cuban presence in Congo.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuba also maintains ties to the Democractic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe. Relations between Presidents Castro and Pinto da Costa have been good since the islands gained independence from Portugal in mid-1975. The leftist government of da Costa, which has acquired Soviet military equipment and Soviet advisers, now has 50-60 Cuban military personnel in Sao Tome primarily providing security and technical training. Cuban civilian presence is estimated at about 140. In January 1979, the Sao Tome Defense Minister met with General Raul Castro in Cuba and in October 1981, several defense and security

officials accompanied their president to Cuba. The two nations have also signed several cooperation agreements in the fields of public health, construction, and fishing, while some Sao Tome military personnel have also received training in Cuba. These close contacts between two socialist states can be expected to continue for the indefinite future.

e. Western Africa

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Benin has pursued a radical socialist course since Colonel Mathieu Kerekou seized power im a 1972 coup. Soviet advisers and equipment were made available to the President and he has maintained close ties with the USSR. In addition, Cuba has supported the Kerekou regime, though this relationship has been occasionally strained.

~~(S/NOFORN/[illegible])~~ Havana cemented diplomatic ties with Cotonou in 1974, and in 1977 Cuban advisers may have helped Kerekou suppress an attempted coup. Currently, there are believed to be 22 Cuban military and security advisers in-country. For the past few years, Cuban advisers have performed two principal functions: providing personal protection for President Kerekou and training the ill-prepared Beninese on Soviet-supplied military equipment. Reportedly, as of September 1981 several Cubans--probably Special Troops from the Ministry of Interior--were assigned to guard the President. Also, a few Cuban naval personnel allegedly were deployed to the fledgling navy to train seamen in the use of Soviet-built patrol boats. Earlier in 1981, a few Cubans possibly trained Benin paratroopers. Finally, several members of the Beninese armed forces are being trained in Cuba.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Relations with Cuba have fluctuated this past year, perhaps reflecting the dynamic internal power struggle within the ruling regime. In January 1981, the Cuban ambassador and key embassy officials were recalled--why is not clear--and relations cooled noticeably. Then in July, a high-level Cuban economic delegation visited Benin and a new scientific and technical agreement was signed. This visit could mark the beginning of an upswing in relations.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Cuban influence in Benin may be disproportionately larger than their limited military security assistance would suggest. This is because they train key military personnel, guard Kerekou, and direct some intelligence and security matters. As long as Kerekou remains in power, the Cuban military presence will remain. In addition, the fact that Cotonou is an important center for Libyan-sponsored subversive activity in West Africa, lends credence to continued revolutionary-minded Cuban involvement in Benin military and security affairs.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Elsewhere in West Africa, Cuban diplomatic ties with Sierre Leone have been cordial for the last decade. In the early 1970s, Cuban military and security personnel trained the Internal Security Unit, now known as the Special Security Division (SSD). The SSD is responsible for protecting President Siaka Stevens and is directly under his authority. In early 1979, some 10-12 Cubans were involved in security training in Freetown in conjunction with preparations for the annual OAU meeting later that year. It is unclear whether or not these advisers departed, but it is likely that they have done so. President Steven's generally pro-West attitude and orientation will temper any significant increase in Cuban influence in Sierre Leone.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In 1960, socialist Guinea became the first Sub-Saharan state to establish official relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba. During the early 1960s, Cuba deployed a small number of military advisers to Guinea in support of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), an anti-Portuguese independence movement based in Guinea. The Cubans were involved in raids staged from Guinea into Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) and the Portuguese even captured and imprisoned a high-ranking Cuban military adviser.

~~(S/NOFORN/[illegible]/NOCONTRACT)~~ Cuban-Guinean relations remained very close until the late 1970s. During that period, Cuba provided military and security advisers including MiG pilots and technicians with personnel training the Popular Militia, the National Police, and President Sekou Toure's personal bodyguards. Since Guinea maintained close military ties with the USSR, Cuban training was also provided on the inventory of Soviet equipment. Hundreds of Guineans received training in Cuba in basic military skills, aviation maintenance, intelligence, and security.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Since the late 1970s, however, relations with Cuba, and the Communist Bloc in general, have slowly cooled. This is due primarily to increasing Guinean unhappiness over poor quality Soviet military and industrial equipment, manufactured goods, and commercial arrangements. Still, the Soviet Union has the most significant foreign influence in Guinea.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Cubans provide about 20 military advisers and 225-250 civilian technicians. In October 1981, Cuba and Guinea signed a cooperation agreement for Cuban medical and agricultural brigades to work in Guinea. This type of Cuban aid, despite Toure's decision to seek additional financial contacts with the West and the general cooling of relations with the Communist Bloc, will continue in the near term.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ In neighboring Guinea-Bissau, Cuban involvement dates to the independence struggle against Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s. Diplomatic relations were established in 1973 between the two socialist states, and the first Cuban ambassador to Guinea-Bissau had been a military adviser to the PAIGC during the independence war. During the mid and late 1970s, the number of Cuban military advisory personnel ranged from 25 to 400.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Currently there are about 50 Cuban military personnel in Guinea-Bissau. They provide instruction in weaponry and tactics, as well as political indoctrination. Senior Guinea-Bissau officials--including former Minister of Defense and current Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira--have attended a military staff school in Cuba. Additionally, about 100 civilians provide training in medicine, education, construction, and fishing.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The leadership of Guinea-Bissau, particularly ex-guerrilla commanders, continues to retain great appreciation for Cuban military and political support during the liberation struggle. Similarly, this leadership will maintain its close ties to the USSR and Bloc countries. Yet officials have also become acutely aware of the limits of these ties and consequently have

broadened their economic contacts with Portugal, Brazil, and the West in general. This pragmatic pattern will likely persist and the Cuban role will probably remain limited to its current status.

(S/NOFORN) Finally, Cuba and the Government of the Cape Verde Islands have historical links. As was the case in Guinea-Bissau, Cuba supported the struggle of the PAIGC against Portuguese rule in the 1960s and early 1970s. Over the years, several agreements of cooperation have been signed, and mutual visits are common between the two countries.

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The importance of Cape Verde for the Cubans is that Amilcar Cabral International Airport on Sal Island is the principal refueling point for regular Cuban flights to Africa, particularly Angola. The Cubans lost landing rights in Guinea and the Il-62M/CLASSIC, their principal long-range transport plane, cannot reliably transit to Angola without a stop.*

(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT) The present number of Cuban military and security personnel in Cape Verde is estimated to be about four. Reportedly, a few periodically stay on Sal to provide protection for Cuban aircraft. Perhaps as many as 12 men perform this function. There are also some 10-15 technicians working in the areas of medicine and fishing.

(S/NOFORN) Praia, in recent years has broadened its contacts with the West, particularly Lisbon and Brasilia. Neither the USSR nor Cuba has been able to provide the large-scale economic aid the islands need. Historical ties notwithstanding, it is doubtful there will be any significant increase in Cuban influence in Cape Verde.

7. CONCLUSIONS

(U) Since the mid-1970s Sub-Saharan states--with the notable exception of South Africa--generally have shared certain common goals. They sought to reduce the influence of former colonial powers, even in areas where interdependence has been deemed necessary. Black African states have desired to voice their opinions and positions on international issues, which at times have an anti-West flavor, and want to formulate their own foreign policies. Consequently, support for the NAM--a forum where Cuba itself has made significant inroads--and the pursuit of international credibility have been genuine African goals. These goals have allowed states to maintain some distance from the superpower rivalry. In addition, African nations have supported liberation movements committed to the overthrow of white minority rule in Namibia, South Africa, and formerly Rhodesia. Thus, any nation which has also supported these objectives demonstrates a certain pro-African attitude. And finally, the developing African countries have wanted

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* (C) The Cubans currently are building an airfield on the island of Grenada, in the Caribbean. Cuba is likely to gain access to this facility in order to use it as another stopover point on the way to Africa. This will obviate the necessity for maintaining its access at Cape Verde.

more control over their own resources. Thus, Cuban policies have blended with African aspirations and when and where these interests have intersected historically, closer relations developed.

(U) Cuban policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have intersected with African aspirations most notably in the context of military/security support, political activism, and socioeconomic change. Cuba has made a strong impact through the provision of military aid--predominately combat troops and advisers along with security and intelligence personnel--unavailable from Western sources. This support has not been forgotten, especially in such countries as Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. At the present time, Cuban activity will continue in two key areas: support for liberation movements seeking to overthrow the white minority regimes in southern Africa--particularly SWAPO and the ANC--and support for dissident groups in pro-Western countries with latent political instability and potential for radical change.

~~(S)~~ Virtually all Black African states along with Cuba recognize the legitimacy of SWAPO and the ANC as insurgent movements. Continued Cuban support to these organizations will likely continue and this support will not only help solidify relations with these groups, but with African states as a whole. Moreover, in states with a generally pro-West orientation where the potential for serious political instability exists, closer association between dissident groups and the Cuban leadership is a viable scenario. In this case, Sierre Leone, Zaire, and Zambia are examples of possible candidates.

(U) At the same time, Cuba faces serious obstacles in its dealings with Sub-Saharan African states which should not be overlooked. Despite the current affinity between Cuban policies and the aspirations of African nations, there are severe long-term restraints on Cuban activities. While many African countries are in need of assistance, they realize the limitations of the Cubans. This is particularly apparent in the economic sphere where Cuban aid is severely restricted by Cuba's own domestic economic problems. African leaders are aware that the internal and international fiscal difficulties they face cannot be solved by the Cuban presence. Moreover, African leaders do not want to trade the imperialism of their former colonial masters for that of Cuba and by extension, the USSR. Even African states with good relations with Cuba do not want--in the long run--to become overly dependent on Castro.

~~(C)~~ For their part, the Cubans have caused some of their own problems in their relations with Africa. Attempts by the Cubans to gain political leverage have involved them in the internal politics of some states, alienating even African allies. Cuban support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hurt its prestige among Third World leaders. This pro-Soviet stance was reflected in its activities in the NAM and further alienated certain African leaders who mistrust the Soviets. In addition, the Cubans have been accused of insensitivity to the needs of the host country. They have displayed an arrogance and know-it-all attitude to states, causing friction with sensitive leaders. Despite Cuba's cultural affinity with Africa, Cuban apathy to local conditions and disputes with the indigenous populace have further contributed to this feeling.

(U) The combined evidence tends to indicate that African nations--notably Angola, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe--will, in the short term, utilize available Cuban support and continue their ties. Also in the short run, the Cubans gain important political leverage and prestige by providing military aid to Sub-Saharan African states. But in the long term, these and other states may not be so anxious for additional Cuban support. The Cubans are aware that additional long-term military commitments in Africa could put unacceptable strains on their relations with the Third World. Additional long-term Cuban military commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa could involve conflict with other military forces, resulting in a protracted struggle and a possible stalmated situation. Another problem is that Cuba has had difficulty in maintaining good relations with states--even close allies in Africa such as Ethiopia and Angola--for more than 3 or 4 years before serious disagreements develop over a wide range of political and economic issues.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Many Sub-Saharan countries want to pursue policies that favor security and economic pragmatism and to use the NAM to move back and forth between East and West, depending on which side serves their needs. African leaders have acquired experience since gaining independence, are more politically astute, and can distinguish the subtle but important difference between appreciation and acceptance of Cuban aid and the actual long-term influence the Cubans may have on the internal dynamics of their countries. The Cubans themselves are aware of these conditions. They will continue to align themselves with those socialist-oriented states in Sub-Saharan Africa which seek outside support from a Third World ally and continue to support those groups which seek radical changes in their countries.

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


Figure 1 Countries Discussed in Text.

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Sassou's Congolese Labor Party and also places emphasis on cultural and educational exchange activities. The Soviets were successful in gaining some minor military concessions from the Congolese in late 1982, although their major goals of naval access rights and military intervention agreements go unfulfilled.

~~(S)~~ For the foreseeable future, Soviet and Congolese ties will be maintained. The Kremlin can pressure Brazzaville by demanding debt repayment and perhaps through its Cuban proxies who occupy a number of advisory and training positions and have considerable influence in the Congo. The President is committed to a path of socialism and there are pro-Soviet elements in his government which must be placated. While Sassou seeks expanded ties with other nations to help his ailing economy and to develop the large known oil reserves, he is dependent on the Soviets for military aid. The situation is symbolic of the military aid dependency relationship the USSR likes to develop with a country.

i. Angola

~~(S/NF)~~ Farther to the south, in Angola, the Soviets remain in a much stronger position. In 1975, during the months preceding independence from Portugal, the Soviet and Cuban supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seized control of the transitional government from rival nationalist groups. International pressures and the weight of Soviet and Cuban assistance forced the eventual collapse of the regular forces of the non-Marxist insurgent groups and the pullback of the South African forces that were supporting them. Currently, under the Soviet-educated President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Angola remains plagued with political instability, insurgencies, and economic stagnation. In order to remain in control of the situation, dos Santos needs continued technical assistance and substantial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

~~(S/NF/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(S) Soviet-Angolan relations have not always been smooth, however. Throughout 1981, South African military pressure, promising negotiations for Namibian independence, and Angolan economic chaos had apparently weakened the resolve of Angola's leadership to continue supporting and sheltering the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). In January 1982, in an apparent effort to bolster Angola's resolve, Moscow concluded with Luanda an unprecedented $2 billion economic aid agreement for the period 1982-90. Prior Soviet economic aid extended had totaled $439 million of which only $32 million was drawn. In a speech delivered in conjunction with the signing, Moscow specifically reminded the Angolans not to cease supporting SWAPO and to expect to have to make sacrifices to achieve a Marxist state. The Angolans replied that they were making more sacrifices than any other country for Namibia's independence and implied that Moscow's military aid did nothing to stop South Africa's attacks on Angolan territory.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~(S/NF/WN/NC)~~ In September 1982, Moscow, Angola, and Brazil signed an agreement to build a 450,000-kW hydroelectric dam at Kapanda on the Cuanza River. The Soviets proposed it as part of their massive aid package. The scale of military deliveries and economic activities are evidence that Moscow has no intention of letting Angola's Marxist government be ousted.

~~(C)~~ Moscow's position in Angola has been strengthened as the Western-backed negotiations on Namibian independence have become stalemated. The prospect of continuous Angolan conflict with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) coupled with confrontation with South Africa over Angola's assistance to SWAPO, forces Luanda to rely more heavily upon its ultimate source of military support, the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, provisions of this support will become expensive for Moscow as the strength of UNITA increases. UNITA's accelerating success in the field poses a growing threat to the MPLA which Cuban Forces alone probably cannot eliminate. Angola cannot afford to pay in the foreseeable future for the massive Soviet and Cuban assistance which will be necessary to deny UNITA a victory—a circumstance which could compel a re-evaluation of Moscow's level of commitment to the current regime and possible c nsideration of alternative solutions.

~~(C)~~ The Angolan leaders probably recognize that their plans for consolidation of power are being forced to take a back seat to Moscow's design of using Angola as a stepping stone toward the destabilization of South Africa. This divergence of goals will, at time, be a source of friction.

~~(C)~~ In a possible effort to reinforce Angola's battered will, the Soviets invited President dos Santos to visit Moscow from 16 to 20 May 1983. During the visit he met with CPSU General Secretary Andropov and other Soviet leaders. This time the Soviets appeared to be much more understanding of Angola's difficult position vis-a-vis South Africa than in January 1982, but noteworthy results are not yet apparent. However, Moscow apparently intends to deter dos Santos from seeking closer ties with Western countries.

~~(C)~~ Although there is no evidence that the Soviets are dictating policy to the Angolans, they do exercise considerable influence over dos Santos' domestic and foreign policy decisionmaking as a result of Soviet, Cuban, and East German penetration of the civil and military infrastructure. This penetration, and dos Santos' near total dependence upon the USSR and Cuba for the survival of his regime, insures for Moscow a fairly reliable ally as long as Moscow is willing to meet dos Santos half way. Angola is the linchpin of the Soviet position in Southern Africa. Its continued support of SWAPO in the face of South African military retaliation is vital to Moscow's efforts to destabilize South Africa and spread Marxism throughout the region. The Soviets have every reason to bolster dos Santos' regime.

j. Namibia

~~(C)~~ The unresolved Namibian independence problem remains the most contentious issue in southern Africa. The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) under the leadership of Sam Nujoma, continues its protracted guerrilla war against South African control of Namibia, and the

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
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ANGOLA-ZAIRE: MEDIATION EFFORTS (U)



ANGOLA-ZAIRE

DIAIAPPR 195-77
16 JUNE 1977

DISTRIBUTION "X"

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (i)

LEADERS SEEK LEVERAGE AS MEDIATION EFFORTS INCREASE



PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
PRESIDENT AGOSTINHO NETO



REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE
PRESIDENT MOBUTU SESE SEKO

UNCLASSIFIED

ANGOLA-ZAIRE: MEDIATION EFFORTS (U)

Summary


~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Angolan President Agostinho Neto and Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko are in the process of determining if mediation between the two countries will take place and, if so, who the mediator will be. Although Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph N. Garba has been acting as an intermediary since the invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province on 8 March, Joachim Yhombi-Opango, President of the People's Republic of the Congo, also has indicated the availability of his country to provide this function. Neto has indicated a preference for the Congo, while Mobutu has opted for continuing with the Nigerian effort.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Mobutu's principal concern during the mediation effort will be Shaba Province border security against future Katangan incursions. Neto, however, will probably insist that any boundary agreement include the entire border between Angola and Zaire. This would have a serious effect on the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda insurgent groups operating out of Zaire against the Neto government. Therefore, such an agreement is not expected. Mobutu may conclude that Neto's position is so tenuous that he will not be in power much longer and that his own forces are now capable of handling either another incursion or any guerrilla operations initiated by the Katangans.

Background

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The conventional or nonguerrilla military phase of the Shaba Province conflict is over. Mobutu and Neto are trying to negotiate their differences so that each can focus on the internal problems confronting their respective

"VICTORY" IN SHABA PROVINCE STRENGTHENS MOBUTU



CI CF-1-6/74

countries. Each had expressed interest in pursuing mediation while the outcome of the conflict was still in doubt. Now that Mobutu is clearly the victor, however, Neto's bargaining leverage has diminished because of his support for the Katangans.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The principal intermediaries and the diplomatic level of initial discussions must now be established. Since the beginning of the conflict, Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba has made numerous efforts to bring the two countries together. Although both Mobutu and Neto have expressed their willingness to negotiate to him, the conditions levied by each side remain unacceptable to the other.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although Nigeria's commitment to resolve the dispute has not been questioned, the People's Republic of the Congo has also recently indicated its willingness to act as mediator. The Congo borders both Zaire and Angola and is desirous of good relations with both countries. It, therefore, may be acceptable to Mobutu and Neto as an alternative to Nigeria.


~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The US and Soviet positions have become an integral part of the mediation process. Although never officially involved, the US, a long-time supporter of Mobutu, has continuously supported and encouraged the Nigerian effort toward mediation of the conflict. Reportedly, the Congo's move was at the prompting of the Soviet Union and has Neto's support. Mobutu, however, leans toward the Nigerian effort. The solution, therefore, may be to have Neto represented by the Congo and Mobutu by Nigeria with initial discussions at the foreign ministry level before progressing to a face-to-face meeting between Mobutu and Neto.

Discussion


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(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)


ANGOLAN INSURGENCY WEAKENS NETO'S POSITION



CI-AO-1 9/76



(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)



~~(S/NOFORN)~~ A combination of factors enhance the probability of the Congo replacing Nigeria in the mediation role. Ideologically, the Congo is compatible with Angola and would be an acceptable mediator to both the USSR and Neto. However, President Opango has just recently reestablished diplomatic relations with the US in hopes of procuring economic aid to help in coping with serious economic problems. Furthermore, he is encouraging other Western countries to consider economic opportunities in the Congo. Consequently, Zaire could consider the Congo an acceptable intermediary and a suitable replacement for Nigeria.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The environment for negotiation has changed considerably within the past month. Although the threat of a Katangan guerrilla cam-

paign will linger, the first phase of the Shaba conflict has ended and Mobutu's bargaining leverage has increased considerably. However, he cannot afford to ignore the chance to mediate with Neto. Zaire's serious economic situation will require Mobutu's full attention, and he will have to act responsibly in order to attract necessary financial assistance needed to begin a "stabilization" and "reform" program. Agreement with Angola will signal investors and creditors that Zaire is ready to focus its attention on the economic realities facing the country.

Bargaining Chips

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Mobutu's principal concern during mediation will be Shaba Province border security against future Katangan incursions. Neto's agreement, however, to withhold support from the Katangans may be at a price that Mobutu will not accept. Neto will probably insist that any border agreement include the entire border between the two countries.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Mobutu wants an assurance that he can concentrate on the economic problems in Zaire without the threat of a new Katangan incursion. A "healthy" Shaba Province is critical to the well-being of the Zairian economy because of its mining operations, which are dependent on the national railroad already crippled by a severe fuel and boxcar shortage. Consequently, a second incursion or the development of a prolonged guerrilla campaign could prevent economic reform.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Katangan presence in Angola and the critical relationship of Shaba Province to the Zairian economy are perhaps Neto's only real leverage in negotiations with Mobutu. In exchange for withdrawing Angolan support for any future Katangan incursion, Neto will want total border security between the two countries. An agreement from Mobutu on this point will seriously erode the capability of FNLA and FLEC in view of their Zairian support. The remaining insurgent group, UNITA, would not be affected because it op-

erates almost exclusively within Angola, although it does have an administrative office in Lusaka, Zambia.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Neto will have to play all of his cards to obtain a total border concession from Mobutu. In addition to withdrawing support to the Katangans, he could offer to return 700 Zairian boxcars and several locomotives held in Angola since he came into power after initially winning out over UNITA and FNLA forces in 1975. These cars are urgently needed by the Zairian National Railroad Company in Shaba Province to transport mineral production for export. They are also needed to move fuel from Ndola, Zambia, because that country refuses to send its trains into Zaire. A further inducement could be to offer Zaire use of the Benguela Railroad whenever it becomes operational. An additional incentive may include the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in order to keep lines of communication open and to explore whatever comparative economic advantages each has regarding the other's economy and to develop their potential.


Outlook

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Mobutu is not likely to jump at Neto's inducements. In spite of the number of incentives that may be offered, Mobutu probably will not accept the total border security concept including the provision that FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA be denied access to sanctuary in Zaire. If he does, it will probably be a paper agreement and he will continue to allow the insurgent groups to cross the border.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although Mobutu is probably fully cognizant of the Katangans potential for waging a prolonged guerrilla campaign and the effect it could have on Zaire's economic problems, he may in the final analysis, conclude that Neto's position is so tenuous that he will not be in power much longer and that his forces are now capable of handling the Katangans. Since the revolt that

took place in Luanda on 27 May, Neto's position appears weaker than ever. If Mobutu believes that Neto's power base is deteriorating, he will not close his border to the insurgents.


~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)



~~(XGDS 2 Declassify upon notification by the originator)~~

PREPARED BY:

(b)(3):10 USC 424


(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

~~Secret~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i)

DIAAPPR 72-85
16 DEC 1985

DIA DIAAPPR 72-85

Defense Intelligence Agency Appraisal

Angola: Counterinsurgency Campaign (U)


Summary

~~(S)~~ *The hostilities in Angola have escalated in each of the past 4 years. This year, Luanda's major dry-season counterinsurgency offensive initially appeared to be only a slightly larger, but similar, version of the 1984 campaign. After the campaign concluded in early October, however, a different picture emerged. It showed that government and insurgent forces had been engaged in perhaps the most devastating fighting of the 10-year insurgency. Each side evidently underestimated its opponent. The government's Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) commanders seem to have underrated the ability of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents to conduct conventional operations. UNITA's leaders apparently failed to appreciate the government's willingness to sustain the offensive despite mounting personnel and equipment losses. Both sides sought to use the campaign results for largely political rather than immediate military objectives.*

Discussion

~~(S/NF)~~ This year's campaign evidently had two primary axes of advance. In late July or early August, a four-or five-brigade FAPLA force began to move east along the Luena-Luau road toward the Cazombo salient. Another four or five brigades reportedly moved southeast along the Menongue-Cuito Cuanavale road toward the town of Mavinga.

~~SECRET~~ (b) (b)(1) (b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g), 1.4(c)



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
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
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
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
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~~(S)~~ During the last half of September and early October, fighting north of Mavinga intensified. Luanda accused Pretoria of staging four air attacks on UNITA's behalf, from airfields in northern Namibia, against FAPLA units north of Mavinga. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests South Africa conducted at least two airstrikes in the Mavinga area. UNITA, however, has denied Luanda's claims and insists Angola's MiG-23s mistakenly bombed government forces on several occasions during the campaign. The insurgents have likewise contradicted what still seem to be uncorroborated government claims that South African ground forces also entered southeastern Angola to assist UNITA's defense of Mavinga. Nonetheless, UNITA has acknowledged receiving substantial South African logistic support during the battle for the town.









~~(S)~~ While both sides have probably exaggerated the casualties in this year's fighting, most accounts strongly suggest this campaign, particularly in the southeast, was the largest sustained engagement between FAPLA and UNITA forces in the war. Although Luanda's immediate objectives seemed to be military, focusing on the capture of UNITA's main bases and headquarters in the southeast, many reports implied underlying political motives.

~~(S/NF)~~ Luanda apparently planned to sustain its offensive through at least the first half of the October-to-April rainy season. This effort would have been the first time in perhaps 6 or 7 years that FAPLA tried to conduct a major campaign beyond the dry season. According to an Angolan army officer captured by UNITA during the Mavinga campaign, the original objective of the offensive was to seize and hold guerrilla bases deep inside UNITA-controlled territory, at least until early December, when the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola held its second party congress.


~~(S/WN/NF/NC)~~ (b)(3) 50 USC 40 (b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403 (g),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),(b)(3) 50 USC 403-1(i),1.4 (c)



(b)(1),1.4 (c)



Outlook

~~(S/NF)~~ The Angolan campaign against UNITA was only slightly successful. Even then, FAPLA's accomplishments in the east could be short-lived and may not last through the rainy season.

~~(S/NF)~~ Luanda will probably have to repeat this year's offensive against UNITA-held territory in the southeast. However, the capture of UNITA bases or even the insurgents' headquarters would not be a militarily decisive accomplishment. Nonetheless, FAPLA will have to demonstrate its ability to conduct sustained operations in the southeast if the Soviet- and Cuban-backed government hopes to challenge UNITA's persistent assertions that the insurgents have established a state within a state and that hostilities in Angola should be regarded as a civil war rather than an insurgency.

~~(S/NF)~~ Recent trends, however, suggest Luanda has become preoccupied with challenging the diplomatic threat posed by overseas perceptions of UNITA's successes at the expense of losing control over increasingly larger areas of the countryside. This development may have resulted either from a calculated gamble by Luanda or an underestimation of UNITA's military capability. If Luanda seeks a strictly military solution to the insurgency, a successful conventional campaign against guerrilla bases in the southeast will have to be followed up by an equally effective sweep through much of the countryside, particularly the densely populated central highlands, where much of UNITA's popular support is located.

~~(S/NF)~~ Doubts about its ability to conduct protracted counterinsurgency warfare may prompt the government to modify this approach. It may instead seek a slight military advantage from which it can then negotiate with UNITA. Barring a coup or a diplomatically brokered settlement in the next 12 months, however, several years of fighting at or near recent

levels will be required before UNITA achieves a decisive military advantage. Luanda would probably need even more time to have any hope of at least suppressing the insurgency to a manageable level. The flow of outside aid to both sides is already substantial. Evidence suggests it will continue, if not expand, implying that major hostilities will resume in the next 12 months.

Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

Secret (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [redacted]

DIAAPPR 75-85
18 DEC 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency Appraisal

Angola: Cuban Military Mission (U)

Summary

(S) *Recent reports of greater and more direct Soviet involvement in government offensives against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrillas have raised new questions about the role of Cuba's estimated 36,000-man expeditionary force in Angola. Havana and Moscow may have concluded that implementation of a successful antiguerrilla strategy requires qualitative rather than quantitative modifications. Consequently, for the first time in 7 years, a sizable number of Cuban troops in the country could soon be reassigned from static defense duties to active counterinsurgency units. Barring any diplomatic breakthroughs, the near-term outcome of this development would be an escalation of hostilities inside Angola as well as further augmentation of Cuba's expeditionary force. Such a development could undermine US diplomatic efforts to promote stability in various corners of southern Africa. However, no evidence thus far confirms any definite change in Havana's military mission. Moreover, based on recent trends, any modifications are likely to be incremental.*

Discussion

(S) Indicators of the size and mission of Cuba's expeditionary force in Angola have been ambiguous. One indirect indicator of the force's changing role was the steady augmentation of troops, from about 20,000 to some 36,000, between 1981 and 1984. An estimated 6,000 of these troops are in air defense units deployed to the increasingly elaborate and more sophisticated network of SAM sites in southern Angola directed against the South African air threat. In addition, much of the nearly $2 billion worth of military equipment that Moscow has delivered to Angola in the past 3 years has probably required more Cuban units to be used effectively.

(S/WN/NF/NC) (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-(g),1.4(c)

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
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
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Outlook


~~(S)~~ The size of Cuba's expeditionary force, the number of casualties, and possibly the degree of involvement in the Angolan insurgency have apparently increased in the past 4 years, largely because of logistic limitations, concern for troop morale, a desire to avoid sustaining large numbers of casualties, and Havana's assessment of the Angolan military situation. Barring a diplomatic breakthrough or a major change in the nature and intensity of the UNITA threat, further changes in the role of Cuban military personnel in Angola are likely to be incremental. Considering the strength and intensity of Cuba's commitment to Angola in the face of a steadily mounting security threat, Havana's near-term support to Luanda is likely to be sustained and perhaps increased. Nonetheless, the extent and seriousness of the insurgent threat that UNITA now represents is not expected to be affected substantially by incremental modifications in Cuba's role. Havana will, therefore, be required to make a long-term commitment to Luanda if Angolan forces are expected to continue bearing the primary responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency warfare. A more radical degree of Cuban involvement could be triggered by major defeats or large-scale desertion in the ranks of government forces. If such a development were to occur in the near term, US efforts to bring about a diplomatic settlement leading to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola and a South African pullout from Namibia would be seriously undermined.

Prepared by:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

C00484565

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The National Intelligence Daily

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
FRIDAY OCTOBER 24, 1975 VOLUME 2, NUMBER 249

C00484565

Angolan Movement Decries Foreign Intervention

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has launched a major propaganda campaign against "foreign intervention" in Angola. The campaign, probably led by military hardliners in the Movement, very likely is designed to set the stage for a unilateral declaration of independence, possibly before November 11.

Last night the Popular Movement ordered mobilization of all men between the ages of 18 and 35, to combat an "invading" force in the south said to number nearly 1,000 troops, including mercenaries and South African regulars. The force reportedly is led by Daniel Chipenda, a former Popular Movement military commander.



Chipenda joined the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola almost a year ago and has been commanding the Front's forces in central Angola since then. According to the Popular Movement's announcement, the invading force has advanced approximately 150 miles into southern Angola. Popular Movement forces in that part of the territory are stretched thin.

The South African government has a small military team in southern Angola to train troops of the National Front. The South Africans, assigned to provide advice and rear-echelon support, have occasionally become involved in fighting.

The mobilization order and the charge of foreign intervention come at a time when the Popular Movement is beginning to feel heavy pressure in the north from military operations of the National Front, and the approaching deadline for Angolan independence.

In northern Angola, the National Front, with the assistance of Zairian troops, has advanced to within 13 miles of Luanda, and some fighting is now taking place there.

The approaching independence deadline takes on added importance for the Popular Movement with each passing day, by virtue of Portugal's continued insistence that it will not transfer sovereignty to the Popular Movement alone. The Movement is equally insistent that it is the only liberation group capable and deserving of running the territory after independence. It is attempting to discredit its rivals as instruments of foreign powers and not true representatives of the Angolan people.

The Popular Movement's ability to carry out a successful mobilization is questionable. The Movement has always had strong popular support in Luanda, but its support in the rural areas and even in the towns of central and southern Angola that it claims to control seems less certain. There, the Popular Movement's mobilization efforts could well bog down.

[redacted] political leaders within the Movement have been trying to demobilize many civilians placed under arms in order to undercut the military's growing influence. The military, however, appears to be running the show, just as it was last summer when it forced the National Front to [redacted] Luanda.

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Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Saturday
8 October 1983

Top Secret

CPAS NID 83-237JX

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
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Special Analysis

Angola: Coping With a Growing Insurgency 12

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8 October 1983

Special Analysis

ANGOLA: Coping With a Growing Insurgency

The Angolan Government, with the assistance of the Soviets and Cubans, is trying to stem the steady advances of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgent forces. At the same time, it continues to be distracted by the South African presence in the south. The regime in Luanda has placed a number of provinces under military rule, and it is fortifying its garrisons in the poorly defended northern regions. Nevertheless, it probably will not be able to reverse the erosion in its security position.

Luanda was shaken by UNITA victories during August. The loss of Cangamba, the largest garrison to fall to a direct insurgent assault, was a major setback.

The government also is aware of UNITA's plans to extend operations into the north. Savimbi claims that this offensive will be two or three times larger than the campaign in August, which probably involved about 10,000 men.

Luanda announced in late July that the military would assume direct rule in provinces threatened by UNITA. President dos Santos apparently believes that unifying all authority in military councils directly responsible to him will end the bickering between the Army and local security forces that has marred previous counterinsurgency efforts. Dos Santos also traveled to several threatened areas and gave major speeches stressing the government's resolve.

The military is trying to build up its strength in the threatened regions, but it probably is having difficulty redeploying its thinly stretched forces.

The Angolans or Cubans also have established a small force at an outpost south of Luena. In addition, combat aircraft and helicopters were sent to Malange in late August, and more ground troops have been moved into the town.

Soviet and Cuban Support

continued

The Soviets have strengthened air defenses in the south with the delivery of 16 SA-6 air defense missile launchers and radar-controlled antiaircraft guns. They also have delivered 12 MI-24 helicopter gunships, which will increase the government's ability to provide close air support to its troops

The Cubans' military contingent of 25,000 to 30,000 men is essential to the security of key towns and garrisons. They also have increased their support

In July, Havana reportedly sent 800 additional troops to Luanda, and it recently stated that it would send more if asked. Five Cuban ships have delivered arms in recent months, including 33 medium tanks and a number of armored personnel carriers

Apprehensions About Pretoria

Luanda's effort to contain the insurgency is hampered by its preoccupation with the threat from South Africa. During the past year, the South Africans have conducted sweep operations in and around their buffer zone in southern Angola. Most of the roughly 30,000 Angolan and Cuban troops in that region, however, are arrayed to defend against a South African attack

The buildup of air defenses in the south also reflects Luanda's concern about the South Africans. a high-level Angolan delegation to Moscow in early September asked for even more antiaircraft weapons

Outlook

Luanda probably will soon announce another of its periodic counterinsurgency campaigns. Its forces, however, are unlikely to be able to do much more than conduct limited forays in the vicinity of major garrisons.

continued

government troops are not prepared to undertake a sustained campaign in the countryside until early next year.

Angola's inability to challenge UNITA on the ground might lead it to use its airpower to attack UNITA's bases near the Namibian border. Such airstrikes, however, could risk a South African response.

The Soviet and Cuban arms shipments merely add to Luanda's already substantial advantage in firepower over the lightly armed guerrillas. They do not address the Army's principal military weakness—the poor performance of its soldiers, who are badly trained, led, and motivated. Havana could be forced to reverse its longstanding practice of avoiding direct clashes with UNITA, even though popular discontent is growing over casualties in Angola.

Increased aid from Moscow and Havana nevertheless will strengthen Luanda's hold on major cities and key garrisons. UNITA in any case probably cannot challenge these strongly defended points. As long as Angolan troops bear the brunt of the fighting in the countryside, however, the insurgents seem likely to retain the initiative there.

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Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
8 March 1984

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8 March 1984

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
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
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Troop Withdrawal Suspended

South Africa informed Angola on Tuesday that it has suspended the phased withdrawal of its remaining forces in southern Angola because of increasing SWAPO infiltration into Namibia. The South Africans cited evidence that SWAPO's actions took place within areas controlled by Angolan forces. South Africa, however, informed Angola that the withdrawal would resume as soon as "the problem had been resolved." Pretoria has moved a large mechanized unit 150 kilometers south from its normal base in northern Namibia.

Comment: The suspension probably is intended as a sharp reminder that Angola has to make a greater effort to enforce the disengagement agreement. Although the South Africans recognize that the Angolans cannot completely control SWAPO infiltration, they clearly believe that the Angolans are doing far less than they can to make disengagement work. Pretoria is likely to view Luanda's response as a measure of Angola's commitment to the peace process. The movement of the mechanized unit away from the border indicates that Pretoria is not now preparing to move back into Angola.

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18 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : Economic Impact on Cuba of Involvement in Angola

Attached is our assessment of the economic costs to Cuba of its involvement in Angola, which you requested [redacted] Questions may be addressed to the author, [redacted]

[redacted]
Office of Economic Research

[redacted]

Attachment:
As stated

MICRO ONLY

[redacted]

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ER M 76-10123
18 February 76

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Economic Impact of Cuban Involvement in Angola

The Cuban military presence in Angola has thus far not constituted an important economic burden for Havana. Direct costs of transporting and supporting the estimated 12,000 man Cuban expeditionary force have been estimated at only $15 million (excluding military equipment), at least part of which probably has been underwritten by Moscow. Virtually all of the estimated $55 million in military equipment sent to Angola from Cuba was orginally supplied Havana by the USSR on a grant basis. Reduced Cuban military equipment inventories have been partly replaced by increased Soviet military deliveries to Cuba during the last quarter of 1975.

Indirect costs to Havana have been insignificant as well. The callup of several thousand reservists has not taxed the Cuban labor force, which exceeds 2.5 million. Use of Cuban commercial aircraft to transport troops has caused only minor disruptions in Havana's airline schedules. Moreover, utilization of as much as 15% of its merchant fleet at any one time for logistical support has not caused serious disruption in Cuban foreign trade patterns. If prolonged however, diversion of the Cuban merchant fleet to Angola will cause greater than normal chartering of non-Cuban vessels to maintain Cuban trade flows with non-Communist countries.

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Directorate of Intelligence

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Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in Southern Africa [redacted]

An Intelligence Assessment

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SOV 84-10069X
May 1984

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Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in Southern Africa

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Acting Chief, Policy Analysis Division, SOVA

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Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in Southern Africa

Key Judgments

Information available as of 2 May 1984 was used in this report.

Moscow is clearly apprehensive that South Africa's recent agreements with Angola and Mozambique may weaken the Soviet position in these key southern African states and undermine efforts to support Namibian and South African insurgents. Soviet commentary has focused on Angola rather than on Mozambique, because the USSR has more at stake in Luanda and a greater ability to affect developments there.

While criticizing US and South African motives for arranging it, the Soviets have not criticized the Angolan cease-fire itself. We believe this reflects their belief that (1) a South African withdrawal from southern Angola will improve the worsening military position of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and (2) the disengagement is unlikely to lead to an overall settlement of the Namibia question.

If the Soviets believed the MPLA leaders were moving toward a Namibia accord that included a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, they would bring pressure to bear on them, as they have done in the past. As a last resort, Moscow might try to protect its interests by promoting a coup by MPLA hardliners. Given the risks inherent in coups, however, and given MPLA determination to resolve the Namibia question, we believe the Soviets would ultimately accede to Luanda's wishes. Moscow would continue to work behind the scenes to maintain its influence within the MPLA and to sustain Luanda's suspicions of Washington and Pretoria.

Although the Soviets have less ability to influence events in Mozambique and are evidently dismayed by the extent of President Machel's accommodation with South Africa, they have not written off Mozambique. Moscow almost certainly will seek to exploit Machel's continued need for military assistance in an effort to limit his turn to the West, but we do not believe it is any more willing than in the past to subsidize Maputo's economic development

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets will try to foment and exploit new tensions to undermine South African diplomacy and to sustain the struggle against white minority rule in Pretoria. They will seek to channel additional assistance to the Namibian and South African insurgents wherever possible. Without the traditional conduits in Angola and Mozambique, however, they are unlikely to enjoy much success

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
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Figure 1
Southern Africa



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Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in Southern Africa (U)

Moscow's position in southern Africa rests primarily on its role as the region's leading arms supplier. In February and March 1984, however, its key allies there, Angola and Mozambique, concluded agreements with South Africa. These are clearly designed to reduce the military pressures that have made the two countries so dependent upon Soviet military assistance. This paper discusses Moscow's response to the challenges posed by Pretoria's initiatives toward Luanda and Maputo

Soviet Interests in Southern Africa

Moscow's basic aims in southern Africa are to undermine or supplant Western and Chinese influence and to promote leftist change. More specifically, it seeks to consolidate the emerging leftist, pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Mozambique, to bring the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to power in Namibia, and ultimately, to undermine the white minority regime in South Africa. Angola is central to these objectives because it positions the USSR to support and influence Namibian and South African insurgents and to exploit potential instability in neighboring Zaire. Through their unqualified support of black African self-determination, the Soviets have also exploited—with some success—black African antipathy toward Pretoria to promote suspicion and distrust of the United States, which Moscow portrays as South Africa's major "ally."

The Soviets also seek access to southern African landing fields and ports for their air and naval forces. Soviet long-term objectives may also include denial or obstruction of Western access to the region's strategic mineral resources. Even if white minority rule in South Africa ended, however, such a "denial strategy" would encounter serious obstacles, such as the reaction of Western nations and resistance from African leaders who depend on the hard currency from mineral sales

The Soviets have made a sizable commitment in arms and money to the socialist-oriented regimes in Angola and Mozambique: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). From the mid-1970s to the end of 1983, the Soviets and the East Europeans provided some $2 billion in military assistance to Luanda and some $700 million to Maputo. They have also extended economic credits and grants totaling some $535 million to Luanda and $355 million to Maputo—but much of this aid has not been drawn.

Moscow's Response to South Africa's Agreements With Angola and Mozambique

General Secretary Chernenko offered the most authoritative Soviet comment on recent developments in southern Africa during a dinner speech on 29 March. He implicitly expressed grudging approval of the accords, while criticizing Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African desires for peace and stability to impose their solutions on the region and indicating his doubts as to whether Angolan security and Namibian independence are "truly" guaranteed


Soviet media commentaries reflect the ambivalence with which Moscow views the Angolan and Mozambican accords with South Africa. On 18 March on Soviet television, political analyst Aleksandr Bovin candidly cited the factors and benefits that had induced Luanda and Maputo to reach agreements with Pretoria. Nonetheless, he criticized the accords, saying it was "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabilization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements." He concluded by noting that the region's fundamental problems were all linked to the existence of the white minority regime—implying a need for continued armed struggle. A 30 April *Pravda*

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Figure 2
The Angolan-South African Disengagement



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Angolan-South African Disengagements

The 16 February 1984 agreement between Angola and South Africa calls for the staged withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in exchange for an Angolan commitment not to allow the Namibian guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to operate in the area vacated by Pretoria. Both sides agreed to establish a Joint Monitoring Commission to police the disengagement area and prevent SWAPO infiltration of northern Namibia.

Background

In our judgment, Angola views the cease-fire as an opportunity to improve its capability to deal with its own insurgency problem—the increasing threat posed by Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA has grown steadily stronger since the civil war began in 1975. In recent years Savimbi's forces have ranged far beyond their traditional stronghold in southeastern Angola, devastating the Angolan economy—already weakened by the preindependence departure of Portuguese managers—and now threatening politically sensitive areas of central and northern Angola.

The MPLA regime has not been able to devote its full military resources to combat the UNITA insurgency. Approximately 15,000 Angolan and Cuban troops have been tied down in the south to guard against South African intervention. The South Africans have occupied a large chunk of southern Angola since mid-1981 and have staged repeated incursions deep into Angolan territory in search of SWAPO guerrillas. (S)

Pretoria agreed to the withdrawal for a variety of reasons. US pressure for a gesture of good faith on Pretoria's part to break the stalemate in the Namibian negotiations was important. Moreover, Pretoria probably views the risk as acceptable—inasmuch as the disengagement agreement requires Luanda to keep SWAPO out of Namibia. The agreement also benefits Pretoria domestically as it eases public concern about South African casualties and the high economic costs of the seemingly endless war.

Prospects

The first three months of disengagement have been successful, but we believe that building on them to achieve a broader regional settlement will be difficult, because:

- *Pretoria continues to link the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola.*
- *Luanda maintains that Cuban troops will not begin to leave Angola until all South African troops have left Angola, all outside aid to UNITA has stopped, and the UN plan for Namibia has been implemented.*

Many South Africans believe that Luanda will not agree to a Cuban troop withdrawal until it can deal with the UNITA threat. Consequently, they argue that a regional settlement is possible only if the MPLA and UNITA reconcile, thus permitting a Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence. MPLA leaders, including moderates, still flatly reject the idea of an accommodation with Savimbi.

report on Mozambique highlighted Maputo's continued commitment to socialism and noted somewhat skeptically of the nonaggression pact that "time will show how events will develop."

Soviet media have focused on the Angolan–South African disengagement. No mention was made of Mozambique's nonaggression pact with South Africa until 16 March, the day it was signed.

Angola

some Soviets in the regio expressed concern over Angola's failure to consult fully with Moscow and Havana as the talks progressed. To remedy this, according to one of these sources, Angolan President dos Santos (head of the MPLA) was

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invited to Havana in mid-March to present a full account of the negotiations. The MPLA's pro-Soviet hardline General Secretary, Lucio Lara, went to Moscow at the same time, ostensibly for a private vacation but presumably to discuss the state of play in the talks with South Afric

Despite Moscow's uneasiness, we have seen no evidence of a Soviet effort to stop the Angolan–South African dialogue since the cease-fire was signed. While castigating Washington and Pretoria, Soviet media have not condemned the agreement itself

The Soviets may feel there currently is little reason to sabotage Angola's talks with South Africa. The cease-fire and the South African withdrawal from southern Angola have diminished the security threat to the MPLA government—a threat that had prompted the Soviets to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. Moreover, if the cease-fire holds, the Angolans and Cubans could focus all of their energies toward the UNITA insurgency. The Soviets may have misgivings about temporarily leaving the Namibian SWAPO guerrillas in the lurch, but preserving the regime in Luanda is a more important priority

Moscow has not changed its overall position on Namibia. It continues to call for a unilateral withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and for implementation of UN Resolution 435.[1] It also continues to criticize any formula that links the South African presence in Namibia to the Cuban troop presence in Angola, stating that the Angolans and Cubans can consider the issue of Cuban withdrawal only after Namibia is independent and the security threat to Angola is eliminated. The Soviets presumably were pleased with the Angolan-Cuban joint statement issued on 21 March, which reaffirmed that the Cubans would not withdraw until after South Africa ends its support of UNITA, withdraws from both Angola and Namibia, and implements the UN plan for the independence of Namibi

[1] UN 435 calls for a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, and the establishment of a UN force to oversee preparations for Namibian elections



Figure 3. Angolan President dos Santos and Cuban President Castro signing a joint communique, 21 March 1984

Mozambique

In contrast to the publicity it has accorded the Angolan cease-fire, Moscow only belatedly acknowledged the security accord between Mozambique and South Africa. We believe the delay reflects Soviet displeasure with FRELIMO leader Samora Machel.

The Soviets have grounds for concern over Machel's about-face. His rapprochement with Pretoria clearly undercuts Soviet interests and prestige and opens up new opportunities for Western inroads in Mozambique. More importantly, from Moscow's perspective, it diminishes the already limited capabilities of the African National Congress (ANC)—the South African insurgent group in exile—and thus obstructs the USSR's long-term objective of undermining the white minority regime in Pretoria

The Soviets evidently tried to dissuade Machel from his rapprochement with Pretoria, reportedly alternating the threat of oil cutbacks with offers of free oil. In the past, however, Moscow's aid commitments have not matched Maputo's economic needs, and we believe the Soviets are still unwilling to increase economic assistance enough to dissuade Machel from talking with the South Africans

Signals From Havana?

Amidst the flurry of diplomatic activity in southern Africa, a number of signals suggested that Havana was reevaluating its position on the Cuban troop presence in Angola. An article that appeared in the Cuban daily Granma *on 22 February 1984 discussed the Angolan–South African disengagement, prompting speculation that Castro was preparing the way for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Cuban officials also began telling Western diplomats they were resigned to a withdrawal. Cuban Vice President Rodriguez, for example, said that if an acceptable agreement were reached on Angola's security, Cuba would be likely to withdraw its troops.*

Although the 21 March joint communique issued during the dos Santos visit seems uncompromising on the preconditions for a troop withdrawal from Angola, it may be designed more to protect Havana's public image than to halt progress on the Namibia question. The fact that Havana has risked raising domestic expectations on the sensitive withdrawal issue indicates that its private posture is not as rigid as the communique suggests

Whatever Castro's thoughts on the Angolan situation, we believe Havana would ultimately accede to Moscow's wishes, whether they be to send additional combat troops or to disengage from Angola entirely. Although tensions could emerge if Castro felt the USSR had sold out in Angola or had used the Cuban troop issue as a pawn in the bigger game of US-Soviet relations, the Soviet-Cuban relationship would remain largely unchanged, because Havana's economic and military dependence upon the Soviet Union is so great

The Soviets have acquiesced in Machel's policy shift, at least partly because they have less at stake in Mozambique than in Angola. A Soviet and Cuban intervention brought to power—and sustained—the MPLA in Angola, but the Soviets did not play a comparable role in Mozambique. Soviet prestige, therefore, is not linked as closely to the survival of the Machel regime. Moreover, the Soviets have less influence in Maputo than in Luanda

Moscow has not written off Mozambique, however. President Machel was accorded high-level attention at the Andropov funeral in mid-February; the *Pravda* account of his meetings with Politburo member Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev noted that prospects for further development of bilateral relations were favorable. Moreover, deliveries of Soviet military equipment have continued since the accord with South Africa was signed

Soviet Prospects and Options

In both Angola and Mozambique, Moscow's immediate objective is to ensure that the accords concluded in February and March do not lead to broader agreements with South Africa.

In Angola

Moscow's major concern in Angola is that there be no agreement on a Cuban withdrawal that would seriously diminish Soviet influence. It probably feels that the current talks are unlikely to lead to such a withdrawal—given the deep-seated nature of regional tensions, the UNITA threat, and the Soviet belief that South Africa remains unwilling to relinquish Namibia. Public statements by Lucio Lara and his fellow MPLA hardliner Paulo Jorge suggest that some in Luanda see the current cease-fire and South African withdrawal as an end in itself and that no decision has been reached on any steps beyond a cease-fire. We believe Moscow shares this assessment

the USSR does not foresee Angola caving in to South African or US pressure. The Soviets therefore may

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Mozambique's Uneasy Detente With South Africa

In a formal ceremony on 16 March 1984 at the border town of Nkomati, Mozambique and South Africa signed a nonaggression pact stating that neither government would allow its territory to be used to prepare acts of violence against the other. In practical terms, Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents in return for Maputo's pledge to prevent guerrilla attacks against South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC).

Background

Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord—the first of its kind between South Africa and a neighboring black state—was hard to make. It stemmed largely, in our judgment, from the economic collapse in Mozambique. Beset by three years of drought and the debilitating attacks of RENAMO guerrillas, large areas of Mozambique were suffering from famine (more than 100,000 Mozambicans have died). The Mozambican security forces—despite large infusions of Soviet military aid—proved incapable of defeating RENAMO, which focused its attacks on key economic targets and foreign economic advisers. The insurgents roam freely in much of the countryside, disrupting food production and impeding the government's provision of drought relief supplies to the peasants.

From a broader perspective, Machel's signing of the accord represents a major departure from Mozambique's heretofore rigidly pro-Soviet, anti-Western policies. It reflects Machel's calculation that the value of new South African investments and possible increases in Western economic assistance would outweigh the risk that the Soviets would cut off their military assistance—which in any case had not turned the tide against the insurgents.

We expect both sides to work hard to make their detente succeed. Mozambican security personnel have raided ANC facilities in Maputo—showing Pretoria that Machel is holding up his side of the bargain. And Pretoria does not want to see its diplomatic triumph tarnished, as South African businessmen flock into Maputo with offers of new investment. In the short term, therefore, Machel's gamble—dealing with black Africa's devil, the white minority regime in Pretoria—appears to be paying off. In the long term, however, political support for the gamble could be undermined by continued RENAMO activity, albeit at reduced levels once the insurgents' stockpiles are consumed, and by poor economic conditions, even if they are better than today's

believe that it would be premature to begin to sabotage Angola's dialogue with South Africa at this time, despite their uneasiness over the diplomatic breakthrough

Nonetheless, Machel's about-face in Mozambique probably has shown Moscow that events in Luanda could also move in a way damaging to Soviet interests. Should the Soviets become suspicious about dos Santos's ultimate aims in dealing with Pretoria, they are likely to exert direct pressure on him. They have done this several times in the past

The Soviets would react more strongly if the disengagement turned out to be the first step toward a Namibia settlement that included a phased withdrawal of the Cubans. With the departure of the Cuban combat troops, the Soviets would lose much of their leverage in Luanda. If a settlement actually did cut UNITA off from its South African supply lines, and if the MPLA concentrated its military efforts against



Figure 4. Prime Minister Botha and President Machel after signing the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, 16 March 1984

UNITA, dos Santos would still depend on the USSR for military support. Moscow would hardly be sanguine about the MPLA's success, however—given its inability to defeat UNITA even with 30,000 Cubans on its side

If dos Santos assembled a coalition that was prepared to take action on the US Namibia package and come to a reconciliation with UNITA, the Soviets could:

- Use disinformation and other active measures to exploit Luanda's fears that Pretoria and Washington are working together to force on Angola a UNITA-MPLA coalition government (or, even worse, a UNITA seizure of power).[2]
- Press SWAPO to step up its activities inside Namibia in hopes of turning Pretoria against a Namibia settlement.
- Promote a coup in Luanda in hopes that, if the pro-Soviet hardliners came to power, Angola would take a more confrontational approach toward South Africa and the SWAPO issue.

[2] The Soviets may have already increased the use of active measures to exacerbate existing suspicions and tensions between Luanda and Pretoria. In March, Soviet media quoted a purported US document that described an alleged meeting in Kinshasa of US, South African, UNITA, and Israeli officials to map out strategy for Angola. At this meeting, plans allegedly were made for stepped-up arms support to UNITA, for UNITA infiltration of MPLA military and political organs, and for destabilization in Luanda itself.

Disinformation might succeed, given the historical suspicion and distrust between Pretoria and its black African neighbors. On the other hand, it probably would be ineffective if both Luanda and Pretoria were determined to reach a settlement. The Namibian insurgents would welcome additional Soviet arms support, to step up their activities, but Moscow would have difficulty supplying SWAPO without its traditional Angolan conduit

A coup by MPLA hardliners would bring more pro-Soviet leaders to power and, by alienating supporters of the ousted leadership, make the new regime more dependent on Soviet aid to keep itself in power. Yet, given the complex of factors that shape MPLA politics—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—Moscow could not be certain that even a successful coup would have the desired result. Tensions between the contesting MPLA factions could weaken the military—thus strengthening the position of Savimbi and his UNITA insurgents. If the coup failed, moreover, Moscow could find itself with no influence in Angola. A Soviet attempt to subvert a Namibia accord that enjoyed the support of most Africans also could jeopardize Soviet credibility and equities among other black African states

Disinformation, coups, and similar measures also fail to take Angola beyond the basic dilemmas that prompted it to respond to South African overtures. If the USSR succeeded in destroying the recent gains, South Africa could resume its pressure on Luanda by reentering southern Angola and stepping up aid to UNITA. This would create another security crisis much like the one that prompted Moscow to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. Moscow may be prepared to up the military ante, as it warned the South Africans last November, in part because the expense would not be great. (Luanda's oil earnings have minimized Soviet and Cuban financial costs in Angola.) The Soviets are unlikely, however, to pick up the economic assistance burden if the Angolan economy becomes a total shambles

We believe that, if the Angolans resolve their internal debate on the Cuban withdrawal and decide to proceed with the US package settlement—even if it leads

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to a reconciliation with UNITA—the Soviets would try to dissuade them but would ultimately bow to their wishes. At a minimum, the Soviets presumably would seek strong assurances that Luanda would retain its leftist political orientation and its close bilateral ties to the USSR. In that case, Moscow would continue to maintain a stake in Angola through its military assistance

Moscow probably would seek to put a positive face on such a settlement, noting Luanda's continued leftist orientation, US recognition of the MPLA (albeit in a coalition with UNITA), and the honorable intentions of the Cubans, claiming that they had eliminated the South African security threat and then left when requested to do so. Moscow might go so far as to claim that the Namibia settlement represented a victory for the Cubans and the MPLA. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independent Namibia—presuming a SWAPO electoral win—in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration

There is some slight evidence that the Soviets may be preparing for such an eventuality. In December 1983, officials from the Africa Institute and the Foreign Ministry told a military solution was not possible in Angola and that peace could only succeed with the formation of a coalition—though both officials had doubts about Savimbi's role in such a scenario

Increasing candor in the Soviet press about Angola's precarious economic condition also suggests that Moscow recognizes that the MPLA may take some dramatic steps to get out of an increasingly untenable position. Recent articles in *New Times*, *Za Rubezhom*, and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* have provided alarming details about Angola's predicament: that 60 percent of the country's bridges and 90 percent of its transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggressors; that tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted in January 1984; that Luanda is experiencing a shortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of refugees from the south; and that not only the territorial integrity but the independence of the young republic has been endangered

In Mozambique

In comparison to Angola, Moscow's options in Mozambique are much more limited since Machel's dramatic about-face in his dealings with South Africa. Still, the friendly reception accorded Machel during his February trip to Moscow reflects the Soviets' desire to maintain a role and presence in Mozambique. We believe they will try to sustain the military assistance relationship—as they have in Tanzania and Guinea—despite the recent setback to their interests. Indeed, deliveries of MIG-21s have continued apace since the accords with Pretoria were signed. As for economic assistance, however, Moscow is unlikely to make any new commitments while Machel continues to accommodate Pretoria. The Soviets have shown little sympathy for Mozambique's plight during the current drought, although they have highlighted their recent food aid commitments to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

In Relations With SWAPO and the ANC

The Soviets will try to channel additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC wherever possible. Moscow's efforts on their behalf, however, could increasingly strain its relations with Angola and Mozambique. The US Embassy in Maputo, for example, reports that local security officials were surprised and uneasy about the amounts and quality of weapons uncovered in recent confiscations of ANC arms caches there; they suspect that the Soviets and East Germans had transported this material without approval of the Mozambican Government

Both the Angolans and the Mozambicans may well suspect a Soviet hand in any future actions by SWAPO or the ANC—such as terrorist attacks or bombings in Namibia or South Africa—that might undermine their accords with Pretoria. Moscow's public emphasis on the need to continue the liberation struggle is likely to compound such suspicions. Similar problems for the Soviets could arise in the other Frontline States, which, despite their public professions of solidarity with SWAPO and the ANC, are reluctant to provoke South African reprisals

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SWAPO and the ANC, in turn, are likely to be concerned that Moscow might sacrifice their interests in order to strengthen its position in Luanda and Maputo. Both liberation movements have been upgrading their ties to the Chinese, but they will ultimately be more dependent on the USSR as a result of the Angolan and Mozambican agreements with South Africa. Indeed, SWAPO and the ANC probably attach greater importance to Soviet backing than ever before, in hopes that Moscow's continued support of the liberation struggle may force Luanda and Maputo to help them also. Without access to camps and transit points in Angola and Mozambique, respectively, SWAPO and the ANC would be seriously hampered in their efforts to continue the armed struggle.

Elsewhere in Africa

The Soviets may be concerned that the recent accords with South Africa might be perceived by other African states as evidence of the USSR's inability or unwillingness to protect its allies

Most African leaders, however, evidently view the accords as limited tactical moves and are disinclined to attach broader significance to them.

As part of its propaganda effort, the USSR will try to reinforce black African antipathy toward Pretoria by publicizing the various aspects of South African apartheid policies. In March the Soviets promoted a joint ANC-SWAPO press conference in Mali to discuss the plight of blacks in Namibia and South Africa. The Soviets naturally have focused on those issues where they share a common position with the black African states. Soviet media, for example, have highlighted the calls of all the Frontline leaders that South Africa implement the UN plan for Namibia without linking it to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Similarly, Soviet commentaries have quoted the public statements of Zambian President Kaunda (that South Africa is using its peace initiative to buy time and delay Namibian independence) to reinforce the long-standing Soviet theme that Pretoria is acting in bad faith

Black African Response to the Recent Accords

While many black African leaders have offered cautiously favorable comments about the recent agreements with Pretoria, they are reluctant to say anything that might be interpreted as approving South African behavior, lest they indirectly relieve international pressure on Pretoria to reform its domestic policies. At the same time, some Africans, such as the Ethiopians, have refrained from publicly criticizing the accords in order to avoid embarrassing "brother Africans," according to the US Embassy in Dakar.

The negotiations with Pretoria have elicited a mixed reaction from the Frontline States not directly involved. Tanzania and Zimbabwe have only been lukewarm in expressing support. Zambia and Botswana are more supportive of the negotiations, but do not trust South Africa and are fearful that the settlement effort will fail. Many African leaders outside the immediate region are less interested in the negotiations, but have indicated their understanding that severe security and economic problems led Luanda and Maputo to deal with Pretoria. Those countries that are privately critical of the negotiations often have focused on the risk that the interests of SWAPO and the ANC will be sacrificed. Even Zairian President Mobutu has expressed such concerns, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.

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Director of Central Intelligence

Top Secret (a)

CIA CPAS NID 87-209JX

National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
8 September 1987

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CPAS NID 87-209JX

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
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Military Developments, 7 September 1987




Top Secret

ANGOLA: Government Offensive Gains

Angolan Government forces are advancing to a showdown battle for the UNITA-held town of Mavinga. Despite insurgent harassment, two columns moving from the north have pushed ahead up to 30 miles (48 kilometers) in the past week, and another column has completed a detour around a river in its path and is moving slowly eastward. The government also is working on a replacement for the bridge at Cuito Cuanavale—destroyed by UNITA saboteurs on 26 August—to permit a resupply convoy to cross. Meanwhile, South Africa has sent additional fighters and attack aircraft to bases within striking distance of the battlefield

Comment: UNITA had counted on its harassment of the government columns and the severing of the supply line to slow the advance. The insurgents probably have been falling back to the more open terrain where UNITA's antitank weapons will be more effective. The insurgents have said they would defend Mavinga; the airstrip there is intact, indicating UNITA is not ready to retreat. South Africa's air movements show Pretoria is concerned by the government advance, but a decision to intervene probably will depend on how UNITA does in the coming fighting.



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Weekly Summary

Secret

CI WS 76-038
No. 0038/76
September 17, 1976

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September 17, 1976

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary

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ANGOLA-PORTUGAL

The foreign ministers of Portugal and Angola are to meet soon to work out details for re-establishing diplomatic ties, which were broken in April when Angola charged Portugal with supporting opponents of the Popular Movement.

The announcement followed an exchange of views in Luanda—held at Angolan President Neto's request—between officials of Portugal's governing Socialist Party and Angolan leaders. The visiting delegation found the Angolans eager to restore formal relations; [redacted] ambassadors could be in place by the end of September. Portugal plans to send a team of economic specialists to Luanda soon.

The Angolans apparently are anxious to speed the return of Portuguese technicians. They also clearly hope that Portugal will help them establish broader links with Europe and other contacts that would facilitate Angola's admission to the UN.

Angola's economy needs Western technology and markets if it is to revive quickly. The country's lucrative commercial agriculture and diamond mining, for example, need access to the West before they can return to normal operations.

[redacted]

Neto's political strength and his self-confidence are growing. In the months immediately following the Popular Movement's victory in the civil war last February, Neto and the Movement's other political leaders—mostly mulattos—were kept from establishing a policy of nonalignment by black radicals in the party's military hierarchy. The radicals appear to have forced the break with Lisbon in April.

During recent months Neto has been considerably more visible and vocal than he was earlier in the year. He has given many speeches and interviews in which he has stressed multiracialism and nonalignment and denounced party disunity.

Neto's efforts to broaden his country's international contacts are not likely to go unchallenged by radicals in the Popular Movement, who have close ties with the Cubans and Soviets who are providing the regime vital military and other assistance.

Neto, a strong nationalist, probably would like to reduce the Cuban presence substantially, but he is in no position to do so while present military and economic conditions prevail in Angola, and he lacks other sources of assistance. A substantial Cuban presence—probably on the order of at least 10,000 troops and advisers—appears likely for some time.



President Neto

[redacted]

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USIB
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

National Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

May 3, 1976

No 697

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National Intelligence Bulletin

May 3, 1976

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National Intelligence Bulletin

May 3, 1976

ANGOLA

Angolan ports indicates that Cuban merchant ships continue to move military equipment to southern Angola.

three Cuban ships berthed in Lobito; one had five T-34 tanks, an unidentified armored vehicle, and two oil trucks on deck. We cannot determine whether the equipment was being loaded or unloaded, but the presence of tanks on deck indicates that the ship probably was shuttling equipment over short distances, such as from Luanda to Lobito.

Luanda in early April showed what appeared to be three PT-76 light tanks, 15 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, and support vehicles in open storage, in addition to one Cuban freighter at dockside.

Over the past month the Cuban-supported Popular Movement has been shifting its armed forces southward to support operations against guerrillas and as a counter to South African forces in neighboring Namibia

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CIA/CG/NID 78-288 JX

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December 12, 1978

South Africa: Aircraft in Namibia

South Africa has stationed Mirage F1 fighter aircraft in northern Namibia for the first time, significantly enhancing its air combat capability near the Angolan border. The move probably reflects South Africa's concern over an increase in Cuban air activity in southern Angola or its belief that the Cubans and Angolans may be strengthening their ground forces there.

[redacted]

five of the Mirage F1s and three older Mirage IIIs at Ondangua airfield, some 60 kilometers south of the Angolan border. Two of the older Mirages were at the base late last month, the first time we had seen fighter aircraft in Namibia. Twelve combat helicopters and eight small straight-wing aircraft—probably used for reconnaissance—were also at Ondangua, making a total of 28 military-related aircraft there.

[redacted]

South African military personnel in Namibia have been concerned about Cuban MIG-21 air operations in southern Angola. They may believe they need the F1, which is more advanced and has a longer range than the older Mirage IIIs. In recent months, the Cubans have increased the number of fighter aircraft in southern Angola, but these may be intended primarily to support Cuban and Angolan ground forces fighting Angolan insurgents. The South Africans may also view increased Angolan and Cuban ground activity in southern Angola as a potential threat to Namibia.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TOT: 160320Z JUL 88 DIRECTOR 158885

SECRET [redacted]
BRIEF 160320Z DIRECTOR 158885
TO: PRIORITY LATIN AMERICA BRIEF.

[redacted]

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 88-165 FOR 16 JULY 1988.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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TOT: 160320Z JUL 88 DIRECTOR 158885

[redacted]

2. ANGOLA-CUBA: CUBAN FORCES SPOTTED AT CALUEQUE

A CUBAN-ANGOLAN FORCE, INCLUDING ELEMENTS OF A TANK COMPANY, SA-9 MOBILE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, HAS MOVED INTO THE AREA OF THE CALUEQUE DAM JUST NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER, [redacted] THE UNIT MAY BE A RECONNAISSANCE PATROL, ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE OF NEW DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SUGGESTS LUANDA AND HAVANA INTEND TO OCCUPY THE SITE PERMANENTLY. [redacted] A CUBAN TACTICAL GROUP HAS ADVANCED SOUTHWARD TO A POSITION ABOUT 10 MILES (16 KILOMETERS) NORTH OF THE CALUEQUE AREA, AND OTHER UNITS APPEAR TO BE REDEPLOYING SOUTHWARD AS WELL. [redacted]

COMMENT: HAVANA PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT BY TAKING UP POSITIONS AT THE BORDER AND THE DAM--VACATED BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FOLLOWING CUBAN AIR ATTACKS IN LATE JUNE--IT CAN INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON PRETORIA IN CONTINUING TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS. HAVANA MAY ALSO INTEND TO HOLD OUT THE POSSIBILITY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS OF REPAIRING THE DAM--WHICH HAD SUPPLIED VIRTUALLY ALL THE WATER TO DROUGHT-STRICKEN NORTHERN NAMIBIA--AS A TACTIC TO REDUCE TENSIONS, SCORE PROPAGANDA GAINS, AND EXACT CONCESSIONS IN THE TALKS. CUBAN FORCES WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRESENCE ALONG THE NAMIBIAN BORDER, ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES PROBABLY WOULD LIKE TO AVOID MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS WHILE TALKS CONTINUE. [redacted]

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Africa Review

5 August 1988

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Africa Review

Articles

Angola: Dithering on Economic Reform

Angola has long talked about economic reform but done little to implement changes that would boost economic performance. The limited action that Luanda has taken so far has been designed to gain IMF membership and needed Western aid and debt rescheduling. Barriers to economic reform include opposition from hardline Marxist government officials, probably supported by Cuban advisers, who are unwilling to reconcile socialist principles with economic necessity. Liberalization of the economy would also undercut privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite. Moreover, the government is currently preoccupied with negotiations aimed at the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, President dos Santos is committed to the idea of economic reform, despite ambivalence about how far it should go, and we believe Luanda will implement at least a watered-down reform program by sometime next year.

Background

Angola's economic reforms, still largely in the planning stage, are intended principally to improve management and production efficiency in agriculture, manufacturing, and distribution. Devised by the second party congress of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in December 1985, the reform program was virtually moribund for more than a year thereafter because of opposition by hardline Marxists and halfhearted support from dos Santos and key members of the government's economic team, such as Minister of State for Production van Dunem Loy. In mid 1987, however, dos Santos began to try to breathe new life into the program to offset the impact of the slump in prices for oil--Angola's principal export--at the beginning of 1986.

Dos Santos's effort led to the initiation in January 1988 of a two stage Economic-Financial Reorganization (Saniamento Economico Financiero, or SEF) program, the first stage of which is scheduled to be completed by 1990. Although the Peoples Assembly subsequently passed five measures to lay out guidelines for the program, they remain unsigned by dos Santos, and action has been limited to ancillary programs to gain IMF membership and acquire needed Western aid and debt rescheduling.

Why Economic Reform?

"You can't have products without producing them." -- Minister of Internal Trade Joaquim Guerreiro Dias.

The push for economic reform grew out of the Angolan government's belated recognition that the longstanding war with UNITA is only partly responsible for the non-oil economy's dismal record since independence. Despite sharp increases in oil production in recent years, data in the press indicate that all non-oil sectors have contracted virtually nonstop since independence in 1975.

The MPLA government cited declining living standards, low labor productivity, huge public domestic and foreign debt, and scarcities of foreign exchange in November 1987 as reasons for implementing the SEF. The SEF draft document also admitted that the government was ill-equipped to monopolize economic activity. Dos Santos declared last May that Angola must stop using the "old alibi" of the war to explain economic failures, and "admit courageously...the excessive centralization...of socialist planning, bureaucratization

of economic management, disorganization and poor managment of enterprises, and galloping indiscipline and corruption.

We disagree with a more cynical view expressed by some observers in Luanda that the SEF is designed solely as a ploy to attract IMF approval of Angola's membership bid, and that Luanda has no intention of implementing the program. Sketchy reporting indicates that the SEF draft proposals roughly parallel measures often associated with IMF conditions for standby loans, including devaluation, reduced budget deficits, tightened credit restrictions, an expanded role for private enterprise, and a sharp increase in efforts to attract foreign investment. Statements by MPLA officials also seem to bear out both the purposeful modeling of the program after IMF conditionality and the claim that the government hopes that the program will be helpful in attracting IMF support. We believe, however, that the abundance of high-level, credible public debate and discussion about the SEF lends credence to the argument that the government's purpose--in addition to attracting IMF support--is also to improve economic performance.

The SEF Program--More Debate than Action

"The issue centers, on the one hand, on the need for the economy to be efficient so socialism can be built and, on the other hand, the need to preserve the ethical principles of socialism to protect the worker." -- An Angolan official.

Before the program was started last January, press accounts stressed that it would be modeled after reformist patterns of East European socialism--particularly that of Hungary--rather than Western capitalism. These accounts said that the program would be put under the direction of a technical team established within an Angolan-Hungarian secretariat, and that the Hungarians would be the chief advisers on its implementation.

Other press accounts, however, indicate that the model that dos Santos and other supporters of the SEF have in mind remains similar to the East European reformist economies, in which major industries deemed to be "strategic" are maintained under government control and operation, and activities such as retail trade, handicrafts, and small farming are opened to individual enterprise.

Despite extensive rhetorical support for reform, Luanda has not undertaken any modification of its socialist system so far, and the government and the black marketeers remain the only actors in the economic arena. There have been no moves toward devaluation, credit control, privatizing government corporations, and increasing financial incentives:

- No date has been set for devaluing Angola's currency,

- Some official rhetoric appears to pinpoint a number of economic sectors--retail and transit trade, transportation, construction, agriculture, and handicrafts--as "areas favorable to development of the private sector," but other discussions by dos Santos note that the intention of the SEF is "not to reprivatise," but only to introduce financial incentives in order to make management more efficient.

- Which state corporations would be privatized and what degree of direct government control would be maintained over those remaining in the state sector also are being defined and debated, and technocrats are still working on new labor laws, banking legislation, and rules for management of treasury assets

Nevertheless, ancillary measures have begun to pay off for Luanda in its push for debt rescheduling from Western countries and for IMF membership. Following dos Santos's trip to Western Europe in late 1987, Luanda reached debt rescheduling agreements with France

Angola: The "Candonga"

The four major black markets in Luanda are known as the "Tourado," "Roque Santeiro," "Cala A Boca," and "Tira Biquina," according to press reports.[1] They are headed by Angolan refugees from Zaire ("Zairotas"), and are located in the vicinity of the city's large dumps. Likened to "poison mushrooms in the Angolan economy" by government officials, they are not subject to price control, taxation, or policing. Although illegal, they are not actively impeded by the government, and are accepted by the citizenry as necessary to daily survival. Similar markets exist in Angola's other principal cities, such as Huamba, Lubango, and Menongue

Press reports indicate that, in contrast to bare government stores, virtually any item, from peanuts to television sets, can by purchased at the black markets, but that prices are extremely high. A sample of recent prices at the official exchange rate, for example, indicated average levels of about $270 for a pair of pants, $500 for a pair of men's shoes, $32 for a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of corn flour, $17 for a tube of toothpaste, and $5,900 for a bicycle

[1] Roughly translated, "Tourado," which may be derived from the term for bull fighting, is related to the concept of fierce competition where elbowing and pushing is required to have success; "Roque Santeiro" is the name of a character suspected of dealing in the black market in a popular Brazilian soap opera shown on Angolan TV; "Cala A Boca" stems from the idea that if someone does something for you, you must "keep your mouth shut!"; and "Tira Biquini," arises from the perception that prices are so high and bargaining so ruthless that one runs the risk of being traded out of their underwear (bikini)

($105 million), the United Kingdom ($48 million), Austria ($11 million), Denmark ($8 million), and Belgium ($5 million). These were followed more recently by an agreement with Brazil ($63 million). Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Portugal also are rescheduling repayments. Angola has applied for IMF and World Bank membership, and expects to discuss membership and loan eligibility with missions from these two institutions later this year

The potential for improved economic performance on the premise that the SEF program will be implemented probably has helped attract foreign aid and investment. Major recent aid commitments include $50 million for agricultural projects from France, $300 million over three years for irrigation, fisheries, and transport from Italy, and $75 million for emergency food aid from the EC. In addition to heavy investment in oil production, sketchy press reporting indicates some foreign interest in such diverse projects as pharmaceutical processing and storage complexes (Indian, British, and French companies), and truck assembly and repair (Brazil).

Obstacles to Implementation

"The major risk is eclecticism, improvisation's twin sister." -- MPLA Central Committee Secretariat.

Luanda faces major obstacles to implementing the portions of the SEF program that would turn the domestic economy toward liberalized socialism. Many hardline government officials, probably with the support of Cuban advisers, are unwilling to reconcile socialist ideals with economic practicalities

Although dos Santos has come out strongly in favor of the program in numerous speeches, his actions so far reflect ambivalence on how much reform he is willing to tolerate. Soon after he initiated the SEF program, dos Santos fired its leading opponent--Maria Mambo Cafe--

and assumed her portfolio as Minister of State for Economic and Social Affairs himself. More recently, however, he fired one of the chief architects of the program, Jose Manuel Cerqueira, and the director of the technical team charged with implementing SEF measures, Mario Nelson Maximilo, (both described as "Angolan yuppies") on the grounds that they were too outspoken in their support for change and were deviating too much from socialist principles

The loss of Cerqueira and Maximilo will aggravate the severe shortage of qualified technicians and managers and further impede implementation of the program, in our judgment. The dearth of capable people already has contributed to imprecision and muddled language that have forced several revisions in early drafts of the SEF guidelines. Press reporting indicates confusion and uncertainty among MPLA party officials about many practical issues likely to be raised by reform. Debate is continuing, for example, on the problems of dealing with unemployment that would likely result from forcing enterprises to operate efficiently, and on whether and how to lure existing black market businesses into legal operations so they would be subject to government taxes and regulations

Other issues still under discussion in official circles relate to devaluation, rationing, and hoarding:

- Any large devaluation apparently would have serious--but undefined--consequences for Luanda's earnings from oil exports under the terms of existing contracts with the Western oil companies operating the oil wells, according to press reports. The SEF program, however, has little chance of being effective without devaluation, in view of current black market exchange rates that range as high as 70 times the official rate--more than 2,000 kwanzas per $1 versus an official rate of 29.68 kwanzas per $1.

- Whether, and how soon, the "food basket" system of rationing should be dropped in favor of market distribution is another point of contention because the existing system apparently favors ruling Party officials.


- Debate also is continuing on how to tax large stocks of kwanzas accumulated by individuals from black market activities.

Outlook

We believe that Luanda will implement at least a watered-down version of the SEF program, but that this may not occur until 1989. Pressure for fast action has been relieved somewhat by increased foreign exchange earnings from oil exports, up from about $1.9 billion in 1987 to nearly $2.4 billion this year. Angolan policymakers also may hope that pressures for economic reform may be eased if a settlement can be reached with South Africa in US-brokered talks that would lead to a phased Cuban troop withdrawal and would lessen the costs of prosecuting the civil war. In any case, the need for Luanda to focus diplomatic resources on peace talks with Pretoria almost certainly has pushed the SEF program onto the back burner, and may even have led dos Santos to shelve the issue temporarily

Nevertheless, officials at the head of the reform effort, including van Dunem Loy, appear to remain hopeful that implementation measures will be approved and published this fall. Although dos Santos is preoccupied with negotiating an end to the war, we believe that he continues to support the SEF, and will try to mend the damage done by firing Cerqueira and Maximilo as soon as it is politically feasible. Moreover, if the IMF moves to accept Angola's membership application, it could induce Luanda to accelerate the pace of reform, in our judgment

This article is Secret



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The National Intelligence Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

Copy No.

THURSDAY NOVEMBER 4, 1976 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 258

Angola: Additional Post for Neto

Angolan President Agostinho Neto is assuming the functions of prime minister, thereby becoming head of government as well as chief of state and party leader of the Popular Movement. This announcement was included in a lengthy statement issued after a recently concluded plenary session of the party's Central Committee. No new position has been announced for former prime minister Nascimento.

The statement also sets forth a broad-ranging program for Angola's political and economic development that carries a strong Marxist thrust, calling for goals to be pursued in the context of "scientific socialism." This follows Neto's signature in Moscow last month of a USSR-Angola "friendship treaty" and a party-to-party agreement.

The new program and Neto's becoming Angola's paramount political figure may have constituted a package put together to accommodate factional differences within the Popular Movement. Some elements of the program differ considerably from policies that Neto earlier espoused.

Heretofore, Neto has been identified with efforts to broaden Angola's economic and political ties with the West and to follow a policy of nonalignment. The statement includes references to such



Agostinho Neto

(See Neto. . .Page 4)


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S. Africa - Angola: Guerrillas

South African military support for the National Union forces of Angolan dissident leader Jonas Savimbi is continuing, [redacted] As a follow-on to earlier contacts, in which the South Africans provided the guerrillas with tactical radio units and made arrangements to provide intelligence on Cuban and Angolan troop dispositions in southern Angola, South African military officials recently agreed to begin training National Union guerrillas.

The training to begin this month—reportedly inside Angola—is intended to prepare platoon-sized teams that will be targeted against Cuban forces in the Cunene area of southern Angola near the Namibian border. The South Africans also reportedly agreed to supply the National Union with infrared equipment to improve its capabilities at night.

South Africa, still smarting from its unsuccessful intervention in the Angolan civil war, apparently hopes to use the National Union to disrupt the Angolan government's efforts to consolidate its authority in southern Angola, and to keep Angola from eventually aiding guerrilla operations into Namibia by the South West Africa People's Organization. Until recently, SWAPO has operated out of Zambia, but it is anxious to establish itself in Angola.



Angolan and Cuban forces have moved into southern Angola in large numbers in recent months, and in view of Pretoria's awareness of the adverse diplomatic consequences of a new military adventure in Angola, South Africa seems unlikely to send personnel into that country. The South Africans could train National Union forces safely in Namibia. [redacted]

Neto. . .

From Page 1

policies, but places heavy stress on Angola's special relations with the USSR and Cuba.

In the economic sector, the new program calls for strong state control over the economy through nationalization and centralized planning. Provision is made for a private sector, but it is to be subjected to strict controls. Until now, the Angolan government has appeared anxious to maintain Angola's access to Western markets and technology.

The Popular Movement is charged with a major role in mobilizing popular support for the regime. It will have direct authority over all mass organizations and will assume the functions of the Information Ministry, which is to be abolished. It is possible that other changes in the structure of the government may be in the offing. Rumors to this effect have been circulating in Luanda since Neto returned from Moscow.

The Central Committee also approved a five-year plan for reorganizing and upgrading the country's armed forces. This will undoubtedly be carried out under Soviet and Cuban direction.

The Central Committee's announcement is not likely to sit well with some of Angola's neighbors, who were upset by the Soviet-Angolan friendship treaty. [redacted] following signing of the treaty Zambian President Kaunda ordered the suspension of further moves to improve relations with Angola until its relations with the USSR are clarified.

The announcement is also likely to be viewed by Zairian President Mobutu as confirmation of his belief that Angola is a Soviet client [redacted]

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Weekly Summary

Secret

CI WS 76-031
No. 0031/76
July 30, 1976

№ 1398

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July 30, 1976

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

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4 Western Hemisphere
Cuba-Angola; Peru

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
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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary

C00466803



One of five Cuban merchant ships, the Vietnam Heroico, photographed returning from Angola on July 24

Western Hemisphere

CUBA-ANGOLA

With Angolan President Agostinho Neto looking on, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, in his annual address on July 26, pledged that Cuban military units and weapons will remain in Angola until that country's armed forces are organized, equipped, trained, and capable of guaranteeing national security.

Castro acknowledged that he is withdrawing military personnel no longer needed in Angola but gave no hint as to the number involved or the pace of the pull-out. He promised Neto that troops would be sent again if the need arose, but he stressed Havana's intention to provide technical cooperation in a variety of fields to help Angola rebuild and eventually overcome underdevelopment. In a speech that preceded Castro's, Neto said large numbers of troops are no longer required, but he emphasized his country's need for Cuban advisers and technical experts.

Both leaders seemed to be making a deliberate effort to play down the Cuban involvement in Angola, presumably because of their sensitivity to the fact it is not entirely accepted by the Cuban population. Castro said there now are several hundred Cuban technicians working in Angola and "it may be necessary to have 2,000 or 3,000 Cubans" working there in public health, construction, education, fishing, agriculture, and the sugar and coffee industries.

We believe 3,000 Cuban technicians may already have arrived, and we expe... this figure to climb rapidly, in part as a result of Neto's visit. Judging from the composition of the large Neto delegation, considerable planning for the future Cuban role in Angola has been taking place since the delegation's arrival on July 22. Neto brought with him senior political, economic, and military officials, as well as representatives from local government, unions, and mass organizations.

Cuban Convoy from Angola

A convoy of five Cuban merchant ships is bringing men and equipment from Angola. Three of the ships have carried troops before; men in fatigues were sighted on the decks of several. The men could be Cuban troops or Angolans being sent to Cuba for advanced military training. Two of the ships were due to arrive at Santiago de Cuba on July 29; the remainder will probably put in at the military port of Mariel west of Havana. This is the third convoy, and apparently the largest, since the Cubans began using the convoy system in May

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PRIORITY

FRP: . . . . . .

STAFF

[redacted]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

84 5744694 ASP

PAGE 001
TOT: 200649Z NOV 84 DIRECTOR 156362

~~S E C R E~~ [redacted]
BRIEF 200649Z DIRECTOR 156362
TO: PRIORITY LATIN AMERICA BRIEF.

[redacted] CIA/CDAS LAB 84-266

[redacted]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 84-266 FOR 20 NOVEMBER 1984.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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1. USSR-CUBA - SOUTHERN AFRICA: RECOGNITION OF LINKAGE
2. [redacted]
3
4.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1. USSR - CUBA - SOUTHERN AFRICA: CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

//MOSCOW AND HAVANA HAVE IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE LINKAGE BETWEEN A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA [redacted].

//OFFICIAL SOVIET AND CUBAN MEDIA--PRAVDA AND GRANMA--HAVE

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84 5744694 ASP PAGE 002 TOT: 200649Z NOV 84 DIRECTOR 156362

REPORTED ON ANGOLAN PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS'S SPEECH TO A CLOSED OAU SESSION IN WHICH HE OFFERED A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND A CUTOFF OF SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT TO UNITA. THE GRANMA ARTICLE, WHICH APPEARED TWO DAYS BEFORE THE PRAVDA ITEM, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US HAD PASSED THE ANGOLAN PROPOSALS TO SOUTH AFRICA BUT DENIED THAT HAVANA WAS BEING EXCLUDED FROM ANY DECISIONS CONCERNING THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA.

//THE PRAVDA ACCOUNT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE US ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, STATING THAT ''THE US HAS AGAIN BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADOPT A SERIOUS APPROACH TO A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT.''

COMMENT: //THE DOS SANTOS SPEECH AT THE OAU PROBABLY COMPELLED MOSCOW AND HAVANA TO ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY FOR THE FIRST TIME THE RECENT FLURRY IN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. BY TACITLY ACCEPTING THE PROPOSALS, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS MAY HOPE TO LOCK DOS SANTOS INTO HIS CURRENT POSITION THE MEDIA ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW AND HAVANA ALSO WANT TO AVOID BEING PERCEIVED AS OBSTACLES TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT.//

//THE USSR AND CUBA PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT PRETORIA WILL NOT ACCEPT DOS SANTOS'S PROPOSAL AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY US DIPLOMACY AND SOUTH AFRICAN INTRANSIGENCE WILL COME UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. NONETHELESS, THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT US EFFORTS MAY RESULT IN A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT THAT WILL UNDERMINE THEIR POSITION IN ANGOLA.//

//BY EMPHASIZING ITS TOTAL SUPPORT OF THE ANGOLAN PROPOSAL IN THE CUBAN PRESS, HAVANA ALSO IS TRYING TO EASE THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF A DIPLOMATIC SETBACK BY CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, CUBAN LEADERS RISK RAISING POPULAR EXPECTATIONS CONCERNING THE RETURN OF TROOPS FROM AN INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR FOREIGN ADVENTURE.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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STAFF

[redacted]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

83 2541939 ASR

PAGE 001
TOT: 020009Z NOV 83 DIRECTOR 732806

S E C R E T [redacted]
BRIEF 020009Z DIRECTOR 732806 CIA CPAS EB 83-212
TO: EUROPEAN BRIEF.

[redacted]

EUROPEAN BRIEF OCPAS EUR 83-212 FOR 1 NOVEMBER 1983.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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1. [redacted]

2. USSR-ANGOLA: SOVIET SUPPORT

1. [redacted]

[redacted]

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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83 2541999 ASR PAGE 002
TOT: 020009Z NOV 83 DIRECTOR 732806

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

[redacted]

2. USSR-ANGOLA: SOVIET SUPPORT

SUCCESSES BY THE UNITA INSURGENTS IN ANGOLA ARE PROMPTING THE SOVIETS TO STEP UP MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS [redacted]

A SOVIET NAVAL TASK GROUP NOW SAILING SOUTHWEST ALONG THE WEST AFRICAN COAST IS HEADED FOR A PORT CALL IN ANGOLA. THE GROUP INCLUDES THE USSR'S NEWEST AIRCRAFT CARRIER, A CRUISER, AND A FRIGATE. A LARGE LANDING SHIP WITH NAVAL INFANTRY ON BOARD IS NOW TRAILING BEHIND [redacted]

LAST MONTH THE NUMBER OF SOVIET-PILOTED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DIRECTLY SUPPORTING ANGOLAN MILITARY OPERATIONS WAS INCREASED TO 12--THE MOST EVER SENT TO A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY. [redacted]

//LUANDA ALSO RECENTLY RECEIVED ITS FIRST SA-6 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AND MI-24 HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. AN ANGOLAN DELEGATION, INCLUDING THE DEFENSE MINISTER, VISITED MOSCOW IN SEPTEMBER AND

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83 2541999 ASR PAGE 003
TOT: 020009Z NOV 83 DIRECTOR 732806

REPORTEDLY ASKED FOR MORE ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS

COMMENT: //THE NEW EQUIPMENT IS NOT LIKELY TO ENABLE ANGOLAN GOVERMENT FORCES TO SLOW UNITA GUERRILLA OPERATIONS. THE ENHANCED ANTIAIRCRAFT CAPABILITY, HOWEVER, MAY INHIBIT SOUTH AFRICAN AIR OPERATIONS ALONG THE CUBAN-BACKED FORWARD DEFENSE LINES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

//THESE DELIVERIES CONTINUE A TREND OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. MOSCOW MAY FURTHER EXPAND ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BUT IT PROBABLY WILL NOT HELP ALLEVIATE THE EQUALLY GRAVE ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH WOULD BE MORE COSTLY TO CORRECT.//

//THE SHIPMENTS INDICATE GROWING SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION AND MOSCOW'S READINESS TO PROTECT ITS INVESTMENT. THE NAVAL TASK GROUP MAY MOVE ON TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, BUT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT THE VISIT IN LUANDA WILL FURTHER DEMONSTRATE THEIR RESOLVE TO BACK THE DOS SANTOS GOVERNMENT.//

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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Weekly Summary

~~Secret~~
No. 0001/76
January 2, 1976
CI WS 76-001
Copy Nº 1399

C00468653

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CONTENTS *(January 2, 1976)*

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

MIDDLE EAST

AFRICA

1 Angola: Tempo Up

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary

ANGOLA: TEMPO UP

Military Situation


With the Organization of African Unity's emergency summit on Angola less than two weeks off, the tempo of fighting in Angola is likely to pick up as the two rival regimes attempt to impress African leaders with their strength.

In eastern Angola, the National Union claimed last week to have captured the important railway town of Teixeira de Sousa. A separate National Union group that set out from Luso for the Popular Movement's major base at Henrique de Carvalho remains stalled at the Cassai River. Popular Movement forces have destroyed bridges across the river and have established new defensive positions north of the river. South of Luso, Union troops continue mopping-up operations against Popular Movement remnants.

In the west-central sector, the Popular Movement apparently remains in firm control of Quibala after several weeks of sharp fighting. The fighting around Quibala has confirmed that the Popular Movement now has some T-34 tanks in the field along with Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank missiles.

In the north, the Popular Movement is preparing to renew its offensive against Ambriz, the National Front's headquarters. An earlier drive bogged down because bridges had been destroyed and rivers were swollen by seasonal rains. The Popular Movement has now managed to place at least one bridge across the Lifune River and has put a small force on the other side.

The Popular Movement has already stepped up its pressure in a wide area south of Negage, with the objective of taking Carmona, an important Front stronghold. This week Front forces reportedly were pushed back from Camabatela on the main road to Negage.





Jonas Savimbi

Political Developments

The continuing publicity being given South African intervention on behalf of the Popular Movement's rivals has increased the pressure on uncommitted African states to come out in favor of the Popular Movement. Last week, two more OAU members—Ghana and Burundi—recognized Agostinho Neto's Luanda-based regime, raising to 17 the number of formal Popular Movement backers in the 46-member OAU. The new total includes Equatorial Guinea, whose recognition of the Popular Movement last November was only recently confirmed.

National Union leader Savimbi and National Front president Roberto have launched a major propaganda campaign aimed at trying to ease the stigma of collaboration with South Africa and to dramatize Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola. Savimbi and Roberto hope to prevent outright recognition of the Neto regime at the summit and to work for a resolution condemning all outside intervention and calling for a cease-fire and a government of national unity.

Soviet Position Hardens

Moscow has stiffened its public support for the Popular Movement in response to statements by high US officials urging an end to Soviet involvement in Angola. In a strongly worded commentary on Christmas eve, *Izvestia* firmly reiterated that detente does not mean that Moscow will stop supporting revolutionary movements. *Izvestia* asserted that efforts by "some" Western circles to portray Soviet backing of the MPLA as inconsistent with detente are pointless.

The Soviets, meanwhile, are not counting the US out of the Angola game just because of controversy in Washington over the issue. Tass director Zamyatin, who sometimes acts as unofficial public spokesman for the Kremlin, seemed to discount senatorial opposition to continued US involvement in Angola in remarks made on December 27. He stressed that the Ford administration was determined to overcome the senatorial attempt to curtail appropriations for Angola.

The Soviets are coming down hard on South African intervention in Angola in anticipation of the OAU meeting next week. Moscow can be expected to use what diplomatic leverage it has in Africa to ensure that Pretoria's involvement becomes the focus of summit deliberations.

The Soviets are also urging the Africans to turn a cold shoulder to proposals for a compromise between the contending Angolan factions. The Russians are saying that attempts at unity are "useless" in view of the "criminal alliance" between South Africa and "splitist groups" in Angola

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Intelligence Checklist

January 19, 1976

23

CI IC 76-012 JX

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The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congres

C00470220

Intelligence Checklist

January 19, 1976

WORLD ROUNDUP: *Today at Annex we review briefly some significant developments since the Congress recessed.*

Top Secret Sensitive

C00470220

Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA: *All but pushed out of northern Angola, the National Front is unlikely to regain its military position as long as the Cubans remain with the Popular Movement. With the collapse of the National Front, the Popular Movement is apparently shifting its military operations southward.*

The Front's military misfortunes present Zaire's President Mobutu with some hard choices. He could underwrite a Front insurgency in northern Angola, but this could invite retaliation in kind from the exiled Zairians who are with the Movement.

A more realistic approach would be for Mobutu to strengthen ties with the National Union in central Angola and perhaps support a political coalition between the Union and the Movement.

The Front's collapse in the north has freed Cuban and Movement troops for action against the Union. [redacted] heavy fighting is taking place in central Angola.

This will present problems for South Africa which supports the Union. Pretoria, which withdrew its troops from combat areas prior to the Organization of African Unity summit earlier this month, seems reluctant to become reinvolved. Moreover, it cannot match the USSR and Cuba when it comes to military assistance.

A coalition between the Movement and the Union would require a good deal of pressure on the Movement from other African states, but they may now try to effect some political compromise. [redacted]

[redacted]

Intelligence Checklist

WORLD ROUNDUP

This Annex provides a brief review of some significant developments which have transpired in several parts of the world since the Congress recessed. We will be happy to elaborate on any item should a Member desire.

ANGOLA

National Front defenses in northwest Angola have collapsed in the face of a Cuban-Popular Movement push up the coast north of Luanda. Zairian units with the Front in that sector are so demoralized Zaire's President Mobutu is reluctant to let them back in the country for fear their attitude will rub off on the rest of his army.

With the defeat of the Front in its northern heartland, Popular Movement leaders and their foreign advisers will probably quickly divert more resources to central Angola, where South African troops and mercenaries have been supporting forces of the Front and its putative southern-based ally, the National Union. In the past few weeks, there have been reports of continuing clashes between Front and Union units in this area.

The Soviets and the Cubans have continued to funnel support to the Movement by air and sea. Cuban forces in Angola are now estimated to number about 9,000.

On the political front, the Organization of African Unity summit did not come up with any decisions on the Angola problem. Although the impasse quashed the Movement's bid for official OAU recognition, it probably also killed any further OAU efforts to

--continued

Intelligence Checklist

encourage the formation of a government of national unity in Angola. In the meantime, the Movement's backers can be expected to step up their campaign in Africa for diplomatic recognition. Twenty-two of the 46 OAU member states now recognize the Movement. No government has recognized the Front-Union regime.

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Weekly Summary

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CI WS 76-040
No. 0040/76
October 1, 1976

Copy No 1413

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October 1, 1976

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

1 Middle East - Africa

Angola-USSR; Ethiopia

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary

ANGOLA-USSR

Angolan President Neto will pay an official visit to the USSR early this month, according to an announcement from Moscow. The visit will be in response to a Soviet invitation issued last May, when Angolan Prime Minister Nascimento was in Moscow seeking additional Soviet assistance. The USSR, along with Cuba, remains Angola's principal source of aid.

Neto will use the visit to seek clarification of the Soviet role in Angola's development. Neto reportedly was not pleased with the results of Nascimento's visit, during which the Soviets agreed to only a moderate increase in the military equipment they provide Angola. The Soviets were also reluctant to provide more than a limited number of military advisers and turned down requests for civilian technicians.

From the Soviet standpoint, Neto's visit probably could not be better timed. It presents Soviet leaders with an opportunity to press their attack against US and British efforts toward a Rhodesian settlement.

Neto will probably be cautious, however, about associating himself with any Soviet criticism that could put him out of step with other front-line African presidents because he values his newly acquired status as a member of their group.

The visit could be offset somewhat by Angola's resumption of diplomatic ties with Portugal, which is likely at about the same time. The Angolan and Portuguese foreign ministers were to meet in Cape Verde on September 30 to work out final arrangements. Neto is anxious to resume the ties to balance his foreign relations and broaden his sources of assistance

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The National Intelligence Daily

Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only

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
TUESDAY JANUARY 13, 1976 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 10

Cuban-Backed Angolan Force Pushing North

Troops of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, heavily backed by Cuban troops, are encountering little resistance in their push northward into the tribal area of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

The Front's defensive posture in northern Angola now has collapsed and it is highly unlikely that it will be able to resist further advances by the Popular Movement.

Popular Movement forces on Sunday



captured Toto and Bessa Monteiro, both key points on the Front's eastern flank from Ambrizete; Front forces are now evacuating Ambrizete.

The Front had withdrawn from its headquarters in Ambriz last week, and its forces were forced to withdraw from its last major base in the central part of northern Angola. The Front's only major fall-back position in the north is San Antonio do Zaire.

The Front, nevertheless, is continuing to proclaim victories. A communique released in Zaire yesterday asserted that Front paratroopers had captured Quifangando, some 12 miles from Luanda. The communique is obviously a fabrication designed to obscure the Front's withdrawal and impress the OAU summit now under way in Addis Ababa.

There continue to be reports that Soviet fighter aircraft have been delivered to the Popular Movement

(See Angola, . . Page 4)

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Angola. . .

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ROUTING			
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	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

Top Secret
(Security Classification)

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday September 28, 1976 CI NIDC 76-228C

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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TOP SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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NR

ANGOLA--USSR: Neto to Visit Moscow

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From the Soviet standpoint, Neto's visit probably could not be better timed. It presents Soviet leaders with an opportunity to press their attack against the Rhodesian settlement plan announced last Friday by Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith.

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The visit could be offset somewhat by Angola's expected resumption of diplomatic ties with Portugal at about

the same time. The Angolan and Portuguese foreign ministers are to meet in Cape Verde around October 1 to work out final arrangements. Neto is anxious to resume the ties to balance his foreign relations and broaden his sources of assistance.

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Central Intelligence

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CIA/CPAS NID 84-014JX

National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
18 January 1984

Top Secret

CPAS NID 84-014JX
18 January 1984

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Top Secret

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
Special Analysis

South Africa–Angola: Outlook for Cease-Fire 15

[redacted]

Top Secret

Latest South African Cross-Border Operation



Top Secret

15 January 1984

Top Secret

Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Outlook for Cease-Fire

A lull in the fighting in southern Angola probably is in the offing. Last Friday South Africa announced the complete withdrawal of its conventional forces in Angola, following its largest cross-border operation since 1981. All but a few reconnaissance units are likely to withdraw south of the border in the next few days. Pretoria has indicated that it will begin observing a 30-day trial cease-fire on 31 January to facilitate Western efforts to break the stalemate in the negotiations on Namibia. At the same time, however, Pretoria will maintain the capability to react forcefully and quickly to any efforts by Angolan and SWAPO forces to move back into the salient that South African troops had occupied. A collapse of the cease-fire could result in greater Cuban involvement in the fighting.

The operation that began 6 December involved more airstrikes than were flown during any previous incursion, including some against targets 250 kilometers inside Angola. Minister of Defense Malan claimed in an official press statement on 8 January that South African forces had captured a major SWAPO headquarters; killed a total of 432 Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO troops; and destroyed 25 Soviet-manufactured tanks. Last Saturday British and South African journalists reported observing a convoy of captured Soviet-manufactured equipment being evacuated by South African forces.

Pretoria asserts its forces had been trying to preempt a planned SWAPO incursion into Namibia. South Africa also might have hoped to distract Angolan and Cuban forces from a counteroffensive against UNITA insurgents. A main objective, however, probably was to push Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO forces farther north in preparation for the cease-fire

Pretoria's offer of a cease-fire may have been based on the assumption that a standdown would enable it to maintain a buffer zone north of the Namibia border

continued

Angolan Resistance

Luanda offered stiffer resistance to the South African operations than on any occasion in the past two years. In early December one of several Angolan armored units that had recently deployed to the forward defense line engaged a South African force. Late in the month Angolan and Cuban surface-to-air missile units along the forward defense line fired on South African fighter-bombers for the first time

South African reports claim that on 3 January two Cuban battalions joined a counterattack by Angolan and SWAPO forces against a South African unit. This was the first significant engagement between South African and Cuban forces since the Angolan civil war of 1975-76.

Although South African officials are publicly exuberant about their victory, heavy South African losses have prompted critical editorials in both the English and Afrikaans press. The government has admitted that 21 South African soldiers were killed or are missing.

The Cease-Fire

Neither side is likely to end all military activity during the trial cease-fire. South Africa will continue to conduct aerial reconnaissance to monitor Angolan forces, and ground reconnaissance patrols would operate north of the Namibian border. In press statements Malan has insisted that South Africa would renew operations in southern Angola "regardless of consequences" if Angola or SWAPO took advantage of the truce.

Angola also is likely to send reconnaissance patrols into the area vacated by the South African forces, and these forces could engage South African patrols. Both Angola and SWAPO, however, could profit from a respite from attacks. They probably will not give South Africa an excuse over the next few weeks for reneging on its commitment to withdraw.

The cease-fire is unlikely to hold beyond the trial period—if that long—unless both sides are willing to tolerate minor military engagements.

continued

Cuban and Soviet Roles

The aggressive Cuban posture in the last round of fighting suggests that Havana may play an active role in any fighting that results from the collapse of the cease-fire. The Soviets probably intend to provide more military support to the Angolans, as the arrival of MiG-23 Flogger aircraft in Luanda earlier this month demonstrates.

The discussions in Moscow last week among the Soviets, Cubans, and Angolans are the latest indication that the USSR and Cuba are taking the deteriorating security situation in Angola seriously. The Soviets, however, are likely to continue to allow Havana to take the lead in combat operations

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USSR-ANGOLA: Economic Agreements Announced

Agreements with Angola were signed in Moscow yesterday to develop a fishing complex employing 6,000 persons and to cooperate in constructing oil depots, producing building materials, and starting farm machinery repair workshops. The value of the projects was not disclosed. The USSR has extended about $430 million in economic aid to Angola since 1975, but only about $32 million is believed to have been used

Comment: The timing of the announcement comes on the heels of disclosure that the USSR and Cuba have agreed to provide more military aid to Angola. It suggests a coordinated effort to demonstrate firm backing for Luanda against increased pressures from Pretoria and South African-backed guerrillas. The new aid agreements do not provide for badly needed imports for the deteriorating Angolan economy or for skilled technical services to revitalize idle industries. Luanda also is making efforts to obtain economic aid in the West

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
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Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.



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National Intelligence Bulletin

January 16, 1976

CUBA

Prime Minister Fidel Castro's lackluster defense of Cuba's military role in Angola suggests he is uncomfortable with what has proved to be an unpopular and costly policy.

Speaking before foreign journalists in Havana yesterday, he acknowledged directly for the first time the presence of "Cuban soldiers" in Angola and apparently made no attempt to cloak official sponsorship by claiming that they were volunteers. He also admitted that his troops had suffered casualties, but he would not elaborate.

As other official spokesmen have done, Castro described Cuba's involvement as a reaction to South Africa's intervention. He said that Cuba is in Angola fighting alongside revolutionaries who are combating the US and South Africa. He claimed that no Cuban military units had gone to Angola prior to the South African "invasion" on October 23; in fact, 1,500 or more Cuban military personnel had arrived prior to that date.

Although only an incomplete text of Castro's remarks is available so far, it is clear that he views an improvement in relations with the US as impossible under present circumstances. He claimed that Cuba is "in favor of peace, the policy of detente, and coexistence between states with different social systems," but he insisted that Cuba would not be diverted from support of the Puerto Rican independence movement or the Popular Movement in Angola as the price for improved US ties. He reiterated his oft-stated, uncompromising demand that "for negotiations with us, the economic blockade must be unconditionally lifted."

Castro's use of a press conference rather than a speech to get his message across is significant; he uses this technique to keep from the Cuban people those matters he believes must be addressed in the international sphere but are too sensitive for domestic consumption. His caution on this occasion tends to confirm already substantial reporting that the Angolan war and Cuba's role in it are unpopular subjects among the population [redacted]

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NFB SNIE 21-86

Angola: Short-Term Prospects for UNITA

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Top Secret

SNIE 21-86

February 1986

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SNIE 71-86

ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR UNITA

Information available as of 14 February 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 20 February 1986.

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SCOPE NOTE

We have addressed the significant augmentation of Soviet and Cuban support to Angola and prospects for the future Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola in two recent publications.[1] Neither specifically analyzed the prospects for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in depth. Given the considerable Community and customer interest in this subject, this Estimate looks at the remainder of 1986 from the perspective of UNITA's prospects. It updates the judgments contained in these two previous publications, with which it is essentially consistent [redacted]

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The military campaign for the remainder of 1986 is unlikely to alter the military picture profoundly in favor of either UNITA or the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

The Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) are preparing another major offensive, expected to begin after the rainy season ends in April, which will be the dominant factor in the military situation for most of 1986. We expect FAPLA to advance along two axes with the UNITA-held town of Mavinga as a major objective. Because of logistic, terrain, and weather constraints, the offensive may well be slow in developing. UNITA has been making extensive defensive preparations, bringing in additional troops, and ambushing the government's supply convoys. Although the full extent of the FAPLA attack has not yet been discerned, it will be at least comparable to the 1985 effort (about 10,000 men). (S NF NC)

Key Variables

We see four key variables setting the parameters of military action:

— UNITA tactics and strategy.

— FAPLA weaponry and performance.

— The South African role in combat.

— The level of Soviet/Cuban support to FAPLA. (S NF)

Most Likely Outcome

Although these factors are volatile and interrelated, it is our judgment that the most likely outcome will be a relative standoff, with tactical gains and losses on both sides throughout the year.

UNITA claims to be prepared for the forthcoming FAPLA offensive, and Savimbi has declared that UNITA will utilize a mobile, fluid defense to blunt it. UNITA is also undertaking harassment attacks around the area of FAPLA buildup to try to delay the offensive from forming and is planning new endeavors in northern Angola. We believe that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted from the fielding of improved weaponry and improved performance because of Soviet training and increased Soviet direction as well as from UNITA's underestimation of

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its opponents. FAPLA's close air support and greater use of armored vehicles will continue to give UNITA problems in 1986 but will probably not prove a decisive advantage in the overall campaign. It remains to be seen whether UNITA, with better preparation and reversion to a more mobile defense strategy to which UNITA is more accustomed, can reestablish its overall superiority in terms of basic troop combat capability and offset the improved FAPLA performance

We expect the Soviet involvement in military support to FAPLA to approximate 1985 levels, albeit with possible new surges in military equipment deliveries once the major campaign begins

The Cuban role also will probably remain similar to 1985, although we envision more Cuban-piloted air sorties in support of the offensive, and we anticipate that Cuban-piloted MIGs would attempt to react more aggressively to any South African air intervention, raising the potential for direct air combat.

We cannot judge how the tactical gains and losses will play out in the major campaign in the southeast. Although Mavinga could fall, we believe the major FAPLA offensive in the southeast will probably be contained short of Jamba. UNITA will also continue, if not step up, its activity in northern Angola. We believe, however, that there is a heightened risk that the Cubans and South Africans could be drawn into direct conflic

We see two tactical possibilities that would have some impact on UNITA's overall prospects:

— Should FAPLA garner even limited battlefield successes, such as the temporary capture of Mavinga or other towns in the southeast, it will reinforce the MPLA policy of seeking a military solution to the UNITA insurgency, much as the capture of Cazombo by FAPLA did in 1985. Such successes would be flaunted by the MPLA as "major victories," not only bolstering FAPLA-MPLA morale but also damaging UNITA's prospects in the eyes of many international observers. Moreover, it would be tactically significant if FAPLA could not only take but hold Mavinga, and to a lesser degree Lumbala N'guimbo or Cangamba, where there are airstrips. This could enable FAPLA to interdict UNITA supply lines to the north and provide sites for supporting air attacks deep into UNITA's heartland.

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— On the other hand, should UNITA stop the FAPLA offensive short of Mavinga, avoid the loss of other major towns, and inflict new losses on FAPLA elsewhere, this could revive doubts among some MPLA leaders as to the efficacy of a military solution, as happened in 1983-84. We do not believe that such doubts would have a payoff this year in terms of changing MPLA policy regarding talks with UNITA or the MPLA's making meaningful concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal. We see the prospects for UNITA-MPLA talks in 1986 as virtually nil and the likelihood of meaningful MPLA concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal, a requisite to advance the negotiations, as remote. Should UNITA blunt the offensive without losing major towns and make gains elsewhere, this would heighten UNITA morale and raise the estimation of UNITA's prospects in the eyes of many international observers. UNITA's prospects in 1986 for gaining additional external support appear quite modest, however [redacted]

Alternative Outcomes

The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible:

— ***Greater FAPLA threat scenario.*** If FAPLA produces unexpected successes in its campaign and also provokes extensive South African air or ground interventions in combat, Washington would share the effects of widespread condemnation of the South African intervention, which the Soviets would quite likely succeed in associating with the United States. Although we envision any such South African intervention as immediately successful in blocking a FAPLA advance, the intervention—especially using air assets—would increase the risk of air combat [redacted] The intervention might also compel the Soviets and Cubans to increase support to FAPLA, including increasing equipment deliveries and taking more measures to negate the effects of South African intervention. This scenario would create the framework for heightened prospects of subsequent Cuban–South African military clashes—both within and beyond the time frame of this Estimate. The Soviets might well deliver nonspecific private or public warnings to Pretoria or Washington should South African intervention seriously threaten FAPLA's prospects.

— ***Greater UNITA success scenario.*** Should UNITA do better than expected in blunting the impending FAPLA offensive and

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gaining successes elsewhere, including recapturing ground lost in 1985, the Soviets and Cubans would face tough choices as to how to retrieve the fortunes of FAPLA. We believe in this circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would occur, and the Cubans might well be forced to utilize the 21,000-man Cuban ground force in Angola to bear at least selectively some of the brunt of fighting UNITA [redacted]

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DISCUSSION

1. This paper assesses the prospects for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for the remainder of 1986. We expect the government to launch another major offensive against UNITA's stronghold in southeastern Angola, probably beginning after the rainy season ends in April. We believe that the main target of the coming offensive is likely to be the town of Mavinga, where a key battle took place last fall. The insurgents have made defensive preparations in the path of the anticipated government advance[redacted]

Prospective MPLA Military Initiatives

2. We regard as plausible UNITA's conviction that the attack on Mavinga will be along two axes of advance—south from Cazombo/Lucusse, and southeast from Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale. The lack of roads/tracks in southeastern Angola works to UNITA's advantage because it severely limits possible axes of advance. We believe that this overall effort will take several months to play out, probably not beginning until after drier weather arrives in May. The advances may not be simultaneous and may well involve several actions as an advance is stopped, regrouping takes place, and then the advance is resumed. Such a scenario would be consistent with previous FAPLA (Angolan armed forces) actions, particularly the 1985 fall offensive[redacted]

3. The speed of advance and timing of the offensive will be subject to two significant constraints: weather and logistics. The rainy season floods streams, makes the unimproved roads in the area difficult to pass, especially for FAPLA vehicles, and usually requires several weeks for drying out. In previous offensives, the government's forces have also suffered from lack of logistic support occasioned by difficult terrain, organizational weaknesses, and particularly UNITA's tactics of ambushing and interdicting the forces supporting advancing units. As a result, FAPLA required significant deliveries of water, POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants), and ammunition from air assets, primarily helicopters, during the 1985 offensive as well as earlier offensives. This put great strain on the Air Force, making the government's air assets vulnerable to UNITA fire; many of FAPLA's helicopter losses in the 1985 offensive were reportedly caused by UNITA mortar fire hitting helicopters on the ground as they offloaded supplie[redacted]

4. Other FAPLA initiatives are likely to be reactive to UNITA's military operations. We anticipate some FAPLA effort to consolidate its position in the Cazombo salient. We also anticipate FAPLA sweep operations in the Central Highlands around the cities of Huambo and Kuito and reactive moves in the northwest to counter expected heightened UNITA activity. We do not expect UNITA's actions elsewhere in Angola to deter the main thrust of FAPLA activity into UNITA-held southeastern Angola, although UNITA operations near the capital, Luanda, or the oil production support facilities in the northwest could draw some FAPLA support away to reinforce these sensitive areas.[redacted]


Soviet and Cuban Support

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machineguns, RPGs, and mortars along with ammunition. We detected a surge in South African deliveries, probably ammunition, during FAPLA's July-October 1985 offensive. South Africa is the primary source of POL and spares for UNITA trucks and also provides food, medicines, and some hospital treatment for UNITA casualties. The annual dollar amount of South African materiel support is modest compared with the amounts provided to the MPLA by its allies, albeit increasing. In mid-1985 the MPLA claimed that the dollar value of South African aid to UNITA since 1975 was $60 million. We are unable to put a dollar figure on South African assistance. Much of the equipment probably comes from captured South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) stocks. UNITA pays for at least some of this equipment by bartering diamonds, ivory, and skins. South Africa also provides a very small number of more sophisticated weapons such as SA-7 hand-held antiaircraft missiles and perhaps reloads for captured multiple rocket launchers such as the BM-21 "Stalin organ." South Africa probably also serves as a conduit for modest numbers of weapons either purchased or otherwise obtained by UNITA from foreign sources and markets.

9. South Africa has also maintained a periodic presence in south-central Angola since 1978 to obtain intelligence on SWAPO and to make periodic preemptive strikes on SWAPO guerrilla camps and units. South African military "special forces" are almost certainly attached to UNITA units near areas of SWAPO operations and probably elsewhere as well. The abortive South African commando strike on oil facilities in Cabinda in 1985 revealed that South African commandos operate clandestinely at least occasionally to strike Angolan targets in support of UNITA objectives.

South African Involvement

8. The principal South African involvement in recent years has been to supply UNITA with training, light weapons, ammunition, and POL. Much of UNITA's military materiel—possibly as much as two-thirds of it, according to estimates by DIA—is captured from the FAPLA. South Africa since 1980 has supplied UNITA with weapons to supplement captured equipment—primarily basic infantry weapons,

11. The South African supply of military equipment to UNITA is relatively low cost and provides some concrete returns in the form of intelligence cooperation on targets of vital interest to South Africa.

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such as SWAPO and the African National Congress (ANC). SWAPO has been required to commit roughly half of its 7,000 combatants in Angola against UNITA in response to MPLA pressure. We anticipate that South African support to UNITA will continue and even increase should the pace of combat require a surge in UNITA's need for ammunition. South Africa is much more chary of direct involvement in combat, however, particularly with regard to its scarce air assets. Nonetheless, we believe—as does UNITA—that South Africa will commit air and even ground assets to protect what it sees as its vital interests.

12. South African actions in 1985 lead us to believe that Pretoria defines its vital interests in the situation in terms of providing whatever support is necessary to save major concentrations of UNITA from defeat and prevent FAPLA capture of the UNITA "capital" of Jamba. We do not believe that South Africa will necessarily commit air or ground units to assist UNITA to defend Mavinga. Should a FAPLA advance proceed much beyond Mavinga, we would anticipate direct South African support to UNITA, including airstrikes. South African air units have adjusted mission profiles out of concern for the growing number of air defense units in order to reduce the likelihood of confrontation with Cuban-piloted MIGs and surface-to-air missiles. We believe, however, that South African forces are prepared to deal with either threat should the need arise.

Other Foreign Support to UNITA

13. We do not see any major "bandwagon effect" on foreign support for UNITA resulting from Savimbi's highly publicized visit to the United States in January or from allegations of US support to UNITA. Although we believe South Africa will remain Savimbi's key source of foreign assistance for the near term, UNITA may acquire limited new external support from African or Western states. We believe these reports are accurate and expect that such support will continue—in the form of funds, propaganda, diplomatic assistance, training of UNITA specialists, and a very modest amount of weaponry. A few conservative African nations—Gabon and Ivory Coast, for example—have quietly expressed sympathy for Savimbi, but we expect no more than a handful will join Zaire in providing behind-the-scenes assistance. Several conservative Arab states have aided UNITA in the past, but we do not know whether such aid is continuing or, if so, at what level. Most black African states would be unlikely to break ranks publicly with the OAU's position of support for the MPLA government in Luanda.

14. We envision some incremental benefits to UNITA, however, in terms of increased private support, more favorable press treatment, and a warmer—albeit "unofficial"—reception of UNITA emissaries in some capitals.

UNITA's Military Prospects

15. We expect the remainder of 1986 to be a period of sustained and periodically intensive combat in Angola, particularly in the southeast. The most likely course of events will occasion no substantial gains or losses for either the MPLA or UNITA, but rather some tactical gains and losses for both sides. During the fighting, the possibility of South African air attacks could arise, heightening the risk of direct clashes with Cuban-piloted MIGs.

16. For UNITA, the 1985 offensive was a sobering experience because the insurgents underestimated their opponents. Although we anticipate UNITA to mount a spirited defense, we do not expect the insurgents to expose themselves to the government's strengths. So far, UNITA has concentrated on attacking FAPLA supply lines and rear bases in the southeast. We expect the insurgents will continue this effort during the offensive.

17. We anticipate UNITA's defense against the main FAPLA offensive in the southeast to be more mobile and fluid than in 1985, reverting to more traditional UNITA tactics. This may well entail the loss of additional UNITA-held towns in Moxico and Cuando Cubango Provinces, specifically Mavinga, Cangamba, and Lumbala N'guimbo. Each of these towns is an important objective for FAPLA in that each has an adjacent airstrip that would enable FAPLA to receive supplies. The tactical and even strategic question posed by the fall of these towns would be whether FAPLA could retain such gains, consolidate its hold, and convert the airstrips into fields that could be used to launch airstrikes deeper into UNITA-held territory. This question is unlikely to be answered in 1986; should the towns be captured by FAPLA, UNITA would almost certainly utilize the rainy season from November 1986 to April 1987 to try to dislodge FAPLA (FAPLA has had great difficulty in holding towns in UNITA-controlled areas during the rainy season when resupply by road becomes impossible because of weather and UNITA activity and when air supply becomes chancy for the same reasons).

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18. Even a temporary FAPLA capture of one or more UNITA-held towns in the southeast will have some damaging effects on UNITA:

— At least temporarily disrupting logistic lines that support UNITA formations in nothern Angola.

— Providing the MPLA with a public "victory" to flaunt both internally and to the world.

— Probably affecting international perceptions of UNITA's prospects.

[redacted] most important, reinforcing the belief [redacted] the MPLA leadership that a military [redacted]tion to the UNITA insurgency is the "correct" policy and enhancing FAPLA's morale. [redacted]

19. On the other hand, UNITA could regain some territory lost in 1985 and increase military pressure on the sensitive capital and oil production areas in northwestern Angola. UNITA will almost certainly attempt several military and sabotage "spectaculars," such as the overrunning of a major town, the sabotage of key economic facilities such as power or water utilities near major MPLA-controlled cities, or raids on airfields or the oil support and storage facilities near Soyo or Cabinda [redacted]

20. Although the 1986 military campaign will probably not produce decisive results for either side, UNITA will try to blunt FAPLA's main effort in the southeast, make new gains elsewhere in Angola, repulse the main FAPLA effort, and, as in 1983-84, heighten concerns in Luanda as to the validity of its commitment to a "military solution." FAPLA in turn will try to recapture some additional territory, gain psychological and propaganda advantages by recapturing a few towns, interdict UNITA supply lines, and possibly gain new tactical and strategic steppingstones into UNITA territory in the form of airfields and radar sites at Mavinga, Cangamba, or Lumbala N'guimbo [redacted]

[redacted] UNITA wants advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons. We doubt that UNITA will obtain sufficient weapons to negate the government's armor and air superiority in the period of this Estimate, although its defensive capabilities may be improved. Even with relatively unsophisticated weapons, however, the insurgents were able to destroy 20 to 30 aircraft during the last offensive, enough to cause the government concern [redacted]

Key Variables

22. We believe the key variables in determining UNITA's military prospects for the short term will be:

— UNITA's own strategy and tactics.

— FAPLA's weaponry and performance.

— The South African role in combat.

— The level of Cuban/Soviet support to FAPLA. [redacted]

23. We believe the most likely course for each of these variables this year to be the following:

— UNITA will revert to a more classic insurgent posture in defending against big FAPLA offensives, relying on mobile defense and the interdiction of supply columns, trading some territory for FAPLA losses.

— Although UNITA will continue to have difficulty with FAPLA close air support and with FAPLA's increasing use of armored vehicles, the insurgents will probably be able to exact sufficiently heavy losses to preclude FAPLA's enhanced capabilities from playing a decisive role overall. We believe that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted from improved [redacted] as well as from UNITA's underestimation of its opponents.

— The South Africans will continue to supply UNITA with materiel and light weaponry but cannot meet UNITA's needs for advanced antiaircraft and antitank weapons. South Africa will be reluctant to use its military assets directly in combat but will do so if it sees its vital interests being damaged, such as a major threat to concentrations of UNITA forces or a direct threat to Jamba.

— We expect that the Cubans and Soviets will continue to provide levels of support approximating the 1985 level without significant new escalations of involvement. The exceptions to this would be triggered by direct South African involvement that threatened the viability of major FAPLA formations, in which case we would anticipate [redacted] air cover for FAPLA forces, or significant new UNITA victories that might occasion higher levels of support and Cuban reinforcements. [redacted]

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Scenarios

The Most Likely

24. FAPLA has apparently "telegraphed its punch" in terms of its most likely axes of advance, giving UNITA an opportunity to prepare defenses in depth as well as to conduct active harassment of areas where the government is building up its forces. Although we cannot determine where FAPLA's advances will be stopped, we believe they are unlikely to pose a serious threat to Jamba. It is possible, however, that a series of determined FAPLA pushes, which would incur heavy losses, could reach Mavinga, Lumbala N'guimbo, or Cangamba. FAPLA aircraft might raid Jamba for psychological and propaganda reasons, but such an attack would probably be ineffectual because of the dispersed layout of the facilities at Jamba

25. In other areas, UNITA is likely to intensify operations, particularly in the northwestern part of the country. UNITA operations will continue to devastate the economic infrastructure in MPLA-controlled areas. UNITA will continue harassing already disrupted coffee-producing areas and will continue essentially to shut down the MPLA's diamond production. A UNITA raid on oil production support facilities at Soyo or even the onshore production and storage facilities in Cabinda is possible because UNITA has publicly targeted these facilities, but we believe such attacks would not seriously disrupt oil production. UNITA is also likely to stage more sabotage operations, including bombings in urban areas

26. The South Africans will probably not see a need to intervene directly in combat unless UNITA's forces are seriously threatened. Should FAPLA present a particularly inviting target, however, South Africa's leaders would be tempted to authorize airstrikes or commando attacks in circumstances that would provide plausible denial of involvement. Similarly, we expect the Cuban and Soviet support to FAPLA combat operations to continue at levels roughly similar to those in 1985

Alternative Scenarios

27. The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible

28. ***Greater FAPLA Threat Scenario.*** A change in the variables regarding UNITA strategy and tactics and FAPLA weaponry and performance could bring about a much more threatening scenario

29. This scenario would arise from FAPLA's massing a larger force for its offensive than in previous years, with greater concentrations of armor and more extensive close air support. Should UNITA underestimate FAPLA capabilities or commit tactical blunders, the FAPLA offensive could not only capture Mavinga but continue to advance. This would almost certainly bring in South African air attacks and possibly some ground units in an attempt to stiffen UNITA's morale. Although active South African involvement would stop the offensive, numerous South African air sorties would greatly increase the risk of air clashes with A South African intervention that threatens large FAPLA formations might well prompt the Soviets and Cubans to escalate their own level of involvement in subsequent military operations, setting the scene for heightened prospects of Cuban–South African direct military clashes. UNITA's activity elsewhere would probably be curtailed as Savimbi would be forced to pull back additional units to defend Jamba. Despite the probable ultimate failure of such an offensive to capture Jamba, the military initiative would clearly belong to the FAPLA and its Soviet and Cuban allies

30. In addition to increasing deliveries and possibly becoming even more involved in combat operations, the Soviets would probably mount a major political/propaganda campaign against a direct South African involvement. The Soviets would attempt diplomatically to encourage regional and international organizations to condemn South African actions, and the Soviets would also make major efforts to associate the United States with South Africa's support for UNITA. The Soviets might also warn South Africa against further actions, as they did privately in 1984

31. ***Greater UNITA Success Scenario.*** This scenario would arise from UNITA's successfully disrupting FAPLA's offensive preparations or inflicting such high losses that the offensive does not advance very far but rather quickly turns into an ignominious retreat. Should UNITA acquire new weaponry, it could significantly increase FAPLA's losses of armor and helicopters. This might also enable UNITA's forces to retake areas gained by the MPLA in 1985, such as the three towns in the Cazombo salient, and to make new gains in the north. Such UNITA successes could devastate FAPLA's morale and force the Cubans and Soviets to make tough choices regarding greater Cuban involvement in combat. We believe in this circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would occur and that the Cuban forces would probably feel compelled at least selectively to engage in combat. Although UNITA still could not capture major towns and

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cities garrisoned by Cubans, UNITA would clearly have captured the military initiative. This scenario would also prompt the Soviets into heightened diplomatic and propaganda activity, again seeking condemnations of the United States and South Africa. The Soviets might make representations to the United States and possibly some nonspecific threats regarding possible effects of US aid to UNITA on other areas of US-Soviet relations

Prospects for Meaningful Negotiations

32. No interested party has written off further participation in US-brokered regional settlement talks. But the reaffirmation of the MPLA's commitment to a military solution at its December 1985 party congress, Luanda's recent reiteration of its longstanding refusal to talk with Savimbi, and the government's preparations for another prolonged military offensive against UNITA this year all suggest that Luanda is not likely to make adequate concessions in negotiations in the near term. Moreover, Angola's dependence on the Cubans for military support and guidance will continue so long as the MPLA views both UNITA and South Africa as military threats. We expect fitful negotiations to continue, but we do not believe a withdrawal of Cuban troops or a reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA is likely over the next 12 months.

Implications for the United States

33. Although we believe the prospects for MPLA-UNITA reconciliation or for substantive progress in negotiations on a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola are virtually nil for the period of this Estimate, we expect that all parties will maintain lines of communication with the United States. Should UNITA succeed in repelling the major FAPLA offensive without sustaining serious losses or losing major towns, this could well generate afresh questions among the MPLA leadership as to the validity of an exclusively military policy toward UNITA. In that contingency, should UNITA make and sustain dramatic new gains—less likely in our judgment—this might eventually lead Luanda to show more active interest in the US-sponsored regional negotiating process if only to gain some diplomatic insurance against increased outside aid to UNITA

34. Should FAPLA succeed in prosecuting its offensive to the point of triggering direct South African combat involvement beyond an isolated response, this could not only risk Cuban-South African air clashes but also stimulate the Soviets and Cubans into increasing their involvement to offset the South African intervention. Although the full effects of this would probably not be seen during 1986, an atmosphere of crisis could be generated by the Soviets, which would be compounded by Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activities

35. In either contingency—substantial gains by UNITA or direct South African involvement in combat—the United States would be the target of not only Soviet, but also widespread African and other Third World criticism and condemnation. Soviet posturing could include warnings not only to South Africa, but also to the United States

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
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ANNEX B

OVERALL FORCE PICTURE

1. Luanda and its Cuban allies hold a better than 2-to-1 advantage in manpower over UNITA and an even more pronounced advantage in firepower. In our view, UNITA holds the edge in the quality of its troops, although this advantage may be eroding because of gradual improvements in the government's forces

2. ***Angolan Armed Forces.*** Luanda has at least 100,000 men under arms in the regular army and other security forces and militia. The Angolan Army is organized in brigades that average about 1,000 men; we believe there are more than 60 brigades. Many of these troops are conscripts. With the exception of a few mechanized brigades that have heavy weapons such as tanks and conventional artillery, most are primarily infantry units with little or no armor and only limited artillery support

3. The Angolan Air Force is expanding its capabilities aided by substantial deliveries of Soviet aircraft and helicopters and a training program for Angolan pilots in the Soviet Union. Angolan and Cuban pilots fly MIG-21, MIG-23, and SU-22 fighters and MI-24, 25 and MI-8, 17 helicopters


4. Angola's air strength is backed by a substantial number of air defense missiles and radars. Moreover, Angola, unlike Pretoria, can easily replace its aircraft losses

Table B-1
Angola: Balance of Forces

Manpower			
MPLA	100,000	UNITA	50,000 to 60,000
Regular military	70,000	Regulars	20,000 to 25,000
Other security forces	30,000	Guerrillas	30,000 to 35,000
Cuban military contingent	36,000	South Africa (in Namibia)	21,000
Combat troops	25,000	South African forces	7,000
Support and advisory personnel	5,000	Territorial forces	11,000
Soviet advisers	1,200	South African security police	3,000
East European advisers	500		

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5. *Cuban Military Contingent.* The Angolan Army is backed by a 36,000-man Cuban military contingent—including some 25,000 combat troops—which guards rear bases, provides security detachments to guard Soviet military advisers, performs essential support services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations. We believe that Cuban combat activity is limited to small groups that supplement the Angolan armed forces by piloting aircraft and helicopters, manning much of the air defense system, driving armored vehicles, and filling other support roles. Over the years, we have not seen evidence of significant Cuban troop deployments in combat operations

7. *UNITA.* The insurgents probably have some 50,000 to 60,000 armed combatants of which about 20,000 to 25,000 are lightly armed but well-trained regulars organized in battalions, most of which are deployed in UNITA-held territory in southeastern Angola. In addition, about 30,000 to 35,000 guerrillas operate in smaller units throughout the country. We believe that UNITA's troops have generally higher morale than the Angolan soldiers. UNITA may have as many as 60 battalions, each averaging between 350 to 450 men. The guerrillas are organized in company-size columns of about 150 to 200 men or in smaller local militias. UNITA also fields small, specially trained sabotage groups

8. *South Africa.* Pretoria has about 20,000 troops in northern Namibia, including Namibian territorial forces and a smaller number of South African regulars

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and conscripts in a small strike force. South Africa also uses its "foreign legion"—the 32nd battalion, with a nominal strength of 1,100 men—and "special forces" teams of five or 10 to 50 or more men for operations in Angola. Pretoria deploys a portion of its Air Force forward in Namibia for operations in Angola. If Pretoria's total air strength is counted, Angola—from a purely numerical perspective—has an edge, with more modern supersonic fighters than South Africa. Pretoria has the edge, however, in pilot skills and tactics

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June 7, 1978

Angola-Cuba

Offensive Against UNITA

Cuban and Angolan troops launched an offensive against guerrillas of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in southeastern Angola on Sunday [redacted]

The Cubans reportedly have been flown into government-held towns in UNITA territory. They also apparently used helicopters to strike at airfields used by UNITA. Angolan troops may be proceeding by land to at least one of the airfields. [redacted] the lack of antiaircraft weapons was causing UNITA major problems.

We [redacted] have received no other indications of fighting, but [redacted] Cuban and Angolan preparations for an offensive in this region [redacted]

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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union
Eastern Europe

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
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
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August 20, 1975

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy . . 1

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USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy

Moscow is pursuing a policy of uncompromising support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. It is not only training Popular Movement troops, but more important, is delivering military equipment. These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but they have considerable impact on troubled Angola. Moscow has sharply increased shipments during the past year, almost certainly because it calculated that the revolution in Portugal would foster a change in the status quo in Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be in a position to exploit.

Even before the increased shipments began, the Popular Movement had amassed an impressive array of Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was well stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade launchers, and some heavier items, such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoilless rifles, and 122-mm. rockets.

The new deliveries have continued the flow of some of this equipment and have added several other types of materiel, including armored cars, trucks, tracked armored anti-aircraft vehicles, armored personnel carriers, RPG-7 anti-tank launchers, anti-tank wire-guided missiles, and rocket launchers. With the receipt of this materiel, the Popular Movement is far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.

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[redacted]

Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular Movement both within the USSR and in Congo. Thousands of Popular Movement troops have received training in the USSR since the early '60s; hundreds of trainees are now in the Soviet Union. [redacted] It is no surprise that Popular Movement troops are better organized and better led than those of its major rival, the National Front.

There have been reports of Soviet military advisers and Congolese troops in Angola assisting the Popular Movement, but these reports are sketchy and unconfirmed. What seems more likely is that the Soviets have asked Cuba to help out with advisers and technicians. [redacted]

The Soviets are probably using the Portuguese Communists as the channel for getting political advice and guidance to the Popular Movement. As far as we know, there are no Soviet officials in Luanda or Angola. Moreover, the ties between the Popular Movement and the Portuguese Communists are close. The Popular Movement was originally an offshoot of the Portuguese Communist Party. Agostinho Neto, the Popular Movement's leader, is an old acquaintance of Cunhal and seems to share his outlook on Marxism and Moscow.

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The Soviets probably see the pro-Soviet Marxist Neto as the kind of liberation movement leader they prefer to work with. Their relative generosity to the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify the rewards which await those who associate themselves with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may hope that with an amenable government in Luanda, they will be able to exert a major influence on events in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances in the region.

The Soviets presumably have not lost sight of the strategic or economic opportunities that might flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's Popular Movement. But it is hard to see how much, if anything, Moscow would actually gain from bases in Angola. With the opening of the Suez Canal the south Atlantic seafaring lanes are even less important to the Soviet navy than they have been. Bases in Angola could not add significantly to any current Soviet military activity, and Angola would be strategically important to Moscow only if the Soviets contemplated a major new increase of their activities in the south Atlantic. This seems highly unlikely.

The Soviets themselves have no need for Angolan or Cabindan resources, but they might want to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients. The Soviets may also want to hinder Western access to the minerals in the area.

The Soviets probably do not expect any immediate return on their investment. While their arms and equipment have helped the Popular Movement to assert control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some other areas, they have not--and probably cannot--overcome the Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses. The Popular Movement's essentially urban character, its relatively limited personnel resources, and Neto's doctrinaire and unappealing personality make significant inroads

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into the countryside strongholds of the National Front or National Union unlikely, no matter how much equipment the Soviets send.

On the other hand, neither of the other two groups (or both in concert for that matter) appears able to defeat the Popular Movement decisively on its territory. Since there is no support whatsoever for a partition agreement, a protracted war of attrition seems in the offing, and Moscow wants to make sure the Popular Movement is well provisioned for the ordeal.

August 20, 1975

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2. USSR-ANGOLA: SOVIET LEADERS HAVE CONCLUDED OFFICIAL TALKS WITH THE HIGH-LEVEL ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER NASCIMENTO WHICH ARRIVED IN MOSCOW EARLY THIS WEEK. ACCORDING TO MOSCOW RADIO, THE TALKS WERE HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF "COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING" AND RESULTED IN THE SIGNING OF A SERIES OF ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND CULTURAL AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS A "DECLARATION ON THE FOUNDATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS."4

GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, PREMIER KOSYGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, AND DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV HEADED THE LIST OF SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO MET PRIVATELY WITH THE ANGOLANS. THE PARTICIPATION OF USTINOV IN THE DISCUSSIONS INDICATES THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE QUESTIONS WERE ALSO HIGH ON THE AGENDA.4

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NASCIMENTO, KOSYGIN REAFFIRMED MOSCOW'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE POPULAR MOVEMENT GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA AND FOR THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. REPEATING A THEME PODGORNY USED IN HIS WELCOMING TOAST LAST WEEK FOR MOZAMBICAN PRESIDENT MACHEL, KOSYGIN STRESSED THAT "DETENTE" AND SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS WERE NOT INCOMPATIBLE AND THAT, IN FACT, DETENTE SERVES TO ACCELERATE THE LIBERATION PROCESS.

3. USSR-CUBA: THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON CUBAN PRIME MINISTER CASTRO'S LETTER TO SWEDISH LEADER PALME, BUT THEY HAVE REPORTED CUBAN FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER RODRIGUEZ' REMARKS ON ANGOLA AT A NEWS CONFERENCE IN TOKYO LATE LAST WEEK.Y

PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, AND OTHER MAJOR KREMLIN PROPAGANDA ORGANS HAVE REPLAYED IN FAIRLY STRAIGHTFORWARD FASHION RODRIGUEZ' ADMISSION OF A SIZABLE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, HIS STATEMENT THAT CUBAN FORCES

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WOULD NOT BE DISPATCHED TO RHODESIA BECAUSE OF THE "RADICALLY DIFFERENT" SITUATION THERE, AND HIS COMMENTS ON NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN HAVANA AND WASHINGTON. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET MEDIA OMITTED THE REMARK ATTRIBUTED TO RODRIGUEZ THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH AROSE IN ANGOLA ARE NOT LIKELY TO CROP UP AGAIN, THE TREATMENT OF HIS TOKYO STATEMENTS IS THE FRANKEST PUBLIC KREMLIN COMMENTARY TO DATE ON CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA.

MOSCOW PROBABLY HAD A HAND IN HAVANA'S APPARENT DECISION TO LOWER ITS PROFILE IN ANGOLA AND ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. RODRIGUEZ HAS BEEN A FREQUENT VISITOR TO THE KREMLIN IN RECENT WEEKS, AND CUBAN DEFENSE MINISTER RAUL CASTRO SPENT ABOUT 10 DAYS THERE EARLIER THIS MONTH.

THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG ARGUED THAT THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION OR INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES AND "DETENTE" AND THAT "DE-

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January 9, 1976

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
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Intelligence Checklist

January 9, 1976

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CONGO
BRAZZAVILLE
KINSHASA
ZAIRE
Ambriz
LUANDA
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Quibala
ANGOLA
Benguela Railroad
Nova Lisboa
(Huambo)
Rio Cuando
ZAMBIA
Rio Cubango
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
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ANGOLA: *The National Front has begun to evacuate its troops from Ambriz, its headquarters in northern Angola.*

[redacted] withdraw was prompted by the belief that the Front could not hold a key position east of Ambriz against any advance by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement.

In central Angola, the fighting reportedly has picked up following a Popular Movement breakthrough of the National Union - National Front siege of Quibala.

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[redacted]

AFRICA: *Foreign ministers of the Organization of African Unity are evidently badly divided on a number of the issues to be discussed at the emergency summit on Angola that begins tomorrow.*

The ministers apparently will leave it to the heads of state themselves to grapple with the difficult issues that divide them.

The meeting is likely to be contentious and could drag on longer than the scheduled two days. Only

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about half of the OAU's 46 heads of state are expected to attend the summit; the remainder will be represented by stand-ins.

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January 21, 1976


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CONGO
BRAZZAVILLE
Congo
KINSHASA
CABINDA
ZAIRE
San Antonio do Zaire
Kasai
Cuito
Rio Cuanza
LUANDA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
ANGOLA
Rio Cunene
Rio Cuando
Benguela Railroad
Bie
Huambo
Cunene hydroelectric project
Rio Cubango
Zambezi
ZAMBIA
Rio Okavango
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
(International Territory)
BOTSWANA
12
16
20
24
8
17
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ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA: *Pretoria has decided to withdraw its military forces from Angola. The withdrawal--involving about 1,000 men*

The South Africans will still maintain a military presence in southern Angola to protect the Cunene hydroelectric project. They also will continue to provide covert material aid to the National Union.

Pretoria's decision was based on growing foreign and domestic opposition to its military role in Angola, on a belief that a continued presence would overtax its resources, and on its disappointment in the failure of the Union-Front combine to cooperate effectively.

The decision will be a major blow to Union officials, who had been expecting increased South African aid. Pretoria has advised the Union to revert to guerrilla warfare since it does not have the experience or the technical know-how to compete with the Popular Movement in the type of mechanized fighting now taking place.

On the military front, the Popular Movement apparently has not made any new advances in northern Angola. The situation is quiet around Santo Antonio do Zaire, the Front's remaining strongpoint in this sector.

In central Angola, heavy and inconclusive fighting evidently is continuing around several key

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Intelligence Checklist

towns. If the expected offensive by Movement and Cuban forces against Luso, Andulo, and Lobito-Benguela succeeds, the Union-Front capital at Huambo and the Union's main staging base at Bie will be threatened.

* * * *

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USSR/AFRICA: *The Soviets continued their military airlift to Angola over the weekend.*

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
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ANGOLA: *At Annex today we offer a condensation of a CIA memorandum, Prospects for Angola, dated January 26, 1976.*

[redacted]

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Cameroon
Central African Republic
Sudan
Ethiopia
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Zaire
Uganda
Kenya
Lake Victoria
Rwanda
Burundi
Tanzania
Kinshasa
Dar es Salaam
Lake Tanganyika
Shaba
Luanda
Angola
Lobito
Benguela Railroad
Lake Nyasa
Malawi
Zambia
Lusaka
Kariba Lake
Rhodesia
South-West Africa (Namibia)
Windhoek
Botswana
Mozambique
Walvis Bay
Pretoria
Lourenco Marques
Swaziland
Lesotho
South Africa

Intelligence Checklist

THE PROSPECTS FOR ANGOLA

Within a matter of weeks, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement is likely to prevail on the battlefields of Angola. Some guerrilla activity will persist, but the Movement's prime goal will be to consolidate its military and administrative grip on Angola's major urban and economic centers, leaving the rural population to fend for itself.

As time passes, the Movement is likely to abandon its no-compromise posture and attempt at least a token reconciliation, which is not likely to include a political role for either Holden Roberto or Jonas Savimbi.

Reconciliation is a practical approach for the Movement, from both a political and an economic standpoint.

The Movement is basically an urban-based organization that derives support from workers, intellectuals, civil servants, and professionals. It relies heavily on mulattoes and the urban Kimbundu tribe. Its links to the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu tribes, who provide the bases of support for the National Front and the National Union, respectively, are virtually non-existent.

Economically, Angola's prospects are heavily dependent upon the interrelationship of the country's three major tribal areas. Angola's once-thriving coffee plantations in the Bakongo north have been cultivated by Ovimbundu from the south. The major port capable of handling coffee shipments is Lobito, which is in Ovimbundu territory.

Zairian President Mobutu is unlikely to underwrite guerrilla operations by either the Front or the Union, largely out of a fear that such operations would draw immediate retaliation in kind from the Movement against Zaire's copper-producing Shaba (formerly Katanga) region. Some 4,000 exiled supporters of the late Moise Tshombe have been fighting with the Movement. The

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Portuguese kept the Katangans intact after Tshombe's secession collapsed in 1963, just to temper Mobutu's support for insurgents in Angola.

Zaire also has pressing economic problems. Reviving the economy rests in considerable part on regaining access to the Benguela railroad and the port of Lobito, the most efficient means of moving Zaire's exports and imports.

With all this in mind, Mobutu is reportedly already putting out feelers to the Movement. His chances of early success are not great. Nevertheless, if Mobutu restrains himself, the Movement probably will allow him access to the Benguela railroad--for a political and economic price.

Zambian President Kaunda will also be forced by a need to get the Benguela railroad reopened to seek an accommodation with the Movement. Kaunda is on better ground than Mobutu. Despite a personal dislike of Movement leader Agostinho Neto, Kaunda has not publicly attacked either the man or his organization. Moreover, Zambia's direct support for the National Union was modest.

South Africa's future moves in Angola presumably will be shaped by the debates in parliament during the next few weeks, by the unfolding of the Movement's actual strategy toward Namibia, and by international reactions to South Africa's strengthened but essentially defensive posture along the border.

Whatever South Africa decides, a Movement victory will give heart to the various insurgent movements whose target is South Africa. We believe that the Movement will encourage such groups, providing both sanctuary and support. Swapo, the Namibian nationalist organization, has a guerrilla force in Zambia and is already in contact with the Movement.

Increased insurgent activity could easily provoke Pretoria to launch pre-emptive strikes well beyond the contemplated defensive perimeter. Prime Minister Vorster hopes to avoid this since military ventures outside South Africa are politically sensitive.

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A substantial Cuban role in Angola is likely long after a Movement victory. Militarily, the Cubans will keep in Angola a force strong enough to enable the Movement to overcome any military threat that might arise, internally or externally. In addition, Cuban military advisers will stay on to organize and train an air force, a navy, and ground forces. The Cubans will also help set up a national police force and a secret political police. They will send experts in forming mass organizations, teachers and instructors at all levels of education, and a handful of technicians to create a controlled system of mass communication.

The Cubans also will try to fill part of the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era.

Cuban resources are limited, and Havana will look to Moscow for relief from a large part of the bill for Angolan assistance. Nevertheless, it is clear that Havana is deeply committed to the Movement for some time to come.

The USSR will come quickly to the aid of the Angolan economy. The Soviets will provide technical assistance and the wherewithal to get the Benguela railroad operating, and to repair the damage that has been done to important roads, bridges, and factories. If needed, the Soviets may try to get Cabindan oil flowing again.

Moscow also is likely to be persuaded of the benefits to be gained, for Neto and itself, of a non-belligerent attitude by the Movement toward Zaire and Zambia.

Competition could build up between the Soviets and the Cubans. But it seems more likely that the essential coincidence of view between Havana and Moscow will continue in Angola for the near future.

The Soviets will try to use their new position with the Movement to gain more influence in Zaire, Zambia, and Mozambique, and Moscow will also try to use its Angolan connection to strengthen contacts with African revolutionary movements. Both Mobutu and

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Kaunda will feel that they have been let down, and as a result they will feel it increasingly necessary to display their African credentials. [redacted]