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TOR: 181440Z AUG 82

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R 181253Z AUG 82

FM (b)(3)10 USC 424  
TO RUZKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3)10 USC 424  
S:10 473-522/THE WHITE HOUSE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUEAOWD/OA WASHDC

RUFMOL (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEHDR  
RUEOFA  
RUEHCR  
RUEHSS  
RUFDA  
RUCJAA  
RUEHOS  
RUEHLD  
RUTADM  
RMDLCH  
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RUEHAA  
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RUEHDA/USCINCEUR VAINHSEN GER  
RUEHDA/USEUCO (b)(3)50 VAINHSEN GER  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3)10 USC 424

~~SECRET WORDS~~

SUBJ: IR (b)(3)10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/SADF  
OPERATIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS IN ANGOLA (U)  
(b)(3)10 USC 424, (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(i)

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(b)(3)-10 USC 424 (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(i)

- 1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (AF)/ANGOLA (AO)/NAMIBIA (NA)
- 2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3)-10 USC 424
- 3. (U) TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS IN ANGOLA
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820813-820818
- 5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LTR
- 6. (U) (b)(3)-10 USC 424
- 7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3)-10 USC 424 (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(i)

8. SUMMARY: IN THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF FOLLOWUP OPERATIONS, SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) GROUND UNITS FIRST MADE CONTACT WITH SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLAS ON 820722 NORTH OF MUPA AND THE LAST ACTION WAS COMPLETED ON 820810 IN THE VICINITY OF (b)(3)-10 USC 424, ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF CUVELAI (b)(3)-10 USC 424. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS KILLED IN THESE OPERATIONS WAS 253. THE SADF GROUND UNITS INVOLVED BEGAN WITHDRAWING SOUTHWARD SOON AFTER 820810, AND MOST OF THEM CAN BE PRESUMED NOW TO HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR BASE AREAS.

9.A. (U) DETAILS:

- 1. (U) THE SADF GROUND FORCES NORMALLY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA (SIX MANEUVER COMPANIES) NORMALLY OPERATE IN GROUPS OF TWO TO FOUR COMPANIES EACH.
- 2. (U) IN THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF SADF FOLLOWUP OPERATIONS, THE FIRST CONTACT OCCURRED ON 820722 JUST NORTH OF MUPA. EIGHT SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED THAT DAY. TRACKING THE SWAPO RETREAT NORTHWARD, THE SADF KILLED 18 GUERRILLAS ON 820726 AND 3 GUERRILLAS ON 820731 ABOUT 8 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CUVELAI.
- 3. (U) ON 820802, ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CUVELAI, THE SADF KILLED 106 SWAPO GUERRILLAS OF A UNIT SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS "ALPHA 84."

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02 020804 45R

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NC 920804

TDR: 181400Z AUG 62

- 4. ~~(S)~~ ON 020804, THE SAOF AMBUSHED A TRUCK CONVOY NORTHWEST OF CUVELAI, DESTROYED MOST OF THE VEHICLES, BUT CAPTURED THREE 10-TON TRUCKS LOADED WITH 14.6-MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINEGUNS.

- 5. ~~(S)~~ DURING 020805-020810, ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF CUVELAI, THE SAOF ENCOUNTERED SHAPO ELEMENTS LATER IDENTIFIED AS BRAVO BN\* AND ELEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN REGIONAL HQ'S. DURING 020804-020810, THE SAOF KILLED 110 GUERRILLAS--MOST OF THEM ON THE LAST TWO DAYS.

- 6. ~~(S)~~ THE TOTAL SHAPO KIA IN THIS SERIES OF OPERATIONS, WHICH ENDED ON 020810, IS THUS 283. THE SAOF CLAIMS 16 OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL KIA DURING THE PERIOD, INCLUDING THE 12 MEN OF 1 PARACHUTE BN AND 3 AIRCREW WHO PERISHED ON BOARD THE PUNA HEL LOST ON 020805.

- 7. ~~(S)~~ THE SAOF GROUND UNITS BEGAN WITHDRAWING SOUTHWARD FROM THE VICINITY OF CUVELAI SOON AFTER 020810, AND MOST OF THEM CAN BE PRESUMED NOW TO HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR BASE AREAS.

END OF MESSAGE

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O:19 473-222/THE WHITE HOUSE  
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RUEADWD/DA WASHDC

RUFHDL (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEHCR  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3)-10 USC 424

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(b)(1),(b)(3)-10 USC 424-1.4(c),1.4(d)  
[Redacted block]

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
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TORI 181432Z AUG 62

MC 9288900

(b)(1)(b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c)-14 (d)



- 10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
- 12. (U) SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO
- 13. (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 14. (U)
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TCR: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY DRIST: NONE

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END OF MESSAGE

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
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80 5239630

TOR: 221115Z OCT 80

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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
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RUTA0H/ [REDACTED] PRIORITY  
RUEHDT/ [REDACTED] PRIORITY  
RUEADWD/OA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
RUDOVIA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) PRIORITY

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EZ1:

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

CITE 0433

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SUBJ: THIS IS IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)  
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL  
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ ANGOLA  
(AO)/ NAMIBIA (WA)  
2. (U) TITLE: SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES STRIKE  
INTO ANGOLA.  
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 801022  
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: SEE FM LINE  
5. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (U) SOURCE: SECURITY FORCE SPOKESMAN AND VARIOUS  
NEWS MEDIA.

7. (U) SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES LAUNCHED  
AN ATTACK INTO ANGOLA ON 801020 KILLING TWENTY-EIGHT  
SWAPO AND MPLA SOLDIERS.

8A. (U) DETAILS:

1. (U) ACCORDING TO A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECURITY FORCES,  
BRIGADIER WILLIE MEYER, SECOND-IN-COMMAND OF THE SWA

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TERRITORY FORCE, TWENTY-EIGHT SWAPO AND MPLA MEMBERS WERE KILLED BY SWA TERRITORY FORCE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE ON 801020.

2. (U) THE ATTACK OCCURED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, NORTH OF KAKOLAND IN THE NORTHWESTERN CORNER OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE OBJECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE WAS TO DESTROY A SWAPO BASE THERE.

3. (U) THE DEFENSE SPOKESMAN SAID IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW MANY OF THE 28 DEAD WERE MPLA SOLDIERS. THE MPLA SOLDIERS HAD BECOME EMBROILED IN THE FIGHTING.

4. (U) IN ADDITION, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT A LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION WAS DESTROYED IN THE RAID.

5. (U) BRIGADIER MEYER SAID THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN AND SOUTH WEST AFRICAN FORCES HAD RETURNED SAFELY TO BASE. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO MENTION OF ANY CASUALTIES FOR THESE FORCES.

88. ~~(C)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

THE CUMULATIVE CASUALTY FIGURES KILLED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GUERRILLA WAR IN SWA/NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA FOR YEAR-TO-DATE ARE: SWAPO - ONE THOUSAND AND SEVEN; SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES (TO INCLUDE SWA TERRITORY FORCES) - EIGHTY-TWO. ALTHOUGH THE NEWS-MEDIA AND DEFENSE FORCE SPOKESMAN INDICATE THAT A TOTAL OF THIRTEEN HUNDRED SWAPO AND MPLA SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED, <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup> PLACES THE FIGURE OVER ONE THOUSAND.

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A

11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO

12. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APPROVED BY: [Redacted]

ASST. 14. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

15. (U) ENCL: N/A

16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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
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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 4034(i)  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 4034(i)  
RUEHDT/ (b)(3):50 USC 4034(i)  
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RUOOVIA/USE UCOM (b)(3):50 USC 4034(i) VAHINGEN GE//IMMED  
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EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 NOV 78

- EZ2:  
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. COUNTRY: RSA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)
  2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  3. TITLE: EAST GERMANS IN ANGOLA
  4. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
  5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 781117
  6. DATE OF REPORT: 781118
  7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781117 (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  9. ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO QPQ: NO
  12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO
  16. SUMMARY: 1. ↔ IN A BRIEFING GIVEN TO ALL MILITARY ATTACHES IN PRETORIA SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REPORTED

THAT THERE ARE THREE BATTALIONS OF EAST GERMAN INFANTRY TROOPS IN ANGOLA THESE TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED IN ANGOLA TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND COMBAT SUPPORT TO FAPLA AND SWAPO TROOPS AGAINST UNITA IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THAT COUNTRY. HERETOFORE THIS ROLL WAS PERFORMED BY THE CUBAN FORCES STATIONED IN ANGOLA. CUBAN LEADERSHIP FAILED, AMONG OTHER REASONS, BECAUSE THEY RECEIVED PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE FIELD WHICH RESULTED IN EXTREME DISLIKE FOR THE CUBANS BY FAPLA TROOPS. ON ONE RECENT OCCASION, CUBAN TROOPS FIRED ON FAPLA FORCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THEM INTO BATTLE. FAPLA TROOPS TURNED ON THE CUBANS AND 150 CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN THE INCIDENT. PRIOR TO THIS BUILD UP, EAST GERMAN SOLDIERS WERE USED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PURPOSES.

2. (↔) THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 3000 EAST GERMAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WHICH INCLUDES SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ONE PARABATTALION IS LOCATED AT CATENQUE (1220S-1400E). THIS BATTALION HAS SUBUNITS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL ANGOLA. ONE INFANTRY BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED AT ROCADAS (1640S-1500E) AND ONE AT ONGIVA (40 KM ACROSS ANGOLA'S SOUTHERN BORDER).

3. (↔) ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE THE EAST GERMAN TROOPS HAVE NOT PARTICIPATED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS AS A UNIT BUT HAVE REMAINED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS PROVIDING OFFICERS AND NCO'S TO FAPLA AND SWAPO FORCES FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

4. (↔) THE EAST GERMAN FORCES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE MORTARS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SUSPECTED TO HAVE ANTI-TANK RECOILLESS RIFLES. THEY ARE EXTENSIVELY SUPPORTED BY M18 HELICOPTERS IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA FORCES. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF FIXED WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BEING USED BY THE EAST GERMAN FORCES. HELICOPTER LOSSES ARE DESCRIBED AS HEAVY AND ATTRIBUTED TO LACK OF PILOT EXPERIENCE AND NOT TO DIRECT COMBAT ACTION. DURING THE LATTER PART OF SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER 3 M18 HELICOPTERS CRASHED WHILE TAKING OFF OR LANDING. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF A RESUPPLY BUILD UP FOR EAST GERMAN AND FAPLA FORCES MAINLY THROUGH LUANDA.

5. (↔) SADF OFFICIALS SAID UNITA FORCES WERE HOLDING UP VERY WELL AGAINST FAPLA FORCES EVEN THOUGH FAPLA RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE EAST GERMANS. MOST OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA FORCES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA IN THE REGION OF THE CITY OF CUNENE (1500S-1540E).

COMMENTS: (↔) SADF OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED OF THE PRESENCE OF EAST GERMAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA. THEY CERTAINLY VIEW THIS AS AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO THEIR INVOLMENT IN NAMIBIA. WITH THE EAST GERMANS PROVIDING TRAINING AND SUPPORT TO SWAPO TROOPS SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT REACT TO THE BUILD UP THROUGH CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS. THIS INVOLMENT IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THIS IS A MAJOR INTRODUCTION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES INTO SOUTHERN AFRICA, AN EVENT AND ESCALATION MANY OBSERVERS SAID WOULD NEVER HAPPEN. SOUTH AFRICA SEES A CORRELATION BETWEEN THIS BUILD UP AND THE MAJOR COMMITMENT THE SOVIET UNION MADE IN ETHIOPEA AND SOMALI. SOUTH AFRICAN'S SPECULATE THAT THIS INVOLMENT WILL EVENTUALLY LEAK ACROSS THE BORDER INTO NAMIBIA.

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UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424 NO. 77

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RUEHUB (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

BT

EZ1:  
UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424 NOV 77

EZ2:  
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY - RSA/SE/ANGOLA/AO CUBA/CU

2. (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: INCREASE INCUBANS IN ANGOLA

4. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 771110

6. DATE OF REPORT: 771114

7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771111 (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. REFERENCES: INITIATIVE

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE C INFO 6

10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO REQ: NO

12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROVING OFFICER

14. SOURCE: THE STAR 771111

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC, NO

16. SUMMARY: SOURCE NEWSPAPERS CORRESPONDENT IN LUANDA REPORTS  
RELEASE FROM THE ANGOLAN NEWS AGENCY (ANGOP) TO THE EFFECT THAT  
CUBA IS SENDING A FURTHER 2600 CIVILIAN ADVISORS TO ANGOLA. THIS  
INCREASE WAS DECIDED LAST WEEK DURING MINISTERIAL LEVEL TALKS  
HELD IN LUANDA. IN RETURN, THE CUBANS ARE PRESSING ANGOLA TO  
SET UP A QUOTE TRADE UNION UNQUOTE MECHANISM SIMILAR TO THE  
CUBANS COMMITTEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CORS).

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UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424 NOV 77

THESE ARE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS WHICH CARRY OUT SOCIAL AND SECURITY  
TASKS.  
COMMENT: 1954 COMES TO ANGOLA.

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UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424 NOV 77



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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Individual Items Of This Report Are  
UNCLASSIFIED Unless Otherwise Indicated  
This is An Information Report, Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence

ONE PAGE IS DENIED IN FULL AND IS NOT INCLUDED.


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Angola (AO)  
USSR (UR)

TITLE: Military Equipment Captured During Operation Askari (U)

DATE OF INFO: (U) 840326 REPORT DATE: (U) 840327  
(YYMMDD) (YYMMDD)

ORIGINATOR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 REQ REFERENCES: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) Enclosed is a list of the types of items captured in southern Angola during December 1983 and January 1984 by units of the South African Defense Force (SADF) and South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF).

DETAILS:

1. (S/NOFORN) Enclosed is a list of 279 types of items, mostly of Soviet Bloc manufacture, captured by SADF/SWATF units in Operation ASKARI, during December 1983 and January 1984, in southern Angola.
2. (S/NOFORN) The list does not include the quantities of each item captured. This information is not available at this time. The overall quantity of materiel, however, is comparable to, and probably exceeds, the tonnage captured during Operation PROTEA in 1981.
3. (S) The list includes three items not previously captured by SADF: the SA-9 missile system, the Flap Wheel radar, and the R405/GAZ Model 66-75 mobile communications system.
4. (S) The list also includes the PT-76 and T-55 tanks, 122-mm D30-2A field artillery gun, and the 57-mm ZIS-2 antiaircraft artillery gun.

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DECLASSIFICATION DATA

82-518-110  
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Page 1 of 3 Pages

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
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page 2 of 3 pages  
IIR (b)(3) USC 424

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:



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CAPTURED EQUIPMENT : OPERATION ASKARI

ARMoured VEHICLES

1. BTR 152 Model V3 (Armoured Personnel Carrier)
- 1a. PT-76
2. BTR 152 Model V2 (Armoured Personnel Carrier)
3. BRDM 2 (4 x 4 Reconnaissance Vehicle)
4. T-55

VEHICLES CARGO/PERS

- 4a. URAL 375 D10 6 x 6
5. GAZ 66-51 4 x 4
6. GAZ 66-52 4 x 4
7. GAZ 66-55 4 x 4
8. Motorcycles (Various)

VEHICLES WITH COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN ARMoured VEHICLES

9. R405/GAZ Model 66-75 (GAZ 66 with van type body and R405 Radio Equipment)
10. R118/GAZ Model 66-05 (GAZ 66 with van type body and R118 Radio Equipment)
11. 2-wheel trailer (Generator Unit for R405 Radio Truck)
12. UAZ 469 B with Radios

VEHICLES OTHER THAN CARGO/PERS AND COMMUNICATIONS

13. Zil 131 (6 x 6 Workshop Truck for light repairs)
14. Ural 375 K10 Fuel Tanker (5,5 m<sup>3</sup> Capacity)
15. Zetor Agricultural Tractor (3 595 cc Model 7011)

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ENCLOSURE 1

(b)(3)(1) USC 424

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2

16. Ural 375 E10 RPK 1 16 x 6 Truck with Radar unit for 57 mm A/A Battery
17. UAZ 452 AP (4 x 4 UAZ Ambulance w/o stretchers)

TRAILERS AND OTHER TOWED ITEMS

18. PMR-3 Mechanical Mine-laying Unit
19. 124M Mobile Kitchen
20. Generator SPO-30 (4 Wheel 2 axle Generator for RPK 1 57 mm S60 Anti Aircraft Battery)
21. Generator CN 3-1
22. Tanker Al-555A (Fuel tanker 4 000 litre)
23. Tanker TB - 50 MTB (IAPZ) (Single axle water tanker)

ARTILLERY GUNS

24. 57 mm ZIS-2
25. 76 mm ZIS-3
26. 122 mm D30-2A 18 M

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

27. 57 mm S60
28. 23 mm ZU 23
29. 14,5 mm ZPU-1

WEAPONS

30. RPG-7 40 mm
31. Sten Mk II
32. VZ 24

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33. VZ 26
34. Airguns
35. Mosin Nagant (Model 1938 Carbine)
36. Mosin Nagant (Model 1944 Carbine)
37. Mosin Nagant (Model 1891/30)
38. Type S6 (SKS) China
39. M59/66 Yugoslavia
40. VZ 52
41. M1 US Carbine
42. Winchester Mod 94 30-30
43. PPSH 41
44. PPS 43 (Fixed Butt)
45. PPS 43 (Folding Butt)
46. RPD
47. RPK
48. DP
49. RP 46
50. Mauser Model 98 7.9 mm
51. AKM (East German)
52. AKM (USSR).
53. AK 47 (USSR)
54. AK 47 (USSR)(Folding Butt)
55. AK 47 M70 (Yugoslavia)
56. AK 47 (Bulgaria)
57. AK 47 (Folding Butt)(Bulgaria)
58. VZ 58P (Czechoslovakia)
59. VZ 58 V (Czechoslovakia)
60. PKM
61. SGMB

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4

62. PKT
63. PKM Spare Barrels
64. AGS 17
65. OSHK 38/46 Vehicle Machine Gun
66. PKM Pintle mounted with Mag Holder
67. Spare Barrel for ZPU-1
68. KPV Vehicle Heavy Machine Gun
69. Spare Barrel 12,7 mm
70. Muzzle Loader
71. Martine Henry
72. 82 mm Mortar Pipe M37 "New" with Muzzle Safety Device
73. 82 mm Mortar Bi-Pods M17
74. 82 mm Mortar Base-Plates M37
75. 82 mm B10 Recoilless Rifle Rifle (with wheels)
76. 82 mm B10 Recoilless Rifle (w/o wheels)
77. 122 mm Grad-P Single tube Rocket Launcher (with sights)
78. 60 mm Mortar Pipe (2 USA  
(1 USSR)

PISTOLS

79. 9 mm Makarov (Each with 2 Magazines)
80. 7,62 mm Tokarev (with 2 Magazines)
81. 7,62 mm Tokarev (with 1 Magazine and holster)
82. 9 mm Star (with 1 Magazine)

WEAPON ACCESSORIES

83. Magazine ZU 23
84. Barrel ZU 23
85. Magazine 7,62 x 54R PKM Box

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86. Magazine 14,5 mm ZPU-1 Box
87. Magazine RPD
88. Magazine Drum PPSH
89. Magazine PP43/PPSH Curved
90. Magazine VZ 26
91. Magazines G3 Alluminium
92. Magazine AK
93. Magazine 14,5 mm BRDM
94. AK 47/ZAKM Oil Bottle (Crate)
95. B10 Gum Tote (Large)
96. B10 Gum Tote (Small)
97. Gun Totes (Unknown)
98. 23 mm ZU 23 Tote.
99. 57 mm EIS-2 Gun Tote
100. 76 mm EIS-3 Gun Tote
101. 122 mm D10 Gun Tote (Incomplete)
102. Manometer
103. ZIP-NZ Measuring Bar
104. Barrel 57 mm Ack-Ack T54/T55
105. Mixed GUN Spares (Crate)
106. U/S Weapon Parts (Crate)
107. 57 mm A/A (Anti-Aircraft)  
Cooling Pump
108. 57 mm A/A Distribution Box
109. 57 MM Cables (On reels)
110. 57 mm Cables (Loose)
111. 57 mm A/A Cleaning Kits
112. 57 mm A/A Loading Plates
113. 57 mm A/A Spares (Crate)

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- 114. Gyro Binoculars
- 115. Clinometer
- 116. Vog-17m 30 mm Grenade Magazine (Empty)

AMMUNITION

- 117. 7,62 x 39 mm Ball
- 118. 7,62 x 39 mm Tracer
- 119. 7,62 x 51 Ball (Bulgaria)
- 120. 7,62 x 54 R Ball
- 121. 7,62 x 54 R PKM Box Magazines with 250 rounds belted
- 122. 7,62 x 54 R Armour Piercing Incendiary (API)
- 123. 7,62 x 54 R Tracer
- 124. 12,7 x 109 mm API
- 125. 12,7 mm x 109 Tracer
- 126. 14,5 mm Ball
- 127. 14,5 mm Ball (Belted)
- 128. 23 mm APT (Armour Piercing Tracer)
- 129. 23 mm Frag HE (Fragmentation High Explosive)
- 130. 23 mm ZU 23 Belts (+ 50 Rounds each)
- 131. 23 mm ZU 23 Magazines (+ 50 Rounds each)
- 132. 57 mm Frag HE Art (Yugoslavia)
- 133. 57 mm APT BC A/A (Armour Piercing Tracer Ballistic Cap, Anti Aircraft)
- 134. 57 mm Frag-T (Fused) A/A (Fragmentation Tracer)
- 135. 57 mm Frag-T (Unfused) A/A
- 136. 57 mm APT BC
- 137. 57 mm APT BC (Arrowhead)
- 138. 57 mm ALT BC (Yugoslavia)

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- 139. 57 mm Frag
- 140. 76 mm APT BC
- 141. 76 mm Frag HE (Fused)
- 142. 76 mm Frag HE (Unfused)
- 143. 76 mm Heat (Fused) High Explosive Anti-tank
- 144. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused M-5)
- 145. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused M-6)
- 146. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused MZ-36)
- 147. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Unfused)
- 148. 82 mm Recoilless Rifle Frag HE
- 149. 82 mm Recoilless Rifle Heat
- 150. 100 mm Frag HE
- 151. 100 mm Heat (Fused)
- 152. 100 mmHVAPDS (Hyper Velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot)
- 153. 122 mm-Frag HE
- 154. 122 mm Heat (Fused)
- 155. 122 mm Heat (Fused) Stand-Off
- 156. 122 mm Rocket Grad-P
- 157. SA-7
- 158. VOG-17M 30 mm
- 159. VOG-17 M 30 mm Grenade Magazines with 29 rounds Belted
- 160. Fuse M63 57 for 50m Anti Aircraft Frag-T
- 161. Fuse RTM-1-Y for 57 mm Frag HE (Artillery)
- 162. Fuse M-5 for 82 mm Mortar Bombs
- 163. Fuse M-6 for 82 mm Mortar Bombs
- 164. Fuse MPH-Y for 122 mm Rocket Grad-T

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165. Fuse RGM-2 (or 122 mm Frag HE)
166. PG-7 Rockets (In cases with boosters)
167. PG-7 Rockets (Loose)
168. PG-7 Rocket Boosters
169. TM-57 Anti Tank mines
170. MVZ-57 Ignitors
171. POM Z-2M Anti Pers Mines (In cases with sticks)
172. POM Z-2M Anti Pers Mines (Loose)
173. POM Z Anti Pers Mines
174. FI Grenade Hand
175. F Grenade Hand
176. RGD-5 Grenade Hand
177. RGD-5 Grenade Hand
178. RG-42 Grenade Hand
179. RG-42 Grenade Hand
180. Grenade Hand Strikers UZR6 Delay
181. Explosive Blocks TNT 75g (Packed)
182. Explosive Blocks TNT 75g (Unpacked)
183. Explosive Blocks TNT 200g (Unpacked)
184. Explosive Blocks TNT 400g (Unpacked)
185. Explosive Blocks TNT 600g (Unpacked)
186. Explosive Blocks TNT 200g (Packed)
187. Explosive Blocks TNT 400g (Packed)
188. Charges Cratering Cylindrical TNT
189. RKG-3M Anti Tank Handgrenades (Complete)
190. RKG-3M Detonators
191. RKG-4M Grenades
192. RKG-3M Handles

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- 193. PMD-6M Anti Personnel Mine (Box without explosive)
- 194. PMD-6M Anti Personnel Mine (with explosive)
- 195. PMD-6 Anti Personnel Mine (Box without explosive)
- 196. Trip Flare - white (with sticks)
- 197. Trip Flare - Green (with sticks)
- 198. Signal Flare Hand Green
- 199. Signal Flare Hand Red
- 200. Signal Flare Hand White
- 201. MD2 Detonator USSR
- 202. S4 Detonator USSR (Box)
- 203. Electrical Detonators Assorted (Crate)

OPTICS

- 204. PAB-2 Periscope Artillery Aiming Circle
- 205. ANB-1 Azimuth Mount for PAB-2
- 206. MP 41 Sight for M37 Mortar
- 207. OPRN Sight for 122 mm Grad-P
- 208. K-1 Collimator
- 209. MIM-44 Sight for Mortar
- 210. Orudy Panoramic Sight
- 211. IEO-2/K810 Sight for B10 Recoilless Rifle
- 212. OP4M-45 Telescope for D 30 122 mm Artillery
- 213. TVNO-2G Infra Red Periscope
- 214. TVN-2 Infra Red Periscope
- 215. TKN-15 Infra Red Periscope
- 216. PPG1 AM Periscope
- 217. Periscope (in plastic box)
- 218. PGO-7v Sight for RPG-7

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- 219. 8x30 Binoculars
- 220. NVA-7x40 Binoculars
- 221. DS-1 Stereoscope Rangefinder
- 222. 3-D Rangefinder with tripod "Telemetro"
- 223. 37 mm TXP-1-37 Bore Scope
- 224. TXP-1-30-515 Bore Scope 30 mm
- 225. TXP-14-350 14,5 mm
- 226. Z TS 27 23 mm Bore Scope with kit in carrier box
- 227. Theodolite (Incomplete with stand)

INSTRUMENTS, MECHANISMS, ETC

- 228. VPKHR Chemical Reconnaissance Instrument
- 229. 9 P58 (MBGI-1) Trigger Mechanism for SA 7
- 230. Meteorological set
- 231. ZIP-N-2 Verx Box Parts Unknown (Sophisticated)

MISCELLANEOUS

- 232. Compressor unit type HCV 120A with 3 HP electric motor
- 233. Generator unit with Berliet engine and electric motor
- 234. Generator Unit 25 HP man occp
- 235. Rifle oil (20 litre drums)
- 236. Minefield markers (crate)
- 237. RDV-5000 (Rubber tank 5000 litre)
- 238. Tripod Collimator (Large)
- 239. Tripod Collimator (Small)
- 240. Jack Bottle Hydraulic.
- 241. Pump Hand ZPU-1
- 242. Grease Gun

- 243. Tools Assorted (Crate)
- 244. Spade (with handle large)
- 245. Spade (without handle large)
- 246. Shovel Infantry (with handle)
- 247. Shovel Infantry (without handle)
- 248. Spade Infantry (utility small)
- 249. Hoe (with handle)
- 250. 2 Man saw
- 251. Pick Infantry (with handle)
- 252. Pick Infantry
- 253. Knife (Assorted)
- 254. Meat cleaver
- 255. Panga (Short blade)
- 256. Panga (Long blade).
- 257. Bag Mortar carrying
- 258. Canteen water carrying
- 259. Tins mess with water bottle  
(Incomplete)
- 260. Helmet soldier steel
- 261. Pan tin eating (Incomplete sets)
- 262. Lamp Parrafin
- 263. Flask water carrying
- 264. Filing Cabinet Cardex

CLOTHING (BUNDLES)

- 265. Webbing
- 266. Web Belts
- 267. Rifle Belts
- 268. Ground Sheets
- 269. Boots
- 270. Civilian Clothing

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- 271. Trousers Camouflage (Made in Cuba)
- 272. Shirts Camouflage (Cuba)
- 273. Jackets (Made in Cuba)
- 274. Trousers green
- 275. Pullovers green
- 276. Shirts various
- 277. Hats, caps, berets

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION <small>Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions</small>		<small>This report contains only selected information. Plans, orders, or instructions should be checked in original form in files of the office.</small>
<small>Classification/Control Markings</small> 1. COUNTRY ANGOLA (AO)		2. REPORT NUMBER. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE Military Equipment Inventory (U)		4. PROJECT NUMBER
5. DATE OF INFORMATION 770217		6. DATE OF REPORT. 770308
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION 770304 (b)(3):10 USC 424		8. REFERENCES Initiative
9. ASSESSMENT SOURCE (b)(3):10 USC 424		10. ORIGINATOR (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. REQUEST EVALUATION (b)(3):10 USC 424 <small>(Country)</small>		12. PREPARING OFFICER: 13. APPROVING AUTHORITY (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6)
14. SOURCE (b)(3):10 USC 424		
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. (b)(3):10 USC 424		
16. SUMMARY (S) This report provides types and amounts of Soviet manufactured military equipment in the inventory of the Angolan (MPLA) armed forces in mid-February 1977.		
18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR <small>(DIA Form 10)</small> USCINCPAC (b)(3):10 USC 424		19. DOWNGRADING AND RECLASSIFICATION DATA CLASSIFIED BY (b)(3):10 USC 424 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1990
		20. ENCLOSURES NONE RECEIVED 05-13 MAR 23 7 52 AM '77
		21. This IIR contains 3 pages

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Continuation Sheet	<del>SECRET</del> <del>NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS</del> <small>Classification/Control Markings</small>	Report No (b)(3)-10 USC 424 Page 2 of 3 pages Originator (b)(3)-10 USC 424																																		
22. DETAILS:  1. <del>(S)</del> Armored Vehicles:  <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 80%;"></th> <th style="text-align: right; width: 20%;"><u>Quantity</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>T34 tanks</td> <td style="text-align: right;">80</td> </tr> <tr> <td>T54 tanks</td> <td style="text-align: right;">30</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PT76 amphibious light tank</td> <td style="text-align: right;">68</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BTR40 armored car</td> <td style="text-align: right;">32</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BTR50 tracked APC</td> <td style="text-align: right;">92</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BTR60 wheeled APC</td> <td style="text-align: right;">74</td> </tr> <tr> <td>BRDM armored car w/heavy machinegun</td> <td style="text-align: right;">20</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> 2. <del>(S)</del> Artillery:  <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 80%;">BM21 40-tube 122-mm truck mounted multiple rocket launchers</td> <td style="text-align: right; width: 20%;">100+</td> </tr> <tr> <td>122-mm rocket rounds for the BM21's</td> <td style="text-align: right;">12,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>82-mm antitank guns (recoilless rifles?)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,700</td> </tr> <tr> <td>82-mm mortars</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ZIS3 76-mm antitank guns</td> <td style="text-align: right;">unk</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unidentified rocket launchers (RPG?)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unidentified light antiaircraft guns mounted on armored vehicles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">300</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unidentified heavy antiaircraft guns mounted on armored vehicles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">25</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> 3. <del>(S)</del> Aircraft:  <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 80%;">Unidentified types</td> <td style="text-align: right; width: 20%;">24</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>  <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: fit-content; margin: 0 auto;"> <del>SECRET</del>  <del>NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS</del>  <small>Classification/Control Markings</small> </div>			<u>Quantity</u>	T34 tanks	80	T54 tanks	30	PT76 amphibious light tank	68	BTR40 armored car	32	BTR50 tracked APC	92	BTR60 wheeled APC	74	BRDM armored car w/heavy machinegun	20	BM21 40-tube 122-mm truck mounted multiple rocket launchers	100+	122-mm rocket rounds for the BM21's	12,000	82-mm antitank guns (recoilless rifles?)	1,700	82-mm mortars	1,000	ZIS3 76-mm antitank guns	unk	Unidentified rocket launchers (RPG?)	1,100	Unidentified light antiaircraft guns mounted on armored vehicles	300	Unidentified heavy antiaircraft guns mounted on armored vehicles	25	Unidentified types	24	(Leave Blank)
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

Continuation Sheet	<p style="text-align: center;"><del>SECRET</del></p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION CONTROL MEASURES</p>	<p>Report No: (b)(3):10 USC 424</p> <p>Page: 3 of 1 pages</p> <p>Origin: (b)(3):10 USC 424</p>												
<p>4. <del>(c)</del> <u>(c)</u> <del>Visible Weapons:</del></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>AK47 rifles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AKM rifles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SKS rifles</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tokarev pistols</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unidentified hand grenades</td> <td style="text-align: right;">80,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Unidentified antitank and antipersonnel mines</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10,000</td> </tr> </table>		AK47 rifles	10,000	AKM rifles	10,000	SKS rifles	10,000	Tokarev pistols	2,000	Unidentified hand grenades	80,000	Unidentified antitank and antipersonnel mines	10,000	<p>(Leave Blank)</p>
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<p><u>COMMENT:</u></p>														
<p>1. <del>(c)</del> <u>(c)</u> (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)</p>														
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; margin: 20px auto; width: fit-content;"> <p style="text-align: center;"><del>SECRET</del></p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION CONTROL MEASURES</p> </div>														

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ITEM NO=00434085

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PAGE 001

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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEDADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) /

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

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RUCLAKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RUFGAID (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RHDLCNE

RUEHSA (b)(3):10 USC 424

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

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BODY

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO); NAMIBIA (WA); SOUTH AFRICA (SF).

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) /SADF IN ANGOLA (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET-NOFORN~~


(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: (U) 880325.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: A. ~~(S-N/E)~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),1.4



2. (c) (b)(3):10 USC 424 COMPARED UNITA FORCES WITH THOSE OF THE MPLA, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS CUBAN TRAINED AND SOMETIME LED. HE DESCRIBED THE FAPLA SOLDIERS AS BEING GOOD FIGHTERS AND WELL RESPECTED BY THE SADF SOLDIERS THEY HAVE FACED. UNITA ON THE OTHER HAND WERE MUCH LESS DEPENDABLE AND DEDICATED TO "MIXING IT UP" WITH THE ENEMY. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 USC 424 Labeled UNITA FORCES AS NOT GOOD SOLDIERS. SADF FORCES TRAINING THE UNITA SOLDIERS ON

WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVE FOUND THAT UNITA, IN GENERAL, DOES NOT USE THE WEAPONS EFFICIENTLY. IN PARTICULAR, THE SADF HAS TAUGHT UNITA THE USE OF THE AMERICAN STINGERS AND (CONFIRMING OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE SEEN) THERE HAVE BEEN FREQUENT INSTANCES WHERE THEY HAVE EITHER USED THEM INCORRECTLY OR HAVE FAILED TO FIRE THEM OUT OF FEAR WHEN UNDER AIR ATTACK.

3. (e) IN SPITE OF GSA RHETORIC THAT THE SADF IS IN NAMIBIA PROTECTING THE OVAMBO PEOPLE FROM THE SWAPO TERRORIST, THE SADF IS THERE TO SUSTAIN UNITA. THE OVAMBO, IN FACT, SUPPORT THE SWAPO TERRORIST PROGRAM AND DO NOT LIKE THE SADF PRESENCE. THIS GREATLY COMPLICATES THE

3. (e) IN SPITE OF GSA RHETORIC THAT THE SADF IS IN NAMIBIA PROTECTING THE OVAMBO PEOPLE FROM THE SWAPO TERRORIST, THE SADF IS THERE TO SUSTAIN UNITA. THE OVAMBO, IN FACT, SUPPORT SWAPO TERRORIST PROGRAM AND DO NOT LIKE THE SADF PRESENCE. THIS GREATLY COMPLICATES THE SADF MISSION. IN ONE ENGAGEMENT INSIDE ANGOLA (b)(1),1,4(e)

(b)(1),1,4(e) A GROUP OF 12 UNITA SOLDIERS, WAS ATTACKED BY A FORCE OF 30 FAPLA SOLDIERS WHOSE MISSION WAS TO CAPTURE A WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICER. THE FAPLA WERE YELLING IN THE NIGHT TO HIS UNITA COMRADES, TO TURN HIM OVER AND "JOIN THEIR SIDE." (b)(1),1,4(e) CALLED IN A HELO STRIKE THAT KILLED 16 OF THE ATTACKERS AND DROVE OFF THE REST, BUT HE WAS LEFT WITH A GNAWING DOUBT WHETHER THE UNITA SOLDIERS, WHOSE FIGHTING THAT NIGHT WAS UNUSUALLY LACK-LUSTER, WOULD HAVE TURNED HIM OVER TO THE FAPLA.

4. (e) CONVERSELY, THE SADF IS HAVING GOOD SUCCESS "TURNING" CAPTURED TERRORISTS (SWAPO) AND USING THEM AS TRACKERS AGAINST OTHER TERRORISTS AND THE ODD FAPLA COMMANDO RAID. THE SADF WILL HAND CUFF THE TERRORIST TO

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 \*\*\*\*\*/  
A BED FOR 2 WEEKS, FEED HIM WELL, AND TALK HIM INTO JOINING THEIR SIDE. "VERY FEW" WHO DECIDE TO JOIN TRY TO GET AWAY OR GIVE LESS THAN THEIR BEST. A TYPICAL TACTIC IS TO SEND A GROUP OF 5 TO 6 OF THE "EX-TER" TRACKERS (AT A RUN) ON THE SPOOR (TRAIL) OF A TERRORIST ATTACKERS, FOLLOWED BY SEVERAL RATEL ARMORED CARS. WHEN THE SPOOR IS LOST THE TRACKERS FAN OUT IN A SEMI-CIRCLE UNTIL ONE OF THEM LOCATES THE SPOOR AND TAKES OFF AT A RUN. THE OTHERS FALL IN BEHIND AND CONTINUE THE CHASE. NO WORDS ARE SPOKEN BETWEEN THE TRACKERS AND THE PURSUIT CAN LAST FROM 6 TO 10 HOURS. THE RATELS FOLLOW ON LINE BEHIND THE FILE OF TRACKERS GUIDED BY A TRACKER SITTING ON THE HOOD OF THE LEAD VEHICLE. ASKED IF THE TRACKERS WERE BUSHMEN, (b)(1),1,4(e) SAID NO. THEY ARE ANGOLANS; NOT AS GOOD AS THE BUSHMEN, BUT SURPRISINGLY CAPABLE TRACKERS, WITH INCREDIBLE ENDURANCE.

5. (e) THE "AFRIKANER MENTALITY" OF MANY SADF COMMANDERS

IS A PROBLEM. AFRIKAANS SPEAKING (MOST) SADF COMMANDERS REFUSE TO BELIEVE A BLACK ARMY CAN FIGHT. MANY TIMES (b)(1),1,4 (c) SENT BACK INTEL. REPORTS OF HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF FAPLA FORCES DUG IN AT A GIVEN LOCATION ONLY TO HAVE COMMANDERS SEND VASTLY OUTNUMBERED SADF FORCES AGAINST THE ENEMY POSITIONS. HE RECOUNTED INCIDENTS OF RATELS BEING THROWN AGAINST, AND "CHEWED TO PIECES" BY SIZABLE GROUPS OF FAPLA TANKS BURIED IN CONCRETE BUNKERS AND PLATOON SIZE SADF FORCES SENT TO ATTACK 500 MAN SIZE FAPLA UNITS. "ITS MAD, BUT THEY (AFRIKANER COMMANDERS) WON'T ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AFRICAN CAN FIGHT WELL AGAINST A WHITE MAN."

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 //COMSOBJ: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

ADMIN  
 PROJ: (U) NONE  
 COLL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 INSTR: (U)  
 PREP: (U)  
 ACQ: (U)  
 DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ -- WARNING NOTICE -- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED -- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) -- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS. -- NOT

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 END OF MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC

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RHEADWD/DA WASHDC (b)(3):50 USC

RHFDAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c)

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RHFRAAB (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(d)

RHEHAAA/SECNAV WASHDC

RHOCNBA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

THIS IS IR NO (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. USSR/ANGOLA

2. (U) SOVIET ACTIONS IN ANGOLA

PAGE 1

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- 3. N/A
- 4. 28 NOV 75
- 5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 28 NOV 75
- 6. A-6
- 7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 8.
- 9. 3 DEC 75
- 10. 3 PAGES
- 11. CIRL QUESTION 1, PAGE 8
- 12. US

(b)(3):10 USC

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. A. (b)(1),1.4 (c) JUDGES AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA A NECESSITY TO COUNTER AN INCREASE IN SOVIET AID TO THE MPLA. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

B. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

THE SUBJECT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN ANGOLA. (b)(1),1.4 (c) COMMENTED THAT SOVIET STEPS HAVE HAD A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON AFRICAN NATIONS PREVIOUSLY EVENHANCED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE IMPLIED THAT THE NEGATIVE IMPACT COULD BE RESTRAINING.

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

AGREED THAT RATHER DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING, HOWEVER, POSED A SOVIET POLICY CHOICE BETWEEN RISK OF WORSENEC CURRENT RELATIONS WITH SOME AFRICAN STATES AND ACQUISITION OF A PRIVILEGED POSITION IN A VERY STRATEGIC LOCATION. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

REPLIED THAT HE NATURALLY WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO HAVE OPTED FOR THE LATTER CHOICE. NEXT REFERRED TO A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE ECONOMIST SPECULATING THAT THERE IS LOW-LEVEL AMERICAN AID REACHING THE FALA/UNITA VIA ZAIRE. REITERATED THE ECONOMIST CONCLUSION WHICH DOUBTED THAT POSSIBLE AMERICAN AID WOULD ESCALATE IF SOVIET SUPPORT INCREASED. "THAT WOULD BE TOO BAD", (b)(1),1.4 (c) "FOR THEN ANGOLA WILL BELONG TO THE RUSSIANS." HE ADDED THAT FALA/UNITA FORCES COULD NOT ACCEPT DECISIVE AID FROM APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THE LIABILITIES WERE TOO GREAT. FALA AND UNITA WERE ALREADY UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE FOR REPORTEDLY ACCEPTING HELP FROM THEIR RASCIST NEIGHBORS TO THE SOUTH. HE CONCLUDED THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES COULD HELP THE FALA/UNITA FORCES IN A MEANINGFUL WAY.

(b)(3):10  
USC 424

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EZ1:

- EZ2:  
THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424  
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
1. (U) COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO)
  2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  3. (U) TITLE: ANGOLA ON ALERT?
  4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: NA
  5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 800229
  6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 800229
  7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 800229 (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  9. (U) ASSESSMENT: B-3
  10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: YES QPB: NO.
  12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  13. (U) APPROVING OFFICER:
  14. (U) SOURCE: ELINA DAILY, KINSHASA ZAIRE
  15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO.
  16. (U) ON DATE OF REPORT, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WARNED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF AN IMMINENT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN

CONFIDENTIAL

ANGOLA.

22. (U) THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC WARNING THAT A MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, WITH THE GOAL TO SABOTAGE PLANS FOR THE CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA WAS BEING PLANNED. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY IN LUANDA (b)(3):10 USC 424 STATED THAT STRONG CONCENTRATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE MASED ALONG THE KUNENE PROVINCE BORDER. THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIQUE, WILL TAKE PLACE USING AIR SUPPORT AND HELICOPTER-TRANSPORTED TROOPS, AND IN ADDITION TO SABOTAGING THE UNITED NATIONS DEMILITARIZATION PLAN, IS DESTINED AS A SHOW OF SUPPORT TO UNITA. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO STATES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE CONDUCTED AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS CAMPAIGN WHICH ANNOUNCES THAT UNITA FORCES, STATIONED IN NAMIBIA, ARE READY TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE AND OCCUPY BORDER POSITIONS WITHIN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE FORESEEN BETWEEN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA. IN KUNENE PROVINCE ALONE, THE COMMUNIQUE ADDS, MORE THAN FIFTY ACTS OF AGRESSION HAVE BEEN COMMITTED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 800000. ALONG THE KWANDO RIVER, SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE RECENTLY BOMBARDED THE BORDER TOWN OF DIRICO (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPORTEDLY ON 800213 AND 800221. SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAVE ALSO REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED INTO THE RUACANA AREA (b)(3):10 USC 424 WHERE THEY HAVE CLOSED THE SLICES OF THE DAM ALONG THE KUNENE RIVER (b)(3):10 USC 424.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: AS WIDELY REPORTED, ANGOLA CONSIDERS THE SPORADIC ATTACKS ALONG ITS BORDERS AS BEING ATTEMPTS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES TO SUPPORT UNITA IN DISRUPTING ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REALIZATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE ALONG THE ANGOLAN/NAMIBIAN BORDER - A PRIME FACTOR FOR DEMOCRACY IN NAMIBIA. TRUE, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ATTACKS ALONG THE ANGOLAN BUT AS IN THE CASE OF DIRICO ON 800213, THE ATTACK LASTED ONLY ONE HOUR AND CONSISTED OF BOMBARDMENT BY 140MM CANNONS. THE COMMUNIQUE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE CONSIDERED AS YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO RALLY THE ANGOLAN FORCES BUT AT THE SAME TIME REFLECTS POSSIBLY INCREASED SUPPORT TO UNITA BY SOUTH AFRICA.

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
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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(2)

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) PORTUGAL (PO); GUINEA BISSAU (PU); CUBA (CU); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC / GUINEA BISSAUAN CONTRIBUTION TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL A PIPEDREAM (U)

WARNINGNOTICE: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED--~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

~~NOINTEL~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 881011.

REQ: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ GUINEA BISSAU'S (PU) PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO SEND PU MILITARY TROOPS TO ANGOLA TO OVERSEE AND ASSIST IN CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL (CTW) IS WISFUL THINKING.

TEXT: ~~(S/NF/WN)~~ A. BACKGROUND: LISBON MEDIA REPORTED ON 11 OCT 88 THAT PU PRESIDENT BERNARDO "NINO" ((VIEIRA)) HAD DECLARED THAT PU WAS PREPARED TO SEND ITS MILITARY TO ANGOLA TO ASSIST IN THE CONTROL

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PAGE:0033

OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS; IT JUST DEPENDED ON A REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA. ((VIEIRA)) WAS IN LISBON ON A STATE VISIT WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT MARIO ((SOARES)) WHEN HE MADE THE REMARKS ON 10 OCT 88.

B. ~~(S//NF//WN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] THE PU ARMY WAS A FAIRLY EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA FORCE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE ARMY DURING THE COLONIAL WARS. AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND AFTER THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PU ARMY AS A FORMAL ARMY, IT IMMEDIATELY FELL APART AS AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING ELEMENT. THERE STILL IS NO REAL ORGANIZATION, NO DISCIPLINE, VIRTUALLY NO SALARIES FOR THE SOLDIERS, AND NO NOTION OF A GENUINE MISSION.

ITS SOLDIERS ARE OFTEN INTOXICATED AND ENGAGE IN OPEN ROBBERY OF PU CITIZENS, OFTEN DRIVEN BY HUNGER TO STEALING FOOD, CROPS, AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS. THE ARMY HAS BEEN USED MORE FOR KEEPING THE POPULACE IN LINE THAN FOR ANY OTHER FUNCTION AND WOULD NOT STAND A CHANCE IN A MILITARY CONFLICT WITH A PREPARED AND TRAINED ENEMY.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] LESS THAN A COMPANY OF WELL-TRAINED AND EQUIPPED COMMANDOS OR SPECIAL PURPOSE TROOPS COULD SEIZE THE CAPITAL CITY OF BISSAU WITHOUT THE PU ARMY BEING MUCH OF AN OBSTACLE. THE NOTION THAT THE PU ARMY COULD PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY IN THE CTW PROCESS IN ANGOLA IS BEYOND REASON. THE PU ARMY COULD NOT POLICE ITSELF IN ANGOLA, MUCH LESS ASSIST IN POLICING THE CUBAN FORCES.

C. ~~(S//NF//WN)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED]

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC

//COMSOBJ: 424

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PROJ: (U).

INST: (U) (b)(3):10

PREP: (U) USC 424

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WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED--~~SECRET~~--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.

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RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
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(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 4031(a)

BT  
E21:  
~~SECRET~~ //N03890//  
E22:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA-MOZAMBIQUE-CAPE VERDE/RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424  
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE (U)  
1. (U) COUNTRIES: ANGOLA (AO), MOZAMBIQUE (MZ), CAPE VERDE (CV).  
2. (U) TITLE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES.  
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 810603-810924  
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
5. (U) REFERENCES: [redacted]

(b)(3):10 USC 424  
6. ~~+~~ SOURCES: (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

7. ~~+~~ SUMMARY: OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, A NUMBER OF

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FRAGMENTARY REPORTS RELATING TO EVENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES OF ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND CAPE VERDE.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

B.A. (U) DETAILS:

(A) ~~(S)~~ MOZAMBIQUE: (b)(1),1.4 (c) SOVIET SUBMARINES HAVE BEEN USING THE PORT OF NACALA ON A PERIODIC BASIS FOR THE PAST YEAR. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS IN NACALA AND THE LOCAL POPULACE ARE SAID TO BE POOR DUE TO SOVIET REFUSAL TO MIX WITH THE BLACK POPULATION, THE SOVIET'S HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING, AND THEIR ATTITUDES OF RACIAL SUPERIORITY. INDEED, (b)(1),1.4 (c) ANTI-SOVIET RIOTS HAVE OCCURRED IN NACALA SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST YEAR WHICH LOCAL FPLM UNITS HAVE BEEN HARD PRESSED TO CONTROL.

~~(S)~~ IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NRM) NOW CONTROLS UP TO ONE THIRD OF THE COUNTRY, PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL AREAS. THE NRM IS SAID TO BE FLYING THE PORTUGUESE FLAG OVER LIBERATED AREAS AND TO BE RECEIVING SOUTH AFRICAN AND "OTHER" SUPPORT. WHILE THE "OTHER" SUPPORT WAS NOT SPECIFIED, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE NRM WAS BEING LED BY FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIALS.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) BELIEVE THAT THE NRM POSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE FRELIMO GOVERNMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

B. ~~(S)~~ ANGOLA: (b)(1),1.4 (c) CUBAN UNITS IN-COUNTRY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS IN ORDER TO INCREASE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS. CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA ARE SAID TO BE RELUCTANT TO VENTURE OUTSIDE THE CITIES AND SUFFER FROM POOR MORALE AND FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY VIS A VIS THE SOUTH AFRICANS. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE CUBANS IS ALSO SAID TO BE DWINDLING AS A RESULT OF THEIR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE MPLA'S ARBITRARY POLICIES IN CONTROLLED AREAS, AS WELL AS BY RACIAL ANTAGONISMS.

~~(S)~~ IN ADDITION (b)(1),1.4 (c) AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION, SWAPO HAS FORMULATED PLANS TO INFILTRATE LARGE NUMBERS OF GUERILLAS INTO NAMIBIA. ONCE ACROSS THE BORDER, THESE GUERILLAS ARE TO ORGANIZE INTO SMALL BANDS AND ATTACK SADF LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT FACILITIES. THIS, THE GUERILLAS HOPE, WILL KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICANS OFF BALANCE AND RENDER ADDITIONAL INCURSIONS INTO ANGOLA MORE DIFFICULT.

C. ~~(S)~~ CAPE VERDE: (b)(1),1.4 (c) DISCREDIT SPECULATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CAPE VERDE (GCV) MAY GRANT BASE ACCESS TO THE SOVIETS FOR THREE REASONS:

1. ~~(S)~~ THE GCV PRESENTLY RECIEVES LARGE REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS LABORERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND PORTUGAL.
2. ~~(S)~~ THE POPULATION AT LARGE IS PRO-U.S., DUE TO THE FACT THAT MOST FAMILIES HAVE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.
3. ~~(S)~~ THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE REGULARLY USES THE AIRFIELD ON SAL ISLAND AND SECRETLY PAYS THE GCV "MILLIONS OF DOLLARS" FOR ITS USE.

EB. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A  
10. (U) COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CODES: NONE  
11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE  
12. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
13. (U) APPROVED BY:  
14. (U) REQUEST FOR EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE  
15. (U) ENCLOSURES: NONE

~~REVW: 1 OCT 1997~~


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
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(b)(3)-10 USC 424

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SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/SADF  
VIEWS ON A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 4031(c)

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

- 1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (NA)/ANGOLA (AO)
- 2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 3. (U) TITLE: SADF VIEWS ON A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820820
- 5. (U) URIG: SEE FM LINE
- 6. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 7. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 4031(c)

SUMMARY: (b)(1):4(c)

(b)(3):1(c) SEEMS FIRM IN HIS CONVICTIONS THAT THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME TO POWER IN NAMIBIA AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD FIGHT "THE TERRORISTS" AS FAR FROM ITS OWN BORDERS AS POSSIBLE. HE DOES NOT SEEM OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT A DECLINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SHOULD AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION NOT BE FOUND IN NAMIBIA.

DETAILS:

1. DISCUSSIVE NAMIBIA RECENTLY AT A PRIVATE SOCIAL GATHERING. (b)(1):4(c) WAS ADAMANT THAT SWAPO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GAIN POWER. ALL THE SOVIET MILITARY MATERIEL NOW IN ANGOLA, HE SAID, COULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH TO CONTINUE THE COMMUNIST "ONSLAUGHT" ON SOUTH AFRICA. HE SAID SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD FIGHT "THE TERRORISTS" AS FAR FROM ITS OWN BORDERS AS POSSIBLE.

2. HE SEEMED CONVINCED THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD NEVER LEAVE. HE SAID THE POPULAR MOVEMENT

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82 9323705 NCR PAGE 003 NC 9323705  
TJRS 261112Z AUG 82

FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE UNDER THE PRESSURES OF THE UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA) INSURGENCY--"EVEN AS THE CUBANS WITHDRAW." IN ADDITION, HE SAID, CASTRO FAVORS EXPORTING HIS UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM AT SOVIET AND ANGOLAN EXPENSE. AND EVEN IF THE CUBANS DID AGREE TO WITHDRAW, HOW COULD SOUTH AFRICA BE SURE THAT REALLY WOULD HAPPEN?

- 3. ~~HE~~ HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE SOLUTION IN NAMIBIA WOULD HAVE TO BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE IDEA OF ANY FINAL MILITARY SOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS AS ABSURD AS THE ISRAELI NOTION THAT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION COULD BE EXTERMINATED. BUT HE ALSO REFERRED TO AN "OPEN-ENDED" MILITARY STRUGGLE ACCOMPANYING THE POLITICAL SOLUTION. ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A DECLINE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST--IF NO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SETTLEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR NAMIBIA--HE SAID, "CAN IT GET WORSE THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST?"

S.S. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(1),4(c)  
(b)(1),4(c)

~~END OF MESSAGE~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECT MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRDI 4

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82 9323071 MCR

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NC 9323071

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DE RUEHSA #6288/02 2301111  
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R 261054Z AUG 82

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

#19 473-422/THE WHITE HOUSE

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(r)

RUEHDA

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RUEHOT

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGSN SEA

RUSNNOA/USEUCOM (b)(3):5 VAHINGSN SEA

BT

SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL NGMT CODES: N/A

12. (U) SPEC INSL: NONE DIRCA NO

13. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MILITARY

02 9323071 MCR

PAGE 005  
T081 201126Z AUG 82

NC 9323071

15. (U) REQ EVALS NO REL TO: NONE  
16. (U) ENCLT N/P  
17. (U) DIST BY ORIGIN: NONE

~~SECRET~~  
END OF MESSAGE

MSGNO 19 (MIIR) \*13/01/77\* \*04:33\* 62  
VZCZC 12:24:55Z EIC942LGY242

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DE RUEKJCS #8501 0121324  
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R 121323Z JAN 77  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEACMC/CMC WASH DC  
RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC  
RUEHAAA/CMO WASH DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC  
RUEAIF/C I A  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC  
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
RUEOIAH/NSA WASH DC  
R 121100Z JAN 77

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GERMANY  
RUFDAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RHFRAAB  
RUEHMO (b)(3):10 USC 424  
BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0020 JAN 77 (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

(b)(3):10 USC  
424 (b)(3):50 USC  
403-1(f)

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. CUBA/USSR/ANGOLA
2. CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA (U)
3. YUGOSLAV NEWS SERVICE, TANJUG
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. 770111
7. 770112
8. 770112, (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. [REDACTED]
14. DIRC-NO
15. SUMMARY: (U) YUGOSLAV PRESS REPORTS ARTICLE BY GABRIEL GARCIA MARGUEZ PRINTED IN HAVANA STATING THAT CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WAS AN INDEPENDENT DECISION ON PART OF CUBANS.
22. DETAILS: (U) TANJUG NEWS SERVICE CARRIED NEWS ARTICLE, DATED 1000Z HAVANA 770111, BY GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ DISCLOSED THAT DECISION TO SEND CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA IN 1975 WAS REACHED INDEPENDENTLY OF USSR AND THAT USSR WAS INFORMED ONLY AFTER DECISION WAS MADE.
23. (U) ARTICLE CONTINUED BY PROVIDING LOGISTICAL INFORMATION. THE FIRST GROUP OF EIGHTY-TWO SOLDIERS WITH ARMS WERE TRANSPORTED BY CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED, LANDING LEGALLY AT BARBADOS AND BUINEA BISSAO, AND SECRETELY PROCEEDING TO LUANDA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0020 JAN 77 (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

ARRIVING NIGHT OF 751108. IN COURSE OF SIX MONTHS,  
CIVILIAN CARRIERS MADE ONE HUNDRED ONE FLIGHTS AND  
FORTY-TWO SHIP CROSSINGS TRANSPORTING SOLDIERS,  
ARMS AND OIL.

24. (U) AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT FIRST CUBAN CONTACT WITH  
ANGOLIAN REVOLUTIONARIES WAS MADE CHE GUEVARA PERSONALLY  
IN 1965 WHEN HE SPENT EIGHT MONTHS IN CONGO PRIOR TO  
FALL OF CHOMBE.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4  
(c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

, DESCRIBE MARQUEZ AS MORE OF A  
NOVELIST THAN A JOURNALIST, THUS THE RATING OF SOURCE  
AND IX94.-589,. CONSIDERING THE SOVIET'S INTEREST IN  
CUBA, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE CUBA BNWOULD MOUNT AN  
INDEPENDENT OPERATION. THIS REPORT, THEREFORE, IS PROVIDED  
FOR WHATEVER VALUE MAY BE GLEANED FROM IT.

~~885-83~~

BT

#8501

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 0020 JAN 77

(b)(3):10 USC 424(b)(3):50 USC 4031(i)

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0062

INQUIRE=DOC2D  
ITEM NO=00426338

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
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PAGE 001  
TOR: 121559Z MAR 86

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HEADER

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R 121404Z MAR 86

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUCLHUA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUEALGX/SAFE

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEOEHA/USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUSNDA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUEAIJU (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUEHMY (b)(3):10 USC 424

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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

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~~NOFORN~~

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); URUGUAY (UY);  
- ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: IIR <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup> SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTEREST  
- IN ANGOLA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
- EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: (U) 860310

REQS: (U) <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

SOURCE: (U) <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

SUMMARY: ~~(CONF)~~ SOUTH AFRICA IS PLANNING DECISIVE MILI-  
TARY ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN ANGOLA  
FOR DATE 1987.

TEXT: ~~(CONF)~~ <sup>(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)</sup>

[Redacted text block]

THESE

OPERATIONS WERE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE APPROXIMATELY IN  
LATE 1987 WHEN IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE U.S. AND PRESI-  
DENT REAGAN WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN UNDERTAKING DUE TO PRO-  
BABLE FRUSTRATION OVER THE LACK OF DECISIVE PROGRESS BY  
THE UNITAS FORCES. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THIS TYPE OF  
ISRAELI BLITZKRIEG CAMPAIGN WAS WELL WITHIN THE SOUTH  
AFRICAN MILITARY'S CAPABILITIES AND WOULD ELIMINATE THE  
PRINCIPLE MILITARY THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA'S EXISTENCE  
AND BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE ENTIRE REGION. <sup>(b)(1),1.4(c)</sup>

<sup>(b)(1),1.4(c)</sup> STATED THAT THE OPERATIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT  
IN CONJUNCTION WITH UNITAS. HE STATED THAT THE SOUTH  
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S ONLY FEAR FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING  
WAS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE U.S. VETO IN  
THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT  
SOUTH AFRICA FROM ECONOMIC RETRIBUTION OR SANCTIONS FROM  
THE PRO-SOVIET/CUBAN BLOCK OF THAT ORGANIZATION. NONE-  
THELESS, THE OPERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT TO  
GUARANTEE SOUTH AFRICAN SURVIVAL AS A SOWEREIGN AND INDE-  
PENDENT NATION.

COMMENTS: ~~(C)~~ <sup>(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)</sup>

//IPSP: <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

//COMSO: <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

COLL: (U) <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

INSTR: (U) <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

PREP: (U) <sup>(b)(3):10 USC 424</sup>

~~NOFORN~~



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PAGE:0064

APPR: (U) (b)(3)-10/USC 424

WARNING: (U) ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

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PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC18D  
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(b)(3)-10 USC 424 151054Z

HEADER

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FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAQ (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

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FM (b)(3)-10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

RUSNNOR/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(f)

INFO RUEFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(f) VAIHINGEN GE

RUFTAKA (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)-10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3)-10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) CONGO (CF); CUBA (CU).

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3)-10 USC 424 CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PROGRESSES (U)

~~SECRET~~

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WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT,  
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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
DSI: (U) 910207.

REQS: (U) (b)(3) 10 USC 424

SOURCE: (b)(1),(b)(3) 10 USC 424.1-4(c)

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ THE CAMP WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS A  
MAIN CUBAN TROOP BASE CAMP JUST NORTHEAST OF POINTE  
NOIRE HAS BEEN EVACUATED. NO PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT  
REMAIN ON SITE.

TEXT: ~~(S/NF)~~ THE SITE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS A  
MAIN BASE CAMP FOR CUBAN TROOPS IN THE CONGO HAS BEEN  
EVACUATED. ALL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN MOVED  
OUT OF THE CAMP. ALL THAT REMAINS ARE SOME EMPTY CEMENT  
BUILDINGS. NO VISIBLE TROOP OR EQUIPMENT MOVEMENTS WERE  
OBSERVED.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),(3)  


~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~NOINTEL~~

PAGE:0015

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C 85027RUEKJCS  
S

5744 160920ZMCR 86-2524500


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FRP: , , 3, 4, , , ,

MILITARY



86 2524500 MCR

PAGE 001  
TOR: 160920Z OCT 86

NC 2524500  
RUEKJCS 5744

HEADER

RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEKJCS #5744 2890902  
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~  
R 160902Z OCT 86  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCLHUA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
RUETIAQ

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R 160838Z OCT 86

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) VAIHINGEN GE  
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //  
RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //  
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //

RHFPAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
RUFDNSI  
RHDLCNE  
RUCBSAA

RUEAHQA/HQUSAF WASHDC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //

RUTAHI (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
RUEHBS  
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RUEHMY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BT  
CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOINTEL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424  
BODY  
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO); CUBA (CU); SOVIET UNION (UR)  
SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / LIFE AROUND THE MILITARY AIR  
BASE AT LUBANGO, ANGOLA (U)  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUAT-  
ED INTELLIGENCE  
DOI: (U) 861009  
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
SOURCE: (S/AF/IN) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c)

[REDACTED]

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SUMMARY: (S/AF) (b)(1).4(c)  
[REDACTED]

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TEXT: 1. (S/AF) DURING A DISCUSSION WITH (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) ON 9 OCT 86, MANY DETAILS ABOUT LIFE IN ANGOLA THROUGH MARCH OF 1986 EMERGED. THE TOWN OF LUBANGO IS THE LOCATION OF AN AIR-FIELD FROM WHICH MIG 21, 23 HINDS AND HIPS ARE FLOWN.

(b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) REVEALED INFORMATION RELATING TO THE DAILY LIFE OF THE LOCAL CIVILIAN POPULATION, AIRCREW TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION, TYPES OF TACTICS USED BY THE AIRCREWS, CREW MORALE, AND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS.

2. (S/AF) (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) REVEALED THAT THE LOCAL CURRENCY IS NEARLY NONEXISTENT, AND A HIGHLY ORGANIZED SYSTEM OF BARTER HAS EVOLVED. THE PRINCIPAL MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE IS THE LOCAL BEER. IN EXCHANGE FOR BEER, IT IS POSSIBLE TO RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM POTATOES TO AIRPLANE TRAVEL. TYPICAL RATES OF EXCHANGE WERE ONE CASE OF BEER FOR TEN KILOGRAMS OR THREE CHICKENS. THREE CASES OF BEER CAN BE EXCHANGED FOR ONE PIG AND 15 CASES FOR ONE COW. ONE CASE OF BEER WAS VALUED AT USD 1000. IN THE CAPITAL OF LUANDA, LOCAL CURRENCY IS AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, THE BARTER SYSTEM IS IN EFFECT. MANY BUSINESSES, TO INCLUDE HOTELS, REQUEST PAY FOR SERVICES IN HARD CURRENCIES. A TYPICAL COST IS USD 100 FOR ONE NIGHT IN A HOTEL. WHEN (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) ARRIVED IN LUANDA, THERE WERE NO TAXIS AVAILABLE FOR HIRE, AND THERE WERE NO CONSUMER GOODS AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE IN THE STORES. THE LACK OF CONSUMER GOODS PREVAILS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. A COMMON PRACTICE OF FOREIGNERS LIVING AND WORKING IN ANGOLA IS TO SMUGGLE HARD CURRENCY INTO THE COUNTRY. EVERY SIX MONTHS, (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) RETURNED TO EUROPE AND BROUGHT BACK USD 1500 BUT WOULD DECLARE ONLY USD 500, HIDING USD 1000.

3. (S/AF) (b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4(c) DISCUSSED TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION. THE ONLY RELIABLE AND QUICK MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IS BY AIR.

~~NOFORN~~

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~~WINTTEL~~

PAGE:0020

HOWEVER, MANY PROBLEMS EXIST. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE BOEING AIRCRAFT WERE SO OVERLOADED THAT THE PILOTS HAD TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF, RETURN TO THE TERMINAL WHERE THE CREW WOULD THROW OUT OF THE PLANE AS MUCH AS THEY FELT NECESSARY, AND REATTEMPT THE TAKEOFF. (b)(3)(10) USC STATED THAT ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, THE BOEING TRANSPORT CRASHED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF, THE PROBABLE CAUSE AN OVER GROSSED AIRCRAFT. THE CREW WOULD THROW OFF LUGGAGE FIRST AND CONSUMABLES LAST. IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR (b)(3)(10) USC TO RIDE ANYWHERE ON A MILITARY AIRCRAFT; THE COST WAS ONE CASE OF BEER. THIS WAS DONE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS FORBIDDEN FOR CIVILIANS, ESPECIALLY FOREIGNERS, TO RIDE ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

4. (C/NF) (b)(3)(10) USC DISCUSSED GROUND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS. (b)(3)(10) USC DIVIDED TRAFFIC INTO TWO MAIN TYPES, MILITARY CONVOYS AND "GUN RUNNERS OR COWBOYS". THE TYPICAL MILITARY CONVOY FROM LUBANGO TO LUANDA REQUIRED 50 DAYS TO TRAVEL THE APPROXIMATELY 300 KILOMETERS. HAZARDS INCLUDED ATTACKS BY REBELS (UNITA) AND LAND MINES. THE MINES WOULD USUALLY EXPLODE UNDER THE THIRD OR FOURTH TRUCK AND HALT THE CONVOY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. THE PROBABLE REASON FOR THE SLOW SPEED IS THE MINE CLEARING ACTIVITIES REQUIRED ALONG THE ROUTE. THE COWBOYS ARE INDEPENDENT CIVILIAN TRUCKERS WHO ALWAYS TRAVEL AT NIGHT. NORMAL METHOD OF OPERATION INCLUDED THE CARRYING OF FLARES FOR ILLUMINATION AND ADDITIONAL MEN TO OPERATE MACHINE GUNS. AS THE TRUCKER TRAVELED FROM POINT TO POINT, AS HE REACHED THE CREST OF A HILL, HE WOULD FIRE A NIGHT ILLUMINATION FLARE. IN THEORY, THE REBELS WOULD THEN TAKE COVER. IN ADDITION, AS THE TRUCK TRAVELED

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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BT  
CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03

(b)(3)10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~NOINTEL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR

(b)(3)10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO); CUBA (CU); SOVIET UNION (UR)


SUBJ: (U) IIR /LIFE AROUND THE MILITARY AIR

DOWN THE HILL THROUGH THE NEXT VALLEY, THE MACHINE GUNNERS WOULD FIRE ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. THIS TACTIC HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS A LOT OF RISK. SOURCE OBSERVED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, VEHICLES AND BODIES WHICH HAD BEEN SHOT AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT PASSAGE. THE HIGH PAY CONTINUES TO ATTRACT VOLUNTEERS TO FACE THE DEADLY RISKS.

5. (c/nf) STATED THAT THE FIRST 15 MIG 21 PILOTS TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION ARRIVED IN LUBANGO DURING THE STAY THERE. THE ANGOLAN PILOTS WERE ALL METIS. TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION LASTED THREE YEARS, AND ALL BEGAN BY LEARNING RUSSIAN. STATED THAT THE PILOTS FELT ALL THEY LEARNED IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS HOW TO TAKE-OFF AND LAND.

STATED THAT THE BASE AT LUBANGO HAD A DUAL PURPOSE OF TRAINING AND MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE ANGOLANS LEARNED THEIR TACTICS AFTER RETURNING TO ANGOLA. SOME OF THE PILOTS RETURNED WITH RUSSIAN WIVES. OF THE INITIAL 15 PILOTS TRAINED, FOUR CONTINUE TO ACTIVELY FLY THE MIG 21, TWO HAD ACCIDENTS AND NO LONGER FLY, AND EIGHT HAVE TRANSITIONED TO THE MIG 23. THE SENIOR ANGOLAN PILOT OF THE 15 SPENT FIVE YEARS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND RECEIVED TRAINING IN BOTH THE MIG 21 AND THE MIG 23.

6. (c/nf)



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(b)(1),(b)(3)-10 USC 424.1.4 (c)

8. ~~(S/AF)~~ (b)(3)-10 USC STATED THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 15 MIG 21S AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF MIG 23S AT LUBANGO. THE MIG 23S ARRIVED IN EARLY 1985. ALSO AT THE AIR BASE ARE MI-24 HIND HELICOPTERS AND ALLOUETTES. (b)(1),(b)(3)-10 USC 424.1.4 (c)

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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PAGE:0067

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ITEM NO=00392756

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
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

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INFO RUEGAID / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

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RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

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RHFPAQA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUFDNSI / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RHDLCNE / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUCBSAA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

RULGSAA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUEAHQA/HQUSAF WASHDC / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUEGAID/USEUCOM / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) VAHINGEN GE / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUEADWD/DA WASHDC / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

RUTAHI / (b)(3):10 USC 424

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PAGE:0068

RUDHAA (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH); ANGOLA (AO); SOVIET UNION (UR);  
CUBA (CU)

SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 CHINESE INTEREST IN U.S.  
EFFORTS AIMED AT ANGOLAN SOLUTION (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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→ DOI: (U) 880322  
REQS: (U) INITIATIVE

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: ~~(CONF)~~ THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION CONCERNING  
EFFORTS AND INTEREST OF THE CHINESE IN LEARNING ABOUT  
U.S. ACTIONS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION.

TEXT: ~~(CONF)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

[Large redacted area]

EXPRESSED PLEASURE KNOWING  
THAT THE USSR WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OCCUPIED WITH SUPPORT-  
ING BOTH ANGOLA AND CUBA.

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PAGE:0069

COMMENT: ~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

AS LONG AS THE USSR IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED  
IN SUPPORTING BOTH CUBA AND ANGOLA, THE CHINESE WILL VIEW  
WITH INTEREST ANY DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN MONEY, EQUIPMENT  
OR TALENT.

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10  
//COMSOBJ: USC 424

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
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EZ2:  
SUBJECT: THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424  
1. (U) COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO); CUBA (CU)  
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN LOSSES DURING ABORTED MPLA  
OFFENSIVE IN CABINDA.  
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A  
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 780818  
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 780821  
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 780818  
(b)(3):10 USC 424  
8. (U) REFERENCES: INITIATIVE  
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: M1  
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ 27792

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

14. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC NO. 15/EAT  
~~NOFORN/UNINTEL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

16. ~~S/NOFORN/UNINTEL~~ SUMMARY: (b)(1),1.4 (c)

REPORTS THAT A RECENT MPLA OFFENSIVE AGAINST FLED REBELS IN CABINDA AREA HAS TURNED INTO A MINOR DISASTER. PARTICULARLY FOR CUBAN COMBAT ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE MPLA. THE CUBAN ELEMENTS WERE APPARENTLY SINGLED OUT AS PRIME TARGETS AND REPORTEDLY SUSTAINED 30% SOME KILLED A MONTH DURING THE COURSE OF THE ADOPTED OFFENSIVE. INCLUDED AMONG OTHER FOREIGN ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE MPLA DURING THE SAME OFFENSIVE WERE A NUMBER OF EAST GERMAN MILITARY ADVISORS. THEIR EXACT ROLE IS NOT CLEAR.

COMMENT: ~~S/NOFORN/UNINTEL~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424;(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

- 1. UK
- 2. (U) CUBANS IN ANGOLA
- 3. NA
- 4. 19 NOV 75
- 5. (b)(3):10 USC NOV 75
- 6. 8-2
- 7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 8. [REDACTED]
- 9. 19 NOVEMBER 1975
- 10. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 11. [REDACTED]
- 12. [REDACTED]
- 13. [REDACTED]
- 14. [REDACTED]

15. (C) (b)(1);(b)(3):10 USC 424.1.1(c) SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATED 5,000 CUBAN TROOPS UNDER COMMAND OF THE MPLA;  
 (C) HE ALSO STATED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ADVISERS ARE ACCOMPANYING FORCES OPPOSED TO THE MPLA IN THE SOUTH OF ANGOLA, SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WERE DEPLOYED ON A PERIMETER OF 50 MILES RADIUS AROUND THE HYDRO ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT IN THE LITTORAL BETWEEN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA,  
 (C) HE TALKED OF EIGHT MIG-21S FLOWN INTO BRAZZAVILLE FOUR DAYS AGO, WHICH, IN ALL, IN HIS OPINION, WAS MAKING THE RUSSIAN BID SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL. (b)(1);(b)(3) THOUGHT THE SITUATION WOULD YET BLOW UP.

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EZ2:

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ISRAEL

2. (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. CUBAN OVERSEAS PRESENCE AND MILITARY CAPABILITY (U)

4. N/A

5. 780103

6. 780105

7. 780103 (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. (b)(3):10 USC 424

9. B-2

10. (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. YES/NO

12. (b)(3):10 USC 424

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14.

15. NO

16. ~~TS/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1),1.4 (c)

[Redacted]

A. PARA 12A(1)

(1) ALGERIA: ABOUT 100-200 CUBAN MILITARY INSTRUCTORS ARE PRESENTLY IN ALGERIA. SOME ARE TRAINING MEMBERS OF THE QUOTE POLISARIO UNQUOTE MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF QUOTE SPANISH SAHAR UNQUOTE.

(2) IRAQ: ABOUT 200 CUBAN INSTRUCTORS ARRIVED IN IRAQ IN THE SUMMER OF 1976. THEIR SPECIFIC ROLE IS NOT CLEAR; HOWEVER, THEY SEEM TO BE INSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL ARMY (MILITIA OF THE BA'TH

PARTY) AND PALESTINIANS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE.

(3) P.O.R.Y. (b)(1), (4) ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE 300 CUBANS IN P.O.R.Y. CUBA HAS SUPPORTED P.O.R.Y. THROUGH QUOTE THE CUBAN REVOLUTION DEFENSE COMMITTEE UNQUOTE, BY ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL MILITIA. THERE ARE ABOUT 200 CUBAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL INSTRUCTORS. ACCORDING TO (b)(1), (4) CUBAN MILITARY MEN PARTICIPATED IN GUERRILLA TRAINING AND SOME HAVE AIDED THE REBELS IN GUERRILLA TRAINING AND SOME HAVE AIDED THE REBELS AT TAPAR. IT SEEMS THAT IN THE P.O.R.Y. MILITIA TRAINING CAMP THE CUBANS TRAINED PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS AND MEMBERS OF AFRICAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (ERITREA LIBERATION FRONT). ANOTHER FIELD OF ACTION FOR THE CUBANS IS IN THE P.O.R.Y. AIR FORCE. INFORMATION FROM 1974 STATES THAT CUBAN PILOTS TRAINED P.O.R.Y. PILOTS ON MIG-21 AIRCRAFT. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CUBANS FORMED THE OPERATIONAL NUCLEUS OF THE P.O.R.Y. AIR FORCE. THE CUBAN PILOTS THEN APPARENTLY LEFT P.O.R.Y. IT IS LIKELY THAT DURING LAST YEAR A FEW CUBAN RADAR AND S/A MISSILES ARRIVED IN P.O.R.Y. SYSTEMS WERE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS.

(4) LIBYA: SINCE CASTRO'S VISIT (MARCH 1977), CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEGUN TO ARRIVE IN LIBYA. THESE PERSONNEL ARE EMPLOYED IN TRAINING AND ADVISING, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMORED FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE, AND PERHAPS IN COMMANDO/GUERRILLA TRAINING. WE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA AT APPROXIMATELY 200-300 MEN.

(5) ANGOLA: FROM THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER 1975 UNTIL FEBRUARY 1976 A LARGE SOVIET AIRLIFT (ABOUT 81 FLIGHTS, MOST OF THEM AN-22 AIRCRAFT) WAS OBSERVED. THE AIRLIFT SUPPLIED MILITARY AID TO THE MPLA MOVEMENT. IN THE BEGINNING OF 1976 THERE WERE 12,000 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA. THEY WERE ORGANIZED IN TEN BATTALIONS AND FOUR TANK COMPANIES WHICH OPERATED IN SMALL GROUPS OF FIVE-SIX TANKS. THE CUBANS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CIVIL WAR, AND BROUGHT ABOUT THE VICTORY OF THE MPLA MARXIST MOVEMENT. (b)(1), (4) (c) THE CUBANS PROVIDED THE AIR SUPPORT FOR THE LAND FORCES BY FLYING MIG-21'S. IN ADDITION, THE CUBANS INSTRUCTED IN THE USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS SUCH AS A/T MISSILES, RECOILLESS GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND MORTARS. THE CUBAN FORCES PARTICIPATED IN ALL STAGES OF THE MPLA'S OVERTAKING OF ANGOLA'S GOVERNMENT. THEY UNDERTOOK THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GUARDING RAILROADS, ROADS AND AIR FIELDS. THE CUBANS FOUGHT IN INDEPENDENT UNITS AS WELL AS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF MPLA UNITS. CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA HAVE INCREASED AND THEIR NUMBER TODAY IS ESTIMATED AS AT LEAST 15,000. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 4,000 CUBAN CIVILIAN ADVISORS IN ANGOLA.

(6) ETHIOPIA: SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ETHIOPIA HAS INCREASED. (b)(1), (4) ESTIMATES THEIR NUMBER TO BE ABOUT 400-600 MEN. THE CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ETHIOPIA ARE ADVISORS AND INSTRUCTORS. THEY DO NOT OPERATE AS INDEPENDENT MILITARY UNITS. THE CUBANS' MAIN ACTIVITIES CENTER AROUND AID TO THE MILITIA.

(7) MOZAMBIQUE: ABOUT 200-400 CUBANS ARE PRESENTLY IN MOZAMBIQUE. THEY ARE EMPLOYED IN INSTRUCTING AND TRAINING GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN THE USE OF SOVIET ARMS AND PREPARING THEM FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST RHODESIA. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CUBANS IN



MOZAMBIQUE ARE FORMING A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE MILITARY ACTION IN RHODESIA.

(8) GUINEA: THERE ARE ABOUT 200 CUBAN TECHNICIANS AND TEACHERS FOR PRE-MILITARY TRAINING IN GUINEA. REPORTS INDICATE THAT CUBAN ADMINISTRATORS AID LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

(9) TANZANIA: THERE IS NO RELIABLE INFORMATION ON A CUBAN PRESENCE IN TANZANIA. (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS REPORTED THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 500 CUBANS IN TANZANIA. THEY REPORTEDLY AID IN THE TRAINING OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTERS WHO PLAN TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME IN RHODESIA.

(10) CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE): THERE ARE ABOUT 150 CUBANS IN CONGO. THEIR OCCUPATION IS UNKNOWN.

(11) SIERRA LEONE: CUBAN SECURITY PERSONNEL ASSIST THE TRAINING OF A LOCAL UNIT FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY.

(12) ZAMBIA: THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF CUBAN PERSONNEL IS LIKELY.

12A (1)(B): AS FAR AS IS KNOWN BY (b)(1),1.4 (c) IT IS PROBABLE THAT CUBA VIEWS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD AS ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF HER MILITARY FORCES (DESPITE THE FACT (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO POSITIVE INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THIS SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE). IT SEEMS THAT, BEHIND THE VIEW, STANDS CUBA'S DESIRE TO SUPPORT RADICAL AND QUOTE ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC UNQUOTE ELEMENTS. AGAIN, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES HAVE OCCURED IN THE CUBAN-MILITARY WHICH MIGHT PREPARE IT FOR OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT OR ANY MILITARY DOCTRINAL CHANGE WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN FORMED FOR THESE SPECIFIC PURPOSES.

12A (1)(C): (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO INFORMATION ON THE EXISTANCE OF CUBAN MILITARY UNITS WHOSE MAIN PURPOSE IS INVOLVEMENT IN DISTANT PARTS OF THE WORLD.

12A (1)(D) AND (E): (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO INFORMATION ON CUBAN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS NOR ON THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AMERICAN ELEMENTS IN THE CUBAN MILITARY.

12A (1)(F) AND (G): (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO INFORMATION ON THESE TOPICS.

12A (1)(H): TODAY, ABOUT TWO YEARS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, THERE IS A GREAT AWARENESS IN THE CUBAN POPULATION OF THE CUBAN OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT. ALL OF THE REGIME'S ATTEMPTS TO CONCEAL THE SIZE OF INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA HAVE FAILED. BITTERNESS IN THE POPULATION IS GROWING AS A RESULT OF THE GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF LOSSES IN THE LINES OF THE OVERSEAS UNITS; BITTERNESS OF WHICH THE REGIME IS WELL AWARE.

12A (1)(I): (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC.

12A (1)(J): (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS NO DETAILS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER THE CUBANS. DURING THE WAR IN ANGOLA STRONG COOPERATION BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CUBANS WAS OBSERVED. THE SOVIETS GAVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND SUPPLIED ARMS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ASSESSES THAT THE SOVIETS KEEP A CLOSE WATCH OVER CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA.

12A (1)(K): IT SEEMS THAT UNTIL RECENTLY CUBA KEPT CLOSE RELATIONS WITH HAWATMA'S POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDFLP), MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL SIMILARITY OF THIS FACTION TO CUBAN IDEOLOGY. ACCORDING TO (b)(1),1.4 (c) ARAFAT MET WITH CASTRO DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN APRIL 1977; THE TWO DECIDED ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS SOME INFORMATION RELATING TO CUBAN AID TO THE TERRORIST

~~SECRET NOFORN~~ (b)(9)-10 USC 424

ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN TRAINING FIELDS IN IRAQ AND LEBANON.  
AT THE MOMENT (b)(1), (b)(3) HAS NO WAY TO VERIFY THE INFORMATION ABOUT  
THE CUBAN CONDUCT OF COURSES FOR THE FATAH ORGANIZATION.

(b)(1), (b)(3) : ~~TS~~ (b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

~~GROUP 1 - UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR.~~

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
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RHFUMHE (b)(3), 50 USC 403-1(i)

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
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BODY

COUNTRY: (U) (b)(3),10 USC 424 USSR (UR); ANGOLA (AO);  
- TURKEY (TU); GREECE (GR); SPAIN (SP).  
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3),10 USC 424 PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BY THE  
- CHIEF OF (b)(3),10 USC 424 ARMED FORCES  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
- EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.  
DOI: (U) 861121  
REQS: (U) (b)(3),10 USC 424  
SOURCE: (U) (b)(3),10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (S) (b)(1),4 (c),1,4 (d)



2. (S) WHEN COMPLIMENTED ON THE "SUCCESS" OF THE BUDGET FIGHT, THE (b)(1),4 (c),1,4 (d) NOTED, "...DON'T BE FOOLED, WE DIDN'T GET NEAR THE FIGURES WE WANTED. WE'RE TRYING TO KEEP QUIET FOR THE NEWSPAPERS BUT NONE OF US ARE REALLY HAPPY WITH THE RESULT. RIGHT NOW IS JUST A DIFFICULT TIME PARTICULARLY WITH THE U.S. FACING GRAMM/RUDMAN RESTRICTIONS."

3. (S) (b)(1),4 (c),1,4 (d) CLAIMED SPAIN WILL FULLY INTEGRATE INTO NATO "...WITHIN TWO YEARS. IT JUST MAKES A LOT OF SENSE FOR THE SPANISH. ONE THING FULL INTEGRATION WILL DO IS ALLOW THEM TO PRESSURE THE BRITISH TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF GIBRALTAR. FRANKLY, I THINK THE BRITISH WOULD BE HAPPY TO BAIL OUT. CERTAINLY, THE FALKLANDS MUST HAVE TAUGHT THEM SOME BITTER LESSONS ABOUT HANGING ONTO OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS IN THE FACE OF REALITIES."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0008

4. (C) (b)(1), (b)(4), (c), (1), (4), (d) WAS MUCH MORE CIRCUMSPECT WHEN IT CAME TO DISCUSSING HIS OWN POSSIBILITIES FOR ANOTHER TOUR (b)(1), (1), (4), (c), (1), (4), (d) HE NOTED, "...THAT'S REALLY NOT A QUESTION I CAN EVEN SPECULATE UPON BECAUSE THE DECISION RESTS SOLELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT. I DID TAKE SOME DAMAGING HITS BELOW THE WATERLINE DURING THE BUDGET FIGHT AND IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO BE IN A POSITION LIKE THIS AND NOT MAKE SOME POLITICAL ENEMIES. IN FACT, I WAS READY TO RETIRE AS A COLONEL IN 1974 AND HERE I AM 12 YEARS LATER STILL BEING SWEEPED ALONG BY EVENTS. I GUESS WE ALL FEEL THE SAME, HOWEVER, IF THE COUNTRY NEEDS MY SERVICES IT WOULD BE HARD TO SAY NO BUT IT'S THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL DECIDE AND I'M HAPPY TO LEAVE IT AT THAT."

5. (C) THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM DREW THESE COMMENTS FROM THE (b)(1), (1), (4), (c), (1), (4), (d) "...THE U.S. SYSTEM IS PROBABLY THE ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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PAGE:0003

INQUIRE=DOC4D  
ITEM NO=00412474

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
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FRP: , ,3, , , ,

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TOR: 021909Z DEC 86

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FM (b)(3),10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC/ (b)(3),10 USC 424

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RUDHAAA (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUCUAAA (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f)

RULWUAA

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE/ (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f)

RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f) VAHINGEN GE/ (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f) //

RHFUMHE (b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUEHMY (b)(3),10 USC 424,(b)(3),50 USC 403-1(f)

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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3),10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3),10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 USSR (UR); ANGOLA (AO);  
 - TURKEY (TU); GREECE (GR); SPAIN (SP).  
 SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BY THE  
 BEST AROUND BUT I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD EVER WORK ANYWHERE  
 ELSE EXCEPT IN THE U.S.. THE WEAKEST THING IS THE  
 ANONYMITY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS. CONGRESS CAN DO ANYTHING  
 IT WANTS AND WHO CAN BE BLAMED? CONGRESS...WHO IS  
 CONGRESS? IF THE PRESIDENT DOES SOMETHING HE HAS TO  
 TAKE THE BLAME, BUT CONGRESS?...ITS TOO EASY FOR ACTIONS  
 TO BE FORCED WITHOUT ANY PERSONAL ACCOUNTING, LIKE THE  
 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS PUSHED ON THE PRESIDENT."

6. (C) (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) ALSO DISCUSSED HIS VIEWS OF GREECE  
 AND TURKEY. "... (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d)  
 (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) THE TURKS  
 ARE OK. THEY ARE YOUR FRIENDS AND WILL STAND BY THEIR  
 COMMITMENT BUT THE GREEKS ARE SOMETHING ENTIRELY  
 DIFFERENT. ALSO, I THINK YOU (U.S.) ARE MISSING A BET  
 BY NOT CONSULTING WITH THE TURKS ON MIDDLE EAST EVENTS.  
 AFTER ALL THEY TOUCH THE SOVIET UNION, IRAN, IRAQ AND  
 SYRIA...MANY OF THE KEY PLAYERS IN THE MIDEAST. YOU  
 REALLY SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR INSIGHTS ON THE  
 AREA."


7. (C) (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) CONCLUDED BY POKING (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d)  
 PEOPLE SAYING, "...THEY ARE THE MOST LEGALISTIC IN THE  
 WORLD. THEY SPEND MONTHS FIGURING OUT WHERE THE LOOP  
 HOLES ARE IN THE LAWS. IN FACT, THEY SPEND MUCH MORE  
 TIME LOOKING FOR WAYS OUT OF WORK THAN IT WOULD TAKE TO  
 DO THE JOB. SOMETIMES IT GETS FRUSTRATING IN THIS  
 COUNTRY."

COMMENTS: (C) (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) IS BRIGHT AND LOVES TO  
 PUT HIS IDEAS ON DISPLAY. NOT ONE TO SHRINK AWAY FROM  
 THE TOUGH QUESTIONS, HE NORMALLY SHOOTS STRAIGHT. THE  
 ONLY TAP DANCE CAME ON THE QUESTION ABOUT HIS "FUTURE  
 PLANS" AND MAYBE HE COULDN'T HAVE GIVEN ANY OTHER  
 ANSWER AT THIS TIME. HIS OPEN ADMISSION THAT HE MAY  
 HAVE GOTTEN HURT IN THE BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIS  
 CIVILIAN MASTERS WAS REVEALING. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN  
 AFGHANISTAN AND ANGOLA SAYS MUCH ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THE  
 (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) FEELING ABOUT THE SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN  
 SOUTHERN AFRICA. FINALLY, (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) LEFT LITTLE  
 DOUBT AS TO HIS ANTI-RED FEELINGS WHEN HE NOTED ABOUT  
 THE CHINESE WHO IS THE SENIOR ATTACHE (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d)  
 (b)(1):1.4 (c):1.4 (d) "...HE IS REALLY A VERY CHARMING MAN, IN FACT,  
 HE MAY BE THE ONLY COMMUNIST I'VE EVER LIKED!"

//IPSP: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1  
 //COMSO: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1  
 ADMIN  
 PROJ: (U) NONE

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PAGE:0005

INSTR: (U)   
PREP: (U)  
APPR: (U)  
~~DECL: OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MSGNO 29 (MIR) ZZA \*05/04/76\* \*03148\*  
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RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC  
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
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INFO RUSNAA/CINCELR VATHINGEN GER  
ZEN (b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 133 APR 76.

EZ21

FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. (U) SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. 1 APR 76
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 2 APR 76
6. R-2
7. NEWS MEDIA
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. 2 APRIL 1976
10. N/A

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. (U) REPORT PRESENTS HIGHLIGHTS OF AN ADDRESS GIVEN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. D. ROGERS, CHIEF, SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGION.

1. (U) GENERAL: DEALING WITH THE BACKGROUND TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN ANGOLA, GEN ROGERS NOTED THAT CUBAN TROUPS HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO THAT COUNTRY IN AUGUST 75 AND LATER THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS APPROACHED BY CERTAIN INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING VARIOUS AFRICAN STATES, FOR ASSISTANCE, AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION, SOUTH AFRICA HAD AGREED TO GIVE THIS ASSISTANCE "ON A LIMITED SCALE."
2. (U) MILITARY PERFORMANCE: GEN ROGERS SAID SOUTH AFRICA HAD ACCOMPLISHED HER MILITARY PLAN IN ANGOLA IN A "BRILLIANT MANNER." "MILITARILY, OUR BOYS IN ANGOLA ACQUITTED THEMSELVES OUTSTANDINGLY AND PROVED MORE THAN A MATCH FOR ANYONE THEY MET, INCLUDING THE CUBANS." GENERAL ROGERS SAID THERE WERE CASUALTIES, BUT NOTHING LIKE NUMBERS QUOTED IN RUMORS. HE SAID THAT ONLY 28 MEN WERE KILLED IN ACTION AND 100 MEN WERE WOUNDED.
3. (U) FUTURE ACTION: THE GENERAL SAID THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY THREAT AGAINST THE REPUBLIC AND CONDITIONS ALONG HER BORDER WERE QUITE, HOWEVER, HE SAID THEY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY, AND APPEALED TO THE PEOPLE TO

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MSGNO 29 (MIR) ZZA \*05/04/76\* \*03148:  
PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL REQUIRED.  
COMMENTS: (C) THERE ARE SO MANY FIGURES QUOTED AS TO SOUTH  
AFRICA'S LOSSES IN ANGOLA, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE WHICH TO  
RELY UPON. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (C)

THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO LEND THEIR  
SUPPORT WAS TIMELY, AS THE SAG RELEASED ON 1 APR 76 THE NEW  
BUDGET, OF WHICH 17.2 PERCENT WAS FOR DEFENSE.

~~003 31 DEC 1982~~

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(i)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUFTAKA

RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) VAIHINGEN GE

RUETIAQ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) MACDILL AFB FL

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RUEADDS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

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RUCBSAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUFGAID/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RHFUMHE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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PAGE:0002

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CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3) 10 USC 424

SECRET NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3) 10 USC 424

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO); SOVIET UNION (UR); CUBA (CU).

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3) 10 USC 424 /FAPLA'S FINAL ASSAULT (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 900206.

REQS: (U) (b)(3) 10 USC 424

SOURCE: (S/NF) (b)(1)(b)(3) 10 USC 424 (c) (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (c)

SUMMARY: (S/NF) THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND SUCCESS OF THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA. SOVIET ADVISORS ARE ASSISTING ONLY IN TECHNICAL AREAS; CUBANS ARE FLYING SOME SORTIES.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE

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~~NOFORN~~

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0005

WHICH AGREES WITH THE SERIOUSNESS AND INTENSITY OF THE OFFENSIVE BUT WHICH GIVES THE SOVIETS CREDIT FOR THE BETTER PLANNING AND EXECUTION. (b)(1),(b)(3)-10 USC 4241.4 (c)

[REDACTED] IN ANY CASE, UNITA PRESIDENT JONAS ((SAVIMBI)) CUT SHORT A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO PORTUGAL IN ORDER TO GET BACK TO AFRICA. FAPLA TROOPS ARE DOING SOMETHING RIGHT.

//IPSP: (U)

(b)(3)-10 USC 424

//COMSOBJ:

ADMIN:

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U)

(b)(3)-10 USC 424

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

(b)(3)-10 USC 424

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET NOT~~

~~RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL. OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

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CLASS. SEC. INFORMATION  
CIVIL RIGHTS - SUBJECT TO  
Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification/Control Markings

This report contains information for  
mission plans and/or policies should not  
be evolved or modified solely on basis of  
this report

COUNTRY ARGENTINA (AR)/ANGOLA (AO) 2 REPORT NUMBER (b)(3):10 USC 424

TITLE (U) General Military Affairs - Cuban Troops in Angola 4. PROJECT NUMBER N/A

DATE OF INFORMATION 770303 6. DATE OF REPORT 770308

DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION 770303, (b)(3):10 USC 424 8 REFERENCES (b)(3):10 USC 424

ASSESSMENT SOURCE [redacted] 10. ORIGINATOR (b)(3):10 USC 424

REQUEST EVALUATION OPO (country) 11. PREPARING OFFICER (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6) 13. APPROVING AUTHORITY

SOURCE "Gente Magazine"

(b)(2)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

D YES  (b)(3):10 USC 424  
I  
R  
C NO

SUMMARY

1. (U) In the 29 February 1977 and 3 March 1977 issues of "Gente" magazine, two articles appeared on Cuba's involvement in Angola. The stories written by Robert Moss, apparently are the first in a series to be published in "Gente" concerning Castro's venture in Africa.

REC'D DES-10 10 MAR 77

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DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR  
DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424  
(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

19. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION DATA  
~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31 (Year 31 DEC 1993 1983)~~

20. ENCLOSURES  
1. Enclosure  
1. Articles from "Gente" Magazine, 1 Cy, 18 Pages (U)  
2) Transcription of since 1 (21) - 2 copy

1+ 2

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21 This IR contains 2 pages

Continuation Sheet

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Classification/Control Markings

Report No (b)(3):10 USC 4

Page 2 of 2 pages

Originator (b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10  
USC 424

2. (U) The 29 February article offers a chronology of the conflict between warring factions. It discusses South Africa's role as well as the movement and employment of communist troops and material into Angola. The second article covers subject matter similar to that of the first and provides some specific details on combat engagements.

COMMENT: (C) The information provided by the articles is probably not new or unknown outside of Argentina. What is interesting, however, is that it was published in a very popular magazine that receives wide coverage. The stories paint Castro's Cuba in a very poor light and shows Cuba as a puppet of the Soviet Union's imperialistic machinations. The articles tell the story of Angola as seen by many Argentine military officers. (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Also, it clearly demonstrates the type of exposure the Argentine public has regarding Cuba's intervention in Angola. Please advise if these articles are of value. If so, subsequent publications will be forwarded via IR.

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**\$1.375.-**



**TONY NAZZARO**  
 Soy de aquí - Mira que luna - Romaneta -  
 Me me mucho - Me llaman amor - Sonríe y  
 otros.

**\$1.160.-**



**LA BANDA DEL BRASIL**  
 QUESTA SERENATA  
 TROPICAL  
 Dais del horizonte - Na Carra  
 do Espateiro - No tango la  
 mas - Mama yo quero - Que  
 bora la banga - Acuarea del  
 Brasil - y otros.

**\$1.160.-**



**LA BANDA DEL PUEBLO**  
 No se va - Yo paci hace diez  
 años - Heridas de amor - Mas  
 Mas Mas - Muchacha Borla  
 Después del carnaval - Y otros.

**Este es su precio hágalo respetar**

• Precio vigente a la fecha

UNO



No faltaron las ejecuciones sumarias cada vez que los bandos en pugna tomaban una ciudad. La violencia estaba a flor de piel.

Por primera vez desde su casi ininterrumpido avance Rommel se encontró con un dilema: sus morteros tenían un máximo alcance de 5 kilómetros, mientras que las baterías del enemigo estaban por lo menos a 7.8 km de distancia, y los proyectiles soviéticos tenían un alcance de 14 km (proyectiles 122). El no podía arriesgarse a abrir fuego en la ciudad ni tampoco avanzar con sus carros blindados y permitir que el enemigo se le aproximara mucho. Mientras tanto los proyectiles del enemigo estaban atemorizando a sus soldados. Desde su puesto de comando en el aeropuerto Rommel encontró una solución: enro sus morteros hacia el este de las afueras de la ciudad especulando en que los pudiera cercar dentro de una determinada distancia antes de que llegaran las tropas cubanas. Tuvo éxito porque cuando los morteros sudfricanos abrieron fuego ellos aun estaban varios metros de sus blancos. Sin embargo el comandante enemigo debía haber llegado a la conclusión de que los sudfricanos estaban merodeando simplemente o rondando, ya que los cubanos se adelantaron inmediatamente. Las compañías de morteros dentro de Benguela siguieron dando poca resistencia y nuevamente la columna Zulu tomó la ciudad angolosa con poco esfuerzo.

La batalla de Benguela había ofrecido una advertencia: los buenos y duros esfuerzos de los soldados no siempre podrían compensar las desventajas de ser matados menos en una guerra donde las tropas negras de ambos bandos mostraban una marcada preferencia de luchar cuanto mas lejos posible de las líneas del enemigo. Rommel envió un mensaje urgente por radio solicitando a Rantu que les enviaran artillería para equiparar el material bélico de largo alcance del MPLA.

El 7 de noviembre la fuerza Zulu entró en Lobito. La población en su mayoría apoyaba al UNITA, los cubanos y el MPLA se retiraron sin luchar. Luego que Lobito había sido tomada por las fuerzas prosoviéticas UNITA había podido mantener un estrecho contacto por teléfono con sus unidades dentro de la ciudad. No se habían tomado medidas para cortar los obvios medios de comunicación.

La única lucha que se produjo dentro de la ciudad fue entre las fuerzas aliadas, ya que las tropas de UNITA del área, dieron y reclamaron su terreno. Encontraron soldados portugueses y un quince años campados en una estación policial y los sacaron simplemente del campamento. Los bosquimanos estaban furiosos y el comisario de las fuerzas locales del UNITA, doctor Valentino, tuvo que calmar la situación con exposiciones amistosas de un tono diplomático. Hubo incidentes desagradables en las harracas locales que habían ocupado el FNLA. Uno de los comandantes militares de UNITA, el mayor Lumumba entró en el lugar y desterró al FNLA con la amenaza de sus rifles. La fuerza Zulu permaneció en Lobito hasta el día de la independencia. Rommel estableció sus cuarteles en el campo aéreo cerca de los pantanos, donde los mosquitos y las pulgas les impedían dormir. Es, pero que lo volverían a llamar en noviembre 11 de acuerdo con las instrucciones originales. Pero las ordenes fueron cambiadas. Aun faltaba una lucha más sangrienta.

**EN EL PROXIMO  
 NUMERO:  
 "LA BATALLA  
 POR LUANDA".**





En la izquierda de los tres grupos angriños se vio oscilar a los jóvenes y la cabeza. Detrás un los del MPLA está al comunismo.

Un testimonio. Un soldado del MPLA sobre la torreta de un tanque soviético. La nota gráfica fue registrada cerca de Luanda.



mento y se escaparon, pero no huyeron sin antes intentar volar el puente. Las cargas explosivas ya habían sido puestas, pero el último hombre encargado de controlar el circuito en el detonador se había olvidado de reconectar el cable. Los sudafricanos dirigieron sus tropas sobre el puente y se acercaron a Catengue, donde las rutas desde Benguela y Nova Lisboa se cruzaban. Ya era hora de buscar provisiones y descubrir donde se hallaba el enemigo.

Se envió una partida de soldados a la ruta hacia Nova Lisboa, donde las unidades del MPLA estaban avanzando hacia Catengue. Un teniente sudafricano llamado Jan se dirigió con un Land Rover hacia un convoy del MPLA, conducido por oficiales. «Mercedes Benz y Citroen tomados» de los portugueses.

Se salvó por el hecho de que el MPLA lo confundió con un cubano. «¿Dónde están los compañeros?» alguien le preguntó. Jan murmuró y se acercó a ellos, con los dedos haciendo la señal del MPLA. El coche del movimiento del MPLA se alejó y entonces Jan abrió fuego sobre ellos con un rifle Browning 50.

A continuación estableció un puesto de emboscada en el camino y pudo derribar no menos de siete carros del enemigo. Iban cayendo como polillas dentro de una llama, sin ningún reconocimiento previo.

Tres hombres del MPLA fueron capturados y fueron obligados a cavar fosas para las próximas víctimas de la emboscada. Jan fue apodado «el cubano» durante el resto de la campaña.

Mientras tanto, partidas de reconocimiento establecieron que la fuerza del MPLA cubana estaba localizada más allá de Benguela con 15 a 20 morteros. Los morteros causaron pánico entre las tropas zulúes, que se negaron a enfrentarlos y la columna produjo una demora de seis horas. Los tiradores del FNLA devolvieron la barricada del MPLA lanzando sus morteros tan rápidamente (25 vueltas en un minuto en vez de los dos minutos normales) que sus rifles comenzaron a prenderse fuego. Hubo varios incendios. Finalmente la ruta fue despejada, luego de que scouts de la fuerza zulú encontraron un rastreador rondando en el sur de la posición enemiga. Un grupo fue enviado a intentar detener al MPLA de su retirada, pero el enemigo ya había realizado una rápida evacuación.

### COLUMNA ZULU VERSUS CUBANOS

Nuevamente la suerte salvó el puente para la columna Zulu. Los ingenieros cubanos ha-

bían colocado un cable desde la parte trasera del puente, desde 2 000 metros del detonador. Todo estaba dispuesto para la voladura y los sudafricanos se sorprendieron de que el puente no hubiera ardo en llamas. Por un golpe de suerte una de sus partidas de reconocimiento que rondaba por ese terreno había cortado el alambre.

En el campo de batalla de Catengue los sudafricanos recogieron otra clave que les indicó la presencia cubana: un mapa marcado en español. Tomaron presos a siete hombres que les informaron de la existencia de un gran campamento fuera de Benguela: con 350 cubanos. Otros trofeos de la batalla fueron un Mercedes Benz, un Alfa Romeo que habían sido utilizados por el MPLA. Los scouts informaron que un total de 52 soldados del MPLA habían sido derribados en Catengue.

Luego de la batalla de Catengue, los cubanos y el MPLA se dirigieron hacia el norte abandonando trincheras y aun grandes cantidades de municiones. A unos 10 km de Benguela la columna Zulú se topo con un gran campamento de entrenamiento capaz de contener a 100 soldados, rodeado por trincheras y fosas profundas. Simplemente había sido abandonado. Los sudafricanos se llevaron 150 tanques de diesel oil, que habían sido abandonados. Justo al sur de Benguela la columna encontró otro campamento que resultó haber sido la principal base cubana, y que había intentado prender fuego para su destrucción. El fuego no se expandió, pudieron rescatar grandes cantidades de habanos, carne enlatada y otras provisiones delicadas. Los bosquimanos se recogieron tanta cantidad de productos naturales despreciables.

Las fuerzas zulúes estaban ya listas para el asalto sobre Benguela. Alistaba en su regimiento 150 sudafricanos blancos con sus panhard, los bosquimanos y el batallón del FNLA, reducido a 450 negros y 80 blancos portugueses. El ataque comenzó el 4 de noviembre, una semana antes del día de la independencia. La base aérea en el sudoeste de la ciudad fue tomada sin resistencia.

Pero ahora había ocurrido algo que los sudafricanos habían temido tanto: el MPLA y las fuerzas cubanas introdujeron sus fuerza en la ciudad. Simultáneamente abrieron luego proyectiles de 120 mm del otro lado de Benguela como también tiraron de las casas de los nativos con pequeñas armas sobre las afueras de la ciudad. La columna tuvo que detenerse por 26 horas en el aeropuerto.



Custodiando desembarcos. La guerra instalo a un satélite de La Habana y de Moscú. Del otro lado del océano, Sudamérica.

Aquí el líder de la UNITA, fuerza anticomunista, arenga a sus tropas. Jonas Savimbi necesitó la ayuda de asesores sudafricanos.



con ellos y abandonar su plan de conquista

La sorprendente victoria militar de la pequeña columna sudafricana en Angola ofreció la posibilidad de algo más: un triunfo militar sobre los comunistas. Pero la oportunidad fue rechazada.

Aun, para un líder y político avizado como Jonas Savimbi, la relación con los sudafricanos no fue fácil al principio. El había estado luchando contra los portugueses durante años, solamente para terminar con el país cuya política de *apartheid* era foco de odio y resentimiento de los negros nacionalistas. Pero enseguida halló un amigo y confidente en el joven y rubio mayor que arribó a Silva Porto el 21 de septiembre de 1975.

El sudafricano no resultó un recién llegado para Angola, ya que había servido como asesor militar con la embajada sudafricana en Luanda entre 1970 y 1973, y hablaba el portugués con fluidez. Era un soldado intelectual que había preparado una tesis doctoral acerca de la lucha contra los insurgentes en el Defense College en Pretoria.

Pero pronto se rompió el hielo y Savimbi y sus hombres comenzaron a llamarlo Comandante Sudafricano Kass (que significa Queso), debido a que provenía de una familia alemana, y Kass lo apodó a Savimbi "el Doctor", o simplemente "Doc".

El mayor arribó con un equipo de 18 instructores del cuerpo de infantería que pronto fueron designados en los campamentos de UNITA como "hermanos". Ellos tenían que entrenar a las tropas de UNITA y ayudarlos a establecer una sólida posición en Angola Central. El equipo sudafricano llegó en el momento en que las fuerzas prosoviéticas habían tomado el control de las ciudades más importantes en Angola, excepto Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Carmona y Serpa Pinto. Los comunistas retenían los puertos clave y estaban penetrando en las áreas tribales de Ovimbundo desde tiempo atrás controladas por UNITA.

El comandante Kaas estaba a cargo de reclutas de UNITA, que tenían entre 14 y 20 años. Realizó un curso de entrenamiento de dos semanas, trabajando noche y día.

## BARRERA EN NOVA LISBOA

La misión crucial de los asesores sudafricanos para con Savimbi era detener el avance de los comunistas sobre Nova Lisboa, en una de las tres rutas principales: desde Luanda al norte y desde Benegueta y Lobito al oeste. Una columna de UNITA bajo el comando de Savimbi partió el 4 de

octubre para detener un avance comunista desde el oeste, y se batió con los cubanos y el MPLA tres días después.

Luego de la batalla las fuerzas de UNITA establecieron posiciones defensivas al oeste de Nova Lisboa y el comandante Kaas pidió refuerzos inmediatos por radio. Recibió un escuadrón de 20 carros blindados, transportados a Silva Porto. La idea de atacar norte del río Cuanza con una nueva fuerza era tentadora, pero las ordenes habían sido mantenidas ahí. Una tarde de octubre el mayor Chundondo, jefe de personal de UNITA, llegó sin aliento, excitado al campamento, alertando que el enemigo estaba avanzando hacia Nova Lisboa desde el norte, estableciéndose en el área Quibala.

El comandante Kaas reunió sus carros blindados y el batallón de UNITA en una columna denominada FOXBAT; fue entonces que el 7 de noviembre las fuerzas de UNITA destruyeron una de sus más grandes carteras. El avance del MPLA era dirigido por un oficial cubano (con dos estrellas rojas en su chaqueta), conduciendo un Citroën negro. Un soldado sudafricano disparó con un rifle 106 mm a su coche, produciendo la muerte instantánea del oficial. La columna FOXBAT mantenía una línea aproximadamente de 30 km, que se sostenía hasta el día de la independencia. La directiva política era que los sudafricanos no tenían que pasar más allá del territorio habitual de UNITA y debían estar listos para retirarse el 11 de noviembre.

Mientras tanto el 14 de octubre otra columna sudafricana se dirigió al límite de Atínca del Sudoeste hacia Angola. El nombre en clave de esta operación fue OPERACIÓN ZULU, que aparentemente conlució a los cubanos. Había mayor cantidad de negros sudafricanos que blancos en las columnas, pero no había ningún zulu.

El oficial al mando era un coronel afrikanner de la provincia del Cabo, egresado de la Academia Militar Saldanha Bay, y que se había ofrecido como voluntario para servir en Angola. Sus compañeros lo apodaban "Rommel", debido a la extraordinaria velocidad del avance de sus columnas.

El 9 de octubre a las 9:30 fue informado que tenía que dejar Pretoria para dirigirse a los cuarteles de operación en Runtu, sobre el límite angolés. En Runtu descubrió que su fuerza consistía en tres batallones: un batallón principalmente reclutado de la franja privi, incluyendo bosquimanos que habían luchado con los portugueses y un batallón negro del FNLA de 1.000 hombres divididos en tres compañías; el mando del comandante "sinha".

Los hombres del FNLA

La invasión comunista de Angola puso en desafío al mundo occidental. ¿Es que alguien va a aceptarlo? ¿O podrían acaso las tropas cubanas y las fuerzas soviéticas capacitar un movimiento marxista solamente con una minoría, para imponer una dictadura por la fuerza de las armas?

La perspectiva estaba lejos de ser agradable para la mayoría de la Nueva África. Los líderes moderados o pro-occidentales, como Kenneth Kaunda de Zambia, Mobutu de Zaire o Senghor de Senegal (bajo ningún aspecto deseaban ver un nuevo peon soviético establecido en Angola).

Zambia y Zaire, ambos dependientes del ferrocarril de Benguela, temieron que los comunistas los presionaran luego económicamente para cambiar sus propias políticas. Como también que Angola se convirtiera en una base subversiva contra los estados vecinos.

Igualmente, la riqueza mineral de Angola (especialmente en diamantes, mineral de hierro y el petróleo de Cabinda) y su posición estratégica convirtió a la misma en centro de vital interés para el gobierno occidental. Pero el interés por Angola radica en un sentido más profundo. O sea, como lugar donde los rusos habían salido a probar la capacidad norteamericana después de Vietnam. Antes del final del conflicto, la mayoría de los gobiernos occidentales —América, Francia, Alemania Occidental, Italia, España, Israel— habían ayudado a las fuerzas antisoviéticas en Angola. Pero esto no fue suficiente. Sudafrica tuvo que asumir la mayor carga mediante la provisión de instructores, asesores y de una columna armada en un desesperado intento por disminuir las diferencias frente a los nacionalistas negros que estaban apoyados por Rusia.

## LA BATALLA SUDAFRICANA

Nadie agradeció la lucha de Sudafrica contra las tropas cubanas y las grandes fuerzas africanas. Sin embargo, ellos se ganaron el agradecimiento del Consejo de Seguridad de las EE UU meses después de haber retirado sus tropas. El ministro de Defensa de Sudafrica, Botha, señaló en un discurso al Parlamento

que su país era parte de Africa, a diferencia de Cuba, por lo tanto tenía algún derecho de interesarse sobre los acontecimientos que tenían lugar a través de sus fronteras. Luego agregó: "Somos un estado africano, y si deseamos mantener nuestro respeto no podemos escapar a nuestra responsabilidad como estado africano situado en este lugar estratégico, en la ruta marítima más importante del mundo".

Pero el hecho clave acerca de la intervención de Sudafrica en Angola se presentaba de un modo que ni Botha ni ningún otro funcionario de Pretoria —capital de Sudafrica— ha estado preparado para tratar. Los sudafricanos entraron en Angola con la bendición de muchos gobiernos occidentales y de la Nueva África y bajo la urgente invitación de los movimientos nacionalistas negros en Angola.

El líder de UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, voló a Pretoria en un periodo crítico de la guerra, a rogarle al Sr. Vorster que mantuviera las tropas. Los sudafricanos también participaron en esta guerra alentados por Henry Kissinger, que les ofrecía garantías norteamericanas que, finalmente, no se concretaron.

Entre los líderes negros, Kenneth Kaunda fue el más audaz y el más directo en sus exposiciones. En 1976 advirtió que no existía razón alguna para creer que los rusos se comportaran de manera diferente en Angola que aquella que habían sostenido en Checoslovaquia. El dijo: "En tanto continuemos condenando la presencia sudafricana en Angola, si por eso pensamos que estamos poniendo las cosas en su lugar, permaneceremos engañándonos a nosotros mismos".

¿Cómo fue que los sudafricanos quedaron absorbidos dentro de una guerra civil negra? La historia comienza en marzo de 1975, cuando un funcionario antiguo del servicio de inteligencia sudafricano se cruzó con Jonas Savimbi en una capital europea. Durante una reunión en Lusaka, Savimbi solicitó dinero y un pequeño armamento para que su movimiento pudiera contribuir con el ejército negro unido que luchaba, ayudando así a establecer un equilibrio militar que forzara al MPLA (Movimiento para la Liberación de Angola) prosoviético, a llevar a cabo las elecciones.

Los sudafricanos, como otros gobiernos occidentales, se hallaban preocupados por las disputas

existentes entre UNITA y sus rivales del FNLA, la tercera facción negra en Angola, por lo tanto instaron a Savimbi a establecer una alianza formal con su líder, Holden Roberto. Savimbi mostró cierta renuencia frente a esta propuesta, quejándose de pillaje y actitudes "antiblanco" entre los líderes del FNLA. Los sudafricanos rechazaron su pedido y dejaron de tener contacto con Savimbi durante un lapso de varios meses.

Holden Roberto también se había dirigido a los sudafricanos mediante intermediarios portugueses. El primer encuentro de ellos con Roberto tuvo lugar en Kinshasa. Fundándose en el deseo de Roberto Holden de consolidar una alianza con Savimbi, los sudafricanos acordaron entregar al FNLA un cargamento de rifles, escopetas y morteros de segunda mano, que recibieron en agosto.

Hacia fines de agosto se realizó una tercera reunión en el territorio que ocupaba UNITA dentro de Angola, donde se hallaba presente un antiguo general del ejército sudafricano que acordó proveer instructores. Se establecieron dos campamentos de entrenamiento, uno para UNITA, en Calombo, en el sur de Silva Port y el otro para el FNLA, en Mapupa, en el sur de Angola.

Ya se había desplegado un pelotón de soldados sudafricanos dentro de Angola, en torno al complejo hidroeléctrico de Caluque sobre el río Cunene, el 9 de agosto, pero esto era meramente una práctica defensiva para resguardar del pillaje la represa y el complejo hidroeléctrico que abastecía energía a los pueblos del sur de Angola. Luego los sudafricanos declararon que su intervención aquí había tenido la aprobación tácita de los portugueses.

La entrada de Sudafrica al campo de batalla y la ofensiva armada denominada "Operación Zulu" comenzaba.

Las instrucciones del ejército eran asistir a las fuerzas de Savimbi y Roberto con el fin de controlar las áreas del sur y centro de Angola, donde gozaban de apoyo étnico, y sobre todo ayudar a UNITA a mantenerse en su capital, Nova Lisboa, que era amenazada por las fuerzas cubanas y del MPLA. Su esperanza radicaba en que si las fuerzas antisoviéticas se hallaban en una posición sólida el 11 de noviembre, el día de la independencia, el MPLA y sus seguidores se verían forzados a pactar



Charlan, cambian impresiones. Son soldados cubanos en Angola con sus aliados negros del MPLA, la fracción procomunista angoleña.



## LAS SIGLAS Y SU SIGNIFICADO

**UNITA:** Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola. Esta fracción —a través de una alianza— luchó junto al FNLA. Se los puede considerar como el frente anticomunista. Lucharon contra el MPLA, procomunista.

**FNLA:** Frente Nacional para la Liberación de Angola. Aliado con la UNITA, ambos grupos recibieron asesores y refuerzos sudafricanos.

**MPLA:** Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola. Procomunista. Recibieron armas soviéticas y 15 mil soldados cubanos.

**ESTA ES LA HISTORIA DE UNA INVASION, DE UNA INTERVENCION EN UN PAIS  
AFRICANO. SUCEDIO EN ANGOLA.**

# **LA GUERRA SECRETA DE FIDEL CASTRO**

**QUINCE MIL SOLDADOS CUBANOS, ADEMAS DE ARMAS, TANQUES Y AVIONES  
SOVIETICOS, SIENDE PARA INSTALAR EN ANGOLA UN REGIMEN COMUNISTA.**

**EL PERIODISTA INGLIS ROBERT MOSS CONTO EN LA PRIMERA NOTA**

**COMO SE OPERA EL ARRIBO DE HOMBRES Y PERTRECHOS A LA EX COLONIA**

**PORTUGUESA. A ESA DOCUMENTACION SE AGREGA AHORA EL RELATO**

**DE LA CONTRAINSURGIVIA SUDAFRICANA Y LOS GRUPOS ANTICOMUNISTAS DE  
LA UNITA Y FRELIMO. CONVIENE, CUANDO SE LEA ESTE ARTICULO, NO**

**OLVIDAR QUE EL OCEANO NOS SEPARA DEL CONTINENTE**

**DONDE SE COMENTO LA AVENTURA CUBANA. PARA REFLEXIONAR.**

**Por ROBERT MOSS**



Qui está documentado. Vinieron desde  
otro continente. Desde America  
platan a Africa. Estos son algunos de  
los soldados cubanos fotografiados  
en tierra angoleña. En total  
sumaron 15 mil. Sin embargo las  
fuerzas sudfricanas los obligaron a  
retroceder, por lo menos hasta que otras  
contingencias forzaron a las fuerzas  
anticomunistas a contener su avance



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...ores de Daniel Chipenda jefe de la columna cuyos cuarteles estaban en Serpa Pinto. Chipenda se había reparado del MPLA el año anterior, de ese modo sus nuevos aliados no tenían aún plena confianza en él. Sus hombres habían sido entrenados por instructores sudfricanos en Mapupa. Dos de las compañías del FNLA habían tenido un mes de entrenamiento, y otra solamente con cuatro días de entrenamiento. Trajo tantos inconvenientes que tuvo que ser enviada de vuelta.

"Rommel" tenía solamente seis oficiales sudfricanos y otros pocos hombres para ayudarlo a comandar sus fuerzas. Desde el comienzo tuvieron inconvenientes con el idioma. La mitad de los bosquimanos hablaba el portugués, la otra mitad, reclutada en el sudoeste de África, hablaba afrikaans.

Los órdenes de "Rommel" eran capturar todos los centros importantes a lo largo de la costa antes del 11 de noviembre, día de la independencia, dando el apoyo étnico al UNITA. El FNLA fuera más fuerte. El nuevo aclarar a los civiles de la población que esta era una columna del FNLA/UNITA; algunos habitantes portugueses se imaginaron erróneamente que ellos habían venido a restaurar el viejo régimen.

Cuando la columna cruzó el límite en Cuangar el 14 de octubre incluía solamente vehículos civiles—camiones, automóviles particulares y unos pocos Land Rovers—. El primer blanco fue la ciudad de Pereira d'Éça, que había cambiado de manos varias veces. La columna no tuvo mucha resistencia por parte de las tropas del MPLA, que se encontraban a lo largo del camino (y tampoco tuvieron muchos problemas con las fuerzas del UNITA, que aún no habían sido notificadas de la OPERACION ZULU). Cuando llegaron a la ciudad los defensores se escondieron.

Esto se convirtió en el "estilo" de la mayor parte de la campaña. Los soldados del MPLA solían usar bajo sus uniformes ropas civiles para que una vez que habían sido sacados de su posición pudieran dejar sus rifles, sacarse el uniforme y mezclarse con la población civil.

La columna ocupó Pereira d'Éça con tal rapidez que las tropas del MPLA que se hallaban en las afueras de la ciudad no tuvieron tiempo de enterarse de la toma de Pereira d'Éça por sus contrarios. El comandante Businha estaba celebrando el triunfo en un bar local cuando aparecieron dos soldados del MPLA. Se volvió hacia ellos y les echó una ojeada, luego los saludó

con los dos dedos para arriba (signo del saludo del MPLA). Cuando ellos respondieron con la misma señal, el comandante sacó su arma y los mató a ambos. La situación de Pereira d'Éça nos da un panorama de lo que los sudfricanos iban a encontrar en la mayoría de los grandes pueblos destruidos por una guerra civil negra. Gran parte de los edificios habían sido saqueados, los almacenes derrumbados. Las fuerzas locales de UNITA fueron traídas para restaurar los servicios básicos.

### UN ROMMEL AVANZA

Dos días más tarde la columna reforzada, ahora dirigida por un Land Rover con un rifle en el techo, tomó en su poder a la ciudad de Joao de Almeida. Esta estaba mejor defendida, ya que había sido utilizada por el MPLA como el mayor depósito de material bélico. Se capturaron grandes cantidades de alimentos; material bélico y de propaganda. Ahora la ruta estaba libre para el asalto de Sa da Bandeira, la capital de Huila, que aún contenía un considerable número de población blanca. La preocupación principal de "Rommel" era que ahora las fuerzas del MPLA pusieran a los civiles en peligro al hallarse dentro de la ciudad, pero las defensas se concentraron en las afueras; tal como en el Monte Cristo Rei (llamado así por la gran estatua de Cristo que estaba ubicada en su cima).

Las fuerzas zulúes se aproximaron al aeropuerto en primer lugar, ya que la columna era básicamente abastecida por aire. Luego enviaron tropas al Monte Cristo Rei por mar la noche del 24 de octubre. Se encontraron que las fuerzas del MPLA ya se habían retirado con su armamento bélico. Esto nuevamente era típico de la campaña, ya que a medida que Zulú se alejaba hacia el Norte, ésta se introduciría en un campo donde su poder sería mayor.

Junto con tropas de carros blindados y medio pelotón con morteros de 81 mm, los sudfricanos eligieron como su próximo blanco el mayor pueblo del sur, Mocamedes. En su camino, las tropas se toparon con soldados que lanzaban unos proyectiles con forma de tubo de 122 mm, un arma de fácil manipuleo, liviana y capaz de ser lanzada desde cualquier vehículo.

Fue durante estas escaramuzas en las afueras de Mocamedes que la columna también se enfrentó con proyectiles RPG-7, utilizados como medio de lucha psicológica. Estos proyectiles tenían un alcance de alrededor de 600 metros, y un mecanismo de auto-destrucción. Trados a una ele-

vada altura, explotaban en el aire con un gran estallido, produciendo una gran nube negra—totalmente inofensiva ya que no tenían perdigones—, pero ciertamente desmoralizadora para los soldados negros, que no podían creer bajo ningún aspecto que dichos proyectiles no eran peligrosos.

La batalla fuera de Mocamedes hubiera producido malos resultados para la columna Zulú si el enemigo hubiera peleado con morteros más potentes. Pero la columna logró atravesar su ruta, capturando una nueva arma (rifles de 82 mm) construidos por los rusos, y de ese modo ocupando la bahía de Mocamedes el 27 de octubre.

Luego de que las fuerzas locales de UNITA se establecieron bajo el control de Mocamedes, la columna regresó a Sa da Bandeira a reagruparse para el ataque principal en el norte. Habían llegado informaciones que el MPLA estaba adentrándose en el sur desde sus posiciones en Benguela y Lobito, un objetivo para la operación sudfricanas como segundo puerto del país y su mayor red ferroviaria.

Durante esta época comenzaba la estación de lluvias, los ríos se desbordaban y convertían las tierras bajas hacia el norte en pantanos. Desde ahora en adelante la campaña se basaba en centralizarse en puentes y cruces de ríos. El control de todas las rutas que permanecían abiertas en todas las estaciones se convirtió en la clave de la victoria o de la derrota.

En la ruta de Sa da Bandeira a Benguela, la columna Zulú se encontró con una serie de posiciones bien equipadas de las fuerzas del MPLA. La influencia de los cubanos, que demostraron estar bien entrenados en preparar y mantener posiciones estáticas, se podía ver muy claramente en cada apostadero a lo largo del camino.

El primer choque rumbo a Benguela tuvo lugar en Caporolo, hacia fines de octubre. Aquí los cubanos y las fuerzas del MPLA habían establecido sus armas en una colina que miraba un puente. "Rommel" envió sus bosquimanos hacia el Oeste a lo largo del río, para que pudieran cruzarlo y tomar por sorpresa al enemigo por detrás. Los bosquimanos fueron demasiado lejos, perdiendo la acción de cuál era la parte más baja del río por la que ellos podrían pasar a nado. Mientras tanto, uno de los panhards descubrió bastante más adelante en el camino principal la posición del enemigo.

Para sorpresa de los sudfricanos, las fuerzas enemigas simplemente tomaron su arma-



« Sin duda, Angola caía en la guerra civil. Pero esa guerra fue alentada desde el exterior y envió a todos. Grandes y chicos.





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**ACROCEL** de **SUDAMTEX**

## LA CONEXION DE LAS BARBADOS

Como llegaron los transportes de tropas cubanas a Angola? El momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975 era Snares en Barbados. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.

No se sabe con certeza si el gobierno de Bridgetown pidió la ayuda. Pero Errol Barrrow en ese entonces primer ministro, dio en una entrevista con el diario londinense "The Sunday Telegraph" que debían ser alrededor de cincuenta los vuelos que hicieron hasta a y antes de que las presiones le hicieran formular una protesta ante los cubanos el 17 de diciembre. Otros observadores dicen que en los momentos culminantes del traslado se hizo entre 10 y 15 vuelos semanales y hasta cinco en una sola noche. Es imposible creer que el gobierno de Barrrow haya ignorado todo lo concerniente a estos misteriosos aviones.

Barrrow dijo a "The Sunday Telegraph" que él no estaba enterado de la verdadera naturaleza de los vuelos cubanos e insistió en que los cubanos en ningún momento mencionaron una solicitud permitida por el país como escala en su camino a África.

Lo que parece estar fuera de discusión es el hecho de que cada avión transportaba alrededor de 100 hombres vestido con ropas civiles pero que llevaban armas en sus valijas. El compartimiento de equipaje de los aviones iba cargado con armamento pequeño, artillería ligera y tanques.

Cuando la conexión en las Barbados se cortó los cubanos solicitaron ayuda al primer ministro de Trinidad Eric Williams. Pero este refuso alegando que no estaba dispuesto a apoyar la intervención extranjera en Angola. Sin embargo los cubanos encontraron países más amigables.

Los portugueses cumplieron un papel decisivo en la ayuda a los cubanos a finales de 1975. Los Britannia II de la Compañía Cubana de Aviación eran reabastecidos de combustible en la base aérea de la isla Santa María de las Azores. Al igual que en las Barbados los aviones aterrizaron de noche con las luces rebajadas y sin declarar su carga. Los pasajeros no desembarcaban.

Para los funcionarios de inteligencia militar portuguesa establecieron que el vuelo procedente de la Habana del día 20 de diciembre llevaba 34 pasajeros hacia Luanda-Bissau. En los siguientes cuatro vuelos se registraron 250 pasajeros.

El tremendo esfuerzo logístico se monto para llevar a los cu-



Fue durante la guerra con Angola Soldados negros e instructores blancos que hablaban español con buena entera en la foto.

Por supuesto, el chico ignora tanto su propio futuro como el desenlace de una lucha que no logra entender, pero sufrirá.



datos y el momento de la liberación de Angola. El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.

Como era la vida en un tiempo de la gran guerra? El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.

Abandonó la Habana en el gran avión el 20 de diciembre. Fue días antes de la liberación de Angola. El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.


Una de las cosas que primero le impresionó fue la enorme cantidad de armas y municiones almacenadas para la guerra. Me fascina en todas estas armas que decir que no pertenecían a nadie. Es increíble la cantidad de dinero que se gastó en la guerra y sólo por minutos. A principios de marzo de 1975 los cubanos dejaron que era un hecho que se iba a iniciar la guerra. El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.

Una semana después de su llegada a la zona de la base aérea de Luanda. El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.

Dos días más tarde se supo lo que los ingleses no querían saber escondidos durante la noche pese a que los camiones cargados estaban blindados muy cerca. Al día siguiente las fuerzas cubano-angoleñas sufrieron fuertes pérdidas. 30 muertos, cientos de heridos, ocho blindados destruidos y muchos heridos.

A medida que progresaba la campaña los momentos de huida y los ruidos de la actividad y salvajismo de los combates fueron en las primeras operaciones. Estos últimos días de comida no fue suficiente para tres días a Dios. Hay un momento por aquí. Puesto que la guerra dominaba las tierras más altas durante la campaña los miembros del MPLA y sus aliados usaban muchas veces pasaron hambre aunque los cubanos recibían por vía aérea comida suficiente. Cual era un factor de retención para sus camaradas africanos.

Como cualquier soldado en el frente el cubano pronto estuvo preocupado por a huir. El momento de la liberación de Angola fue el momento de la liberación de los barcos de la flota de los Estados Unidos que desembarcaron en las Barbados en 1975. La actividad era escasa e intermitente estaba lejos de la capital Bridgetown y poco gente parecía notar los vuelos nocturnos durante las primeras semanas. Barbados es uno de los pocos lugares de Caribe donde las costumbres son muy liberales y donde los funcionarios acostumbra hacer a los amigos una lista de momentos importantes.



Gran parte de estas fotografías permanecieron inéditas y se registraron durante el año pasado. Aquí un grupo de irregulares cubanos comandados por el instructor cubano Superaron en número a los grupos anticomunistas. La proporción fue 1 a 10

Aquí algunos soldados de la coalición de la UNITA y el FNLA que combatieron contra las fuerzas comunistas del MPLA se dedican a inspeccionar el armamento capturado a estos últimos, luego de un encuentro registrado en Huambo. Lo que manipulan es un mortero soviético de 80 mm. La demás es toda una artillería arribada a Angola a través de verdaderos puentes aéreos. En primer plano, un soldado lleva una poderosa ametralladora de origen belga. Los pertrechos no fueron escasos



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menor intención de compartir el poder y menos todavía de permitir una elección general en la cual la UNITA —con una fuerte base entre los Ovimbundu, el grupo étnico más numeroso de Angola— casi seguramente había de obtener la mayoría. Entre abril y agosto de 1975 las armas del bloque soviético penetraron por los puertos de Luanda, Darts-Salaam y Pointe Noire. También llegaron a Brazzaville, por aire, fuertes cargamentos provenientes de la URSS.

El MPLA fue equipado para la guerra convencional con tanques, cañones, tanques T-54 y T-34 y con artillería de campaña. En contraste, la UNITA y el FNLA poseían armas pequeñas.

Fero por importante que hubiera sido el aprovisionamiento de armas no servía demasiado si los miembros del MPLA no sabían cómo usarlas. En diciembre de 1974 un numeroso contingente de oficiales del MPLA habían viajado a la URSS para recibir instrucción militar. Y a principios de 1975 se tomó una decisión más importante: se enviarían instructores cubanos a Angola.

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, vicepresidente de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, admitió públicamente en un discurso pronunciado en diciembre de 1975 que había 230 instructores militares cubanos con el MPLA en abril de ese año. Algunos habían sido transferidos hacia esa época al fuerte de Massangano. El 25 de julio otros 50 cubanos llegaron por aire a Brazzaville para colaborar en el montaje de armas almacenadas en Pointe Noire.

Los oficiales portugueses izquierdistas que habían visitado La Habana en julio se habían comprometido (de acuerdo con la versión de García Márquez) a asegurar el formal beneplácito portugués para la ayuda cubana al MPLA. En agosto el ministro de Defensa del MPLA, João Carrera, visitó Moscú y solicitó el envío de tropas soviéticas para apoyarlas. Los soviéticos rechazaron decididamente el pedido, sin duda temiendo la intervención norteamericana, pero sugirieron a Carrera que hiciera el mismo pedido a los cubanos. Poco después, Carrera se reunió con tres consejeros cubanos de alto rango en Luanda, a partir de allí fue tarea de ellos convencer a Castro.

Esos a los compromisos cubanos en otras partes de África, el Oriente Medio y el Caribe, algunas fuentes occidentales destacadas opinan que Castro no se entusiasma demasiado pronto con la idea de este nuevo atrevimiento ideológico. Su mayor temor era a la posible reacción norteamericana, quizás de acción directa, o mediante un bloqueo contra Cuba. El mal estado de la economía de la isla y el escaso presupuesto militar (300 millones de dólares anuales) pueden haber sido otros motivos de entramiento. Sin embargo, los soviéticos dejaron bien en claro que "pagarían las cuentas" y se dice que habrían asegurado, secretamente, su participación directa si los norteamericanos intervenían.

Simultáneamente una serie de 200 tropas africanas —Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique,

el Congo-Brazzaville y Argelia— presionaban sobre Castro para que enviara tropas.

## EL PRIMER MOVIMIENTO DE LOS CUBANOS

Fuentes del espionaje occidental creen que Castro ya había tomado la decisión de intervenir finalmente en Angola antes de que Oscar Oramas, uno de los consejeros cubanos que había estado en Luanda, se reuniera con él en La Habana para prevenirle sobre una probable intervención sudáfricana. Sudáfrica había permanecido secretamente relacionada con la UNITA y el FNLA, y no era descartable su participación activa en apoyo de los mismos.

De todas maneras el curso de los acontecimientos en las siguientes semanas demuestra que las tropas cubanas entraron en acción en Angola mucho antes del 5 de noviembre (fecha dada por García Márquez). Las tropas cubanas entraron en combate en Angola dos meses antes de que lo hicieran los sudáfricanos.

El 16 de agosto doscientos instructores cubanos más llegaron a Luanda, donde el MPLA dominaba totalmente la situación. Según fuentes de la UNITA, una parte de los cubanos fue transferida a Lobito y Benguela, en el sur, donde establecieron un campo de instrucción y una base de abastecimientos. En los fuertes combates que llevaron al MPLA al control de Lobito, una plaza fuerte tradicional de la UNITA, que tuvieron lugar ese mismo mes, se dice que lucharon junto a los guerrilleros del MPLA "hombres de piel blanca que hablaban español". En setiembre, en el frente norte, el FNLA halló los cadáveres de dos cubanos en los restos de un vehículo artillado.

A partir de fines de setiembre se aceleró la llegada de los cubanos. Al igual que con el transporte de armas, Congo-Brazzaville era el principal lugar de paso. El presidente Marien Ngouabi devolvía los servicios que se le ofrecieron cuando visitó Cuba poco tiempo antes. Castro le prometió crítica asistencia militar, incluyendo seis lanchas patrulleras de fabricación soviética (Zaire tiene sólo dos), cazas Mig y entrenamiento militar para sus tropas.

## PILOTOS PARA LOS CAZAS SOVIETICOS

Los pertrechos de guerra eran desembarcados, almacenados y trasladados en Pointe Noire. El 25 de setiembre el barco cubano "Vietnam Heroico" llevó a ese puerto 20 vehículos artillados, 30 camiones pesados y 120 soldados cubanos. El 3 de octubre otro barco cubano desembarcó 350 hombres, quienes fueron transportados en avión al frente norte.



Bañadas sus costas por el Atlántico, Angola es un viejo objetivo de los países del área comunista. Esos países montaron el poderoso operativo para transportarlas en otro satélite. Las fuerzas eran desproporcionadas.


Una ametralladora, un ventre inflamado. Un muchacho angolés y un conductor cubano. Algo difícil de explicar. Una invasión directa en un país lejano.





Una instructora cubana desfila con tropa de angoleños. Aros, anillos, pulseras, significan alguna coquetaría. Salvo los instructores, los demás cubanos enviados a África ignoraban que su misión sería finalmente la de combatir

Estos irregulares pertenecen a las tropas del MPLA y la foto fue tomada en la región de Barra do Dande cuando esas tropas apoyadas por los cubanos fueron ocupando el territorio angolano que cedieron la UNITA y el FNLA



rica decisiva. Fuentes de la CIA dicen que ya en 1969 se le advertió haberse se al un acuerdo secreto con Mao por el cual se garantizaban igual continuidad y cambio de la promesa de que el MPLA mantendría permitiera el establecimiento de bases nava soviéticas en Angola.

Los portugueses iniciaron planes descolonizadores en 1972. En la segunda mitad de ese año los soviéticos enviaron armas al MPLA vía Damián Salazar por valor de seis millones de dólares. Además abrieron otra ruta para el envío de pertrechos por Congo-Brazzaville. Las armas eran llevadas por barco hasta el puerto congoleño de Pointe Noire y luego hacia el enclave de Cabinda en camiones y también viajaban en avioneta a la base Maya Malya en las afueras de Brazzaville desde donde eran llevadas a Angola por pequeños barcos que se descargaban en las costas desiertas del noroeste o por avionetas.

En ese momento el Alto Comisionado portugués en Angola era el almirante Rosa Coutinho e el "mirante Rojo" notorio por sus simpatías hacia el MPLA. Saqueó los files del FNLA (Frente Nacional para la Liberación de Angola), la hostilidad de Rosa Coutinho hacia este movimiento y su jefe Holden Roberto, derivaba de las indignidades cometidas contra él cuando siendo un joven oficial colonia destinado a Santo Antonio de Zaire, fue hecho prisionero por el FNLA y mantenido en la cárcel en Kinshasa durante medio año. Holden Roberto es casado de presidente Mobutu del Zaire (ex Congo belga).

## LANZACOHETES PARA EL MPLA

Sea cual fuere la explicación Rosa Coutinho no hizo ningún intento por perturbar el envío de armas del bloque soviético al MPLA desde que fue designado Alto Comisionado en 1974. Su inmediato sucesor, el general de la Fuerza Aérea Silva Cardoso fue menos parcial. En abril de 1975 detuvo un barco yugoslavo impidiéndole descargar armas en Luanda, aunque el flujo de armamento siguió mediante el uso de barcos pesqueros y lanchas de desembarco de fabricación soviética.

Recayo en el general Silva Cardoso quien fue abruptamente trasladado en julio de 1975 bajo el pretexto de "agotamiento físico y psicológico" a gobernar en el período durante el cual se desintegró la fórmula política que se había acordado para el futuro de Angola en la conferencia de Alvor. Portugal, sancionada con la firma de los tres movimientos guerrilleros en enero de 1975. Los tres sectores acordaban compartir el gobierno provisional que prepararía unas elecciones a efectuarse el 10 de octubre y declarar la independencia el 11 de noviembre. Cada uno se comprometía a aportar cinco mil miembros para constituir una fuerza armada nacional.

Para el MPLA y quienes lo apoyaban desde afuera no era un

En la mañana del 7 de octubre de 1975 una compañía de soldados del movimiento anticolonialista UNITA dirigido por Jonas Savimbi se dirigía hacia el oeste en la región central de Angola pertenecían a uno de los tres movimientos guerrilleros que habían acordado compartir el gobierno de Angola cuando esta se independizara de Portugal hecho ocurrido un mes antes. Su misión era interceptar una columna del prosoviético MPLA que avanzaba hacia Nova Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNITA (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había partido de su base en Silva Porto con dos vehículos Panhard artillados (un regalo del presidente Mbotu, del Zaire), pero uno se había descompuesto en el camino. El resto del armamento era poco impresionante: tres jeeps con lanzacohetes antitanques, dos cañones de 106 mm sin retroceso y cuatro ametralladoras Browning '30. Era virtualmente la totalidad del arsenal de la UNITA.

La columna incluía calorificadores sudfricanos de infantería que actuaban como consejeros, comandados por un mayor. Eran profesionales que habían acudido como voluntarios en ayuda de la UNITA en lo que hasta entonces había sido una constante derrota ante fuerzas superiores armadas por los soviéticos. Vestían uniformes de la UNITA.

A las cuatro mil y media de la población de Nalón de Matos la pequeña columna llegó a un puente. Las avanzadas informaron que el terreno estaba libre de enemigos. Pero, de pronto, la avión de observación apareció sobre sus cabezas y un soldado comenzó a dispararle. Esto desencadenó un huracán de fuego. Desde las columnas del otro lado del río las fuerzas del MPLA (Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola) atacaron con cañones sin retroceso, artillería liviana y morteros mientras cinco tanques de fabricación soviética T-34, tripulados por cubanos, comenzaron a avanzar.

El jeep del mayor sudaficano recibió el impacto de un proyectil anfiblindaje de uno de los tanques, pero no sufrió daños. Los jóvenes soldados de la UNITA — que habían tenido sólo dos semanas de preparación para la guerra — se desparramaron sin saber que hacer. Pero el único auto artillado de la UNITA, comandado por un teniente sudaficano, avanzó y consiguió perforar uno de los tanques enemigos con una granada de 90 mm. El tanque quedó envuelto en llamas. Igual suerte corrió otro que recibió el impacto de un cañón de 106 mm. Después de esto los otros tres tanques retrocedieron.

Mientras los morteros del MPLA mantenían un intenso fuego, los sudfricanos dispararon a ciegas con cohetes antitanques contra las columnas ocultas del enemigo. Mercedemente, una patrulla de la UNITA pretendió haber contado 116 tanques del MPLA. Los sudfricanos no tuvieron bajas.

Esta escaramuza en un oscuro rincón de Angola central (nunca antes revelada) fue la primera confrontación armada entre los cubanos y los sudfricanos el primer día de una guerra en la cual

uno de los más descarados intentos expansionistas de los soviéticos y sus aliados resultó exitoso no por errores políticos a su juicio, de los Estados Unidos en esta materia.

La invasión comunista de Angola es uno de los hechos más decisivos y más sombríos del período que comenzó en 1945. Es la historia de cómo más de 15 000 soldados de la república azucarera y el Caribe fueron llevados a través de 6 000 millas sobre el Atlántico para servir como tropas coloniales del imperio soviético. Y de cómo un gobierno procomunista en Lisboa, y una cantidad de gobiernos del Tercer Mundo facilitaron el camino de la invasión.

Es también la historia de cómo los sudfricanos — supuestamente aislados de la comunidad internacional — fueron impulsados, por líderes negros moderados de algunos países africanos, a enviar tropas a Angola para rechazar la intervención comunista.

Al final de una verdadera ofensiva relámpago los sudfricanos estuvieron a punto de asegurar la total victoria. Juntos de los movimientos anticomunistas de Angola. Por qué esa victoria no tuvo lugar, constituye una historia más compleja.

En una era de batallas televisadas, de sucesos que se conciben y se visualizan al minuto, la guerra de Angola fue notablemente secreta y la verdad de lo que ocurrió comienza a salir a la luz en forma paulatina. Los cubanos han publicado su versión en un muy extenso artículo publicado por el novelista colombiano Gabriel García Márquez en la revista mexicana Progreso. En un conjunto muy rico en detalles su narración está plagada de distorsiones e inexactitudes.

Por ejemplo, García Márquez declara que la decisión de enviar soldados cubanos a Angola fue tomada el 5 de noviembre de 1975. Pero las tropas cubanas estaban en el campo de batalla desde varios meses antes. En su artículo da la impresión de que los cubanos marcharon triunfalmente hacia el sur en los primeros meses de 1975, pero no menciona el hecho de que tardaron más de dos meses en ocupar el territorio que los sudfricanos habían abandonado después de tomar la decisión política de retirarse.

## “UN TIGRE LADRON Y SUS SALVAJES CACHORROS”

Fue una guerra de camuflaje. Tanto los cubanos como los sudfricanos fueron a Angola vistiendo ropas civiles o bien otros uniformes. Los voluntarios cubanos (como los tres prisioneros que fueron llevados a Sudáfrica para ser hospitalizados) habían ido a Angola convencidos de que trabajaban en proyectos de ingeniería o de que habrían de seguir cursos en la URSS. Los primeros instructores sudfricanos de la UNITA recibieron órdenes de hablar solo en in-

gles y de hacer sólo un par de meses.

No puedo pretender ser muy a descubierto en sus más mínimos detalles la guerra secreta de Angola, pero esta narración sustentada en autorizadas fuentes de varios países no comunistas proporcionará muchísimos primordiales desconocidos hasta ahora. En primer lugar la invasión comunista de Angola y como se hizo luego el curso de la guerra incluyendo a batallas por Luanda y la región.


Los soviéticos han estado profundamente comprometidos en Angola desde comienzos de la década del sesenta. En 1956 el rigidamente prosoviético Partido Comunista portugués ayudó a constituir el MPLA, en el cual surgió como figura dominante el doctor Agostinho Neto — un mulato que había participado en la formación de una organización comunista clandestina durante su época de estudiante en Oporto —. Alrededor de 1969, el MPLA estableció sus primeros contactos con los cubanos, quienes en esa época ayudaban a formar un campo de entrenamiento para fuerzas guerrilleras africanas en Dolisie Congo-Brazzaville. Tambien, un grupo de cuadros del MPLA recibió adiestramiento en Cuba en el mismo período.

En 1964 el dirigente comunista portugués Álvaro Cunhal organizó una reunión entre Agostinho Neto y dirigentes soviéticos en Moscú. Esto fue el comienzo de un ambicioso proyecto soviético de ayuda. Armas y alimentos comenzaron a llegar desde los países socialistas a Dar-es-Salaam, desde donde eran llevados en camión hasta Angola, por Zambia. Pronto se hicieron familiares en las aguas de Tanzania los barcos mercantes soviéticos cargados con armas invueltas rifles AK-47, lanzacohetes RPG-7 y morteros. Los soviéticos además comenzaron a enviar un subsidio monetario que oscilaba entre los 150 mil y 300 mil dólares anuales.

Quizás todavía más importante fue el hecho de que los soviéticos comenzaron a recibir un contingente regular de miembros del MPLA para ser adiestrados en el instituto de Marxismo-Leninismo (como cuadros políticos), en el campamento militar de Simferopol en Ucrania (como suboficiales y soldados) y en la Academia Militar Frunze (como oficiales). Uno de los graduados en Frunze fue Raó Carneira, quien, como ministro de Defensa, habría de tomar parte decisiva en las conversaciones secretas que llevarían a la invasión cubana en Angola.


La ayuda soviética al MPLA disminuyó entre 1972 y 1974, aparentemente como consecuencia de los pobres resultados obtenidos en la lucha guerrillera contra los portugueses. Sin embargo, hubo un notable avivamiento del interés en la actividad del MPLA muy poco antes del golpe ocurrido en Lisboa el 25 de abril de 1974 que abrió las puertas para la descolonización del África portuguesa. Como los comunistas portugueses habían tenido mucho que ver con ese golpe, los soviéticos poseían información precisa desde casi dos meses antes.

Pero para los soviéticos el objetivo estratégico clave no era Portugal sino sus posesiones africanas, sobre todo Angola, rica en petróleo, diamantes y otros minerales, y con una ubicación geo-



Pruebas a la vista. Un proyectil de origen soviético en tierra angolés.

Armamento nuevo, todo un lujo y recién llegado desde los países comunistas.





#### INSTRUCTORES CUBANOS

Primero llegaron unos pocos instructores. En el lejano país africano comenzaron a entrenar a las legiones del movimiento beligerante denominado MPLA, un grupo que logró imponerse luego de complicadas indecisiones políticas. Fueron abastecidos con armamentos soviéticos. Luego arribaron más cubanos. Unos 15 mil, según el extenso artículo que redactó e investigó el periodista inglés.

**PRIMERA NOTA**

**PASO EN ANGOLA.  
CONVIENE QUE USTED  
SE ENTERE. TIENE  
QUE VER TAMBIEN CON  
ARGENTINA.  
ES LA HISTORIA DE UNA  
INVASION.**

# **LA GUERRA SECRETA DE FIDEL CASTRO**

**POR ROBERT MOSS**

Angola fue una colonia portuguesa en Africa. Angola es rica en oro y diamantes. Cuando comienza el proceso de su independencia, Fidel Castro decide iniciar una aventura africana con el apoyo decisivo de la Unión Soviética. Esto se traduce en hombres y armas.

Más de 15.000 soldados cubanos instauraron en Angola un régimen comunista, con armas sofisticadas, tanques soviéticos, aviones MIG 21 y raciones de comidas que venían de Alemania Oriental. Esta serie de notas cuenta en detalle esa invasión y abre los ojos sobre las tácticas y estrategias del mundo comunista hacia Africa. Conviene, cuando se lea este artículo, no olvidar que sólo nos separa de ese continente un océano.

#### **MOSS: LA INFORMACION MENOS CONOCIDA**

Hace pocos meses visitó la Argentina, concedió entrevistas, habló de política. Es periodista y su nombre está ligado a una temática intrincada. Es que no siempre los temas de la política internacional son lo suficientemente claros. O se se los conoce parcialmente. La claridad es, precisamente, una de las virtudes de Moss, algo que habitualmente demuestra como editor de "Foreign Report", un semanario confidencial londinense. Su libro "El colapso de la democracia" está a punto de aparecer en Buenos Aires.







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
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
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COMPRANDO DOLARES

¡GANÉ!



JUGANDO AL PRODE

TRÁIGAME CENTOLLA CON SALSA  
GOLF, POLLO A LOS SIETE PERFILES.  
FRUTILLAS VENDÔME Y VINO  
FRANCÉS



GASTANDOLA EN RESTAURANTES

¿QUÉ NÚMERO VA A SALIR  
LA GRANDE?



PAGANDO CONSULTAS A ADIVINAS

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ABSTRACT
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Two articles appearing on Cuba's involvement in Angola. First in a series to be published in "Gente" concerning Castro's venture in Africa.

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FIDEL CASTRO'S SECRET WAR

By Robert Moss

This is the history of an invasion, an incident in Angola, which we must be aware of and which also has something to do with Argentina.

Angola used to be a Portuguese colony in Africa. Angola is rich in gold and diamonds. When it began to fight for its independence, Fidel Castro decided to launch an African adventure with the decisive support of the Soviet Union. The came in the form of men and arms. In Angola, more than 15,000 Cuban soldiers established a communist regime, with sophisticated weapons, Soviet tanks, MIG-21 aircraft, and rations coming from East Germany. This series of reports recounts this invasion in detail and is an eye-opener on the tactics and strategies employed by the communist camp in dealing with Africa. When reading this article, you must not forget that only an ocean separates us from that continent.

Moss--The Least-Known Facts

A few months ago, he visited Argentina, gave interviews, and talked about politics. He is a newsman and his name is linked to a rather intricate theme. The topics of international policy are not always sufficiently clear--or they are known only partly. Clarity is precisely one of the virtues of Moss, something which he habitually demonstrates as editor of "Foreign Report," a London confidential weekly. His book "The Collapse of Democracy" is about to come out in Buenos Aires.

In the morning of 7 October 1975, a company of rookies from the anti-Soviet movement UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], headed by Jonas Savimbi, happened to be moving west in the central region of Angola. It belonged to one of the three guerrilla movements which had agreed to share the government in Angola as soon as it became independent from Portugal--something which had indeed occurred a month earlier. Its mission was to intercept a column of the pro-Soviet MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] which was advancing on Nova Lisboa, Angola's second-largest city.

The UNITA column had left its base at Silva Porto with two old Panhard weapons carriers (a gift from President Mobutu of Zaire) but one of them had broken down on the way. The rest of the unit's armament was not at all impressive: three jeeps with AT missile launchers, two 106-mm recoilless guns, and four Browning cal.50 machineguns. That was virtually the entire arsenal of UNITA.

The column included 14 South African infantry instructors who were acting as advisors, commanded by a major. They were professionals who had volunteered to help UNITA in what until then had been a constant series of defeats at the hands of superior forces armed by the Soviets. They were wearing UNITA uniforms.

About 4.5 miles from the town of Norton de Matos, the small column came to a bridge. The scouts reported that the area was free of enemy.

but immediately an observation aircraft appeared overhead and a soldier began to fire away at it. That unleashed a hurricane of fire. From the hills on the other side of the river, the hidden forces of the MPLA hit the company with recoilless guns, light artillery and mortars, while five Soviet-made T-34 tanks with Cuban crews began to advance.

The South African major's jeep was hit by an AT projectile from one of the tanks but was not damaged. The young UNITA soldiers--who had gotten only two weeks of training for guerrilla warfare--scattered without knowing what to do. But the only armored car of UNITA, commanded by a South African 2nd lieutenant, advanced and managed to hit one of the enemy ranks with a 90-mm shell. The tank burst into flames. The same thing happened to another one that was hit by a 106-mm shell. After that, the other three tanks withdrew.

While the MPLA mortars maintained heavy fire, the South Africans fired six AT missiles blindly at the enemy's hidden positions. Later on, a UNITA patrol claimed to have counted 116 dead MPLA soldiers. The South Africans suffered no losses.

This skirmish in an obscure corner of Central Angola (so far not reported) was the first armed clash between the Cubans and the South Africans, the prelude to a war in which one of the most blatant expansionist attempts of the Soviets and their satellites turned out successful, not due to victory in battle but due to the political mistakes made--in my judgment--by the United States in this case.

The communist invasion of Angola is one of the most decisive and one of the most somber events of the period which began in 1945. It is the story of how more than 15,000 soldiers from the sugar republic in the Caribbean were brought 6,000 miles across the Atlantic to serve as the colonial troops of the Soviet Empire. And it is the tale of how a pro-communist government in Lisbon and a number of Third World governments facilitated the path of invasion.

It also the story of how the South Africans--supposedly isolated from the international community--were persuaded, by the moderate black leaders of some African countries, to send troops to Angola in order to repel communist intervention.

At the end of a veritable lightning offensive, the South Africans were about to assure total military victory for the anticommunist movements in Angola. Why that victory did not materialize is an even more complex story.

In an era of televised battles, of events following each other in rapid succession, with instant replay, the war in Angola was notably secret and the truth of what happened there is only now beginning to come to light gradually. The Cubans published their version in a very extensive article published by the Colombian novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez in the Mexican magazine "Progreso." Although very rich in detail, his narration is full of distortions and inaccuracies.

For example, Garcia Marquez declared that the decision to send Cuban soldiers to Angola was made on 5 November 1975. But the Cuban troops had been on the battlefield several months earlier. In his article, he gives the impression that the Cubans marched in triumph south during the first months of 1976 but he does not mention the fact that it took them more than 2 months to occupy the territory which the South Africans had abandoned after making the political decision to withdraw.

"A Rogue Tiger With Its Wild Cubs"

This was a war of camouflage. Both the Cubans and the South Africans were in Angola wearing civilian clothes or other uniforms. The Cuban volunteers (like the three prisoners who were taken to South Africa to be hospitalized) had come to Angola, convinced that they were going to work on engineering projects or that they were going to take courses in the USSR. The first South African instructors of UNITA were ordered to talk only English and to pass themselves off as Englishmen.

I am not going to try to describe the secret war in Angola down to the very last detail but this story (supported by authoritative sources in various noncommunist countries) will present many, many details which so far are unknown. First of all, the communist invasion of Angola as such and how it took place; then, the course of the war, including the battle for Luanda, the capital.

The Soviets were profoundly involved in Angola from the start of the sixties. In 1956, the rigidly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party helped establish the MPLA in which Dr. Agostinho Neto rose as the dominant figure; he is a mulatto who had participated in the formation of communist underground organization while he was a student in Oporto. Around 1960, the MPLA established its first contacts with the Cubans who at that time helped in setting up a training camp for the African guerrilla fighters in Dolisie, Congo-Brazzaville. A group of MPLA cadres also received training in Cuba during that same period of time.

In 1964, the Portuguese communist leader Alvaro Cunhal organized a meeting between Agostinho Neto and Soviet leaders in Moscow. That was the start of an ambitious Soviet aid project. Weapons and rations began to arrive from the socialist countries in Dar-es-Salaam from where they were trucked to Angola via Zambia. Soon, Soviet merchant vessels became a familiar sight in the waters of Tanzania; they were loaded with small arms, AK-47 rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, and mortars. The Soviets also began to send a money subsidy which varied between \$150,000 and \$300,000 per year.

Most important perhaps was the fact that the Soviets began to receive a regular contingent of MPLA members to be trained at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (as political cadres), in the military camp at Simferopol, in the Ukraine (as NCOs and EM), and in the Frunze Military Academy (for officers). One of the Frunze graduates was Iko Carneira who, as minister of defense, was to play a decisive part in the secret conversations which led to the Cuban invasion of Angola.

Soviet aid to the MPLA declined between 1972 and 1974, apparently as a consequence of the poor results obtained in the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese. However, there was a notable revival of interest in the activities of the MPLA shortly after the coup which took place in Lisbon on 25 April 1974; it opened the doors wide for the decolonization of Portuguese Africa. Since the Portuguese Communists had nothing to do with that coup, the Soviets had precise information almost 2 months in advance.

But for the Soviets the key strategic objective was not Portugal; instead, it was its African possessions, especially Angola, which is rich in petroleum, diamonds, and other minerals and which is in a decisive geopolitical location. Sources in ENITA say that the Soviets had already signed a secret accord with Neto in 1969 in which they guaranteed continuing support in exchange for the promise that, if the MPLA were to be victorious, it would permit the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Angola.

The Portuguese announced their decolonizing plans in August 1974. During the second half of that year, the Soviets sent arms to the MPLA, via Dar-es-Salaam, worth \$6 million. They also opened another route for the shipment of supplies via Congo-Brazzaville. The arms were taken by boat to the Congolese port of Pointe Noire and then to the enclave of Cabinda by truck; they also arrived by plane at the Mava Mava base in the outskirts of Brazzaville from where they were taken to Angola in small boats from which they were unloaded along the deserted sections of the coast in the Northwest, or in light aircraft.

At that moment, the Portuguese high commissioner in Angola was Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the "Red Admiral," notorious for his enmity with the MPLA. According to sources in the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), Rosa Coutinho's hostility toward the movement and its leader, Holden Roberto, sprang from the way in which he was humiliated when, as a young colonial official, he was assigned to Santo Antonio de Zaire; he was taken prisoner at that time by the FNLA and was kept in a jail in Kinshasa for half a year. Holden Roberto is the brother-in-law of President Mobutu of Zaire (the former Congo).

#### Rocket Launchers for the MPLA

Regardless of what the explanation may be, Rosa Coutinho did nothing to disturb the shipment of arms from the Soviet Bloc to the MPLA after he was appointed high commissioner in 1974. His immediate successor, Air Force General Silva Cardoso was less partial. In April 1975, he stopped a Yugoslav vessel and prevented it from unloading arms in Luanda although the flow of weapons continued through the use of fishing boats and Soviet-made landing craft.

To General Silva Cardoso (who was abruptly transferred in July 1975 under the pretext of "physical and psychological exhaustion") fell the task of governing during the period which brought the disintegration of the political formula that had been agreed upon for

the future of Angola at the Alvor Conference in Portugal; the agreement was signed by the three guerrilla movements in January 1975. The three sides agreed to share a provisional government which would prepare for the elections to be held on 30 October and which would declare independence on 11 November. Each side pledged to contribute 8,000 men to establish a national armed force.

But the MPLA and its supporters on the outside had not the slightest intention of sharing power and even less so of permitting a general election in which the UNITA--with a strong base among the Ovimbundu, the numerically strongest ethnic group in Angola--would certainly have won a majority. Between April and August 1975, arms from the Soviet Bloc penetrated through the ports of Luanda, Dar-es-Salaam, and Pointe Noire. Big shipments from the USSR also arrived by air in Brazzaville.

The MPLA was equipped for conventional warfare with rocket launchers, T-54 and T-34 tanks, and field artillery. By contrast, the UNITA and the FALA only had small arms.

Although arms shipments were important, they would not have done too much good if the members of the MPLA did not know how to use them. In December 1974, a large contingent of MPLA officers went to the USSR for military training. Early in 1975, an extremely important decision was made: Cuban instructors were to be dispatched to Angola.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of Cuba in charge of foreign relations, publicly admitted (in a speech delivered in December 1975) that there were 230 Cuban military instructors with the MPLA in April of that year. Some had been transferred around that time to Ft. Massangano. On 25 July, another 50 Cubans arrived by air in Brazzaville to help assemble the weapons stored at Pointe Noire.

The Portuguese leftist officers, who had visited Havana in July, had pledged (according to Garcia Marquez) to guarantee the formal Portuguese blessing for Cuban aid to the MPLA. In August, the MPLA defense minister, Iko Carreira, visited Moscow and asked for the dispatch of Soviet troops to assist the MPLA. The Soviets decidedly rejected the request, undoubtedly afraid of United States intervention; but they did suggest to Carreira that he present the same request to the Cubans. Shortly thereafter, Carreira met with three high-ranking Cuban advisors in Luanda; after that it was their job to convince Castro.

In spite of Cuban commitments in other parts of Africa, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean, some reputable Western sources think that Castro was not too enthusiastic right away about the idea of this new ideological venture. His greatest fear was the possible reaction by the United States, perhaps in the form of direct action or through a blockade against Cuba. The island's poor economic situation and the rather slim military budget (\$300 million per year) could have been other reasons for his rather cool attitude. The Soviets however made it quite clear that they "would pay the bills" and it is also said that



they secretly promised their direct participation if the Americans should intervene.

Simultaneously, a series of African governments--Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique, Congo-Brazzaville, and Algeria--put pressure on Castro to dispatch troops.

#### First Cuban Movement

Western espionage sources believe that Castro had already decided fully to intervene in Angola even before Oscar Drazas, one of the Cuban advisors who had been in Luanda, met with him in Havana to warn him about possible South African intervention. South Africa had continued to maintain secret relations with UNITA and FNLA and one could not rule out the possibility of its active participation in support of those two organizations.

At any rate, the course of events during the following weeks demonstrates the fact that the Cuban troops went into action in Angola long before 5 November (the date given by Garcia Marquez). The Cuban troops engaged in combat in Angola two months before the South Africans did.

On 16 August, 200 additional Cuban instructors arrived in Luanda, where the MPLA completely dominated the situation. According to UNITA sources, some of the Cubans were transferred to Lobito and Benguela, in the South, where they set up a training camp and a supply base. During the heavy fighting against the MPLA over control of Lobito--a traditional stronghold of UNITA, during that same month--it is said that there were "white-skinned, Spanish-speaking men" fighting side by side with the guerrillas of the MPLA. In September, the FNLA found the corpses of two Cubans in the remnants of an armored vehicle on the northern front.

Toward the end of September, the Cubans began to arrive at a faster rate. The same is true of the shipment of weapons; Congo-Brazzaville was the principal transit station. President Marien Ngouabi returned the favor which had been offered him when he visited Cuba a short time ago. Castro promised him extensive military aid, including six Soviet-made patrol boats (Zaire only has two), Mig fighters, and military training for his troops.

#### Pilots for Soviet Fighter Planes

The war materiel was unloaded, stored, and transhipped at Pointe Noire. On 25 September, the Cuban vessel "Vietnam Heroico" brought 20 armored vehicles, 30 heavy trucks, and 120 Cuban soldiers to that port. On 5 October, 350 men debarked from another Cuban vessel and were airlifted to the Northern Front.

Afterward, the vessel "La Playa de La Habana" brought 500 men on 12 October while another 270 Cubans, including pilots, had arrived in

Brazzaville by air. On 14 October, a delegation from the Cuban Communist Party arrived in Brazzaville and assured the MPLA leaders that their country would provide the pilots necessary to fly the Mig-17 and 21 planes sent by the USSR.

On 16 October, Soviet aircraft brought 800 Cuban soldiers to Brazzaville. This Soviet flight and the following ones employed the transit permit which had been given for the air spaces of Algeria and Guinea-Conakry. Between 18 and 19 October, 500 Cuban soldiers, who had arrived in the vessel "La Playa de La Habana," were airlifted to Angola in Soviet aircraft. On 20 October, another 750 Cubans arrived at Novo Redondo, south of Luanda, using coastal vessels. On the 26th of that month, 160 Cuban soldiers arrived at Maya-Maya and immediately continued on to Angola.

As Castro's men continued to arrive, the quantity and quality of Soviet war materiel unloaded at Pointe Noire increased spectacularly. Mig-21 fighters, without their armament (which was installed in Congo-Brazzaville), tanks, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, and small arms. Many of these arms were moved to arsenals located in the interior of Angola, in Porto Amboim and Quicama, ready for use by the Cubans the moment they arrived.

Toward 11 November, Angola's Independence Day, there were around 4,000 Cuban soldiers in that country. About 2,500 were in Luanda and on the Quifangondo Front where their presence made it possible for the MPLA to beat back the advance of the FNLA toward the capital. It therefore makes no sense to say that Cuba's decision to send major combat units was made early in November, after South African intervention.

During the 2 months following independence, the strength of the Cuban forces in Angola was increased to a total of 15,000 men. Some belonged to special infantry units of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (the equivalent of the special forces of the Soviet KGB [State Security Committee], experts in internal repression); but the majority were "volunteers" drawn from the ranks of the reserves who were offered big pay to make the trip. None of them were told that they were going to war.

Sergeant Ezequiel Mustelier, a peasant from the Cuban Province of Oriente, 23 years old, captured by the South Africans in the area of Cariango on 10 December, said that he had gone to Angola, convinced that he was to participate in an aid mission to build schools.

Carlos Naru Mesa and Roberto Morales Bellma, captured on 12 December, said that they believed that they were going to be taken to the USSR for a political education course.

#### The Barbados Connection

How did the Cuban troop transports get to Angola? The resupply airport preferred by the Ilyushin and Britannia aircraft, which took off from Jose Marti Airport between October and December 1975, was Seawell, on Barbados. Security was rather perfunctory, the airport

was far from the capital, Bridgetown, and few people seemed to notice the nightly flights during the first few weeks. Barbados is one of the few places in the Caribbean where customs are very liberal and where officials have the habit of closing their eyes to all kinds of abnormal activities.

It is not known for certain whether the government in Bridgetown gave the green light. But Errol Barrow, at that time prime minister, said in an interview with the London daily "the Sunday Telegraph" that there must have been about 50 flights which stopped over there before pressure caused them to protest with the Cubans on 17 December. Other observers say that, at the height of the airlift, there were between ten and 15 flights per week and up to five in a single night. It is impossible to think that Barrow's Government was unaware of the movements of these mysterious aircraft.

Barrow told "The Sunday Telegraph" that he was not familiar with the real nature of the Cuban flights and insisted that the Cubans at no time even tried to ask him for permission to use his country as a stop-over in their air operation.

What seems to be beyond discussion is the fact that each aircraft carried around 100 men, wearing civilian clothes but carrying arms in their suitcases. The cargo spaces of the aircraft were filled with small arms, light artillery, and mortars.

When the Barbados connection was cut, the Cubans asked prime minister Eric Williams of Trinidad for assistance. But he refused, maintaining that he was not prepared to support foreign intervention in Angola. The Cubans however found other friendly countries.

The Portuguese played a decisive role in helping the Cubans at the end of 1975. The Britannia 31 aircraft of the Cuban Airline Company were refueled at the air base on the island of Santa Maria de las Azores. As on Barbados, the aircraft landed at night, with their lights shut off, and without declaring their cargo. The passengers did not get off.

But Portuguese military intelligence officers established that the flight originating in Havana on 20 December brought 94 passengers to Guinea-Bissau. During the following four flights, 250 passengers were recorded.

The tremendous logistic effort which was mounted to bring the Cubans and their weapons to Angola went almost undetected at that moment and Western intelligence services were quite slow in discovering the facts and circumstances. The Cubans however had some trouble: several coastal vessels, which they used to move men and arms from the Congo to the northern part of Angola, were victims of Sabotage. Two of them were blown up by Portuguese agents connected with the French [intelligence] services and at least three others were wiped out by South African commandos.

What was life like on the front for a young Cuban, around 22 or 23, who began his military service at 16 and who had a job in a textile mill or who was a peasant in his home country? We can get some information on that through the diary of a soldier assigned to a place near Quibala, the scene of the biggest battles in December 1975.

He left Havana in a "big plane" on 4 December (one day after Castro, according to his apologists, had ordered the intervention) and the trip took 28 hours. "They did not allow us to bring documents or any other identifying items along," he noted in his diary, "but everybody knows that there are Cubans in Angola."

One of the things which impressed him most of all was the enormous quantity of arms and ammunition stored for the invading force. "I was fascinated to see all those weapons around which did not belong to anybody. The amount of money wasted in the war is incredible." In contrast to many of his buddies, it seems that he was a Catholic because he was disgusted when, in a small church abandoned by the Portuguese, he found "a stack of English-language magazines with photos of nude women."

One or two weeks after his arrival, he complained about the poor combat efficiency of his allies in the MPLA. On 21 November he wrote that "this morning, two armored vehicles and one truck were attacked by surprise and destroyed while we were on patrol. Those Angolans are very careless."

Just two days later he complained that the Angolans did not want to dig foxholes during the night in spite of the fact that enemy guns were in position very close by. On the following day, the Cuban forces suffered heavy losses: "38 dead, hundreds taken prisoner, eight armored vehicles destroyed, and many wounded."

As the campaign progressed, rations, hygiene, and rumors on the ferocity and savagery of the enemy became the main sources of concern. "Over the past several days, we have not had enough to eat but, thank God, there is much cattle about here." Since UNITA controlled the richest land during the campaign, the members of the MPLA and their Cuban allies very often went hungry even though the Cubans received sufficient rations by air, which was a factor of irritation to their African "comrades."

Like any front line soldier, the Cuban was soon preoccupied with hygiene. On 1 December he wrote that, while resting, he had killed "52 lice; I counted them because they were real beasts and, boy, did they bite!" At that point he had managed to find a young black woman who made coffee for him.

This was a war where there were very few conveniences and comforts for the men, except the occasional discovery of some Angolan wine left behind by the Portuguese settlers after their departure from Angola. The Cubans, both officers and men, had only one luxury: they received a weekly ration of cigars and cigarettes from their homeland.

The Cubans took some heavy blows. In the battle for Bridge No. 14, in the area north of Santa Comba, on 9 December, they lost 90 men. In a battle near Quibala, on 14 December, another 50 were killed in action. Badly wounded Cuban soldiers were moved to the GDR--apparently in order not to demoralize the Cuban people. The soldiers told stories about refrigerator vessels which carried the corpses of dead Cubans.

The wartime performance of the Cubans in Angola did little to help create a myth of Vietcong-style invincibility, at least among those who really know how to fight. Neither propaganda about "revolutionary solidarity," nor Castro's efforts to demonstrate the existence of affinity between the Cuban and Angolan peoples ("African blood runs through our veins") were sufficient to eliminate friction between the expeditionary force and the people whom it was supposed to be helping. Cuban prisoners were very explicit in their opinions on their African allies.

It was quite common to hear them complain that the men of the MPLA were poorly trained from the military viewpoint and that they were nothing but "a bunch of cowards." On the other hand, MPLA prisoners said that the Cubans were "racists" who insisted on getting privileges denied the African troops. Besides, they would kill any black soldier who tried to withdraw even though his officers had already fled. Such tensions persist. Early in January of this year, there were reports to the effect that ten Cubans were killed by MPLA men in a barracks in the south of Angola. Castro's African safari did not end in Angola. He said so very clearly in his 26 July 1976 speech when he remarked: "The Cuban military units and the necessary weapons will remain in Angola.... This will continue as long as necessary.... And the Cuban soldiers will again fight side by side with the Angolan people." In Rhodesia? In Southwest Africa? In South Africa, the main target of communist aggression on the African Continent?

A tremendous effort is being made at this moment--through newspapers, books, and motion pictures--to depict the Cuban troops in Angola as heroic conquerors, inspired by love of their cause, before whom the enemy's lines open up like the waters of the Red Sea.

The truth was somewhat different. The Cubans outnumbered the South African forces by 10:1. Thanks to Soviet generosity, the pro-Moscow forces outnumbered their enemies at the same ratio in terms of armament and they also had Mig aircraft. All in all, the Cubans "won" only in the sense that the South Africans were politically forced to withdraw while the anticommunist guerrillas continue to fight.

But this was a victory at any rate. It teaches us that, in the great worldwide conflict, in which Angola was just one battle, victory or defeat will depend exclusively on political determination.

SECRET




FIGURE APPENDIX


LN 127-77

Cuban instructors. First just a few instructors came. In the distant African country, they began to train the legions of the belligerent movement called MPLA, a group which managed to prevail after complicated political indecisiveness. They were supplied with Soviet arms. Then more Cubans came. About 15,000, according to the article written by the English newsmen on the basis of his investigation.

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
Evidence:  
A projectile of Soviet  
origin on Angolan soil.

New weapons, quite luxurious, recently  
arrived from the communist countries.




A Cuban female instructor parading with Angolan troops. Earrings, finger rings, and bracelets indicate some coquettishness on her part. Except for the instructors, the other Cubans dispatched to Africa did not know that their ultimate mission would be to fight.






These irregulars belong to the MPLA troops and the photo was taken in the region of Barra do Dande, when these troops were supported by Cubans who were occupying the Angolan territory given up by UNITA and FNLA.




Washed along its coastline by the Atlantic, Angola is an old target of countries in the communist area. Those countries mounted a powerful operation to turn it into another satellite. The forces involved were disproportionately strong.

Legend: 1--Cuban troops airlifted via Azores, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola; 2--Cuban troops airlifted via Algeria or Conakry to Brazzaville and then by land to Angola; 3--Cuban troops airlifted via Barbados to Luanda and Brazzaville; 4--troops, arms, and vehicles shipped from Cuba to Congo-Brazzaville and then airlifted to Angola; 5--Soviet supplies brought in by ship to Congo-Brazzaville and then Angola; 6--Soviet arms by boat to Dar-es-Salaam and then by air to Angola.



A submachinegun and guts; an Angolan boy and a Cuban driver--something difficult to explain; direct invasion of a distant country.




The photo shows some soldiers belonging to the UNITA and FNLA coalition who fought against the communist forces of the MPLA; they are shown inspecting weapons captured from the latter during an engagement in Huambo. They are handling an 80-mm Soviet mortar. The other item is an artillery piece delivered to Angola by airlift. In the foreground, a soldier is shown handling a powerful machinegun of Belgian origin. Supplies were plentiful.

LN 127-77




Angela:



The little fellow of course knows nothing about his own future and about the outbreak which he cannot understand but still suffer just the same.

LN 127-77



A document in itself: a Soviet T-54 tank smack in the middle of a street in Luanda, the capital of Angola. Undisguised support.

## FIDEL CASTRO'S SECRET WAR

This is the history of an invasion, of intervention in an African country. It happened in Angola: 15,000 Cuban soldiers, plus weapons, tanks, and Soviet aircraft were used to establish a communist regime in Angola. In the first installment, the English newsman Robert Moss reported on the arrival of men and supplies in the former Portuguese Colony. To this documentary report we now add the story of the South African counteroffensive and the action of the anticommunist groups of Angola's UNITA and FNLA. In reading this article, we must not forget that there is only an ocean separating us from the continent where this Cuban adventure took place. Food for thought.

By Robert Moss.

Abbreviations and Their Meaning

UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. This fraction fought side by side with the FNLA through an alliance. We can consider them to be the anticommunist front. They fought against the procommunist MPLA.

FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola, allied with UNITA. Both groups received South African advisors and reinforcements.

MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, procommunist. Received Soviet weapons and 15,000 Cuban soldiers.

The communist invasion of Angola was a challenge to the Western world. Will anybody accept it? Or could the Cuban troops and the Soviet forces, by any chance, set up a Marxist movement only with a minority in order to impose dictatorship by force of arms?

This prospect is far from pleasing to the majority of the countries in "New Africa." The moderate or pro-Western leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Mobutu of Zaire, or Senghor of Senegal, in no way whatsoever wanted to see a new Soviet pawn established in Angola.

Zambia and Zaire--both of whom depend on the Beneguella Railroad--were afraid that the communists would then exert economic pressure in order to force them to change their policies. Angola became a base for subversion against neighboring states.

Angola's mineral wealth (especially in diamonds, iron mineral, and petroleum at Cabinda) and its strategic position turned it into a center of vital interest for the Western governments. But interest in Angola is much more profound. It is a place where the Russians managed to test United States capabilities after Vietnam. Before the end of the conflict, the majority of Western governments--United States, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Israel--had aided the anti-Soviet forces in Angola. But that was not enough. South Africa had to shoulder the heaviest burden

by dispatching instructors, advisors, and an armed column in a desperate attempt to diminish the disparity with respect to the black nationalists who were supported by Russia.

#### The South African Battle

Nobody expressed appreciation for South Africa's struggle against the Cuban troops and the major forces in Africa. South Africa however did earn the appreciation of the United Nations Security Council months after it had withdrawn its troops. South African Defense Minister Botha, in a speech to Parliament, pointed out that his country was a part of Africa, in contrast to Cuba, and therefore had some right to show its interest in events taking place beyond its borders. Then he added: "We are an African State and if we want to maintain our self-respect, we cannot shirk our responsibility as an African State, situated in this strategic location, on the world's most important sealane."

But the key fact concerning South Africa's intervention in Angola turned up in a manner which neither Botha, nor any other official in Pretoria, the capital of South Africa, had been prepared to deal with. The South Africans entered Angola with the blessings of many Western governments and many governments of New Africa and upon the urgent invitation of the black nationalist movements in Angola.

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi flew to Pretoria at a critical moment during the war to ask Mr. Vorster to keep the troops there. The South Africans also participated in this war after they had been encouraged by Henry Kissinger who offered them American guarantees which in the end did not materialize.

Among the black leaders, Kenneth Kaunda was the boldest and the most blunt in his statements. In 1976, he warned that there was no reason to believe that the Russians would behave in Angola any different from the way they behaved in Czechoslovakia. He said: "So long as we continue to condemn the South African presence in Angola--if by that we think that we are placing things in their proper context--we will in effect be only fooling ourselves."

"How were the South Africans drawn into a black civil war? The story begins in March 1975, when an old South African Intelligence Service officer met with Jonas Savimbi in a European capital. During a meeting in Lusaka, Savimbi asked for money and small arms so that his movement could contribute to the united black army which was in action, thus helping to establish a military balance which would force the pro-Soviet MPLA to carry out the elections.

Like other Western governments, the South Africans were worried over the disputes existing between UNITA and its rivals in the FNLA, the third black faction in Angola; this is why they insisted that Savimbi establish a formal alliance with its leader, Holden Roberto. Savimbi displayed a certain reluctance toward this proposal, complaining of plunder and "anti-white" attitudes among the FNLA leaders. The South Africans rejected his request and suspended contact with Savimbi for several months.



Holden Roberto had also contacted the South Africans through Portuguese intermediaries. Their first meeting with Roberto took place in Kinshasa. On the basis of Roberto Holden's desire to build an alliance with Savimbi, the South Africans agreed to let the FNLA have a shipment of second-hand rifles, shotguns, and mortars which they did receive in August.

A third meeting was held toward the end of August on the territory occupied by UNITA within Angola; it was attended by a former general of the South African Army who agreed to provide instructors. Two training camps were set up, one for UNITA in Calombo, south of Silva Porto, and another one for the FNLA, in Mapupa, in the southern part of Angola.

A platoon of South African soldiers have already been dispatched to Angola, to the hydroelectric complex of Calueque on the Cunene River on 9 August; but that was merely a defensive move to protect the dam and the hydroelectric complex, which supplied energy to the towns in the south of Angola, against plunder. The South Africans declared that their intervention here had the tacit approval of the Portuguese.

South Africa's entry on the battlefield and the armed offensive, called "Operation Zulu," now began.

The army had received instructions to assist the forces of Savimbi and Roberto for the purpose of controlling the areas in the south and center of Angola, where they had ethnic support, and above all to help UNITA to hold on to its capital, Nova Lisboa, which was threatened by the Cuban forces and the MPLA. The hope was that, if the anti-Soviet forces were to find themselves in a solid position on 11 December, that is to say, Independence Day, the MPLA and its followers would find themselves forced to deal with them and to abandon their plan of conquest.

The surprising victory of the small South African column in Angola offered a possibility for something more: a military victory over the communists. But the opportunity was missed.

Relations with the South Africans were not easy in the beginning, even for a seasoned leader and politician such as Jonas Savimbi. He had been fighting against the Portuguese for many years but now he had to deal with a country whose policy of apartheid was the target of hatred and resentment on the part of black nationalists. Then he found a friend and confidant in the young and blond major who arrived at Silva Porto on 21 September 1975.

The South African was not a recent arrival in Angola; he had served as military advisor with the South African Embassy in Luanda between 1970 and 1973 and he spoke fluent Portuguese. He was an intellectual soldier who had written a doctoral thesis on counterinsurgency at the Defense College in Pretoria.

The ice was soon broken and Savimbi and his men began to talk to the South African Major Kass (which means cheese) because he came from a German family; Kass called Savimbi "doctor" or simply "Doc."

The Major arrived with a team of 18 infantry instructors who soon were called "brothers" at the UNITA camps. They had to train the UNITA troops and help them establish a strong position in Central Africa. The South African team arrived at the moment when the pro-Soviet forces had seized control in Angola's most important cities, with the exception of Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Carmona, and Serpa Pinto. The communists held the key ports and were penetrating into the tribal areas of the Ovimbunder which had always been controlled by the UNITA.

Major Kaas [sic] was in charge of the UNITA recruits who were between the ages of 14 and 20. He gave a 2-week training course, working night and day.

#### Barrier in Nova Lisboa

The crucial mission of the South African advisors assigned to Savimbi was to stop the advance of the communists on Nova Lisboa along one of the three main routes: from Luanda to the north and from Benguela and Lobito to the west. One UNITA column, under the command of Savimbi, left on 4 October to stop a communist advance from the west and clashed with the Cubans and the MPLA 3 days later.

During the battle, the UNITA forces established defensive positions west of Nova Lisboa and Major Kass asked for immediate reinforcement by radio. He received a squadron of 22 armored cars which were transported to Silva Porto. The idea of attacking north of the Cuanza River with this new force was tempting but orders were to stay in position. One afternoon in October, Major Chindondo, the UNITA personnel chief, arrived excitedly at the camp, alerting everybody to the fact that the enemy was advancing toward Nova Lisboa from the north, establishing himself in the area of Quibala.

Major Kaas assembled his armored cars and the UNITA battalion in a column called FOXBAT; it was then, on 7 November, that the UNITA destroyed one of their biggest outfits [sic]. The MPLA advance was led by a Cuban officer (with two red stars on his blouse), driving a black Citroen. A South African soldier fired a 106-mm rifle at the vehicle, instantly killing the officer. The FOXBAT column held a line of approximately 30 km which was to hold out until Independence Day. The policy was for the South Africans not to move any further into UNITA territory and to be prepared to withdraw on 11 November.

On 14 October, however, another South African column moved to the border between Southwest Africa and Angola. The code name given to that operation was OPERATION ZULU which apparently confused the Cubans. There were more South African blacks than whites in the column but there were no Zulus.

The officer in command was a South African colonel from Cape Province, a graduate of the Saldanha Bay Military Academy, who had volunteered to serve in Angola. His comrades called him "Rommel" because of the extraordinary speed with which his columns advanced.

At 0930 on 9 October he was informed that he was to leave Pretoria and move to the operations base at Runtu on the border with Angola. At Runtu he found that his force consisted of two battalions: one battalion recruited mainly from the Caprivi strip, including Bushmen who had already fought under former Portuguese officers; and one black battalion from the FNLA, numbering 1,000 men, divided into three companies under the command of Major Businha.

The FNLA men were followers of Daniel Chipenda, a guerrilla leader whose headquarters was in Serpa Pinto. Chipenda had broken away from the MPLA the year before so that his new allies did not yet have full confidence in him. His men had been trained by South African instructors in Mapupa. Two of the FNLA companies had gotten one month of training and the other one had only had 4 days of training; it ran into so much trouble that it had to turn back.

"Rommel" only had six South African officers and a few other men to help him command his forces. From the very beginning, he had trouble with the language. Half of the bushmen spoke Portuguese and the other half, recruited in the southwestern part of Africa, spoke Afrikaans.

"Rommel" had gotten orders to seize the important centers along the coast prior to 11 November, Independence Day, where ethnic support for the UNITA and the FNLA was strongest. He had to explain to the civilians in the towns that this was a FNLA/UNITA column; some Portuguese inhabitants mistakenly believed that they had come to restore the old regime.

When the column crossed the border at Cuangar on 14 October, it included only civilian vehicles—trucks, private cars, and a few Land Rovers. The first target was the city of Pereira d'Eca which had changed hands many times. The column did not encounter much resistance from the MPLA troops who were along the road (and they did not have many problems either with the UNITA forces which had not yet been notified of OPERATION ZULU). The defenders simply went into hiding when they arrived at the city.

That became the "style" for most of the campaign. The MPLA soldiers used to wear civilian clothing under their uniforms so that, after they had been driven out of their position, they could throw their rifles away, take off their uniforms, and mingle with the civilian population.

The column occupied Pereira d'Eca so fast that the MPLA troops, who were in the outskirts of the city, did not have time to learn of the capture of Pereira d'Eca by their adversaries. Major Businha was celebrating the victory in a local bar when two MPLA soldiers appeared. He turned to them and looked them over; then he saluted them with two fingers pointing up (the MPLA salute). When they responded with the same sign, the major whipped out his weapon and killed both of them. The situation in Pereira d'Eca gives us an idea of what the South Africans were going to encounter in most of the big towns which had been

destroyed by a black civil war. Many buildings had been sacked and the shops and stores had been cleaned out. The local UNITA forces were brought in to restore basic services.

#### Rommel Advances

Two days later, the reinforced column, now commanded from a Land Rover with a rifle [sic] mounted on the roof, took over the City of Joao de Almeida. It was better defended because the MPLA had used it as a major war materiel base. Large quantities of rations were captured, along with war materiel and propaganda material. Now the road was free for the attack on Sa da Bandeira, the capital of Huila, which still contained a considerable number of whites. "Rommel's" main concern now was that the MPLA forces would endanger the civilians in the city but the defenses were concentrated in the outskirts, such as at Monte Cristo Rei (so called because of the huge stature of Christ located on its summit).

The Zulu forces were approaching the airport, primarily, since the column was basically supplied by air. Then they sent troops to Monte Cristo Rei by sea during the night of 24 October. They found that the MPLA forces had withdrawn with their war materiel. This again was typical of the campaign; as the Zulu troops moved north, the other side entered an area in which it was stronger.

With the troops in the armored cars and half a platoon with 81-mm mortars, the South Africans chose Mocamedes, the major port in the South, as their first target. On the way, the troops clashed with soldiers who fired several 122-mm tube-shaped [sic] projectiles; this is an easily handled, light weapon capable of being fired from almost any vehicle.

It was during these skirmishes in the outskirts of Mocamedes that the column also ran into RPG-7 projectiles used as a means of psychological warfare. These projectiles had a range of about 600 meters and a self-destruct mechanism. Fired from high altitude, they would explode in the air with a tremendous bang, producing a big black cloud, completely harmless, because there were no fragments in the shell, but certainly demoralizing to the black soldiers who simply refused to believe that those projectiles were not dangerous.

The battle outside Mocamedes would have turned out rather badly for the Zulu column if the enemy had fired more powerful mortars. But the column managed to continue on, capturing a new weapon (82-mm rifles) made by the Russians; it also occupied the Bay of Mocamedes on 27 October.

While the local UNITA forces established control in Mocamedes, the column returned to Sa da Bandeira in order to regroup for the main attack in the North. Information had been received to the effect that the MPLA was moving south from its positions in Benguela and Lobito, one of the objectives for the South African operation since it was the country's second-largest port and its biggest railroad center.

The rainy season began at that time, rivers flooded and the lowlands to the north were turned into swamps. From then on, the campaign

centered around bridges and river crossings. Control of all of the all-weather roads became the key for victory or defeat.

On the road from Sa da Bandeira to Benguela, the Zulu column ran into a series of well-equipped positions of the MPLA forces. The influence of the Cubans, who proved to be well trained in setting up and maintaining static positions, could be seen very clearly at every military post along the way.

The first clash on the way to Benguela took place in Caporolo toward the end of October. Here the Cubans and the MPLA forces had set up their weapons on a hill overlooking a bridge. "Rommel" sent his bushmen to the west, along the river, so that they might cross it and take the enemy by surprise from the rear. The bushmen were too far away, missing the lowest section of the river where they could simply ford. In the meantime, one of the panhards discovered the enemy position on the main road further ahead.

To the surprise of the South Africans, the enemy forces simply took their arms and escaped but they did not pull out before trying to blow the bridge. The explosive charges had been put in place but the last man responsible for pushing the button had obviously forgotten to connect the cable to the detonator. The South Africans crossed the bridge with their troops and approached Catengue, where the roads from Benguela and Nova Lisboa cross. The time had come to look for provisions and to discover where the enemy was.

A party of soldiers was sent out on the road to Nova Lisboa, where the MPLA units were advanced toward Catengue. A South African lieutenant, called Jan, drove a Land Rover toward a MPLA convoy, led by officers in Mercedes Benz and Citroen vehicles "taken" from the Portuguese.

He managed to get away because the MPLA mistook him for a Cuban. "Where are our comrades?" somebody asked him. Jan mumbled something and approached them, raising his fingers to give the MPLA salute. The MPLA vehicle approached and then Jan open fire on them with his Browning 50 [cal.] rifle [sic; MG].

He then set up an ambush on the road and was able to knock off no less than seven enemy [armored] cars. He picked them off as if in a shooting gallery.

Three MPLA men were captured and were forced to dig graves for the coming victims of the ambush. For the rest of the campaign, Jan was dubbed "the Cuban."

In the meantime, reconnaissance patrols had discovered that the Cuban MPLA force was located further beyond Benguela with 15-20 mortars. The mortars caused panic among the Zulu troops who refused to face them and the column was delayed for 6 hours. The FNLA gunners drove the MPLA roadblock back, firing their mortars so rapidly (25 rounds per minute, instead of the customary 2 minutes) that their tubes began to catch fire.

There were several fires. The road was finally cleared when the scouts of the Zulu force found a bulldozer as they swept around the enemy position to the south. One squad was sent out to try to block the MPLA's retreat but the enemy had evacuated very quickly.

#### Zulu Column Against Cubans

Once again, fate saved the bridge for the Zulu column. The Cuban engineers had run a cable from the rear of the bridge to the detonator for 2,000 meters. Everything was ready to blow the bridge and the South Africans were surprised that it was not blown up. By a stroke of luck, one of their reconnaissance patrols had cut the wire while moving through the area.

On the Catengue battlefield, the South Africans found another piece of evidence pointing to the Cuban presence: a map marked in Spanish. They captured seven men who told them of the existence of a big camp outside Benguela [sic], with 350 Cubans. Other battle trophies included a Mercedes Benz and an Alfa Romeo which had been used by the MPLA. The scouts reported that a total of 52 MPLA soldiers had been killed in Catengue.

After the battle of Catengue, the Cubans and the MPLA moved north, abandoning their trenches and even large quantities of ammunition. About 10 km from Benguela, the Zulu column ran into a big training camp capable of accommodating 100 men, surrounded by deep trenches and ditches. It had simply been abandoned. The South Africans took 150 cans of diesel oil which had been abandoned. Just south of Benguela, the column ran into another camp which turned out to have been the main Cuban base and which was set up for burning so that it would be destroyed. The fire did not spread and they were able to rescue large quantities of cigars, canned meat, and other gourmet foods. The bushmen were delighted with this tremendous quantity of by no means negligible products.

The Zulu forces were ready for the assault on Benguela. Their regiment included 150 white South Africans with their Panhards, along with the bushmen and the FNLA battalion, which had shrunk to 450 black and 80 white Portuguese. The attack began on 4 November, one week prior to Independence Day; the air base southwest of the city was taken without resistance.

But now something happened with the South Africans had very much been afraid of; the MPLA and the Cuban forces pushed into the city. They simultaneously opened fire with 122-mm projectiles from the other side of Benguela; they likewise fired on the native huts with small arms from the city's outskirts. The column had to stop at the airport for 26 hours.

For the first time since his almost uninterrupted advance, "Rommel" faced a dilemma: his mortars had a maximum range of 5 km while the enemy's batteries were at least 7-km away, and the Soviet projectiles had a range of 14 km (that is, the 122-mm projectiles). He could not


risk opening fire on the city, nor could he advance with his armored cars and permit the enemy to approach further. In the meantime, the enemy's projectiles scared his soldiers. From his CP at the airport, "Rommel" found a solution: he sent his mortars to the east of the city's outskirts, speculating that he could move them for a certain distance before the Cuban troops would arrive. He was successful because, when the South African mortars opened fire, they were still several meters from their targets [sic]. The enemy commander however had concluded that the South Africans were merely marauding or snooping around and so the Cubans advanced immediately. The mortar companies inside Benguela offered little resistance and the Zulu column once again took the Angolan city with little effort.

The Benguela battle however had taught one lesson: the tremendous effort made by the soldiers could not always make up for the disadvantages of being under fire, especially in a war where black troops on both sides displayed a pronounced preference for fighting as far as possible from the enemy lines. "Rommel" sent an urgent radio message, asking Rantu to send artillery with which he could match the long-range equipment of the MPLA.

The Zulu Force entered Lobito on 7 November. The majority of the population supported the UNITA and the Cubans and the MPLA withdrew without fighting. After Lobito had been taken by the pro-Soviet forces, UNITA had been able to maintain close contact by phone with its units inside the city. Nothing had been done to cut off these obvious means of communication.

The only battle inside the city was between the allied forces since the UNITA troops in the area demanded their territory. They found Portuguese soldiers and bushmen in a police station and they simply kicked them out of the camp. The bushmen were furious and the commissioner in charge of the local UNITA forces, Dr. Valentino, had to calm the situation with friendly statements delivered in a diplomatic tone of voice. There were unpleasant incidents in the local barracks which had been occupied by the FNLA. One of the UNITA military commanders, Major Lumumba, entered the place and kicked the FNLA out, threatening it with his rifles. The Zulu force remained in Lobito until Independence Day. "Rommel" established his HQ at the airfield, near the swamps, where the mosquitos and lice prevented him and his men from catching any sleep. He was hoping that he would be called back on 11 November in accordance with original instructions. But the orders were changed. An even bloodier struggle was ahead.


In our next issue: "The Battle for Luanda."




Here it is, documented. They came from another continent. They flew from America to Africa. These are some of the Cuban soldiers who were photographed on Angolan soil. They total 15,000; however, the South African forces pushed them back, at least until other contingents forced the anti-communists to stop their advance.

LN 127-77





They chat and talk about their experiences. They are Cuban soldiers in Angola with their black allies of the MPLA, the procommunist Angolan fraction.




Guarding the landings. The war established a satellite of Havana and Moscow. On the other side of the ocean, South America.



The photo shows the leader of UNITA, an anticommunist force, haranguing his troops. Jonas Savimbi needed the help of South African advisors.



Angola undoubtedly is involved in a civil war. But that war was encouraged from abroad and involved everybody, both big and little.



In any of the three Angolan groups, one could see youngsters parading at the head. Communism is behind those of the MPLA.



Evidence: A MPLA soldier on the turret of a Soviet tank. This picture was taken near Luanda.

UNCLASSIFIED



There was no lack of summary executions everytime the opposing bands took a city. Violence was encouraged.

UNCLASSIFIED

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TOR: 061146Z SEP 85

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RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEKJCS #2557 2491146  
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
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RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) /  
RUCLHUA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 061137Z SEP 85

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RUEHTT (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RHDLCNE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) /

BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMPLET 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANNUAL FAPLA OFFENSIVE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

INTEL

DOI: (U) 850903

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (U) THE ANNUAL FAPLA OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA IN ANGOLA IS BIGGER AND BETTER THIS YEAR. THERE ARE FOUR DIFFERENT OFFENSIVES. THE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS IS SLIM SINCE THE RAINY SEASON BEGINS SOON. THIS YEARS ACTIONS ARE POSSIBLY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE NON ALIGNED NATION CONFERENCE WHICH BEGAN 2 SEPTEMBER IN LUANDA.

TEXT: 1. (c) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

2. (U) THERE ARE FOUR SEPARATE OPERATIONS UNDERWAY.

3. (U) HUAMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE ENGAG-

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MSGNO 39 (MIIR) ISG \*07/09/85\* \*00:03\*  
ED IN AN AREA PACIFICATION ROLE. THE MISSION IS TO ROOT  
OUT UNITA AND PLACE A FAPLA INTELLIGENCE NETWORK IN BEING.  
THE TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE THE SO-CALLED "VIGALANTE" BRI-  
GADES.

4. (U) CUNENE (b)(3):10 USC 424 (EVALE AREA) ONE FAPLA BRI-  
GADE AND AROUND 1,200 LOCAL SWAPO SOLDIERS ARE INVOLVED IN  
AN AREA PACIFICATION OPERATION IN THIS AREA. THE MISSION  
IS THE SAME AS IN HUAMBO.

5. (C) CAZOMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE IN-  
VOLVED IN A CONVENTIONAL STYLE ATTACK FROM LUACANA TO CAP-  
TURE CAZOMBO. TWO ADDITIONAL FAPLA BRIGADES ARE MOVING  
INTO THIS AREA TO ASSIST. THE ATTACKING FORCE IS SUPPORT-  
ED BY MIG-21, 23, AND MI-25 AIRCRAFT. THEY ALSO HAVE AT-  
TACHED ARMOR CONSISTING OF 2 EA T-62'S AND 4 EA T-55'S  
MANNED BY CUBANS. NUMEROUS SOVIET ADVISORS ARE PRESENT.  
ON 28 AUGUST A SOVIET ADVISORY COMMITTEE VISITED THE TWO  
FORWARD BRIGADES. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE LOGISTICAL BUILD-  
UP PRIOR TO THIS OPERATION. HOWEVER, (b)(1),1.4 (C) BELIEVES  
PETROL FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND THE TANKS IS INSUFFICIENT TO  
CONDUCT THE COMPLETE OPERATION. THE TWO FORWARD BRIGADES  
ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED 50KM NORTH OF CAZOMBO. THE RAINY  
SEASON IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN SEVERAL WEEKS WHICH SHOULD  
GRIND THE OFFENSIVE TO A HALT.

6. (C) CUITO CUANAVAL (b)(3):10 USC 424 5 EA FAPLA BRIGADES  
ARE INVOLVED IN A TWO-PRONGED ATTACK FROM MAVINGA (b)(3):10  
(b)(3):10 WITH 2 EA BRIGADES IN THE NORTH AND 3 EA BRIGADES  
IN THE SOUTH TO CAPTURE CUITO CUANAVAL. THIS OPERATION  
IS SUPPORTED BY MIG-21, 23, SU-22, AND MI-25 AIRCRAFT PLUS  
A COMPANY OF TANKS. THERE ARE SOVIET ARTILLERY ADVISORS  
AT BRIGADE LEVEL. THE AIR FORCE IS ATTACKING TARGETS  
PRIOR TO THE ARMY'S ADVANCE.

7. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (C) THINKS THAT FAPLA MAY TRY AN AIR STRIKE  
ON JAMBA, UNITA'S HEADQUARTERS DURING THIS PERIOD WHILE  
THE NON ALIGNED NATIONS ARE MEETING. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

8. (C) THERE ARE SEVERAL NEW ASPECTS TO THIS YEAR'S OF-  
FENSIVES:

- A. AN INCREASE IN SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.
- B. USE OF T-62 TANKS.
- C. CUBAN CREWS FOR TANKS.
- D. USE OF MIG-23 AND SU-22 AIRCRAFT.
- E. BIGGER AND BETTER LOGISTICS BUILDUP.

COMMENT: 1. (C) ALL FOUR OPERATIONS WERE LAUNCHED TOO  
LATE TO AVOID THE ADVENT OF RAINY SEASON. THEY SEEM TO  
DO IT EVERY YEAR. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

END OF MESSAGE

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\*\*\*<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>>\*\*\*

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANNUAL FAPLA OFFENSIVE (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

4. (C) (b)(1)

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MSGNO 39 (MIIR) ISG \*07/09/85\* \*00:03\*

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) NONE  
COLL: (U) NONE  
INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PREP: (U)  
APPR: (U)  
EVAL: (U) YES REL TO:NONE  
ENCL: (U) NONE  
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
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REEL NUMBER 008321 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0069

MSGNO 6 (MIR) \*01 \*01.09/31\* \*13:20\*  
ZCZC 18:16:40Z (MI)

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
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424 IMMEDIATE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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RUEHOT



RUCJAAA/USCINCEUR MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GER IMMEDIATE

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EZ1:


~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~NOFORN~~

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/  
ANGOLA/USSR/CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 6 (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL  
1. OI CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA  
WA/ANGOLA (AO)/USSR (UR)

2. OI IR NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 3. (U) TITLE: CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA 700
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810901
- 5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
- 6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

[REDACTED]

- 7. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ SUMMARY: IN THE FIGHTING NEAR NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424 ON 810827, SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) UNITS CAPTURED ONE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISOR AND KILLED FOUR OTHERS. NINE ADDITIONAL PROBABLE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE OBSERVED ESCAPING. THESE 14 SOVIETS WERE IN ADDITION TO AN UNCONFIRMED NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS WHO WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE ESCAPED FROM YANGONGO (b)(3):10 (b)(3):1 BEFORE THE INITIAL SADF GROUND ATTACK ON 810825. BASED ON DOCUMENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE FOUND THERE (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] THE 14 SOVIETS ENCOUNTERED NEAR NGIVA WERE PART OF THE LEADERSHIP THAT REGROUPED FLEEING FAPLA UNITS THERE AND ORGANIZED THE RENEWED FIGHT AFTER THE SADF UNITS THOUGHT THEY HAD SECURED THE POSITION. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SADF GROUND UNITS RETURNED TO BASES IN NAMIBIA 810901. THE MAIN BODY IS STILL WITHDRAWING SOUTH OF MUPA (b)(3):10 USC 424 THEY ARE ENCOUNTERING NUMEROUS EMPLACED MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS, SLOWING THE MOVEMENT OF THE VEHICLE COLUMN, WHICH INCLUDES RATEL'S AND BUFFELS. THEY ARE NOW ENGAGED WITH FAPLA OR SWAPO UNITS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SADF KIA COUNT REMAINS AT 10. ONE REASON FOR THE RELATIVELY LIGHT SADF CASUALTIES IS THAT MANY SWAPO/FAPLA T-34 TANKS WERE DUG IN SO DEEPLY THAT THEIR GUNS WERE UNABLE TO TRAVERSE, AND MANY 12.7-MM AND 14.5- MM AA GUNS WERE DUG IN SO THAT THEY COULD NOT BE DEPRESSED FOR ANTIPERSONNEL USE.

- 9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE
- 9B. ~~(C)~~ ORIG CMTS: (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED]
- 10. (U) PROJ: N/A
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
- 12. (U) SPEC INST: NONE
- 13. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

REVW: 31 AUG 87

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NC 7648875

FOR: 151148Z DEC 81

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 DE RUEHSA #7979/01 3491137  
 ZNY ~~CCCC~~  
 R 141031Z DEC 81 ZEL  
 FM (b)(3):10:USC 424  
 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10:USC 424  
 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
 RUEHTN/ (b)(3):50:USC 403-1(i)  
 RUCIAEA  
 RUCIPBA  
 RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC  
 RUEJFA/ (b)(3):50:USC 403-1(i)  
 RUEHDT  
 RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL  
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
 RUDDVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50:USC 403-1(i) VAIHINGEN GER  
 BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 (b)(3):10:USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10:USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/  
 OPERATION DAISY (U)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (AA)/ANGOLA (AO)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10:USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: OPERATION DAISY
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 811211
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10:USC 424



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TOR: 151148Z DEC 81

7. (U)

(b)(3)10 USC 424

8. ~~TO~~ SUMMARY: DURING 1-22 NOV 81, BETWEEN 2,000 AND 2,500 SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) TROOPS, SUPPORTED BY A VARIETY OF ATTACK AND TRANSPORT PLANES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE (SAAF), DESTROYED A SENIOR HEADQUARTERS COMPLEX OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLA FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA.

9.A. (U) DETAILS:

- 1. ~~TO~~ DURING 1-22 NOV 81, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) CARRIED OUT OPERATION DAISY IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA. THE OBJECTIVE OF DAISY WAS TO DESTROY A SENIOR FIELD HQ OF THE SWAPO GUERRILLA FORCES, WHICH HAD BEEN LOCATED EAST OF BAMEI ~~(b)(3)10 USC 424~~ BETWEEN THE NEGIUMBE AND CAIUNDO RIVERS. THIS WAS THE SWAPO HQ THAT HAD CONTROLLED THE THREE FRONT HQS (NORTHWESTERN, NORTHERN, AND NORTHEASTERN FRONTS) IT HAD BEEN DISRUPTED BY THE SADF IN OPERATION PROTEA IN AUGUST AND IN EARLIER CROSS-BORDER RAIDS DURING 1981. DURING OCTOBER, THIS HQ WAS TRYING TO REGROUP SWAPO FORCES AND TO REESTABLISH A DEGREE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA THAT WOULD PERMIT A RESUMPTION OF EFFECTIVE SWAPO RAIDS INTO NAMIBIA.

- 2. ~~TO~~ DAISY WAS PLANNED IN ORDER TO PREVENT SWAPO FROM REESTABLISHING ITSELF IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, AND SINCE THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS CLEARLY SEPARATED FROM ANGOLAN TOWNS AND GOVERNMENT MILITARY (FAPLA) INSTALLATIONS, DAISY WAS SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SADF TO CONDUCT A PURELY ANTI-SWAPO OPERATION. IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERED MILITARILY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WILL AND ABILITY TO STRIKE SWAPO BASES AT A DISTANCE OF MORE THAN 200 KM INSIDE ANGOLA.

- 3. ~~TO~~ DIRECTIVES ISSUED TO THE ATTACKING FORCES STRESSED THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING SADF CASUALTIES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. DIRECTIVES ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN PROPERTY AND THE ANGOLAN INFRASTRUCTURE, AND CONTACT WITH FAPLA FORCES THAT DID NOT TRY TO INTERFERE.

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TOR: 151146Z DEC 81

- 4. ~~REF~~ THE ATTACKING SAA FORCES INCLUDED ONE BATTALION-SIZE MECHANIZED INFANTRY GROUP, ONE BN-SIZE MOTORIZED INF GP, AND AIRBORNE FORCES APPROXIMATELY OF BN SIZE WHICH WERE ORGANIZED INTO RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, BLOCKING FORCES, AND A RESERVE. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THIS FORCE WAS BETWEEN 2,000 AND 2,500. IT WAS COMMANDED BY BRIG R, "WITKOP" ((BADENHURST)), THE OFF COMMANDING, SECTOR 10, WITH HQ AT OSHAKATI (b)(3) (U) USC-424 SAAF SUPPORT INCLUDED BUCCANEERS, MIRAGE F-1'S, IMPALA MK-2'S, C-47'S, C-130'S, ALOUETTE 111'S, AND PUMAS.

- 5. ~~REF~~ THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE SWAPO GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS ESTIMATED AT 1,200. THE HQ COMPLEX WAS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF A 36-30KM DEFENSIVE AREA. THE 1,200 GUERRILLAS WERE DEPLOYED IN THREE MAIN GROUPS--TO THE EAST, SOUTH, AND WEST OF THE HQ. THE GROUPS ON THE EAST AND SOUTH WERE REGULAR GUERRILLA TROOPS. WEST OF THE HQ WAS A GROUP OF SWAPO "CRIMINAL" DETAINEES, WHO WERE ALSO EXPECTED TO HELP DEFEND THE HQ IF NECESSARY.

- 6. ~~REF~~ ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 NOV, AIRBORNE RECON TEAMS

END OF MESSAGE

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PAGE 001 <sup>4</sup>

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R 141031Z DEC 81 ZEL

FM (b)(3)(1) USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3)(1) USC 424  
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEHTM (b)(3)(5) USC 403-1(f)  
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RUCIPB  
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC  
RUEUFAA (b)(3)(5) USC 403-1(f)  
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RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIMINGEN GER  
RUDDVIA/USEUCV (b)(3)(5) USC 403-1 WAIMINGEN GER  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 (b)(3)(1) USC 424

WERE DROPPED A FEW KILOMETERS NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF THE  
OBJ AREA. THEY REPORTED ON 2 NOV THAT THE SAAPU HQ AND  
DEFENSIVE TROOPS WERE STILL IN PLACE, AND THE MECH AND MTZ  
INF GPs CROSSED THE BORDER IN TWO COLUMNS. THEY CROSSED  
NORTHEAST OF USHAKATI--THE MTZ COLUMN ON THE LEFT, AD-  
VANCING GENERALLY NORTHEAST TOWARD IONDE (UNLOCATED BUT  
PROBABLY (b)(3)(1) USC 424 ABOUT 120 KM NORTH OF THE BORDER).  
THE MECH COLUMN, ON THE RIGHT, ADVANCED NORTHEASTWARD TO  
BYPASS IONDE TO THE EAST BEFORE TURNING NORTHWEST TOWARD  
THE URJ.

- 7. ON 3 NOV, THE MTZ GP ATTACKED A SMALL SAAPU  
SECURITY OUTPOST AT IONDE AND CLEARED THE POSITION FOR  
USE BY BRIGADIER HADENHORST AS A FORWARD TACTICAL HQ. A  
SMALL SAA INF FORCE WAS LEFT THERE FOR LOCAL SECURITY.  
THE AIRBORNE RESERVE FORCE WAS PLACED ON ALERT AT THE  
IONDE AIRSTRIP.



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PAGE 002 <sup>5</sup>

NC 7648900 <sup>875</sup>

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- 8. ~~FOR~~ BETWEEN 0400 AND 0500L ON 4 NOV, AIRBORNE UNITS WERE DROPPED BY C-130 AIRCRAFT NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF THE OBJ AREA TO ACT AS BLOCKING FORCES. AT 0815L, SAAF AIRCRAFT BOMBED THE OBJ AREA, FLYING FROM EAST TO WEST. THEY REPORTED INEFFECTIVE 23-MM AND SA-7 ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE. AT 0900, THE MECH GP ATTACKED FROM THE EAST AND THE MTZ GP FROM THE SOUTH.

- 9. ~~FOR~~ THE MECH GP WAS SURPRISED BY SWAPO RESISTANCE ENCOUNTERED ABOUT 10 TO 15 KM EAST OF THE OBJ AREA. THIS WAS THE ONLY RESISTANCE. HOWEVER, THE OBJ AREA ITSELF HAD BEEN ABANDONED BY THE TIME THE SAA INF UNITS ARRIVED. MOST OF THE GUERRILLAS ESCAPED SAFELY, SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDING THE BLOCKING FORCES.

- 10. ~~FOR~~ DURING 5-9 NOV, THE SAA UNITS REMAINED IN THE OBJ AREA TO REPLENISH THEIR SUPPLIES AND TO DESTROY THE ABANDONED SWAPO HQ AND DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, FOOD, CLOTHING, AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. THE ABANDONED WEAPONS INCLUDED AK-47 AND OTHER RIFLES, VARIOUS MACHINEGUNS, 82-MM MORTARS, RPG-7 LAUNCHERS, AND VARIOUS MINES.

- 11. ~~FOR~~ ON 6 NOV, AN SAAF MIRAGE F-1 SHOT DOWN A MIG-21 THAT SEEMED TO BE TRYING TO INTERFERE WITH AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DAISY.

- 12. ~~FOR~~ DURING 10-22 NOV, THE SAA UNITS SEARCHED A WIDE AREA FOR SIGNS OF A SWAPO PRESENCE. THE PARACHUTE UNITS SEARCHED UP TO THE AREA WEST OF THE OBJ AREA. THE MTZ UNITS SEARCHED TO THE SOUTH, AND THE MECH UNITS TO THE EAST. MECH UNITS PENETRATED AS FAR NORTH AS 240 KM FROM THE NAMIBIA BORDER, EAST OF CASSINGA. (b)(3), (U) USC 429  
DAISY OFFICIALLY ENDED ON 22 NOV, AND ALL SAA FORCES HAD RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN NAMIBIA BY 24 NOV.

- 13. ~~FOR~~ DURING THE ENTIRE OPERATION, ONLY 71 SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE SAA UNITS LOST THREE KILLED. AT LEAST THREE GUERRILLAS, INCLUDING TWO WOUNDED, WERE CAPTURED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT OTHER SWAPO CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM THE SAAF ATTACK ON 4 NOV AND WERE REMOVED FROM THE OBJ AREA BY THE GUERRILLAS WHO

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
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TOR: 151156Z DEC 81

ESCAPED. APPARENTLY MOST OF THE KNOWN SAAARD DEAD WERE  
KILLED AT IUNDE ON 3 NOV AND EAST OF THE OBJ AREA ON 4 NOV.  
TWO OF THE SAA DEAD WERE KILLED IN THE SKIRMISH EAST OF  
THE OBJ ON 4 NOV. THE THIRD WAS KILLED LATER THE SAME DAY  
BY AN ANTIPERSONNEL MINE LEFT IN AN ABANDONED BUNKER IN  
THE OBJ AREA.

9.8.

(b)(1),(b)(3),10 USC 4214(c)



END OF MESSAGE

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
PAGE 001

NC 7548915

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 RUCIPB  
 RUEAHUA/WH 222 WASH DC  
 RUEOFAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
 RUEHDT/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
 RUCJAAI/USCIB/WH WASHINGTON AFB FL  
 RUSVAII/USCIB/WH WASHINGTON GER  
 RUDDVIA/USCIB/WH WASHINGTON GER  
 BT

~~SECTION 03 OF 03~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424



- 10. (U) ~~INFO~~ N/A
- 11. (U) ~~INTL~~ CODES: N/A
- 12. (U) ~~SEC~~ INFO: NONE DIRC: NU
- 13. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 15. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ~~INTL~~ N/A
- 17. (U) ~~INTL~~ DIRC: N/A

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END OF MESSAGE

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27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN (b)(3):10 USC 424 JUL 78

REEL NUMBER 007536 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0005

MSGNO 5 (MIIR) \*31/07/78\* \*08:46\*  
ZCZC 10:08:47Z (MI)

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TOR: 310731Z JUL 78

NC 1059220

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DE RUEKJCS #0515 2120729  
ZNY ~~CCCC~~  
P 310729Z JUL 78  
FM JCS  
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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIF/C I A  
RUENEC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIAH/NSA WASH DC  
P 310605Z JUL 78  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC  
INFO RUENAAA/SCINCEUR WASHINGTON DC  
RUDDVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) WASHINGTON DC  
BT

EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN (b)(3):10 USC 424 JUL 78

- EZ2:  
THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
  2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  3. TITLE: SOUTH AFRICAN ANGOLAN RAID (U)
  4. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
  5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 780722
  6. DATE OF REPORT: 780728
  7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B INFO 2
  10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO OPD: NO
  12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC  
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. SOURCE (b)(3):10 USC  
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NOFORN CAVEAT (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC DIRC: NO  
16. SUMMARY: (C/NOFORN) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),,1 THE SADF USED AN AIR DROPPED CANISTER BOMB UNIT AS AN ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON DURING THE RAID ON CASSINGA. THE ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON WAS DESCRIBED AS THE TYPE THAT AFTER IMPACT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN (b)(3):10 USC 424 JUL 78

BOUNCES BACK INTO THE AIR AND EXPLODES AT 1 TO 2 METERS. (b)(3):10 USC 424  
DESCRIBED THE WEAPON AS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND THAT THIS WEAPON  
ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE ANGOLAN CASUALTIES.  
COMMENT: (c) THIS IS THE FIRST EVIDENCE THAT THIS TYPE OF  
WEAPON WAS USED IN THE PASSINGA RAID. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~GDS-84~~

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NNDD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 AUG 76.

REEL NUMBER OCT059 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0023

MSGNO 25 (MIR) \*23/C8/76\* \*04:18\*  
RVZCZC 15:57:29Z EIC992

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DE RUEKJCS 08524 2321554  
ZNY-0000 15:57:36Z C  
R 201542Z AUG 76

FM JCS  
INFO RUENC/SECSTATE WASH DC  
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RUEMAAA/CNO WASH DC  
RUEAOLD/CSA WASH DC  
R 201140Z AUG 76

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSMAA/CINCEUR WADNINGEN GER  
BT

EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 AUG 76.

EZ2:  
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

1. ANGOLA/REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. (U) MORE CUBAN'S TO ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. 18 AUG 76
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 18 AUG 76
6. B-2
7. NEWS MEDIA
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. N/A
10. 20 AUGUST 1976
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 12.
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14.

15. (U) IN THE 18 AUG EDITION OF THE RAND DAILY MAIL, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT CUBA WAS TO SEND 4,000 TROOPS TO "HELP CRUSH UNITA." THIS IR REPORTS THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THIS ARTICLE.

1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, CUBA HAS AGREED "TO SEND 4,000 MORE TROOPS TO ANGOLA SOON AS PART OF A NEW CAMPAIGN TO CRUSH THE GROWING GUERILLA RESISTANCE OF THE 25,000 UNITA TROOPS NOW FIGHTING IN THE BUSH." THE DECISION WAS APPARENTLY MADE DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CASTRO AND NETO DURING NETO'S RECENT STATE VISIT TO CUBA. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN "TO COUNTER THE SUCCESSFUL GUERILLA CTION BEING WAGED BY UNITA AGAINST THE CUBAN FORCES INSOUTHERN ANGOLA, IN WHICH UNITA HAS SUCCEEDED IN PINNING DOWN THE CUBAN FORCES WHO ARE THE BACKBONE OF THE MPLA GOVERNMENT." THE ARTICLE STATED THAT THE CUBANS WHO WERE TRAINED FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE WERE RELUCTANT TO MOVE OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WHERE UNITA EXERCISES SOME CONTROL.
2. (U) THE ARTICLE STATED THAT A NUMBER OF CUBAN SOLDIERS HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 AUG 76.

BEEN KILLED IN SPORADIC ATTACKS SINCE THE MPLA VICTORY EARLIER THIS YEAR. "THE RELUCTANCE OF THE CUBANS TO FIGHT FAR OUTSIDE THE TOWNS IS ALREADY CAUSING CONSIDERABLE FRICTION BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND THE MPLA WHOSE FOLLOWERS RESENT THE PRIVILEGED TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN TROOPS", THE ARTICLE SAID.

3. (U) THE ARTICLE STATED THAT, UNITA SPOKESMEN SEEM EXTREMELY CONFIDENT THAT THEIR STRATEGY OF A LONG, DRAIN-OUT, HARASSING GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN WILL "EVENTUALLY FORCE THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS OUT OF ANGOLA JUST AS THE US WAS FORCED OUT OF VIETNAM." CONTINUING, IT STATED, "UNITA HAS COMPLETED THEIR REORGANIZATION AFTER LOSING THE CONVENTIONAL WAR AGAINST THE SUPERIOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF THE CUBANS EARLIER THIS YEAR; AND, DR. SAVIMBI IS LEADING THE BATTLE FROM INSIDE ANGOLA. ALMOST ALL HIS FORMER SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS HAVE RETURNED TO HIM AND NEW RECRUITS ARE GAINED DAILY."

4. (U) THE ARTICLE CLAIMED THAT, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO CUT OFF ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TOWNS AND VILLAGES. "THEY ARE DETERMINED THAT THE BENGUELA RAILWAY WILL BE PUT PERMANENTLY OUT OF ACTION," IT SAID. THE LUANDA RADIO ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE HAS VERIFIED UNITA CLAIMS AND INDICATED

THAT SUPPORTERS WERE ACTIVELY UNDERMINING THE MPLA GOVERNMENT IN AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL. THE RADIO ALSO HAS REPORTEDLY CLAIMED THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CHARGED THAT "SABOTEURS HAD STOLEN THOUSANDS OF TRUCKS, DESTROYED 'COUNTLESS' BRIDGES AND DISRUPTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN A CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO RUIN THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY."

COMMENT: (+) IT IS RUMORED IN SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY CIRCLES THAT THE MORALE OF THE CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA IS INDEED LOW; AND THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS WERE INDEED RELUCTANT TO CARRY THE WAR TO THE ENEMY--IN THIS CASE UNITA IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT SAVIMBI IS WAGING A WAR OF SORTS PROBABLY WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT. ANY SUCCESSES HE HAS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, ARE NOT PRECISELY KNOWN. SAVIMBI CONTINUES TO BE HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ANGOLA FOR THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS AND VIETNAM FOR THE US IS NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE OR PARTICULARLY VALID; HOWEVER, THERE IS A THREAD OF COMPARATIVE VALIDITY. [ ] SPECULATES THAT THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COUNTER ANY THREAT SUCH AS THAT IMPOSED BY SAVIMBI WITHOUT MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AT AN INCREASINGLY GREATER RESOURCE INVESTMENT WHICH NEITHER CAN DIRECTLY AFFORD. HENCE, THE SPECULATION THAT 4,000 MORE CUBANS ARE ENROUTE TO ANGOLA IS PROBABLY CORRECT.

THIS REPORT IS A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO (b)(3):10 USC 424

GOS 31 DEC 1982.

BT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: ANGOLA/SOUTH WEST AFRICA/ REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	8. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
2. SUBJECT: (U) MPLA Moving South	9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 September 1976
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 24-26 Aug 76	11. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: (b)(3):10 USC 424	12. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE	13. FORWARDED BY:
7. SOURCE: News Media	14. APPROVED BY:

15. SUMMARY (U) The 27 August edition of the Pretoria News carried a headlines, "MPLA Moving South." This IR reports substance of article.

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1. (U) The article stated, "MPLA and CUBAN forces are massing in southern ANGOLA in a determined bid to stamp out all resistance." According to reports reaching WINDHOEK, SWA, it is the "biggest" military operation in ANGOLA since the end of the ANGOLAN civil war.

2. (U) According to the article, the build up "is aimed primarily at stamping out UNITA resistance to the MPLA Government. UNITA is still believed to have the upper hand in certain parts of southern ANGOLA." The article continued, "despite mass troop movements, reports of fighting appear to be unfounded." First news of the operation came from the border town of CUANGAR on Tuesday, 24 August.

3. (U) The article further stated that on 25 August, the combined

(b)(3):10 USC 424

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: CINCEUR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: (b)(3):10 USC 424	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE
<p>CLASSIFIED BY</p> <p>SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1982</p> <p>3516-366-2</p> <p><del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del></p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>		



CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

REPORT NO.

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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CUBAN and MPLA forces moved into CALAIS in force, accompanied by helicopters, tanks, and armoured cars. Sources in RUNDU, which is just across the river from CALAIS, said that though troops were massing across the river there was no shooting. All appeared to be calm, with CUBAN soldiers seen handing out cigarettes to the villagers. Earlier reports said the sound of shots and explosions could be heard from across the ANGOLAN border. On 27 August sources said there was no shooting, and only large aircraft, apparently landing troops and supplies, could be seen landing across the border.

4. (U) The article further announced the flight of about 700 refugees across the border into the KAVANGO homeland in northeastern SWA on 26 August. The refugees, mostly Black, have been put up in the existing refugee camp where they were being cared for by the KAVANGO Government. The article further stated, "there were now about 2,000 people in the refugee camp, counting last night's arrivals as well as refugees still left over in the camp after crossing the KAVANGO River several months ago."

COMMENTS: (C) For sometime now reports have indicated that the UNITA forces are causing many headaches for the MPLA and CUBAN forces in southern ANGOLA. This concentration of troops into this area is apparently an all out attempt to improve their position in southern ANGOLA. The influx of the 700 refugees into SWA could present a problem to authorities and further strains on the economy in order to provide needed care.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424 061334Z

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INFO RU (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

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RUF G A I D / USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //

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RHF P A A A //

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RUEADWD/DA WASHDC/ (b)(3):50 USC 424 //

RHF P A A A (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G) //

RUEHSB (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEHLG

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RUEHSA

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CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA (SA); ANGOLA

~~SECRET~~

(AO); ZAIRE (ZI).

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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DOI: (U) 901100.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: ~~(S)~~ / (b)(1)(b)(3):10 USC 424, L4 (c)  
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ SOUTH AFRICA REPORTEDLY MAY BE PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPLY AND MILITARY ADVISORY SUPPORT TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. UNITA MAY BE ESTABLISHING A HEADQUARTERS IN LUNDA PROVINCE.

TEXT: ~~(S/NF)~~ ACCORDING TO AS YET UNCONFIRMED REPORTING, SOUTH AFRICA IS PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES (E.G., FUEL AND FOOD) TO THE UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA). THESE SUPPLIES ARE REPORTEDLY SHIPPED BY SEA FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO A ZAIREAN PORT AND THEN TRANSPORTED TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICA IS ALSO REPORTEDLY PROVIDING SOME MILITARY ADVISORS TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. THERE HAS BEEN INFORMATION THAT UNITA IS ESTABLISHING A MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN THE LUNDA PROVINCE OF NORTHERN ANGOLA. (b)(1):4(c)  
[REDACTED]

COMMENTS: ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1)(b)(3):10 USC 424, L4 (c)  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAS SUGGESTED UNITA COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, IN THE PAST, CONCERNING UNITA'S AGENDA IN THE PEACE TALKS WITH THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA). SOURCE'S INFORMATION, PRESENTED IN THIS REPORT, PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INDICATION OF ACTIVE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN AFFAIRS. IF TRUE, IT WOULD INDICATE COLLABORATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE IN ASSISTING UNITA AS WELL AS SUGGEST UNITA INTEREST IN BROADENING THE BASES FOR ITS SUPPORT. THE ESTABLISHMENT

MSGNO 9 (MIIR) ISG \*24/01/84\* \*03:13\*  
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EZ1:

UNCLAS E F T O (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

UNCLAS EFTO

SERIAL: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

PASS: (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF); NAMIBIA (WA)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 FOUR GUERRILLAS KILLED IN THE  
- OPERATIONAL AREA

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

INTEL

DOI: 840121

REQS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TRACKED DOWN AND KILLED  
FOUR BLACK-NATIONALIST TERRORISTS WHO HAD FLED INVADING SA  
TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE ((MEIRING))  
COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE SAID

MSGNO 9 IMIIRI ISG \*24/01/84\* \*03:13\*  
ON 840121. THE TERRORISTS WERE KILLED IN A SKIRMISH THAT  
TOOK PLACE IN THE MANGETTI BLOCK ON 840121.

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COMMENTS: THE SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER  
WHICH IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFORMATION IS POSSIBLY TRUE.  
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PROJ: N/A  
COLL: NONE  
INSTR: NONE (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PREP: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
APPR: [REDACTED]  
EVAL: NONE REL TO: NONE  
ENCL: NONE  
DISSEM: N/A

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HEADER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3)10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3)10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: SADF ADMITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN FIGHTING

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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
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DOI: (U) 871112.

REQS: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) / (b)(3)10 USC 424  
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SUMMARY: (S/NF) (b)(1)1.4 (c)1.4 (d)



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
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2. ~~(S/NF)~~

(b)(1)(b)(3) 10 USC 4241-4 (6)



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
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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3)-50 /

RUEDADA (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(G)

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(G) /

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCLAKA (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(G) /

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RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3)-50 USC / VAIHINGEN GER//

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3)10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3)10 USC 424  
BODY

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: SADF ADMITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN FIGHTING  
TAKING FAPLA'S BASE AT CUITO CUANAVALA.)



//IPSP: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424  
//COMSOBJ: (b)(3)10 USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) NONE (b)(3)10 USC 424

PREP: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

ACQ: (U) (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(f)

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL. OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

OPERATIONAL PLANS, INTELLIGENCE, AND RESEARCH

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~  
~~(Classification and Control Markings)~~

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

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1. COUNTRY: ANGOLA/REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	8. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3)10 USC 424
2. SUBJECT: (U) South African Military Operations in Angola	9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 February 1976
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Late 1975-Jan 76	11. REFERENCES: (b)(3)10 USC 424
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: (b)(3)10 USC 424	12. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3)10 USC 424, (b)(6)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE (b)(3)10 USC 424	13. PREPARED BY:
7. SOURCE: (b)(3)10 USC 424	14. APPROVING AUTH:

15. SUMMARY: (S) Post-withdrawal from Angola, South Africa continues to assess military short-comings, some of which are reported by this IR. The significance of this report relates to South African military capabilities and limitations. (b)(1)14(c)

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(b)(3)10 USC 424

1. (S) The purpose of this report is to submit various information in amplification of IRs (b)(3)10 USC 424 related to South African military operations in Angola.

a. (S) A total of 7 South Africans have been captured in two incidents. In one case, National Servicemen failed to follow their orders and simply drove into an area known to be held by the MPLA. The other case, an ambush, was reported by IR (b)(3)10 USC 424.

b. (S) (b)(3)10 USC 424, (c) the only units which really performed well were Reconnaissance Commando's. He said that they are an all-Permanent Force (PF) unit; their description equates

(c)

14. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: USCINCEUR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: <del>(b)(3)10 USC 403</del> <del>DECLASSIFIED ON 05-01-2001</del>	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE
<p>DD FORM 1396 1 SEP 68</p> <p><del>SECRET</del> NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (Classification and Control Markings)</p> <p>3384-373-2</p>		<p>REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 68, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 69.</p> <p>DA FORM 1045 (REV 10-61) GPO 1964-0-287</p>

Page 2 IN (b)(3)10 USC 424

to a US Navy "SEAL". They have trained for operations from South African Navy (SAN) submarines. (b)(1),(b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) the Army probably will have to form at least one brigade with all-PF (no National Servicemen). } OK

c. (S) (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) The main operating forces in Angola were motorized units of about 200 men each. It was such a unit which captured TEIXEIRA DE SOUSA. Another occupied NOVO REDONDO and caused some concern during the withdrawal lest it be cut off. When the enemy sensed that South Africa was withdrawing, they made a strong effort to capture the major South African supply dump at CELA and then swing west to cut off NOVO REDONDO. Defensive measures to block this attack disrupted the withdrawal schedule. } OK

d. (S) (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) Four aircraft were lost in Angola: two Puma helicopters and two light spotter planes. One of the helicopters was destroyed on the ground by enemy fire, but the other was shot down by friendly anti-aircraft fire in the CELA area. In this incident, (b)(1),(b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) the dead included Brigadier POTGIETER, who commanded the Military Academy last year. One officer survived. The fact that the helicopter was not marked was the main cause of the error, notwithstanding unsatisfactory recognition skill. } OK


COMMENTS: (b)(1),(b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) } 1.4c

ADDITIONAL COMMENT (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) (S) Ref para 1.d. above, the comment relative to the shooting down by friendly ground fire of a SAP helicopter in which BRIG POTGIETER was riding and subsequently killed adds validity to rumors emanating from SVA (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) to this effect. Pretoria is (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) reported this incident as a "light aircraft" crash; and, (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) assumed that aircraft involved was AM3C. It is now apparent the aircraft involved was a PUMA helicopter. This is more in line with the capabilities of CPT de Wet, the pilot of this helicopter who was also killed, and who was well known (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c) } OK

MSGNO 7 (MIIR) ISG \*08/03/83\* \*06:11\*  
ZCZC 11:09:44Z (MI)

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO 473-522/THE WHITE HOUSE

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RUSNNOA /USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

47 : : 9- (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

47 : : --- /USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

BT

EZ1:

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA/ETHIOPIA/  
CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: ANGOLA (AO)/SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ETHIOPIA (ET)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 830302
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- - -
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- - -

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MSGNO 7 (MIIR) 15G \*08/03/83\* \*06:11\*

8. ~~7C~~ CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA MAY HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING JANUARY 1983. AS MANY AS 10,000 ADDITIONAL CUBAN MILITARY COULD HAVE ENTERED ANGOLA, PRIMARILY FROM ETHIOPIA.

9.A. ~~7C~~ DETAILS: (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] PREVIOUS REPORT OF INCREASED CUBAN PRESENCE (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) FROM A PREVIOUS BASELINE OF 25,000 CUBAN MILITARY, AS MANY AS 10,000 ADDITIONAL CUBAN MILITARY MAY HAVE ENTERED ANGOLA (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THAT COULD BE TRUE BUT EVIDENCE WAS SCANTY. (b)(1),1.4 (c) [REDACTED] AT PRESENT, HE COULD NOT VERIFY A NUMBER ABOVE 25,000. (b)(1) [REDACTED] THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT SOME 5-10,000 CUBANS COULD HAVE COME IN ON FLIGHTS FROM ETHIOPIA (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) [REDACTED]

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
12. (U) SPEC INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO
13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424 [REDACTED]
14. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~DECL: OADR~~

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**COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA REPORTING**

Article 1: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b> <small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small>	This report contains confidential information. Plans and/or policies should not be leaked or omitted solely on the basis of this report.
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1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. SUBJECT: South African Troops Remaining in Angola	4. DATE OF REPORT: 5 February 1976
5. IIC NUMBER:	6. NO. OF PAGES: 2
7. DATE OF INFORMATION: 4 Feb 76	8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 4 Feb 76, (b)(3):10 USC 424	10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6)
11. EVALUATION SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424	12. PREPARED BY:
13. SOURCE: News Media	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

15. SUMMARY

An article headlined "5,000 SA men stay in Angola" appeared in the February 4 1976 edition of the JOHANNESBURG Star. This IR reports substance of this article.

244

Rec'd DS-4 / 17 FEB 76

1. In an interview with Mr. Bernard MOSSITER of the Washington Post, Mr. P.W. BOTHA, SA Defence Minister, was quoted as saying that, "some 4,000 to 5,000 troops were patrolling the whole area for which we are responsible, and would stay there until a new ANGOLAN regime assured PRETORIA that it would not provide bases for terrorists striking across the border into SOUTH WEST AFRICA." The area referred to extends from "the ATLANTIC OCEAN to the ZAMBIAN border and up to 50 km into ANGOLA at some points." Mr. BOTHA is further quoted as saying, "We are prepared to withdraw from ANGOLA when we are satisfied that ANGOLA won't be used to overrun the OWANBO with undesirable elements (SWAPO) and refugees." Mr. BOTHA insisted that, "SWAPO is not a big problem. It is only a danger in this sense: it is inspired by intervention of a foreign force and arms from communist sources and training in communist countries."

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR OSCINCEUR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA	18. ATTACHMENT PAGE NONE
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR (b)(3):10 USC 424

2. Mr. BOTHA further stated that, "the lack of Western support for SOUTH AFRICA's continued military involvement in ANGOLA had produced broad feelings of disappointment - not only with Washington - with responsible institutions of the free world - that they don't stand up against RUSSIAN militarism." "Your executive branch said openly it was supporting FNLA and UNITA. Only after the Senate made its fateful decision to stop financing arms for anti-MPLA forces then things went wrong," he said.

OK

3. According to this article, Mr. BOTHA "was cagey" about how wrong things went. He said, "At first, SOUTH AFRICAN troops had so much success we were in further than we wanted. Some units stretched several hundred km into ANGOLA."

OK

4. The article stated the RUSSIAN backed MPLA and their CUBAN allies countered with what BOTHA said were "superior weapons", notably the 122 mm rocket launcher. BOTHA said, "we were not routed as some of your papers said, but the SOUTH AFRICANS pulled back along the border."

OK

5. The following question was put to Mr. BOTHA: "With the growing prospect of Black majority rule in Rhodesia, SOUTH AFRICA will become the last white bastion in AFRICA. Can it survive in its present form?" He replied: "We are not fighting the continent. We are fighting the intervention."

OK

COMMENT: BOTHA is more open with the foreign press than his own country's press. Very little of the information which was attributed to him directly had ever been published previously in SOUTH AFRICA. This interview is sure to stir the ire of SOUTH AFRICAN newsmen, the public and parliament.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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


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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY  
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EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

SUBJECT: THIS IS IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ ANGOLA (AO)/ NAMIBIA (NA)

2. (U) TITLE: SA ATTACKS SWAPO BASE IN ANGOLA

3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 810318

4. (U) ORIGINATOR: SEE FM LINE

5. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (U) SOURCE: VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE HAS ATTACKED ANOTHER SWAPO BASE IN ANGOLA ON 810317.

8A. (U) DETAILS:

1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE NEWS MEDIA, GENERAL CONSTAND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

VILJOEN, CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE FORCE, ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE ATTACKED A SWAPO BASE IN THE VICINITY OF LUBANGO (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA ON TUESDAY, 17 MAR. IT WAS THE DEEPEST STRIKE INTO COUNTRY SINCE THE ANGOLAN WAR IN 1975.

2. (U) GEN VILJOEN SAID THAT AFTER REPEATED WARNINGS TO ANGOLA BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE ATTACKED THE BASE. HE SAID THESE OPERATIONS, LIKE THIS ONE, ARE ALWAYS CONDUCTED AGAINST CONFIRMED "TERRORIST BASES". HE ADDED THAT THIS ATTACK FOLLOWS MURDERS AND DEEDS OF "TERROR" PERPETRATED AGAINST INNOCENT INHABITANTS OF SWA/NAMIBIA.

3. (U) VILJOEN SAID ALL DEFENSE FORCE ELEMENTS RETURNED SAFELY TO SWA/NAMIBIA.

8B. (U) ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:

1. (U) NO OTHER INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED IN TERMS OF SWAPO OR POSSIBLE ANGOLAN CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE ARE WITHHOLDING THEIR CASUALTY REPORTING TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. (b)(3):10 USC 424 INDICATED THAT THE LAST ACCOUNT OF ANY SA CASUALTIES OCCURRED ON 810205 AND 810208 WHEN TWO SA SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY SWAPO.

2. (U) FOUR CANBERRA BOMBERS RETURNED TO WATERKLOOF AIR BASE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (17 MAR 81). WHILE THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY TIED TO THE RAID, THE CANBERRA'S ARE ONLY FLOWN INFREQUENTLY AND IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THEY COULD OF PROVIDED AIR SUPPORT TO THE LATEST SADF RAID INTO ANGOLA.

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A

10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A

11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO

12. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APPROVED BY:

14. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

15. (U) ENCL: N/A

16. (U) DISTBY ORIGINATOR: N/A

DECL 17 MAR 87

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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HEADER

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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
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RUCLAKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED]

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RUCLHUA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED]

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RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] VAHINGEN GER IMMEDIATE

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
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 COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO);  
 SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SADF ACTIONS (U)  
 WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
 INTEL  
 DOI: (U) 870608  
 REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 .

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ THE SADF IS SPOILING FOR A FIGHT WITH FAPLA  
 IN ANGOLA.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)  
 .

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) (THE SADF) WERE WATCHING THE  
 SITUATION IN ANGOLA VERY CAREFULLY. THEY WANTED FAPLA TO  
 LAUNCH THEIR OFFENSIVE TOWARD JAMBA IN THE SOUTHEAST. (FAPLA)  
 ARE ALMOST READY. (THE SADF) CAN HARDLY WAIT FOR THEM TO MOVE  
 A LITTLE MORE SOUTHEAST WHERE WE CAN SMACK THEM GOOD. (THE  
 SADF) ARE REALLY READY TO SET THEM BACK A BIT. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

COMMENT: 1. ~~(S)~~ WE TAKE THIS AS SERIOUS AND NOT THE  
 BRAVADO OF AN INDIVIDUAL. (b)(1),1.4 (c)



//IPSP: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 //COMSOBJ: (b)(3):10 USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

WARNING: (U) ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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
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RUEHWD / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
RUDOVIA

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EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424  
EZ2:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), NAMIBIA (WA), ANGOLA (AO)  
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 JMC OPERATIONS (U)  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
INTEL  
DOI: (U) 840604  
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (C) DURING THE MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IN ANGOLA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION (JMC) HAS INCREASED AND NEW MEASURES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO MEET THIS NEED. (b)(1),1.4 (C)

THE ANGOLAN (FAPLA) COMPONENT HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO SEND JMC TROOPS INTO AREAS UNDER SADF CONTROL AND ALSO TO RISK CLASHES BETWEEN JMC TROOPS AND GUERRILLAS ANYWHERE WITHIN THE AREA OF DISENGAGEMENT.

TEXT: 1. (C) DURING THE CURRENT SADF-FAPLA DISENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, THE JMC DETERMINED THAT IT NEEDED MORE THAN THE SIX COMPANIES OF INFANTRY ORIGINALLY ALLOTTED TO IT.

8400341155

MSG NO 23 (MIIR) ISG \*05/06/84\* \*22:09\*

THIS FORCE WAS TOO SMALL FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLAS IN THE AREA OF DISENGAGEMENT.

2. (C) TO MEET THIS NEED, THE SADF HAS UNDERTAKEN TO ASSIGN ADDITIONAL SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) TROOPS TO THE JMC. TO CONTINUE IMPLEMENTING THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF TROOP PARITY, FAPLA HAS UNDERTAKEN TO MATCH SAA STRENGTH ON JOINT MONITORING TEAMS BY ATTACHING FAPLA UNITS AS REQUIRED FOR PARTICULAR JMC MISSIONS. THESE ADDITIONAL FAPLA TROOPS WOULD BE RETURNED TO THEIR PARENT ORGANIZATIONS FOLLOWING THE MISSION.

3. (C) IN ADDITION, (b)(1),1.4 (c)

THE FAPLA COMPONENT HAS PROVEN TO BE RELUCTANT TO SEND JOINT MONITORING TEAMS TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS IN THE AREA THAT REMAINED UNDER SADF CONTROL--SOUTH OF THE CURRENT LATITUDE OF THE JMC HQ. WHEN SUCH OCCASIONS ARISE, THE FAPLA TENDENCY HAS BEEN TO DEMUR ON THE BASIS THAT PROBLEMS SOUTH OF THE LINE SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE SADF INDEPENDENTLY.

4. (C) THE (b)(1),1.4(c) ALSO CLAIM THAT THEIR FAPLA COUNTERPARTS HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO RISK DIRECT CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JOINT MONITORING TEAMS AND SWAPO GUERRILLA UNITS--EITHER NORTH OR SOUTH OF THE LINE. THE EFFECT OF THIS FAPLA APPROACH TO JMC OPERATIONS, FOR ABOUT THE PAST TWO MONTHS, HAS BEEN THAT JOINT MONITORING TEAMS ARE USED MAINLY TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS NORTH OF THE LINE THAT INVOLVE RESULTS OF PAST SWAPO ACTIVITY.

COMMENTS: (C) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A

COLL: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE

ENCL: (U) NONE

DISSEM: (U) N/A

DECL: OADR

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
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /  
INFO RUEHTN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /  
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER //  
RUDOVIA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /

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EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)  
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 CUBAN DEPLOYMENTS IN ANGOLA (U)  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
- INTEL  
DOI: (U) 840612  
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ SIX CUBAN REGIMENTS ARE POSTED ALONG THE MOCAMEDES-MENONGUE RAILROAD. THEY ARE ORIENTED TO PREVENT UNITA FROM CONTROLLING THE RAILROAD. ADDITIONAL CUBAN FORCES ARE DEPLOYED WITH RADAR SITES AND AS ADVISORS TO ACCOMPANY FORWARD DEPLOYED BRIGADES. THE FURTHEREST SOUTH THAT CUBANS ARE KNOWN TO BE DEPLOYED ARE VIREI, CAHAMA, AND MULONDO.

TEXT: ~~(S)~~ THE SIX CUBAN REGIMENTS ARE LOCATED AT MOCAMEDES, CHIBEMBA (b)(3):10 USC 424, LUBANGO (b)(3):10 USC 424, DONGO (b)(3):10 USC 424, MENONGUE (b)(3):10 USC 424, AND MATALA (b)(3):10 USC 424. THE CAHAMA RADAR SITE (b)(3):10 USC 424 IS BELIEVED TO AN EARLY WARNING SITE, AND THE MULONDO (b)(3):10 USC 424 RADAR SITE IS BELIEVED TO BE FIRE CONTROL (b)(3):10 USC 424. AN ADDITIONAL CUBAN BATTALION IS LOCATED AT VIREI (b)(3):10 USC 424.

COMMENTS: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A

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MSGNO 16 (MIIR) ISG \*22/06/84\* \*00:28\*  
COLL: (U) NONE  
INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PREP: (U)  
APPR: (U)  
EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE  
DISSEM: (U) N/A  
~~DECL: OADR~~

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T081 261100Z AUG 82

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FM (b)(3)10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCA/OIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3)10 USC 424

8 29 473-522/THE WHITE HOUSE

RUEA11A/CIA WASHDC

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RUFHDL (b)(3)50 USC 4037(f)

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RUEHSA

RUFDAAA/CINCSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER

RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUEHOS (b)(3)50 USC 4037(f)

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RUSNVA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

RUSNDA/USEUCO (b)(3)50 VAIHINGEN GER

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3)10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

SUBJ: (b)(3)10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/SADF  
- VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN CUBAN TROOPS IN

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ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT (U)

(b)(3);10 USC 424;(b)(3);50 USC 403-1(f)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)/NAMIBIA (NA)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3);10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: SADF VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820823-920828
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) (b)(3);10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3);10 USC 424

8. ~~(b)(3);10 USC 424~~ SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A VERY SENIOR SPOKESMAN, THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IS THE "MAIN CONCERN" OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) WITH REGARD TO A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. IF THE CUBANS DO NOT WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA, HE SAID, THE ANGOLAN "CIVIL WAR" PROBLEM COULD NOT BE SOLVED, AND THERE COULD BE NO LASTING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA--REGARDLESS OF WHO COMES TO POWER IN WINDHOUK.

9.A. (U) DETAILS.

- 1. ~~(b)(3);10 USC 424~~ ON 820823, A VERY SENIOR OFFICER OF THE SADF STATED THAT THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IS THE SADF'S "MAIN CONCERN" WITH REGARD TO THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. HE SAID: "THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA, THE CIVIL WAR PROBLEM, MUST BE SOLVED IF THERE IS TO BE A LASTING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA."
- 2. ~~(b)(3);10 USC 424~~ HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS AGREED WITH THE IDEA THAT THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM AND THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED CONCURRENTLY. BUT NOW HE WAS BEGINNING TO FEEL THAT PERHAPS THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED FIRST.

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TOR: 261100Z AUG 82

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
- 3. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ HE SAID HE BELIEVES THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA FEELS THAT IT MUST KEEP THE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA TO HELP CONTROL THE UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA) IN THEIR CURRENT "CIVIL WAR." IF AN MPLA-UNITA SETTLEMENT COULD BE ARRANGED, NO ONE IN ANGOLA WOULD FEEL THE NEED FOR CUBAN TROOPS, AND CONVERSELY, AS LONG AS THE CUBANS ARE ON HAND TO HELP, THE MPLA WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO RETAIN EXCLUSIVE POWER AND NOT BE INCLINED TO COME TO TERMS WITH UNITA POLITICALLY.

- 4. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ BUT HE APPARENTLY ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS--AND THE SOVIET BLOC SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE THEY REPRESENT IN ANGOLA--CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO STABILITY IN NAMIBIA AND ULTIMATELY IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE SAID THAT IF THE CUBANS STAYED IN ANGOLA, AND THE MPLA-UNITA WAR CONTINUED, IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE WHO CAME TO POWER IN SWAPO AS A RESULT OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. IF SWAPO WERE OBTAINED IN NAMIBIA, AND THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM HAD NOT BEEN SOLVED, SWAPO WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING, AND THE SADF WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE IN THE DEFENSE OF NAMIBIA.

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RUEHUL (b)(3):50 USC 4031(i)

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RUEHDS (b)(3):50 USC 4031(i)

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RUEHDA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 VAIHINGEN GER

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SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 5. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ON 26J285, ANOTHER VERY SENIOR SADF OFFICER STATED THAT HE REGARDED THE REMOVAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AS "VITAL" TO A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, IMPLYING THAT THE CUBAN PRESENCE WAS PREVENTING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MPLA-UNITA DISPUTE. HE STATED THAT UNITA LEADER JONAS SAVIMBI WAS PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN A FAIR

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MC 93237

ELECTION AND TO ACCEPT A ROLE IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT  
IN LUANDA--BUT ONLY AFTER THE CUBANS ARE GONE. HE  
CHARACTERIZED THE CUBAN PRESENCE AS "A CANCER" THAT WOULD  
SPREAD INTO AND THROUGH NAMIBIA. AS LONG AS THE CUBANS  
REMAINED IN ANGOLA (AND BY IMPLICATION, THE MPLA IN  
LUANDA), STABILITY IN NAMIBIA AND IN OTHER NEIGHBORING  
COUNTRIES WOULD BE THREATENED.

S.S. (b)(1),(b)(3) 10 USC 424.14(c) 14(d)

- 10. (U) WROJ NO1 N/A
- 11. (U) COLL WGT CODESI N/A
- 12. (U) SPEC INAT1 NONE DIRCI NO
- 13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3) 10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APP BY:
- 15. (U) REV EVAL1 NO REL YOI NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL1 N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY CRIS1 NONE

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MSGNO 49 (MIIR) ZZA \*23/02/76\* \*04118\*  
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RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC  
RUEBAAA/CNO WASH DC  
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R 241515Z FEB 76

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
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INFO RUSNAAA/LSCINCE/R VAHINGEN GER  
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- EZ2:  
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. PORTUGAL
  2. 40,000 CUBANS IN ANGOLA AND A RUSSIAN SUPPLY BASE (U)
  3. NA
  4. 23 FEB 76
  5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 23 FEB 76
  6. B-2
  7. LOCAL PRESS, "DIARIO DE NOTICIAS," (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
  9. 24 FEB 76
  10. NA
  11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
  - 12.
  13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
  - 14.

15. (U) "DIARIO DE NOTICIAS", LISBON DAILY NEWSPAPER, REPORTS THE FOLLOWING FROM THE "SUNDAY TRIBUNE", JOHANNESBURG, S. AFRICA: SHIPS CARRYING FAMILIES OF CUBAN SOLDIERS AND TECHNICIANS ARE ARRIVING IN ANGOLA. THIS INFORMATION SUPPOSEDLY CAME FROM SOUTH AFRICAN AND WESTERN SECRET SERVICES. THE SAME SOURCES SAID THAT EVENTUALLY THE CUBANS MAY MAKE UP A COLONY OF 40,000 PEOPLE. A. (U) ACCORDING TO PROF. MICHAEL LOUW, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA, "THIS HAPPENING OFFERS THE POSSIBILITIES OF GROWING STABILITY IN ANOLLA." LOUW ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION "NOW CONSTITUTES A VERY INTERESTING EVOLUTION OF TRIANGULAR OBLIGATIONS FOR THE U.S.S. R., CUBA AND ANGOLA. I BELIEVE THAT THE LSSR HAS LIMITED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THIS BRILLIANTLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED STRATEGIC OCUP." BESIDES THAT HE ADDED THAT, "THE SOVIET UNION HOPES THAT THE MPLA WILL GIVE IT A BASE, THAT WILL ACT AS A SUPPLY BASE, IN

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MSGNO 49 (MIR) IZA \*25/02/76\* \*04118\*  
LUANDA - IN SOME RESPECTS A MILITARY BASE (GMT, TC SAY THE LEAST)  
FROM WHICH IT WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT A NEW STRATEGY CON-  
CERNING THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC.  
ON THE OTHER HAND THE MPLA WILL HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MAIN-  
TAINING A WELL TRAINED NATIONAL ARMY AND WILL BENEFIT FROM CONSTANT  
SUPPORT IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS OF THE UNITA TROOPS."  
COMMENTS: (C) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 4241,4(c) THAT PRESENT NUMBER OF  
CUBANS IN ANGOLA IS 20,000 (TWENTY THOUSAND) PLUS ABOUT 1,500  
WOMEN. FURTHER STATED WAS THAT THE CUBANS NOW CONTROL ALL VITAL  
POINTS WITHIN LUANDA AND MPLA TERRITORY. (b)(1),(c) BELIEVES THAT  
WITHIN THREE TO SIX MONTHS MPLA BLACKS WILL BEGIN ATTACKING CUBANS  
UNLESS THEY LEAVE ANGOLA. STATES THAT AT LEAST 60 TO 80,000  
CUBAN MILITARY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL ANGOLA.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424


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PAGE 001 *of 005* NC 6767422  
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEJFAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
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RUTA0H/  
RUEHDT/  
RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
RUDDVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1  
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(b)(3):10 USC 424 *of Two*

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SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/  
- NAMIBIA/RECENT ANTI-SWAPD OPERATIONS (U)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO), NAMIBIA (NA)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: RECENT ANTI-SWAPD OPERATIONS
4. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION 810715
5. (U) UNIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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FORM 161404Z JUL 81

(b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. (C) SUMMARY: IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN COMBAT ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS MONTHS. THIS WAS CAUSED BY A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING CERTAIN SHIFTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN TACTICS.

9A. (U) DETAILS:

1. (C) DURING 810701-810715, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES (SADF) OPERATING IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA KILLED 126 AND CAPTURED 26 GUERRILLAS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO). SIX OF THOSE CAPTURED WERE WOUNDED. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THREE SADF MEN WERE KILLED.

2. (C) THE NUMBER OF SWAPO-INITIATED INCIDENTS IN NAMIBIA HAS FALLEN DRAMATICALLY FROM A PEAK OF 117 AND 100 IN APRIL AND MAY RESPECTIVELY TO 65 IN JUNE AND 2 IN JULY (AS OF 810715).

3. (C) DURING 810709-810715, THE SADF CAPTURED ABOUT 100 TONS OF MATERIEL FROM SWAPO BASES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, INCLUDING SOVIET SA-7 MISSILE LAUNCHERS, 122-MM ARTY RCKET-ROUNDS, AND MORTARS. MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ONE SWAPO BASE INCLUDED TWO SOVIET B-10 RECOILLESS GUNS INTACT AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, A SUPPLY OF SOVIET LAND MINES: 18 TAT-1 AND TWO TMA-3 ANTITANK MINES.

4. (C) ALSO DURING 810709-810715, TWO SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE SWAPO NORTHERN FRONT WERE CAPTURED: THE DEPUTY CDR, (FNU) ((KATANGA)); AND THE ARTY CDR, JONNY ((ANGULA)).

5. (C) THESE RECENT SADF SUCCESSSES RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS MONTHS WERE THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING CERTAIN SHIFTS IN SADF TACTICS AND TACTICAL OBJECTIVES:

A. (S//FOUO) DURING 810400 AND 810500, SADF INTEL

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DETECTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE CULMINATION OF A PROCESS OF SWAPO "INTEGRATION" WITH ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAPLA), WHICH HAD BEEN PROCEEDING FOR UP TO 12 MONTHS. FAPLA WAS SHARING SUPPLIES, MOTOR TRANSPORT, SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, AND MILITARY INTEL WITH SWAPO. AND SWAPO BASES HAD BEEN RELOCATED MUCH CLOSER TO FAPLA BASES APPARENTLY TO FACILITATE THIS SHARING AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAPLA AIR DEFENSES. THE EFFECT WAS TO INCREASE SWAPO'S OVERALL CAPABILITIES AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SADF TO MAINTAIN ITS POLICY OF AVOIDING CONTACT WITH FAPLA. IN RESPONSE, THE SADF BEGAN A PROGRAM OF MORE AGGRESSIVE COMBAT PATROLS INTO ANGOLA IN LATE JUNE, AIMED PRIMARILY AT DISRUPTING SWAPO COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE SADF ALSO TRIED TO ENSURE (WITH APPARENT SUCCESS) THAT FAPLA RECEIVED ADEQUATE WARNING OF THESE PATROLS TO ENABLE THEM TO STAY OUT OF THE WAY.

3. ~~(S/NOPOR)~~ THE EFFECT OF THESE SADF OPERATIONS IN LATE JUNE AND EARLY JULY WAS TO BEGIN A REVERSAL OF THE SWAPO/FAPLA "INTEGRATION" PROCESS, TO CREATE SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES IN SWAPO BASES, AND GENERALLY TO SO CONFUSION AMONG SWAPO UNITS. THE LOGISTICAL DIS-

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RUEGFA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c)

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RUEHDT (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c)

PRIORITY

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RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIMINGEN GER PRIORITY

RUDJVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c) WAIMINGEN GER PRIORITY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUPTIONS, COUPLED WITH THE CURRENT DROUGHT IN THE REGION, CAUSED SWAPO TO MOVE SOUTH IN LARGER NUMBERS (AND PERHAPS WITH LESS CAUTION), AIMING TO INFILTRATE NAMIBIA IN SEARCH OF FOOD. THE SAOF THEN BEGAN TO INTERCEPT THE LARGER, SOUTHBOUND SWAPO GROUPS (30 TO 40 MEN EACH) NORTH OF THE BORDER, BEFORE THEY BROKE UP INTO THEIR NORMAL SIZE (5 TO 10) INFILTRATION TEAMS.

C. (C) SUBSEQUENTLY IN JULY, THE SAOF CHANGED ITS PURSUIT TACTICS AGAINST FLEEING, NORTHBOUND SWAPO UNITS. PREVIOUSLY, THE OBJECTIVE OF SAOF PATROLS WAS TO OVERTAKE FLEEING SWAPO UNITS AND ATTACK THEM AS FAR SOUTH AS POSSIBLE. THE NEW TACTIC WAS TO FOLLOW THE NORTHBOUND SWAPO UNITS TO THEIR BASES AND TO ATTACK THE BASES. RESULTS OF THIS CHANGE INCLUDED THE CAPTURE OF MATERIEL AND SENIOR OFFICERS AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 ABOVE.

7B. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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PAGE 002 <sup>5</sup>

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TOR: 161409Z JUL 81

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

- 10. (U) PROJECT N3: NONE
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
- 12. (U) SPECIAL INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO
- 13. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APPROVED BY:
- 15. (U) REG EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~REF 15 JUL 81~~

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
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REEL NUMBER 008292 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0070

MSGNO 3 (MIIR) K01 \*23/07/81\* #12:08:  
ZCZC 17:05:12Z (MI)

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TOR: 231410Z JUL 81

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RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEHSA #4839 2041407  
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R 231403Z JUL 81  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//  
473-88-/CIA WASHDC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEHTN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEHCR  
RUEOFAA  
RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEHDT (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
RUDOVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) VAIHINGEN GER  
BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA  
ANGOLA/POSSIBLE ANC-SWAPO COOPERATION (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

- 1. (U) CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA  
- (WA)/ANGOLA (AO)
- 2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 3. (U) TITLE: POSSIBLE ANC-SWAPO COOPERATION
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810722
- 5. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 6. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
- 7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

SAOF OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN  
ANGOLA HAVE UNCOVERED EVIDENCE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC). (b)(1), (4)(c) APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT ANC GUERRILLAS IN ANGOLA ARE USING SWAPO BASES AND FACILITIES, RECEIVING INSTRUCTION FROM CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, CONDUCTING SOME TRAINING JOINTLY WITH SWAPO, AND RECEIVING SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM THE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA). (b)(1), (4)(c) APPARENTLY HAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANC GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN USED IN SWAPO OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND DOES NOT SEEM OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL.

P.A. (U) DETAILS: NONE

P.B. (U) ORIG CMTS: (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)



- 10. (U) PROJECT NO: NONE
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODE: N/A
- 12. (U) SPECIAL INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO
- 13. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APPROVED BY:
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~DECLASS ON: 23 JUL 1997~~

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INQUIRE=DOC6D  
ITEM NO=00797626

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C 07404RUEKJCS 4757 281423ZMCR 87-6296295

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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCLAKA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUCLHUA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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RHDLCNE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 2753-1(a) //

RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 2753-1(a) VAIHINGEN GER//

RUEHOR/ (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEHRU/ (f)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0102

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03

(b)(3)10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3)10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO);

SUBJ: UPDATE ON THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY

EVALUATED INTEL

DOI: (U) 870924

REQS: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (e) THREE SENIOR SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) OFFICERS PRESENTED A BRIEFING TO THE FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE. THE OFFENSIVE HAS MADE VERY LITTLE FORWARD PROGRESS AND HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN FOR THE LAST TEN DAYS BECAUSE OF LACK OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

TEXT: 1. (e) THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. LUCUSSE FRONT (3RD MILITARY REGION): FAPLA HAS 5 BRIGADES COMMITTED TO THIS FRONT, THE 3RD, 39TH, 43RD, 45TH, AND 54TH, SUPPORTED BY 6 MIG 21'S AND 4 MI 17'S STAGING OUT OF OF LUENA //GEO COORDS: 1200S/1990E//. FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE FROM THE NORTH TOWARD MAVINGA //GEO COORDS: 1590S/2010E// IS GENERALLY ALONG A LINE RUNNING FROM CANGOMBE //GEO COORDS: 1450S/1990E// TO GAGO COUTINHO //GEO COORDS: 1410S/2140E//. FIGHTING HAS BEEN VERY LIGHT ON THIS FRONT, HOWEVER, LITTLE FORWARD PROGRESS IS BEING MADE AND IT APPEARS VERY UNLIKELY THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ADVANCE MUCH FARTHER SOUTH TOWARD MAVINGA BEFORE THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON.

B. CUITO-CUANAVALÉ FRONT (6TH MILITARY REGION): FAPLA HAS 8 BRIGADES COMMITTED ON THIS FRONT, THE 16TH, 21ST, 47TH, AND 59TH, WHICH ARE LEADING THE OFFENSIVE, AND THE 18TH, 13TH, 25TH, AND 66TH IN SUPPORT. AIR SUPPORT ON THIS FRONT IS 29 MIG 21'S AND 10 MI-25'S, ALL STAGING OUT OF MENOGUE AIR BASE //GEO COORDS: 1520S/2010E// THE LEADING BRIGADES HAVE ADVANCED AS FAR AS CUNJAMBA //GEO COORDS: 1520S/2010E// WITH THE 59TH ON THE NORTH OF THE LOMBA RIVER //GEO COORDS: 1530S/2015E// AND THE 47TH ON THE SOUTH OF THE LOMBA. THE 21ST HAS BEEN TRYING (UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO CROSS THE LOMBA AND THE 16TH IS DUG IN NEAR CUJAMBA. THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING HAS TAKEN PLACE ON THIS FRONT AND SINCE 14 AUGUST FAPLA FORCES HAVE LOST 628 KIA, 530 WIA, AND 20 POW'S (CUBAN LOSSES REPORTEDLY HAVE

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PAGE:0103

BEEN 6 KIA AND 4WIA). DURING THE SAME PERIOD FAPLA MATERIEL LOSSES HAVE AMOUNTED TO 10 TANKS, 8 BTR-60'S, 2 BM-21'S, 65 LOGISTICAL VEHICLES, AND 1 SA-13 DESTROYED.

C. THE OFFENSIVE ON BOTH FRONTS HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN FOR THE PAST 10 DAYS BECAUSE OF SEVERE SUPPLY SHORTAGES--SOME UNITS ARE REPORTEDLY COMPLETELY OUT OF RATIONS AND MOST OTHER EXPENDABLE MATERIAL. THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO CENTER AROUND POOR TIMING OF THE OFFENSIVE--BEGUN TOO LATE IN THE DRY SEASON TO ACHIEVE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES BEFORE THE RAINS BEGIN--AND INCREDIBLY BAD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FORCES. REPORTEDLY, ONLY 5 REGULAR UNITA BATTALIONS ARE OPPOSING FAPLA FORCES.

2. ~~(S)~~ MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CURRENT FAPLA OFFENSIVE AND OPERATION 2D CONGRESS (THE 1985 OFFENSIVE) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

--STRONG POINTS:

A. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVE, FAPLA STOCKPILED SUPPLIES TO THE EAST OF THE CUITO RIVER AND THIS EFFORT PAID OFF INITIALLY BY PERMITTING MUCH BETTER RESUPPLY OF THE FORWARD BRIGADES.

B. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN TRAINING OF FAPLA FORCES, PARTICULARLY SPECIAL ACTION TROOPS SUCH AS COUNTER INSURGENCY AND COMMANDO FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN AUGMENTING FORWARD FAPLA BRIGADES.

C. UPGRADED MOBILE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND MORE EFFECTIVE ADMIN

END OF MESSAGE

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ITEM NO=00798113

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
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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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RUSMNOA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GER (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUFGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) WAIHINGEN GER//

RUEHOR (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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PAGE:0097

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO);

SUBJ: UPDATE ON THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA (U)  
INTEGRATION OF THESE ELEMENTS INTO THE OVERALL TACTICAL  
SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WITH THE BRIGADES  
ARE THE SA-7,-8,-9,-13,-14, AND -16'S AS WELL AS HAND-HELD  
ANTI-AIR MISSILES.

D. UPGRADED AND MORE EFFECTIVE BRIDGING EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN  
USED BY FAPLA THIS YEAR. OF SPECIAL NOTE IS THE USE OF  
ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCH BRIDGES (AVLBS) TO SPAN SEVERAL OF  
THE LARGELY DRY RIVERS WITH EMBANKMENTS TOO STEEP FOR  
VEHICLES TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT BRIDGING.

E. OVERALL, THERE APPEARED TO BE MUCH BETTER PLANNING FOR  
THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVE.

F. THERE ARE SOME 4 TO 7 SOVIET AND THE SAME NUMBER OF  
CUBAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS WITH EACH FAPLA BRIGADE;  
PRIMARILY WITH AIR DEFENSE, ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERING  
ELEMENTS. CUBAN PILOTS ARE FLYING MIG'S AND HELOS IN  
SUPPORT OF THE FORWARD FAPLA BRIGADES AND SOVIET PILOTS  
ARE FLYING RESUPPLY AND TROOP TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELOS  
IN FAPLA REAR AREAS.

--WEAK POINTS:

A. FAPLA HAS BOTH 121MM HOWITZERS AND BM-21'S SUPPORTING  
THE OFFENSIVE BUT, BECAUSE OF VERY POOR TARGETING, IT HAS  
BEEN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE.

B. ALTHOUGH LOGISTICAL PLANNING HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY  
IMPROVED FOR THIS OFFENSIVE, THE TIMING OF RESUPPLY IS  
STILL EXTREMELY POOR AND THIS HAS RESULTED IN LACK OF FOOD  
AND AMMUNITION TO THE LEADING BRIGADES. THE RESULT IS A  
BOGGED DOWN OFFENSIVE.

C. FAPLA HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY OPERATIONS IN UNITA'S REAR  
AREAS, THEREBY PERMITTING UNITA COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION  
IN RESUPPLY, TROOP MOVEMENT, ETC.

D. FAPLA DOES NOT HAVE ANY EFFECTIVE AIR-GROUND LIAISON  
RESULTING IN SEVERAL FRIENDLY TROOP STRIKES BY THEIR OWN  
AIRCRAFT AND VERY INEFFECTIVE CLOSE COMBAT SUPPORT FOR  
THEIR TROOPS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E. EFFECTIVE UNITA ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AND FEAR OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIRFORCE INTERVENTION HAS FORCED FAPLA AIR FORCES TO BE MORE DEFENSIVE AND CAUTIOUS. FAPLA MAKES ONLY HIGH-ALTITUDE ATTACKS WHICH ARE LARGLY INEFFECTIVE AND HELICOPTER OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN REAR AREAS, HAVE VIRTUALLY STOPPED.


3. (C) SADF ASSESSMENT IS THAT FAPLA FORCES IN THE 3RD MILITARY REGION WILL NOT TAKE THEIR ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES. IN THE 6TH MILITARY REGION, THE LEADING BRIGADES MAY BE SUCCESSFUL IN CROSSING THE LOMBA RIVER BUT THIS WILL BE THE EXTENT OF THEIR FORWARD MOVEMENT. THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED IN TAKING--OR EVEN SERIOUSLY THREATENING--THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MAVINGA.

4. (C) FAPLA AIRCRAFT AND HELO INVENTORY IS AS FOLLOWS:

MIG 21 - 44	MI-8	- 42
MIG 23 - 51	MI-17	- 38
SU-22 - 17	MI-25/35	- 25
IL-76 - 3	MI-28	- 14
AN-12 - 14	GAZELLOS	- 11
AN-26 - 24	ALOUTTE III	- 22

COMMENTS: 1. (C)

(b)(1)(b)(3) NO USC 424.14 (c) 1.4 (d)



ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 (b)(3)10 USC 424

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
BODY

PASS: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO);

SUBJ: UPDATE ON THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA (U)  
PREPARED WITH CONTIGENCY PLANNING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED  
FORCES TO INTERVENE IN SUPPORT OF UNITA IF UNITA RUNS INTO  
TROUBLE CONTAINING THE OFFENSIVE.

(b)(1),1.4,(b)(1),4 (d)



//IPSP: (b)(3)10 USC 424

//COMSOBJ (b)(3)10 USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) NONE (b)(3)10 USC 424

PREP: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424

APPR: (U) (b)(3)10 USC 424


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INFO RUEHTT / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /

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EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONFIDENTIAL

EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / FAPLA'S EFFORTS TO ENGAGE UNITA

- (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVAL-  
UATED INTEL

DOI: (U) 850904

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) (b)(1)

"CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS" IN ANGOLA.

TEXT: 1. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 THREE AREAS WHERE FAPLA  
FORCES WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED WITH UNITA

2. (U) IN THE AREA SOUTH OF LUBANGO (b)(3):10 USC 424 FAPLA  
HAS DEPLOYED 6 BATTALION IN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL UNITA'S  
ACTIVITIES.

3. (U) FOUR BRIGADES, SUPPORTED BY CUBAN ARMOR ARE ATTEM-

MSGNO 23 (MIIR) ISG \*06/09/85\* \*01:04\*  
PTING TO ENGAGE UNITA FORCES BETWEEN LUACANO (b)(3):10 USC 424  
AND CAZOMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1),1.4 (c) THIS WAS THE  
FIRST TIME CUBAN ARMOR WAS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF A FAPLA  
OFFENSIVE.

4. (b)(1),1.4 (c) 5 BRIGADES WERE MOVING IN  
A TWO PRONGED ATTACK FROM CUIE CUANAVAL (b)(3):10 USC 424 TO  
MAVINGA (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(1),1.4 (c) MAVINGA HAD  
(b)(1),1.4 (c) SUSTAINED AIR ATTACKS BY MIG-21S OR POSSIBLY SU-22.  
(c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) FEELS THAT IF MIG-21S WERE USED THAT THEY WERE PROB-  
ABLY FLOWN BY ANGOLANS. HOWEVER, IF SU-22S WERE EMPLOYED  
(b)(1),1.4 (c) FEELS THE PILOTS WERE MOST LIKELY CUBANS.
5. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ACCORDING TO (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE FACILITIES AT MENONGUE  
AIRFIELD (b)(3):10 USC 424 WERE UNDERGOING CONSIDERABLE  
EXPANSION. (b)(1),1.4 (c) FEELS THAT IT IS MOST PROBABLE THAT  
SV-22 AIRCRAFT WILL BE BASED AT MENONGUE WITH THE EXPRESS  
PURPOSE OF STRIKING AT UNITA HEADQUARTERS AT JAMBA. AL-  
THOUGH FACILITIES AT JAMBA ARE QUITE DISPERSED AND DO NOT  
MAKE AN EASY TARGET, (b)(1),1.4 (c) FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE MORE OF  
A PROPAGANDA TARGET THAN ONE HAVING REAL MILITARY VALUE.
6. (b)(1),1.4 (c) SOVIET ADVISORS WERE OPERATING  
DOWN TO BRIGADE LEVEL AND THAT ALL OPERATIONS WERE PLANNED  
BY SOVIET ADVISORS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) PUT NO CREDITIBILITY IN REPORTS  
OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS OPERATING IN EASTERN ANGOLA.  
(b)(1),1.4 (c) FELT THAT IF THERE WERE SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN  
ANGOLA THEY WOULD BE PROTECTING LUANDA IN LIGHT THE UPCOM-  
ING NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE.
7. (b)(1),1.4 (c) WITH REGARD TO LUANDA (b)(1),1.4 (c) MAJOR  
BUILDINGS IN LUANDA WERE BEING EQUIPPED WITH POWER GENERA-  
TORS DUE TO UNITA'S CAPABILITY TO INTERRUPT POWER SUPPLIES.  
(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) NONE  
COLL: (U) NONE  
INSTR: (U) NONE  
PREP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
APPR: (U)  
EVAL: (U) YES REL TO: NONE  
ENCL: (U) NONE  
DISSEM: (U) NONE  
~~DECL: OADR~~  
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
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ZCZC 12:08:44Z (MIIR)

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 RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY  
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 RHFRAAE  
 RUEQFAA  
 RUEHDT  
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 RUOOVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
 RUEHRO (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) PRIORITY

BT

EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

EZ2:

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/  
 ANGOLA/USSR/CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 5 (U)



- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
- (U) CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (WA)/ANGOLA (A01)/USSR (UR)
  - (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424



3. (U) TITLE: CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 5  
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810829  
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE  
6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~SECRET~~ SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) FORCES ENCOUNTERED RELATIVELY HEAVY RESISTANCE BY REGROUPED ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT (FAPLA) UNITS AT NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424 BEFORE THE POSITION WAS FINALLY SECURED LATE ON 810827. SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) NORTHWESTERN FRONT HQ WERE KILLED OR CAPTURED IN THE FIGHTING. APPARENTLY ONE OF THOSE KILLED WAS THE FRONT'S CHIEF OF INTEL. MOST OF THE SADF FORCES ARE NOW AT MUPA (b)(3):10 USC 424 WHICH WAS TO BE THE NORTHERNMOST PENETRATION BY GROUND UNITS IN THE ORIGINAL BATTLE PLAN. WITHDRAWAL TO NAMIBIA WILL BEGIN TODAY (810829) AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS AND MORE FIGHTING. SADF GROUND UNITS INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION CONSIST OF TWO TASK FORCES, EACH WITH THREE BATTALIONS, A TOTAL OF BETWEEN 4,000 AND 5,000 TROOPS. SADF HQ STATES THAT 10 SADF MEN HAD BEEN KIA BY NIGHTFALL ON 810828 AND ESTIMATES SWAPO KIA TO HAVE BEEN QUOTE IN THE HUNDREDS UNQUOTE. NO ESTIMATE OF FAPLA CASUALTIES IS AVAILABLE AS YET. (b)(1),1.4 (c) HAS LOST ONE ALLOUTTE HELO TO AAA FIRE, WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS GENERALLY HEAVY. NO CUBAN PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED. THE SWAPO CONVENTIONAL BRIGADE HAD BEEN MOVED TO CAHAMA (SSE OF CHIBEMBA (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE  
9B. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

10. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: NONE  
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODE: NONE  
12. (U) SPECIAL INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO  
13. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
14. (U)  
15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE  
16. (U) ENCL: NONE  
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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(b)(3):10 USC 424



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PAGE 001 of 005  
TOR: 141745Z SEP 81

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O 141638Z SEP 81

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(7):10 USC 424

INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHTN (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)  
RUCIAEA  
RUCIPBA  
RUEHMOA  
RUEBARA  
RUEDAJU  
RUCDGOA  
RHFRAAE  
RUEOFAA  
RUEHOTA

RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
RUDDVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
JT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: 14 (b)(3):10 USC 424 /REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/  
ANGOLA/USSR/OPERATION PROTEA RESULTS (U)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA  
(\*\*)/ANGOLA (AO)/USSR (UR)
2. (U) IR NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 002

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TOR: 141745Z SEP 81

3. (U) TITLE: OPERATION PROTEA RESULTS  
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810913-810914  
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE  
6. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(G)

8. (U) SUMMARY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) HAS EVIDENCE OF 21 SOVIETS PRESENT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN LATE AUGUST AND BELIEVES IT HAS PROVED THE INVOLVEMENT OF AT LEAST SOME OF THEM IN LOW LEVEL MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE ORGANIZATION (SWAPO). DURING 810824-810904, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) CAPTURED ABOUT 2,400 TONS OF MILITARY MATERIAL IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND DESTROYED ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT IN PLACE THERE. CAPTURED ARMORED VEHICLES DISPLAYED AT OSHAKATI (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC NAMIBIA, INCLUDED NINE T-34 TANKS AND FOUR PT-76 TANKS. THE SADF SUSTAINED TEN MEN KILLED IN ACTION DURING THIS OPERATION, NAMED OPERATION PROTEA, AND ESTIMATES THAT SWAPO AND THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES LOST ABOUT 1,000 KIA.

9A. (U) DETAILS:

1. (U) IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR SOVIETS KILLED AND ONE CAPTURED ON 810827, THE SADF HAS PRESENTED OCCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF 17 OTHER SOVIETS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AT THE TIME. THEY INCLUDED AT LEAST 12 OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS ADVISORS TO FAPLA, AND THE SAA CHIEF AND HIS STAFF BELIEVE THEY HAVE PROVED THAT MANY OF THESE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE WORKING WITH SWAPO ALSO AND WERE INVOLVED IN SWAPO MILITARY OPERATIONS AT COMPANY LEVEL OR BELOW. THE SAA EVIDENCE OF THIS INCLUDES A PHOTO OF SOVIETS WORKING WITH SWAPO/FAPLA OPERATIONS MAP AND WHAT PURPORTS TO BE THE MAP ITSELF.
2. (U) DURING OPERATION PROTEA IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, 810824-810904, THE SADF CAPTURED ABOUT 400 TONS OF AMMUNITION, 487 TONS OF WEAPONS, 1,194 TONS OF SOFTSKIN VEHICLES, 20 TONS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, AND OVER 374 TONS

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OF ARMORED VEHICLES. CAPTURED WEAPONRY INCLUDED 2 BM-21 MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS; 26 ZIS-3 76MM FIELD GUNS; 16 ZU-23 TWIN AAA GUNS; 20 M-55 TRIPLE 20-MM AAA GUNS; AND 110 SA-7 GRAIL SAM'S. ARMORED VEHICLES INCLUDED 9 T-34/85-MM MEDIUM TANKS; 4 PT-76 LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS TANKS; AND 4 BRDM-2 AMPHIBIOUS SCOUT CARS. ALL OF THIS MATERIEL WAS DISPLAYED AT THE SADF SECTOR 10 HQ AT OSHAKATI ON 010914.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TONNAGES OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER MATERIEL WERE DESTROYED IN PLACE DURING THE OPERATION. ROUGHLY HALF OF THE MATERIEL WAS FOUND AT XANGONGO (1634S/01501E) AND THE OTHER HALF AT NGIVA (1703S/01547E). A CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE CAPTURED MATERIEL DISPLAYED AT OSHAKATI IS R39.27 MILLION. THIS ESTIMATE IS REGARDED AS CONSERVATIVE BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THE AGE OF CERTAIN ITEMS, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE A VALUE OF R50,000 FOR THE MEDIUM TANK.

4. ~~(S)~~ THE SADF SUSTAINED 10 MEN KIA DURING THE OPERATION, AND THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT ABOUT 1,000 MEN OF SWAPO AND FAPLA WERE KIA. ACCURATE BODY COUNTS WERE NOT RECORDED, BUT THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT SWAPO AND FAPLA EACH LOST ABOUT 500 KIA.

END OF MESSAGE


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04/38/ SECTION MESSAGE

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PAGE 001-4

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TOR: 141715Z SEP 81

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FM (b)(3)10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3)10 USC 424

INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHTN/ (b)(3)10 USC 424 (b)(3)50 USC 4031(d)

RUCIAEA

RUCIPBA

RUEHMO

RUESARA

RUEOAJD

RUCDGO

RHFRAAE

RUEOFAA

RUEHDT

RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY


RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY

RUDDVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3)50 USC 4031(d) VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3)10 USC 424

9d. (b)(1)(b)(3)10 USC 4241(c)1.4(d)



10. (U) PROJECT NO: N/A

11. (U) CULL MGMT CODE: (b)(3)10 USC 424

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PAGE 0025

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TOR: 141715Z SEP 81

12. (U) SPECIAL INSTS: N/A DIRC: NO

13. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3)(1) USC 424

14. (U) APPROVED BY:

15. (U) REQ EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE

16. (U) ENCL: N/A

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~REF: 15 SEP 81~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

MSGNO 18 (MIIR) ISG \*03/10/85\* \*00:18\*  
ZCZC 05:16:07Z (MI)

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TOR: 021431Z OCT 85

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DE RUEKJCS #4267 2751428  
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~  
R 021428Z OCT 85  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO UEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):50 /  
RUCLHUA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEALGX/SAFE

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):10 USC 424 /

INFO RUEHMY (b)(3):10 USC 424

RHDLCNE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) /

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EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMPLET 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONFIDENTIAL

EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO), SOVIET UNION

- (U) CUBA (CU)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLAN UPDATE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FIN ALLY EVALUATED  
INTEL

DOI: (U) 850930

REGS (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (c) (b)(1),1.4(c) BELIEVES BOTH FAPLA OFFENSIVES HAVE  
GENERALLY RUN THEIR COURSE. THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON,  
A SHORTAGE OF LOGISTICS, AND UNITA RESISTANCE CONTRIBUTED  
TO SLOW THE OFFENSIVES. THE OPERATION NEAR MAVINGA (b)(3):10 USC 424  
(b)(3):10 USC 424 COULD STILL HAVE SOME LIFE. THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WILL  
TELL THE SOVIET AND CUBAN HAND WAS EVIDENTLY ON THE TILLER.

TEXT: 1. (c) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) THE CURRENT SITUATION  
IN ANGOLA. (b)(3):10 USC 424 FAPLA HAS LOST THE FOLLOWING

8500933782

MSGNO 18 (MIIR) ISG \*03/10/85\* \*00:18\*  
AIRCRAFT SINCE 1 AUG 85:

- 7 EACH MI-25
- 2 EACH MI-17
- 3 EACH MI-8
- 3 EACH MIG-21
- 2 EACH MIG-23

THEY CREDIT THE LOSS TO SEVERAL FACTORS. I.E. GROUND FIRE, SA-7, MORTAR FIRE WHILE MIG-25'S WERE ON THE GROUND, AND SIMPLY RUNNING OUT OF GAS. THEY CLAIM CUBANS AND RUSSIANS ARE FLYING THE MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT. WITH THE CUBANS IN THE MIG-21S AND MI-25S WITH RUSSIANS IN THE MIG-23S.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF CAZOMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424 FAPLA HAS EMPLOYED FOUR INFANTRY BRIGADES, 14TH, 21ST, 67TH, AND 63RD. THEY CAPTURED CAZOMBO ON 19 SEPTEMBER. THE UNITS ARE STILL IN THE AREA WITH THE 63RD MOVING TOWARD LUCUSSE IN THE WEST. FAPLA EMPLOYED 6 EA TANKS, 2 EA BEING T-62'S. THERE WERE THREE SOVIET ADVISORS PER BRIGADE WITH CUBAN CREWS IN THE TANKS. THE RAINY SEASON HAS ALREADY BEGUN IN THIS AREA. FAPLA MAY TRY TO HOLD CAZOMBO THROUGH THE RAINY SEASON. IF THEY TRY, (b)(1),1.4 (c) SEES IT AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNITA TO PICK THEM OFF AND STRANGLE THEIR LOGISTICS.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE OPERATION ON THE VICINITY OF MAVINGA. THERE ARE ALSO 4 FAPLA BRIGADES INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION. THIS IS THE MAIN ATTACK. THE BRIGADES ARE 8TH, 13TH, 7TH, AND 25TH. THE 8TH AND 13TH WENT ON ONE AXIS FROM QUITO CANAVALLE AND THE 7TH AND 25TH ON ANOTHER. THE DECISIVE BATTLE TOOK PLACE ON THE LOMBA RIVER. UNITA PUT UP A DETERMINED RESISTANCE AND HAS STOPPED THE ADVANCE JUST NORTH OF MAVINGA. THE 82ND BRIGADE HAS BEEN ORDERED INTO THE AREA FROM THE NORTH AS WELL AS 2 EA SWAPO BATTALIONS GOING TO MENONGUE. (b)(1),1.4 (c) BELIEVES THEY WILL TRY FOR MAVINGA BEFORE THE RAINS COME IN MID-OCTOBER. IF THEY CAN TAKE MAVINGA, THEY MAY TRY FOR JAMBA. (b)(1),1.4 (c) DOUBTS THEIR SUCCESS. THIS AS WELL AS THE OTHER OPERATION ARE EXPERIENCING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) SAYS THEY HAVE INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE TO BURN THEIR VEHICLES RATHER THAN ALLOW THEM TO FALL INTO UNITA HANDS. THERE ARE THREE SOVIET ADVISORS PER BRIGADE SUPPORTED BY AIR. AN AN-30 AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS ALLEGEDLY USED TO RECON UNITA POSITION AS WELL AS DEEPER RECON TOWARDS JAMBA.

4. ~~(C)~~ THE FAPLA BRIGADE IS ABOUT EQUAL TO A U.S. BATTALION. THE STRENGTH OF THESE BRIGADES IS FROM 800 TO 1200 MEN.

5. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) ADMITTED THEY HAD MEDICS IN OTHER LOCATIONS SUPPORTING UNITA. THEY REFUSED TO COMMENT ON ANY AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED OR TROOPS DEPLOYED.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

END OF MESSAGE

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\*\*\*<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>\*\*\*  
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424


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MSGNO 18 (MIIR) ISG \*03/10/85\* \*00:18\*  
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO), SOVIET UNION  
          - (UR) CUBA (CU)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLAN UPDATE (U)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)




PROJ: (U) NONE  
COLL: (U) NONE  
INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PREP: (U)  
APPR: (U)  
EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE  
ENCL (U) NONE  
DISSEM: (U) NONE  
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END OF MESSAGE  
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MSGNO 13 IMIIRI ISG \*06/12/82\* \*10:51\*  
ZCZC 15:47:23Z IMI

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):10 USC 424

8,19 473-522/THE WHITE HOUSE

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEHOR

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RUEHSB

RUFDA

RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL

RUEHOS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

RUEHLD

RUEHLS

RHDLCNE

RUEHCR

RUEHOT

RUFHFR

RHFRAAB

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RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

RUSNNOA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) VAIHINGEN GER

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EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA/SOVIET BLOC PRESENCE IN ANGOLA (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: ANGOLA (AQ)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: SOVIET BLOC PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 821203
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE:

8. ~~(c)~~ SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

8201941326

MSGNO 13 (MLIR) ISG \*06/12/82\* \*10:51\*

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THERE ARE MORE THAN 26,000 MILITARY AND 8,500 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FROM SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES STATIONED IN ANGOLA.

9A. (U) DETAILS:

1. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) ESTIMATES ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL NOW STATIONED IN ANGOLA:

- USSR: 750 MILITARY AND 250 CIVILIAN
- EAST GERMANY: 1,000 MILITARY AND 1,800 CIVILIANS
- CUBA: 25,000 MILITARY AND 6,500 CIVILIANS
- OTHER: ABOUT 1,000 TOTAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY

2. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT EAST GERMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL (IN ADDITION TO THE CUBANS) ARE NOW FLYING MIG-21 AIRCRAFT ON OPERATIONAL MISSIONS.

9B. ~~(C)~~ ORIG CMTS: (b)(1),1.4 (c) ESTIMATES AND OPINIONS ARE PROBABLY GENUINE, POSSIBLY ACCURATE, AND COULD INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES.

- 10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
- 12. (U) SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO
- 13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APP BY:
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: NONE

~~DECL: OADR~~

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PAGE 002  
TOR: 060700Z JUL 78

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COUNTRY NATIONAL ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

1. ~~(S)~~ THE USSR AND CUBA, AS WELL AS OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS EAST GERMANY, PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID IN FORMS WHICH MAKE THE EXTENT OF THIS AID DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY. THESE COUNTRIES ARE PROVIDING TECHNICIANS AND ADVISORS TO ANGOLAN AGRICULTURE, MINING AND INDUSTRY, AS WELL AS EQUIPMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS, FOODSTUFFS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

2. ~~(S)~~ A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS ON TRADE, ECONOMIC AID AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN ANGOLA AND THE USSR, THE DDR, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY AND BULGARIA. ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1977 A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION FOR 20 YEARS WAS ENTERED INTO WITH THE USSR. ANGOLA ALSO AGREED TO SETTLE HER WAR DEBTS TO THE USSR OVER A PERIOD OF 10 YEARS BY WAY OF THE DELIVERY OF RAW MATERIALS, WHILE THE USSR IS TO BUY PRODUCTS SUCH AS COFFEE FROM ANGOLA, AT PRICES FAR BELOW THOSE CURRENT ON FREE MARKETS. ROYALTIES PAID BY THE USSR IN RESPECT OF ITS EXPLOITATION OF THE FISHING INDUSTRY, AND BY THE DDR IN RESPECT OF THE MINING INDUSTRY, ARE BEING CALCULATED AT EXCEPTIONALLY LOW RATES.

3. ~~(S)~~ IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE NOW APPROXIMATELY 6000 CUBAN CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA. THESE INCLUDE ADVISORS, EXPERTS, TEACHERS, FARMERS AND COMPANY MANAGERS. SEVERAL CUBAN FARMING FAMILIES HAVE BEEN SETTLED IN THE GABELA/QUIBALA REGION, WHILE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF NATIONALIZED UNDERTAKINGS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SUGAR AND COFFEE INDUSTRIES, ARE BEING MANAGED AND CONTROLLED BY CUBANS. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED THAT CUBAN SETTLERS IN THE COUNTRY BE GRANTED ANGOLAN CITIZENSHIP, AND HAS UNDERTAKEN TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA TO 10,000. CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THESE CUBAN CIVILIANS, PROBABLY PRECLUDES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY CUBAN TROOPS WHILE THE UNSETTLED PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY PREVAILS.

4. ~~(S)~~ THE MPLA ARMED FORCES OF APPROXIMATELY 55,000 MEN NOW INCLUDE ABOUT 13,500 CUBANS, AND ABOUT 1,000 SOVIET, EAST GERMAN, BULGARIAN, YUGOSLAVIAN AND ROMANIAN PERSONNEL. SOVIET, CUBAN AND EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL ARE ALSO ASSISTING IN THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, AND ESPECIALLY EAST GERMANS FILL MOST OF THE SENIOR POSITIONS IN THIS ORGANIZATION.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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TOR: 060700Z JUL 78

NC 0945160

5. ~~(S) (REF ID: A66717)~~ THE USSR ASSISTS ANGOLA IN SEVERAL RESPECTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PERSONNEL. OF THE ESTIMATED 450 SOVIET PERSONNEL AT PRESENT IN ANGOLA, MORE THAN HALF ARE INVOLVED WITH MILITARY AFFAIRS. THEY CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATE INTERNAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE, WHICH THEY DOMINATE. THE USSR ALSO PROVIDES FLIGHT TRAINING AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR THE AIR FORCE. SOVIET PILOTS ARE KNOWN TO FLY THE HEAVIER TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE AIR DEFENSE OF LUANDA IS MANNED BY THE SOVIETS, AND CERTAIN SENIOR POSITIONS IN NAVAL VESSELS ARE FILLED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.

~~END OF MESSAGE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

ACTION: NONE INFO: UDPI-I, ODPS-S, RF, FILE, (2/W)

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PAGE 0014  
TUR: 060700Z JUL 78MC 0945161  
5/60

PP RUEAIIIE  
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P 060657Z JUL 78  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEANCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CCO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADAD/LSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIIF/C I A  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEIIAH/NSA WASH DC  
P 051430Z JUL 78  
FM (b)(3)10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSKAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
BT

~~SECRET~~ TRANSFER SECTION 2 OF 2 0313 JULY 78

B. ARMAMENTS. THE BULK OF THE ARMAMENTS IN ANGOLA IS FROM THE USSR. SINCE JULY 1977 THEY HAVE PROVIDED ANGOLA WITH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WORTH BETWEEN AN ESTIMATED \$50 AND \$100 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES ARTILLERY PIECES, SMALLBORE WEAPONS AND VEHICLES. SINCE MAY 1977 APPROXIMATELY 1,200 SOVIET MILITARY COOKIES HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO ANGOLA. SINCE SEPTEMBER 1977 THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO DONATED A ZHUK PATROL CRAFT, A SHERSHEN TORPEDO BOAT AND A POLNUCHY LANDING CRAFT TO THE ANGOLAN NAVY.

C. TRAINING. SOVIET INSTRUCTORS PROVIDE TRAINING TO AIR FORCE PILOTS, TO THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, AND TO THE ANGOLAN POLICE CORPS. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT RECRUITS FOR THE NAVY ARE ALSO BEING TRAINED BY THE SOVIETS.

D. MERCHANT NAVY. SOVIET UNION HAS SINCE MARCH 1978 DONATED THE FOLLOWING MERCHANT VESSELS TO ANGOLA:

1. VLADIMIR ILICH, 5,600 TONS
2. KARL MARX, 8,000 TONS
3. FRIEDERICH ENGELS, PROBABLY 8,000 TONS
4. SIX FISHING VESSELS.

6. ~~(S/N 001)~~ THE APPROXIMATELY 13,500 CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA ARE DEPLOYED ON ALL MILITARY FRONTS AND ARE ACTIVELY TAKING PART

~~SECRET~~

NON-AGENCY

78 0945101

PAGE 002 5  
TOR: 060700Z JUL 78

NC 0945101  
5160

IN OPERATIONS. (NO COMMENT: U.S. FIGURES GENERALLY HOLD THE  
CUBAN STRENGTH TO BE 19,000 TO 20,000). THEY ARE FURTHERMORE  
EMPLOYED AS GROUND PERSONNEL IN THE AIR FORCE AND SUSPECTEDLY  
AS PILOTS OF MIG AIRCRAFTS AND HELICOPTERS. CUBAN ALSO HOLD  
SEVERAL POSITIONS ON ANGOLAN SHIPS, AND VIRTUALLY ALL TRAINING  
OF ARMY PERSONNEL IS CONDUCTED BY CUBANS. THEY ARE INVOLVED  
IN THE TRAINING OF AIR FORCE PILOTS, NAVAL PERSONNEL AND THE  
POLICE AND SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. SINCE JUNE 1975  
CUBAN FORCES HAVE SUFFERED AN ESTIMATED 2,000 CASUALTIES,  
AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY BEING  
EMPLOYED ONLY AS RESERVES IN OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA.  
THEY ARE ALSO DEPLOYED MOSTLY IN THE LARGER CENTERS, WHERE  
THE DANGER OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES BEING CONDUCTED AGAINST  
THEM ARE SLIGHT.

7. ~~(S)~~ THERE ARE AT PRESENT AN ESTIMATED 250 TO  
300 EAST GERMANS IN ANGOLA, MOST OF WHOM ARE SPECIALIZED  
PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE MANAGEMENT, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS  
OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY. SOME  
PERFORM TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS IN THE AIR FORCE, AND THEY ALSO  
PROVIDE ADVANCED TRAINING TO THE ARMY. FOR THIS PURPOSE MILITARY  
TRAINING CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CDR, WHERE  
REPORTEDLY PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED BY SOVIET ADVISORS, WILL BE  
TRAINING.

~~0000 2000~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

NON-AGENCY


7A 094510L

PAGE 003  
TOR: 060700Z JUL 78

NC 0945100

5. ~~(S) (U) (L) (R)~~

(b)(1), (1.4)(c)



~~END OF MESSAGE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NON-AGENCY

ACTION: NONE INFO: DDPI-1, JOPS-S, RP, FILE, (2/7)


78 0945161

PAGE 0014  
TOP: 060700Z JUL 78

NC 0945161  
5160

PP RUEAII  
ME RUEKJCS #0154 1870057  
ZNY ~~05555~~  
P 060657Z JUL 78  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEAFCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHGE/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEVAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADAD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIIF/C I A  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIAM/NSA WASH DC  
P 051430Z JUL 78  
FM (b)(3) USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSKAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 0313 JULY 78



~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

**EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION**

MSGNO 40 (MIIR) ISG \*10/12/83\* \*00:38\*  
ZCZC 05:35:44Z (ME)

153

UNCLASSIFIED

MILITARY

[REDACTED]

83 2855284

MUR

TOR: 091603Z DEC 83

NC 2855284

RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEKJCS #1776 3431602  
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R 091602Z DEC 83  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEALGX/SAFE  
R 091515Z DEC 83

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DTA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424 //  
INFO RUEHCR/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a) //  
RUEHMO/ (b)(3):10 USC 424 //  
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER// (b)(3):50 USC 403 //  
RUSNNOA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a) VAIHINGEN GER//

BT  
EZ1:  
UNCLAS E F T O (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:  
UNCLAS EFTO  
SERIAL: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF); SOVIET UNION (UR); ANGOLA (AO);  
- MOZAMBIQUE (MZ); NAMIBIA (WZ)  
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 REDS BUILDING MASSIVE ARSENAL ON  
- SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS - GEN MULLER  
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT; NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
INTEL  
DOI: 831208  
REQS: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: THE KREMLIN IS PUMPING EVER-INCREASING QUANTITIES  
OF AERIAL HARDWARE RANGING FROM SUPERSONIC JET FIGHTERS TO  
ADVANCED RADAR AND MISSILE SYSTEMS INTO SOUTH AFRICA'S  
NEIGHBORING BLACK STATES, SAYS THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRI-  
CAN AIR FORCE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MIKE ((MULLER)).

*Field...*  
*Public...*

8307400187

MSGNC 40 (MIIR) ISG \*10/12/83\* \*00:38\*

TEXT: THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE, LT-GENERAL MIKE MULLER, SPEAKING IN PRETORIA YESTERDAY (831207), SAID INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAD PROVED A MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF AERIAL HARDWARE IN THE STATES BORDERING SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT WAS OF THE MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY - AND ONE STATE WAS IN POSSESSION OF GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES DEPLOYED NOWHERE OUTSIDE RUSSIA APART FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. GENERAL MULLER SAID THE BUILD-UP HAD GROWN OVER THE LAST THREE TO FIVE YEARS. "THE FACT THAT SO MUCH IS BEING PUMPED BY RUSSIA INTO SATELLITE STATES IS A CLEAR PROOF OF THE KREMLIN'S DESIGNS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA," HE SAID. ABOUT 200 MIG AIRCRAFT WERE IN THE HANDS OF NEIGHBORING STATES, ABOUT 100 OF THEM WELL-KNOWN HIGH-PERFORMANCE AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL MIG 21'S. GENERAL MULLER SAID RADAR SYSTEMS HAD "SPRUNG UP LIKE MUSHROOMS" ON THE REPUBLIC'S BORDERS. IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA ALONE BETWEEN 60 AND 70 UNITS WERE KNOWN TO BE PRESENT, WHILE MOZAMBIQUE RADAR COVERED AREAS DEEP INTO THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL AND NORTHERN NATAL. GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES DEPLOYED INCLUDED THE SHORT-DISTANCE SA-7 - THE SAME SYSTEM USED TO DOWN THE TWO VISCOUNT PASSENGER AIRLINERS IN THE RODESIAN CONFLICT. MORE SIGNIFICANT, HOWEVER, WAS THE PRESENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE DEADLY SA-3 MISSILES IN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN PLACES SUCH AS MAPUTO AND LUBANGO, THE GENERAL SAID. IT HAD BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THE STATES HARBOURED ADVANCED RUSSIAN SA-8 GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES. THESE CONSTITUTED A MEDIUM-DISTANCE, FAST REACTION SYSTEM WHICH WAS HIGHLY MOBILE AND EFFECTIVE. "OTHER THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOUTHERN AFRICA IS THE ONLY REGION IN WHICH THIS SYSTEM IS DEPLOYED," HE SAID. THE MISSILES WERE BACKED-UP BY "AN INCREDIBLE NUMBER OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OF ALL CALIBRES", INCLUDING THE RADAR-DIRECTED ZSU-23/4 SHILKA, WHICH WAS DEVASTATING AT SHORT RANGE. "ALL THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE USSR HAS A HIGH PREMIUM ON SOUTHERN AFRICA." "WE EXPECT THAT THIS SOVIET-BACKED AIR THREAT WILL ESCALATE FURTHER AND IT IS CLEAR THAT WE SHALL HAVE TO KEEP ON OUR TOES TO FACE THE THREAT," SAID GENERAL MULLER.

COMMENTS: THE SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE; INFORMATION IS POSSIBLY TRUE. THIS IS THE ENTIRE ARTICLE.

PROJ: N/A

COLL: NONE

INSTR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP:

APPR:

EVAL: NONE REL TO: NONE

ENCL: N/A

DISSEM: N/A

NNNN


NNDD

8307400188

MSGNO 4 (MIIR) ISG \*19/09/84\* \*16:12\*  
ZCZC 21:10:20Z (MI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY



84 5230802

MCP

TOR: 191823Z SEP 84

NC 5230802

PP RUEAIIA  
DE RUEKJCS #9078 2631822  
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~  
P 191822Z SEP 84  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEALGX/SAFE  
P 191534Z SEP 84

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUCBSAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUFTAKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUFDAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUDOVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) VAIHINGEN PRIORITY

RUCUEKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RULWIOC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RUDOVIA/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

RHFUMHE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUDLAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RHFQAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RHFPAAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEBARF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RHDLCNE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUTADF (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUDHMY (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUTADS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUTAGN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHLG (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHSB (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHMY (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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MSGNO 4 (MIIR) ISG \*19/09/84\* \*16:12\*

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)  
SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 MORE ANGOLAN LOSSES (U)  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY  
EVALUATED INTEL.

DOI: (U) 840918 (RO)

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) OPEN: "O DIA," PORTUGAL, MORNING DAILY  
LISBON NEWSPAPER, RIGHTIST ORIENTATION,  
PRIVATELY OWNED.

SUMMARY: (U) SOURCE REPORTS THAT UNITA HAS DOWNED A  
MIG-21 AND AN MI-8, IN ADDITION TO INFLECTING CASUALTIES  
ON THE ANGOLAN ARMY. THE 18 SEP 84 REPORT IN THE  
"O DIA," BASED ON UNITA SOURCES, IS PARAPHRASED AND  
TRANSLATED BELOW.

TEXT: (U) THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASED TRANSLATION  
OF AN 18 SEP 84 NEWSPAPER REPORT ABOUT ANGOLAN AIRCRAFT  
LOSSES AND ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT/CUBAN/UNITA TROOP  
CASUALTIES.

- UNITA FORCES DOWNED A MIG-21 AIRCRAFT (REGISTRATION  
- NUMBER 64C) TWO KILOMETERS TO THE EAST OF KUEMBA AND  
- SHOT AN MI-8 HELICOPTER, WHICH CRASHED 51 KILOMETERS  
- TO THE EAST OF THE CITY OF LUSO. THE CUBAN PILOT  
- OF THE MIG-21 WAS BURNED TO DEATH, AS WAS THE  
- HELICOPTER CREW.

- THE UNITA REPORT WAS GIVEN TO THIS NEWSPAPER  
- YESTERDAY, AND IT ALSO CLAIMS THE FOLLOWING ARMY  
- CASUALTIES:

- A. DEAD - 97 FAPLA, 11 CUBANS  
- B. CAPTURED - 17 FAPLA  
- C. SURRENDERED - 17 FAPLA  
- D. WEAPONS CAPTURED - 103  
- E. LIBERATED PEOPLE - 741  
- F. UNITA DEAD - 08  
- G. UNITA WOUNDED - 17

- THE DOCUMENT AFFIRMS THAT ON THE 13TH OF SEP-  
- TEMBER, ACTION AT KINGUENGUE (22 KILOMETERS FROM  
- THE ZAIRE BORDER AND 90 KILOMETERS NORTH OF MARIMBA  
- ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE CUANGO RIVER) RESULTED IN  
- SEVEN CUBANS KILLED AND THE CAPTURE OF MANY

\*\*\*<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>\*\*\*

DB-4, (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

8400612953

MSGNO 4 (MIIR) ISG \*19/09/84\* \*16:12\*  
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)  
SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 / MORE ANGOLAN LOSSES (U)  
- VEHICLES.

COMMENTS: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ IT APPEARS THAT THIS REPORT REFERS  
TO AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN ADDITION TO THOSE REPORTED IN

(b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES

(U), DTG: 141041Z SEP 84, ~~(C/NOFORN)~~.

PROJ: (U) N/A

COLL: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U)

ENCL: (U) N/A

DISSEM: (U) N/A

WARNING: (U) ~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

REEL NUMBER 007283 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0004

MSGNO 8 (MIR) \*25/07/77\* \*04:12\*  
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ZNY ~~0000~~ 12:32:06Z C  
R 221235Z JUL 77  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEFHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIF/C I A  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEOIAH/NSA WASH DC  
R 220930Z JUL 77

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSMAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
RUDONBA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEOAJD  
RUEOAJA  
RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
RUCBSAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEBARA  
RUEHMO (b)(3):10 USC 424

BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. RSA(SF)/ANGOLA(AO)/USSR(UR)
2. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. POSSIBLE USSR SHIPS FOR ANGOLA NAVY (U)
4. NONE
5. 770600
6. 770721
7. 770720 (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. INITIATIVE
9. A-2
10. (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. NO
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]
15. NONE/WON DIRC
16. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET AMUR AND ALLIGATOR CLASS VESSELS IN LUANDA WERE FLYING THE ANGOLESE FLAG AND NOT AS A COURTESY FLAG. FURTHER, THAT THE LST AND AN LCT WERE OBSERVED CONDUCTING CROSS-BEACH OPERATIONS WITH TANKS. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ALSO SIGHTED WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE A SUBMARINE BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or procedures should not be based on unverified data on the basis of this report.

<p>1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: (U) South African Troops in Angola</p> <p>3. INC NUMBER:</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 28 Nov 75</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: (b)(3):10 USC 424</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE</p> <p>7. SOURCE: News Media</p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 December 1975</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 2</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6)</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY:</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:</p>
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15. SUMMARY: (U) Under banner headlines, the Friday, 28 November edition of the Johannesburg Star reported "SA Troops Well Inside Angola." This IR reports substance of article.

101

Rec'd DS-4 / 12 DEC 75

(U) 1. The Star article reported that South African troops were in ANGOLA serving as advisers and providing logistical support to the anti-MPLA forces. The article also stated that SA troops had clashed with AFRICAN troops in southern ANGOLA in recent weeks, but that it was not always clear whether they were forces of the MPLA or SWAPO. The SA troops are said to be based at CALEQUE (17165-14402) about 39 km inside ANGOLA and were prepared to penetrate more than 300 km into ANGOLA in consonance with the "hot pursuit" policy of the SAG.

(U) 2. According to the article, there was a company of about 150 SA troops with armored cars in CALEQUE. Details on the number of advisers were lacking. The article claimed the presence of SA troops in ANGOLA had the approval of JONAS SAVIMBI, the UNITA leader, which controls most of the territory south of BENGUELA.

<p>14. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p> <p>USCINCEUR</p>	<p>17. DOWNGRADING DATA:</p>	<p>18. ATTACHMENT DATA:</p> <p>NONE</p>
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR (b)(3):10 USC 424

(Class/Section and Control Markings)

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Railway stretching from the Port of LOBITO (1222S-1330E) to the ZAMBIAN copperbelt region.

(U) 3. The article quoting "authoritative sources in PRETORIA" and referring frequently to "the Minister" stated with reference to the SAVIMBI blessing that "In this case we are in good company because we find ourselves in the company of the big free nations of the world," referring to FRANCE, UK, US and "perhaps" BELGIUM.

OK

(U) 4. The article stated that "RUSSIA is in this bad position. She has long lines of communication in this instance. The West with many friends in SOUTHERN AFRICA can establish itself in a very strong position and make it impossible for RUSSIA to infiltrate SOUTHERN AFRICA." Further, it added "SOUTH AFRICA would like to see more active AMERICAN participation." Referring again to "the Minister", the article continued, "the Minister said SOUTH AFRICA would be prepared to join other nations if they are prepared to drive RUSSIA out of SOUTHERN AFRICA, but added, SOUTH AFRICA would not fight to the last SOUTH AFRICAN on behalf of the free world." "If we have to fight we will fight on our borders to the last man," he said.

OK

(U) 5. Quoting an article in the LONDON TIMES, the Star article continued, "The LONDON Times said today, the feeling is that the West is not pulling its weight in confronting the Communist threst in ANGOLA. More active participation by the West would allow SOUTH AFRICA to increase its own involvement on the side of FNLA and UNITA."

OK

~~(FOUO)~~ COMMENT: Although his name was missing and his title was only alluded to, it is quite obvious the "Minister" and this source was the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. BOTHA. It appears to RO that this being the case, Mr. BOTHA is glaring the public up for the eventual announcement that SOUTH AFRICA is perhaps involved deeply in the ANGOLA situation. Military mail from the "border operational areas" is now being censored; and, defense related announcements are becoming more frequent and from a higher level. These events follow closely recent meetings with the press - particularly the English press - called by Mr. BOTHA in which he vented his displeasure about press speculation and leaks which he considered endangered the security of the country.

OK

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DD FORM 1396c

(Class/Section and Control Markings)

REPLACES AF FORM 113, 28 61 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62 AND 113-114-1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MSGNO 5 (MIR) ZZA #30/12/75\* #07153\*  
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FM JCS  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC  
RUEAIIIF/C I A  
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC  
P 291010Z DEC 75

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUEBARA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUSNAAA/USCINCELR VAITINGEN GER  
RUDONBA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUCBSAA  
ZEN (b)(3):10 USC 424  
RUEH

BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 DEC 75

EZ2:

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/USSR
2. (U) SOVIET PLANES FLYING MISSIONS IN ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. 29 DEC 75
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 29 DEC 75
6. B=3
7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 8.
9. 29 DEC 75
10. ONE SECTION
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 12.
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14.
15. ~~(C)~~ UNIDENTIFIED TYPE OF SOVIET JET A/C REPORTEDLY FLYING SUPPORT MISSIONS IN ANGOLA. INFO SKETCHY, HOWEVER (b)(1),1.4 (c) INDICATED RUSSIAN MADE JETS INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. (b)(1),1.4 (c) NOT SURE PLANES ARE BEING LAUNCHED FROM ANGOLA, FEELS THEY MAY BE FLYING IN FROM NORTHERN NEIGHBORS. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~003-1981~~

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NNDD

DISSEMINATES

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

3323-55-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
[REDACTED]

78 1694924

FOR: 121308Z DEC 78

PP RUEAIIIE  
DE RUEKJCS #9845 3461306  
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~  
P 121306Z DEC 78  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIIF/C I A  
RUETIAH/NSA WASH DC  
P 121245Z DEC 78  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER  
RUDOVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 VAIHINGEN GER  
RUFHOL (b)(3):10 USC 424  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
RUEHDT (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

- THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA(SF)/ANGOLA (AO)/GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GC)
  2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):15 USC 370
  3. (U) TITLE: EAST GERMANS IN ANGOLA
  4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
  5. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 781212
  6. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 781212
  7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781212 (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. (U) REFERENCE: INITIATIVE AND IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
  9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO, OPQ: NO
  12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY
  14. (U) SOURCE: S.A. NEWSPAPER RAND DAILY MAIL DTG 781212 . (b)(3):10 USC 424
  15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE, DIRC: NO
  16. (U) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FORWARDS A VERBATIM COPY OF A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE IN THE RAND DAILY MAIL ON '2 DEC 73  
CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF 2,000 EAST GERMAN PARATROOPS  
AND MILITARY INSTRUCTORS IN ANGOLA.

1. (U) HEADLINE: "2,000 EAST GERMANS JOIN WAR ON UNITA"  
BY CHRIS MARAIS.

"NEARLY 2,000 EAST GERMAN PARATROOPS AND MILITARY  
INSTRUCTORS HAVE FLOWN INTO ANGOLA DURING THE PAST  
SIX WEEKS AND ARE NOW ACTIVELY DEPLOYED AGAINST UNITA  
GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGIONS, ACCORDING  
TO MILITARY OBSERVERS."

"THE EAST GERMANS, EQUIPPED WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS, HAVE  
JOINED THE RULING MPLA FORCES AND THEIR CUBAN ALLIES  
IN MOUNTING A MASSIVE ONSLAUGHT AGAINST DR. JONAS SAVIMBI'S  
UNITA GROUPS."

"MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT, TOO, THAT A NUMBER OF EAST GERMAN  
INSTRUCTORS ARE TRAINING MPLA AND SWAPO RECRUITS AT BASE  
CAMPS."

"THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE EAST GERMAN MILITARY  
PRESENCE HAS BEEN TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH ELECTION  
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA."

"AS YET, NONE OF THE EAST GERMAN FORCES HAS SET FOOT  
ON SWA SOIL, THE OBSERVERS SAID."

"ASKED HOW THE OPERATION AGAINST UNITA WAS FARING THE  
SOURCES SAID THAT DR SAVIMBI'S FORCES IN THE SOUTH OF  
ANGOLA WERE TOO WELL-ORGANISED TO HAVE SUFFERED ANY  
MAJOR SETBACKS."

COMMENT: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

DECL. 12 DEC 34

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This report contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

5  
495

1. COUNTRY: MALAWI	9. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. SUBJECT: (U) Political Orientation of Malawi Army Officers	8. DATE OF REPORT: 5 December 1975
1. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
	11. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 21 Nov 75	12. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: (b)(3):10 USC 424	13. PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(6)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE (b)(3):10 USC 403-1(f)	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:
7. SOURCE:	

15. SUMMARY:

(c) This report provides additional insights into how the Malawi Army officer corps views the position of MALAWI in the political spectrum and into the officers' thinking with regard to the circumstances under which MALAWI's political orientation might be forced to change.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

021

Rec'd DS-4 / 13 DEC 75

(c) (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

2. (c) (b)(1), 1.4 (c) said the struggle for control of ANGOLA had been the subject of intense conversation among many of the officers (b)(1), 1.4 (c) (b)(1), 1.4 (c) during the previous week. He said the major concern expressed by the officers was that the West (with which MALAWI was clearly identified in their minds) was on the verge of

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: USCINCEUR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DEC 81	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL  
(Classification and Control Markings)

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

Branch Copy

DD FORM 1396  
1 SEP 62

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 O-316-817

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60,  
WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 61,  
AND DA FORM 1048, 1 JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE  
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 61.

6-4280

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424  
PAGE 2 of 3 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR (b)(3):10 USC 424

"losing" ANGOLA. Moreover, he said that he was personally convinced that if "we" allowed Communist interests to prevail in ANGOLA, as they were now prevailing in MOZAMBIQUE, the West would be doomed to lose all of its influence in the southern third of Africa. And if the West lost its influence in southern Africa, MALAWI would soon find itself hopelessly isolated and inevitably forced to an accommodation with the radical forces that lay between it and the Indian Ocean coast.

3. (c) Specifically, (b)(1),1.4 (c) believed it was essential for the U.S. to do more in support of the moderate UNCTA-FNLA coalition and to prevent the Soviet-supported MPLA from dominating the future government of ANGOLA. He seemed to be very well informed and current on the various news media reports of Communist and other foreign activities in and around ANGOLA. He said it seemed as though the future of ANGOLA was likely to be determined by the fact that the USSR was willing to do whatever was necessary to ensure an MPLA victory while the U.S. was apparently not willing to do enough to prevent an MPLA victory.

4. (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) knew that such national policy decisions were not as simple for a democracy like the U.S. as some of the younger officers thought. But their views, he said, should nevertheless be of interest to the U.S. Government. He said the younger officers saw the power and wealth of the U.S. as practically unlimited; they believed that the ability of the U.S. to influence world events was limited only by the will of the American people; and they would be very disillusioned if the U.S. were to allow Soviet interests to "take over" in ANGOLA. This possible disillusionment was significant, he said, because these younger officers represented an important segment of the next generation of leaders in MALAWI.

5. (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c) realized that ANGOLA itself was not of vital interest to the U.S.—nor should it be to the USSR. Then why, he asked, was the Soviet Union trying so hard to gain the position of prime influence there? Was it not because of SOUTH AFRICA and the Cape sea routes? He said he believed that the Soviet strategy here is to eventually dominate the Cape and that the Soviets see ANGOLA and MOZAMBIQUE as means to that end. He suggested that the U.S. also should regard the Cape as a vital interest and be willing to counter this Soviet strategy.

COMMENTS:

1. (c) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO.  
PAGE  
ORIGINATOR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

PAGES

4. (c) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4 (c)

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396  
1 APR 62 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-543162

REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 60  
AND DA FORM 604, 1 AUG 60 WHICH  
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRP: . . 3: . . . .

MILITARY



81 6540586

PAGE 001


NC 6540586

OR: 061154Z JUN 81


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 R 061139Z JUN 81  
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 TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
 INFO RUEAITA/CIA WASHDC  
 RUEKJCS/SFCDEF WASHDC  
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC  
 RUEACMC/CHC WASHDC  
 RUEBARA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
 RUSNAAA/USCINCPAC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) VAIHINGEN GE  
 RHDLCE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
 RUCJAAA/USCINCPAC MACDILL AFB FL  
 RUEHCR (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
 RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORVA  
 RUCBSAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)  
 RUSNAAA  
 RUSNAAA/USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GE  
 RUEHCR (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424



SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 ~~CASE~~ VERDE/CUBAN OVERSEAS PRESENCE/  
(U)



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT; NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY

81 65405AA


PAGE 002

NC 6540586

TOR: 061154Z JUN 81

1. (U) CTRY: CAPE VERDE (CV) CUBA (CU)
2. (U) REPORT NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN OVERSEAS PRESENCE
4. (U) DATE OF INFO 810321 AND 810605
5. (U) ORIG: (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)



9A. ~~(S)~~ DETAILS: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF (b)(3):10 USC 424

\*NOT THE CUBANS NORMALLY RUN THREE FLIGHTS PER WEEK THROUGH SAL ISLAND'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BETWEEN HAVANA AND LUANDA. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE FREQUENCY HAS BEEN INCREASED TO FIVE FLIGHTS PER WEEK. THE TWO ADDITIONAL ONES NOT RPT NOT BEING OFFICIALLY RECORDED BY THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES. MOREOVER, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE TWO ADDITIONAL QUOTE GHOST UNQUOTE FLIGHTS ARE MANNED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WHO ARE CUBANS. THE AIRCRAFT IN USE ARE REPORTEDLY IL-62'S WITH COMMERCIAL PASSENGER CONFIGURATION. (b)(3):10 USC 424

9B. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY

81 6540586

PAGE 003

NC 6540586

TOR: 061154Z JUN 81

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

- 10. (U) DRGJ NO: NONE
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
- 12. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC-NC
- 13. (U) DRP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 14. (U) APP BY:
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: YES; REL TO: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

~~REV: 6 JUN 87~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

REEL NUMBER 007232 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0033

MSGNO 39 (MIIR) \*11/05/77\* \*04:47\*

VZCZC 16:19:06Z

EC9506Y302  
RR RUEAIE  
DE RUEKJCS #9729-1301619

ZNY ~~99999~~  
R 101619Z MAY 77  
FM JCS

INFO RUEACHC/CMC WASH DC  
RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC  
RUEAGND/CSA WASH DC  
RUEAIIF/C-1 A  
RUENHC/SECSTATE WASH DC  
RUEADWH/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
RUEOIAH/NSA WASH DC  
R 101015Z MAY 77

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RU (b)(3):50 USC 4033(c)  
RUCSAAE [REDACTED]

BT  
EZ1:

~~SECRET~~//NWINTTEL 591 MAY 77

EZ2:  
THIS IS IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. USSR (UR) ANGOLA/MOZAMBIQUE
2. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. SOVIET TRAINING OF TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (U)
- 4.
5. UNKNOWN
6. 770510
7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. [REDACTED]
9. F - 6
10. (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. YES
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]

15. ~~WRITE~~ CAVEAT USED (b)(3):10 USC 424
16. SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ NWINTTEL IR REPORTS SOVIETS TRAINING IN USSR OF TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. END SUMMARY.
22. DETAILS: 1. ~~(S)~~ NWINTTEL (b)(1),1.4 (c)

RELATED FOLLOWING STORY. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] ACCEPTED THE RANK OF PRAPORSHCHIK IN ARMY, WITH UNDERSTANDING HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO USE PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS. INSTEAD HE WAS SENT TO A BASE SOMEWHERE IN CRIMEA, WHERE HE WORKED WITH TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. TROOPS WERE FLOWN DIRECTLY TO BASE WHERE THEY REMAINED, WITHOUT PASSES, FOR THE DURATION (UNSPECIFIED) OF THEIR TRAINING.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: ~~(S)~~ NWINTTEL (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1), (1.4)(c)

~~NOV 31 DEC 85~~  
BT  
#9729  
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REEL NUMBER 007533 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0019

MSGNO 33 (MIIR) \*26/07/78\* \*07:32\*  
ZCZC 07:17:08 (MI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



78 100207Z

TOR: 251152Z JUL 78

NC 1032842


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R 251138Z JUL 78

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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADLD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIIE/C I A  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAR/NSA WASH DC

R 251106Z JUL 78  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKCB/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUSNAAA/CINCEUR WASHINGTON DC  
RUCSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

RUFDAAA  
RUDECA  
RHFRAAB  
RUWTEKA  
RUCSAAE  
RUFTSHA



BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 1. COUNTRY: USSR (LR) ANGOLA (AN)
- 2. REPORT NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 3. TITLE: SOVIET GENERALS REPORTED IN ANGOLA (U)
- 4. PROJ NO: GRITTED
- 5. DATE OF INFO: 780719
- 6. DATE OF REPORT: 780725
- 7. DATE & PLC OF ACQ: 780719, (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 8. REF: (b)(3):10 USC 424

9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

11. REQ EVAL: YES

12. PREP OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

13. APPROV AUTH: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 14. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 15. SPEC INSTR: NON-DIRC.  
 16. SUMMARY: (+) IR FORWARDS (b)(1),1.4 (c) BELIEF THAT A NUMBER OF SOVIET GENERAL OFFICERS ARE PLAYING A KEY ROLE IN ANGOLA.  
 17. DETAILS: (+) (b)(1),1.4 (c) CLAIMED THAT SOVIET GENERAL COL TSCHACHENWITSCH HAS BEEN ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REORGANIZING THE ANGOIAN ARMED FORCES, THE GENERAL HAS ALLEGEDLY ALSO ASSUMED THE PLANNING AND CONTROLLING OF OPERATIONS IN THE REGIONS BORDERING ANGOLA. (b)(1),1.4 (c) ALSO SPECULATED THAT IN THE EASTERN REGION OF ANGOLA ON THE BORDERS WITH SHABA AND ZAMBIA, THE FOLLOWING SOVIET GENERALS ARE PRESENT: PARAMONOV, KUPTCHENKO, REHEN AND GONTCHARENKO. IN LUBANGO PROVINCE, ANGOLA, GENERALS KODAN, ODAESSIAN, YARGAOR AND ZAPUTRIANEV ARE ALSO ALLEGEDLY WORKING WITH THE ANGOIANS AND FILLING IMPORTANT COMMAND POSITIONS, IN THE ULGE SECTOR GENERAL TCHATSHENKO AND IN CABINDA GENERAL POR-TOLOV.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (+) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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NNNN  
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


143/ DISSEM PER AIG#970

~~SECRET~~

FRP: . . . . .

NON-AGENCY



78 0672247

PAGE 001

NC 0672247

TOR: 090101Z MAY 78

RR RUEATIA  
DE RUEKJCS #4284 1290052

ZNY 33333  
R 090035Z MAY 78

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

TO (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(f)

RULPALJ/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

RUDORRA (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(f)

RUSNAAA/USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE

BT

~~SECRET//INTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT//ORCON~~ 3115

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN-128-1E (AS OF: 1.400 EDT 8 MAY 78)


(b)(3)-10 USC 424, (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(f)

CUBA-AFRICA: CASTRO'S VIEWS. (U)

1. ~~SECRET//INTEL//NOFORN//NOCONTRACT~~

(b)(3)50 USC 403-1(f)

(b)(1)(b)(3)50 USC 403 (e), 1.4 (c)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NON-AGENCY

78 0672247

PAGE 002

NC 0672247

TOR: 090101Z MAY 78

(b)(1),(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (a), (1), (4)(c)

4. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ THE EXACT INTENT OR EXTENT OF THE STATEMENTS ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE NOT KNOWN. CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS ARE WORKING WITH SWAPO FORCES FOR EVENTUAL CONTROL OF NAMIBIA AND WITH GUERRILLA GROUPS TRAINING TO FIGHT IN RHODESIA. FOR THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THE CUBAN ASSOCIATION WITH THESE GROUPS WILL BE LIMITED TO MILITARY ADVISORS.

*R. of ...*

(b)(1),(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (a), (1), (4)(c)

PREPARED BY: (b)(3)-10 USC 424

(XGDS ? ~~DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR~~)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~



78 1693521


PAGE 001

NC 1693521

TOR: 120627Z DEC 78

RR RUEAIIA  
DE RUEKJCS #4626 3460610

ZNY ~~SECRET~~



RUMPOHS T  
RUMGNUL T  
RULYJFK T  
RUMPAON  
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R 120602Z DEC 78

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO DIA (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7088  
DIADIN 345-11A (AS OF: 2133 EST 11 DEC 78)  
SUSJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)  
CUBA: CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ANGOLA. (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ CUBAN AND ANGOLAN OFFICIALS HAVE SIGNED 35 COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS FOR 10,700 CUBAN CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO WORK IN ANGOLA IN 1979. OF THE PROJECTED NUMBER, 6,400 WILL BE WORKING UNDER THE BASIC ECONOMIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS AND THE REMAINDER WILL ASSIST COOPERATIVES AND COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES AND PROVIDE POLITICAL ADVICE. THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE WAS 6,000, BUT BASED ON RECENT INFORMATION FROM ANGOLA: PRESIDENT NETO, 7,200 CUBAN

78 1693521

PAGE 002  
 TOR: 120627Z DEC 78

NC 1693521

CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE NOW SERVING IN ANGOLA.

X. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ HAVANA APPEARS TO HAVE EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO STEADILY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA. THE MOVEMENT OF CUBANS WILL BE FACILITATED WITH THE EXPANSION OF CUBAN CIVIL AIRLINES ROUTES. HAVANA APPARENTLY IS WILLING TO BEAR THE STRAIN ON THE DOMESTIC LABOR MARKET FOR THE BENEFITS IT DERIVES FROM RENDERING SUCH AID. THIS LATEST EFFORT, WHICH IS STRONGLY BACKED BY THE CUBAN HIERARCHY, WILL PROVIDE TRAINING TO CUBAN GRADUATES OF SECONDARY AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~


END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REEL NUMBER 008365 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0091

MSGNO 4 (MIIR) K01 \*05/11/81\* \*03:14\*  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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DE RUEKJCS #7409 3090648  
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P 050648Z NOV 81  
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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
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P 041600Z NOV 81  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424  
INFO RU (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUWTEKA  
RULWIOC  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUSNAAA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) VAIHINGEN GE  
RUFTSHA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUDLAAA  
RUFTFHA  
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RUCIMAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RHDLCNE  
RUFDAAA //  
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424  
RHFRAAE (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)  
RUEHSA

BT  
EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~  
SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 PORTUGAL (PO); SOUTH AFRICA (SF);  
ANGOLA (AO); RUMORS OF INCREASED MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA/  
~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

EZ2:  
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.  
1. (U) CTRYS: PORTUGAL (PO); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO)  
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

- 3. (U) TITLE: RUMORS OF INCREASED MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA (U)
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 811103
- 5. (U) ORIG: (b)(3):10 USC 424
- 6. (U) REQ REFS: [REDACTED]
- 7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICA IS CONCERNED OVER RUMORS OF INCREASED MILITARY STRENGTH IN ANGOLA. THEY HAVE REPORTS OF THE ARRIVAL OF FIVE SOVIET MIG-27 AIRCRAFT DURING THE LAST HALF OF OCTOBER. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF A NEW SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM BEING INSTALLED IN ANGOLA WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ORIGINALLY DESCRIBED AS A SAM-10; DUE TO THE SKETCHY NATURE OF THE REPORTS, THIS SYSTEM IS NOW LISTED AS UNIDENTIFIED. INCREASES IN FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL ALSO CONCERN THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THEY INDICATE THAT ONE "LATINO (THEIR TERM) HAS BEEN TAKEN AND MAY BE A NICARAGUAN; THEY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME WITH REPORTS OF A NICARAGUAN UNIT DEPLOYED IN ANGOLA. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH A REPORTED EAST GERMAN MILITARY FORCE.

- 9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE
- 9B. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ ORIG CMTS: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IS BASED GREATLY ON RUMOR WITH LITTLE ACTUAL FCTS. [REDACTED]

- 10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
  - 11. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
  - 12. (U) SPEC INST: CIRC NO: ~~NOFORN CAVEAT USED TO PROTECT~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424
  - 13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  - 14. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
  - 15. (U) REQ EVAL: YES; REL TO NONE
  - 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
  - 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
- ~~DECL 04 NOV 07.~~  
NNNN  
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FORM 174

CLASSIFICATION BY *ELIX* (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a) TOTAL COPIES 32-1

REPRODUCE ISSUING OFFICE

NO. AGENCY MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

TUR 242031Z MAY 77

R 242009Z MAY 77 ZEX  
FM DIA WASH DC

TO (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)  
(b)(3):50 USC 403-

BT  
~~SECRET~~ 2844  
FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)  
DIADIN 144-3A (AS OF 1 2943 EDT 24 MAY 77)  
CURA-ANGOLA: CONVOYS TO AFRICA. ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(S)~~ IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE -- APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO COUNTER AN UPSCALE IN INSURGENT ACTIVITY AND RESULTANT PRESSURE ON CUBAN SHIPS -- A THIRD MAY CONVOY OF CUBAN MERCHANT SHIPS HAS DEPARTED CUBAN WATERS FOR AFRICA.
2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S)~~ THESE THREE CONVOYS OF SHIPS DEPARTED CUBA ABOUT THE TIME CUBAN CASUALTIES REPORTEDLY MOUNTED IN THE THREE FRONT INSURGENT WAR IN ANGOLA AND CABINDA. CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THE NEED FOR CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF AGOSTINHO NETO IS CLEAR. USE OF SHIPS TO TRANSPORT PERSONNEL WAS IMPLEMENTED IN LATE 1975 AND 1976 DURING THE CONVENTIONAL PHASE OF THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA. WHAT REMAINS UNEXPLAINED IS THE REASON FOR THE USE OF SHIPS NOW, SINCE THREE-TIME WEEKLY CUBAN CIVIL AIR AND SOVIET-CHARTERED FLIGHTS BETWEEN HAVANA AND LUANDA GIVE CURA THE CAPACITY TO AIRLIFT SOME 400 PERSONNEL PER WEEK TO AFRICA IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS PER FLIGHT. IF THE SHIPS CONTAIN ONLY MATERIEL, THIS WOULD BE A SHIFT FROM RECENT PRACTICE, SINCE THE BULK OF MILITARY SUPPLIES IN RECENT MONTHS HAS REPORTEDLY COME DIRECTLY FROM THE USSR.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(89-31 928 057)

~~SECRET~~

NO COPY ONLY (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L/NORM 0185 SEP 79

REEL NUMBER 007829 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0145

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ZCIC 15:06:45Z (Y1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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TOR: 251238Z SEP 79

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ZNY ~~CCCCC~~  
P 251236Z SEP 79  
FM OJCSMC WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAH/NSA WASH DC  
P 250740Z SEP 79

FM (b)(3)10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RUEKBSA (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUMTECA/HQ  
RUMXIOC/HQ  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WASHINGTON DC  
RUSNAAA/USEUCOM (b)(3)50 USC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETSWA (b)(3)50 USC 403-1(i)  
RUEKJCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L/NORM 0185 SEP 79

- 1. (U) COUNTRY: (b)(3)10 USC 424 (P) / ANGOA (A)
- 2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 3. (U) TITLE: LIFE IN LUANDA
- 4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: AB
- 5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 7909
- 6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790924
- 7. (U) DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 790918 (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 8. (U) REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
- 9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: YES; NP; NONE
- 12. (U) PREPARING OFFICE: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 13. (U) APPROVING AUTH: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 14. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3)10 USC 424
- 15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ~~NORM CAVEAT USED TO PROTECT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L/NORM 0185 SEP 79



(b)(3) 10 USC 424

16. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ DURING LUCH ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ BUSINESSMAN WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM ANGOLA PROVIDED HIS VIEWS OF LIFE IN LUANDA.

22. (U) DETAILS: FOLLOWING ARE ITEMS ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ ADDRESSED:

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ HIS VISIT WAS AS "OFFICIAL" AS HE COULD ARRANGE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED ON ALL CALLS TO GOA OFFICES BY THE PORTUGUESE EMBASSY'S COMMERCIAL OFFICER-- WHO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN TO ANY OF THE OFFICES, IN SPITE OF HAVING BEEN IN COUNTRY FOR A YEAR. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ HAD MEETINGS WITH THE MINISTERS OF PLANNING AND OF INDUSTRY AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK. NO CUBANS OR OTHER NON-ANGOLANS WERE IN EVIDENCE.

2. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ PRESENT IN LUANDA WHEN NEWS OF PRESIDENT AUGOSTINHO NETO'S DEATH ARRIVED. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE ALTERATION TO THE LOCAL AMBIENCE APPARENT TO SOURCE, THOUGH A RUMOR BEGAN GOING AROUND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD KILLED NETO. AT ALL LEVELS OF ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ CONTACTS WHITES AND MULATTOES EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THEIR FUTURE. ONE MULATTO ANGOLAN OFFICIAL (NFI) ASKED ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ FOR A JOB. ALMOST ALL OF ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ CONTACTS EXPRESSED STRONG DISLIKE FOR THE CUBANS BUT SPOKE IN PRAISE OF THE YUGOSLAVS. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ HAD IMPRESSION MANY INDIVIDUALS HAD RECEIVED TRAINING IN YUGOSLAVIA PRIOR TO ANGOLA'S INDEPENDENCE.

3. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ THE MPLA HAS THREE SEPARATE, ARMED ORGANIZATIONS: FAPLA, THE ARMY, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE GOA OR, IN OTHER WORDS, BY THE WHITES AND MULATTOES; THE 200,000-STRONG PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES, CONTROLLED BY BLACKS; AND THE POLICE.

4. IF A SCONFANTATION DEVELOPS-- BLACKS VS MULATTOES AND WHITES-- ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ CONTACTS SAID THEY BELIEVE MANY FAPLA UNITS WILL SUPPORT THE BLACKS AND OTHER WILL GO OVER TO UNITA. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ MET AN GOA OFFICER -- "COMMANDANTE ZOLA" -- WHO HAS A BLACK AMERICAN WIFE. ZOLA WANTED TO TALK POLITICS, BUT ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ WOULD HAVE NONE OF IT. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ ALSO MET SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIMED TO BE UNITS PERSONNEL AND WHO WERE QUITE OPEN ABOUT THEIR CONNECTIONS.

5. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ MANY APPARENTLY NON-OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT WERE VISIBLE. ONE ANGOLAN TOLD ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ THE STORY THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN LEFT IN PLACE "IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE IMPRESSION OF ANGOLAN STRENGTH." SEVERAL MIG'S BROKE THE SOUND BARRIER OVER LUANDA AT NIGHT ON OCCASION, "FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS."

6. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ SPOKE WITH A SALESMAN WHO HAD RECENTLY SOLD SIX ARMORED MERCEDES 600 LIMOUSINES (ALLEGEDLY) AT A COST OF US DOLS 325,000 EACH TO THE NETO GOVERNMENT. OTHER SIMILAR CARS HAD BEEN PURCHASED EARLIER. GOA MINISTERS DRIVE AT HIGH SPEEDS THROUGH LUANDA WITH HORN'S BLANKING AND COLORED LIGHTS FLASHING. AT ONE POINT ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ DRIVER STOPPED HIS CAR AND TOLD HIM TO GET OUT AND STAND AT ATTENTION, AS DID THE DRIVER. THIS OCCURRED DURING THE PLAY OF THE ANGOLAN NATIONAL ANTHEM. SOURCE WAS INFORMED THAT TROOPS IN THE STREET INSURED

COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT. THE DRIVER ADDED THAT AN EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT AND TWO OF HIS STAFF MEMBERS WERE KILLED BY ANGOLAN POLICE OR TROOPS WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY PROPER RESPECT TO THE ANGOLAN NATIONAL ANTHEM.

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ (b)(7)(C) IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE IN LUANDA WERE AS FOLLOWS: HIS HOTEL -- ONE RESERVED FOR HIGH LEVEL VISITORS -- WAS VERY DIRTY. BED LINENS AND TOWELS WERE UNUSABLE (HE BORROWED SOME FROM A RELATIVE). HOTEL PASSENGER ELEVATORS WERE NOT WORKING AND GUESTS HAD TO RIDE (WITH CONSIDERABLE TREPIDATION) THE FREIGHT ELEVATOR, WITH INDESCRIBABLE PEOPLE AND COMMODITIES. THERE WERE LINES HUNDREDS OF METERS LONG OUTSIDE THE ONLY FOUR RESTAURANTS IN THE CITY OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. ONLY FISH AND RICE WERE SERVED. MANY HUNGRY-LOOKING, RAGGED PEOPLE ARE ON THE STREETS. IN CONTRAST, A PORTUGUESE BUSINESSMAN, WHO HAS A HOUSE IN THE DIPLOMATIC AREA OF LUANDA, HAS TWO BOATS, FOUR CARS, HORSES AND A KITCHEN STOCKED WITH LOBSTER, STEAKS, CHAMPAGNE, ETC.

COMMENT ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(D) PROBABLY REPORTED ACCURATELY WHAT HE SAW AND HEARD. HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO ANGOLA BEFORE AND ISN'T TOO KEEN ON GOING BACK. HE IS AN ASTUTE AND REASONABLY DISPASSIONATE OBSERVER WHO HAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN IMPROVING HIS BUSINESS CONNECTION IN ANGOLA. HOWEVER, HE FEELS ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS OPERATIONS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NETO SUCCESSION PROBLEM.

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH (b)(7)(D) (b)(7)(C)

19. (U) DOWNGRADING & DECLASS DATA: ~~REF: 24 SEP 1999~~

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REEL NUMBER 007046 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0023

17

TO RUEAOC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEFHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RU CBSAA (b)(3):50 USC 403-10  
RUWTEKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-10  
RUCSAAE  
RUSNAAA AISCINCEJR VAHINGEN GER  
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EZ 1  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- EZ 2:  
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. (U) COUNTRY: PORTUGAL (PO)
  2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  3. (U) TITLE: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA
  4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
  5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 771023
  6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 771027
  7. (U) DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771023 (b)(3):10 USC 424
  8. (U) REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
  9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  10. (U) ORIGINATOR:
  11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: NO
  12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY
  14. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE; DIRC: NO
  16. (U) SUMMARY: REPORT CONTAINS COMMENTS (b)(1),1.4 (c)
22. (U) DETAILS: A. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAT THE OVERHAUL OF NORD ATLAS AIRCRAFT FOR THE ANGOLAN AIR FORCE (AAF) BEING CONDUCTED AT ALVERCA (OFICINAS GERAIS DE MATERIAL AERONAUTICO (OGMA)) WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. THE ANGOLANS WERE PLEASED AS WERE THE PORTUGUESE WHO WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE WORK AND THE PAYMENT IN U.S. DOLLARS. IN ADDITION TO THE WORK AT OGMA - (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE PAF PRESENTLY HAD QUITE A NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS IN ANGOLA ASSISTING THE AAF WITH OPERATIONS/MAINTENANCE OF THE NORD ATLAS AND OTHER A/C THE PORTUGUESE LEFT BEHIND.

B. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE ANGOLANS WERE EXTREMELY HAPPY TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL AIRFRAMES SINCE THE QJBANS AND RUSSIANS PROHIBITED THEM FROM GETTING CLOSE TO THE EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE IN-COUNTRY. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c) THERE IS TOTAL DIS-  
JUST WITH THE QJBAN/RUSSIAN ADVISORS. ALSO THE CONSENSUS OF  
OPINION HOLDS THAT PRESIDENT NETO IS A VIRTUAL PRISONER

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

~~GDS 31 DEC 1993~~

BT

BT

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
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PAGE 001

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 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
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 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

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 RUSNNOA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 VAIHINGEN GER//

BT  
 UNCLAS E F T D SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

UNCLAS EFTO

SERIAL: IIR (b)(9):10 USC 424  
 COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AQ), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)  
 SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS  
 - IN ANGOLA, II  
 WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
 - INTEL  
 DOI: 840109  
 REQS: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
 SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: A STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN MAGNUS ((MALAN)) SAID SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN FROM BATTLE AREAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AFTER A MONTH OF CONDUCTING WHAT DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAVE TERMED A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION AGAINST SWAPO BASES. ON 840107 INFORMATION WAS RELEASED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAD KILLED A

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MJR

PAGE 001

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RUEAIIA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEALGX/SAFE

R 091455Z JAN 84

FM (b)(3)-10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC, (b)(3)-10 USC 424

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUFHDL (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(g)

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RUEHOT

RUSNNDIA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER, (b)(3)-50 USC 424

RUSNNDIA/USEUCOM (b)(3)-5 VAHINGEN GER//

BT

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3)-10 USC 424

UNCLAS EFTO

SERIAL: IIR (b)(3)-10 USC 424

COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AQ) SOUTH AFRICA (SF)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3)-10 USC 424 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS

ON ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES BY SWAPO OR "FORCES OF ANY OTHER ORDER" WHILE THE SCALING-DOWN OPERATION IS IN PROGRESS.

COMMENTS: SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFORMATION IS PROBABLY TRUE.

PROJ: N/A

COLL: NONE

INSTR: (b)(3)-10 USC 424

PREP:

APPR:

EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

ENCL: NONE

DISSEM: N/A

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLAS EFTO

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

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AIR RADAR SYSTEMS."

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
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TO DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)



USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50  
USEUCOM (b) VAHINGEN GER//

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

UNCLAS EFTO

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: IIR

COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS

- IN ANGOLA, II

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

- INTEL

DOI: 840109

REQS: (b)(3):10 USC 424


SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: A STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN MAGNUS (MALAN) SAID SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN FROM BATTLE AREAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AFTER A MONTH OF CONDUCTING WHAT DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAVE TERMED A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION AGAINST SWAPO BASES. ON 840107 INFORMATION WAS RELEASED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAD KILLED A COMBINED FORCE OF 324 SWAPO, CUBAN AND ANGOLAN TROOPS AND DESTROYED 11 SOVIET TANKS, IN FIGHTING AT CUEVELAI (b)(3):10 USC 424 SEVEN SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS DIED IN THE LATEST ENCOUNTER, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 21 SINCE THE OPERATION BEGAN ON 6 DEC 83.

TEXT: 1. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS, LTGEN IAN ((GLEESON)) SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) HAD SUCCEEDED IN DISPERSING THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) BUILD-UP, DISRUPTING THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR INFILTRATION OF NAMIBIA AND TURNED BACK THE SPEARHEAD OF THEIR ADVANCE.

2. THE RELEASE STATED THAT A COMBINED FORCE OF 324 SWAPO, CUBAN AND ANGOLAN TROOPS HAD BEEN KILLED, AN 11 TANKS DESTROYED AFTER AN ATTACK ON AN SADF CONTINGENT ON 840103 NEAR CUEVELAI. THE DEFENSE FORCE CLAIMED A NUMBER OF PRISONERS - INCLUDING ANGOLAN - HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT WOULD NOT DISCLOSE THE EXACT NUMBER. SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD FACED HEAVY ARTILLERY AND TANKS. ELEVEN TANKS HAD BEEN PUT OUT OF ACTION BY SOUTH AFRICAN INFANTRY USING ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND 90 MM CANNON ON INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES. IN ADDITION THE SADF HAS DESTROYED A "SIZABLE" AMOUNT OF MILITARY HARDWARE--INCLUDING "SOPHISTICATED

ACTION  
INFO



- +CSA WASHINGTON DC
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- +CSAF WASHINGTON DC
- +CIA WASHINGTON DC
- +CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
- +DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
- +CMC WASHINGTON DC
- +SAFE

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

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PAGE 1 OF 1  
091455Z JAN 84  
SECT 01 OF 02

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE

ZYUW RUEHSAAD273 009154Z

R 091455Z JAN 84

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER (b)(3):50 USC

USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC VAHINGEN GER//

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

UNCLAS EFTO

SERIAL: IIR (b)(3):10 USC

COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS

ON ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES BY SWAPO OR "FORCES OF ANY OTHER ORDER" WHILE THE SCALING-DOWN OPERATION IS IN PROGRESS.

COMMENTS: SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFORMATION IS PROBABLY TRUE.

PROJ: N/A

COLL: NONE

INSTR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP:

APPR:

EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

ENCL: NONE

DISSEM: N/A BT

ACTION  
INFO

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NIDS(\*) J5(\*) SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(\*) USDP(\*\*)

ASD-P&F(\*) (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

- +CSA WASHINGTON DC
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- +CMC WASHINGTON DC
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SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

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
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091455Z JAN 84  
SECT 02 OF 02



MSGNO 2 (MIIR) ISG \*06/01/82\* \*10:43\*  
ZCZC 15:39:45Z (MI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY



82 7759006

MCP

TOR: 061332Z JAN 82

NC 7759006

PP RUEAIIA  
DE RUEHSA #0084 0061325  
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P 061324Z JAN 82  
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):10 USC 424 / PRIORITY  
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RUEHKI PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY  
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
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BT


EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/CUBA/ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/  
SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA (U)  
DIA FOR DC-1(CCF)/JSW-1/JSI-5/DB-3/JSI-4B; INFO DB-3D1/  
DB-3E2/DC-4A/JSI-5B.



- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/CUBA (CU)/ANGOLA (AO)  
- NAMIBIA (NA)
  2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
  3. (U) TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
  4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820106
  5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
  6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

MSGNO 2 (MIIR) ISG \*06/01/82\* \*10:43\*

- (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) HAS CONFIRMED THE LOSS OF ONE OF ITS PUMA HELICOPTERS WITH CREW IN FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA DURING 4-5 JAN 82. THE THREE CONFIRMED KIA INCLUDED THE SON OF MAJ GEN DENNIS J. (HEARP)), SAAF, CHIEF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, HQ, SADF. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME TO INDICATE WHETHER CUBAN TROOPS MIGHT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE SADF HEL AND CREW. THE CUBAN PRISONER TAKEN BY THE SADF IN ANGOLA ON 5 JAN 82 WAS EVACUATED INTO NAMIBIA ON 6 JAN 82 AND IS BEING INTERROGATED IN NAMIBIA AT THIS TIME.

9.A. (U) DETAILS: NONE

9.B. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424.1.4 (c)

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A

12. (U) SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO

13. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. (U) APPROVED BY:

15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

16. (U) ENCL: N/A

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A


~~DECL: 6 JAN 86~~

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MSGNO 8 (MIIR) ISG \*18/01/82\* \*19:09\*  
7CZC 15:08:14Z (MI)

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82 7772109 MUP

TOR: 080949Z JAN 82

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
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
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RUFDAAA  
RHOLCNE  
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RUOOVIA  
BT

EZ1:

UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/CUBA/ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/  
SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 3



THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/CUBA (CU)/ANGOLA (AO)/  
- NAMIBIA (NA)
2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 3
4. DATE OF INFO: 820107
5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. SOURCE: PRETORIA NEWS *OKA.1*

8. SUMMARY: THE CUBAN SOLDIERS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT  
FIGHTING AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF)

8305020736

MSGNO 8 (MIIR) ISG \*18/01/82\* \*10:09\*  
UNITS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA MAY HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF A  
CUBAN LOGISTICAL UNIT BASED AT LUBANGO (b)(3):10 USC 424  
THE ONE CUBAN PRISONER AND ONE KIA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED  
AS MEMBERS OF A LOGISTICAL COMPANY BASED THERE. THE  
PRISONER WAS IDENTIFIED AS PRIVATE FRANCISCO PAULO  
(HERNANDEZ), AGE 31. PVT HERNANDEZ IS MARRIED, HAS  
FOUR CHILDREN, AND HAD BEEN STATIONED IN ANGOLA FOR  
FIVE MONTHS. THE KIA WAS IDENTIFIED AS SERGEANT RAYMUNDO  
(DAVILA). ,NDD

- 
- 9.A. DETAILS: NONE  
9.B. ORIG CMTS: SOURCE IS A DAILY NEWSPAPER THAT IS  
SOMETIMES RELIABLE; INFO IS POSSIBLY TRUE. THIS REPORT  
ADDS DETAIL TO IR'S (b)(3):10 USC 424 MORE DETAIL WILL  
BE AVAILABLE LATER.  
10. PROJ NO: N/A  
11. COLL MGMT CODES: N/A  
12. SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO  
13. PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424  
14. APPROVED BY:  
15. REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE  
16. ENCL: N/A  
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

NNDD

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