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RUDKFDG/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0063
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0013
RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0008
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0013
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0002
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0002
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PRAIA 0253

E.O. 11652: XGDS 4

TAGS: PINT, PGOV, PINR, EAIR, MOPS, AO, CV

SUBJECT: USE OF AMILCAR CABRAL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO
FERRY CUBAN MILITARY AND OTHER PERSONNEL

REF: PRAIA 0160

1. UNTIL AROUND THE END OF FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR ONE FLIGHT
PER WEEK OF CUBAN AND ANGOLAN AIRWAYS EN ROUTE LUANDA PASSED
THROUGH AMILCAR CABRAL AIRPORT ON THE ISLAND OF SAL. THESE
FLIGHTS NORMALLY CARRIED AROUND 160 PEOPLE, MOST IF NOT ALL
CUBANS.

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH THESE FLIGHTS INCREASED TO
TWICE WEEKLY. ONCE AGAIN THE PLANES SEEMED TO BE FULLY
BOOKED. THE PASSENGERS WERE ALMOST ALL YOUNG MALES WITH

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DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

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CLOSELY CROPPED HAIR AND IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION.

3. AT THE END OF MARCH THE FLIGHTS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY TO SEVERAL A WEEK, AND OCCASIONALLY TWICE DAILY. THE TRAFFIC SEEMED TO BE ALL IN ONE DIRECTION (I.E. HAVANA TO POINTS IN AFRICA, MOSTLY ANGOLA). COMMENT: A SOURCE WHO WORKS AT THE AIRPORT TOLD CHARGE THAT HE HAD CONFIRMED WITH RADIO AND RADAR OPERATORS AT AIRPORT THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THIS TRAFFIC WAS HEADED SOUTH AND NO LOADED AIRCRAFT WERE RETURNING THROUGH SAL. END COMMENT. THE PLANES CARRIED SOMEWHAT REDUCED NUMBER OF PASSENGERS, NORMALLY AROUND 130 TO 135. ALL OF THE AIRCRAFT APPEARED TO BE ILUYSHINS AND BOEING 707S, AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ILUYSHINS BEARING AEROFLOT MARKINGS CARRYING CUBAN PERSONNEL PASSED THROUGH SAL.

4. THE DAILY (OCCASIONALLY TWICE A DAY) FLIGHTS OF CUBAN AND ANGOLAN AIRWAYS AIRCRAFT THROUGH SAL CONTINUED AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF MAY AND POSSIBLY INTO JUNE. AT THAT TIME THEY WERE REDUCED TO TWICE WEEKLY WHICH IS THE CURRENT PATTERN.

5. KNOWLEDGE OF THE USE OF SAL AS A FERRYING POINT FOR CUBAN PERSONNEL BECAME FAIRLY WIDESPREAD IN CAPE VERDE, DESPITE THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY MEASURES AT THE AIRPORT. THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR, THE BRAZILIAN CONSUL AND THE U.S. CHARGE AND TDY VICE CONSUL ALL WERE AT THE AIRPORT AT DIFFERENT TIMES WHEN THE CUBAN PASSENGERS DISEMBARKED AND ENTERED THE TRANSIT LOUNGE OF AMILCAR CABRAL AIRPORT. THE CUBANS WOULD REMAIN IN THE TRANSIT LOUNGE FOR AT LEAST NINETY MINUTES WHILE THEIR AIRCRAFT TOOK ON FUEL AND WAS SERVICED.

6. THE PERSONNEL TRANSITING AMILCAR CABRAL WERE GENERALLY A HOMOGENOUS GROUP (YOUNG, TRIM, CURIOUS, SHORT HAIR, GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION, GOOD DISCIPLINE, UNIFORMS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION). IN THE GROUPS OBSERVED BY WESTERN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO PRAIA THERE ALWAYS SEEMED TO BE SEVERAL OLDER MEN WHO WERE IN CHARGE OF THE GROUP. THESE OLDER MEN SEEMED ALSO TO ACT AS LIAISON OFFICERS WITH THE AEROFLOT PERSONNEL WHO MET THE PLANES. SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL FROM PRAIA WERE ALSO OBSERVED

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MEETING THE PLANES.

7. REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES SEEM TO POINT TO THE
PASSAGE THROUGH SAL DURING THE MONTHS OF APRIL AND MAY
OF MORE THAN TEN THOUSAND (10,000) CUBANS. A SOUTH AFRICAN
TECHNICIAN WORKING AT AMILCAR CABRAL TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT
HE HAD COUNTED EIGHTY SEVEN (87) FLIGHTS IN APRIL AND MAY
CARRYING CUBANS VIA SAL, AND ALL OF THESE FLIGHTS HEADED
TOWARD AFRICA.

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 PRAIA 0253

8. ON 18 JUNE THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH OF LONDON PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON THE USE OF AMILCAR CABRAL AIRPORT AS A POINT OF TRANSIT FOR CUBANS HEADED FOR AFRICA. ON JUNE 20 THE CAPE VERDEAN AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL, CORSINO FORTES, FORMALLY DENIED THE UTILIZATION OF THE AIRPORT IN SAL BY SOVIET PLANES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF WAR MATERIAL OR CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA.

9. ON JUNE 24 LOCAL WEEKLY "VOZDIPVOY" PUBLISHED CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED BUT UNATTRIBUTED DENIAL OF REPORTS THAT THE ISLAND OF SAL WAS BEING USED AS POINT FOR CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. IN FACT ARTICLE WAS BASED ON AMBASSADOR FORTES' STATEMENT TO THE LISBON PRESS (SEE LISBON 4580).

10. DURING AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRESIDENT PEREIRA ON JULY 6 THE LATTER CONFIRMED PASSAGE OF CUBANS THROUGH SAL. PRESIDENT NOTED AND DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS AND PRESSURES WHICH BEAR ON GOCV IN THIS SITUATION, I.E. THE EXISTENCE OF A

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CIVIL AIR AGREEMENT BETWEEN CAPE VERDE AND CUBA, THE "CIVILIAN" STATUS OF THE PASSENGERS AND THE CLOSE RELATIONS OF GOCV WITH CUBA. MORE IMPORTANT ARE THE COMMITMENTS AND CLOSE AND FRATERNAL RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE GOCV AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA AND BETWEEN THE MPLA AND THE PAIGC. THE GOCV IS COMMITTED TO THE SUPPORT AND DEFENSE OF THE NETO GOVERNMENT AND RECOGNIZES THAT AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA NEEDS CUBAN PRESENCE TO SURVIVE (SEE PRAIA A-6 OF MARCH 30). PEREIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXPANDING CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA BUT CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT UNTIL THE NEED FOR THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IS REMOVED, HE DOES NOT SEE HOW HIS GOVERNMENT CAN DECLINE TO AUTHORIZE THE PASSAGE OF CUBAN PERSONNEL THROUGH SAL. B1

11. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT MANY FACTORS, WEIGHTS, PRESSURES AND CONSIDERATIONS ARE INVOLVED IN THE CAPE VERDEAN DECISION TO ALLOW THE USE OF SAL AS A TRANSIT POINT FOR CUBAN PERSONNEL HEADED FOR POINTS OF AFRICA.

PEREIRA WOULD PROBABLY RATHER NOT HAVE THE CUBANS GOING THROUGH SAL BUT SEES THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, AS BEING NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED. THE PASSAGE OF CUBANS THROUGH SAL IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. B1
MARKS

END OF MESSAGE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 12 BILATERAL WITH PORTUGUESE
FM MIRANDA

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH FM
MIRANDA FOCUSED ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHERE MIRANDA EXPRESSED
PESSIMISM THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVT WOULD SEE ITS WAY CLEAR TO
ENTER INTO A MEANINGFUL, PUBLIC DIALOGUE WITH SAVIMBI AND
UNITA. END SUMMARY.3. MIRANDA'S LATE ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS FROM LUANDA MADE IT
IMPOSSIBLE TO SCHEDULE A FORMAL BILATERAL IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER,
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OPENING NAC PLENARY SESSION ON
DECEMBER 12, THE SECRETARY SOUGHT MIRANDA OUT AND THEY HELD A
FIFTEEN MINUTE INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION IN THE PORTUGUESE
DELEGATION AREA. THE SECRETARY CONGRATULATED MIRANDA ON HIS
DESIGNATION AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT
MEETING HIM FOR THE FIRST TIME. HE THEN STRESSED THE VALUE WE
PLACED ON OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PORTUGAL, REFERRING TO THE
MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF THOSE RELATIONS (NATO, BILATERAL
SECURITY TIES, TRADE). IN THAT LATTER REGARD, MIRANDA
EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER TEXTILES AND INDICATED THAT THEY WERE
DEPENDENT ON THE PRESIDENT TO DO THE RIGHT THING. THE
SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD
SECURE THE VOTES TO SUSTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S VETO. THE
PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED ON THE PROTECTIONISM ISSUE,
BUT WE HADTO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS EPISODE WAS AN INDICATION OF
SENTIMENT ON THE HILL.4. TURNING TO SOUTH AFRICA, THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO HIS
USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP ON THE REGION AND INDICATED
HOW

MUCH HE VALUED THEIR INSIGHTS IN THIS AREA. MIRANDA RESPONDED

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Date 1/22/04

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.

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THAT HE HAD JUST FLOWN IN FROM ANGOLA. THEY HAD JUST ELECTED A
NEW POLITICAL COMMITTEE. IT WAS TOO SOON TO KNOW WHERE THIS
WOULD LEAD. THEY HAD TAKEN IN MORE MILITARY MEN AND PEOPLE
FROM THE PROVINCES. IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER WEEK OR SO FOR THE
SITUATION TO BECOME CLEARER. MIRANDA SAID HE HAD TALKED TO
ANGOLAN LEADERS ABOUT UNITA, BUT THEY HAD MANIFESTED NO
INTENTION OF ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE. [

THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE
THE FIGHT AND MIRANDA BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS/CUBANS WOULD
SUPPORT THEM IF THINGS ESCALATED. [

5. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN FACT ESCALATION WAS ALREADY IN
PROGRESS, AND THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS HAD SUPPORTED IT. WE
FRANKLY WONDERED HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE THE MPLA TO REALIZE
THAT THIS "SUPPORT" WAS COSTING THEM MONEY THEY SIMPLY COULD
NOT AFFORD, AND IT WAS PREVENTING THEM FROM PUTTING IN PLACE A
SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE AND COMMERCE THAT WORKED. MIRANDA AGREED,
SAYING THAT THE ANGOLANS DESPERATELY NEEDED TO CONCENTRATE ON
MANAGEMENT AND MODERNIZATION. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE LUSAKA
MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE, TO WHICH THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT
AS CROCKER WOULD BE IN LUSAKA IN A WEEK OR SO. HE HAD GOTTEN
AS LEAST AN INDICATION OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND WE HAD NOTED
SOME POSITIVE REACTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

6. MIRANDA THEN REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT THE LUANDA
AUTHORITIES

SIMPLY WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO TALK TO UNITA OPENLY. THE
SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SIMPLY WOULD HAVE TO
RECONCILE THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY. MIRANDA
RESPONDED THAT HIS STILL WAS NOT APPARENT TO THEM AND HE FELT
THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION COULD CONCEIVABLE CONTINUE FOR
YEARS.

7. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH MIRANDA RAISING BRIEFLY A
PROBLEM

WITH REGARD TO THE "LAJES AGREEMENT." A US CONTRACTOR, HE
SAID, WAS CHANGING THE CONDITIONS WITH REGARD TO THE TENDER OF
OFFERS. THEIR AMBASSADOR WOULD BE RAISING THIS ISSUE IN
WASHINGTON, HE SAID. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD
CERTAINLY ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM; WE REALIZED THAT SMALL
PROBLEMS

WERE OFTEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN BIG ONES AND THAT THEY OFTEN
ONLY GOT WORSE IF LEFT UNATTENDED. SHULTZ
END OF MESSAGE

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
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RUEHCR/AMCONSUL DURBAN 5654

RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 4403

RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 1762

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RUEHRU/AMEMBASSY MASERU 3097

RUEHMB/AMEMBASSY MBABANE 4324

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CONTROLS

SECRET PRETORIA 17083

EXDIS

AF FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

BODY

TAGS: SF, PGOV, AO

SUBJECT: THE WAR IN ANGOLA

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

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2. AT A DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE ON NOVEMBER 5, [] MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR MAJOR GENERAL CHRIS [] GAVE US AN UPDATE ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA. [] OBVIOUSLY PLEASED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF SADF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS. [] WANTS TO FOLLOW UP AGAINST CUITO CUANAVALA. HE SAID HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN "VICTORY" IN THE BUSH WAR WAS BUT ANOTHER CHAPTER IN A SAGA WITH A LONG TIME YET TO RUN.

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3. [] THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE CUITO RIVER BRIDGE IN SEPTEMBER HAD NOT BEEN THE CATALYST FOR THE SADF'S BOLD MOVES TO BREAK THE SOVIET/FAPLA OFFENSIVE. RATHER THE TRIP WIRE WAS AND REMAINS FAPLA MOVEMENT TO CROSS THE LOMBA RIVER AND MOVE TOWARD MAVINGA. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WAS IMMINENT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS ACTED.

4. [] THE WAR HAD BEEN CURIOUSLY A SOVIET/SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT, AND THAT WORRIED HIM. THE CUBANS HAD BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE, NOTABLY IN THE AIR. THE STINGERS HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE BUT THERE WAS A GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS TO BE INVOLVED. [] THE CUBANS NOW MAY SENSE THAT THEIR ANGOLA ADVENTURE IS A FAILURE. INDEED MAYBE THAT IS TRUE OF THEIR AFRICA EXPERIENCE AS A WHOLE. FAPLA BRIGADES HAD IN FACT FOUGHT AND MANUEVERED IN A GENERALLY COURAGEOUS MANNER DESPITE THEIR IMPOSSIBLE PREDICAMENT.

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5. ON FAPLA'S PERFORMANCE, [] REMARKED, "THEY GET BETTER EVERY YEAR. WHEN THEY COME BACK IN TWO YEARS, THEY WILL BE BETTER STILL." NONETHELESS, [] THE NEXT FAPLA OFFENSIVE -- WHENEVER IT COMES -- WILL BE A DEPRESSING EXPERIENCE FOR THE ANGOLANS AS THEY MOVE PAST THE RUSTED HULKS OF DESTROYED EQUIPMENT AND THE UNBURIED BODIES OF THE DEAD FROM THE EARLIER OFFENSIVES.

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6. [] DESCRIBED THE SADF AS VERY WARY OF THE OTHER SIDE IN THE EARLY ENGAGEMENTS. FO EXAMPLE, THE G-5S WERE USED HESITATINGLY AT FIRST, FIRING A FEW ROUNDS AND ONLY AT NIGHT. [] CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN ANGOLA RADAR FOR SPOTTING THE ORIGIN OF ARTILLERY SHELLS; HOWEVER, WHEN IT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE IN OPERATION, SADF USE OF THE G-5S BECAME MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVE INCLUDING MASSIVE

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DAYLIGHT BOMBARDMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAD A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE WITH A LOT OF THEIR TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT.

7. [] THE SAAF HAD BEEN USED ONLY SPARINGLY AT FIRST, "NOT AT ALL LIKE 1985." THE SOUTH AFRICANS REMAIN VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE SOVIET SAMS. LATER ON, HOWEVER, THE SAAF BECAME MORE ACTIVE. BUT THE MIRAGE WHICH SOFT LANDED ON A ROAD AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRIEVED WAS THE ONLY LOSS.

[] THE SAMS WERE NOT WELL DEPLOYED AND WERE POORLY UTILIZED.

8. [] THE SOUTH AFRICANS WON BECAUSE THEY FOUGHT A DEFENSIVE BUSH WAR WITH GENERALLY LIGHT, UNCOMPLICATED EQUIPMENT AND A GREAT DEAL OF MOBILITY AND DECEPTION. THE SOVIETS LOST BECAUSE THEY FOUGHT A CUMBERSOME CONVENTIONAL
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 PRETORIA 17083

EXDIS

AF FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: SF, PGOV, AO

SUBJECT: THE WAR IN ANGOLA -- [] OFFENSIVE WAR. AND, WHEN THINGS STARTED TO GO WRONG, THEY BECAME VICTIMS OF THE LOGISTICAL BREAK-UP OF THEIR COMPLEX OPERATION. [] THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD OPERATED UNDER A WORST CASE SCENARIO, I.E., THAT SADF INTERVENTION WOULD LIKELY PROVOKE A MAJOR SOVIET/CUBAN COUNTERSTRIKE. FOR WHATEVER REASON THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED.

WHAT NEXT?

9. [] NO FIRM DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ABOUT CUITO CUANAVALA, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY FELT IT HAD BEEN A TRAGIC MISTAKE TO ALLOW THE ANGOLANS TO CONSOLIDATE THAT POSITION OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE SADF IS SHELLING THE EAST BANK OF THE CUITO RIVER TO PREVENT FAPLA FROM SETTING UP DEFENSIVE LINES.

[] PERSONALLY WANTS TO GIVE CUITO CUANAVALA A VERY HARD TIME. SHELLING AND HARASSMENT OF CUITO ITSELF AND THE WEST BANK HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

10. FURTHER NORTH, [] CONCERNED BY FAPLA GAINS AROUND CANGAMBA. [] DID NOT EXCLUDE DIRECT SADF OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA. NO DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. BUT LOST GROUND WOULD HAVE TO BE RECLAIMED OR UNITA SUPPLY LINES TO THE NORTH WOULD BE COMPLICATED.

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11. [] GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IN FUTURE, SADF
PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY IN ANGOLA IN SUPPORT OF UNITA
WILL BE MORE PROMINENT AND ACTIVE. IN THAT REGARD,
[] IMPLIED THAT ARMOR UNITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
MOVED ACROSS THE BORDER. [] DID NOT SEEM
COMFORTABLE WITH THAT DEVELOPMENT IN HIS BUSH WAR.

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12. [] "WE WILL BE DOING ALL OF THIS
AGAIN IN TWO YEARS." PERKINS
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

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
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RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0044
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0132
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0016
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CONTROLS

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

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TAGS: PREL, AO, SF

SUBJECT: STRAUSS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. I MET WITH STRAUSS FOR 90 MINUTES
JUNE 29TH. STRAUSS IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT RECENT
CUBAN ATTACKS ON SAG FORCES AT CALUEQUE DAM WILL
ELICIT A STRONG SAG RESPONSE, THEREBY ENDANGERING
RECENT PROGRESS AT CAIRO TALKS. STRAUSS HAS SENT

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MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV URGING SOVIET PRESSURE ON CUBANS AND ASKS THAT U.S. USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT HAS IN LUANDA TO URGE RESTRAINT. END SUMMARY.

3. STRAUSS WAS WELL BRIEFED ON LATEST BYPLAY IN ANGOLA NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT PIK BOTHA CALLED HIM YESTERDAY TO REPORT THAT DESPITE THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE CREATED AT THE CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS, CUBAN AIR FORCE HAD LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ON SAG FORCES OCCUPYING THE CALUEQUE DAM. 11 SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BEEN KILLED. IN RELATED FIGHTING AT CHIPA MPLA AND CUBANS HAD SUFFERED 400 LOSSES, PIK HAD REQUESTED STRAUSS TO USE HIS INFLUENCE IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON TO PLEAD FOR CUBAN RESTRAINT. BOTHA SAID THAT SAG HAD "EXCELLENT" INFORMATION THAT CUBANS WERE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF MOSCOW TO INCREASE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE SAG BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO RAISE THE PRICE THEY WOULD ASK THE SOVIETS FOR CTW FROM ANGOLA. BOTHA TOLD STRAUSS THAT SAG WOULD "HIT BACK, AND HIT BACK HARD" IN FACE OF LATEST CUBAN ADVANCES.

4. STRAUSS AS MEDIATOR?

STRAUSS LISTENED CAREFULLY TO EXPLANATION OF OUR VIEWS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BUT SAID THAT IF U. S. SOUGHT RECONCILIATION WITHOUT SAVIMBI (AS OPPOSED TO UNITA) WE COULD FORGET THE WHOLE AFFAIR. DOS SANTOS HAD SENT HIM TWO LETTERS RECENTLY URGING HIM TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE. PIK BOTHA HAD TOLD HIM THAT GIVEN THE PRESENT TALKS, AS WELL AS MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO OFFER HIMSELF AS MEDIATOR. NONETHELESS, BOTHA URGED HIM TO REMAIN ENGAGED, READY TO PLAY A ROLE IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. STRAUSS SAID HE HAS NO PERSONAL OR POLITICAL INTEREST IN MUCKING AROUND IN SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT SAID HE WAS WILLING TO PLAY A ROLE "ONLY IF I CAN FURTHER THE PROCESS OF PEACE IN THE REGION."

5. NAMIBIA

STRAUSS SAID THAT BOTH P.W. BOTHA AND PIK BOTHA HAD CONVINCED HIM THEY WERE SERIOUS ABOUT NEGOTIATING A CTW AND INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA BASED ON 435. BUT BOTHA HAD SAID THAT PREREQUISITE FOR GETTING OUT OF NAMIBIA WAS "AN END OF INTIMIDATION OF THE OVOMBU." HE WOULD NOT TURN NAMIBIA OVER TO SWAPO. [

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6. MOZAMBIQUE

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STRAUSS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD MET WITH DHLAKAMA
"A FEW DAYS AGO IN MUNICH." DHLAKAMA, STRAUSS SAID. B1

HAD
PLEADED FOR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING IN HIS PROGRAM TO
PROMOTE "FREE ELECTIONS, AND OVERTHROW OF MARXISM-
LENINISM AND A RETURN OF CAPITALISM" TO MOZAMBIQUE.
STRAUSS ASKED IF THE GERSONY REPORT WAS ACCURATE.
WHEN ASSURED THAT IT WAS, STRAUSS SAID THAT WE FACED
A SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE IN WHICH THE WORST ARMY IN
THE WORLD WAS FIGHTING WITH THE MOST UNDISCIPLINED GUER-
ILLA FORCE IN THE WORLD. AS A RESULT, A COUNTRY AND
PEOPLE WERE BEING DESTROYED. B1

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 MUNICH 02565

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, AO, SF

SUBJECT: STRAUSS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

8. STRAUSS SAID THAT U.S. POLICY WAS ON THE MARK IN
DEFINING ANGOLA AS THE KEY TO PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE EITHER ANGOLA OR MOZAMBIQUE
BUT TO SEEK A REGIONAL REDUCTION OF TENSION. HE WAS

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QUITE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE RETHINKING THEIR AFRICAN POLICY. GORBACHEV HAD TOLD HIM IT WAS A LOT EASIER TO INTRODUCE TROOPS INTO A REGION THAN IT WAS PULLING THEM OUT. BUT, STRAUSS CONCLUDED, IF WE WANT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS IT HAS TO BE ON THE PERIPHERY. THE SITUATION IN EUROPE WAS STALEMATED, LOCKED BETWEEN AN ENORMOUS CONCENTRATION OF FORCES THAT DID NOT ALLOW MUCH MOVEMENT. BUT THE SOVIETS WERE OVEREXTENDED: AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA. HE AGREED THAT THE SAG HAD OFTEN BEEN INTRANSIGENT AND UNWILLING TO LET THEIR AFRICAN "LOSE FACE GRACEFULLY." THAT WAS THE KEY TO SUCCESS. STRAUSS ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY ONCE AGAIN REITERATING HIS CONCERN THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL AND WRECK THE "REAL PROSPECT" FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

9. COMMENT. I CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT STRAUSS HAS BY NO MEANS MADE UP HIS MIND ABOUT RENAMO. ON THE ONE HAND, HE APPEARED GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF RENAMO ATROCITIES.,

B1

10. STRAUSS APPEARED IMPRESSED WITH RESULTS OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN THE REGION AND SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH CROCKER IN WASHINGTON (SEPTTEL). FOR THE MOMENT, AT LEAST, HE APPEARS TO HAVE BACKED OFF HIS EARLIER ENTHUSIASM TO PLAY THE PEACEMAKER BUT IS PREPARED TO DO SO WHEN HE BELIEVES HE HAS A CHANCE OF SUCCESS. FISCHER

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END OF MESSAGE

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EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PDEV MILI CU AO WA
SUBJ: CUBANS ALLUDE TO ANGOLAN BUFFER ZONE

1. FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION ON [REDACTED] BETWEEN [REDACTED]
AND CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ WAS GIVEN TO
PRINCIPAL OFFICER BY [REDACTED]

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31
B1

2. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, WHICH DEALT LARGELY WITH
BILATERAL MATTERS, [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT IT
SEEMED TO HIM THAT CUBA HAS RECENTLY ASSUMED A DISTINCTLY
LOWER PROFILE IN AFRICA. RODRIGUEZ REPORTEDLY AGREED WITH THIS
ASSESSMENT AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT CUBA HAS NEVER OPPOSED
PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN AFRICA. HE THEN VOLUN-
TEERED [REDACTED] WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS ATTITUDE THE CONSTRUC-
TIVE CUBAN RESPONSE TO A US OR WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL PUT TO
[REDACTED] BY CHIEF REVIEW PANEL TAMP [REDACTED] BUFFER ZONE OR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL

[REDACTED]

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OF FORCES ALONG THE ANGOLAN BORDER BE EFFECTED IN THE INTERESTS
OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. RODRIGUEZ REPORTEDLY
TOLD THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD RESPONDED
TO OUR DEMARCHE SAYING THAT, WHILE A DECISION ON THIS PROPOSAL
MUST COME FROM THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT, CUBA WOULD PASS THE
SUGGESTION ON TO THE ANGOLANS WITH AN INDICATION THAT CUBA
VIEWED IT FAVORABLY. B1

3. RODRIGUEZ ALSO CITED FIDEL CASTRO'S SUGGESTION LAST YEAR
TO MICHEL PONIATOWSKI THAT FRANCE AND CUBA UNDERTAKE A JOINT
MEDICAL PROJECT IN ANGOLA WITH FRANCE SUPPLYING MEDICINES AND
CUBA THE DOCTORS.

4. COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ'S CITATION OF THE ANGOLAN BUFFER ZONE
IDEA MAY HAVE SIGNIFICANCE NOW THAT POSSIBILITIES HAVE ONCE
AGAIN OPENED UP FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DRAWDOWN IN NAMIBIA. AT TIME
LAST YEAR WHEN CUBANS COMMUNICATED THEIR FINAL THOUGHTS ON SUB-
JECT, WE HAD IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE SOMEWHAT MORE NEUTRAL ON
IDEA THAN PARA 2 DESCRIPTION WOULD SEEM TO IMPLY.

WE ARE REPORTING
CONVERSATION AT PRESENT TIME IN EVENT THAT BUFFER-ZONE
CONCEPT MAY HAVE RELEVANCE TO PRESENT NAMIBIA ARRANGEMENTS.
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END OF MESSAGE

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RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0396
RUTAOU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 3455
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E.O. 12065: ~~RUS 1 AND 3 AND 4~~ 25 OCT 99 (JOHNSON, MARILYN P.) OR-M
TAGS: CU UR PURG SHUM TO FR
SUBJECT: CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS; TOGO

REF: STATE 260695 (EXDIS)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PART OF MISSION EFFORT TO RESPOND TO POLICY REFEEL
DCM DISCUSSED SOVIET/CUBAN RELATIONS IN 22 OCTOBER MEETING
WITH TOGOLESE FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF CABINET
CHEAKA. DCM EMPHASIZED USE OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO CUBA TO INTERVENE IN OTHER COUNTRIES, CUBA'S UNCRITICAL

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SUBSERVANCE TO SOVIET POLICY AND CONTRADICTION BETWEEN
PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA AND CUBA'S CLAIMS TO NON-
ALIGNMENT. CHEAKA LISTENED POLITELY AND TOOK NOTES.

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E.O. 12065 RDS-1 5/5/01 (WISNER, FRANK G.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, AD

SUBJECT: ANGOLA: POST-CROCKER MISSION ASSESSMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY.

WE HAVE SHARED WITH US
A SERIES OF PAPERS PREPARED BY [REDACTED] FOLLOWING
DR. CROCKER'S VISIT TO ANGOLA. [REDACTED] CONCLUDE THAT THE
ANGOLANS ARE READY TO PRESS AHEAD WITH A NEGOTIATED NAMIBIAN
SETTLEMENT. THEY CONTINUE TO BE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT ANY
LINKAGE BETWEEN A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND A RESOLUTION OF
ANGOLA'S INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND A DEPARTURE OF CUBAN
TROOPS. THE ANGOLANS SEE THEIR OPTIONS AS VERY LIMITED
SINCE THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN COUNT ON SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET
ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT THAT THE CIVIL WAR BRINGS NEW
PRESSURES ON THE REGIME. THEY HAVE TOYED WITH AND PROBABLY
REJECTED EXPULSION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PETROLEUM COMPANIES IN
THE EVENT WE PROVIDE AID TO UNITA. [REDACTED]
CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY OF VIEWS
BETWEEN [REDACTED] WASHINGTON CONCERNING THE ANGOLAN

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SITUATION

END SUMMARY.

3. THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN LUANDA HAS PREPARED A SERIES OF ASSESSMENTS ON ANGOLA POST-DR. CROCKERS'S VISIT. IN THE EVENT THAT THESE ASSESSMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY SHARED WITH US, THE FOLLOWING ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS.

4. BACKGROUND. LOOKING BACK OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ANGOLANS COUNTED ON A CARTER VICTORY IN THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. THE ANGOLANS CALCULATED THAT CARTER WOULD BE ON ANGOLA'S SIDE IN DISAGREEMENTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THEY ALSO BELIEVED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS COMMITTED TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK AND WAS PREPARED TO WORK TOWARDS BETTER RELATIONS WITH LUANDA. INITIALLY ANGOLAN SHOCK OVER THE CARTER DEFEAT WAS OVERSHADOWED BY INTERNAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WHICH EMERGED DURING THE MPLA PARTY CONGRESS AND THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE GENEVA PIM. GRADUALLY, HOWEVER, LUANDA WOKE UP TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT AMERICAN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT TAKE A DIRECTION UNHELPFUL TO IT. THE FIRST SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS WERE TRANSMITTED.

DOS SANTOS CONFERRED WITH THE SOVIETS WHEN HE ATTENDED THE 28TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. IN MOSCOW, WE BELIEVE THAT DOS SANTOS LEARNED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO EXTEND MASSIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA, EVEN IF THE UNITED STATES RAISED THE ANTE IN NAMIBIA, HELPED SAVING AND ENCOURAGED A REOPENING OF THE NORTHERN FRONT BY RESUSCITATING THE FLNA. THE ANGOLANS WERE DEEPLY UPSET BY THE TREND THEY SAW IN AMERICAN THINKING AND THE NEWS THAT DR. CROCKER INTENDED TO VISIT LUANDA THEREFORE CAME AT A PARTICULARLY OPPORTUNE MOMENT.

5. NEGOTIATING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. DR. CROCKER GOT HIS MESSAGE ACROSS IN ANGOLA. HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT IF THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT GIVEN A STRONG BASIS ON WHICH TO PURSUE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT IT COULD WALK AWAY FROM THE MATTER. THE ANGOLANS UNDERSTOOD THAT WE DO

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NOT BELIEVE UNSC RESOLUTION 435 IS SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AND THEY LISTENED CAREFULLY TO OUR THOUGHTS ON THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION OR CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PROTECTIONS FOR NAMIBIA'S MINORITIES. DR. CROCKER'S MESSAGE WAS ONE OF FIRMNESS AND OPENNESS AND WAS NOT UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ANGOLANS. IN SHORT, ANGOLA REMAINS COMMITTED TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION FOR ANGOLA. IT WANTS THE WEST TO OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT AS LONG AS THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CONCERNS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES AND ENGAGES SOUTH AFRICA EXDIS

IRREVERSIBLY IN A DECISION.

6. SOVIET AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. THE ANGOLANS WERE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY THE EMPHASIS WHICH DR. CROCKER PUT ON A CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY WERE SHAKEN BY DR. CROCKER'S QUESTIONING OF HISTORY AND THE DOUBTS HE EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE INEVITABILITY OF A SOVIET-CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IN THE EVENT THAT NAMIBIA IS SETTLED. DR. CROCKER MADE THE POINT, WHICH THE ANGOLANS ACCEPTED, THAT NEW IDEAS WERE NECESSARY. THE ANGOLANS REMAIN CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PLANNING TO HELP UNITA AND POSSIBLY THE FLNA. EVEN IF ZAIRE REMAINS NEUTRAL, A MORE VIOLENT CIVIL WAR WOULD CREATE FRESH TENSIONS WITHIN THE MPLA AND THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP COULD FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP. EVEN IF THE SOVIETS AGREED TO INTERVENE MASSIVELY, WHICH THE ANGOLANS BELIEVE IS UNLIKELY, ANGOLA WOULD BECOME A NEW AFGHANISTAN, LOSING ITS PERSONALITY AND INDEPENDENCE.

7. THE ANGOLANS DO NOT HAVE MANY OPTIONS. THE LUANDA REGIME BRIEFLY CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF FORCING GULF, TEXACO AND MOBILE OUT OF THE PETROLEUM CONCESSIONS AND REPLACING THEM WITH EUROPEAN COMPANIES SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AID UNITA AND FLNA. THE ANGOLANS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ELF AND TOTAL ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS. THEY MAY EVEN HAVE CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF EMBARGOING PETROLEUM SALES TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT BELIEVE THAT THE ANGOLANS HAVE CONCLUDED THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET EUROPEAN HELP FOR THEIR OIL FIELDS AND THAT IF IT CAME IT MIGHT NOT BE EFFECTIVE. A PETROLEUM EMBARGO WOULD DO LITTLE TO HURT THE UNITED

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STATES. THE ONLY OPTION THE ANGOLANS BELIEVE THEY HAVE IS TO GENERATE AFRICAN POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES. THE RECENT FRONT LINE COMMUNIQUE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE ANGOLANS HAVE CHOSEN THIS OPTION FOR THE TIME BEING.

8. CONCLUDE THE ANGOLAN MODERATES ONLY ENJOY A SMALL MARGIN OF MANEUVER. THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP FACES THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE RADICAL CHALLENGE AND THE STRENGTH OF THE RADICALS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ASSERT THEMSELVES MAY HAVE BEEN SHOWN IN THE POLITICAL BUREAU'S COMMUNIQUE OF LATE APRIL 1981 ON THE SUBJECT OF "GENERAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST IMPERIALISM." AGREE WITH OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION BUT BELIEVE THAT EUROPEAN INTEREST IN ANGOLA ARE DIFFERENT FROM AMERICAN AND THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE EUROPEANS TO SUPPORT WITHOUT RESERVATION AN AMERICAN POSITION WHICH TIGHTLY LINKS NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA.

SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE THE ONLY COUNTERVAILING FORCE TO THE SOVIETS' PRESENCE IN ANGOLA NOW. AT THE RIGHT TIME, AND WITH A SOLID NAMIBIAN PLAN IN HAND THAT CONVINCES THE ANGOLANS NAMIBIA WILL BE SETTLED, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SEEK NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND A CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE GOOD OFFICES OF ONE OF ANGOLA'S NEIGHBORS--ZAMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE--COULD BE CALLED UPON AT THAT POINT.

9. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE THAT THE WEST AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE INITIATIVE WITH THE ANGOLANS. WE NEED TO PLAY OUR CARDS CAREFULLY AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE NAMIBIA TOWARDS REAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET BLOC. WISNER

END OF MESSAGE

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EXDIS

I.O. 12068: ROS-1 8/14/12 (PROPER, D.C.) DR-H
TAGS: PEPR PO AO WA
SUBJECT: AF DAS WISNER'S CONVERSATION ON SOUTHERN
AFRICA WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY

A. AF DAS WISNER, ANGOLA DESK OFFICER RANNEBERGER, ALAN KEYES (E/P), AND EMBOFFS MET JUNE 10 WITH THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, MORAIS CABRAL, TO DISCUSS ANGOLA/NAMIBIA ISSUES. WISNER PROVIDED A CANDID SUMMARY OF RECENT CONTACT GROUP ACTIVITY, EMPHASIZING THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH RECENT EVENTS PRESENTED FOR RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

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D. AMBASSADOR WISNER EXPRESSED US REGARD FOR THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES PORTUGAL POSSESSES IN DEALING WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA, AND FOR THE ROLE THE PORTUGUESE COULD (AND WE HOPED WOULD) PLAY IN COOPERATION WITH THE US AND CONTACT GROUP TOWARDS RESOLVING REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR PORTUGUESE SUGGESTIONS IN THE DAYS AHEAD AS WELL AS FOR WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT THE PORTUGUESE ROLE IN THE AREA.

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F. AMBASSADOR WISNER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE UPCOMING INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE WITH THE FRONTLINE STATES, WHICH WILL BE HELD IN LISBON AND IN WHICH THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL PLAYS A LEAD ROLE, COULD WELL PROVE TO BE A "HATE FEST" CONDEMNATORY OF CG EFFORTS AND EXIST PREJUDICIAL TO ONGOING PEACE EFFORTS.

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END SUMMARY
3. AMBASSADOR WISNER OPENED BY PROVIDING A CANDID SUMMARY OF CONTACT GROUP ACTIVITY SINCE THE FRONTLINE/SHAPO

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PAGE 003

NC 8837806

TOR: 182287Z JUN 82

REJECTION OF PHASE I ELECTORAL PROPOSALS AT THE DAR ES SALAAM MEETING ON MAY 4. HE DESCRIBED THE MAJOR PROGRESS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY THE US WITH THE SAG AT THE CROCKER/FOURIE MEETING IN GENEVA; THE POSITIVE REACTION OF OUR CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS TO THOSE RESULTS, LEADING TO THE DECISION TO LAUNCH A RENEWED DRIVE AIMED AT SPEEDING UP THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PROCESS; AND THE SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS AND RESULTS OF FRENCH AND BRITISH MEETINGS WITH MUGABE; THE CROCKER AND GENSCHER MEETINGS WITH MUJOMA IN BONN; AND THE WALTERS MISSION. HE NOTED THAT THESE COORDINATED INITIATIVES HAD AIMED AT PREPARING THE GROUND FOR FORMAL PRESENTATION OF PHASE ONE/PHASE TWO/CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS TO THE FRONTLINE BY A CG TEAM WHICH WAS EVEN NOW ON THE SCENE IN AFRICA. AMBASSADOR WISNER ALSO NOTED THAT THOSE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH UN AUTHORITIES WHO, TO DATE, HAD REGISTERED NO MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTION.

8. IN CONCLUDING HIS OPENING REMARKS, WISNER NOTED THAT IN TALKING WITH DOS SANTOS, THE WALTERS TEAM HAD MADE DISCREET REFERENCE TO THE DOMESTIC RECONCILIATION ISSUE, BY EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT SOME DAY ALL ANGOLANS COULD SIT AROUND THE SAME TABLE TOGETHER. AT THE SAME TIME THE TEAM HAD AFFIRMED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES TO SOLVE.

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TOR: 152207Z JUN 82

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10. WISNER NOTED WE HAD TOLD DOS SANTOS THAT IN A POST-CUBAN, POST-NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT ENVIRONMENT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO BRING ITS FULL WEIGHT TO BEAR IN ASSISTING ANGOLAN RECONSTRUCTION, JUST AS WE HAD DONE IN ZIMBABWE.

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TDR: 182297Z JUN 82

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TOR: 1822872 JUN 82

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18. AMBASSADOR WISNER SAID THAT THE USG HAD A DEEP AWARENESS AND APPRECIATION FOR THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES PORTUGAL ENJOYED IN DEALING WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA. WE HAD BEEN PROFOUNDLY STRUCK BY THE EAMES VISIT, ECHOS OF WHICH WERE STILL VERY EVIDENT TO THE WALTERS MISSION DURING THEIR VISIT TO LUANDA. THE US HOPED THAT ANGOLA WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH WE COULD WORK TOGETHER WITH PORTUGAL, AS WELL AS WITH OTHERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP. PORTUGAL COULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE. WE WERE ALL FACING A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIA/ANGOLA PROBLEM, AS WELL AS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR US AND PORTUGUESE

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COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC AVENUES
OF COOPERATION IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS IN THE REGION.
WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR PORTUGUESE SUGGESTIONS IN THE
DAYS AHEAD, AS WELL AS FOR WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD
SUPPORT PORTUGAL IN THE AREA IN ITS SPECIAL ROLE -- A
ROLE WE ADMIRE AND ENCOURAGE.

81

SOVIETS AS PART OF ITS
WISHER REPLIED THAT WE HAD
HAD A SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS IN WHICH
WE HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN
ISSUES TO US AND OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION.

18. KEYES OBSERVED THAT SWAPO ITSELF HAD AN
INCENTIVE TO CO-LOCATE ITS CAMPS WITH HIGH-VALUE ANGOLAN
EXD15
INFRASTRUCTURE, IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THE INTERVENTION
OF FAPLA IN ITS SUPPORT WHEN SWAPO CAMPS CAME UNDER
SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK.

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TOR: 152257Z JUN 82

21. AMBASSADOR WISNER INQUIRED ABOUT THE UPCOMING "INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE WITH THE FRONTLINE STATES" WHICH IS TO BE HELD IN LISBON JULY 16-18. MORAIS CABRAL REPLIED THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS EXPECTED TO ATTRACT SOME "FRONTLINE FOREIGN MINISTERS AS WELL AS OTHER IMPORTANT FIGURES. PRESIDENT EAVES HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE TO GRANT AN AUDIENCE TO CONFERENCE REPRESENTATIVES, AND WOULD DO SO.

AMBASSADOR WISNER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WPC SPONSORSHIP MADE IT LIKELY THE CONFERENCE WOULD TURN OUT TO BE A "HATE FEST" WHICH COULD ONLY COMPLICATE FURTHER THE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND MIGHT WELL PRODUCE A BLANKET DENUNCIATION OF CONTACT GROUP EFFORTS.

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21. THIS CABLE WAS NOT REVIEWED BY AMBASSADOR WISNER
OR MESSRS. KEYES OR RANNEBERGER PRIOR TO THEIR
DEPARTURE FROM LISBON.
2. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT CABLE TO OTHER
POSTS.
ROWELL
END OF MESSAGE

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MSGNO 57 (STXX) ISG *27/01/84* *01:13*
 ZCZC 06:12:37Z (ST)

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 FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0730
 RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 0480
 INFO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1070
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7723
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 2928
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PRAIA PRIORITY 0722

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

FOIPA/PA	Mandatory Review
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Exemptions

ARP Action Cert

B1
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Date 7/29/04

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Z1:
 SECRET LISBON 00871
 EXDIS
 Z2:
 CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY AND A/S CROCKER
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL AX, US
 SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SAG-ANGOLA MILITARY TALKS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
 2. DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MOZAMBICAN
 VELOSO AND DAS WISNER ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, THE
 LATTER RAISED THE IDEA OF ARRANGING PROXIMITY TALKS
 IN CAPE VERDE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN AND ANGOLAN
 MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IF THE SADF WITHDRAWAL FROM
 CUNENE HOLDS AND IS RESPECTED BY THE ANGOLANS, SWAPO
 AND THE CUBANS. WISNER ELABORATED THAT PERHAPS
 THERE COULD BE A U.S. PRESENCE TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY
 AND THE TWO SIDES COULD EXCHANGE MILITARY INFORMATION
 ABOUT PROBLEM AREAS, A PROCESS THAT COULD LEAD TO
 NEGOTIATIONS ON A CEASE FIRE.
 3. REACTION WAS NEGATIVE. HE STATED THAT
 BASED ON MOZAMBIQUE'S NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE WITH THE
 SAG, SOME SORT OF GENERAL FRAMEWORK OR POLITICAL
 AGREEMENT HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO LOOKING AT
 MILITARY DETAILS. ACCORDING TO TWO MIDDLE
 RANKING MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ACCOMPLISH
 LITTLE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT AT A HIGHER LEVEL.
 HE ALSO DID NOT BELIEVE A THIRD PARTY SHOULD PARTICIPATE
 DIRECTLY IN THE TALKS, ALTHOUGH HE ALLOWED THAT IT
 MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S. TO BE NEARBY. FINALLY
 HE RECOMMENDED AGAINST CAPE VERDE AS A SITE, URGING

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MSGNO 57 (STXX) ISG *27/01/84* *01:13*
THAT A LOCATION CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL ZONE BE USED
INSTEAD. HE MENTIONED BOTSWANA AS A POSSIBILITY AS
WELL AS THE REINSTITUTION OF THE MECHANISM WHEREBY
THE SAG AND ANGOLA EXCHANGED INFORMATION ON NORMAL
OPERATIONAL MATTERS.

4. [] UNDERSCORED THE DIFFICULTY A CALENDARIO
FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PRESENTED TO THE GPRA. HE SAID
PATRIOTISM AND SOVEREIGNTY WERE IMPORTANT FACTORS IN
KEEPING THE GPRA FROM OFFERING A TIME SCHEDULE. THERE
IS NO QUESTION THAT THE ANGOLANS WANT THE CUBANS TO
DEPART WHEN THE CONDITIONS ARE PROPER, STATED []
AND [] AND OTHERS ARE ACTIVELY WORKING
ON WAYS TO MEET THE U.S. NEED FOR A CALENDARIO AS
WELL AS THE NEED FOR DOS SANTOS TO BE ABLE TO SATISFY
HIS POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY.

5. COMMENT: WISNER BELIEVES [] S COMMENTS
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SAG-ANGOLAN MILITARY TALKS
HAVE CONSIDERABLE MERIT. HE IS REVIEWING HOW TO
REFORMULATE THE CONCEPT TO BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED
RESULTS. ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, WISNER WAS FIRM ABOUT
THE NEED FOR A DEFINITE COMMITMENT WHICH THE GPRA
WOULD LIVE UP TO LATER.
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8019
INFO RUEHTT/NAMIBIA COLLECTIVE
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Exemptions

ARP Action Cert

Date 7/29/84

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EZ1:
SECRET LONDON 12498
EXDIS

EZ2:
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SF, WA, UK
SUBJECT: P.W. BOTHA'S VISIT TO BRITAIN: CANDID TALK
AND SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER P.W. BOTHA WAS IN BRITAIN FOR SEVEN HOURS ON SATURDAY AND, WHILE THE WALLS OF APARTHEID WERE NOT SEEN TO TREMBLE, THE VISIT WAS CLEARLY A SUCCESS FOR EVERYONE: SA GOT SOME LEGITIMACY, HMG PUT FORTH ITS VIEWS FRANKLY ON SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REGION, AND THE LONDON-BASED ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT (AAM) HAD A GOOD DEMONSTRATION AND MAY HAVE WON SOME NEW MEMBERS.
3. P.W.'S SHORT STAY IN BRITAIN WAS HIGHLY ORCHESTRATED FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. HIS SAA 747 FLEW INTO HEATHROW IN THE LATE MORNING, AND THE PM AND HIS PARTY WERE TAKEN BY HELICOPTER TO THATCHER'S COUNTRY HOUSE AT CHEQUERS FOR LUNCH. BOTHA LEFT DIRECTLY FROM HEATHROW FOR SWITZERLAND.

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Date 11/24/02 Exemption B1 1.57(b) B3 CIA

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5. NOT SURPRISINGLY GIVEN BRIT/BOER HISTORY, P.W.'S VISIT -- THE FIRST BY A SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER SINCE VERWOERD PULLED SA OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN 1961 -- TOUCHED A NERVE IN THIS COUNTRY. PRESS COVERAGE WAS INTENSIVE, INDEED EQUAL TO THAT FOR THE RUN-UP TO THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. THE PROSPECT OF AN SA PRIME MINISTER IN BRITAIN WAS THE CATALYST FOR A SUBSTANTIAL ANTI-APARTHEID DEMONSTRATION IN HYDE PARK AND MARCH TO TRAFALGAR SQUARE WITH A CROWD OF 15 - 20,000. TO SOME EXTENT, AS DESCRIBED BY ONE JOURNALIST, IT WAS A "RENTACROWD, THE UPMARKET SUBSIDIARY OF RENTAMOB," BUT THERE WERE MANY THERE (INCLUDING JOHN LEAHY'S SON) WHO SINCERELY FELT THE VISIT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR ANY NUMBER OF REASONS. BUT IT WAS A RATHER SUBDUED CROWD ON THE WHOLE; AS AAM PRESIDENT ARCHBISHOP TREVOR HUDDLESTON DECLARED,

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1 (STXX) ISG *04/06/84* *13:10*
--- WHEN WE STARTED THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT 15
--- YEARS AGO, WE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
--- DEMONSTRATE AGAINST APARTHEID TODAY."
6. A FINAL CURIOSITY: AS THE CROWD ASSEMBLED IN HYDE
PARK, ARTILLERY FIRE SUDDENLY ERUPTED; SOME IMMEDIATELY
FEARED IT MIGHT BE THE SADF'S BOLDEST CROSS-BORDER
OPERATION TO DATE. IT TURNED OUT TO BE THE HORSE GUARDS
ARTILLERY PRACTICING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT
REAGAN IN LONDON. PRICE

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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4714
INFO RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 2008
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0419
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 1926
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2134
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1984
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 4109
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 2062
RUEHMB/AMEMBASSY MBABANE 6515
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 4691
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DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)	
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Exemptions B1
ARP Action Cert JAK Date 11/29/04

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EZ1:
CONFIDENTIAL GABORONE 4062
EXDIS
EZ2:
DEPT FOR AF/S (HUGHES), LONDON FOR FRASURE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, BC, AO, SF
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA'S CHIEPE ON AID TO UNITA
REFS: A) STATE 262509, B) STATE 338773, C) STATE 327195,
D) STATE 339771 (EXDIS), E) GABORONE 3562, F)
GABORONE 3597

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Date 11/24/02 Exemption B1-1.5(b)(d)
B3-CIA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER CHIEPE BELIEVES ASSISTANCE TO UNITA WOULD FORCE LUANDA TO CALL FOR MORE CUBAN SUPPORT, WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435, AND WOULD EXACERBATE EAST-WEST TENSIONS IN THE REGION. SHE CONSIDERS THAT AID TO UNITA WOULD ALLOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO EQUATE AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO UNITA WITH SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE TO RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE, UNRAVELLING OUR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN THE REGION. ON BILATERAL

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END SUMMARY.

3. CHIEPE SUMMONED CHARGE NOVEMBER 8 TO OBTAIN AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT SHE TERMED CONFUSING PRESS REPORTS OF POSSIBLE US AID TO UNITA. POLOFF ACCOMPANIED. CHIEPE CLAIMED THAT WHEN SHE HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH US THE REPEAL OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT, THE EMBASSY HAD SAID THAT NO ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN TO UNITA. CHARGE REPLIED THAT THE PEPPER-KEMP BILL PROPOSED USDOLS 27

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MSGNO 3 (STXX) ISG *10/11/85* *00:03*

MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN AID FOR UNITA, FOLLOWING GUIDANCE CONTAINED REF B. WE POINTED OUT THAT AT THE TIME OF THE EARLIER DISCUSSION, THERE HAD BEEN NO PLAN TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO UNITA; WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY IN ANGOLA IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, INCLUDING A MASSIVE INFLOW OF NEW WEAPONS, WAS HEIGHTENED THE LEVEL OF CONCERN OVER ANGOLA IN THE U.S., WHILE LUANDA HAD MISSED A MAJOR OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD BY RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE U.S. MARCH FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THIS ACCOUNTED FOR RECENT PRESSURE IN CONGRESS TO PROVIDE AID TO UNITA.

4. CHIEPE REPLIED THAT SHE FELT U.S. AID TO UNITA WOULD QUOTE ENTRENCH UNQUOTE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND WOULD FORCE LUANDA TO ASK FOR MORE SOLDIERS FROM HAVANA, THUS GIVING THE SOVIET UNION AN EXCUSE TO CAUSE MORE TROUBLE IN THE REGION. SHE SAID THIS WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE. SINCE UNITA IS ALREADY ASSISTED BY SOUTH AFRICA, SHE CONTINUED, SHE DID NOT SEE HOW AMERICAN ASSISTANCE COULD IMPROVE THE SITUATION. GIVEN THAT PRETORIA IS ALREADY RECALCITRANT, AND THAT LUANDA TAKES ONE STEP FORWARD AND THEN TWO STEPS BACK, U.S. AID TO UNITA WOULD GIVE ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO NOTHING ABOUT NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.

5. CHARGE DESCRIBED THE RECENT TALKS WITH THE SAG DELEGATION AND DOS SANTOS CONTAINED IN REF D. WE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CONTINUED MOVEMENT. SINCE THEN, CONCERN IN THE U.S. HAS MOUNTED AS APPARENT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA HAS INCREASED. MOREOVER, THE USG VIEWS UNITA AS A LEGITIMATE NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION, DESPITE SAG SUPPORT FOR IT, UNLIKE RENAMO. WHICH HAS NO LEGITIMACY.

7. THEN CHIEPE ASKED IF THE USG WOULD BE WILLING TO GO INTO ANGOLA AND ASSIST AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT THERE IF THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA WERE NON-COMMUNIST. CHARGE REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ABSTRACT THE ANGOLAN SITUATION FROM MASSIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE. AMERICANS SYMPATHIZE WITH RESISTANCE TO SOVIET INSPIRED GOVERNMENTS. CHARGE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S OCTOBER 24 PROPOSAL FOR THE UNGA EXPLICITLY INCLUDED ANGOLA AS ONE OF THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES MIGHT SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THEREBY HELPING TO BRING PEACE TO A TROUBLED AREA AND REDUCING EAST-WEST CONFLICT. THE RECENT MILITARY OFFENSIVE WHICH LUANDA CONDUCTED AGAINST UNITA HAD FOUNDERED, WE ADDED, AND THIS SERVED TO SUPPORT THE USG VIEW THAT NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT IS POSSIBLE -- THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND INSTEAD.

EXDIS

8. CHIEPE CITED THE SAYING THAT WHEN TWO ELEPHANTS FIGHT, IT IS THE GRASS THAT SUFFERS. IN THIS CASE, THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION IS THE TURF, SHE SAID, ADDING THAT SHE HOPED EAST-WEST CONFLICT COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE REGION. SHE THEN ASKED WHAT FORM U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UNITA COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE. WE TOLD HER THAT UNDER THE PEPPER-KEMP BILL WE HAD NO SPECIFICS, OTHER THAN THAT THE AID WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN, PRESUMABLY FOOD, MEDICINE, AND SUPPLIES. CHIEPE REPLIED SHE WAS WORRIED THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE COULD RELEASE FUNDS WHICH MIGHT BE USED TO BUY WEAPONS. AFTER A MOMENT'S PAUSE SHE ADDED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD LABEL THIS ASSISTANCE AS EQUIVALENT TO SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR RENAMO. FURTHERMORE,

MSGNO 3 (STXX) ISG *10/11/85* *00:03*
SHE CONTINUED, SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD ALLOW PRETORIA TO TELL
WASHINGTON, QUOTE IS IT WRONG FOR US TO DO IN NAMIBIA
WHAT YOU ARE DOING IN ANGOLA? UNQUOTE. SHE SUMMED UP HER
VIEWS BY REITERATING THAT SUCH AID COULD EXACERBATE THE SITUA-
TION AND ENTRENCH THE CUBANS RATHER THAN GETTING THEM OUT.

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END OF MESSAGE
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PAGE 01

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INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3557

AMEMBASSY 2701

AMEMBASSY 903

RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 41

BT

CONFIDENTIAL USNATO 3136

LIMITS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: :PFUR, MILI, NATO, AD, CU,

SUBJECT: ANGOLA CUBAN PRESENCE AND INTENTIONS IN

REFS: (A) USNATO 0712

(B) STATE 119727

1. A REPORT

ON CUBAN PRESENCE AND INTENTIONS IN ANGOLA WAS
CIRCULATED TO MEMBERS OF NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE BY
ON JUNE 2. THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION

HAST

"HARD-LINER" WHO IS NEVERTHE-
LESS CONSIDERED WELL INFORMED.

2. BEGIN TEXT

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE SCOPE OF CUBAN
TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM ANGOLA, AND ABOUT CUBAN INTERESTS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA, PROMPTED BY THE REPORT OF THE LETTER FROM
CASTRO TO PALME,
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

CUBAN PRESENCE

(A) TOTAL CUBAN TROOPS AT THE PEAK OF THE ANGOLAN WAR WAS
BETWEEN 12,000 AND 13,000 AND NEVER EXCEEDING THE LATTER FIGURE;
(B) WITHDRAWALS: THE PROCESS STARTED SIX WEEKS AGO; TOTAL WITH-
DRAWN TO DATE APPROXIMATELY 3,000;
(C) NUMBERS LEFT: (IN RELATION TO THE STATEMENT IN TOKYO BY
CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ THAT THE TOTAL "TROOPS" WAS NOW
AROUND 5,000) - THE TOTAL IN ANGOLA COULD BE AS LOW AS

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Date 11/21/02 Exemption

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B3 CIA

Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir

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Date 12/10/02 Declassify on 6/3/06 Reason 25X6

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PAGE 02

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5,000, BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT HIGHER. HOWEVER, THIS REFERRED TO MEN NOW UNDER MILITARY COMMAND AND ASSIGNED TO MILITARY TASKS, E.G., DEFENSE. APART FROM THESE MEN, THERE ARE MANY, MAYBE SOME 3,000 MEN, THERE ARE MANY, MAYBE SOME 3,000 MEN, WHO WERE DEMOBILIZED AND WHO ARE NOW ENGAGED IN CIVILIAN TASKS, E.G., COMMUNICATIONS, ROADS, CONSTRUCTION.

(D) ARMS: ALL ARMS AND SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY SENT TO ANGOLA IS BEING KEPT THERE SO FAR WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT POTENTIAL FIGHTING POWER REMAINS UNIMPAIRED.

CUBAN INTENTIONS OUTSIDE OF ANGOLA

(A) THE CUBANS DO NOT INTEND TO GET INVOLVED UNILATERALLY ELSEWHERE, E.G., RHODESIA, NAMIBIA, SINCE THE SITUATION IS NOT COMPARABLE TO ANGOLA, WHO COULD "ASK" THE CUBANS TO GO IN? NO SINGLE MOVEMENT EXISTS WHICH REALLY COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT, IS EFFECTIVE OR WHO CAN SPEAK FOR THE POPULATION. THIS IS TRUE OF RHODESIA, AND EQUALLY SO OF SWAPO IN NAMIBIA. THE CUBANS ARE NOT "ADVENTURERS";

(B) CUBA'S "FRIENDS" LIKEWISE ARE AGAINST ANY OTHER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

ATTITUDE OF THE USSR AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS WAS EVEN MORE FIRM ON THIS THAN THAT OF THE CUBANS.

(C) DURATION OF CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA: A SHIFT IS TAKING PLACE FROM A MILITARY TO A CIVILIAN ROLE. THE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION, STABILIZATION AND PACIFICATION WAS ENORMOUS AND THE CUBANS WILL STAY ON AS LONG AS NEEDED - TWO YEARS, FIVE YEARS, TEN YEARS, ETC.

(D) CAN CUBAN ACTION "ELSEWHERE" BE RULED OUT? NO ANSWER TO THIS WAS POSSIBLE AS IT DEPENDS ON HOW THE SITUATION WILL EVOLVE, AND IN PARTICULAR ON WHETHER THERE WILL BE A FULL-FLEDGED CONFLICT WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF SMITH.

COMMENT
IT WAS MOST INTERESTING AND SURPRISING THAT

HE SHOULD HAVE VOLUNTEERED SO MUCH SPECIFIC INFORMATION. WHILE THE FIGURES OF PEAK NUMBER AND REMAINING "TROOPS" PERHAPS SEEM TO LOW, AND THAT FOR MEN WITHDRAWN SOMEWHAT HIGH, HIS INFORMATION CONFIRMS THE IMPRESSION THAT MANY CUBANS HAVE SHIFTED TO CIVILIAN TASKS AND THUS, TECHNICALLY, ARE NO LONGER TROOPS, HIS MAIN PURPOSE, THEREFORE, PROBABLY WAS TO REASSURE US CONCERNING SOVIET AND CUBAN INTENTIONS, AND ON THE REALITY OF THE CUBAN DESIRE

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FROM

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 306-4A (AS OF: 0930 EST 1 NOV 76)

ANGOLA-CUBA: RELOCATION OF FORCES IN ANGOLA. (S)

1. (S) REPORTS SUGGEST THAT RELOCATIONS OF MEN AND MATERIEL HAVE OCCURRED, IN PART REFLECTING THE CHANGING REQUIREMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA WAR AND AAVANA'S ROTATION OF PERSONNEL. THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CONTINUES TO BE A MOBILE FORCE CAPABLE OF REDEPLOYMENT TO ACCOMMODATE TACTICAL SITUATIONS AND THE INFUX OF FRESH TROOPS.

(b)(1),(b)(3):P.L. 86-36,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):18 USC 798

CUBAN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE ALSO APPARENTLY WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA, DEPARTING THE TOWNS OF SERPA, PINTO, AND GUITO-CUANAVALLE.

(b)(1),(b)(3):P.L. 86-36,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):18 USC 798

3. (S) THE MAIN CUBAN FORCES SEEM TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE AREA BOUNDED BY NEGAGE ON THE NORTH, HUAMBO ON THE SOUTH, AND LUSO ON THE EAST, SUGGESTING A MORE COMPACT FORCE DEPLOYMENT.

(b)(1),(b)(3):P.L. 86-36,(b)(3):50 USC 403,(b)(3):18 USC 798

CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA ARE BELIEVED TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTHWEST -- THE MOCAMEDES-LUBANGO AREA -- AND ALONG PORTIONS OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER.

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SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 307-8A (AS OF 1 1230 EST 2 NOV 76)
ANGOLA: MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTHWEST. (U)

1. (S/NOFORN) THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) COUNTERGUERRILLA OFFENSIVE THAT BEGAN IN NORTH-WESTERN ANGOLA ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO IS MEETING WITH SOME SUCCESS. LUANDA'S FORCES ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET ADVISERS.
2. (S) FNLA HEADQUARTERS IN KINSHASA, ZAIRE, HAS REPORTEDLY URGED ITS FORCES IN NORTHWESTERN ANGOLA NOT TO BE Dismayed BY THE RECENT LOSS OF TERRITORY TO THE MPLA. FNLA, KINSHASA REMINDED ITS TROOPS, IS FIGHTING A GUERRILLA WAR AND MUST EXPECT SOME TEMPORARY REVERSES WHEN THE ENEMY IS STRONG. FNLA STRATEGY IS TO CONTROL THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION -- SPECIFICALLY THE ROADS -- THAT CONNECT THE TOWNS AND NOT THE TOWNS THEMSELVES.
3. (S/NOFORN) FNLA HAS BEEN WAGING A GUERRILLA WAR OF LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS SINCE MID-1976 FOLLOWING THE COMPLETE ROUT OF ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE EXPULSION OF MOST OF ITS GUERRILLA FORCES EARLIER IN THE YEAR. MPLA DISORGANIZATION AND POPULAR TRIBAL SUPPORT IN THE NORTH ENABLED FNLA GUERRILLAS TO OCCUPY SEVERAL TOWNS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HOWEVER, FNLA GUERRILLAS ARE OPERATING IN THE BUSH IN THE VICINITY OF TOWNS TO HARRASS MPLA/CUBAN GARRISONS AND DISRUPT SURFACE TRANSPORTATION. LUANDA'S AIR POWER HAS MADE IT UNWISE FOR FNLA FORCES TO MOVE INTO TOWNS AND ESTABLISH BASES. IN THE WAKE OF ITS INABILITY TO BLOCK MPLA/CUBAN DRIVES IN THE AREA, FNLA IS RE-EMPHASIZING PURELY GUERRILLA TACTICS.

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USEUCOM FOR GEN HAIG
USCINCEUR FOR GEN HUYSER
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
DIADIN 307-3E (AS OF: 1919 EST 2 NOV 76)
ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA: MIL AID FOR UNITA. (CT)
1. ~~(S/NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT/NNINTEL)~~ A MILITARY AID
AGREEMENT WAS REPORTEDLY REACHED LAST MONTH BETWEEN SOUTH
AFRICAN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND THE NATIONAL UNION
FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA). A GROUP OF
FIVE TO EIGHT SOUTH AFRICANS WILL BEGIN TO TRAIN UNITA
GUERRILLA CADRE INSIDE ANGOLA LATER THIS MONTH. THE
GUERRILLA-WARFARE TRAINING COURSES WILL BE FOUR TO SIX
WEEKS IN LENGTH AND WILL BE CONDUCTED FOR UNITA GROUPS
OF 30 TO 40. TRAINED CADRE ARE TO BE DEPLOYED TO CUNENE
PROVINCE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBAN UNITS.
2. ~~(S/NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT/NNINTEL)~~ AN OFFER OF AS-
SISTANCE TO UNITA HAD BEEN MADE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO BUT
ONLY RECENTLY HAS THERE BEEN EVIDENCE THAT UNITA PRESI-
DENT SAVINGBI HAS ACCEPTED IT. A POINT OF DIFFERENCE
REPORTEDLY WAS THE TRAINING LOCATION -- IN ANGOLA OR IN
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HAD WANTED
TO AVOID THE RISK OF CONDUCTING THE TRAINING IN ANGOLA.
3. ~~(S/NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT/NNINTEL)~~ ASIDE FROM TRAIN-
ING, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE UNITA WITH
INFRARED EQUIPMENT FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS. UNITA CLAIMS THAT
THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA HAVE SHOWN A DISLIKE FOR NIGHT FIGHT-
ING AND WILL RARELY COUNTERATTACK WHEN ENGAGED DURING DARK-
NESS. UNITA HOPES TO EXPLOIT THIS WEAKNESS WITH THE USE
OF THE INFRARED EQUIPMENT.
4. ~~(S/NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT/NNINTEL)~~ THIS TRAINING
ASSISTANCE WILL IMPROVE UNITA'S COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OVER
THE LONG TERM. THE SIZE OF THE PROGRAM INDICATES THE SOUTH

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AFRICANS ARE PROBABLY ENVISIONING A LONG-RANGE COMMITMENT.
THE SOUTH AFRICANS PROBABLY HOPE A REVITALIZED UNITA IA
SOUTHERN ANGOLA CAN PREVENT THE CUBAN AND MPLA FORCES FROM
PROVIDING EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO THE SWAPO GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.
IT IS STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THIS TRAINING PROGRAM
IS SANCTIONED BY PRETORIA OR ANOTHER INDEPENDENT OPERATION
BY THE MILITARY, AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY PREVIOUS REPORTING.
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A RAND NOTE

TRANSFORMING CLIENTS INTO SUBORDINATES
THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

ROSE F. CORCORAN

JULY 1985

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The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy



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A RAND NOTE

TRANSFORMING CLIENTS INTO SURROGATES:
THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

Rose E. Gottemoeller

July 1985

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Prepared for

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy

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PREFACE

Because the United States plays an important role in protecting Western interests outside Europe, many Americans expect the cooperation of U.S. allies, especially the industrialized nations, in this endeavor. The willingness of U.S. allies to help, however, depends on the nature of the cooperation requested and the situation in which it is required.

The Soviet Union faces similar problems in protecting its own perceived interests as head of the socialist alliance. In recent years, Soviet efforts to expand cooperation among its allies have received wide attention in the West, especially since these efforts have increasingly involved the Soviet Union in third world crises and conflicts.

This Note examines Soviet cooperation with five third area client states--Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada--in an attempt to explain how the Soviets manage these relationships. The lessons of the Soviet experience, it is hoped, will aid U.S. policymakers seeking greater and more effective cooperation with U.S. allies in the developing world.

The Note contributes to a Rand project on enhancing the support of friends and allies for U.S. maneuver forces. The project was funded by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. NDA903-85-C-0030.

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SUMMARY

The Soviet Union cultivates a wide variety of client states, all of which depend to some degree on the Soviets, share with them certain objectives, and assist them in the international arena. Some support the USSR on the political front, in the United Nations and in the nonaligned movement. Others assist with aid projects abroad, providing doctors, technicians, and teachers. Still others contribute military support, including training, weapons and equipment, and even combat missions.

These clients are acting as surrogates for the USSR. As such, they serve Soviet purposes while sparing the Soviets direct involvement in third world affairs.

This study examines (1) the incentives for Soviet-client cooperation and the limits to their effectiveness and (2) how the Soviets manage their relationships with their third world allies. It focuses particularly on the Soviet ability to induce cooperation in activities beyond a client's borders.

The research is based on primary sources, including Soviet theoretical writings and documents from the Grenadan revolution. It also uses western analyses of overall Soviet performance in the third world, detailed case studies of individual countries, and the current press.

Four conditions define a cooperative relationship between the USSR and its client state:

- Proximity of the client to a major opponent of the USSR
- Reliance of the client on the USSR for strategic goods
- Government of the client country by a Marxist-Leninist regime
- Existence in the client country of a well-developed economy and professional military establishment.

These four conditions, however, do not fully explain the process by which a client state becomes a surrogate. Two additional factors contribute to the conversion process:

- First, a client state may have its own regional or international leadership aspirations, in which case it may align itself with the USSR so as to augment its own national military and political power.
- Second, Moscow will likely increase military and economic aid to a client whose national aspirations dovetail with its own interests. The client's status as a privileged ally then increases the chances that it will become a surrogate.

This study applies the four conditions and two additional factors noted above to five cases: Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada. The case studies illustrate how the original basis for cooperation between the USSR and its clients evolved out of the four conditions. Theoretically, once the basis is firmly established, incentives for a client to perform as a Soviet surrogate should begin to operate. The cases indicate that incentives sometimes work imperfectly in inducing surrogate performance.

Cuba has the broadest basis for cooperation of the five third world countries examined. The four conditions for Soviet-client cooperation describe the Cuban case. Cuba lies only 90 miles from the United States; it receives the bulk of its strategic goods from the USSR; it has a strong central government rooted in Marxist ideals; and it controls a well-developed military establishment.

Inducements to cooperate exist on both the Cuban and Soviet sides. In Cuba, the Soviets have acquired a base from which to influence events in Latin America. To preserve that base, they willingly bankroll a Cuban economy that otherwise would not survive. Moreover, a well-trained Cuban military establishment maintains its skills in Soviet service abroad.

Cuba's strongest incentive to cooperate, however, probably derives from the extent to which its interests coincide with Moscow's. Almost from its inception, the Castro regime has sought international leadership. Its ambitions were at least partly realized in the 1970s, when it entered the conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia as a Soviet surrogate. Its performance in these conflicts further enhanced its position with regard to Moscow, resulting in increased material support for the Cuban economy. This privileged status as a Soviet ally in turn increases the likelihood that Cuba will perform as a Soviet surrogate.

Vietnam also has the four basic conditions for cooperating with the Soviet Union. However, Vietnam defines its national interests as advancing control over Indochina in the face of Chinese efforts to secure a zone of influence in the region. At the same time, the Soviet Union seeks rapprochement with China. The two policies conflict when Chinese demands, as conditions for agreement with the Soviets, impinge on Vietnamese interests.

The clash between Soviet strategic policy and Vietnamese national interests will probably prevent Cuban-style cooperation between the two, at least in the foreseeable future. To the Soviets, rapprochement with China takes precedence over serving its client's interests. Vietnam will probably continue to support the Soviets, however, as long as that support does not give China an advantage over Vietnam.

Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada have (or had) less reason than Cuba and Vietnam to cooperate with the Soviets. Only one condition for cooperation applies to all three: The Soviet Union supplies strategic goods to each. Otherwise, they have neither strong Marxist governments nor reliable military establishments. Syria, moreover, is not located near a major opponent of the USSR. Nevertheless, the three clearly have had cooperative relationships with the Soviets, especially in international political forums. However, they probably neither could nor would regularly assume more taxing surrogate roles.

These five cases indicate that the Soviets have yet to find a surefire means of turning a client relationship into reliable surrogate performance. Even when the factors underlying cohesion and the necessary incentives seem to be operating on both sides, the Soviets

cannot be certain that a client will remain committed to performing surrogate roles.

In sum, the Soviets cannot guarantee surrogate performance. They can only improve the likelihood that a client will perform by (1) giving it incentives and (2) ensuring that it meets certain basic requirements for reliability and availability of resources, especially skilled cadres of military and aid personnel.

The Soviet experience has important implications for the United States: U.S. policymakers can successfully use surrogates in the third world; indeed they may be required to in future world conflicts. However, they should not underestimate the taxing requirements for transforming a client into an effective surrogate.

A potential surrogate must qualify on a basic level with a strong central government, viable economy, and trained military establishment. The United States must possess the means to influence him, whether as a strategic supplier, bulwark against the Soviet bloc, or partner willing to consider his national interests. Finally, and most important, the client's national interests cannot conflict with or prevent the United States from achieving its own strategic goals.

In attempting to use a client in a surrogate role, the United States will probably not be able to meet these stringent requirements. As a result, U.S. policymakers must be willing to accept the risk that a client will perform inadequately or not at all. Indeed, uncertainties remain even if all requirements are met, because a client's perceptions of its interests shift over time. The United States must therefore accept the need to adjust policies that require foreign surrogates, or to quickly abandon them when they fail. Surrogates are an important element of great power strategies in the developing world, but the Soviet experience shows that they are a risky one.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union cultivates a wide variety of client states, all of which depend to some degree on the Soviets and share with them certain international objectives. As a result, the Soviets obtain many kinds of assistance from their clients. Some support the USSR on the political front, for example, in the United Nations and the nonaligned movement. Others assist with aid projects abroad, providing doctors, technicians, teachers, etc. Still others contribute wide-ranging military support on Soviet behalf, including training, weapons and equipment, and even combat missions. These clients are acting as surrogates for the USSR.¹

CHARACTERISTICS OF A SURROGATE RELATIONSHIP

A client state becomes a surrogate when it moves beyond passive political and diplomatic support for the Soviet Union to actively implementing Soviet policies in neighboring countries or around the world. Although often most influential at the regional level, such countries also promote Soviet interests globally.²

The Soviets recognize the advantages of having surrogates perform certain political, economic, and military tasks on the international front. The involvement of a client may, for example, prevent direct confrontations between the USSR and its major opponents, the United States and China. In many cases, clients are better suited than the Soviets to handle third world issues and personalities. Finally,

¹USSR has had cooperative relationships with Eastern European countries since World War II. Nowadays, the Czechoslovaks tend to supply arms to aid candidates, for example, while the East Germans provide training. Other East European states have served in other surrogate roles over the years. See Brian Crozier, *The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union*, Conflict Studies No. 92, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, February 1978; Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1980; and William F. Robinson, *Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa*, RAD Background Report/142, Radio Free Europe Research (Eastern Europe), June 21, 1979.

²See the definitions of surrogate in Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts*, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1983, p. 101.

surrogates can insulate the Soviet Union from accusations of great power meddling in third world affairs. In short, they serve Soviet purposes while sparing the Soviets direct involvement.

This definition of the surrogate relationship embraces many degrees of support and cooperation, highlighting the range of surrogate roles that a country might fill. Under this definition, for example, a country unable to render the Soviets combat support might nevertheless serve as a mouthpiece for the USSR in the nonaligned movement, where the latter lacks a direct voice. Since a country often cannot or will not perform certain tasks for the Soviets, the broad definition includes countries that are Soviet surrogates in some circumstances but not in others.

Four conditions contribute to a cooperative relationship between the USSR and its client state:

- Proximity of the client to a major opponent of the USSR³
- Reliance of the client on the USSR for strategic goods
- Government of the client country by a Marxist-Leninist regime
- Existence in the client country of a well-developed economy and professional military establishment.

One or more of these conditions provide the basis on which the client and surrogate relationships develop and mature. The conditions illustrate where incentives lie, sometimes for one participant, sometimes for the other, and sometimes for both.

With regard to the first condition, a country such as Cuba, close to the United States, or Vietnam, close to China, aligns itself with the Soviet Union to face down its superpower neighbor. The Soviet Union, in turn, acquires a means to influence events in an opponent's traditional sphere of interest. This might be called the "outpost-of-empire" condition.

³Ambassador William H. Luers, U.S. Department of State, pointed out this principle in remarks at a luncheon meeting of the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, November 30, 1983.

The second condition involves the USSR's being a client's major or only supplier of such strategic goods as oil, weapons, industrial equipment, raw materials, and food. Some countries pay for Soviet weapons with their own petrodollars; others are in debt to the Soviets for everything from wheat to MiGs. The degree of dependence indicates (although imperfectly) the strength of the strings that the Soviets might pull to ensure that a client serves Soviet objectives.

The Soviets for obvious reasons prefer that a country have a genuine Marxist-Leninist party firmly in control of its central government--the third condition. The party and government usually have close ideological and institutional ties with Moscow. Soviet recognition that a regime must firmly control political power before it can be considered a reliable "revolutionary power" came about after repeated and sometimes spectacular disappointments in Egypt, Somalia, and Ghana.⁴

The fourth condition--a developed economy and professional military establishment--is important for foreign aid and military cooperation. A client should be able to offer the Soviets one or more of the following advantages: trained armed forces highly motivated by revolutionary ideals; industries producing exportable goods, including weapons; and technicians and experts capable of overseeing many types of foreign-aid and military-training programs.

⁴Soviet recognition that a regime must firmly control political power before it can be considered a reliable "revolutionary power" came about after many disappointments. Hosmer and Wolfe (1983, pp. 27-34) discuss a few of these. A Soviet commentator addressed such failures as follows: "The issue comes down, after all, not to tempos of reforms, as some revolutionaries think at times, but to the effectiveness of the measures adopted, not to the broadness of the economic reforms but to the reliable securing of all (or the maximum possible) fullness of power. It is precisely this, in the last analysis, that is the key to the realization of reforms not on paper, but in fact, the guarantee of the reliability and irreversibility of revolutionary gains." See Sergo Mikoyan, "On the Peculiarities of the Revolution in Nicaragua," *Latinskaya Amerika*, July 1982, p. 41. Another thoughtful discussion of Soviet concerns about backsliding appears in Thomas J. Zamostny, "Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Thinking," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 223-235.

These conditions, while basic to extensive cooperation between the Soviet Union and its clients, do not fully explain the process by which a client state becomes a surrogate. Two additional factors seem especially important to the conversion process:

- First, a client state may have its own regional or international leadership aspirations, in which case it may align itself with the USSR so as to augment its own national military and political power. Thus, Cuba and Vietnam became surrogates in attempting to realize their own national ambitions.
- Second, Moscow will likely increase military and economic aid to a client whose national aspirations dovetail with its own interests. The client's status as a privileged ally then increases the chances that it will become a surrogate.

What determines the degree of cooperation that the Soviets can expect? How far will a client go in serving Soviet interests? The answers obviously involve incentives for both sides to cooperate. They also depend on the limits to the effectiveness of those incentives, limits that stem from the national interests and priorities of each participant.

STUDY PLAN AND SOURCES

This study examines (1) the incentives for Soviet-client cooperation and the limits to their effectiveness and (2) how the Soviets manage their relationships with their third world allies. It focuses particularly on the Soviet ability to induce cooperation in activities beyond a client's borders.

The study applies the four conditions and two additional factors noted above to five cases: Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada. The case studies illustrate how the original basis for cooperation between the USSR and its clients evolved out of the four conditions. Theoretically, once the basis is firmly established, incentives for a client to perform as a Soviet surrogate should begin to

operate. The cases indicate that incentives sometimes work imperfectly in inducing surrogate performance; at times, seemingly nothing will persuade a client to reconsider its national interests or cooperate in Soviet policy goals despite them.

Cuba is examined first, in Sec. II, because over time it has exemplified a Soviet client that has both cooperated with the Soviets in many roles and failed to cooperate at important junctures in its relationship. Section III reviews the case of Vietnam, also an interesting example of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. Section IV briefly discusses the surrogate roles of Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada.

Section V attempts to portray the Soviet mechanism for managing client relations, including the incentives for surrogate activities, the limitations of such incentives, and the negative and positive aspects of Soviet efforts. The research stresses the means by which the Soviets attempt to transform their clients into surrogates, rather than overall Soviet policy goals for a country, except when such goals affect the surrogate question. Finally, it discusses the implications of the study's findings for the United States.

The research is based on primary sources, including Soviet theoretical writings and documents from the Grenadan revolution. Western analyses of overall Soviet performance in the third world, as well as detailed case studies of individual countries, were also used. Newspapers and journals provided further information. Finally, the research benefited greatly from the insights of several scholars of Soviet and third world affairs: Edward Gonzalez, Stephen Hosmer, and Thomas Wolfe of The Rand Corporation and Ambassador William H. Luers of the U.S. Department of State.

In addition to the five cases presented here, other countries might have been examined in the research. North Korea, for example, offers interesting possibilities for analysis because of its dual relationship with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The five cases chosen, however, represent a wide range of cooperative interaction. Their variety thus serves to illustrate the Soviets' overall ability to induce surrogate performance. This study examines the reasons why some clients are less disposed than others to cooperate.

II. CUBA

ALMOST AN IDEAL SURROGATE

Cuba is probably the Soviet Union's best example of an outpost of empire. In the Soviet view, Cuba is "the advance post of socialism in the western hemisphere, 90 miles from the citadel of imperialism."¹ Although Castro leaned toward the United States after coming to power in 1959, by 1960 he had perceived a grave threat from the United States and turned to the Soviet Union for survival.² By 1961, Cuba had signed its first bilateral trade agreement with the USSR, received its first shipment of Soviet crude oil, and broken diplomatic and consular relations with the United States.³

Judging by their decision to station nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, one may conclude that the Soviets saw almost immediately that they could use Castro's Cuba to challenge American power and influence in the western hemisphere--indeed, in the world at large. The Cubans, for their part, realized that they could use the USSR and other socialist countries as "the guarantee of their security."⁴

Cuba depends heavily on the USSR for strategic goods. In 1982, a Soviet journal described Cuba's oil dependence in these blunt terms: "Practically the entire functioning of Cuba's national economy is based on energy supplies from the Soviet Union."⁵ Cuba produces basically sugar and nickel for export, and like other third world raw material producers, it is subject to severe boom-and-bust cycles in the

¹*Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), Moscow, December 29, 1982.

²Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, p. 84.

³Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Sugar and Petroleum in Cuban-Soviet Terms of Trade," in *Cuba in the World*, Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1979, pp. 276-277.

⁴*Krasnaya zvezda*, December 29, 1982.

⁵V. Burmistrov, "The First Soviet-Cuban Long-Term Trade Agreement (1976-1980): Its Results," *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), January 1982, p. 9.

international marketplace.⁶ Economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has insulated Cuba from the worst of the fluctuations. Castro characterized the cooperation as "a truly ideal, exemplary type of economic relations between an industrialized nation and a poor, underdeveloped country such as ours."⁷

In addition to aiding the civilian economy, the Soviets have steadily modernized the Cuban armed forces over the past eight years. Shipments of military supplies reached 66,000 tons in 1981--as President Reagan stated, "more than any year since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis."⁸ Shipments have included Soviet MiG-23 (Flogger) fighter aircraft, some of the most modern in the Soviet arsenal. Thus, the USSR supplies most of Cuba's strategic goods, economic and military.

A third factor also influences the Cuban-Soviet relationship: a strong Marxist-Leninist government over a united polity. Castro's nationalism and social idealism contributed to the popularity of his revolution in its early stages. When Castro embraced the revolutionary ideals of a Marxism-Leninism, Cuba's citizens evidently followed close behind. Today, Cuba remains free of popular rebel insurgencies. Although some discontent probably exists,⁹ it has not led to the development of serious opposition to Castro.

The acquiescence of the Cuban population in the national cause makes it possible for Castro to require extraordinary sacrifice, and get it. Thus, although the Cubans forgo many goods and services considered necessities elsewhere, they evidently support the flow of goods and services abroad. Cuban "revolutionary doctors" serving in Nicaragua, for example, have been a considerable source of national pride. Likewise, Cuban economic aid programs are apparently not begrudged

⁶The cycles are influenced by factors beyond the control of even the best economic planners. Bad weather and low prices, for example, ruined Cuba's sugar crop in the late 1960s. Indeed, "the two variables worked against the Cubans; whenever they had a good crop, prices were low and, conversely, when prices were high, they had a poor crop." See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economy and International Economic Relations," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago (1979), p. 173.

⁷*Granma* (Havana), Year 8, No. 2, January 14, 1973.

⁸*New York Times*, February 25, 1982.

⁹Hosmer and Wolfe (1983, p. 167), for example, noted the domestic political costs that significant casualties in foreign wars might engender for Castro.

because they carry the message of Cuban success to other third world countries. This national enthusiasm provides an important basis for cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Cuba's strong military establishment further contributes to the relationship. Fidel Castro has announced that the Cuban army is available to aid "sister peoples" in their struggles against imperialism, and indeed the Cuban military has shown its willingness to participate in both combat and military training programs.¹⁰ It played both roles in Angola and Ethiopia. The Cubans were instrumental in achieving short-term victories for pro-Moscow forces in both countries before 1980. In trying to consolidate those victories since 1980, they have been actively involved in training local forces.

Although the Cubans may serve as a conduit for Soviet arms, however, they are not themselves major arms suppliers, as are the Czechoslovaks and East Germans.¹¹ The Cubans, however, offer the Soviets manpower in the form of combat troops and military technicians.

The first four conditions of Soviet-client relationships apply strongly to the Cuban case. Cuba is a Soviet outpost of empire; it receives the bulk of its strategic goods from the USSR; it has a strong central government rooted in Marxist ideals, and it controls a well-developed military establishment. Hence, the basis for Cuban cooperation with the Soviets is seemingly quite firm. Because the two sides share interests ranging from the advancement of world revolution to the continued viability of the Cuban economy, incentives to cooperate apply fairly consistently, and the Cubans and the Soviets have cooperated with evident ease in a number of areas.

Other motivations for the relationship, however, spring not from mutual interests but from interests limited to one side or the other. Where the interests of the two sides clash, the potential for sponsor-

¹⁰For a discussion of this issue, see Edward Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1977, p. 9.

¹¹For a sample of Soviet bloc weapon supply activities in the third world, see the Central Intelligence Agency series, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975* (ER76-10372U, July 1976); *1976* (ER77-10296U, August 1977); *1977* (ER78-10478U, November 1978); *1979* (ER80-10318U, October 1980).



client conflict emerges. This potential has in fact been present through the history of the Soviet-Cuban relationship.

For example, Castro enthusiastically declared Cuba to be a Marxist-Leninist state in 1961, well over a year before the Soviets could bring themselves to acknowledge its status as such. Castro's enthusiasm concerned the Soviets because they understood the ideological implications of the Cuban declaration. By the rules of communist construction, once a country has advanced to the stage of socialism, it cannot retrace its steps through any of the preliminary stages of development, such as feudalism or capitalism. The collapse of a declared socialist state challenges the validity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. For that reason, Castro's declaration forced Moscow to up its aid commitment simply to keep the Cuban economy above water and forestall backsliding.¹²

Castro's interests in this case were probably rooted in a mixture of Marxist zeal and political pragmatism, for without a firm sponsor he could not long defy the position of the United States in the western hemisphere. His interests apparently spurred the Soviets to act, in their view probably prematurely, to accept Cuba into the socialist bloc.

Although Cuba was firmly in the Soviet-led socialist camp by 1962, a disappointment at the hands of its newfound mentor forced another twist in its ideological development. In 1962, the Soviets installed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, then quickly removed them under threat of nuclear attack from the United States. The strain of this missile crisis profoundly disillusioned Castro, who thought of the missiles primarily in terms of Cuban defense. The Soviets, dismissing his concerns, withdrew the weapons without even consulting him.¹³

¹²As Wayne Smith put it, "Even after Cuba had read itself into the socialist camp, the Soviets persisted in describing its major importance as being the advancement of the noncapitalist, rather than socialist, path in Latin America." See "Soviet Policy and Ideological Formulations for Latin America," *Orbis*, Winter 1972, pp. 1127-1128, 1134. See also Morton Schwartz, "The USSR and Leftist Regimes in Less-Developed Countries," *Survey*, Spring 1973.

¹³William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 201, September 1977, p. 6.

The missile crisis, a bitter lesson for Castro on the nature of great power rivalries, led him to look elsewhere for political support: According to a 1970 account:

Castro, depending on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance, but resentful over Khrushchev's settlement with Kennedy, vented his ire by adopting a Maoist line on the feasibility of exporting revolution by violent means. This set him in direct opposition to . . . Khrushchev, who advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence.¹⁴

In the mid-1960s, Cuba actively supported revolutionary movements in Latin America and Africa, thus exploiting the growing rift between China and the USSR. Cuba's revolutionary fervor culminated at the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America--the so-called TriContinent Congress--held in Havana in January 1966. Although the Soviets intended to use the conference as a political forum to grapple with the Chinese,¹⁵ Castro immediately dominated the floor with wild rhetoric calling for guerrilla warfare throughout the third world:

The peoples have the right to sweep away, and sooner or later they will sweep away, all those governments, traitors at the service of foreign interests in their own countries, and they will sweep them away through the most violent revolutionary action, because imperialist exploitation and oppression is imposed on them with an ever increasing use of force, violence, arms, and there remains no other choice open to them.¹⁶

The Soviets, whose support for armed uprisings was at a low point, probably found such inflammatory statements difficult to take. However, since Castro's guerrilla war indisputably had succeeded and since the Chinese stood even further to the left, the Soviets felt obliged to

¹⁴Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970, p. 301.

¹⁵Smith (1972), p. 1142.

¹⁶*Granma* (Havana), Vol. 1, No. 2, February 20, 1966.

uphold at least some aspects of "revolutionary action." Castro, however, was not satisfied, and accused the orthodox leadership of being a "Mafia of pseudo-revolutionaries."¹⁷

This complicated tangle of ideological conflict continued until 1968, when Che Guevara's death in Bolivia signaled the failure of Cuban efforts to export revolution to Latin America.¹⁸ The Cuban economy also began to collapse under pressure from the USSR and elsewhere. In addition, Cuba's formerly cordial relations with China began to deteriorate, thus depriving Castro of outside support in his clashes with the Soviet Union.¹⁹

The Soviets were able to bring Cuba back to their sphere of influence by applying economic pressure as events unfavorable to the Cubans unfolded elsewhere. During this period, however, Cuban national interests would almost certainly have dominated Castro's motives for cooperating with Moscow. As a result, the Soviets probably did not count on surrogate cooperation from Havana during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship changed radically in the mid-1970s, when newfound mutual international interests led to joint military ventures in the third world. Of these, the intervention in Angola was the most notable.

SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

The major Soviet-Cuban activity in Angola took place in 1974 and 1975, when Portugal was disengaging from its African empire. The independence of Angola had been set for November 11, 1975, and three indigenous political groups were slated to participate in a coalition transition government. These arrangements, which the three groups had agreed to in January 1975, had begun to break down by March.

¹⁷Smith (1972), pp. 1140-1142.

¹⁸Guevara's failure in Bolivia is discussed in *ibid.*, p. 1142, and in Dominguez (1978), pp. 87, 89.

¹⁹Dominguez (1978), p. 89.

In March 1975, the Soviet Union increased arms shipments to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the faction it had chosen to support. During the same period, Cuban military advisers began to arrive to train MPLA fighters. Castro was a close friend of the group's leader, Agostinho Neto, and had backed him for some years.²⁰ According to Jiri Valenta, this Soviet and Cuban military assistance "unquestionably emboldened the MPLA and contributed to the breakdown of the transitional government."²¹

The other two factions, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), also were emboldened by aid from foreign powers and also contributed to the breakdown. UNITA was first supported by China and later by South Africa. The FNLA received aid from Zaire, China, and the United States.²² This array of foreign assistance supported a continued struggle among the triumvirate to establish dominance prior to the November 1975 independence day. Deep-seated racial and ethnic animosities, along with deep mistrust among the leaders of the three groups, fueled the struggle. According to one FNLA spokesman at the time, "Ideology is secondary. . . . It's really just a power struggle. We have all been fighting [the Portuguese] so long, we have too much invested in blood to allow the others to win."²³

The fighting in the spring was followed by a full-scale civil war in summer 1975. South African forces invaded in August to secure the Cunene River dam that provides water for its territory of Namibia. Although the South Africans professed limited goals in this intervention, they apparently were responding to a request to provide

²⁰Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decisionmaking on Angola," in David E. Albright (ed.), *Communism in Africa*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1980, p. 110.

²¹Ibid., p. 101. This section focuses on Soviet-Cuban cooperation in Angola in 1975 and 1976. For a review of Soviet-Cuban activities in the region since 1980, see Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1985, pp. 29-50.

²²Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 81.

²³Quoted in Valenta (1980), p. 101.

military advisers and equipment to UNITA and the FNLA. In Soviet eyes, the South African threat was probably compounded by increased aid from China and the United States. The Soviets apparently feared that the Chinese leadership would actually "enter into a conspiracy with the United States" to cooperate in supporting UNITA and the FNLA.²⁴

Increased aid to its rivals led to MPLA reverses on the battlefield. Although the FNLA and UNITA had been driven from the capital, Luanda, and from 12 of the 15 provinces by midsummer, early fall brought a counteroffensive that carried FNLA forces to within 20 miles of Luanda. They were joined in this operation by Zairian elite commandos whose military skill changed the course of the battle.²⁵ The Soviets apparently decided at this stage to increase support of the MPLA.

Cuban military personnel had been advising the MPLA since the spring, and a contingent of at least 1500 combat troops began to arrive in Angola in late September. According to some accounts, the MPLA had requested these troops directly from the Cubans after the Soviets had refused to provide their own combat forces, but had advised the MPLA to ask the Cubans.²⁶ Although evidence on this point varies, it seems likely that Castro himself decided to commit combat units, perhaps with Soviet assurances of support, rather than responding to Soviet orders to make the commitment. By late fall, the Cubans had apparently decided to swell the initial contingent to about 20,000 troops, the deployment of which was achieved by spring 1976.²⁷

Between November 1975 and February 1976, Cuban manpower and Soviet military equipment ensured the survival and eventual victory of the MPLA. Although Cuban troops barely arrived in time to prevent the capital, Luanda, from falling to the FNLA in November, by December they

²⁴V. Solodovnikov, TASS, November 18, 1975, cited in Valenta (1980), pp. 103-104.

²⁵Valenta, pp. 101, 105.

²⁶Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 81; see also Robert Moss, *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), January 30, 1977, pp. 8 and 9, and Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1976, p. 97.

²⁷Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 83.

had begun to turn the tide against the MPLA's opponents. The FNLA and UNITA forces, untrained in mobile mechanized warfare, were overwhelmed by a minimum of Cuban fighting efficiency.

The South Africans, however, proved even more skilled at mobile warfare than the Cubans. In mid-December, the Cubans lost a three-day pitched battle to the South Africans about 150 miles south of Luanda. According to some accounts, such defeats so unnerved the Cubans that they considered withdrawing from Angola.^{2*} Retreat proved unnecessary, however, for the South Africans themselves withdrew in January 1976.^{2*}

Many factors external to the relationship of the USSR and Cuba contributed to the success of their cooperation in Angola. First, the political ferment inside Angola during the period of declining Portuguese influence, with three strong factions competing for control of the country upon independence, provided opportunities for outsiders to meddle.

Second, the lack of strong commitment from the Soviet Union's superpower rivals to aid the FNLA and UNITA also helped the Soviet-Cuban intervention. The U.S. Congress had limited further aid to foreign insurgencies, and China had backed away from its aid to the FNLA, probably because it did not want to associate with South Africa.

A third factor was the poor military discipline and ineffectiveness of Angolan indigenous forces. Moreover, several African nations, including Algeria, Mali, and the People's Republic of the Congo, gave the Soviets basing rights; the Soviets used the bases as staging areas for their airlift and arms supply operations.^{3*}

^{2*}Ibid., p. 224, fn. 24.

^{2*}African political pressure, the cutoff of U.S. aid to the MPLA's opponents, and the continuing buildup of Cuban forces were three apparent reasons for the South African withdrawal. See Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), pp. 224-225, fn. 25. For a South African account, see "Nature and Extent of the SADF's Involvement in the Angolan Conflict," South African Defense Forces Headquarters, Pretoria, February 3, 1977.

^{3*}Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 85.



The Soviet-Cuban success was attributable also to the fact that the relationship had matured to the point that effective cooperation was possible. Each participant had achieved capabilities to permit a successful intervention in a third world conflict. The Soviet Union had built up its airlift and sea-lift potential since the 1960s and had acquired experience in using both in the Middle East. In general, the Soviets seemed to have a better developed conception of the logistics and command and control requirements that would be exercised in Angola than they had exhibited previously.

The Cubans complemented the Soviet command and support structure with an armed force that had trained on Soviet equipment. Annual Cuban imports of arms from the Soviet Union had tripled between 1970 and 1975, and the Cubans made use of the new arms and materiel to modernize their army (see Table 1). At the same time, as the Cuban armed forces modernized, the need for them inside Cuba decreased.³¹ Castro was therefore in a position to offer his troops for combat in third world revolutions.

It would be wrong to assume that Cuba provided the muscle while the USSR provided the brain. Edward Gonzalez convincingly describes the Soviet-Cuban relationship as a dynamic one, not one of dominance and subordination.³² In Gonzalez's view, Cuba pursues its own objectives in the third world, but within the parameters of Soviet political and strategic interests. These objectives, according to Gonzalez, spring from Cuban ideological drives, the organizational interests of the Cuban armed forces, and Castro's quest for international status and for influence in the third world and the Soviet Union.³³

³¹Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in Albright (1980), pp. 152-153.

³²Ibid., p. 145.

³³Ibid., p. 147. For other commentaries on Cuban national interests and objectives, see Mark W. Katz, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection," *International Security*, Summer 1983; Jorge I. Dominguez, "It Won't Go Away: Cuba on the U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," *International Security*, Summer 1983; and Sergio Roca, "Cuba Confronts the 1980s," *Current History*, February 1983.

Table 1
CUBAN IMPORTS, INCLUDING ARMS, 1970-1982
(In \$ million current)

Year	Arms Imports ^a	Total Imports	Arms as % of Total Imports
1970	20	1310	1.5
1971	30	1390	2.2
1972	70	1300	5.4
1973	70	1780	3.9
1974	60	2690	2.2
1975	70	3767	1.9
1976	130	3879	3.4
1977	100	4362	2.3
1978	350	4751	7.4
1979	260	5089	5.1
1980	260	6409	4.1
1981	800	6602	12.1
1982	975	6916	14.1

SOURCE: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979* (ACDA Publication 112, March 1982), *1971-1980* (ACDA Publication 115, March 1983), *1972-1982* (ACDA Publication 117, April 1984).

^aThe USSR supplied most of these arms; other Warsaw Pact nations also contributed.

The search for leverage with the Soviet Union is probably one of the most important determinants of Cuban cooperative behavior. Castro and the Cubans seemingly have decided that supporting Soviet interests in the third world will reap them the status of a privileged ally. Indeed, Table 1 graphically illustrates this reward. Arms shipments to Cuba from the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries tripled between 1970 and 1975; by 1982, arms aid had skyrocketed to over 40 times the 1970 amount. The Kremlin had apparently concluded that the Cubans were well worth rewarding.

The leverage that the Cubans can gain from their relationship with the Soviet Union, however, is limited. The Angolan conflict provided the important example of Cuban failures against the South Africans. While Cuban successes speak well for the military prowess of the Warsaw Pact, defeats against troops carrying advanced Western weapons have the opposite effect.

Based on the Angola experience, the Soviets may perceive the Cubans to be of limited usefulness in any venture where advanced Western military technology and tactics are likely to play a role. Such Soviet perceptions may in turn lead to controls on Cuban attempts to pursue its own objectives in the third world.

SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia provides further examples of limitations on the Soviet-Cuban relationship. The Ethiopian revolution began in September 1974 with the dethronement of Emperor Haile Selassie and his replacement by the Dergue, a group of leftist military officers also known as the Provisional Military Council. At the time, the Soviets were providing arms to the Somalis, who were pressing irredentist claims to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area heavily inhabited by Somali tribesmen.³⁴

Several trends in 1975 and 1976 made Ethiopia an increasingly tempting target for the Soviets. Domestic turmoil, the Somali invasion, and continued rebellion in the northern region of Eritrea made the Dergue desperate for increased military aid. At the same time, the United States, the traditional Ethiopian arms supplier, began to balk at continuing the arrangement because of human rights violations and the movement of the Dergue toward socialism.

The Soviet Union and Ethiopia first concluded an arms deal in July 1976. By spring 1977, the Dergue expelled the remaining U.S. military officers and the United States terminated its aid commitments to Ethiopia. At the same time, the initial contingent of Cubans arrived to train Ethiopians on Soviet equipment.³⁵

³⁴Without Soviet arms, the Somalis would not have been emboldened to invade the Ogaden, according to Paul Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1981, pp. 61, 69.

³⁵Henze (1981), p. 63. See also Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), pp.

Meanwhile, the Ethiopian armed forces were fighting poorly against the Somalis in the Ogaden. "Beleaguered and semimutinous," they were forced to retreat in October 1977.³⁶ The Soviets and Cubans had each been trying to negotiate a settlement of the conflict, but the Ethiopian defeats combined with Somali intransigence led them to abandon these efforts.

On October 19, 1977, the Soviets ended arms aid to Somalia.³⁷ As a result, Somalia renounced its treaty with the USSR in November and expelled Soviet and Cuban advisers. Many of these advisers went directly from Somalia to Addis Ababa, where they were desperately needed to help the Ethiopians to absorb the arriving Soviet military equipment and to cope with the Somalis.

The Cubans were again drawn into combat. Arriving by air and sea from Angola, Somalia, South Yemen, and Cuba, they numbered about 12,000 by spring 1978.³⁸ They fought effectively in the Ogaden and helped to train a much expanded Ethiopian army.

The Cubans provided only limited combat support, however. When the Ethiopian army sought to quash the long-standing rebellion in Eritrea, the Cubans participated only on a severely restricted basis. They reportedly provided air support in Eritrea, but limited ground forces almost totally to garrison roles.³⁹

As Paul Henze noted, the Cubans showed more "conscience" regarding Eritrea than they showed about any other international issue in which they were involved; i.e., they avoided engaging in combat against the Eritrean insurgency, which they had supported in the 1960s and early 1970s.⁴⁰ Whether the Soviets would have preferred otherwise is

91-92; Paul B. Henze, "Communist Ethiopia--Is It Succeeding?" The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., P-7054, January 1985, p. 20; and Edmond J. Keller, "The Ethiopian Revolution at the Crossroads," *Current History*, March 1984, p. 119.

³⁶Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 91.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 92. Other estimates placed the number of Cuban troops closer to 18,000. See, for example, Henze (1981), p. 64.

³⁹Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 228, note 73.

⁴⁰Henze (1981), p. 73. Henze further notes that this circumspection did not give the Cubans any special credibility with the Eritrean factions.

difficult to gauge, but it is notable that they went beyond field command activities to provide air and naval support in actions against the Eritrean separatists.⁴¹ They participated at a considerably lower level in Angola.

Soviet involvement did not solve the Eritrean problem, however. According to Henze, the Soviets attempted to play all sides in the conflict and, as a result, were discredited by both the Ethiopian central government and the Eritrean insurgents.⁴²

The situation in Eritrea, complicated by drought and famine and by turmoil in neighboring Sudan, has become less amenable to a political solution in the years since the Dergue took power. If the Soviets are to effect a reconciliation between the Eritreans and the government in Addis Ababa, it probably will not occur through force of arms. The Eritrean and Ethiopian lack of confidence in the Soviets, however, does not encourage hope for a political agreement under the Soviet aegis.

Nevertheless, Soviet and Cuban cooperation succeeded in Ethiopia, as it did in Angola, in establishing the Soviets' chosen faction in power. The combination of Cuban combat troops and Soviet logistics and command support--Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe call the technique *cooperative intervention*⁴³--has enabled the Soviet Union to achieve decisive results where other superpowers and regional actors have failed. Cooperative intervention has also given the Cubans significant leverage over their Soviet allies. This leverage resulted in material rewards for the Cubans; it also may have opened more outlets for the international ambitions that encouraged their common effort with the Soviets in the first place.

The Soviets, heartened by success in Angola and Ethiopia, may now have decided that cooperation with the Cubans in Central America could stimulate revolutionary activity in the area and weaken U.S. influence. The Cubans have long sought this outcome, but the Soviets have until now discouraged them. Cuban effectiveness in cooperative interventions may have changed Soviet perceptions of opportunity in the region.

⁴¹Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 228, note 73.

⁴²Henze (1981), p. 73.

⁴³Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 79.

LIMITS TO CUBAN INFLUENCE

The leverage that the Cubans can hope to exert, however, is probably limited. Cuban influence with the Soviets rests heavily on the performance of the Cuban armed forces in combat against third world insurgents. The Cubans have succeeded in establishing the preeminence of a favored faction in such conflicts. They have shown less skill in consolidating that outcome so that the faction can remain in power unchallenged and begin to mature as a ruling body.

In Angola, the MPLA continues to face armed opposition, despite the presence of Cuban combat troops and a large contingent of Soviet and Cuban military and government advisers. In Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Meriam has not allowed the Cubans and the Soviets to participate in building up the Ethiopian government and security forces. Government posts are still limited to Ethiopians, many of whom received their education and formative experience during years when Ethiopia looked west.⁴⁴ In neither country can Cuban military force decisively guarantee the continued reign of the leadership that it brought to power.

The equivocal results in Angola and Ethiopia probably stem from the extreme divisions that exist among national groups in these countries rather than from the poor military skills of the Cubans. Nevertheless, the situation in the mid-1980s, ten years after the Angolan and Ethiopian revolutions, bespeaks the limits of military power in enforcing solutions, whether that power be provided by the Cubans or by another internal or external actor.

The limits to Cuban military effectiveness must be clearly visible to the Soviets, who continue to work side by side with Cubans as advisers to the local regimes. Although no evidence exists to show the Soviets eager to abandon their positions in the two cases, the lessons of the experience are probably not lost on them. Winning the capital city is not the same as consolidating power, a goal to which the Cuban armed forces might be able to contribute little. The lack of Cuban effectiveness during a protracted period of jockeying for local leadership may in fact have a net negative effect on Cuban efforts to influence the Soviets.

⁴⁴Henze (1985), pp. 31, 35-37, 43.

A further limit on Cuban leverage, alluded to earlier, stems from the poor Cuban performance against modern, well-equipped combat troops. With the example before them of Cuban failures against South African forces in Angola, the Soviets must be concerned that the repetition of such problems would damage their credibility as both a successful champion of third world causes and an international arms supplier. As Hosmer and Wolfe note,

[U]nless the Soviets were to feel more confident than they probably are concerning Cuban capability to handle . . . outside Western opposition in the future, the combat use of Cubans . . . against such oppositions would not appear to recommend itself to Moscow.⁴⁸

Such Soviet doubts will likely reduce Cuba's leverage over the Soviet Union.

⁴⁸Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 104.

III. VIETNAM

A REVOLUTIONARY ALLY

From the end of World War II until 1975, the Vietnamese Communist Party cooperated with both the Chinese and the Soviets to gain control of the former French colonies in Indochina. When victory came in 1975, however, this tripartite alliance ended almost as soon as the Americans left. At the same time that the Vietnamese sought to assume leadership of Indochina, the Chinese wanted to assert their great-power prerogatives in the region. In February 1979, after the Vietnamese installed a pro-Hanoi regime in Kampuchea, the Chinese invaded Vietnam in a punitive gesture that left no doubts as to the poor state of Chinese-Vietnamese relations.¹

Soviet support of Vietnam during the Chinese invasion remained limited to diplomacy, logistics, and a show of naval force in the South China Sea.² The Vietnamese were probably emboldened to move into Kampuchea, however, only after they had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in November 1978.³ In supporting the Vietnamese, the Soviets were evidently bidding for influence in an area that the Chinese considered their own.

The Soviet Union's patronage of Vietnam has enabled it to maintain a foothold in a portion of the world long closed to it.⁴ The interests of both sides coincide: The Soviets want to weaken Chinese influence; the Vietnamese want to improve their regional position. Thus, the first condition of surrogate cooperation applies to the Soviet-Vietnamese client relationship. Vietnam has gained the status of a Soviet outpost of empire.

¹MacAlister Brown, "Laos: Bottoming Out," *Current History*, April 1983, p. 180.

²Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), p. 95.

³Ibid., p. 56.

⁴David P. Chandler, "Strategies for Survival in Kampuchea," *Current History*, April 1983, p. 153.

The second condition for a cooperative relationship--the degree to which Vietnam depends on the Soviet Union for strategic goods, such as weapons, petroleum, raw materials, and industrial products--further contributes to Moscow's ability to demand cooperation. Over the past few years, the Soviets have typically provided as much as 90 percent of Vietnam's total import volume. In 1982, imports from the USSR included 200,000 tons of grain, 550,000 tons of fertilizer, and about 1.5 million tons of oil and oil products, all Vietnam's oil needs. In 1983, these figures were expected to increase by more than 30 percent over 1982 amounts.⁵

In addition to the goods traded, the Soviets have been heavily involved in industrial and building projects in Vietnam. These have included the building of a 5-kilometer bridge near Hanoi, enlargement of the Haiphong port, coal mine operations, and new machinery plants. A Soviet-Vietnamese company is also drilling for oil and gas on the Vietnamese continental shelf.⁶ In return for the services of the Soviet technical advisers assigned to these projects, Vietnamese go to the USSR and Eastern Europe to work, thus receiving training and practical experience.⁷

The Soviet bloc has consistently aided the Vietnamese armed forces. In 1982, high-level Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German military delegations arrived in Vietnam to assist in military modernization projects. The modernization effort seems to have extended even to remote units of the Vietnamese army: Vietnamese forces fighting in western Kampuchea, far from Vietnamese territory, used the latest Soviet tanks and infantry assault rifles.⁸

⁵Ton Long, "A Reassuring Hug," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 6, 1983, pp. 79-80.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's New Pragmatism," *Current History*, April 1983, p. 184.

⁸*Ibid.*

The value of Vietnamese arms imports from the Soviet bloc indicates these trends (see Table 2). Following the fall of South Vietnam and the reunification of the country in 1975, Soviet bloc aid to Vietnam dropped off, hitting a low of \$20 million in 1977. By 1979, arms imports had again risen to \$1.2 billion. A level of at least \$500 million was sustained between 1979 and 1982.

Table 2
VIETNAMESE IMPORTS, INCLUDING ARMS, 1970-1982
(In \$ million current)

Year	Arms Imports ^a	Total Imports	Arms as % of Total Imports
1970	200	373	53.6
1971	310	594	52.2
1972	1200	692 ^b	173.4
1973	270	616	43.8
1974	150	NA ^c	NA
1975	80	NA	NA
1976	40	NA	NA
1977	20	NA	NA
1978	70	900	7.8
1979	1200	NA	NA
1980	1000	NA	NA
1981	575	NA	NA
1982	800	NA	NA

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979* (ACDA Publication 112, March 1982), *1971-1980* (ACDA Publication 115, March 1983), *1972-1982* (ACDA Publication 117, April 1984).

^aThe USSR supplied most of these arms; other Warsaw Pact nations also contributed.

^bThe source documents report total trade figures published by individual countries but use multiple sources for arms transfer data. Obviously, the \$692 million does not include all arms imports for 1972.

^cData are not available.

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Vietnam, in short, seems as good a candidate as Cuba to cooperate with the Soviets on the basis of the economic and military aid that it receives. Certainly at the present time, the two sides perceive their interests to coincide on this issue. Soviet aid assures the Vietnamese of their continued support.⁹ The Vietnamese, seeking little aid elsewhere, evidently accept the arrangement.

The leaders of the Communist Party in Vietnam had long adhered to the goals of revolution and military resistance before they gained control of the entire country in 1975. This small, cohesive elite today continues to control the Vietnam government.¹⁰ From the Soviet perspective, the ideological credentials of these leaders are well established. If anything, the Soviets apparently have tried to temper overzealous communist reformers in Vietnamese-controlled Indochina.¹¹

Thus, although the Vietnamese must battle rebel insurgencies in Laos and Kampuchea and dissent within their own communist party,¹² they represent a government firmly rooted in the Soviet tradition. A prominent Vietnamese propagandist in fact portrayed a Vietnamese party role strikingly similar to that played by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during the Brezhnev regime, when the CPSU was said to have appropriated government functions. The propagandist criticized the Vietnamese Communist Party for abandoning a true leadership role and taking on the day-to-day running of the country. This process, he claims, has produced an overly bureaucratized system suffering "a chaotic overlap between government and party functions."¹³

⁹Ton Long (1983), p. 80.

¹⁰Thayer (1983), p. 159.

¹¹For example, Alexei Kosygin, then Soviet premier, evidently advised the Laotians in 1979 to stop collectivization before their entire peasant class fled to Thailand. See Brown (1983), p. 154.

¹²See, for example, Paul Quinn-Judge, "A Vietnamese Cassandra," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 26, 1982, pp. 14-16.

¹³Nguyen Khac Vien, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 15.

In any event, the third condition of Soviet-client cooperation also applies to the Vietnamese case. The Soviets accept the government in Hanoi and believe that it will remain in power.

The Vietnamese military establishment fulfills the fourth condition of cooperation, having proved itself in the long war against the French and Americans, in the resistance to the Chinese invasion, and in the occupations of Laos and Kampuchea. The large-scale military modernization discussed earlier is at least partly a tribute to the performance of the Vietnamese armed forces over the years. So are the deadly weapons, among them lethal chemicals, with which the Soviets have evidently entrusted the Vietnamese.¹⁴

The Vietnamese military establishment, while effective, has thus far played only a limited role outside Indochina. In perhaps the best-known instance of outside activity, the Vietnamese in 1980 offered the revolutionary forces in El Salvador some 60 tons of U.S. rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, and ammunition captured in the Vietnam war.¹⁵

In active combat roles, however, the Vietnamese have limited themselves to Laos and Kampuchea, which Vietnamese forces have occupied since the late 1970s. A July 1977 treaty confirmed the "special relationship" under which 40,000 Vietnamese troops are today in Laos;¹⁶ the 180,000 Vietnamese currently serving in Kampuchea began their stay with the ouster of Pol Pot's regime in 1978.¹⁷ These numbers probably represent the limits of Vietnamese resources, at least resources available to form expeditionary forces for combat elsewhere in the third world.

¹⁴See U.S. Department of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan*, Special Report No. 98, March 22, 1982, and U.S. Department of State, *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update*, Special Report No. 104, November 1982.

¹⁵See Hosmer and Wolfe (1983), pp. 102-103.

¹⁶Brown (1983), p. 156.

¹⁷Robert S. Dudley, "Now the Kremlin Feels the Heat," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 8, 1983, p. 24.

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As long as Vietnam is tied down in Laos and Kampuchea, it would be hard pressed to take on a mission such as Cuba's in Angola. Moreover, the Vietnamese leadership does not appear committed to achieving control beyond Southeast Asia. The old communists in Hanoi, in short, do not seem to possess the same global ambitions that drive Castro.

BUT A LIMITED SURROGATE

Despite the strong basis underlying Vietnam's cooperation with the Soviet Union, its large-scale commitment in Southeast Asia would appear to limit its ability to play surrogate roles according to Kremlin priorities. In fact, Vietnam's commitment to pursuing its own national objectives in Laos and Kampuchea creates the potential for a divergence of Soviet and Vietnamese interests. China may provide the impetus for such a split.

The Vietnamese quickly moved into the vacuum created by the U.S. departure from Indochina. The governing classes in Laos and Cambodia had also fled, leaving a dearth of civil servants skilled in government administration. The local communists, distrusting those who remained, killed some and sent others to camps to be reeducated. To fill the gap, they sent many young people to Vietnam and the USSR for training. It will be many years, however, before the younger generation matures sufficiently to govern.¹⁸

Meanwhile, Vietnamese govern Laos and Kampuchea.¹⁹ This process has apparently alarmed the Chinese, who perhaps see the emergence of a Vietnamese-dominated Indochinese federation before the end of the century. To the extent that the Vietnamese seek to consolidate such a federation, they will directly interfere with China's interests in the region.²⁰

¹⁸Brown (1983), p. 156.

¹⁹For interesting discussions of this phenomenon, see John McBeth, "Bureaucrats from B68," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 15, 1982, p. 16; and Nayan Chanda, "A Defector's Designs," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 26, 1982, p. 44.

²⁰Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia and the Superpowers: The Dust Settles," *Current History*, April 1983, p. 179. Pike also notes that the Chinese are trying to bleed Hanoi in Indochina, especially Kampuchea (see p. 147).

At the same time, the Soviets most likely seek to counterbalance Chinese influence as a great power. The Soviets also are aiding Laos and Kampuchea, but to a far lesser extent than the Vietnamese. After all, Vietnamese forces occupy these countries and Vietnamese bureaucrats govern them. The Soviets see their 25-year dispute with the Chinese as a strategic matter. They probably consider their current alignment with the Vietnamese a tactical ploy in that dispute. The Vietnamese, in contrast, seem vitally committed to extending their control over Indochina. They need the Soviets to provide them the resources to achieve that goal.

The present Soviet-Vietnamese relationship probably represents a marriage of convenience for the Soviets and of necessity for the Vietnamese.²¹ The Vietnamese, therefore, are doubtless seeking to pry as many resources out of the Soviet Union as possible and, at the same time, to maintain Soviet political support in international bodies and on bilateral and regional fronts. Soviet policy seems at present to accord with those interests.

When Soviet and Vietnamese interests threaten to diverge, the Vietnamese try to influence the Soviet Union in the direction that they prefer. A prime example of such efforts involves Vietnamese fears of a Soviet-Chinese rapprochement.

As the Soviets and Chinese reopened negotiations to improve relations in spring 1983, the Vietnamese launched a strong offensive on the Thai-Cambodian border, striking guerrillas supported by, among others, the Chinese. Hanoi was apparently demonstrating its control in Indochina, no matter what the behavior of its superpower ally, the USSR. The Vietnamese foreign minister in fact warned the Soviets, "Our foreign policy is based on our own forces, not on any relationship with another country. . . . Once the relationships change, you have to change yourself."²²

²¹Ibid., p. 148. For additional commentary on the current Soviet-Vietnamese relationship, see the testimony of Bernard K. Gordon, Evelyn Colbert, and Douglas Pike in "The Soviet Role in Asia," *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives*, 98th Congress, 1st Session, July 26, 1983, pp. 160-234.

²²Quoted in John Stirling, "Why Vietnam Fears Closer Soviet-Chinese Ties," *Business Week*, May 2, 1983, p. 51.

Vietnamese bravura in this case seems farfetched, especially because Vietnam depends so heavily on the USSR for economic and military aid. Nevertheless, Hanoi did meddle in great-power politics in an attempt to influence the Soviets to adjust their policy of seeking accommodation with the Chinese. The Vietnamese apparently hoped to do this by spoiling Soviet-Chinese negotiations, forcing the Soviets to choose between supporting the Vietnamese offensive and mollifying the Chinese. The commitment of the two great powers to negotiate prevailed: Hanoi failed to prevent continued high-level contacts between the Soviets and Chinese.²³

The Soviets certainly recognized where Vietnamese interests lay, but improving the Soviet Union's strategic relationship with the Chinese apparently mattered more to them than placating their Vietnamese allies. In single-mindedly pursuing their own interests, the Vietnamese in turn diverged from their basis for cooperation with the Soviets. In sum, they acted less like a surrogate than an unruly ally.

But allies they remain. The Soviets probably think that, overall, the Vietnamese are working to Soviet advantage in Southeast Asia. Certainly the volume of Soviet aid to Vietnam attests to that conclusion. Although the Vietnamese do not always serve Soviet purposes in Indochina, they have given the Soviets a foothold in Southeast Asia.²⁴ The most important symbol of this foothold is the access that the Soviet navy enjoys to the important bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. The Vietnamese, one might say, are Soviet allies with a mixed record of surrogate performance. Their own interest in controlling Indochinese events limits their usefulness to the USSR.

²³For example, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Kapitsa visited Peking in September 1983.

²⁴Chandler (1983), p. 153.

IV. NICARAGUA, SYRIA, GRENADA

Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada have each, in some sense, played the role of a surrogate for the Soviet Union in the third world. However, as we try to determine what basis for cooperation exists in each case, we find that these countries can be called Soviet surrogates only under very particular circumstances.

NICARAGUA: LIMITED MEANS FOR COOPERATION

Nicaragua superficially resembles Cuba. The Sandinistas brought to Nicaragua a Marxist government that has gained a considerable degree of popular support. The country, virtually in the U.S. backyard, is well situated geopolitically to become a Soviet outpost of empire. The Soviets, it would seem, have only to throw their support fully behind the Sandinistas and they will acquire another Cuba in Central America.

But aside from Nicaragua's outpost-of-empire potential, the other factors of cooperation are missing. The Soviets have not begun to underwrite the Nicaraguan economy; if anything, they have warned the Nicaraguans that they are unable to shoulder heavy new economic burdens in the third world.¹ Even their military aid did not compare in strategic importance with that extended to Cuba.

The Soviets evidently established a threshold in shipping arms to the Nicaraguans. According to one analyst, the shipments so far have been specifically geared to counterinsurgency warfare--small arms, helicopters, and antiaircraft weapons to protect against small planes. Although MiG-21 fighters have reportedly been slated for Nicaragua, this analyst asserts that they are "temporarily" deployed in Cuba while Nicaraguan pilots train in Bulgaria, and it is unclear whether the Soviets will ever risk a U.S. response by redeploying them to Nicaragua.² In short, neither in the economic nor military sphere have

¹Speech of Yuri Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, June 15, 1983, reported in *Pravda*, June 16, 1983; translated in the FBIS Soviet Union *Daily Report*, June 16, 1983, p. R11.

²Peter Clements, Central Intelligence Agency, at a luncheon meeting of the Washington, D.C., Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, November 30, 1983.

the Soviets been willing to become major suppliers of strategic goods to Nicaragua.

Soviet hesitation to underwrite the Nicaraguan revolution may have much to do with the status of the Marxist government in Managua. Although it has gained popular support, it continues to battle three separate insurgent groups in the countryside. These *contra* forces are well supplied with foreign weapons and evidently have the use of a good communications system.³ Moreover, they need not fight the Sandinistas continuously, but can regroup, train, and get supplies in Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas, therefore, face a much more stubborn insurgent threat than would be encountered on an island such as Cuba. Their chances of establishing a strong central government in control of remote areas are correspondingly slim, at least in the short run.

The Soviets have evidently recognized the risks of the situation, for they have indicated that the Nicaraguan revolution may not be irreversible.⁴ They thus have acknowledged that Nicaragua may revert to the capitalist path of development and are not tying their prestige to the survival of the Sandinistas. They recognize at the same time that the Sandinistas do not have the domestic political capital to cooperate with the socialist bloc on a wide front.

On the military side, Nicaragua is unquestionably a net consumer of goods and services. The capabilities of the Nicaraguan military establishment are limited to battling the insurgents, and they sometimes appear inadequate for even that purpose. In short, the Soviets cannot count on the Nicaraguans to cooperate in military actions elsewhere in the third world, even in Central America.

Because Nicaragua has outpost-of-empire potential, the Soviets are probably attracted by the opportunities that it represents. The Sandinistas for their part are probably eager to prove their Marxist credentials; they are certainly eager to attract Soviet aid in order to consolidate their power. With this limited basis for cooperation, the Soviets might expect the Sandinistas to support them in international political bodies, such as the United Nations. Beyond that, they likely

³Dudney (1983), pp. 21-22.

⁴Richard Gott and Jonathan Steele, "Russia Turns Down the Cuba Card," *The Guardian* (London), April 28, 1983, p. 15.

do not expect Nicaraguan cooperation in Soviet economic aid or military initiatives. Hard pressed at home, the Nicaraguans have few resources or personnel to spare for activities abroad.

SYRIA: LIMITED BASIS FOR COOPERATION

The Soviets and the Syrians cooperate, but on a specific and limited basis. Syria evidently seeks to control events in the Middle East, a volatile region where the United States and USSR have themselves vied to control events for nearly two decades.⁵ A short-lived effort of the two to cooperate in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict ended with the separate peace between Egypt and Israel that President Carter engineered in 1978. Since then, Moscow has apparently looked for a means to regain influence in Middle Eastern affairs. Syria appears to be serving as that means.

The basis for Soviet-Syrian cooperation is scant, however, since few of the factors underlying a close Soviet-client relationship apply. Syria is not located close to any Soviet superpower rival, hence it cannot serve as a Soviet outpost of empire. The government of Syrian President Assad is not controlled by a Marxist-Leninist party; indeed, Syria is among the Middle East states that have periodically harassed and arrested local communist party members.⁶ Thus, the Soviets lack ideological reasons to support Syria, since Moscow can have little hope that Syria will adopt a Marxist line and begin the march toward socialism.

⁵For a discussion of Syrian interests in the region, see Milton Viorst, "We Forget That Syria, Too, Has Vital Interests," *Washington Post*, Outlook Section, December 11, 1983.

⁶The Soviets have occasionally called on the Syrians to extend more power to their indigenous communist party, but without much apparent success. See R. A. Ulyanovskiy, "On the Unity of the Anti-Imperialist Front of Progressive Forces in the Newly Independent States," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, No. 9, September 1972, pp. 76-86. Syrian politics seem to be affected more by internecine strife than by ideological considerations. See Martin Talbot, "Aliiev in Syria," *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey, England), Vol. 13, No. 6, March 1984, pp. 1-2.

Furthermore, the Soviets evidently have little faith in the Syrian military establishment. Following the poor showing of Soviet air defense weapons against Israeli fighter aircraft in the Bekaa valley of Lebanon in summer 1982, Soviet commentators openly criticized the poor training of Syrian forces.

According to one Soviet article, the same weapons that the Syrians had failed to use properly had been effective in Vietnamese hands.⁷ The official Soviet military newspaper stated bluntly that Syrian soldiers "must be taught to read and write before they can begin to master weapons and hardware."⁸ From this evidence, one may assume that the Soviets probably have little faith in the Syrians as a military force in third world conflicts, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere.⁹

The Soviet supply of strategic goods--in this case weapons--to Syria offers the one condition that could lead to cohesion. As with the Egyptians ten years earlier, the Soviets have evidently decided that they must provide their Syrian clients with sophisticated SA-5 air defense weapons to combat Israeli air operations in the region.¹⁰

The Soviet-operated SA-5s serve several purposes: As part of an integrated air defense system, they offer the Soviets the opportunity to restore their image as a supplier of reliable weapons--an image tarnished when the Syrians lost 99 planes to the two lost by the Israelis in the Bekaa valley campaign.¹¹ They also form an important deterrent force. Because they are operated by Soviets, the Kremlin

⁷Quoted in Cynthia A. Roberts, "Soviet Arms Transfer Policy and the Decision to Upgrade Syrian Air Defences," *Survival*, July-August 1983, p. 157.

⁸Col. F. Kozanchuk, "Meetings on Syrian Soil," *Krasnaya zvezda*, January 29, 1983, p. 5.

⁹The struggle for power in Damascus also might fuel Soviet concerns that different elements of the Syrian armed forces will open fire on one another, catching Soviet advisers in the crossfire. In short, the Soviets have more than one reason to doubt the reliability of the Syrian armed forces. See Talbot (1984), p. 2.

¹⁰For a comparison of the Egyptian and Syrian cases, see Craig S. Karpel, "Mideast Melody: Play It Again, SAM," *Wall Street Journal*, June 15, 1983, p. 34.

¹¹Vincent J. Schodolski, "Soviet Arms Replacing Syrian War Losses," *Chicago Tribune*, March 23, 1983, p. 8.

leadership probably calculates that (1) the United States would press the Israelis not to strike the missile batteries and (2) Damascus would not initiate a major air battle in the region without certain SA-5 protection of Syrian forces.

The missiles thus enable the Soviets to influence the escalation potential of the conflict. Although never invited in as peacekeepers, the Soviets have all the same found a way to deploy a peacekeeping force in the Middle East.

The Syrians as Soviet clients benefit from the replacements for their war losses.¹² The Soviets, in turn, gain the influence that they have sought in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given their earlier experiences with Nasser and Sadat,¹³ however, they probably have little confidence in their long-term ability to compel Syrian cooperation in juggling the forces at work in the region to Soviet advantage. Where Sadat drove Soviet advisers--including those manning SAM batteries--from Egypt in order to launch the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Assad might do the same once his troops learned to operate the SA-5s.

The Soviets' ability to keep the peace or incite conflict at will therefore depends solely on Syria's perceived military aid requirements. Since Syrian perceptions might change, one hesitates to predict continued Soviet-Syrian cooperation on the basis of the strategic supply factor. The Soviets now probably count on the Syrians to act for them in certain third world matters. Because of the scant basis for cooperation, however, they cannot rely on the Syrians to oblige over a long period.

¹²Schodolski, *ibid.*, catalogues the other military items that the Soviets have recently given to Syria, including 1000 new trucks, 350-400 T62 and T72 tanks, and 100 new fighters, mostly MiG-23s.

¹³Hosmer and Wolfe (1983) discuss the Egyptian case in detail and provide extensive references; see Ch. 6, 11, and 12 and corresponding footnotes.

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GRENADA: MORE A CLIENT THAN A SURROGATE

Grenada was no more than a fledgling Soviet client state when the United States invaded the island in October 1983. The Grenadan case showed promise as an example of Soviet-client cooperation, but Grenada itself was at such an early point of revolutionary development that the Soviets would hardly have expected much help from the Grenadans in third world initiatives.

Nevertheless, Grenada is perfectly situated in a geopolitical sense to serve as a Soviet outpost of empire. The Soviets readily noted that fact and seemed prepared to support Grenada as one more means of irritating the United States in its traditional sphere of influence.

Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, then Chief of the Soviet General Staff, said in a 1983 meeting with Grenadan Chief of Staff Major Einstein Louison: "Over two decades ago, there was only one Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." The United States, the marshal then said, would try to prevent progress, but "there were no prospects for imperialism to turn back history." Evidently to bar an imperialist resurgence, Ogarkov pledged that "the Soviet Union would contribute to raising the combat readiness and preparedness of the Armed Forces of Grenada."¹⁴

Well before the Ogarkov-Louison meeting, in fact, the Soviet Union and Grenada had in July 1982 signed an agreement under which the former would supply military equipment to the latter. The Soviets were to provide rocket launchers, rifles, machine guns, vehicles, and other military items by 1985.¹⁵ The arrangement, made in great secrecy, apparently did not proceed smoothly, for Louison complained to Ogarkov during their meeting that items, especially vehicle spare parts, were not arriving on time.¹⁶

¹⁴Report of the meeting between the chiefs of the general staffs of the Soviet armed forces and people's revolutionary armed forces of Grenada, March 10, 1983; documents captured by the U.S. Armed Forces and released by the U.S. Department of State, DOS document 000008, p. 2.

¹⁵See *Agreement between the Government of Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of Special and Other Equipment*; documents captured by the U.S. Armed Forces and released by the U.S. Department of State, DOS document 000191.

¹⁶U.S. Department of State, DOS document 000008, p. 3. Ogarkov,

The Soviet Union thus was supplying strategic goods, but not with nearly the evident enthusiasm that the Cubans were providing aid programs. The Cubans were doing in Grenada what they generally do best in aiding newly declared revolutionaries--providing doctors and establishing a literacy campaign.¹⁷ They also launched a showy building project--the international airport at Point Salines--the likes of which are the hallmark of Soviet aid programs but are usually too expensive for the Cubans to undertake. The Cubans, therefore, may have been serving as Soviet surrogates in this case.

Whatever the Soviet-Cuban cooperative arrangements in Grenada, they were supplying Grenada with strategic goods in a way that tended to tie that country to the Soviet bloc. The Point Salines airport, for example, was evidently a source of great pride to the Grenadans, who would be unlikely to abandon the project even if slighted by the Soviets and threatened by the Americans. The aid incentive for Soviet-client cooperation seems thus to apply in the Grenadan case.

The third condition of Soviet-client cooperation--a strong, Moscow-oriented central government--however, did not apply in the case of Grenada. A Soviet theoretical journal, *Latinskaya Amerika*, devoted to revolutionary developments in that part of the world, revealed the Soviets' lack of confidence in the ultimate success of the Grenadan revolution.

In a 1983 article in *Latinskaya Amerika*, Richard Jacobs, Grenadan ambassador to the USSR, quoted Prime Minister Maurice Bishop as declaring in a July 1982 speech in Moscow that the Grenadan revolution was "firmly established on a path of socialist orientation."¹⁸ According to Jacobs, "an organization with a socialist orientation, the New JEWEL Movement, headed the revolutionary process." He further described the movement as a vanguard party, the members of which sought

the record states, "jokingly" told Louison to keep to his studies, Louison being a student at a Soviet military academy in Moscow.

¹⁷Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication and Action, Task Force Report, *Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution*, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 81-86.

¹⁸W. Richard Jacobs, "The Revolutionary Process in Grenada," *Latinskaya Amerika*, No. 6, 1983; translated in the FBIS *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs*, JPRS 84530, October 13, 1983, p. 8.

to increase the worker's revolutionary consciousness and turn "spontaneous protest into an organized struggle."¹⁹

These designations have real meaning in Soviet ideological parlance. "Socialist orientation" and "vanguard party" describe Marxist revolutionary regimes holding power in countries considered not yet ripe for full-scale socialist revolution. The Soviets use the terms when they fear that a country will lose the momentum of socialist development, or that nearby capitalists will meddle. The fact that Bishop and Jacobs were evidently constrained to describe their revolution in those terms means that the Soviets did not have full confidence that the revolution would succeed in Grenada.²⁰

The fourth condition--a strong military establishment--also did not apply, a fact readily evident from Marshal Ogarkov's assessment of the Grenadan armed forces. In his meeting with Major Louison, Ogarkov stated bluntly that "since Grenada was located close to U.S. imperialism and *was not developed militarily* the Grenada revolution would have to be specifically vigilant at all times."²¹ Ogarkov clearly would not have expected the Grenadan armed forces to cooperate in military activities elsewhere in the third world.

The Grenadans were nevertheless willing to act in international political forums in the Soviet interest. Bishop, for example, clearly reflected the Soviet position toward nonalignment when he spoke at the Sixth Conference of the Heads of State from the Participating Countries of the Nonaligned Movement:

Nonalignment, as we understand it, in no way means that we must take a position of neutrality in the emasculated and negative sense of this concept; and in exactly the same way it does not mean that our country must play the role of a political eunuch. . . . On the contrary, we view nonalignment

¹⁹Ibid., p. 10.

²⁰The Soviets had good reason to fear backsliding. According to Jiri and Virginia Valenta, they probably knew of the power struggle going on within the New JEWEL Movement in September-October 1983. See their "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1984, pp. 1-23, esp. pp. 20-23.

²¹U.S. Department of State, DOS document 000008, p. 2.

as a positive ideological current, which arouses us to take a principled and decisive position on international problems.²²

Grenada, Bishop made clear, would associate nonalignment with revolution--the Soviet definition of the nonaligned movement, not that of its founders.²³

The Grenadan revolutionary government was thus able to serve the Soviets in one surrogate role. The poor state of its economy and armed forces, however, precluded its cooperating with the Soviets in economic aid projects and military actions abroad. In fact, the weakness of Grenada's central government as a revolutionary force probably would have precluded its sending its resources abroad, even if the armed forces or economy had been stronger. The basis for Soviet-Grenadan cooperation depended heavily on Grenada's attraction as an outpost from which the Soviets could project power in the Caribbean region.

²²Quoted in Jacobs (1983), p. 8.

²³For the origins of the nonaligned movement, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, Princeton U. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970.

V. CONCLUSIONS

LESSONS OF THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The cohesion of cooperative links between the USSR and its clients in the third world depends on four conditions: (1) the client state serves as a Soviet outpost of empire; (2) the client state receives the bulk of its strategic goods from the USSR; (3) the client state's government inspires Soviet confidence; and (4) the client state has a well-developed economy and/or professional military establishment. In addition, congruence in the interests of the two sides provides firm incentives for cooperation. These incentives, in turn, help to explain the process by which a client state becomes a Soviet surrogate.

Cuba has the broadest basis for cooperation of the five third world countries examined. The four conditions for Soviet-client cooperation describe the Cuban case. Cuba is a Soviet outpost of empire; it receives the bulk of its strategic goods from the USSR; it has a strong central government rooted in Marxist ideals; and it controls a well-developed military establishment.

Inducements to cooperate exist on both the Cuban and Soviet sides. Where Castro stands firm 90 miles from Florida, the Soviets acquire a means to influence events in Latin America. To preserve that means, they willingly bankroll a Cuban economy that otherwise would not survive. The investment is a good bet for the Soviets because Castro firmly controls and surely wants to continue to control the central government in Havana. Moreover, a well-trained Cuban military establishment maintains its skills in Soviet service abroad.

Cuba's strongest incentive to cooperate, however, probably derives from the extent to which its interests coincide with Moscow's. Almost from its inception, the Castro regime has sought international leadership. Its ambitions were at least partly realized in the 1970s, when it entered the conflicts in Africa as a Soviet surrogate. Its performance in these conflicts further enhanced its position with regard to Moscow, resulting in increased material support for the Cuban economy. This privileged status as a Soviet ally in turn increases the likelihood that Cuba will perform as a Soviet surrogate.

Vietnam also has a broad basis for cooperating with the Soviet Union, for the four basic conditions are present in the Soviet-Vietnamese client relationship. However, Vietnam defines its national interests as advancing control over Indochina in the face of Chinese efforts to secure a zone of influence in the region. At the same time, the Soviet Union seeks rapprochement with China. The two policies conflict when Chinese demands, as conditions for agreement with the Soviets, impinge on Vietnamese interests.

The clash between Soviet strategic policy and Vietnamese national interests will probably prevent Cuban-style cooperation between the two, at least in the foreseeable future. Even if the basic conflict of interests were resolved, Vietnam's commitment to securing Laos and Kampuchea absorbs all of the capabilities that it can muster from its own stores and Soviet aid. Vietnam's national objectives, and the rebuilding of its war-ravaged economy, leave no resources for the role of Soviet surrogate beyond Indochina.

To the Soviets, rapprochement with China takes precedence over serving its client's interests. Vietnam will probably continue to support the Soviets, however, as long as that support does not give China an advantage over Vietnam.

Nicaragua, Syria, and Grenada have (or had) less reason than Cuba and Vietnam for cooperation with the Soviets. Only one condition for cooperating with the Soviets applies to all three: The Soviet Union supplies strategic goods to each. Otherwise, they had neither strong Marxist governments nor reliable military establishments. Syria, moreover, cannot be considered a Soviet outpost of empire. The three clearly have had cooperative relationships with the Soviets, especially in international political forums. However, they probably neither could nor would regularly assume more taxing surrogate roles.

The narrow basis for cooperation in these cases probably precludes the operation of other incentives. Soviet superpower interests would have little chance of coinciding with Nicaraguan, Syrian, and (formerly) Grenadan national ambitions. The exceptions seem to depend largely on geopolitics. Nicaragua is and Grenada was a Soviet outpost in the western hemisphere. In a region dominated by the United States, the two

have no one to turn to but Cuba should the Soviet Union fail to support their interests. Castro's resources are limited, however, and his relationship with the Soviets is currently close. He would thus be unlikely to overshoot a Soviet commitment in any radical way. Perhaps this is one reason why Cuban resistance to the U.S. invasion of Grenada did not continue, despite contrary predictions.

The Syrians, in contrast, can take their interests elsewhere if they and the Soviets fail to agree. They might, as Sadat did in the 1970s, turn to the United States or another Western power. Or, they might turn elsewhere in the Middle East. Syria is neither a Soviet outpost nor a Marxist state, so it need not limit itself in choosing an alternative to the Soviet Union. If it is concerned about obtaining spare parts for Soviet weaponry, the Egyptian case illustrates that the problem can be overcome.

These cases leave a definite impression that the Soviets have yet to find a surefire means of turning a client relationship into reliable surrogate performance. Even when the factors underlying cohesion and the necessary incentives seem to be operating on both sides, the Soviets cannot be certain that a client will remain committed to performing a number of surrogate roles.

The uncertainty of the surrogate relationship seems to stem from shifting perceptions of national interests. A client's idea of what is important for his national survival and advancement changes over time. Hence, even if the Soviets are fairly certain today that Castro identifies Cuban national aspirations with the goals of the Soviet bloc, tomorrow they may find that he has found an opening from the West to be attractive.

Although Castro would certainly find it risky to defy his major strategic supplier in a big way, he may, as he has in the past, attempt to diversify his sources as well as his international contacts. As a result, he may become less willing to take on major operations as a Soviet surrogate in the third world.¹ Furthermore, Castro may find his goals shifting as the result of Cuban experiences in these countries.

¹Edward Gonzalez points out, however, that the Cubans actually have few alternatives to the USSR as a strategic ally, because the Soviets both supply high levels of economic support and allow Havana the freedom

If Cuba's long-term experience as a Soviet surrogate in Angola becomes a national burden, for example, the value of such adventures in Cuban eyes may rapidly decline.

Likewise, the Soviets may discover Cuba's value as a surrogate to be limited in certain circumstances. If, for example, the Cuban armed forces faced defeat, Western perceptions of the Warsaw Pact's military power might erode. The Soviets thus might seek to discourage the Cubans from further combat, while the Cubans remained determined to proceed. In this case, the greatest Soviet strategic worry, the status of the Warsaw Pact, would interfere with Cuban national goals and objectives. With the means to achieve their objectives curtailed, the Cubans might refuse to cooperate fully with the Soviets in the third world.

Thus, the Soviets cannot guarantee surrogate performance. They can improve the likelihood that a client will perform by (1) giving him incentives and (2) ensuring that he meets certain basic requirements for reliability and availability of resources, especially skilled cadres of military and aid personnel. Satisfaction of these requirements in essence provides a basis for the Soviet decision to attempt to use a client in a surrogate role. Neither incentives nor requirements, however, ensure that the client will perform.

The nature of the various surrogate roles may give some notion of what the Soviets can expect from a surrogate. Each country considered here has performed the least stressing surrogate role, i.e., supporting the Soviet Union in the international political arena. To perform this role consistently, a country need only speak up for the Soviets in international forums. For Soviet clients, this option clearly costs little in terms of their national interests.

Only Cuba and Vietnam have cooperated with the Soviet Union in the more stressing economic and military aid projects. These well-established, strong Marxist states can send resources abroad without triggering internal dissent or threatening their ability to handle local rebellions. Economic burdens do constrain the aid that they can offer, however. Cuba limits its assistance mostly to trained personnel;

to pursue its preferred foreign policy. See Edward Gonzalez, *A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., R-2954-DOS, September 1982, pp. 49-52.

Vietnam operates almost exclusively in Indochina. Therefore, their willingness to cooperate with the Soviets on aid projects is tempered by national concerns for the health of their economies.

Cooperation in the most stressing role, military combat abroad, has likewise applied only to Cuba and Vietnam. Vietnam's surrogate performance has been muddled, however, by its leaders' stubborn pursuit of their national interests in the face of Soviet efforts to improve relations with China. It is often unclear whose interests the Vietnamese are pursuing in Laos and Kampuchea.

In recent years, only the Cubans have consistently seemed to be serving a wide spectrum of Soviet interests in the third world. They have spared the Soviets direct involvement in international politics, foreign aid, and military campaigns abroad. They have often performed in situations where Soviet action would have been imprudent or impossible. This cooperation seems to be based today on Cuban indebtedness combined with an extraordinary congruence of Soviet and Cuban interests. Havana has advanced its own international policies through cooperative ventures with the USSR.

The Soviet experience suggests four overall conclusions:

1. A great power soliciting surrogate performance from a client must attempt to determine how the client perceives his national interests. If they relate to the client's willingness to cooperate, the great power should consider how best to further them or, at least, how best to prevent them from clashing with his own goals.
2. A client's geographic location strongly influences his urge to cooperate. If he lies near a great power, then he will frequently be ready to cooperate with a strategic opponent of that power so as to protect himself from his powerful neighbor.
3. A client's indebtedness for strategic goods can strongly influence his willingness to cooperate, especially under pressure. To determine the degree of influence, the price and availability of a commodity on the world market must be considered. Hence, the Soviet Union as the supplier of oil has greater leverage on its clients than does the United States as

a supplier of grain. The incentives in this situation strongly depend on a client's price and supply alternatives.

4. For more taxing surrogate roles than, say, support in international forums, the surrogate must offer the great power certain incentives. Thus, a great power should attempt to use a client in aid or combat operations only if it meets the following conditions:

- First, the client regime must control a strong central government, the ideology of which is compatible with the ideological commitments of the great power. A strong government without internal strife to drain his resources ensures that the client will be able to maintain his commitment to a surrogate task.
- Second, the client must possess an industrial base and/or military establishment well enough organized to provide resources for activities beyond the country's borders.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Soviet experience clearly shows the sponsor-client relationship to be one of enormous complexity. The complexity increases when the sponsor attempts to translate the relationship into some form of surrogate cooperation. Although a client may be willing to play a surrogate role, the sponsor must decide whether the result is worth the price. A great power can provide incentives, but beyond those incentives a client's participation is motivated by his own interests--interests that the sponsor can never fully control. He can channel them or even attempt to change the client's perceptions of them, but ultimately the client's own calculation of advantage prevails.

These conclusions have certain important implications for the United States: U.S. policymakers can successfully use surrogates in the third world; indeed they may be required to in future world conflicts.² However, they should not underestimate the taxing requirements for transforming a client into an effective surrogate.

²Stephen T. Hosmer's study *Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., R-3208-AF,

A potential surrogate must qualify on a basic level with a strong central government, viable economy, and trained military establishment. The United States must possess the means to influence him, whether as a strategic supplier, bulwark against the Soviet bloc, or partner willing to consider his national interests. Finally, and most important, the client's national interests cannot conflict with or prevent the United States from achieving the goals of U.S. strategy. If, for example, the client intends to control events in a region, the policies that he undertakes to achieve that objective should not prevent the United States from dealing effectively with the Soviet Union or China.

In attempting to use a client in a surrogate role, the United States will probably not be able to meet these stringent requirements consistently. As a result, U.S. policymakers must be willing to accept the risk that a client will perform inadequately or not at all. Indeed, uncertainties remain even if all requirements are met, because a client's perceptions of his interests shift over time. The United States must therefore accept the need to adjust policies that require foreign surrogates, or to quickly abandon them when they fail. Surrogates are an important element of great power strategies in the developing world, but the Soviet experience shows that they are a risky one.

forthcoming, pp. 54-75) suggests this necessity. See also Charles Wolf, Jr., "Beyond Containment: Reshaping U.S. Policies Toward the Third World," Discussion Paper No. 98, California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., September 1982.

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DIADIN 259-BA (AS OF: 1748 EDT -0 SEP 81)

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: RESULTS OF OPERATION PRUTEA. (U)

~~1.~~ SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) OFFICIALS ESTIMATED THAT THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) AND ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAPLA) EACH LOST ABOUT 500 TROOPS DURING SOUTH AFRICA'S CROSS-BORDER OPERATION -- CALLED OPERATION PRUTEA -- INTO ANGOLA BEGINNING AROUND 24 AUGUST AND ENDING ABOUT 4 SEPTEMBER. THE 1,000 FIGURE WAS ARRIVED AT BY BOLD COUNTS AND ESTIMATES PROVIDED BY 38 POW'S. PRETORIA PREVIOUSLY CLAIMED ABOUT 450 ENEMY KILLED.

2. ~~REPORTEDLY~~ REPORTEDLY, THE SADF HAS PRESENTED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF 7 SOVIETS, NOT INCLUDING THE TWO MILITARY PERSONNEL KILLED AND ONE CAPTURED, IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATION. ABOUT 12 WERE ASSIGNED AS ADVISERS TO FAPLA, AND SOME MAY HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH SWAPO, ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY. EVIDENCE INCLUDES PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOVIETS WORKING WITH A SWAPO/FAPLA OPERATIONS MAP.

3. ~~THE SADF~~ THE SADF CAPTURED ABOUT 2,400 TONS OF MATERIEL DURING OPERATION PRUTEA AND DESTROYED ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT ON THE SPOT IN ANGOLA. EQUIPMENT CAPTURED INCLUDED 400 TONS OF AMMUNITION, 487

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TONS OF WEAPONS. 1,94 TONS OF SOFT-SKIN VEHICLES, 20 TONS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, AND OVER 374 TONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES. ROUGHLY HALF OF THE CAPTURED MATERIEL WAS FOUND AT XANGUNGO AND THE OTHER HALF AT NGIVA. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SOME 53,000 GALLONS OF FUEL STORED UNDERGROUND IN ANGOLA WAS ALSO FOUND AND DESTROYED.

4. ~~SECRET~~ ALTHOUGH RADAR FACILITIES AT SEVERAL SOUTHERN ANGOLAN SITES WERE REPORTEDLY DESTROYED BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING OPERATION PROTEA, THE BAR LOCK AND SIDE NET RADARS AT CAHAMA, 50 NM NORTH OF THE ANGOLA-NAMIBIA BORDER, WERE APPARENTLY NOT DAMAGED. HOWEVER, AT LEAST 10 BUILDINGS WERE DESTROYED AT THE CAHAMA MILITARY CAMP. FARTHER SOUTH, THERE WAS MODERATE BOMB DAMAGE OBSERVED ON THE EAST SIDE OF TOWN AT NGIVA WHILE IN THE WESTERN PART, 13 OF 14 BUILDINGS AT THE ARMY BARRACKS WERE DESTROYED. TWO OF THREE SUPPORT BUILDINGS WERE ALSO DESTROYED AT NGIVA AIRFIELD. ONE DAMAGED OOD PAIR RADAR WAS REPORTED AT THE RADAR SITE AT CHIMBEMBA, NORTH OF CAHAMA.

5. ~~SECRET~~ SOUTH AFRICA WILL MAKE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA OVER THE ENEMY PERSONNEL KILLED AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED DURING ITS OPERATION IN ANGOLA AND OVER THE SOVIET CONNECTION WITH FAPLA AND SWAPO. OPERATION PROTEA WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A CATCHING BLow TO SWAPO AND IT WILL

IT IS LIKELY TAKE THE INSURGENTS SEVERAL MONTHS TO A YEAR TO REGROUP. IN THE MEANTIME, SOUTH AFRICA EXPECTED TO KEEP SWAPO ON THE DEFENSIVE WITH SMALLER CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ANGOLA. PRETORIA WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY SOVIET OR CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND SUPPORT TO SWAPO, AT LEAST NOT UNTIL IT SUFFERS GREATER CONSEQUENCES.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

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INFO RUE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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MSGNO 11 (MIIR) ISG *30/07/84* *09:08*

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EZ2:

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 CUBAN MILITARY IN ANGOLA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL.

DOI: (U) 840720(RO)

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 ORDER OF BATTLE
INFORMATION, AS WELL AS INDICATIONS OF MORALE AMONG
CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN ANGOLA: (b)(3):10 USC 424
THAT CUBAN AND FAPLA TROOPS ALLEGEDLY HAD A FIREFIGHT
IN MAR 84, IN WHICH THERE WERE 300 CUBAN CASUALTIES.
ALSO, ACCORDING TO (b)(3):10 U THERE IS A DETACHMENT OF
600 TO 1000 CUBAN WOMEN IN ANGOLA, WHO PROVIDE
ADMINISTRATIVE AND NURSING SERVICES, AND PERFORM
GUARD DUTY. DETAILS FOLLOW.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 2640 (h)

DISPOSITION OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES IN VARIOUS PROVINCES
OF ANGOLA:

- ZAIRE PROVINCE	--	500 TROOPS
- UIGE	--	3,000
- LUANDA	--	20,000
- CUANAA	--	5,000
- LUANDA NORTE	--	200
- HUAMBO	--	10,000

2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ OTHER ELEMENTS SAID TO BE OPERATING IN
ANGOLA WERE 500 ANC AND SWAPO IN MALANGE PROVINCE.

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE ANGOLANS USE SPARSELY POPULATED
MOXICO PROVINCE AS AN ARMY TRAINING AREA (b)(3):10 US ALSO
CITED NEGAGE, SOUTH OF TOWN OF UIGE, LUANDA AND HUILA,
AS BEING SITES USED BY THE ANGOLAN AIR FORCE. MIG 21
AIRCRAFT ARE REPORTEDLY LOCATED AT HUILA. SOVIET
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS, EMPLOYED BY THE FAPLA, WERE
ALSO SAID TO BE LOCATED AS FAR NORTH AS ZAIRE PROVINCE
AND UIGE.

4. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE MORALE OF CUBAN FORCES IS REPORTEDLY
VERY LOW, DESPITE APPARENT EFFORTS TO PROCURE GOOD
FOOD AND PROVIDE GOOD MEDICAL TREATMENT. A "FORÇA
FEMININA," A DETACHMENT OF BETWEEN 600 TO 1000 BLUE-
UNIFORMED CUBAN WOMEN, IS SAID TO BE ASSIGNED TO NURSING
AND ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS. THEY ALSO PERFORM GUARD
DUTY. CUBAN TROOPS ARE SAID TO BE FORBIDDEN TO
FRATERNIZE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE. EXPEDITIONARY

<<<<< SECTION 2 >>>>>

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 CUBAN MILITARY IN ANGOLA (U)

FORCE RELATIONS WITH THE FAPLA, ACCORDING TO (b)(3):10 U

HIT A LOW EBB IN MAR 84, WHEN A FIREFIGHT BETWEEN
THE FAPLA AND CUBAN TROOPS RESULTED IN 300 CUBAN
CASUALTIES.

MSGNO 11 (MIIR) ISG *30/07/84* *09:08*

COMMENTS: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A

COLL: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U)(b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

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SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO); SOUTH AFRICA (SF); CUBA (CU).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] CUITO CUANAVAL: ENOUGH IS

ENOUGH FOR SOUTH AFRICA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 880426.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (S) (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]
SUMMARY: (S) SOUTH AFRICA IS PULLING BACK FROM CUITO
CUANAVAL BECAUSE FURTHER GAINS WOULD NOT BE WORTH THE
LOSS OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF
INCREASED CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

TEXT: 1. (S) THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE'S (SADF)
DECISION TO PULL OUT OF ANGOLA AND BACK TO THE NAMIBIAN
AREA IS BASED PRIMARILY ON SOUND MILITARY TACTICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION WITH POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
AN IMPORTANT, BUT DEFINITELY SECONDARY, CONSIDERATION.
BACK IN AUGUST 1987 THERE HAD BEEN REAL FEAR OF AN
ALL-OUT ATTACK BY POPULAR ANGOLAN FORCES (FAPLA) ON
MAVINGA WITH A FOLLOW-ON DRIVE TO WIPE OUT THE UNITA
STRONGHOLD AT JAMBA. CONSIDERING THAT FAPLA HAD BEEN
ALL BUT DECIMATED ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND PUSHED BACK TO
THE CUITO CUANAVAL AREA, THE SADF FELT THAT THE PRIMARY

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page 2

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MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF SADF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED. BY EARLY DECEMBER 1987 IT WAS ALREADY APPARENT TO SADF PLANNERS THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE MUCH MORE TO GAIN BY CONTINUED FIGHTING AT CUITO.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE SADF SENIOR PLANNERS HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO PREDICT AN EASY VICTORY NOR TO EXPRESS ANY REAL OPTIMISM FOR FEAR OF LETTING PUBLICITY DETERMINE MILITARY ACTION. THE SADF REALIZED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT ACTUALLY TO HOLD CUITO IN THAT THE FAPLA/CUBAN MILITARY COULD JUST AS EASILY STAND BACK AND LAUNCH PIN-POINT ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES INTO ANY SADF FORCES IN CUITO OR AT THE AIRFIELD. THUS WHEN UNITA BEGAN MAKING UNTRUE CLAIMS OF CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION OF CUITO, THE SADF LEADERSHIP BECAME EXTREMELY ANNOYED.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE SADF FELT THAT IT HAD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO ATTACK AND HOLD PRACTICALLY ANYWHERE WITHIN ANGOLA, EVEN WITH THE EXTENSIVE LOGISTICAL TRAIL THAT WOULD ENSUE FROM SUCH OPERATIONS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER SUCH EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS WOULD BE WORTH THE ASSURED LOSS IN PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL. THIS QUESTION BECAME MORE SIGNIFICANT IN LIGHT OF INCREASING CUBAN INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF FAPLA. THE CUBANS WERE BECOMING MORE AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR AIR RECCE AND SORTIES AND HAD POSITIONED THEIR GROUND FORCES IN SUCH A WAY TO LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIGHT THE SADF OVER MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH OR NORTHWEST OF CUITO. THE SADF WAS LIKEWISE CONCERNED ABOUT AN INEVITABLE COUNTER-ATTACK SHOULD IT OPT TO OCCUPY CUITO.

4. ~~(C)~~ THE DECISION WAS MADE THAT IT WAS NOT WORTH FURTHER SOUTH AFRICAN LOSSES FOR WHAT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE APPRECIABLE GAINS. THE SADF HAD SHOWN ITSELF CAPABLE, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL MACHINERY WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES FOR TALKS. THE REAL MILITARY CONCERN BECAME THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF A RETROGRADE OPERATION WITHOUT FURTHER UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES; THE APPEARANCE OF BEING CHASED OUT OF ANGOLA BY THE FAPLA/CUBAN MILITARY WAS LIKEWISE A REAL CONCERN. THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO COUNTER THE ANTICIPATED MPLA PROPAGANDA TO THAT EFFECT, AND THE MILITARY MADE SURE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD MOVE AS SMOOTHLY AND SAFELY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE SADF. THE SADF HAS BEEN EMPLOYING

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WITHERING ARTILLERY FIRE TO COVER THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ACTUALLY IN CONTACT AND HAS SOWN "THOUSANDS" OF MINES IN THE PATHS OF WOULD-BE PURSUERS.

5. ~~(C)~~ THE SADF WILL REGROUP AND CONSOLIDATE WITHIN NAMIBIA AND EXPECTS FAPLA TO ATTEMPT TO RESTRUCTURE ITS MILITARY AND BEG MORE EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO LAUNCH ANOTHER "DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE" IN JULY OR AUGUST. THE SADF AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PLANNERS EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CUT BACK ON AID TO FAPLA DUE TO NEW SOVIET POLICIES WORLDWIDE TO REDUCE CONFLICTS. IF THE SOVIETS DO CURTAIL AID, THEN SOUTH AFRICA WILL HAVE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION BY NOT WASTING ANY MORE LIVES OR HARD-TO-REPLACE MATERIEL, ESPECIALLY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. IF THE SOVIETS DO RE-EQUIP FAPLA, THEN THE HARD-LINER "SECOND-GUESSERS" WILL CONDEMN THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OF SOUTH AFRICA FOR NOT FINISHING THE JOB AT CUITO WHEN THEY HAD THE CHANCE.

COMMENTS: ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

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//COMSOB USC 424

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PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

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WARNING:(U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

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~~CONFIDENTIAL - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

EZ2:

327 APR 76

THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ANGOLA/CUBA
2. CUBAN PROFILE IN ANGOLA (U)
3. NA

4. 9-18 APRIL 76

5. (b)(3):10 USC 28 APR 76

6. NA

7. (b)(3):10 USC

8. 424

9. 30 APRIL 76

10. NA

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. ~~IC/NOFORN~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) SITUATION OF CUBANS
IN ANGOLA HAS BROACHED. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

A. IN ORDER TO REDUCE THEIR VISIBILITY IN LUANDA, 2,000 CUBAN
TROOPS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO CABINDA;
B. CUBAN SHIPS HAVE BEEN IN THE VICINITY OF CABINDA, (b)(1),1.4 (c)
SPECULATE THAT CUBAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN FERRIED OUT TO THE SHIPS
AT NIGHT FOR RETURN TO CUBA.
COMMENT: ~~IC/NOFORN~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

3412-196-2

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

MSGWD 15 (MIIR) ZZA *03/03/76* *04117*
CUBAN PRESENCE APPEARS CREDIBLE. THE SPECULATION THAT CUBANS
ARE BEING SNEAKED OUT OF THE COUNTRY IS SO TENUOUS THAT IT
WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE WORTH REPORTING EXCEPT IT IS SO COUNTER
TO THE CUSTOMARY STORIES OF INFLUX OF CUBANS THAT IT IS UN-
USUAL. (b)(1),1.4 (c) USUALLY TRY TO PAINT AS DARK A PICTURE
AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ELICIT SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

~~COB 31 DEC 1982~~

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MSGNO 2 (MIIR) K01 *20/01/81* *09:26*
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHTM (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUFHUK
RUTAOK
RUEHDT
RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL
RUDOVIA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
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EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

DIA FOR IR BRANCH: (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: THIS IS IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF) / ANGOLA
(AO) / NAMIBIA (WA)
2. (U) TITLE: ACTIVITY IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 810117-810119
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: SEE FM LINE
5. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (U) SOURCE: VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA

7. (U) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FORWARDS A SUMMARY OF EVENTS
IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA IN SWA/NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA; TWO
SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED; THIRTY-FIVE
SWAPO MEMBERS KILLED; TWO CIVILIANS KILLED AND THREE
INJURED IN LANDMINE EXPLOSIONS; ANGOLA CLAIMS SOUTH
AFRICA FORCES MADE CROSS-BORDER RAIDS INTO THEIR TERRITORY.

8A. (U) DETAILS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE NEWS MEDIA, BRIGADIER WILLIE MEYER, SECOND-IN-COMMAND OF THE SWATF, ANNOUNCED THAT ONE CORPORAL AND ONE RIFLEMAN OF THE SOUTH AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE WERE KILLED IN A SKIRMISH WITH SWAPO GUERRILLAS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA OF SWA/NAMIBIA ON 810115. HE SAID THIRTY-FIVE SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED IN A TWO DAY PERIOD - PRESUMABLY DURING 810115-16.

2. (U) ACCORDING TO THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA BROADCASTING COMPANY (SWABC), TWO PORTUGUESE CONSTRUCTIONS WORKERS WERE KILLED WHEN THEIR LIGHT VEHICLE DETONATED A LANDMINE IN THE VICINITY OF OMBALANTU IN NORTHWESTERN OVAMBO OVER THE WEEKEND OF 8100117-18. THREE CIVILIANS WERE INJURED IN ANOTHER EXPLOSION ON THE ONESI ROAD IN NORTHWESTERN OVAMBO ON 810118. SWABC SAID THAT THE LANDMINES WERE PLANTED BY SWAPO.

3. (U) ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL NEWS MEDIA, THE ANGOLAN NEWS AGENCY "ANGOP" - ANNOUNCED ON 810118 THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES BASED IN SWA/NAMIBIA MADE A NEW SERIES OF RAIDS INTO SOUTHERN ANGOLA. "ANGOP", QUOTING A DEFENSE MINISTRY STATEMENT ISSUED IN LUANDA, SAID SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS BEGAN WITH RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ON 810111. THE OVERFLIGHTS OF ANGOLA'S SOUTHERN KUNENE PROVINCE CONTINUED AND ON 810114 A MOTORIZED COMPANY OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS CROSSED THE BORDER NEAR CHIEDE. ON 810115, SOUTH AFRICAN UNITS, BACKED BY SIX PUMA HELICOPTERS AND A SQUADRON OF MIRAGE FIGHTERS ATTACKED ANGOLA TROOPS STATIONED NEAR KUAMATO. ON 810117, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN LUANDA SAID FIERCE FIGHTING WAS STILL TAKING PLACE AND BOTH SIDES HAD SUFFERED A NUMBER OF DEAD AND WOUNDED. SOUTH AFRICAN OVERFLIGHTS WERE INTENSIFIED DURING 810117 WITH MILITARY AIRCRAFT INTRUDING AS FAR NORTH AS LUBANGO, ABOUT 250KM FROM THE BORDER.

8B. (U) ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:

1. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO
12. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APPROVED BY:
14. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. (U) ENCL: N/A
16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEADADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

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RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 CHEMICAL WARFARE IN ANGOLA.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

DOI: (U) 871229.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ SADF GROUND FORCES FEARED FAPLA USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING LOMBA RIVER ACTION.

TEXT: ~~(S)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 SADF GROUND FORCES
FACED A POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING COMBAT SITUATION IN
MID-OCTOBER DURING THE BATTLES AT AND IN THE VICINITY OF
THE LOMBA RIVER. SADF INTELLIGENCE PICKED UP TWO RADIO
INTERCEPTS OF FAPLA (ANGOLAN ARMY) TRANSMISSIONS FROM THE
BATTLE AREA TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS REQUESTING PERMISSION
TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST UNITA AND SADF FORCES.

(b)(3):10 USC 424 THIS INTELLIGENCE CAUSED NEAR
PANIC AT SADF'S OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE SADF
GROUND TROOPS IN ANGOLA HAD NO CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE
CLOTHING OR EQUIPMENT NOR ANY MEANS OF COUNTERING FAPLA'S
USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

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PAGE:0090

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

//COMSOBJ:

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

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ITEM NO=00136105

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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

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RUEADADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUCJHUA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

ASS: (U) CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY.

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: (U) IIR

(b)(3):10 USC 424

THOUGHTS

ON MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

DOI: (U) 880209.

REQS: (U)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(c)

SOURCE: (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT FAPLA'S ABILITY
TO LAUNCH ANOTHER OFFENSIVE IN 1988 AND ABOUT SOVIET
INTENTIONS.

TEXT: 1. (C) THE THREE BRIGADES
FAPLA HAS ON THE SOUTHEAST SIDE OF THE CUITO RIVER DO NOT
KNOW THE BRIDGE OVER THE CUITO--AND THEIR ONLY SAFE ROUTE
OF WITHDRAWAL--IS OUT AND THE THEY ARE EFFECTIVELY CUT
OFF. BUT, (b)(1):1.4 (C) WENT ON TO SAY, IT PROBABLY WOULD
MAKE NO DIFFERENCE ANYWAY AS THE FAPLA BRIGADES WILL STAY
IN PLACE AND FIGHT AS THEY HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO DO.

(b)(1):1.4 (C) WAS USING THIS POINT TO CONTRAST FAPLA TROOPS WITH
THE CUBANS AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE
MAJOR DIFFERENCES THEY HAVE OBSERVED BETWEEN THE TWO: IN
SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES THE CUBANS WOULD "CUT AND RUN, AS
THEY DO ANY TIME THEY ARE ENGAGED." THE FAPLA ARE MUCH
BETTER FIGHTERS (b)(1):1.4 (C)

2. (C) FAPLA IS STILL VERY MUCH IN CONTROL OF CUITO
CUANAVALA ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE TAKEN A BEATING BY ARTILLERY
AND UNITA'S HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS. (b)(1):1.4 (C) BELIEVES CUITO
CUANAVALA CAN BE USED BY FAPLA TO LAUNCH A 1988 WINTER
OFFENSIVE EVEN THOUGH THE AIRFIELD HAS BEEN HEAVILY

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PAGE:0080

DAMAGED. "HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO PATCH UP A RUNWAY,"
(b)(1)(14)(G) THEN ADDED, "NOT VERY LONG." AS FOR
OTHER FACILITIES AT CUITO, THEY WERE NOT REALLY IMPORTANT
TO BEGIN WITH SO MOST OF THE DESTRUCTION THAT HAS TAKEN
PLACE DURING THE LONG SIEGE HAS NOT REALLY EFFECTED THE
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CUITO CUANAVALA OR RENDERED IT
USELESS TO ANY OF THE COMBATANTS. CUITO'S VALUE LIES IN
THE FACT THAT IT IS ALONG A MAJOR COMMUNICATION ROUTE AND
IS A STEPPING STONE TO ANY EFFORT TO MOVE AGAINST MAVINGA
AND JAMBA.

3. (S) DISCUSSING THE TACTICS/STRATEGY OF LAYING SIEGE TO
CUENA, LUENA AND OTHE NORTHEASTERN VILLAGES IN AN EFFORT
TO DRAW FAPLA AWAY FROM CUITO AND OTHER AREAS IN THE
SOUTHEAST, (b)(1)(14)(G) THIS IS NOT WORKING AS
ENVISAGED. FAPLA IS HANGING TOUGH. ALSO WORKING IN
FAPLA'S FAVOR IS BETTER CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. BOTH CUBAN AND
FAPLA PILOTS ARE BEGINNING TO FLY LOWER AND CLOSER TO
ENGAGED COMBATANTS THEREBY DELIVERING MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE
FIRE POWER. (COMMENT: THIS ACCOUNT OF CUBAN AND FAPLA AIR
TACTICS CONFIRMS AN EARLIER REPORT OF CHANGING AIR
TACTICS. (b)(3)(10) USC 424) (b)(1)(14)(G) CHEMICAL
WARFARE WAS BEING USED BY FAPLA BUT SADF HAD NO SOLID
EVIDENCE OF ITS USE OTHER THAN THE VICTIMS THEMSELVES.
SADF WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT FAPLA USE OF GAS DURING THE
HEAVY FIGHTING ON THE LOMBA RIVER LATE LAST YEAR WHEN THEY
(SADF) HAD TROOPS WITH UNITA BUT NONE WAS USED (b)(3)(10) USC 424
(b)(3)(10) USC 424 THE MASSED TROOPS AND TERRAIN ALONG THE
LOMBA PRESENTED AN IDEAL TARGET FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE BUT
THE TERRAIN AND NATURE OF FIGHTING NEAR CUITO DOES NOT
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
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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (U) CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY.

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

LEND ITSELF TO EFFECTIVE USE OF GAS. THERE ARE NO MASSED TROOPS AND THE GAS WOULD QUICKLY DISPERSE AND DISSIPATE IN THE RELATIVE OPEN AND HIGHER TERRAIN NEAR CUITO CUANAVAL. A GAS ATTACK WOULD EFFECT NO MORE THAN A HANDFUL OF TROOPS AT ANY ONE TIME.

4. (S) SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE STILL UNCERTAIN AND CAUSE FOR CONCERN AMONG THE UPPER ECHELONS OF SADF LEADERSHIP. AS NOTED IN IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SADF COULD QUICKLY FIND THEMSELVES IN SERIOUS TROUBLE ON THE BATTLE FIELD IF THE SOVIETS DECIDE TO UP THE ANTE AND CONTINUE TO INTRODUCE INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SADF SIMPLY CANNOT SUSTAIN HEAVY LOSSES OVER THE LONG TERM--IN MANPOWER OR EQUIPMENT. (b)(1):4 (c) THE SOVIETS "CONTINUE TO POUR IN NEW EQUIPMENT AND THERE IS NO SIGN THAT THEY ARE READY TO QUIT AND CUT THEIR LOSSES." (b)(1):4 (c) SURMISE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY LOW-COST EFFORT GOING IN ANGOLA AND IT CAN CONTINUE FOR YEARS TO COME. RELEVANT TO THEIR EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WAR IN ANGOLA COSTS THEM VERY LITTLE WITH POTENTIALLY LARGE GAINS, (b)(1):4 (c) ALSO STRESSED THE FACT, BELIEVED BY MANY AMONG THE SADF LEADERSHIP, THAT CLASSIC COMMUNIST STRATEGY IS TO MAKE NOISES OF WANTING TO NEGOTIATE ANY TIME THEY FIND THEMSELVES IN A TIGHT SPOT AS THEY NOW DO IN ANGOLA--BUT THIS IS ONLY TO BUY TIME FOR THEM TO MANEUVER FOR MORE FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN SUM, ONE SHOULD NOT PUT MUCH STOCK ON RUMORS GOING ABOUT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO CUT A DEAL IN ANGOLA,

(b)(1):4 (c)

5. (S) TRUNING TO UNITA, (b)(1):4 (c) ((SAVIMBI)) COULD NOT SURVIVE IN A MPLA-UNITA COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CONTINUED, STRONG WESTERN--PARTICULARLY U.S.--SUPPORT. (b)(1):4 (c) "SAVIMBI AS PART OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA IS NOT A SAFETY VALVE FOR THE SAG." (b)(1):4 (c) ASKED RHETORICALLY, "HAS THERE EVER BEEN A CASE WHERE A WESTERN/CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL FACTION HAS

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not complete
Also duplicate

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PAGE:0075

SURVIVED IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH A COMMUNIST PARTNER?" (b)(1),1,4(c) PARTITION OF ANGOLA AS HAS BEEN BANDIED ABOUT IN SOME CIRCLES IS A NON-STARTER. PARTITION IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OAU AND WILL NEVER BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

6. (S) (b)(1),1,4(c) BELIEVES THE HARD-LINERS IN THE MPLA STILL HAVE THE UPPER HAND AND CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO EVEN CONSIDER NEGOTIATION WITH UNITA BUT THERE IS THE LIKELIHOOD THE MODERATES WILL GAIN CONTROL AND THEY (THE MODERATES) WANT TO NEGOTIATE. BRIEFLY ADDRESSING THE SWA/NAMIBIAN PROBLEM, (b)(1),1,4(c) UN RESOLUTION 435 IS OK EXCEPT FOR THE PROVISION PROVIDING FOR UNTAG TROOPS TO SUPERVISE THE DISARMING OF SWATF TROOPS. ARMED UNTAG TROOPS OCCUPYING SWATF BASES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, (b)(1),1,4(c)

COMMENTS: 1. (S) (b)(1),1,4(c)

//IPSP: (U)

//COMSOBJ:

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

COLL: (U) (b)(3),10,USC-424

INSTR: (U)

END OF MESSAGE

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(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

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PAGE:0077

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR
BODY

PASS: (U)

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: (U) IIR

ADMIN

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL~~.

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END OF MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

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PAGE 001

NC 3104695

TOR: 131605Z JAN 84

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RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424 PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//, PRIORITY
RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
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RUSMNOA/USCINCEUR VAITHINGEN GER// (b)(3):50 USC 4
RUSMNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS
- IN ANGOLA, III (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALU-
ATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 840112
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (S) THE RECENT EXCURSION BY SOUTH AFRICA INTO
SOUTHERN ANGOLA HAD THREE GOALS: (1) TO MOUNT AN OPER-
ATION TO PREVENT CUBAN AND ANGOLAN (FAPLA) TROOPS FROM
AIDING SWAPO (SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION)
(2) TO PREVENT SWAPO FROM HIDING WITH FAPLA AND CUBAN
TROOPS (3) TO DESTROY THE LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF
SWAPO. CLAIMING SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THESE GOALS, SOUTH

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PAGE 002
TOR: 131606Z JAN 84

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AFRICAN TROOPS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING AND SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THE NEXT 7 TO 14 DAYS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ AFTER INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES HAD FORECAST THE INFILTRATION OF UP TO 1200 SWAPO DURING THE RAINY SEASON, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) DECIDED TO MOUNT THE RECENT OFFENSIVE. GOALS FOR THIS OPERATION WERE THREEFOLD: (1) TO MOUNT AN OPERATION TO PREVENT CUBAN AND FAPLA TROOPS FROM AIDING INFILTRATION OF SWAPO TROOPS INTO NAMIBIA (2) TO PREVENT SWAPO TROOPS FROM HIDING WITH CUBAN AND FAPLA TROOPS AND (3) TO DESTROY LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF SWAPO.

2. ~~(C)~~ THE OPERATION WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO MAIN ZONES WEST AND EAST OF THE CUNENE RIVER. THE WESTERN TASK FORCE (WTF), CONSISTED OF A MECHANIZED COMBAT GROUP, TWO MOTORIZED COMPANIES, AND ONE ARTILLERY BATTERY WITH 140MM GUNS AND 20MM AAA. THE EASTERN TASK FORCE (ETF) CONSISTED OF 8 INFANTRY COMPANIES. THE WTF RANGED AS FAR WEST AS CANAMA ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ AND AS FAR NORTH AS MJLONDO ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ AND CUELAI ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~. THE ETF WAS AS FAR NORTH AS CASSINGA ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ AND AS FAR EAST AS CALUNDO ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~.

3. ~~(C)~~ AIR FORCE UNITS DEDICATED TO THE OPERATION WERE: AN IMPALA SQUADRON, AN ALOUETTE IIL SQUADRON, 8 PUMA HELOS, 2 DC-3 DAKOTAS, AND NUMEROUS BOSBOK AND KUDU OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT. MIRAGE, BUCCANEER, AND CANBERRA AIRCRAFT WERE USED AS NEEDED.

4. ~~(C)~~ CASUALTIES FOR THE OPERATION WERE LISTED AS 21 KIA AND APPROXIMATELY TWICE THAT MANY WOUNDED (MOST WOUNDED WERE THE RESULT OF MINE INCIDENTS). OVER HALF OF THE KIA WERE LOST IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS. DURING THE INITIAL PENETRATION BY THE ETF, ONE PLATOON HAD GOTTEN FURTHER AHEAD THAN BRIEFED AND WAS ATTACKED BY A BATTALION SIZE FORCE, RESULTING IN 8 KIA, 1 CAPTURED, AND MANY WOUNDED. THE OTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE CUELAI AREA, WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ENCOUNTERED A TANK ATTACK. A RATEL WAS HIT RESULTING IN 5 KIA. THE HIGHER CASUALTY RATE (ONLY 21 KILLED DURING OPERATION PROTEA), WAS ATTRIBUTED TO A CLOSER INTEGRATION OF SWAPO FORCES WITH CUBAN AND FAPLA FORCES. RESISTANCE WAS DEFINITELY STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED.

5. ~~(C)~~ CAPTURED EQUIPMENT INCLUDES TANKS SIGNAL VEHICLES, TROOP CARRIERS, 23MM LT AAA GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, ANTI TANK GUNS, SAM 7'S, AND 40MM GRENADE LAUNCHERS. ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ DID STATE THAT NO NEW (NOT PREVIOUSLY ENCOUNTERED) RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT WAS ENCOUNTERED.

6. ~~(C)~~ ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ TROOPS ARE CURRENTLY BEING WITHDRAWN. PORTIONS OF THE MECHANIZED UNITS SHOULD BE BACK IN NAMIBIA TODAY (13 JAN). THE WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 7-14 DAYS. ~~(b)(1),1.4(c)~~ ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~ THE SADF WAS READY FOR FOLLOW-UP
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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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PAGE 001

NC 3104702

TDR: 131607Z JAN 84

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P 131606Z JAN 84
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INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 131515Z JAN 84
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424 PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC// PRIORITY

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RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER (b)(3):50 USC 401
RUSNNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS

ACTIONS IF THE NEED AROSE, BUT THAT IF SUCH ACTIONS WERE
NECESSARY THEY WOULD BE ON A SMALLER SCALE AND OF LIMITED
DURATION. THE REASON GIVEN FOR THIS WAS THE PURPORTED
SUCCESS OF GOAL THREE, NAMELY THE DESTRUCTION OF MUCH
OF THE PRE-POSITIONED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ALONG THE SWAPO
INFILTRATION ROUTES. THE MISSILE SITES WERE ALSO MENTION-
ED AGAIN AS A POSSIBLE FUTURE TARGET.

COMMENTS: (b)(1):1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) NONE (b)(3):10 USC 424
PREP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

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PAGE 002
TOR: 131607Z JAN 84

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APPR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE

ENCL: (U) NONE

DISSEM: (U) N/A

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END OF MESSAGE

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MSGID 19 (PIIR) ZZA *09/01/76* *05:00*
MVZCZC 16:25121Z EIC522LCY373

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R 081701Z JAN 76
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
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RUEFMQA/CSAF WASH DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC
RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC
R 081500Z JAN 76

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GERMANY
RUEHSA (b)(3):10 USC 424

BT
EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

EZ2:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ANGOL/REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. ~~13~~ SOUTH AFRICA ARMY UNITS IN ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. DEC 75 - JAN 76

5. (b)(3):10 USC 424

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9. 8 JANUARY 1976

10. ONE SECTION

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. ~~13~~NOFORN (b)(3):50 USC UNITS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WITHIN ANGOLA, INCLUDING A RECENT SWEEP ALONG THE BENGUELA RAILWAY UP TO ZAMBIA, SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS REPORT RELATES TO SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT AND US INTEREST IN ANGOLA. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

1. ~~13~~NOFORN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424-1, 1.4 (c) SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) FORCES HAVE RECENTLY CLEARED THE BENGUELA RAILWAY LINE AS FAR AS ZAMBIA, INCLUDING SOME BRIDGE REPAIR. UNITS REPORTEDLY MET WITH LITTLE RESISTENCE AS THEY SWEEP THROUGH THE AREA, HOWEVER, FORCE WAS REPORTEDLY AMBUSHED BY APPROXIMATELY 150 CUBANS (UNK LOCATION) AS THEY WITHDREW ALONG THE RAILWAY LINE. THREE CUBANS REPORTED KILLED WITH THREE SAA SOLDIERS, ONE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND ONE TRUCK CAPTURED. INFO REGARDING THE THREE CAPTURED MEN FIRST APPEARED IN SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS, 7 JAN 76.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

2. ~~13~~NOFORN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) INDICATED THAT ARMY UNITS HAVE MADE OTHER DEEP PROBES INTO ANGOLA, HOWEVER HE PERSONALLY FEELS THESE FORCES ARE NOW BEING SLOWLY WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRY. UNPOPULAR REACTION FROM WESTERN WORLD OF SA INVOLVEMENT, COBBLED WITH INCREASING IN-FIGHTING BETWEEN FNLA AND UNITA FORCES, PRIMARY REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL, RECENT HEAVY RAINS AND SWOLLEN RIVERS IN

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MSGNO 19 (MIIR) ZIA *09/01/76* *05:00*

SOME AREAS ALSO HINDERED SA ARMY OPERATIONS. SUCH OPERATIONS WOULD REQUIRE BRIDGING MATERIAL AND A MUCH LARGER FORCE THAN S.A. DEFENSE FORCE WILLING TO COMMIT.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

3. ~~TS/NOPORN~~ [REDACTED] FEELS IF AND WHEN SA FORCES ARE PULLED OUT OF ANGOLA, MPLA FORCES WILL PUSH RIGHT TO SOUTH WEST AFRICA. HE INDICATED THAT PART OF THE RECENT CALL-UP OF SA CITIZENS FORCE UNITS, UNITS WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TRANSFERRED TO THIS OPERATIONAL AREA DURING THEIR THREE MONTH PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE, WILL BE USED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITIONS ALONG THE SWA

(b)(1),(b)(3):50
USC 403-1
(i),1.4 (c)

BORDER.
COMMENTS: ~~TS/NOPORN~~ [REDACTED] UNABLE TO GIVE SPECIFIC LOCATING DATA OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY FORCES, THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH, OR INDICATE EXACTLY HOW FAR THEY HAVE REACHED INTO ANGOLA. WITH THE CONTINUING ACTIVATION OF MANY CITIZEN FORCE UNITS THROUGHOUT SA, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THERE ARE ANY IMMEDIATE PLANS TO COMPLETELY END THEIR INVOLVEMENT. AS THE [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] SUGGESTS, THESE FORCES COMMITTED MAY BE IN THE PROCESS OF PULLING BACK, HOWEVER IT APPEARS THE SA DEFENSE FORCE ARE PREPARED TO ACTIVATE AS MANY UNITS AND MEN AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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MSG#0 19 (PIIR) ZZA *09/01/76* *05:00*
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R 081500Z JAN 76

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GERMANY

RUEHSA (b)(3):10 USC 424

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EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

EZ2:

(b)(3):10 USC 424

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ANGOL/REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. ~~157~~ SOUTH AFRICA ARMY UNITS IN ANGOLA
3. W/A
4. DEC 75 - JAN 76

5. (b)(3):10 USC 424

6.

7.

8.

9. 8 JANUARY 1976

10. ONE SECTION

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. ~~157~~ (b)(3):50 USC UNITS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WITHIN ANGOLA, INCLUDING A RECENT SWEEP ALONG THE BENGUELA RAILWAY UP TO ZAMBIA, SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS REPORT RELATES TO SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT AND US INTEREST IN ANGOLA. (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

1. ~~157~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c) SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) FORCES HAVE RECENTLY CLEARED THE BENGUELA RAILWAY LINE AS FAR AS ZAMBIA, INCLUDING SOME BRIDGE REPAIR. UNITS REPORTEDLY MET WITH LITTLE RESISTENCE AS THEY SWEEP THROUGH THE AREA, HOWEVER, FORCE WAS REPORTEDLY AMPLISHED BY APPROXIMATELY 150 CUBANS (UNK LOCATION) AS THEY WITHDREW ALONG THE RAILWAY LINE. THREE CUBANS REPORTED KILLED WITH THREE SAA SOLDIERS, ONE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND ONE TRUCK CAPTURED. INFO REGARDING THE THREE CAPTURED MEN FIRST APPEARED IN SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS, 7 JAN 76. (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f), 1.4 (c)

2. ~~157~~ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f) INDICATED THAT ARMY UNITS HAVE MADE OTHER DEEP PROBES INTO ANGOLA, HOWEVER HE PERSONALLY FEELS THESE FORCES ARE NOW BEING SLOWLY WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRY. UNPOPULAR REACTION FROM WESTERN WORLD OF SA INVOLVEMENT, COMBLED WITH INCREASING IN-FIGHTING BETWEEN FNLA AND UNITA FORCES, PRIMARLY REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL, RECENT HEAVY RAINS AND SWOLLEN RIVERS IN

3330-454-2

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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MSGNO 19 (PIIR) ZIA *09/01/76* *05:00*

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(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC
424,(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i),1.4 (c)

3. ~~IS/NOFORN~~ FEELS IF AND WHEN SA FORCES ARE PULLED OUT OF ANGOLA, MPLA FORCES WILL PUSH RIGHT TO SOUTH WEST AFRICA. HE INDICATED THAT PART OF THE RECENT CALL-UP OF SA CITIZENS FORCE UNITS, UNITS WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TRANSFERRED TO THIS OPERATIONAL AREA DURING THEIR THREE MONTH PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE, WILL BE USED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITIONS ALONG THE SWA

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(i),1.4 (c)

BORDER.
COMMENTS: ~~IS/NOFORN~~ UNABLE TO GIVE SPECIFIC LOCATING DATA OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY FORCES, THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH, OR INDICATE EXACTLY HOW FAR THEY HAVE REACHED INTO ANGOLA. WITH THE CONTINUING ACTIVATION OF MANY CITIZEN FORCE UNITS THROUGHOUT SA, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THERE ARE ANY IMMEDIATE PLANS TO COMPLETELY END THEIR INVOLVEMENT. AS THE

(b)(1),(b)(3):10
USC 424,1.4 (c)

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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1

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RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

RUCLAKA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

RUCLHUA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

INFO RHDLCNE/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

RUSMNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

RUFGAII/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1 (f)

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PAGE:0076

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO); BELGIUM (BE)

SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 RUSSIAN NERVE GAS PROBABLY
USED IN ANGOLA ACCORDING TO BELGIAN MEDICS.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELL. REPORT IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

DOI: (U) 880324.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) //1. MEDIA-LONDON TIMES; 2. (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) THE UNITED NATIONS HAS RECEIVED A REPORT BY A
BELGIUM MEDICAL TEAM AFTER THEIR VISIT TO ANGOLA WHICH
CONCLUDES THAT RUSSIAN-MADE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE ALMOST
CERTAINLY EMPLOYED AGAINST UNITA FORCES THERE. IIR
CONDENSES A MEDIA ARTICLE ON THE BELGIANS' REPORT.

TEXT: 1. (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPORTED THAT
MEDICAL TEAMS FROM SEVERAL COUNTRIES INCLUDING SF WERE
CHECKING INTO ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BY FAPLA FORCES IN ANGOLA. ONE OF THOSE COUNTRIES WITH AN
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM WAS BELGIUM, AND THEIR FINDINGS, WHICH
TENDED TO CONFIRM THE CHARGES, WERE CONTAINED IN A REPORT
WHICH WAS SENT TO , AMONG OTHERS, THE UNITED NATIONS. THE
REPORT WAS SUMMARIZED IN A 20 MARCH LONDON TIMES ARTICLE
WHICH AMEMBASSY LONDON PASSED BY CABLE TO SECSTATE. FOR
ANALYSTS WHO MAY NOT HAVE SEEN IT, WE REPEAT THE ESSENCE
OF THE ARTICLE BELOW.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT:

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PAGE:0077

A. RUSSIAN-MADE NERVE GAS WEAPONS HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY BEEN USED IN THE ANGOLAN WAR, KILLING, BLINDING AND PARALYSING GUERRILLAS OF JONAS ((SAVIMBI'S)) UNITA MOVEMENT, ACCORDING TO INDEPENDENT MEDICAL INVESTIGATIONS.

B. DOCTORS FROM GHENT UNIVERSITY IN BELGIUM HAVE REACHED THIS CONCLUSION AFTER A SIX-DAY MISSION TO ANGOLA LAST ONTH. IN A REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS THEY SAY THAT FROM THE CONDITION OF SOLDIERS EXAMINED, AND TOXICOLOGY TESTS PERFORMED, THERE IS A "HIGH PROBABILITY" THAT THE MEN ARE NERVE GAS VICTIMS.

C. FURTHER EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE SEIZURE OF KITS FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF TOXIC GASES FROM CUBAN SOLDIERS TAKEN CAPTIVE BY UNITA. THE KITS ARE OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN AND CARRY INSTRUCTIONS IN RUSSIAN AND SPANISH. IDENTICAL KITS HAVE BEEN FOUND ON RUSSIAN SOLDIERS CAPTURED BY THE MUJAHEDDIN IN AFGHANISTAN, THE REPORT ADDS.

D. THE INQUIRY TEAM, HEADED BY PROFESSOR AUBAIN ((HEYNDRIKX)), HEAD OF THE TOXICOLOGY DEPARTMENT AT HENT, IS FUNDED ONLY BY THE UNIVERSITY AND HAS NO POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE, HEYNDRIKX SAID LAST WEEK. IT WAS INVITED BY UNITA TO VISIT A FIELD HOSPITAL AT MAVINGA, IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, BECAUSE OF CONCERN ABOUT THE CONDITION OF SOME OF THE MEN REACHING THE HOSPITAL.

E. USING A BLOOD TEST CAPABLE OF DETECTING NERVE GAS EXPOSURE LONG AFTER AN ATTACK, THE DOCTORS FOUND POSITIVE RESULTS IN TWO OF EIGHT PATIENTS EXAMINED. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE OTHER SIX SUGGESTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE NERVE GAS "MARKER" WAS NO LONGER PRESENT, THEY TOO WERE VICTIMS. ALL OF THEM WERE SUFFERING ILL EFFECTS, BUT SOME MORE THAN OTHERS. THE VERY SEVERE ONES WERE PRACTICALLY COMPLETELY PARALYSED, AND WERE INCONTINENT....

F. THE RESULTS CONFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF A PREVIOUS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

MISSION TO ANGOLA IN WHICH THE SAME INVESTIGATORS FOUND INDICATIONS OF NERVE GAS EXPOSURE IN TWO BLIND PATIENTS....

G. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE ALLEGEDLY BEING USED IN A LAST-DITCH ATTEMPT TO PREVENT UNITA FROM OVERRUNNING THE GOVERNMENT'S FORWARD BASE OF CUITO CUNAVALE, THE LAUNCHING PAD FOR RECENT OFFENSIVES AGAINST THE REBELS, PETER ((GODWIN)) WRITES FROM JOHANNESBURG. UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS ARE CURRENTLY LAYING SIEGE TO THE BASE.

H. RADIO SOUTH AFRICA LAST MONTH QUOTED THE GENEVA-BASED INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW AS SAYING THAT SURVIVORS OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS HAD BEEN EXAMINED BY U.S. ARMY DOCTORS WHO FOUND THAT SOME WERE PARALYSED. RADIO SOUTH AFRICA WENT ON TO REPORT THAT THE CHEMICAL AGENT WAS BEING DROPPED FROM SOVIET HIND HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS.

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PAGE:0078

1. JONAS SAVIMBI FIRST CLAIMED TWO YEARS AGO THAT SOVIET-SUPPLIED CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE BEING USED TO BLIND AND KILL HIS MEN.
END TEXT.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

COMMENTS: 1. (U) OBVIOUSLY REFERENCES TO BATTLES ARE NOW SOMEWHAT DATED BUT [] FELT THAT OTHER INFORMATION IS PERTINENT TO ANALYSTS. THE FULL REPORT MAY BE OBTAINABLE UPON REQUEST TO THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF GHENT, BELGIUM OR PERHAPS THROUGH U.N. SOURCES.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

2. (U) [] DO NOT KNOW ANYONE [] WHO HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ANGOLA ALTHOUGH MOST [] FEEL THAT THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN SOME LIMITED USE (BY CUBAN RATHER THAN ANGOLAN FORCES). ONE OF THEM, [] MAY LATER PROVIDE SOME ACCESS TO RESULTS OF THE SADF'S INVESTIGATION. []

(b)(1),1,4 (c)

//IPSP (U) (b)(3):10
//COMSOBJ (U) USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SERIAL: DIADIN 12-14A

BODY

SUBJ: CUBA-ANGOLA: TROOP PRESENCE. (U)

DOI: 12 JAN 88 (AS OF 1632 EST)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NN/NN)~~ CUBAN POLITBURO MEMBER JORGE RISQUET STATED IN AN INTERVIEW THAT ABOUT 40,000 CUBAN TROOPS ARE IN ANGOLA, A FIGURE THAT AGREES WITH RECENT REPORTS OF AN AUGMENTATION.

2. (U) RISQUET REITERATED THAT THE CUBANS' BASIC MISSION IS TO PREVENT FURTHER SOUTH AFRICAN ADVANCEMENTS AND A NEW INVASION OF ANGOLA. HE ALSO DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT UP TO 10,000 CUBANS HAD DIED IN ANGOLA.

3. ~~(SNNZNY)~~ IMAGERY REVEALED THAT ELEMENTS OF A TANK BRIGADE FROM CUBA'S 50TH DIVISION HAVE MOVED TO ANGOLA. IN ADDITION, CUBAN EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN UNLOADED AT LOBITO IN ANGOLA. TWO MOTORIZED REGIMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 50TH DIVISION ARE ALSO OUT OF GARRISON, BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN LOCATED AND COULD STILL BE IN CUBA.

4. (S/WR/AF) - MOVEMENT OF CUBAN UNITS IN ANGOLA CONTINUES. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE CUBAN REINFORCED REGIMENT BRIGADE DEPARTED MENONGUE. ALSO, ELEMENTS OF A CUBAN COMBAT UNIT MAY HAVE ARRIVED IN BENGUELA.

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PAGE:0008

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ COMMENT: RISQUET'S COMMENT THAT 40,000 CUBAN TROOPS ARE IN ANGOLA, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER EVIDENCE, SUGGESTS A LIMITED INCREASE HAS TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED 38,000-PLUS CUBAN TROOPS. (b)(1), (4)(c)

(c)

ADMIN

PREP: (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~DESL: OADR~~

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MSGNO 3 IMIIRI ISG *25/03/83* *12:35*
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BT

EZ1:

UNCLAS E F T O (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

UNCLAS E F T O

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/SWAPO

TACTICS (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (WA)/ANGOLA (AO)

2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: SWAPO TACTICS

4. DATE OF INFO: 830321

5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE

6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

- (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. SOURCE: BEELD NEWSPAPER

8. SUMMARY: THE BUSHWAR IN SOUTH WEST FOR THE FIRST

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MSGNO 3 IMIIRI ISG *25/03/83* *12:35*
TIME SHOWS SIMILARITY WITH THE WAR IN THE FORMER RHODESIA;
THERE IS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TERRORISTS WHO OPERATE OVER A
LONG PERIOD INSIDE THE COUNTRY'S BORDER, AND THE WHITE
FARM TERRITORY OVER THE WHOLE NORTH HAS BECOME A PRIMARY
TARGET.

9.A. DETAILS:

1. THE GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SITUATIONS IS THAT SWAPO, UNLIKE ZIPRA AND ZANLA, IS UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE ANY LONGER THAN A FEW MONTHS. IF THIS ATTEMPT IS NOT EVENTUALLY ENDED, IT WILL TAKE SWAPO, PROBABLY MORE THAN A YEAR, TO BUILD UP TO THE SAME LEVEL.
2. THE OTHER DIFFERENCE IS THAT SWAPO IS FACING THE MOST FORMIDABLE POWER ON THE CONTINENT AND SOUTH AFRICA POSSESSES GREATER ECONOMIC AND OTHER RESERVES THAN RHODESIA AT THAT TIME.
3. SWAPO PRESENT OFFENSIVE POINTS UP A CLEAR CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATIONS ENTIRE APPROACH TO THE WAR: INSTEAD OF CONCENTRATING ON A WAR OF LOW INTENSITY IN MAINLY OVAMBO- LAND AND MINOR ACTS OF SABOTAGE, PREPARE YOURSELF WELL AND HIT HARD WITH A LARGE GROUP DEEP INTO SOUTH WEST, AND ENSURE THAT YOUR FIGHTERS MAINTAIN A PRESENCE OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME IN SOUTH WEST TERRITORY IS THE NEW TACTICS. IT MAKES SWAPO LESS VULNERABLE AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ELIMINATION OF THE SWAPO BASES IN ANGOLA.
4. INFILTRATING THE WHITE FARM TERRITORY HAS, SINCE 1976 IN THE NORTH, BECOME AN ANNUAL PHENOMENON AFTER THE RAINY SEASON. THIS YEARS INFILTRATION HAS BEEN COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.
5. ALMOST A YEAR HAS GONE INTO PREPARATIONS FOR THIS AND THE BEST TROOPS RECEIVED THE BEST TRAINING BY RUSSIAN AND EASTERN BLOC INSTRUCTORS, WHILE APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED OF THEM RECEIVED TRAINING IN LIBYA ITSELF. THERE ARE ALSO MANY MORE TERRORISTS: APPROXIMATELY 700 AS AGAINST LAST YEARS APPROXIMATELY 250. SWAPO TOOK THE UNHEARD OF STEP IN SENDING ALMOST THE ENTIRE SPECIAL UNIT OUT OF LUBANGO IN ANGOLA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION. NOTWITHSTANDING THE SECURITY FORCES INITIAL SUCCESSES WHEN THE FIRST GROUPS BEGAN INFILTRATING APPROX- IMATELY A MONTH AGO, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE THREAT WILL LAST MUCH LONGER THIS YEAR THAN PREVIOUS YEARS.
6. ACCORDING TO THE ARMED FORCES, THE STRONG TERRORIST FORCE HAS BROKEN UP INTO SMALL GROUPS ACROSS A WIDE FRONT TO CONTINUALLY ATTEMPT TO PENE1RATE WHITE AREAS, WHILE OTHERS WAIT TO ENTER IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. ALTHOUGH ONLY UNCLAS EFTO
ONE GROUP HAS ENTERED THE WHITE AREA EAST OF ETOSHA TO THE KAMANJAB-OUTJO AREA, ACROSS TSINTSABIS TO TSUMEB AND OTAVI AND THROUGH THE WESTERN KAVANGO TO GROOTFONTEIN.
7. IN SOUTH AFRICA THERE IS LITTLE UNDERSTANDING - AND MANY ERRONEOUS IMPRESSIONS - OF THIS TYPE OF WAR BEING HAGED HERE. IT IS OPENLY QUESTIONED AS TO HOW THE SECURITY FORCES COULD TAKE TWO WEEKS TO TRACK AND KILL ONLY FIVE TERRORISTS WHO INFILTRATED INTO THE TSUMEB DISTRICT, AND

MSGNO 3 (MIIR) 1SG *25/03/83* *12:35*
THEN ALLOW A FEW OTHERS TO ESCAPE. THE PROBLEM FOR THE
SECURITY FORCES IS THIS: HOW DOES ONE STOP 700 WELL
TRAINED, DETERMINED GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN A LARGELY,
THINLY, POPULATED AREA OF MORE THAN 50,000 SQ KMS, WHILE
A VERY LARGE SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION SYMPATHIZES WITH
THEM, AND THE TERRAIN IS IN THEIR FAVOR?

8. THE TERRORISTS SENT ON MISSIONS ARE, ACCORDING TO THE
SECURITY FORCES, THE BEST THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED THUS FAR.
THEIR TRAINING IN SURVIVAL, FIGHTING SKILL, AND ANTI DETEC-
TION WAS VERY GOOD. THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ARE BRAND
NEW AND OF THE BEST. THEY ARE MORE DETERMINED AND
AGGRESSIVE THAN BEFORE - THE SECURITY FORCES ARE RELUCTANT
TO SAY IT IS COMMUNIST BRAIN-WASHING, BUT THERE IS APPARENT-
LY A GOOD DOSE OF FANATIC NATIONALISM PRESENT. THEY ARE
APPARENTLY BETTER TERRORIST THAN THE AVERAGE TERRORIST
OF ZANLA, ZIRPA, FRELIMO, FAPLA, OR THE FNLA.

9. IN OVAMBO, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN KOAKOVELD AND
KAVANGO, THE TERRORIST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE RURAL
POPULATION. CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE ALSO EXISTS THAT THIS
YEAR, AS WELL AS THE LAST, THEY HAVE RECEIVED SUPPORT
FROM FARM WORKERS, EITHER BECAUSE THEY SYMPATHIZED WITH
SWAPO, OR BECAUSE OF INTIMIDATION AND FEAR.

10. ALL THE TERRORISTS ON THE CURRENT MISSION POSSESS
CIVILIAN CLOTHING AND MONEY, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT A
SIGNIFICANT NUMBER HAVE ALREADY MELTED INTO THE LOCAL
POPULATION IN OVAMBO, TO BECOME ACTIVE LATER.

11. THE THICKLY WOODED, MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OF THE NORTHERN
DISTRICTS IS THE TERRORISTS BIGGEST ALLY. VISION IS
LIMITED LARGELY TO A METER OF TWO, AND DRESSED IN CAMOFLAGE
CLOTHING, A TERRORIST CAN MOVE WITHIN A FEW METERS OF YOU
WITHOUT DETECTION. AT NIGHT IT IS SUICIDE FOR THE DEFENSE
FORCE TO COME ACROSS TRACKS, BECAUSE YOU CAN WALK INTO AN
AMBUSH AT ANY MOMENT. THE ONLY WAY TO ELIMINATE A TERRORIST
IS TO PURSUE HIM UNTIL YOU CATCH UP WITH HIM AND SHOOT
HIM FATALLY. IT IS EASIER SAID THAN DONE. SHOULD HE
WALK OVER ROCKS OR VERY HARD GROUND, HE LEAVES ALMOST NO
TRACKS. WHILE YOU ARE FOLLOWING HIM, YOU HAVE TO ALWAYS
BE AWARE OF FOUR THINGS: THE TRACKS; POSSIBLE AMBUSHES,
THE DREADED POM 2 AIR EXPLODING ANTI PERSONNEL MINE WHICH
CAN BE TRIGGERED BY A TRIP WIRE, AND THE "BLACK WIDOW",
A SMALL PERSONNEL MINE WHICH IS BURIED IN THE TRACKS.
THREE SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL HAVE ALREADY DIED IN THE
LAST FEW WEEKS BECAUSE OF THE POM 2.

12. THE TERRORISTS ARE WELL TRAINED IN LAYING MISLEADING
TRACKS. WITH VARIOUS TECHNIQUES THEY CAN CAUSE THEIR
PURSUERS TO BELIEVE THEY ARE MORE OR LESS THAN THEY
ACTUALLY ARE, OR BY BACKTRACKING FOOL YOU OVER DIRECTION.
THEY ALSO WALK OVER STONES, WIRE FENCES OR TARRIED ROADS
TO LEAVE NO TRAIL, OR WIPE OUT THEIR TRACKS WITH BRANCHES.
IF IT RAINS THEIR TRACKS ARE WASHED AWAY, AND VISION IS
FURTHER RESTRICTED. LARGE GROUPS ARE EASY TO FOLLOW,
WHICH IS WHY THE TERRORISTS USUALLY BREAK INTO SMALLER
GROUPS. IF THE DEFENCE FORCE IS HOT ON THEIR TRAIL, THEY
SPLIT OFF INDIVIDUALLY, WHICH MEANS THAT MANY MORE PURSUERS
HAVE TO BE CALLED IN.

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MSGNO 3 (MIIR) ISG *25/03/83* *12:35*

13. WERE IT NOT FOR THE HIGH QUALITY OF THE SECURITY FORCES, THE PICTURE WOULD BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. THE MEN WHO CONDUCT THE PHYSICAL "SEARCH AND DESTROY" ON THE GROUND ARE THE POLICE COUNTER-1 URGENCY UNIT: THE DREADED KOEVOET, A LARGELY BLACK UNIT OF THE S. A. POLICE, AND THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE SHAP. IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COMMUNITY, KOEVOET PARTICULARLY IS VIEWED AS THE BEST TERRORIST FIGHTERS, WITH THE TASK FORCE NOT FAR BEHIND THEM. IT IS AN ENTIRELY UNCONVENTIONAL GROUP OF MEN WITH AN UNBELIEVABLE RECORD ABOUT WHICH VERY LITTLE CAN BE WRITTEN. EVEN THOUGH THERE IS CONSTANT TENSION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE POLICE, THEY GENERALLY WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OUTSTANDING. TO COMPLETE THE TEAM, THERE IS THE SOUTH AFRICAN HELICOPTER FLYERS AND THEIR CREWS, WHO MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE PARTICULARLY IN LARGE FIREFIGHTS.

14. IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS THAT LIE AHEAD, THE COURAGE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE SECURITY FORCES AS WELL AS THE TERRORISTS WILL BE TESTED TO THE UTMOST.

9.B. ORIG CMTS: SOURCE IS A JOHANNESBURG DAILY NEWSPAPER (AFRIKAANS) WHICH IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE; INFO IS PROBABLY TRUE.

10. PROJ NO: N/A
11. COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
12. SPEC INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO
13. PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. APP BY:
15. REQ EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE
16. ENCL: N/A
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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
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CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(f)

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO);

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLAN UPDATE (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY

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PAGE:0047

EVALUATED INTEL

DOI: (U) 860528

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ THE SADF THINKS THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE WILL NOT START FOR AT LEAST ONE AND ONE HALF MONTHS, IF AT ALL THIS YEAR.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

2. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE SADF DOES NOT EXPECT THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE TO START WITHIN THE NEXT ONE AND ONE HALF MONTHS. THE TROOP STRENGTHS ARE RIGHT BUT THE LOCATIONS AND LOGISTICAL PREPAREDNESS ARE WRONG. THERE ARE FOUR FAPLA BRIGADES AROUND QUITO CANAVALÉ (b)(3):10 USC 424 HOWEVER, ONE OF THESE WAS VERY HARD HIT LAST YEAR AND THE OTHER THREE ARE (b)(1),1.4 (c) REMNANTS. THE SADF DOES NOT SEE THE FRANTIC ACTIVITY IN THE AREA WHICH PREVIOUSLY INDICATED AN ATTACK. ALTHOUGH LOGISTICS ARE ARRIVING IN QUITO, THEY ARE STILL INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN OFFENSIVE.

3. ~~(C)~~ THERE ARE ALSO 4 BRIGADES IN THE VICINITY OF CAZOMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 WITH BRIDGING EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER THESE BRIGADES ARE SPREAD AROUND THE AREA AND HAVE LOCATED IN NEARBY TOWNS. FOR AN OFFENSIVE TO BEGIN IN THIS AREA, THESE BRIGADES MUST COME TOGETHER INTO AN ATTACK FORCE. (b)(1),1.4 (c) FAPLA IS STILL RELYING ON SOVIET DOCTRINE WHICH CALLS FOR A CORRELATION OF FORCES PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. (b)(1),1.4 (c)

4. ~~(C)~~ THE SADF BELIEVES THERE IS DISAGREEMENT WITHIN FAPLA OVER THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVE. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE PUSHING FOR IT WHILE FAPLA WOULD PREFER PERHAPS TO WAIT A YEAR. THE SADF SEES A COMPROMISE SCENARIO AS POSSIBLE. FAPLA WOULD MOUNT A LIMITED OBJECTIVE OFFENSIVE. THEY WOULD NOT TRY TO BECOME DECISIVELY ENGAGED AND HAVE A VERY LIMITED OBJECTIVE. THE SADF COULD SEE A LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK FROM QUITO TO CAPTURE MAVINGA USING TROOPS FROM CAZAMBO AND QUITO. THEY WOULD ALSO SEE AN ATTACK IN CAZAMBO TO FURTHER ESTABLISH A FAPLA PRESENCE. UNITA HAS HAD RECENT SUCCESS IN THIS AREA IN CAPTURING PORTIONS OF THE DIAMOND AREA. DIAMONDS ARE THE SECOND LEADING INCOME PRODUCER IN THE COUNTRY.

5. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) SAW FAPLA

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WITH CUBAN AND RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE FINALLY TAKING JAMBA. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD IT. THE LOGISTICS WOULD EVENTUALLY FORCE FAPLA TO FALL BACK TO QUITO. ADDITIONALLY THERE IS NOTHING IN JAMBA WORTH TAKING AND HOLDING, ONLY A FEW GRASS HUTS.

6. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) IS VERY SKEPTICAL OVER A COALITION GOVERNMENT INVOLVING ((SAVIMBI)). THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN FAPLA WHO REJECT SUCH AN ALLIANCE BECAUSE OF A FEAR OF TRIBAL DOMINATION. SAVIMBI AND MOST OF UNITA COME FROM THE LARGEST TRIBE IN ANGOLA.

7. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) SEES LITTLE CHANGE TO UNITA AFTER SAVIMBI. THE BRIGADIER LEVEL OFFICERS IN UNITA ARE BRIGHT, VERY LOYAL, AND TOTALLY DEDICATED TO THE MOVEMENT. THERE IS NO INTERNAL OPPOSITION SEEN AT THIS TIME. THESE BRIGADIERS ALSO COME FROM SEVERAL TRIBES AND LOCATIONS WHICH SHOULD SPREAD THE POWER BASE OF UNITA.

8. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) SPECULATED THAT THERE WAS A CONFLICT OVER STRATEGY WITHIN FAPLA. ONE SCHOOL FOLLOWED THE PORTUGUESE THEORY WHERE THE COUNTRY WAS DIVIDED INTO ZONES. THE SOUTHEAST, SAVIMBI'S AREA WAS WRITTEN OFF. THERE WAS NO REASON TO FIGHT FOR THIS REGION. THERE IS NOTHING THERE. A SECOND REGION COVERED THE FARMING AREA. HERE, THE PORTUGUESE WOULD ACCEPT RAINY SEASON INFILTRATION AS THEY DEVELOPED INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THE CONDITIONS WERE RIPE, THE FORCES WOULD STRIKE A HARD ADMIN

END OF MESSAGE

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
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INFO RUEHTN (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RHDLONE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUFGAID (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(2)

BODY

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO);

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLAN UPDATE (U)

BLOW SETTING THE INSURGENTS BACK SEVERAL YEARS. THE
THIRD AREA WAS TO BE PROTECTED. THIS WAS THE DIAMOND,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0050

OIL, AND PRODUCE AREAS. THE SOVIET SCHOOL ON THE OTHER HAND HIT AT THE ENEMY IN TYPICAL SOVIET STYLE WITH TROOPS, TANKS, AND AIR IN A MASSIVE COMBINED ATTACK. THUS FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTROLLED THE STRATEGY PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT.

9. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) BELIEVES HOLDEN ((ROBERTO)) AND FNLA ARE BOTH SPENT FORCES, BUT ADMITS (b)(1),1.4 (c) BIASED AGAINST HIM. (b)(3):10 USC 424 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT (b)(1),1.4 (c) THOUGHT THE FNLA WAS SPENT BUT ROBERTO WAS STILL A PLAYER SINCE HE REPRESENTED ONE OF THE LARGER NORTHERN TRIBES.

10. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c) DANIEL ((CHIPENDA)) HAS RETURNED TO ANGOLA AND SHOULD BE WATCHED WITH CARE. DURING THE CIVIL WAR HE REPRESENTED THE CONVENTION FOR A NATIONALIST ANGOLA (CNA) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THOUGHT THAT FAPLA BROUGHT HIM BACK TO FORM PERHAPS AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PARTY TO UNITA AND FAPLA. THE DESIRE WOULD BE TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FROM UNITA OR AT LEAST NEUTRALIZE A SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION.

11. ~~(S)~~ THE SADF HAS LEARNED OF LAST YEAR'S FAPLA MILITARY STRATEGY. THERE WAS TO BE A TWO-PRONGED ATTACK TO TAKE JAMBA. ONE FORCE WOULD TAKE CAZOMBO THEN ATTACK SOUTH. THE OTHER WOULD ATTACK THROUGH QUITO TO MAVINGA TO TAKE JAMBA. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE SADF DOES NOT KNOW THE TIME TABLE. THIS PLAN COULD TAKE SEVERAL DRY SEASONS TO EXECUTE. (b)(3):10 USC 424 FAPLA SITS IN QUITO AND CAZAMBO NOW. THERE MAY BE SOME TRUTH TO THIS CLAIM.
COMMENT: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

//IPSP: (b)(3):10

//COMSOB USC 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

~~DECL: OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

207

PAGE:0068

INQUIRE=DOC9D
ITEM NO=00476595

CDS

C 41794RUEKJCS 1043 291800ZMSR 88-9747078

F I MIDB
S UPID

/ /

~~SECRET~~

FRP: , , 3 , , , ,

MILITARY

88 9747078 MSR

PAGE 001
TOR: 291800Z JUL 88

NC 9747078
RUEKJCS 1043

HEADER

RR RUEAIIA

DE RUEKJCS #1043 2111617

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

R 291617Z JUL 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEDADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEGAID/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 VAIHINGEN GE

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL/ (b)(3):50 USC

RUCLAKA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50

RUCLHUA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUETIAQ

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 291614Z JUL 88

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RHDLCNE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEGAID (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

RUDHAAB (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUFHLI (b)(3):10 USC 424

RUEHTO

RUEHLG

RUEHSB

RUEHRU (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

RUEHMB

RUEHOR

~~SECRET~~

29

~~SECRET~~

PAGE:0069

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA (SF)

SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC MILITARY SITUATION IN
ANGOLA'S 5TH MILITARY REGION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.


DOI: (U) 880728.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) SADF HAS A FORMIDABLE MILITARY FORCE FACING
THEM ACROSS THE BORDER IN ANGOLA'S 5TH MILITARY REGION.
THIS HAS TO BE A SOBERING INFLUENCE TO SOME OF THE MORE
GUNCHO YOUNG COMMANDERS WHO WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE CUBANS
ON.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c),1.4 (d)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE:0070

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 4241.4 (c),1.4 (d)



COMMENT: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10
//COMSOBJ: (U) USC 424
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) NONE
COLL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE:0071

INSTR: (U) NONE (b)(3):10 USC 424
PREP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
ACQ: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~.DECL. OADR:
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MSGAL 14 (MIR)
ZCZC 14:00:00Z (MIR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424
11/04/83 *C9:11*

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY

83 0936530 MCR

TOR: 111301Z APR 83

NC 0936530

KK RUEAIIA
DE RUEKJCS #314C 1011300
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~
R 111300Z APR 83
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEACW/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CNS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
R 111210Z APR 83
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. 9 473-28-/CIA WASHINGTON (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)
473# ://SECSTATE WASHDC

RUEFGL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

RUEHIN

RUEHJR

RUEHCR

RUEHCR

RUEHSE

RUECAA

473# :4

RUEHUS

RUEFLG

RUEFLS

RHCL CN

473# :4

RUEHUT

RUEHFR

RUEHFR

473# :5

RUSNNUA/USC INCEUR VAHINGEN GER/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1

47 ..9- (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

47 ..9- (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

BT

EZ1:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

ASNOG 14 (MIK) *11/04/83* *09:11*
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN
ANGOLA I AIC W REPORT (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVAL-
UATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 8304C7
RECS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) (b)(1),1.4 (c) NOW ESTIMATES
THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA AT 25,000.
OF THIS TOTAL, ABOUT 12,000 TO 14,000 ARE DEPLOYED ALONG
THE RAIL LINE FROM MUCAMEDES (b)(3):10 USC 424 TIMES WORLD IN-
DEX-GAZETTEER) AND FURTHER SOUTH. THEY OPERATE RADAR SITES
AND AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS, MIG-21 AIRCRAFT, AND LOGIS-
TICAL INSTALLATIONS FOR THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES (FAPLA)
AND PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR SOME FAPLA GROUND UNITS.
THEIR PRIMARY MISSION IS TO HELP FAPLA CONTROL THE UNITA
INSURGENCY.

TEXT: (U) SEE SUMMARY.

COMMENTS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 INFO IS PRO-
BABLY TRUE. THIS UPDATES IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

PROJ: (U) N/A

COLL: (U) NCNE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NCNE

ENCL: (U) NCNE

DISSEM: (U) NCNE

WARNING: (U) N/A

DECL: OADR

NNNN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

MSGNO 15 (MIIR) ISG *04/06/84* *09:13*
ZCZC 14:10:17Z (MI)

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY

84 4323407

MCR

TOR: 041217Z JUN 84

NC 4323407

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEKJCS #6683 1561153
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~
R 041153Z JUN 84
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 041140Z JUN 84

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424 /
INFO RUE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUCLAKA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GER//
RUDOVIA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) //
RUEHWD/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
BT

EZ1:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), NAMIBIA (WA), ANGOLA (AO)
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /SAAF OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND
ANGOLA (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVAL-
UATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 840524
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (c) THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE (SAAF) HAS
ADAPTED ALOUETTE HELICOPTERS AND DAKOTA (C-47) TRANSPORTS
AS "GUNSHIPS" FOR USE IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS
IN THE NAMIBIA-ANGOLA OPERATIONAL AREA.

TEXT: 1. (c) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

WAC IS IN WINDHOEK, COLOCATED WITH HQ, SOUTH WEST AFRICA
TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF)--IN A MULTISTORY BUILDING CALLED
"THE BASTION," IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA. BUT WAC IS DIRECTLY
SUBORDINATE TO HQ, SAAF, IN PRETORIA AND IS NOT A PART OF

8400340184

MSGNO 15 (MIIR) ISG *04/06/84* *09:13*

SWATF

2. (U) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE HAS TASKED THE OC. WAC. TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOC, SWATF. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
IF THIS COOPERATION SHOULD PROVE UNSATISFACTORY, THE LATTER WOULD APPEAL THROUGH THE ARMY-SADF-AIR FORCE CHANNEL IN PRETORIA TO HAVE THE OC. WAC. REPLACED.

3. (U) WAC PROVIDES CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO SWATF AND SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) TROOPS WITH THE IMPALA MK II JET AND WITH ALOUETTE III HEL AND DAKOTA (C-47) TRANS THAT HAVE BEEN ADAPTED TO THE "GUNSHIP" ROLE. THE IMPALA FIGHTER-BOMBER IS WELL SUITED TO ATTACKING ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN POSITIONS.

4. (U) WAC USES THE MIRAGE F-1 FOR GROUND ATTACK AGAINST DEEPER TARGETS AND TO ESCORT THE CANBERRA ON RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER SOUTHERN ANGOLA. WAC'S TWO CONFIRMED (AND ONE POSSIBLE) MIG-21 KILLS HAVE BEEN BY THE F-1 IN THIS ESCORT ROLE.

5. (U) WAC ALSO USES THE IMPALA AND THE MIRAGE III FOR RECON MISSIONS.

6. (U) WAC CURRENTLY REGARDS ITS GREATEST THREATS TO BE THE REDUNDANT, FIXED AND MOBILE RADARS AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, WHICH ARE "PROLIFERATING" IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. SOUTH OF THE NAMIBE RAIL LINE, FOR EXAMPLE, WAC HAS IDENTIFIED 57 AIR DEFENSE RADAR POSITIONS OPERATED MAINLY BY CUBAN PERSONNEL.

7. (U) THE GREATEST POTENTIAL AIR THREATS TO SWATF AND SAA TROOPS ARE THE FLOGGERS AND HINDS NOW IN THE ANGOLAN (FAPLA) INVENTORY. (b)(1),1.4 (c) A FLOGGER BASED AT NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424 COULD ATTACK WINDHOEK; AND HINDS FITTED WITH GATLING GUNS, ROCKETS, AND ANTITANK MISSILES WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN SWATF/SAA OPERATIONS.
COMMENTS: (U) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A

COLL: (U) NONE

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE

ENCL: (U) NONE

DISSEM: (U) N/A

DECL: OADR

NNNN

NNDD

8400340185

MSGNO 15 (MIIR) ISG *04/06/84* *09:13*
ZCZC 14:10:17Z (MI)

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY

84 4323407

MCR

TOR: 041217Z JUN 84

NC 4323407

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEKJCS #6683 1561153
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~
R 041153Z JUN 84
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 041140Z JUN 84

FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424
INFO RUE (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUCLAKA/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER//
RUDOVIA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEHWD/ (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

EZ1:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF), NAMIBIA (WA), ANGOLA (AO)
PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /SAAF OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND
ANGOLA (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVAL-
UATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 840524
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (C) THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE (SAAF) HAS
ADAPTED ALOUETTE HELICOPTERS AND DAKOTA (C-47) TRANSPORTS
AS "GUNSHIPS" FOR USE IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS
IN THE NAMIBIA-ANGOLA OPERATIONAL AREA.

TEXT: 1 (C) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF)--IN A MULTISTOREY BUILDING CALLED
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SUBORDINATE TO HQ, SAAF, IN PRETORIA AND IS NOT A PART OF

8400340184

MSGNO 15 (MIIR) ISG *04/06/84* *09:13*

SWATF.

2. (C) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) TROOPS WITH THE IMPALA MK II JET AND
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BEEN ADAPTED TO THE "GUNSHIP" ROLE. THE IMPALA FIGHTER-
BOMBER IS WELL SUITED TO ATTACKING ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN PO-
SITIONS.

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DEEPER TARGETS AND TO ESCORT THE CANBERRA ON RECONNAIS-
SANCE MISSIONS OVER SOUTHERN ANGOLA. WAC'S TWO CONFIRMED
(AND ONE POSSIBLE) MIG-21 KILLS HAVE BEEN BY THE F-1 IN
THIS ESCORT ROLE.

5. (C) WAC ALSO USES THE IMPALA AND THE MIRAGE III FOR
RECON MISSIONS.

6. (C) WAC CURRENTLY REGARDS ITS GREATEST THREATS TO BE
THE REDUNDANT, FIXED AND MOBILE RADARS AND SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILES, WHICH ARE "PROLIFERATING" IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.
SOUTH OF THE NAMIBE RAIL LINE, FOR EXAMPLE, WAC HAS IDEN-
TIFIED 57 AIR DEFENSE RADAR POSITIONS OPERATED MAINLY BY
CUBAN PERSONNEL.

7. (C) THE GREATEST POTENTIAL AIR THREATS TO SWATF AND
SAA TROOPS ARE THE FLOGGERS AND HINDS NOW IN THE ANGOLAN
(FAPLA) INVENTORY. (b)(1),1.4 (c) A FLOGGER
BASED AT NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424 COULD ATTACK WINDHOEK; AND
HINDS FITTED WITH GATLING GUNS, ROCKETS, AND ANTITANK
MISSILES WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN SWATF/SAA OPERATIONS.
COMMENTS. (C) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/A
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
PREP: (U)
APPR: (U)
EVAL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE
ENCL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) N/A
DECL: OADR

NNNN

NNDD

8400340185

MSGNO 5 (MIIR) ISG *11/08/82* *05:14*
ZCZC 10:11:49Z (MI)

UNCLASSIFIED

MILITARY

82 9220952

MUP

TOR: 110825Z AUG 82

NC 9220952

PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHSA #5740 2230728
ZNR UUUUU
P 110726Z AUG 82
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC / (b)(3):10 USC 424 / PRIORITY
INFO RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEHOR
RUEOFAA
RUEHOR
RUEHSB
RUFDAAA
RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL
RUCIPBA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEHOS
RUEHLD
RUTAQH
RHOLCNE
RUEHRM
RUEHOT
RUFHFR
RHFRAAB
RUEHOT
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
RUSNNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
BT
EZ1:
UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424
EZ2:
SUBJ IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA
- SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

(b)(3):10 USC 424; (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (WA)/ANGOLA (AO)
 2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
 3. TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
 4. DATE OF INFO: 820811
 5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE
 6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8304352047

MSGNO 5 IMIRI ISG *11/08/82* *05:14*

(b)(3):10 USC 424

7. SOURCE: RAND DAILY MAIL

8. SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) UNITS HAVE KILLED 201 GUERRILLAS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) DURING OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN RECENT WEEKS. IN ONE ACTION ON 820809, 15 MEMBERS OF THE SADF WERE KILLED, TWELVE PARATROOPERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY AND THE THREE-MAN CREW OF A SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE PUMA HELICOPTER WERE KILLED WHEN THEIR PUMA WAS SHOT DOWN IN AN SADF ATTACK ON SWAPO POSITIONS. THE HELICOPTER WAS FERRYING THE PARATROOPERS IN AN ASSAULT ON SWAPO POSITIONS WHEN IT WAS SHOT DOWN, PRESUMABLY BY A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE. EVERYONE ON BOARD WAS KILLED. THIS WAS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SADF MEMBERS TO BE KILLED IN A SINGLE OPERATION SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN 16 YEARS AGO. THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SADF LATE ON 820810 DID NOT INCLUDE THE LOCATION OF THE ACTION ON 820809 OR ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT THE RECENT ACTIVITY OF THE SADF IN ANGOLA.

9.A. DETAILS: NONE

9.B. ORIG CMTS: SOURCE IS A JOHANNESBURG DAILY NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFO IS PROBABLY TRUE. OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN PAPERS HAVE PUBLISHED SIMILAR STORIES. ADDITIONAL DETAILS MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

10. PROJ NO: N/A

11. COLL MGMT CODE: NONE

12. SPEC INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO

13. PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. APPR BY:

15. REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

16. ENCL: N/A

17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

NNNN

NNDD

8304352048

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MILITARY

PAGE 001 / 005 NC 9221416
 IOHI 111188Z AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MILITARY

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PAGE 002
1001 111150Z AUG 82

NC 0221916

IN ANGLO AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT (U)
(b)(1)(b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 50 USC 403-1 (b)(1) 4 (b)



-1. THE SADF APPARENTLY BELIEVES, AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THAT AN EARLY SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA WOULD PRODUCE AN INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO SOUTH AFRICA. THE SADF APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) IS TOO WEAK NOW TO WIN FAIR ELECTIONS--AND PERHAPS EXPECTS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO AGREE TO SETTLEMENT TERMS ONLY AT SUCH A TIME, WHEN SWAPO IS THUS JUDGED TO BE TOO WEAK TO WIN. IF THIS ASSESSMENT OF SADF BELIEFS IS CORRECT, IT WOULD IMPLY THAT THE SADF EXPECTS THAT AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA WOULD HAVE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A GUERRILLA FORCE SUCH AS SWAPO.

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BASED IN ANGOLA AND SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET BLOC. THE APPARENT SADF ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF), ALSO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, SUPPORTS THIS IMPLICATION.

-2. ~~THE~~ THE SADF IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS ARE IN ANGOLA PRIMARILY TO HELP THE RULING PARTY (MPLA) CONTROL UNITA. THE SOUTHERN ANGOLAN INSURGENT GROUP LED BY JONAS SAVIMBI. BUT THE SADF ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE USSR EXPECTS THE CUBANS, AS WELL AS THE MPLA, TO HELP MAINTAIN SWAPO AS A VIABLE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND KEEP ALIVE ITS CHANCES OF EVENTUALLY GAINING CONTROL OF NAMIBIA. SPECIFICALLY, ACCORDING TO THE SADF, CUBANS ARE MANNING ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES (FAPLA) AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS THAT HELP PROTECT SWAPO IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, AND CUBANS ARE USED TO ADVISE ON OR PERFORM CERTAIN STAFF FUNCTIONS--TRAINING, PLANS, AND INTELLIGENCE--FOR SWAPO AS WELL AS FAPLA.

-3. ~~THE~~ IN THE SADF VIEW, THEREFORE, A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WOULD HAVE TWO BENEFICIAL EFFECTS. IT WOULD WEAKEN SWAPO MILITARILY, MAKING IT EASIER FOR THE SWATF (WITH SADF HELP AS REQUIRED) TO DEFEND NAMIBIA. AND IT WOULD REDUCE

~~END OF MESSAGE~~

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F M (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/OJA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424

019 473-422/THA WHITE HOUSE

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KUFHUL (b)(3); 50 USC 403-1(a)

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RUEUF A.

2004年12月

長江以南各省

AGENTS:
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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BUENOS AIRES

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SECTION 02 OF 02

(b)(5): TO USC 424

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d)

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PAGE 002 605
TUNE 1112021 AUG 82

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BABLY WOULD LOOK UPON SOME FORM OF WESTERN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, SERVING AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE REMAINING SOVIET BLOC PRESENCE, AS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE THAT ALL OR MOST CUBAN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND NOT RETURNED. THE SAOP IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANY CUBANS WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA WOULD BE ADDED TO THE SOVIET BLOC PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN A MORE DIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE EAST.

(b)(1),(b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c)

- 10. (U) PROJ NUT N/A
- 11. (U) CULL MGMT CODES: N/A
- 12. (U) SDC INST: NONE DIRC: NU
- 13. (U) (b)(3)10 USC 4241-4(c)
- 14. (U)
- 15. (U) NEW EVAL: NJ REL YOS: NONE
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: NONE

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END OF MESSAGE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

REEL NUMBER 008567 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0096

MSGNO 19 (MIIR) *11/08/82* *17:16*
ZCZC 22:13:47Z (MI)

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TOR: 111451Z AUG 82

NC 9223054

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DE RUEHSA #5796/01 223144Z
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON (b)(3):10 USC 424 /
8,19 473-522/THE WHITE HOUSE

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUEHOS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUSNNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA

- SOME OPINIONS ON ANGOLAN STABILITY AND UNITA (U)



~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: SOME OPINIONS ON ANGOLAN STABILITY AND
- UNITA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820800
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE LARGEST AND STRONGEST OF THE ANGOLAN INSURGENT GROUPS, UNITA, UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE AS A MILITARY FORCE IF IT HAD NO SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

UNITA WOULD CONTINUE AS A VIABLE THREAT TO THE RULING PARTY (MPLA) WITHOUT SOUTH AFRICAN ASSISTANCE (b)(1),1.4 (c)

BELIEVE THAT ANGOLA IS GRADUALLY BECOMING LESS STABLE AND EXPECT THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE. THEY APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT SOVIET BLOC INFLUENCE IN LUANDA IS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO A CONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA.

9.A. (U) DETAILS:

1. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

HAVE INDICATED, DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, THAT THERE IS SOME COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SADF AND UNITA FORCES. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE SADF AND UNITA EXCHANGE SOME TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS ALSO SOME OPERATIONAL COORDINATION.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) BELIEVE THE SADF PROVIDES UNITA WITH LIMITED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING POL. THIS IS POSSIBLY TRUE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT PRETORIA HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF MONEY FOR UNITA.

2. ~~(C)~~ WHATEVER THE FORM OF SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR UNITA, MOST (b)(1),1.4 (c) AGREE THAT IT IS LIMITED AND FAR FROM DECISIVE. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT UNITA WOULD CONTINUE AS A VIABLE THREAT TO MPLA CONTROL, AT LEAST IN THE SOUTHEASTERN QUARTER OF ANGOLA, WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM PRETORIA. IF TRUE, THERE WOULD BE FOUR REASONS FOR THIS:

- A. ~~(C)~~ THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES (FAPLA) ARE NOT AS COMPETENT AS THEY WOULD NEED TO BE IN ORDER TO DEFEAT UNITA AND THE OTHER ANGOLAN INSURGENT GROUPS.
- B. ~~(C)~~ THE UNITA PRESIDENT, JONAS SAVIMBI, IS AN EFFECTIVE LEADER, AND HIS TROOPS ARE HIGHLY MOTIVATED.
- C. ~~(C)~~ UNITA IS AN ETHNICALLY COHESIVE ORGANIZATION THAT IS BASED AND PROBABLY ENJOYING POPULAR SUPPORT IN ITS TRADITIONAL HOME TERRITORY.
- D. ~~(C)~~ UNITA PROBABLY RECEIVES SOME MATERIAL

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES OTHER THAN SOUTH AFRICA,
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

MSGNO 6 (MIIR) ISG *13/08/82* *03:10*
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TOR: 130624Z AUG 82

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// (b)(3):10 USC 424 PRIORITY

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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

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RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER

RUSNNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

EZ1:

UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/SADF

- - OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)/NAMIBIA (WA)

2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA

4. DATE OF INFO: 820813

5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE

6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. SOURCE: RAND DAILY MAIL

8304352049

MSGNO 6 (MIIR) ISG *13/08/82* *03:10*

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2. IN A SPECIAL BRIEFING RESTRICTED TO WINDHOEK NEWSPAPER EDITORS ON 820812, THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF), MAJ GEN CHARLES (LLOYD), RELEASED EXTENSIVE DETAILS OF THE LATEST PUSH INTO ANGOLA, WHICH HE SAID WOULD CONTINUE. ONE OF THE WINDHOEK EDITORS RELAYED THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY GENERAL LLOYD TO THE RAND DAILY MAIL.

3. GENERAL LLOYD STATED THAT THE OPERATIONS WERE NOT AN INVASION OF ANGOLA AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WOULD QUICKLY MOVE BACK TO THE NAMIBIAN BORDER IF A CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

4. GENERAL LLOYD GAVE THE FOLLOWING CASUALTY (KIA) FIGURES BY MONTH FOR THE CURRENT SERIES OF OPERATIONS: SWAPO 73, SADF 6 IN JUNE; SWAPO 110, SADF 7 IN JULY; SWAPO 235, SADF 16 THUS FAR IN AUGUST. APPARENTLY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1982, SWAPO HAS LOST 951 KILLED, AND THE SADF HAS LOST 71.

9B. ORIG CMTS: SOURCE IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE; ALTHOUGH INCOMPLETE, THE INFO IS PROBABLY TRUE AS FAR AS IT GOES. CASUALTY FIGURES DO NOT JIBE WITH PREVIOUS REPORTING. SEE IR'S (b)(3):10 USC 424 IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TRUCKS AND SAM'S, AS DESCRIBED, ARE MOBILE LAUNCHERS OR MISSILES BRING TRANSPORTED TO A FIXED SITE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS SHOULD BECOME AVAILABLE SOON.

10. PROJ NO: N/A

11. COLL MGMT CODE: N/A

12. SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO

13. PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. APP BY:

15. RBO EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

16. ENCL: N/A

17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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TOR: 160517Z SEP 81

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC (b)(3)-10 USC 424

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RUDORRA (b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

DIADIN 25R-4E (AS OF: 2120 EDT 15 SEP 81)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

) SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: RESULTS OF OPERATION PRUTEA. (U)

1. ~~404~~ SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) OFFICIALS ESTIMATED THAT THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) AND AN-
GOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAPLA) EACH LOST ABOUT 500 TROOPS DURING
SOUTH AFRICA'S CROSS-BORDER OPERATION -- CALLED OPERATION PRUTEA --
INTO ANGOLA BEGINNING AROUND 24 AUGUST AND ENDING ABOUT 4
SEPTEMBER. THE 1,000 FIGURE WAS ARRIVED AT BY BODY COUNTS AND
ESTIMATES PROVIDED BY 38 POW'S. PRETORIA PREVIOUSLY CLAIMED ABOUT
450 ENEMY KILLED.

2. ~~57~~ ~~INTL~~ ~~NO~~ ~~CONTRACT~~

(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

(b)(1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403 (g) 1.4 (c)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403-1(a)

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TOR: 160517Z SEP 81

(b)(1),(b)(3),50 USC 403(g),1.4(c)

3. ~~CS~~ REPORTEDLY, THE SADF HAS PRESENTED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF 17 SOVIETS, NOT INCLUDING THOSE KILLED OR CAPTURED, IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATION. ABOUT 12 WERE ASSIGNED AS ADVISERS TO FAPLA AND SOME MAY HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH SWAPO, ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY. EVIDENCE INCLUDES PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOVIETS WORKING WITH A SWAPO/FAPLA OPERATIONS MAP.

4. ~~CS~~ THE SADF CAPTURED ABOUT 2,400 TONS OF MATERIEL DURING OPERATION PROTEA AND DESTROYED ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT ON THE SPOT IN ANGOLA. EQUIPMENT CAPTURED INCLUDED 400 TONS OF AMMUNITION, 487 TONS OF WEAPONS, 1,194 TONS OF SOFT-SKIN VEHICLES, 20 TONS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, AND OVER 374 TONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES. ROUGHLY HALF OF THE CAPTURED MATERIEL WAS FOUND AT XANGUNGO AND THE OTHER HALF AT NGIVA. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SOME 53,000 GALLONS OF FUEL STORED UNDERGROUND IN ANGOLA WAS ALSO FOUND AND DESTROYED.

5. ~~CS~~ ~~STATEMENT~~ (b)(1),1.4(c)

6. ~~CS~~ SOUTH AFRICA WILL MAKE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA OVER THE ENEMY PERSONNEL KILLED AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED DURING ITS OPERATION IN ANGOLA AND OVER THE SOVIET CONNECTION WITH FAPLA AND SWAPO. OPERATION PROTEA WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A CRIPPLING BLOW TO SWAPO AND IT WILL QUITE LIKELY TAKE THEM SEVERAL MONTHS TO A YEAR TO REGROUP. IN THE MEANTIME, SOUTH AFRICA CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO KEEP SWAPO ON THE DEFENSIVE WITH SMALLER CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ANGOLA. PRETORIA WILL NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY SOVIET OR CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND SUPPORT TO SWAPO, AT LEAST NOT UNTIL IT SUFFERS GREATER

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TUR: 160517Z SEP 81

CONSEQUENCES.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(REV# 15 SEP 11)

END OF MESSAGE

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MSGNO 6 (MIIR) ISG *13/08/82* *03:10*
ZCZC 08:08:08Z (MI)

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TOR: 130624Z AUG 82

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424 PRIORITY
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUFHOL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUEHOS (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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RUSNNOA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

BT

EZ1:

UNCLAS (b)(3):10 USC 424

EZ2:

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/SAOF
- - OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)/NAMIBIA (WA)
 2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
 3. TITLE: SAOF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
 4. DATE OF INFO: 820813
 5. ORIG: SEE FM 1 INF
 6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
 7. SOURCE: RAND DAILY MAIL

8304352049

MSGNO 6 (MIIR) ISG *13/08/82* *03:10*

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10. PROJ NO: N/A

11. COLL MGMT CODE: N/A

12. SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO

13. PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. APP BY:

15. R80 EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

16. ENCL: N/A

17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/

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TO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/

(b)(3) 50 USC 405

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CONTROLS

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S-49,733

SERIAL: (U)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO)

SUBJ: IIR

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FIFTH

MILITARY REGION (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

INTEL.

DOI: (U) 880400

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (S/NF/IN) REPORT SUMMARIZES ANGOLAN EFFORTS TO
STRENGTHEN DEFENSE LINES AND DEPLOY FORWARD ADDITIONAL CUBAN
FORCES.

TEXT:

1. (S/NF/IN) THE SITUATION IN THE FIFTH MILITARY REGION IS
CHARACTERIZED BY THE STRENGTHENING OF FAPLA'S FIRST LINE OF~~SECRET~~~~NOFORN~~~~NOINTEL~~

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PAGE:0052

DEFENSE (NAMIBE/MENONGUE/CUITO CUANAVALA) AS WELL AS FAPLA'S FORWARD POSTS AND BASES NORTH OF THE SWA/ANGOLA BORDER. CUBAN FORCE LEVELS IN THIS REGION HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND FORCES HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED FURTHER SOUTHWARDS TO SUPPORT FAPLA UNITS. THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIFTH MILITARY REGION AS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ THREE FAPLA BATTALIONS AT ONGIVA WERE GROUPED AS A BRIGADE (61 BDE) FAPLA PLANS TO OCCUPY CUAMATO FROM ONGIVA.

B. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ APPROXIMATELY 3,100 ADDITIONAL CUBAN TROPS (TWO REGIMENTS) ARRIVED IN NAMIBE. FURTHER INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ THREE CUBAN TANK BATTALIONS ARRIVED AT LUBANGO AT THE END OF JUN 88.

(2) ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ A CUBAN REGIMENT ARRIVED AT DONGO DURING THE FIRST HALF OF MAR 88.

(3) ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ A CUBAN REGIMENT IS DEPLOYED AT CACONDO.

C. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ FAPLA INTENSIFIED ITS RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE OTCHINJAU REGION. REMARK: THESE ACTIONS CAN BE REGARDED AS AN EARLY INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE OCCUPATION OF OTCHINJAU.

D. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ THE FAPLA FORCES IN CAHAMA (2 BDE) HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED BY CUBAN TROOPS (POSSIBLY A REGIMENT) SINCE MAR 88.

E. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ ACCORDING TO REPORTS A JOINT CUBAN/FAPLA/SWAPO DEPLOYMENT (STRENGTH UNKNOWN) HAS BEEN IN THE HUMBE REGION (10 KM NORTH-WEST OF XANGONGO) SINCE 14 MAR 88. THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGION WERE THE REPAIRING OF A BRIDGE AND THE LIFTING OF MINEFIELDS SOUTH OF HUMBE ON THE ROUTE TO CALUEQUE.

F. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS OF 19 BDE HAVE MOVED FROM MULONDO TO XANGONGO SINCE 17 MAR 88. FAPLA GROUND FORCES AT XANGONGO, CURRENTLY CONSISTING OF FOUR BATTALIONS, ARE ACCORDING TO INDICATIONS SUPPORTED BY SA-6 AND SA-9 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES (SAM'S) AND A 57MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY. XANGONGO WAS ALSO REINFORCED BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS.

G. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ FAPLA REINFORCED THE BATTALION AT CUVELAI WITH A CUBAN BATTALION SUPPORTED BY A SA-13 (SAM) AND ZSU-23/4 (SHILKA) BATTERY, AS WELL AS A SECOND INFANTRY BATTALION OF 35 BDE. THERE ARE ALSO SA-6 (SAM'S) NUMBER UNKNOWN) AT TECHAMUTETE WHICH ARE DESTINED FOR CUVELAI. THE REINFORCEMENT OF CUVELAI IS AN INDICATION THAT FAPLA PLANS TO OCCUPY THE TOWN WITH A BRIGADE (35 BDE).

H. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN SWAPO AND FAPLA, AS WELL AS THE PROTECTION THAT FAPLA OFFERS TO PLAN TERRORISTS HAVE ENABLED SWAPO TO REACH THE SAME INTENSITY OF ACTIONS IN WESTERN OWANBO DURING ITS CURRENT INFILTRATION AS IS THE CASE IN THE SAME PERIOD DURING 1987. IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN OWANBO SWAPO'S INFILTRATION IS STILL DISRUPTED, MAINLY BECAUSE OF SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

2. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ RELEVANT FACTS

A. ~~(S/NF/IN)~~ IN THE PAST CUBAN REGIMENTS WERE MAINLY

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RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC

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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424

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EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ NO FORM 0485 OCT 76

EZ2:

DN-2E2

THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ANGOLA/CABINDA

2. (U) INFO ON ANGOLA

3. N/A

4. 76-10

5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 76-10-13 TO 15

6. B--2

7. (b)(3):10 USC 424

8.

9. 21 OCT 76

10. N/A

11. (b)(3):10 USC 424

12.

13. (b)(3):10 USC 424

14.

15. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

A. REF PARA 3: THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA PROPER IS ESTIMATED TO BE FROM 10,000 TO 12,000 WITH A FEW THOUSAND ADDITIONAL CIVILIANS.

B. REF PARA 4: ALTHOUGH LITTLE OR NO MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE RETURNED FROM ANGOLA TO CUBA, RETURNEES ARE TAKING WITH THEM TO CUBA EX-PORUGUESE CONSUMER DURABLES SUCH AS CARS, REFRIGERATORS, ETC.

C. REF PARA 6: THE FAPLA COMMANDER IS JACOB CAETANO, ALIAS "MONSTRO". (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

D. REF PARA 7: THE "MYSTERY" ON FNLA'S RESURGENCE IS LESSENERD

~~SECRET~~ NO FORM 0485 OCT 76

IF ONE CONSIDERS ZAIRIAN AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY INPUTS OF WEAPONS AND AMMO VERSUS USAGE. CACHES SEEMS TO BE THE CONCLUSION, AUGMENTED BY BATTLEFIELD RECOVERIES AND UNKNOWN QUANTITIES OF SUPPLIES LEFT BY PORTUGAL. ZAIRE CEASED TOTALLY ITS SUPPORT TO FNLA ON 5 APR 76. WHILE IT IS ACCURATE TO SAY FNLA IS EXHIBITING A SENSE OF PURPOSE IN NORTHWEST OPERATIONS (THIS PROBABLY A REFLECTION OF GUERRILLA AS OPPOSED TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS), THEIR ORGANIZATION IS THE SAME OLD (TIRED?) LEADERSHIP. THEY ARE RECEIVING SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION SO NECESSARY TO GUERRILLA WARFARE, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RECEIPT OF SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. EFFORTS TO SOLICIT SUCH FOREIGN SUPPORT CONTINUE. IN THE SOUTH FAPLA HAS SINCE MAY 76 CONDUCTED 4 CONCERTED ATTACKS AGAINST UNITA INVOLVING CUBAN T34 TANKS, APCs AND HEAVY ARTILLERY, WHICH INDICATES THE DEGREE TO WHICH UNITA IS A THORN IN THE SIDE OF MPLA.

E. REF PARA 8: BOTH UNITA AND FNLA ARE USING WHITE PORTUGUESE ANGOLANS IN THEIR FORCES (300 IN THE NORTH OF WHOM SOME 50 ARE FULL-TIME COMMANDOS AND THE REMAINDER PART-TIME; ABOUT 150 IN THE SOUTH WITH CHIPENDA; APPROXIMATELY SEVEN WITH SAVIMBI. FRANCE MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN HELPING FLEC, WITH THIS BEING PRIVATE BUSINESSES DOING THE FUNDING, HOWEVER THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUANCE OF THIS AT THE PRESENT.

F. REF PARA 10: FAPLA STRENGTH IN CABINDA IS ESTIMATED TO BE 5,000 TO 6,000. FAPLA GARRISONS ARE BELIZE, BUCO-ZAU, DINGE, LANDANA, AND LUCULA (TANDO-ZINZE).

G. REF PARA 11: MOLICA CEASED TO EXIST AS OF AUG 76. WHEN FLEC ATTACKS A TOWN/VILLAGE, THEY DO NOT ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY AND HOLD THE TARGET. RATHER THEY PICK UP ANYTHING OF VALUE AND DISPERSE, THUS AVOIDING FIXED BATTLES.

H. REF PARA 12: FLEC HAS DIVIDED CABINDA INTO 5 MILITARY ZONES, NORTH TO SOUTH, WITH ZONE 1 IN THE NORTH, ZONE 5 IN THE SOUTH. FEW FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN ZONE 5 DUE TO LACK OF ADEQUATE CONCEALMENT (THIS IS A SAVANNA AREA). MOST FORCES ARE IN THE CENTER ZONES. FLEC FORCES NUMBER 10,000 TO 11,000 MILITANTS (NOT TRAINED SOLDIERS BUT WILLING FIGHTERS, UNARMED AND LARGELY UNTRAINED). ARMS ARE PASSED ALONG AMONG UNITS, DEPENDING ON PLANNED OPERATIONS, AS NOT ENOUGH (ONLY 500 INDIVIDUAL ARMS) ARE AVAILABLE FOR REGULAR ISSUE ON A RETAIN BASIS. MOLICA HAS CEASED TO EXIST AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. PEACE WAS MADE AND THEY ARE BACK IN THE FOLD OF FLEC. DACOSTA REMAINS IN FRANCE, BUT AS REPRESENTATIVE OF FLEC.

J. REF PARA 13: EAST GERMANY IS AIDING ANGOLA WITH INTELLIGENCE TRAINING.

~~X608 2/31 DEC 2006~~

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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This Is An Information Report, Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence

COUNTRY: *SOVIET Union (URS), ANGOLA (AO)*
FRANCE (FR)

REPORT NO: (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(a)

TITLE: Photographs of Soviets in ANGOLA (U)

DATE OF INFO: 811106
NYMM DOI

REPORT DATE: 811109
NY MM DOI

ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424

REQ REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: A. (b)(3):10 USC 424
B. "Paris M tch" a
weekly magazine which is believed to be reliable.
C. (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) IR forwards copies of photographs obtained from source A which were captured in a Soviet advisor's house in ANGOLA during the South African military operation "Proteus" in September. Some of the photos (at encls) were used in an article published in 16 Oct issue of source B magazine entitled "A Great African War Has Started in ANGOLA" by Roger Holeindre, a well-known French military correspondent. A copy of this article (at encls) with its translation is included in the IR.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

DETAILS: (U) obtained copies of photographs of Soviet presence and activities in ANGOLA (encls) from source A. Source A provided source B magazine with some of the photos for a feature article entitled "A Great African War Has Started in ANGOLA", written by Roger Holeindre. The French version of this article is at enclosures but an English translation of it follows;

ORDER PHOTOS DIRECTLY FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424 BY

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED TRANSLATION.....

- The Angola-Namibia war can no longer be considered as an inter-African conflict, but as an open fight between Western countries and Communism.

5 - While meticulously searching the ground taken up in ANGOLA during
4 Operation "Proteus", South African infantrymen found some unquestionable
3 proofs of a strong Soviet and East German settlement. Four thousand
2 tons of Soviet equipment were captured or destroyed, and SAM-7, SAM-3 and
1 S-M-6 bases were discovered.

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1 DEC 78

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- T-34 tanks and over 200 new vehicles were taken back to NAMIBIA as well as an impressive number of heavy equipment, from amphibious tanks to 40-tube Stalin launchers firing 122mm rockets. The conventional artillery and air-defense artillery are identical to those in operation in the Polisario units fighting against MOROCCO. Many Soviet and East German wives are staying with their husbands, who act as advisors or instructors, which would mean that they are planning to stay there for a long period of time.

- A vast radar warning system was deployed along the border facing South Africa, but it seems that only that equipment served by Europeans was being monitored continuously.

- On the other hand, the ground-to-air missile launchers, operated only by Communists from "brother countries", caused some problems for the attacking air forces.

- South African and Namibian infantrymen discovered some buried defense lines, the design and finish of which would lead one to think that instructors from Asia served in that area; they may even have been North Vietnamese, the only serious users of the French NCO's Instruction Book ("field fortifications" chapter). It was in this book that Giap's men found all the information that was needed for the trench and sapper war around Dien-Bien-Phu.

- According to the South Africans, there is a risk of a great war breaking out in the very near future throughout the southern part of the continent. General Charles Lloyd, commanding the South African and Namibian forces along the Angolese border, recently stated: "Through the force of circumstances, we are preparing, militarily and logistically, for a conventional war along the Angolese border."

- Whatever the logical and humanitarian reasons for which apartheid is condemned by a majority of governments in the world, we must admit that South Africa will fight for what she considers her right to live.

- Today, the Namibian problem is closely involved in the masked war between South Africa and USSR through the intermediary of ANGOLA.

- Committed to South Africa by the league of Nations after World War I when all African territories belonging to the vanquished Imperial Germany were confiscated, Namibia, a territory covering 825,000 km² - twice the surface of FRANCE - has a population of only one million people including 100,000 white people and 10 black ethnic groups, one of which, that of the Ovambos, includes 500,000 people living on a tiny part of the country, 100 x 400 km in area, with a tribal extension in ANGOLA. In spite of free

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elections in 1978, the complete abolishment of the apartheid, and the institution of a multiracial and multiracial government at Windhoek, the capital of the country, the UN recognized SWAPO, an "independent" and "Marxist" organization based abroad, as the only authentic representative of the whole Namibian population.

- The Soviet, Eastern European Socialist powers and CUBA are assisting SWAPO, based in ANGOLA, in its fight, against South Africa. The latter government is assisting not only the legal Namibian government which it partly controls (Foreign Affairs and Defense), but also Jonas Sawimbi's "Unita" Party in ANGOLA. Jonas Sawimbi is making life hard for the troops of the Luanda government established by the Soviets and Cubans. In 1981, the Angolese Marxist government controls less than 2 million inhabitants out of the 6 million people in the country.

BLOODLESS ANGOLA CAN NO LONGER FEED HER POPULATION

- Her Army, "FAPLA" (Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of ANGOLA), is almost everywhere on the alert and most of the garrisons are supplied only by the Soviet Air Force of which two Super-Antonov aircraft and six heavy helicopters were shot down by men from UNITA. As a matter of fact, Jonas Sawimbi is blaming the Luanda government for launching a war against SOUTH AFRICA and NAMIBIA just to conceal their huge internal problems. This weak but potentially rich country cannot feed its population while, at the time of the Portuguese, it could export grains, meat, coffee and fish in large quantities. The armed opposition blames the "disastrous economic policy copied from the Soviets" for this state of things. The only resources of the Angolese Marxist government are the oil fees paid by the U.S. Gulf Oil Company located on the territory of Cabinda and protected against anti-Marxist guerillas by a very strong Cuban force! The South African army, which is certainly the best equipped and most efficient army in Africa with its specialists who are able to make the best use of its sophisticated equipment (which is not the rule in African armed forces), does not intend to show moderation. As a matter of fact, its leaders are using Israeli tactics, for they are on friendly terms with that country, and they speak quite clearly about this subject: "We'll strike as far as Ethiopia, if need be! We are already feeding one third of Africa, what else is required from us? We are white African people. Is it a crime if we want to stay here, to fight for our country, and to survive?"

- "Everywhere where the white minority negotiated without any real guarantees and without keeping the upper hand on military means, this minority has been wiped out. It is not against our black people who live in the country that we are fighting, but it is against those, abroad, who are supported, armed and paid by the Soviets, and who are threatening our freedom and our very

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life as a nation."

- What happened in Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia) is giving serious arguments to those, black and white, who in NAMIBIA, do not want rebels from the outside to be considered as representatives of the population. In Salisbury, the situation is worsening and the white people who were born in the country and who did everything to stay there, are now leaving at the rate of almost ten thousand a month. The recent nationalization of private schools has only speeded up the process. New obstacles are being placed in their path by Mr Mugabe's government. They are not allowed to take their belongings or their money with them!

- By sending its white people away, Zimbabwe within two years will be in the same situation as the "front line" countries against SOUTH AFRICA: MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, BOTSWANA, and ANGOLA. Those countries, which until recently were prosperous, with their excellent soil, plenty of sun and water, are now experiencing starvation. On 4% of the arable land in AFRICA, the South Africans are producing more than one third of the crops grown on the whole continent. In fact, everytime they find some serious leaders, the black people rise and fight the forms of government forced upon them by the "right-minded people" in Europe or in the UNITED STATES. While Sawimbi has been fighting efficiently in ANGOLA, the national resistance movement in MOZAMBIQUE has already acquired 4 to 5 thousand anti-Marxist combatants who are holding the bush and are causing great anxiety to the local government and to the KGB men for, in spite of the deployment of men and equipment, the understanding between the Soviets, East Germans, Cubans and the civilian populations does not seem to be ideal. The Soviets are generally hated by the Africans whom they call "black asses."

- The price-tag for the Soviets' brotherly assistance is high, very high. RUSSIA succeeded in obtaining all fishing rights in the waters of MOZAMBIQUE and ANGOLA. Like in all other African countries RUSSIA "protects", and in which she got the same rights at sea, her trawler fleets ransack sea bottoms, and finally less than 40% of the results of this anti-ecological massacre reach the socialist countries.

THE CUBANS ARE SYSTEMATICALLY PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY

- It is good to know that these special "trawlers" are navigating as small fleets and come directly under Admiral Gorskhov's wartime naval headquarters.

- As for the Cubans, whom the East Germans are calling "poor soldiers" and "jokers", they are blamed by the population for completely plundering the country which, according to unprejudiced observers, seems to be true.

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- All belongings left by the Portuguese as well as most of the civilian automobiles have been sent to CUBA.
- The most surprising revelations of the "Proteus" operation in ANGOLA concerned intelligence. Piles of documents prove that the African Marxist movements are getting some unexpected assistance: they are financed by the Ecumenical Council of Churches, whose central office is located in Geneva.
- In the last few years, the main beneficiaries of such incredible liberalities have been SWAPO and South African black terrorist groups.
- These same organizations also receive funds, indirectly, from the UN, UNESCO, and other so-called "charitable" movements which collect money in all major cities in Europe to help the "starving people in third world countries"! Millions of U.S. dollars are thus collected. In conclusion, it must be stated that in the captured documents, GUADELOUPE, MARTINIQUE, the REUNION and NEW CALEDONIA are always mentioned as countries which are currently fighting against French colonialism. And they must be helped in shaking off this terrible yoke.

END TRANSLATION.....

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: ~~(C/NIFORM)~~ (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

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APPROVED BY:

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equest Evaluation Releasable To: None

3 ENCLOSURE(S):

1. Article: "En Angola, la Grande Guerre
d'Afrique est commencée" (U), 1 cy, 8 pgs,
811016 (U)

2. Photography: Photos captured during Operation
PROTEUS (U), 15 prints, B/W undtd (U)
3. Photography: Photos captured during Operation
PROTESU (U), 1 roll, 35mm, BW negatives, 31
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En Angola, la grande guerre d'Afrique est commencée

La guerre d'Angola-Namibie ne peut plus être considérée comme un conflit inter-africain, mais comme un affrontement direct entre l'Occident et le communisme.

Les fantassins sud-africains fouillent méticuleusement le terrain qu'ils ont occupé en Angola au cours de l'opération Protea ont trouvé des preuves irréfutables de la forte implantation soviétique et est-allemande. Quatre mille tonnes de matériels soviétiques ont été saisis ou détruits, des bases de Sam 7, Sam 3 et Sam 6 ont été découvertes.

Des tanks T 34 et plus de 200 véhicules neufs ont été ramenés en Namibie ainsi qu'un impressionnant matériel lourd allant des chars amphibies aux orgues de Staline de 40 tubes tirant des fuses de 122 mm. L'artillerie classique et l'artillerie anti-aérienne sont identiques à celles en service dans les unités du Polisario contre le Maroc. De nombreuses femmes soviétiques et est-allemandes accompagnent leurs époux conseillers et instructeurs, ce qui tend à prouver que leurs séjours sont destinés à être de longue durée.

Un vaste système d'alerte radar était déployé le long de la frontière face à l'Afrique du Sud, mais il semble prouvé à l'appui que seul le matériel soviétique des Européens assurait la veille continue.

Par contre, les rampes de lancement de missiles sol-air servies uniquement par des communistes des « pays frères » ont donné du souci aux forces aériennes attaquantes.

Les fantassins sud-africains et namibiens ont découvert des lignes de défense entières dont la conception même et le fin lissage à penser que des Asiatiques ont servi comme instructeurs. Peut-être même des Nord-Vietnamiens seuls utilisateurs sérieux du manuel du grand français chapitre « fortifications de campagne ».

C'est d'ailleurs dans ce manuel que les hommes de Guep avaient trouvé toutes les données nécessaires à la guerre de tranchées et de sape autour de Dien Bien Phu.

Selon les Sud-Africains une grande guerre risque d'éclater demain dans tout le Sud du continent. Le général Charles Lloyd, commandant des forces sud-africaines et namibiennes de la frontière angolaise vient de déclarer : « Nous nous préparons par la force des choses, militairement et logistiquement pour une guerre classique à la frontière avec l'Angola ».

Quelles que soient les raisons logiques et humanitaires qui font condamner l'apartheid par une majorité des gouvernements du monde, il faut pourtant admettre que l'Afrique du Sud se battra pour ce qu'elle considère comme son droit à vivre.

Aujourd'hui, le problème namibien est étroitement lié à la guerre larvée qui oppose l'Afrique du Sud à l'URSS par Angola interposée.

Conflit par la Société des Nations à l'Afrique du Sud après la guerre

de 14-18 qui vit la confiscation de tous les territoires africains de l'Allemagne impériale vaincue, la Namibie territoire de 825 000 km², deux fois la France, n'est peuplée que par un million d'habitants, dont 100 000 Blancs et 10 ethnies noires dont une seule, celle des Ovambos, compte 500 000 âmes installées sur une partie minuscule du pays, 100 km sur 400, avec prolongement tribal en Angola. Malgré des élections libres en 1978, l'abolition totale de l'apartheid et la constitution d'un gouvernement multiracial et multiracial à Windhoek, capitale du pays, l'Onu a reconnu la Swapo organisation « indépendantiste » et « marxiste » basée à l'étranger comme seul représentant authentique de toute la population namibienne.

Les Soviétiques, les puissances socialistes de l'Est européen et Cuba aident la Swapo, basée en Angola contre l'Afrique du Sud. Celle-ci aide non seulement le gouvernement namibien légal qu'elle contrôle en partie. Affaires étrangères et Défense, mais surtout en Angola même l'Unita de Jonas Savimbi qui mène la vie dure aux troupes du gouvernement de Luanda mis en place par les Soviétiques et les Cubains. Le gouvernement marxiste angolais contrôlé en 1981 moins de 2 millions d'habitants sur les 5 que compte le pays.

L'Angola exsangue ne nourrit plus sa population

Son armée, les FAPLA. Forces armées populaires pour la libération de l'Angola, sont presque partout sur le qui-vive et beaucoup de leurs garnisons ne sont tentées que par l'aviation soviétique dont deux avions supériorité et six hélicoptères lourds ont été abattus par les hommes de l'Unita. Jonas Savimbi accuse d'ailleurs le gouvernement de Luanda de se lancer dans la guerre contre l'Afrique du Sud et la Namibie, uniquement pour faire oublier ses problèmes internes qui sont colossaux. Le pays exsangue et potentiellement riche, ne réussit pas à nourrir sa population alors que, du temps des Portugais, il exportait des céréales, de la viande, du café et du poisson en très grande quantité. L'opposition armée dénonce comme responsable de cet état de fait la « politique économique désastreuse basée sur le modèle soviétique ». Les seules ressources du gouvernement marxiste angolais sont les revenus pétroliers versés par la Gulf Oil, société américaine

installée dans l'enclave de Cabinda et défendue contre les guérilleros anti-marxistes par une très forte garnison cubaine. L'armée sud-africaine, certainement la meilleure et la mieux équipée d'Afrique, grâce à ses spécialistes qui savent tirer le maximum du matériel sophistiqué dont elle dispose - ce qui n'est guère le cas dans les armées africaines - n'a nullement l'intention de faire preuve de modération. Ses chefs, d'ailleurs, appliquant la tactique d'attrition pays avec lequel ils entretiennent des rapports suivis, sont très clairs à ce sujet : « Nous frapperons jusqu'en Ethiopie si le faut ! Nous nourrirons déjà le tiers de l'Afrique, que nous demanderions de plus ? Nous sommes des Africains blancs. Est-ce un crime si nous voulons le rester, défendre notre pays et ne pas disparaître ? ».

Partout où la minorité blanche a exercé sans garanties réelles et sans garder la haute main sur les moyens militaires, elle a été balayée. Ce n'est pas à l'intérieur contre nos Noirs que nous faisons la guerre, c'est à l'extérieur contre ceux qui, armés, armés, payés par les Soviétiques menacent notre liberté et notre existence même en tant que nation ».

Les événements du Zimbabwe ex-Rhodesie apportent aujourd'hui des arguments sérieux à ceux Noirs et Blancs, qui en Namibie ne veulent pas que seuls les rebelles de l'extérieur soient considérés comme représentants de la population. A Salisbury, en effet, la situation se dégrade et les Blancs nés dans le pays, qui ont tout tenté pour rester, partent aujourd'hui à la cadence de près de dix mille par mois. La récente nationalisation des écoles privées n'a fait qu'accroître le phénomène. Mais de nouvelles embûches sont dressées sur leur chemin par le gouvernement de M. Mugabe. Ils ne peuvent emporter ni leurs biens ni leur argent !

Le Zimbabwe en faisant partir ses Blancs connaîtira avant deux ans le même sort que les pays dits de la « ligne de front » contre l'Afrique du Sud, le Mozambique, la Tanzanie, le Botswana et l'Angola. Ces pays, hier prospères, avec des terres excellentes, du soleil et de l'eau, connaissent la famine.

Sur 4 % des terres cultivables d'Afrique, les Sud-Africains font eux, plus du tiers de toutes les récoltes du continent. La population noire d'ailleurs, chaque fois qu'elle trouve des chefs sérieux, se lève et se bat contre des régimes que lui ont imposés les « bien-pensants » d'Europe et d'Amérique. Si Savimbi se bat et se bat bien en Angola au Mozambique, le

mouvement national de résistance aligne de 4 à 5 000 combattants anti-marxistes qui tiennent la brousse et donnent bien du souci au gouvernement local et aux hommes du K.G.B. car, malgré le déploiement d'hommes et de matériel, il semble que l'entente entre Soviétiques, Allemands de l'Est Cubains et populations cibles ne soit pas toujours éphémère. Les Soviétiques dans l'ensemble sont nés par les Africains qu'ils traitent de « couteux noirs ». L'ade « fraternité » des Soviétiques coûte cher, très cher. L'URSS a réussi à se faire céder tous les droits de pêche dans la totalité des eaux mozambiquaises et des eaux angolaises. Comme dans tous les pays d'Afrique qu'elle « protège » et où elle a obtenu les mêmes droits maritimes, ses flottes de chalutiers saccagent les fonds marins pour que finalement, moins de 40 % des résultats de ce massacre anti-écologique arrivent sur les comptoirs de vente des pays socialistes.

Les Cubains pillent systématiquement le pays

Il est bon de savoir que ces « chalutiers » un peu spéciaux naviguent en véritables petites escadres et sont rattachés directement à l'état-major général de la marine de guerre de l'Amiral Gorshkov.

Les Cubains, eux, que les Allemands de l'Est traitent de « mauvais soldats » et de « rigolos » sont accusés par la population d'avoir pillé totalement le pays ce qu'à dire des observateurs impartiaux, semble bien être la vérité. La totalité des biens mobiliers laissés par les Portugais en partant, ainsi que le parc automobile ont été en grande partie pris le chemin de Cuba.

Les plus étonnantes révélations apportées par l'opération Protea en Angola sont celles ayant trait au renseignement. Des monceaux de documents prouvent que les mouvements marxistes africains ont trouvé une aide matérielle et sont financés par le Conseil exécutif des Eglises dont le siège central est à Genève.

Pour ces dernières années les principaux bénéficiaires de ces incroyables largesses sont le Swapo et des groupes terroristes noirs sud-africains. Les mêmes organisations touchent aussi des fonds, par des vœux octroyés, de l'Onu, de l'Unesco et de mouvements dits charitables qui font des quêtes dans toutes les grandes villes européennes pour venir en aide aux « affamés du tiers-monde ».

Les versements atteignent des millions de dollars. Us ajoutons en conclusion que sur les documents saisis, la Guinée-Bissau, la Martinique, la Réunion et la Nouvelle-Calédonie sont toujours désignées comme des pays en lutte contre le colonialisme français. Et qu'il faut aider à secourir ce territoire pour...

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par ROGER HOLLENDRE
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EXC 1 / 10 DE

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DES DOCUMENTS
QUI PROUVENT LEUR
INTERVENTION

LES RUSSSES EN ANGOLA

Des photos de soldats soviétiques abattus et capturés en Angola ont été publiées. Il y a quinze jours, « Match » présentait déjà le premier prisonnier soviétique de l'Afrique du Sud, Nikolai Fedorovich Pestrov, s'étant fait prendre lors de l'opération « Prétite » à Orange. Ce homme avait été tué à ses côtés ainsi que trois autres Soviétiques. Son portrait diffusé à travers le monde apportait la preuve de la présence de l'Armée rouge dans les combats des partisans marxistes de la gauche révolutionnaire en Angola du Sud-Ouest africain. Aujourd'hui, l'Armée rouge est encore plus accusée. Pour la première fois, en effet, on voit sur des images O.N.U. via qu'on porte des Soviétiques en Angola. Des documents archaïques : un simple pose, la kalachnikov en bandoulière, devient sa ville de jonction. Et des scènes pourtant réelles : instructeurs armés devant du matériel neuf ou donnant des cours de guérilla aux soldats du Frelimo (Forces armées populaires pour la libération de l'Angola) : officiers supérieurs des pays communistes en promenade dans les rues de Luanda. Un nouveau contingent de techniciens de l'Est vient d'arriver en renfort. De nombreux des femmes accompagnent les troupes et remplacent les hommes aux fonctions officielles. Les jours passent toujours : seront-ils toujours ?

Dans
leur villa, Ivan et sa
femme

C'est l'histoire
de deux hommes, deux femmes
et d'un amour qui dure
depuis 1945. Ils ont
été mariés pendant 15 ans
et ont eu trois enfants.

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PAGE 3

Photography of Soviet soldiers killed or captured in ANGOLA have been published. Fifteen days ago, "Match" presented the first Soviet prisoner in SOUTH AFRICA: Nicolai Feodorovich Pestretsov was captured during the "Proteus" operation at Ongiva. His wife and three other Soviet people were killed at his side. His portrait, circulated throughout the world, provided proof of the Red Army presence at the side of Marxist guerillas of the South-West African liberation movement (SWAPO). Today, we have still more overwhelming proofs. For the first time, some pictures of the daily life of Soviet people in ANGOLA are published. They are exclusive documents: a married couple is posing, with a kalachnikov across the shoulder, in front of their villa. They also show purely military scenes: instructors who are busy with some new equipment, or who are giving courses of training in guerilla warfare to "FAPLA" (Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of ANGOLA) troops; Senior officers from Communist countries walking in the streets of Luanda; a new quota of technicians from the east arriving in support. Many wives came with their husbands and are also carrying out official duties. This is proof that they will stay for a long period of time.

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PAGE ⁵
A

Moscow's commitment in ANGOLA results from the treaty signed on 8 October 1976 for a period of twenty years, between the Luanda Government and Nikolai Podgorny. It is estimated that three thousand Soviet and East German technicians are present in ANGOLA. The latter are specifically in charge of surveillance, security and intelligence operations. Some of them are already relieving part of the twenty thousand Cubans stationed along the Namibian border. The FAPLA Angolese troops are being trained by communist officers and NCO's under Karl Marx's portrait. They will soon proceed from theory to practice on equipment off-loaded from cargo ships in Luanda: armored vehicles with machine-guns, antitank weapons, T-74 122mm and D-44 85mm cannons, Stalin rocket launchers, air transportable tanks, BTR-152 combat trucks which are a model between the U.S. GMC and the half-track trucks. Armored vehicles on which SAGGER missiles and anti-aircraft guns are mounted can also be seen, as well as some sophisticated equipment already placed along the Polisario Front: new cross-country vehicles. And finally, some conventional air-defense batteries which are noticed as being back in Warsaw Pact units. Namibia, a buffer-territory between ANGOLA and SOUTH AFRICA, is in ideal experimentation field for them. This territory is being used as the rehearsal theater before a major open conflict.

Marxists instructors are landing with their equipment.

Equipment and weapons are off loaded from cargo ships in Luanda. Soviet technicians are explaining how they work to Angolese troops. A line of "Pobieda" jeeps can be seen in the background.

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[illegible]

**Les instructeurs
maristes débarquent
le matériel**

L'ingegner Carlo Gatti, che ha
 lavorato per 15 anni alla Siemens
 e che ha lavorato per 15 anni alla
 Siemens e che ha lavorato per 15
 anni alla Siemens e che ha
 lavorato per 15 anni alla Siemens

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
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Page 7

A 23mm three-tube anti-aircraft gun has been captured in ANGOLA by some South-African guerillas. The same equipment has been delivered to Polisario to fight against MOROCCO.

During the "Proteus" Operation, some South-African troops are distributing food to the population which welcomes them. Ten thousand Angolese took refuge in NAMIBIA.

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Ce canon anti-aérien trépied de 23 mm, anciennement belge, a été saisi en Angola par les commandos sud-africains. Les mêmes maternels ont été livrés au Pakistan pour combattre le Maroc. Au cours de l'opération « Phoenix », les soldats sud-africains distribuent des vivres à la population qui leur réserve un bon accueil. 10 000 Angolais ont aujourd'hui trouvé refuge en Namibie.



MSGNO 2 IMIRI ISG 27/12/82 11:27
ZCZC 16:23:55Z IMI

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TOR: 271535Z DEC 82

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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
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FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/ (b)(3):10 USC 424
INFO RUEHSAX (b)(3):10 USC 424
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EZ1:

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EZ2:

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY/SOUTH
AFRICA/CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN AFRICA/ (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GE), SOUTH
AFRICA (SF)

2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN AFRICA

4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 821223

5. (U) ORIG: (b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424

8. ~~TC/NOPORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY:

(b)(1),1.4 (c) CLAIMS TO HAVE OBSERVED
RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS INTO SOUTH ANGOLA. HE WAS
IMPRESSED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN FIGHTING ABILITIES,
EQUALLY UNIMPRESSED WITH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CUBAN
ANGOLA PRESENCE AND STATED HE UNDERSTOOD 2-3000 CUBANS
WERE TO BE SENT TO MOZAMBIQUE TO OPEN ANOTHER FRONT.

9A. ~~TC/NOPORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

DETAILS:

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

CLAIMS TO HAVE TAKEN PART IN FIVE
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AS AN OBSERVER DURING RECENT SOUTH
AFRICAN OPERATIONS INTO SOUTHERN ANGOLA. HE OBSERVED THAT

8201960172

MSGNO 2 IMIIRI ISG *27/12/82* *11:27*

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY IS A HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL FIGHTING FORCE AND WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE YOUNG OFFICERS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING THE FIGHT TO THE OPPOSITION IN ANGOLA. HE WAS ALSO IMPRESSED WITH THE BLACK "BUSHMASTER" UNITS SOUTH AFRICA EMPLOYES IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST SWAPO.

~~TC/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

HE STATED SWAPO OWNS THE LARGE URBAN AREAS IN ANGOLA, WHILE UNITA OWNS THE COUNTRY SIDE AND SMALL VILLAGES. HE REPORTED, A FAVORITE SWAPO TACTIC IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST AREAS UNDER UNITA INFLUENCE IS THE USE OF TWO-THREE MAN HARASSMENT/ KILLER/SABOTAGE TEAMS. THE TEAMS ARE SENT UNDER THE COVER OF DARKNESS BY TRUCK OR AUTOMOBILE INTO THE TARGET AREA TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION.

~~TC/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

HE STATED THERE ARE CURRENTLY 30,000 CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA. HE WASN'T FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH THEIR ABILITIES, ALTHOUGH MENTIONING HE HAD HEARD THERE ARE PLANS TO SEND 2-3000 CUBANS TO MOZAMBIQUE TO OPEN ANOTHER FRONT AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

~~TC/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FIGHTING IS VERY EXPENSIVE, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS FEELING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN.

98. ~~TC/NOFORN~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

ORIG CMTS:

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

THE VERACITY OF HIS STATEMENTS ARE NOT KNOWN.

10. (U) PROJ NO: NONE

11. (U) COLL MSGMT ~~(b)(3):10 USC 424~~

12. (U) SPEC INST:

13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

14. (U) APP BY:

15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO; REL TO: NONE

16. (U) ENCL: NONE

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: NONE

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TO (b)(3):10 USC 424

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

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RUEDADA (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 (b)(3):10 USC 424

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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

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PAGE:0047

BODY

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

PASS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ISRAEL (IS); CYPRUS (CY); SOUTH AFRICA (SA); LEBANON (LE).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC POSSIBLE ISRAELI - SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS ACQUISITION (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 880720.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ DURING THE EVENING NEWS BROADCAST ON MIDDLE EAST TELEVISION OF 880720, (b)(3):10 USC 424 A SHORT THREE-TO-FIVE MINUTE EXCERPT ON THE PROBLEMS THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE WAS FACING COMBATING ADVANCED SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR ARENA. THE SHORT NEWS CLIP FEATURED THREE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE "CHEETAH" FIGHTERS TAKING OFF AND FLYING IN FORMATION, AS WELL AS A SPEECH BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE COMMANDER, REPORTEDLY AT THE RECENT PILOT GRADUATION CEREMONY (DATE UNSPECIFIED).

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ WHILE THE NEWS CLIP INDICATED THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THE "CHEETAH" COULD MEET SOUTH AFRICA'S COMBAT NEEDS EVEN AGAINST THE CUBAN/SOVIET PILOTED ANGOLAN MIG-23 AIRCRAFT, IT ALSO INDICATED THAT THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ADVANCED SYSTEMS NOW IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE INVENTORY, SUCH AS A HELMET MOUNTED SIGHT WHICH ALLOWED FIGHTER PILOTS TO SIMPLY LOOK AT A PARTICULAR TARGET IN ORDER TO TARGET THE FIGHTER PLANE'S MISSILES.

COMMENTS: ~~(C/NF)~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424 -- FROM TIME-TO TIME,

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MIDDLE EAST TELEVISION, WITH ITS MAILING HEADQUARTERS IN NICOSIA, CYPRUS, AND ITS BROADCAST ANTENNA IN SOUTH LEBANON, AIRS FILM CLIPS ON SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ISSUES. THEY BROADCAST ONE HOURS WORTH OF NEWS EACH EVENING, WITH 30 MINUTES IN ARABIC, AND 30 MINUTES IN ENGLISH. [REDACTED] HAS SEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY RELATED FILM CLIPS ON BOTH PROGRAMS.

(b)(3):10
USC-424

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW IF THE PRESENCE OF A HELMET MOUNTED SIGHT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, [REDACTED]

(b)(1),1.4(c)

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC

//COMSOBJ: 424

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PROJ: (U)

INSTR: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

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WARNING: REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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PAGE:0070

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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC/

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(3):10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) NIGERIA (NI); ANGOLA (AO); CUBA (CU); SOUTH AFRICA (SF).

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0071

SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 /BABANGIDA DECLARES SUPPORT FOR
CUBANS IN ANGOLA. (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 880306.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC
424

SOURCE: (U) //OPEN//DAILY NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER, "SUNDAY
HERALD", ILORIN, NIGERIA, 6 MAR 88, IN ENGLISH

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ PRESIDENT BABANGIDA HAS EXPRESSED HIS
SUPPORT FOR CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA IN VIEW OF THE RECENT
SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE. HE ALSO PLEDGED TO SIDE WITH
CUBA AGAINST THE U.S. BACKED UN RESOLUTION CONDEMNING
CUBA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ PRESIDENT IBRAHIM B. ((BABANGIDA)) HAS
REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED NIGERIA'S "TOTAL POLITICAL SUPPORT"
FOR CUBA'S ROLE IN ANGOLA "IN THE CURTAILMENT OF
SOUTHERN AFRICAN AGGRESSION." GEN BABANGIDA RECEIVED A
SPECIAL ENVOY, CABINET MEMBER MANUEL VILLA ((SOSA)),
FROM CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL ((CASTRO)) AT DODAN BARRACKS
ON 5 MAR 88. SOSA REPORTEDLY BRIEFED BABANGIDA ON THE
RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE IN ANGOLA, EXPLAINING IN
DETAIL THE SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVES AND ANGOLAN AND
CUBAN DEFENSIVE STRATEGY. SOSA REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE
ANGOLAN POSITION HAD BEEN REINFORCED AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN ATTACK REPULSED. SOSA REPORTEDLY GAVE BABANGIDA
CASTRO'S PERSONAL ASSURANCE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN
OBJECTIVE OF SEIZING "ANGOLA'S MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC
REGION" WOULD NOT SUCCEED.

2. ~~(S)~~ ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, BABANGIDA REPORTEDLY PLEDGED
THAT NIGERIA WILL DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO ENSURE
THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SUCCEED IN EFFORTS TO
HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN
GENEVA "UNJUSTLY CONDEMN" THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

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PAGE:0072

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

//IPSP: (U)(b)(3):10 USC
//COMSOBJ: 424

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) NONE.

COLL: (U)

INSTR: (U)(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC 424

PREP: (U)

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WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~DECL. OADR~~

END OF MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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PAGE 01 020259Z
ACTION INR-18

2169 AF8928

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2169 AF8928

INFO C-01 AS-01 AF:P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PHA-01 AF.S-01 NAM-01
ANG-01 /DBS A2

INFO LOG-00 EUR-00 AF-00 PM-10 INRE-00 ACDA-12 /032 W
-----247571 020917Z /30

R 012217Z MAR 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i).

~~SECRET UNINTEL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: DIADIN 61-1A

SUBJ: ANGOLA. SOVIET AIRLIFT ACTIVITY. (U)

DOI: 25 FEB 88 (AS OF 2100 EST)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (VTA)
AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED TO ANGOLA HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED AIRLIFT SUPPORT
TO THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS OF KUITO AND MENONGUE IN ORDER TO KEEP
NEARBY BESIEGED GARRISONS FROM FALLING TO THE GUERRILLAS.

35

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS6166 ~~SECRET~~

2. ~~(S)~~ IN LATE JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY, VTA AIRCRAFT
OPERATING OUT OF LUANDA REPORTEDLY FLEW APPROXIMATELY 30 TRIPS TO
KUITO. A SIMILAR INCREASE IN VTA ACTIVITY TOOK PLACE IN MID-
FEBRUARY, WITH MORE THAN 50 FLIGHTS TO MENONGUE. IN ADDITION,
MOCCOA ROTATED THE FOUR IL-76/CANDID'S DEPLOYED TO ANGOLA DURING
THIS RECENT INCREASE IN AIRLIFT ACTIVITY. IMAGERY REVEALED THAT
THESE CANDID'S ARE A NEWLY MODIFIED VARIANT WITH UNIDENTIFIED
EXTERNAL FITMENTS. THE FITMENTS MAY BE DESIGNED TO GIVE THE
AIRCRAFT INCREASED PROTECTION AGAINST UNITA'S HEAT-SEEKING SAM'S.
CANDID'S WITH THIS MODIFICATION HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN IN
ANGOLA.

3. ~~(S)~~ BOTH CAPITALS ARE NEAR MILITARY GARRISONS THAT HAVE
BEEN BESIEGED BY NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA
(UNITA) GUERRILLAS. SINCE EARLY JANUARY, UNITA GUERRILLAS HAVE
SURROUNDED THE GARRISON AT CUENBA, AND KUITO HAS BECOME AN
INCREASINGLY VITAL BASE FROM WHICH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS
HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE SIEGE. MENONGUE HAS
ALSO BECOME AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT STAGING AREA FOR ANGOLAN AND
CUBAN FORCES TRYING TO RELIEVE THE BELEAGUERED GARRISON AT KUITO
CUANAVALE, WHICH UNITA, BACKED BY SOUTH AFRICAN AIR AND ARTILLERY

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS6166 ~~SECRET~~

ELEMENTS, HAS BESIEGED SINCE LATE 1987.

4. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: THIS AIRLIFT ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN ANGOLA IS ANOTHER REFLECTION OF THE INTENSITY OF MILITARY
ACTIVITY OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. IT FURTHER INDICATES LUANDA'S
DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE BESIEGED GARRISONS FROM FALLING TO UNITA.
THE INSURGENTS AND THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN BACKERS HAVE NOT YET
DISENGAGED, AND THEY MAY LAUNCH LARGER ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT
POSITIONS TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THE REMAINING 1 TO 2 MONTHS
OF THE RAINY SEASON.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PAGE 01 300245Z
ACTION INR-10

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INFO C-01 AS-01 EPS-01 AF: P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PMA-01 EXED-01
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INFO LOG-00 AF-00 PM-10 INRE-00 ACDA-12 032 W
-----254446 010251Z 38

R 292044Z JUN 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),

~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL NOFORN

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: DIADIN 181-9A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: BORDER TENSIONS. (U)

DOI: 28 JUN 88 (AS OF 0115 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~IS UN INTEL~~ FIGHTING ON 27 JUNE BETWEEN CUBAN POPULAR

PAGE 02 RUEI JCS9187 ~~SECRET~~

ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA) AND SOUTH AFRICAN
DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORIAL FORCE (SWATF)
ELEMENTS NEAR CHIPA IN SOUTHERN CUNENE PROVINCE MAY FORESHADOW A
MAJOR CONFRONTATION DESPITE CONTINUING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. (U) SADF HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCED THAT CUBAN FAPLA FORCES HAD
LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE TOWARD CALUEQUE ON 27 JUNE. SADF SWATF FORCES
REPULSED THE ATTACK AND KILLED ABOUT 200 CUBAN FAPLA TROOPS. IN
ADDITION, THEY DESTROYED TWO T-54 TANKS, TWO BTR APCs, AND EIGHT
OTHER VEHICLES. ONE SADF OFFICER DIED IN THE FIGHTING.
SUBSEQUENTLY, AN AIR ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED BY CUBAN FAPLA AIRCRAFT
AGAINST THE DAM, AND 10 OR 11 SADF PERSONNEL WERE KILLED. IN
ADDITION, THE DAM WALL, ELECTRICAL LINES TO THE DAM, AND THE WATER
PIPELINE WERE REPORTEDLY DAMAGED.

3. ~~IS UN INTEL~~

(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

HUNDRED PEOPLE AND A SMALL HERD OF CATTLE WERE NOTED MOVING SOUTH
ACROSS THE CUNENE RIVER ON THE 25TH, SUGGESTING THE EVACUATION OF
NONCOMBATANTS FROM THE AREA. NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, INDICATES THAT

PAGE 03 RUEI JCS9187 ~~SECRET~~

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AOR HAS BEEN INCREASED IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA.

4. ~~IS UN INTEL~~ THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS HELD IN CAIRO ON THE 24TH AND
THE 25TH ENDED WITH AN AGREEMENT TO RECONVENE IN THE US IN EARLY
JULY. MEANWHILE, THE RECENT FIGHTING IS VERY LIKELY AN EFFORT BY
PRETORIA TO DEMONSTRATE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND RESOLVE TO
HAVANA. ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICA MOST LIKELY INITIATED THIS SPIRIT, THE
CUBAN FAPLA RESPONSE WILL DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIGHTING WILL
ESCALATE OR CALM DOWN.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PAGE 01 280431Z

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SA-01 ~~NAM-01~~ ANG-01 011 A3

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 PM-10 INRE-00 ACDA-12 032 W
-----014516 280835Z 38

R 280230Z MAY 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),

~~SECRET WHYTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424,

SERIAL: DIADIN 148-21A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA. MILITARY SITUATION. (U)

DOI: 26 MAY 88 (AS OF 2140 EDT)

TEXT: 1 ~~(S-NN-NF)~~ TWO SOUTH AFRICAN MIRAGE III JET FIGHTERS
WERE OBSERVED ON 25 MAY (b)(1),1.4 (c) ONDANGWA AIRFIELD IN NORTHERN

PAGE 02 RUEHJCS1016 ~~SECRET~~

NAMIBIA. THEIR DEPLOYMENT IS PROBABLY RELATED TO AIR ACTIVITY OVER SOUTHERN CUNENE PROVINCE AND NORTHERN NAMIBIA.

2. ~~(S-NN-NF)~~ NO MIRAGE FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN NOTED AT ONDANGWA SINCE NOVEMBER 1987. THE ONLY MILITARY AIRCRAFT NORMALLY SEEN THERE ARE TRANSPORTS, HELICOPTERS, AND IMPALA GROUND-ATTACK JETS. THE ARRIVAL OF THE MIRAGE IIIS MAY BE IN RESPONSE TO RECENT INCIDENTS OF MIGS ENTERING NAMIBIAN AIRSPACE.

3. ~~(S-NN-NF)~~ ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA, A SOUTH AFRICAN CACTUS SAM AIR DEFENSE BATTERY HAD DEPARTED RUNDU SINCE THE 23D AND MAY BE EN ROUTE TO THE RUACANA CALUEQUE AREA. A SUSPECTED AIR DEFENSE SITE HAS BEEN NOTED NORTH OF THE CALUEQUE DAM, BUT NO EQUIPMENT HAS ARRIVED AT THAT LOCATION.

4. ~~(S-NN-NF)~~ COMMENT: AS OF THE 26TH, ONLY TWO JET FIGHTERS WERE AT ONDANGWA, MOST LIKELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. PRETORIA IS EXPECTED TO WAIT FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE NEXT ROUND OF SOUTHERN AFRICA PEACE TALKS IN BRAZZAVILLE WITH LUANDA, HAVANA, AND WASHINGTON BEFORE IT CONSIDERS INITIATING A MAJOR CROSS-BORDER OPERATION. THE SADF, HOWEVER, WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE, AS WELL AS PREPARE FOR THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, IF THE TALKS FAIL.

PAGE 03 RUEHJCS1016 ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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PAGE 01 162312Z
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INFO C-01 AC-01 EPS-01 AF-P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PHA-01 EXED-01
AFS-01 AF-C-01 SA-01 NAM-01 ANG-01 /013 A1

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 ARA-00 PM-10 INRE-00 ACDA-12 /022 W
-----356760 1700012 /38

R 162014Z MAY 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50
USC 403-1(i).

PAGE 04 RUEHJC57536 ~~SECRET~~

4. ~~IS/WH/WH~~ COMMENT: THE CHANCE OF A CLASH BETWEEN CUBAN AND SADF OR SWATF ELEMENTS IS CONSIDERED MOST LIKELY IF THE CUBANS TRY TO OCCUPY CALUEQUE, A DAM AND HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ABOUT 10 KM NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. HOWEVER, PRETORIA APPARENTLY DOUBTS THAT A CUBAN ATTACK ON CALUEQUE IS IMMINENT, BASED ON THE SADF'S APPARENT LACK OF RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT. THE SADF PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT THE THREAT IS NOT SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE MOVEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES, ESPECIALLY AIRCRAFT, TO NORTHERN NAMIBIA. THE SADF COULD RAPIDLY INCREASE BOTH ITS AIR AND GROUND ASSETS IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA. HOWEVER, PRETORIA WOULD PROBABLY NOT DEPEND ON THIS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO A THREAT AS IT HAS HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE AND AUGMENT ITS FORCES FOR DEFENSIVE

ACTION
(b)(3):10 USC 424

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PAGE 02 RUEHJC57536 ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i).

~~SECRET~~ MINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT

SERIAL: DIADIN 137-9A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA-CUBA: CURRENT SITUATION. (U)

DDI: 13 MAY 88 (AS OF 2020 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~IS/WH/WH~~ THE DANGER OF A SERIOUS CLASH BETWEEN OPPOSING FORCES IN SOUTHWESTERN ANGOLA HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST MONTH.

PAGE 03 RUEHJC57536 ~~SECRET~~

HOWEVER, A LACK OF INFORMATION ON THE ACTUAL INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED HAMPERS EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE LIKELIHOOD OF FIGHTING BETWEEN HAVANA AND PRETORIA.

2. ~~IS/WH/WH~~ NEITHER HAVANA NOR PRETORIA HAS PUBLICIZED THE 4 MAY CLASH BETWEEN CUBAN/POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA TERRITORIAL FORCE (SWATF) ELEMENTS NORTH OF CALUEQUE. ALTHOUGH THE TWO SIDES MAY NOT WANT THE SITUATION TO ESCALATE INTO A FULL-SCALE CONVENTIONAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF), THEY HAVE NOT DEPARTED FROM THE DISPUTED AREA.

3. ~~IS/WH/WH~~ IMAGERY REVEALS A PROBABLE CUBAN ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE PATROL ABOUT 20 KM FROM THE SITE OF THE EARLIER CLASH. CONSTRUCTION ON THE NEW AIRFIELD AT CAHAMA WILL APPARENTLY BE COMPLETED AS EARLY AS MID-JUNE. THE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF SADF RATEL INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES FROM OSHIVelo AND ONDANGWA IN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PAGE 01 010028Z

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ACTION INR-10

INFO C-01 AS-01 AF:P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PMA-01 AF:S-01 SA-01
NAM-01 ANG-01 010 A2

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 ARA-00 PM-10 INRE-00 ACDA-12 DS-01
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R 312204Z MAR 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i).

~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT

SERIAL: DIADIN 91-11A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: GROWING THREAT. (U)

DOI: 30 MAR 88 (AS OF 2213 EST)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S) (NF) (NO)~~ CUBAN AND POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE
LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA) UNITS, NUMBERING APPROXIMATELY 4,800
MEN, ARE REPORTEDLY ABOUT 70 KM FROM NAMIBIA.
2. ~~(S) (NF) (NO)~~ THE CUBAN-FAPLA FORCES WERE REPORTED IN THREE
PRIMARY AREAS--NEAR HUMBE XANGONGO, AT CUELAI, AND AT NGIVA. THE

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS4843 ~~SECRET~~

MAJOR CONCENTRATION, WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY, IS
BETWEEN HUMBE AND XANGONGO. A TANK UNIT IS ALSO REPORTEDLY AT
CUELAI. THE CUBAN FAPLA FORCES HAVE NOT SECURED THE ROAD BETWEEN
CUELAI AND NGIVA, BUT THEY ENTERED MUPA ON 29 MARCH.

3. ~~(S) (NF) (NO)~~ SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES (SADF) ARE AWARE OF THIS
CUBAN FAPLA FORCE, BUT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA
OF UNDUE ALARM ON THE PART OF PRETORIA. NO COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE AT
GROOTFONTEIN, AND ONLY IMPALA GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT WERE SEEN AT
ONDANGWA. AT OSHIVELO, 23 OLIPHANT--MODIFIED CENTURION--TANKS AND
MORE THAN 30 RATEL INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES WERE PRESENT ON THE
29TH. NORMALLY, ONLY THE 13 TANKS OF THE 61 MECHANIZED INFANTRY
GROUP ARE SEEN AT OSHIVELO. THE ADDITIONAL TANKS MAY SIGNAL THE
PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS FROM ANOTHER SADF UNIT. THEIR LOCATION OUTSIDE
THE USUAL CAMP MAINTENANCE AREA MAY MEAN THAT THE TANKS ARE NOT
BASED AT OSHIVELO BUT ARE THERE FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR EVEN
TRAINING.

4. ~~(S) (NF) (NO)~~ COMMENT: A CUBAN FAPLA ADVANCE TOWARD THE
NAMIBIAN BORDER WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF A CLASH WITH SOUTH
AFRICAN UNITS. HOWEVER, LUANDA'S MILITARY FORCES AND ALLIES WOULD
PROBABLY NOT ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE BORDER. NONETHELESS, ANY

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS4843 ~~SECRET~~

CUBAN-FAPLA ADVANCE TOWARD CALUEQUE, WHICH CONTROLS PART OF THE
WATER SUPPLY IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA, CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE RESISTED BY
PRETORIA.

(b)(3):10 USC 424.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PAGE 01 290023Z
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INFO C-01 AS-01 AF-P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PMA-01 AF-S-01 SA-01
NAM-01 ANG-01 010 A2

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-----143160 290113Z 38

R 282018Z MAR 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403

~~SECRET~~ ~~INTEL REPORT~~

SERIAL: DIADIN 88-5A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: MILITARY ACTIVITY (U)

DOI: 28 MAR 88 (AS OF 2031 EST)

TEXT. 1. ~~SECRET~~ PRETORIA HAS INCREASED ITS AOB AT GROOTFONTEIN AIRFIELD IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA. THIS EXPANSION MAY FORESHADOW AN AIRSTRIFE AGAINST CUBAN POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA) FORCES THAT HAVE DEPLOYED TO WITHIN 70 KM OF THE

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

PAGE 02 RUEHJCS3699 ~~SECRET~~

FIGHTERS LOADED WITH AAMS AT GROOTFONTEIN. THE F1S DEPARTED FROM GROOTFONTEIN IN LATE FEBRUARY, BUT FOUR WERE SEEN THERE ON 20 MARCH, WHEN OPERATIONS WERE APPARENTLY UNDER WAY AGAINST CUBAN FAPLA POSITIONS IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA. ONE F1 CRASHED IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA ON 19 MARCH WHILE RETURNING FROM SUCH A MISSION. THAT CRASH BROUGHT TO THREE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE F1S LOST TO HOSTILE ACTION SINCE SEPTEMBER 1987.

3. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: IF AN AIR ATTACK IS BEING CONTEMPLATED, CUBAN FAPLA GROUND FORCES ARE UNLIKELY TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGET. IMAGERY ON 19 MARCH REVEALED THAT AN EARLY WARNING RADAR SITE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED NEAR CAHAMA, ABOUT 220 KM NORTH OF THE BORDER. THIS RADAR FACILITY IS THE SOUTHERNMOST ONE IN ANGOLA. THE DESTRUCTION OF THIS SITE WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO LUANDA AND HAVANA ABOUT THE EXTENT OF ACTIVITIES THAT PRETORIA WILL TOLERATE. THE AAMS ON THE F1S COULD SIGNIFY, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE NOT INTENDED FOR GROUND ATTACK. THEY COULD BE USED TO SUPPORT IMPALA GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT FROM ONDANGWA, OR CANBERRA OR SUCCANEER BOMBERS FLYING OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

PAGE 03 RUEHJCS3699 ~~SECRET~~

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~SECRET~~ WHINTEL NSORDAN

SERIAL: DIADIN 53-9A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-NAMIBIA. REPRIS/LS (U)

DOI 22 FEB 88 (AS OF 2235 EST)

TEXT 1 (U) SOUTH AFRICAN FIGHTERS ATTACKED SUSPECTED BASES OF THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA ON 20 FEBRUARY FOLLOWING A TERRORIST BOMBING AT OSHANATI IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA THAT KILLED 18 PERSONS AND INJURED MORE THAN 30.
2. (U) ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE

PAGE 02 RUEHJCS3722 ~~SECRET~~

(SADF) HEADQUARTERS. THE AIRCRAFT STRUCK SWAPO TARGETS NEAR LUBANGO AND NGIVA. OFFICIALS OF THE INSURGENT ORGANIZATION DENIED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST BOMBING, WHICH WAS THE WORST SUCH INCIDENT IN NAMIBIA. THE BOMB EXPLODED IN A BARN FILLED WITH EMPLOYEES OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT WHO HAD JUST BEEN PAID

3. ~~COMMENT~~ SWAPO HAS HAD SEVERAL TRAINING FACILITIES NEAR LUBANGO. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE INSURGENT GROUP'S MILITARY WING. THE CITY IS ALSO A MAJOR CUBAN GARRISON AND IS RINGED BY EXTENSIVE AIR DEFENSE DEPLOYMENTS. INFORMATION ON WHETHER PRETORIA INFLECTED ANY DAMAGE OR WHETHER ANY CUBAN TARGETS WERE INVOLVED IS NOT YET AVAILABLE

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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ACTION INR-10

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INFO C-01 AS-01 EPS-01 AF-P-01 AFRA-01 RCA-01 PMA-01 EXED-01
AF-S-01 SA-01 010 A1

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-----313243 022334Z 38

R 020307Z FEB 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL NOFORN

SERIAL: DIADIN 32-13A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA: MILITARY ACTIVITY. (U)

DOI: 1 FEB 88 (AS OF 2120 EST)

TEXT: 1. ~~SECRET~~ PRETORIA MAY BE SHIPPING G-5 155 HOWITZERS TO
EITHER SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) OR NATIONAL UNION FOR THE
TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA) UNITS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

2. ~~SECRET~~ SOUTH AFRICAN AOB IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA REMAINS AT A
REDUCED, ALTHOUGH STILL HEIGHTENED, LEVEL. HOWEVER, 10 G-5'S WERE
IN THE RAIL TRANSSHIPMENT AREA AT GROOTFONTEIN ON 24 JANUARY, AND 5

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS7926 ~~SECRET~~ (b)(1),1.4 (c)

OF THEM DEPARTED 4 DAYS LATER. RU4DU AIR BASE ON 30
JANUARY REVEALED THREE G-5'S IN A STORAGE AREA, AND TWO OF THESE
GUNS MAY HAVE BEEN PRESENT SINCE 25 JANUARY. IN ADDITION, ONE
UNIDENTIFIED ARTILLERY PIECE WAS NEAR A C-160 TRANSPORT. WHETHER
THE ARTILLERY WAS DESTINED FOR DELIVERY TO RUNDU OR WAS ABOUT TO
DEPART IS UNCERTAIN.

3. ~~SECRET~~ SEVEN MIRAGE F-1 JET FIGHTERS, WHICH BEFORE SEPTEMBER
1987 WERE NOT NORMALLY STATIONED AT GROOTFONTEIN AIRFIELD, ARE STILL
THERE. HOWEVER, INAGERY OF 31 JANUARY INDICATES THAT THE AMOUNT OF
AMMUNITION BEING STORED OPENLY HAS BEEN REDUCED. ON 29 JANUARY
NEARLY 50 MEDIUM-SIZE TENTS WERE IN THE AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITY
AT GROOTFONTEIN, BUT 2 DAYS LATER THE NUMBER HAD DROPPED TO FEWER

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

5. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF HEAVY BOMBING
PLATFORMS SUCH AS THE BUCCANEERS AND THE APPARENT DECREASE IN
AMMUNITION STOCKPILES MAY MEAN THAT PRETORIA DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A
HIGH LEVEL OF AIR SUPPORT TO UNITA IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS7926 ~~SECRET~~

HOWEVER, THE MOVEMENT OF G-5'S TO RUNDU, A MAJOR LOGISTIC BASE FOR
RESUPPLY TO JONAS SAVIMBI'S FORCES, SUGGESTS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN
SUPPORT FOR UNITA'S RAINY SEASON OFFENSIVE HAS NOT LESSENED AND
COULD INCREASE. THE LONG-RANGE ARTILLERY PIECES HAVE PROVED HIGHLY
EFFECTIVE AGAINST CUBAN AND ANGOLAN FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA.
ADDITIONAL G-5'S, UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN OR UNITA CONTROL, WOULD ENABLE
SAVIMBI TO MAINTAIN AND POSSIBLY TO EXPAND THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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-----126305 180512Z /30

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),

SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT. THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DID DESTROY A CUBAN AN-26/CURL TRANSPORT IN MAY, AND IN AUGUST, THE AIRCRAFT USED BY THE PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA WAS HIT BY AN AAM OVER SOUTHERN ANGOLA. ONE ENGINE OF THE BAE-125 WAS HIT, BUT THE PLANE LANDED SAFELY.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

~~SECRET~~ ~~DATA~~

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~~SECRET~~ ~~UNRECORDED~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424,

SERIAL: DIADIN 288-17A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA: THREAT PERCEPTIONS. (U)

DOI: 17 OCT 88 (AS OF 1555 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~THE~~ THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE (SAAF) REPORTEDLY HAS LITTLE RESPECT FOR THE CAPABILITIES OF THE CUBAN OR ANGOLAN AIR FORCES OR AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. THE SAAF CLAIMS THAT 25 SA-6/GAIPULS AND 3 SA-2/GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT IN 1988 WITHOUT THE LOSS OF A SINGLE PLANE.

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS8638 ~~SECRET~~

J. ~~THE~~ THE SAAF BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN AIR DEFENSES ARE HINDERED BY POOR COORDINATION. MISSILES ARE FIRED WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT ARE OUT OF RANGE AND AT BALLOONS WITH RADAR DEFLECTORS ATTACHED. HOWEVER, THE SAAF APPARENTLY STILL TAKES PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN THREAT. SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT ARE RESTRICTED TO ALTITUDES BETWEEN 17 AND 34 METERS ABOVE GROUND LEVEL AND ARE EQUIPPED WITH PASSIVE-ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES. IN ADDITION, SAAF UTILITY AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED WITH FLARE DISPENSERS ATTACHED TO EACH WING. PRETORIA ALSO CLAIMS THAT SA-4/GANEF AND SA-5/GAMMON MISSILES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED INTO ANGOLA.

3. ~~THE~~ THE SOUTH AFRICANS ALSO DEPRECATED THE THREAT POSED BY THE CUBAN-ANGOLAN AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS. THEY CLAIMED THAT BEFORE THE BOMBING OF THE CALVEQUE DAM, WHERE 12 SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN A LATE JUNE ATTACK, ONLY 2 SADF SOLDIERS HAD DIED IN 750 AIR-TO-GROUND SORTIES. THEY STATED THAT IN THE QUILO CUANAVALE AREA, MOST CUBAN-ANGOLAN AIRCRAFT REMAINED ABOVE 2,000 METERS AND WERE SELDOM SEEN. ACCORDING TO THEIR ESTIMATES, CUBAN-ANGOLAN AIR FORCES HAVE ONLY 34 OPERATIONAL MIG-23/FLOGGERS, WHICH ARE USED IN BOTH THE AIR-TO-GROUND AND AIR-TO-AIR ROLES. THEY

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS8638 ~~SECRET~~

BELIEVE THAT ALL 12 OF THE SU-25/FROGFOOT GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT DELIVERED TO ANGOLA WILL BE OPERATIONAL SHORTLY BUT THAT ONLY 2 OF THE 14 SU-22/FITTERS IN ANGOLA ARE STILL FLYING.

4. ~~COMMENT:~~ COMMENT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ASSESSMENTS MAY UNDERSTATE CUBAN-ANGOLAN CAPABILITIES AND MAY EXAGGERATE SOME ASPECTS OF THE THREAT PRETORIA'S FORCES COULD FACE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GENERALLY POOR PERFORMANCE OF ANGOLAN PILOTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THAT OF CUBAN PILOTS, WHO ARE BELIEVED TO BE MORE CAPABLE AND BETTER TRAINED. IN ADDITION, NO EVIDENCE POINTS TO THE PRESENCE OF SA-4 OR SA-5 MISSILES IN ANGOLA, AND ONLY 3 OF THE 12 FROGFOOT FIGHTERS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED.

5. ~~NONETHELESS,~~ NONETHELESS, MANY OF THE SHORTCOMINGS NOTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS APPEAR ACCURATE. THE ANGOLAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM HAS BEEN PLAGUED WITH COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND HAS FAILED TO HIT ANY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i).

~~SECRET~~ ~~UNRECORDED~~

SERIAL: DIADIN 14-5A

SUBJ: ANGOLA-CUBA-SOUTH AFRICA MILITARY SITUATION. (U)

DOI 13 JAN 88 (AS OF 2100 EST)

TEXT 1 ~~SECRET~~ INDICATIONS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND FORCES
HAVE RECENTLY REENTERED SOUTHERN ANGOLA COULD PRESAGE AN
INTENSIFICATION OF HOSTILITIES

2. ~~SECRET~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (c) 31 SOUTH AFRICAN ARMORED
VEHICLES BELONGING TO THE 32 BATTALION DEPARTED THEIR BASE AT

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS3457

~~SECRET~~

THIPAPO DURING THE PAST WEEK. FIVE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE
(SADF) ARMORED VEHICLES THAT HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED AT RUNDU HAVE ALSO
LEFT BASE. WHETHER ALL THESE UNITS HAVE DEPLOYED TO SOUTHERN ANGOLA
IS UNCLEAR, BUT ELEMENTS OF THE 32 BATTALION MAY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED
TO SUPPORT NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA
(UNITA) FORCES THAT HAVE BESIEGED THE ANGOLAN GARRISON OF CUITO
CUANAVALA SINCE LATE NOVEMBER.

3. ~~SECRET~~ WHETHER HAVANA HAS DECIDED TO MOVE ANY COMBAT UNITS
INTO SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA TO COUNTERATTACK UNITA OR SADF ELEMENTS IS
STILL UNCERTAIN. ELEMENTS OF A RECENTLY IDENTIFIED CUBAN ARMORED
BRIGADE AT LOBITO DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO ANY
COMBAT ZONES IN THE CENTER OR IN THE SOUTH.

4. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: ELEMENTS OF THIS BRIGADE MAY HAVE ARRIVED
FROM CUBA AND COULD BE USED TO REALIGN RATHER THAN AUGMENT HAVANA'S
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. SINCE LATE 1986, ELEMENTS OF THREE CUBAN
BRIGADES IN NORTH AND CENTRAL ANGOLA HAVE DEPARTED GARRISON AND HAVE
NOT BEEN LOCATED ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. THESE ELEMENTS ARE
BELIEVED TO TOTAL 2,400 PERSONNEL. THE NEW ARMORED BRIGADE IN
LOBITO MAY BE PART OF CUBA'S 50TH DIVISION AND COULD BE A
REPLACEMENT FOR THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE THAT WAS TEMPORARILY

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS3457

~~SECRET~~

DRAWN DOWN, PERHAPS DURING THE 1987 ROTATION CYCLE.

5. ~~SECRET~~ THE BATTLE FOR CUITO CUANAVALA IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY AND
COULD BE A FOCAL POINT FOR COMBAT IN THE SOUTHEAST FOR THE REMAINDER
OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHICH NORMALLY ENDS IN LATE APRIL. LUANDA AND
ITS SOVIET AND CUBAN ALLIES APPEAR COMMITTED TO HOLDING THE
GARRISON. WHETHER UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICA INTEND TO CONDUCT AN
IMMINENT ASSAULT ON THE TOWN OR A PROTRACTED SIEGE IS UNCLEAR

(b)(3):10 USC 424.

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PAGE 01 210141Z
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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i).

~~SECRET~~
(b)(3):10 USC 424.

SERIAL: DIADIN 294-5A

SUBJ: ANGOLA: CUBAN MILITARY POSITIONS. RU

DOI: 20 OCT 88 (AS OF 1650 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ CUBAN UNITS HAVE VACATED AT LEAST FOUR POSITIONS IN SOUTHWESTERN ANGOLA DURING THE PAST WEEK AND MAY BE REDEPLOYING FARTHER NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER.

2. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ SINCE 14 OCTOBER, ELEMENTS OF TWO CUBAN TANK BATTALIONS, TWO MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANIES, ONE HOWITZER BATTERY, TWO LIGHT ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTALIONS, ONE BM-21 MULTIPLE ROCKET

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PAGE 02 RUEKJCS9777 ~~SECRET~~

LAUNCHER BATTERY, TWO SA-6/GAINFUL SAM BATTERIES, AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS HAVE DEPARTED THE CAPIRA AREA. IN ADDITION, ONE TANK BATTALION, ONE AIR DEFENSE BATTERY, TWO ARTILLERY BATTERIES, AN SA-6 BATTERY, AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS HAVE DEPARTED DONGUENA.

3. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ DURING THE PAST WEEK, ELEMENTS OF A CUBAN TACTICAL GROUP DEPARTED THEIR DEPLOYMENT AREA AT CATAGUERO. THE DEPARTING UNITS INCLUDED ELEMENTS OF TWO T-54/55 TANK COMPANIES, ELEMENTS OF A BMP-1-EQUIPPED MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY, ELEMENTS OF AN AIR DEFENSE BATTERY, A 122-MM D-30 HOWITZER BATTERY, AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS. IN ADDITION, A PROBABLE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA) UNIT HAS VACATED ITS POSITION AT ROTUNDA. IT HAS WITHDRAWN ELEMENTS OF TWO TANK COMPANIES, ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY, ONE SA-6 SAM BATTERY, AN ARTILLERY SECTION, A RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, AND SUPPORT UNITS.

4. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ THE CURRENT LOCATIONS OF THESE UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED, BUT THEY HAVE PROBABLY REDEPLOYED FARTHER NORTH. RECENT IMAGERY OF CHIBENBA REVEALED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENSE, ARTILLERY, AND SUPPORT UNITS. CHIBENBA HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR GARRISON SINCE CUBAN AND FAPLA UNITS REDUCED THEIR STRENGTH THERE IN JULY TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENTS FARTHER SOUTH.

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS9777 ~~SECRET~~

5. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ COMMENT: THE REASON FOR THE APPARENT WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN AND ANGOLAN UNITS FROM THE SOUTHWEST IS UNCERTAIN. THE ONSET OF THE OCTOBER-APRIL RAINY SEASON MAY HAVE CONVINCED CUBAN AND ANGOLAN COMMANDERS THAT THEY SHOULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR FORCES ALONG OR NEAR THE HARD-SURFACE ROAD FROM LUBANGO TO XANGONGO.

6. ~~TSNYW/AF~~ ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT CUBAN FORCES ARE PREPARING TO PULL THEIR UNITS OUT OF THE SOUTHWEST IN ANTICIPATION OF A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS INVOLVING SOUTH AFRICA, CUBA, ANGOLA, AND THE US. THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE IN LATE OCTOBER.

(b)(3):10 USC 424.

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i).

~~SECRET WHINTEL NOFORN~~

(b)(3):10 USC 424.

SERIAL: DIADIN 287-16A

SUBJ: ~~SOUTH AFRICA-NAMIBIA~~: SLOW DEPARTURE. (U)

DOI: 6 OCT 88 (AS OF 1655 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S-WN-NFI)~~ A TACTICAL AIRFIELD UNIT (TAU) HAS APPARENTLY
DEPLOYED FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO GROOTFONTEIN AIRFIELD IN NORTHERN
NAMIBIA, BUT A DRAWDOWN OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF)
PERSONNEL HAS EVIDENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN THE NAMIBIA-ANGOLA BORDER
AREA.

2. ~~(S-WN-NFI)~~ THE TAU AT GROOTFONTEIN WAS NOTED ON 30 SEPTEMBER AND
4 OCTOBER, AND IT IS PROBABLY THE UNIT THAT DEPARTED PIETERSBURG

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS7824 ~~SECRET~~

AIRFIELD IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 6 AND 21 SEPTEMBER. THE SAME TAU
IS THOUGHT TO HAVE DEPLOYED TO ONDANGWA AIRFIELD, NAMIBIA, IN JULY
AND THEN TO HAVE RETURNED TO ITS HOME BASE. ITS PRESENCE IN
NORTHERN NAMIBIA INCREASES THE SADF'S CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND
DIRECT AIR OPERATIONS, BUT THE UNIT IS MOST LIKELY THERE FOR
TRAINING PURPOSES.

3. ~~(S-WN-NFI)~~ MEANWHILE, A MECHANIZED GROUP AND TWO ARTILLERY
BATTERIES HAVE BEEN PRESENT, NEAR ONDANGWA AIRFIELD SINCE LATE
SEPTEMBER.

4. ~~(S-WN-NFI)~~ COMMENT: THE SADF SEEMS TO BE MOVING FORCES SLOWLY
AWAY FROM THE BORDER. THE UNITS, HOWEVER, REMAIN CLOSE ENOUGH TO
THE RUACANA AREA TO REACT QUICKLY SHOULD CUBAN AND ANGOLAN UNITS
NEAR THE BORDER BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE AND INITIATE HOSTILE ACTION
AGAINST PRETORIA'S FORCES.

(b)(3):10 USC 424.

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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

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~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL NOFORN

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: DIADIN 280-6A
SUBJ. SOUTH AFRICA-NAMIBIA: MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS. (U)
DOI: 5 OCT 88 (AS OF 1940 EDT)
TEXT: 1. ~~SECRET~~ (b)(1), 1.4 (c) SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA TERRITORIAL FORCE (SWATF) FACILITIES IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA SEEMS TO CONFIRM A LOWER LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE BORDER AREA.
2. ~~SECRET~~ SADF AND SWATF UNITS APPEAR TO HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM THE BORDER WITH NAMIBIA ELEMENTS OF SEVEN MOTORIZED INFANTRY COMPANIES, FOUR EQUIPPED WITH CASSPIR LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES (LAVS)

PAGE 02 RUEHJCS6194 ~~SECRET~~
AND THREE WITH BUFFEL LAVS, WERE RECENTLY OBSERVED AT ONDANGWA MILITARY INSTALLATION SOUTH.
3. ~~SECRET~~ MEANWHILE, A MECHANIZED GROUP EQUIPPED WITH RATEL INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES AND TWO ARTILLERY BATTERIES--ONE 155-MM G-5-EQUIPPED AND ONE 140-MM G-2-EQUIPPED--WERE NOTED NEAR ONDANGWA AIRFIELD. THE ARTILLERY, WHICH APPEARS TO BE NET COVERED AND IS DEPLOYED NEAR THE MECHANIZED GROUP, MAY HAVE COME FROM THE RUACANA AREA, WHERE EIGHT ARTILLERY PIECES AND SIX PRIME MOVERS THAT WERE SEEN ON 28 SEPTEMBER HAD DEPARTED BY THE 30TH.
4. ~~SECRET~~ DESPITE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN SADF AND CUBAN, ANGOLAN FORCES ALONG THE BORDER WITH NAMIBIA, PRETORIA EVIDENTLY REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF ITS FORCES TO DETECT HOSTILE AIR THREATS. IN AN APPARENT MOVE TO IMPROVE THIS CAPABILITY, THE SADF HAS DEPLOYED A PLESSEY AR-3D EARLY WARNING RADAR TO OSHIKUKU MILITARY CAMP, ABOUT 30 KM SOUTH OF THE ANGOLA-NAMIBIA BORDER. THE AR-3D RADARS ARE USUALLY STORED AT PIETERSBURG AIRFIELD IN SOUTH AFRICA. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE BEEN SEEN AT RUNDU AIR BASE AND AT ONDANGWA, ABOUT 63 KM EAST-SOUTHEAST OF OSHIKUKU, WHERE A SECOND AR-3D REMAINS. THE AR-3D AT RUNDU WAS REPLACED BY AN AMES-14 EARLY WARNING RADAR, BUT THIS RADAR ONLY HAS A RANGE OF ABOUT 130 KM,

PAGE 03 RUEHJCS6194 ~~SECRET~~
COMPARED WITH ABOUT 330 KM FOR THE AR-3D
5. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: WHETHER PRETORIA HAS DRAWN DOWN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ITS FORCES NEAR THE ANGOLA-NAMIBIA BORDER IS UNDETERMINED. HOWEVER, SOME UNITS ARE APPARENTLY MOVING TO POSITIONS THAT WILL REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INADVERTENT MILITARY CLASH WITH CUBAN OR ANGOLAN FORCES IN THE RUACANA AREA. SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE A POSITIVE SIGN SINCE REGIONAL PEACE TALKS ARE SCHEDULED TO RESUME IN NEW YORK ON 6 OCTOBER.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),

~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL REPORT

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SERIAL: DIADIN 232-10A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: PEACE TALKS (U)

DOI: 19 AUG 88 (AS OF 1925 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE OF~~ (b)(1),1.4(c) CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE OF
SOUTH AFRICAN G-5 155-MM TOWED HOWITZERS IN ANGOLA WAS OBTAINED ON
18 AUGUST. PRETORIA EVIDENTLY WANTS THE US TO BE ABLE TO VERIFY

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS3002 ~~SECRET~~

SOUTH AFRICAN COMPLIANCE WITH RECENTLY NEGOTIATED PEACE TERMS.
2. ~~CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE OF~~ THE SIX G-5 HOWITZERS WERE OBSERVED ON IMAGERY OF
MAVINGA AIRFIELD IN SOUTHEAST ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICA DEPLOYED THE G-
5'S TO THE CUITO CUANAVALA AREA IN 1987, TO SUPPORT GUERRILLAS OF
THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA), BUT
PRETORIA HAS AGREED TO REMOVE ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ANGOLA BY 1
SEPTEMBER. THE HOWITZERS ARE PARKED IN TRAVEL MODE NEAR THE
AIRFIELD, WHERE OIL HAS BEEN SPRAYED AND SOME CLEARING ACTIVITY IS
EVIDENT. ALTHOUGH THE HOWITZERS COULD BE TOWED TO NAMIBIA, THE
SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE MAY BE REMOVING THE G-5'S USING TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT SUCH AS C-130S.

3. ~~CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE OF~~ ANOTHER POSSIBLE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE UNIT HAS
ARRIVED AT MPUPA SINCE THE 16TH. THIRTY-FIVE VEHICLES, CONSISTING
OF BUFFEL LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES AND 10-TON CARGO TRUCKS, WERE ON
THE SOUTHEAST SIDE OF THE CUITO RIVER. PROBABLY ON THEIR WAY TO
NAMIBIA. AN ADDITIONAL BUFFEL-EQUIPPED COMPANY ARRIVED AT RUNTU
MILITARY CAMP IN NAMIBIA ON THE 17TH. IT MAY HAVE COME FROM ANGOLA,
BUT CONFIRMATION CANNOT BE MADE WITH AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

4. ~~CONFIRMING THE PRESENCE OF~~ COMMENT: THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS--BETWEEN ANGOLA, CUBA,
SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE US--WILL CONVEY IN BRAZZAVILLE, CONGO, ON THE

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS3002 ~~SECRET~~

24TH. THE NEGOTIATORS HOPE TO AGREE ON A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP
WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA, THE LAST MAJOR HURDLE TO OVERCOME BEFORE
PRETORIA WILL CONSIDER IMPLEMENTING UN RESOLUTION 435 ON NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE. SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS OBSTRUCTING
A SETTLEMENT, BUT RECENT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT BOTHA INDICATE THAT
PRETORIA DOES NOT EXPECT A QUICK AGREEMENT.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1
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(b)(3):10 USC 424.

SERIAL. DIAIN 221-17A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA. AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENTS (U)

DOT: 3 AUG 82 (AC OF 2020 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~SECRET~~ (b)(1),1.4 (C) 3 AUGUST OF GROOTFONTEIN AIRFIELD
IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA REVEALED THAT 26 GROUND-ATTACK AND FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT HAD ARRIVED SINCE THE 7TH. PRETORIA COULD BE PREPARING FOR

PAGE 02 RUENJCC09631 ~~SECRET~~

COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, IMPROVING ITS AIR DEFENSES, ON
CONDUCTING TRAINING EXERCISES

2. ~~SECRET~~ THIRTEEN MIRAGE F1'S, FOUR MIRAGE 111'S, POSSIBLY
CHEETAH, AND NINE IMPALA GROUND-ATTACK AIRCRAFT JOINED FOUR
IMPALOS, WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED FROM ONDANGWA TO GROOTFONTEIN IN THE
7TH. NO CANBERRA LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE/BOMBER AIRCRAFT WERE OBSERVED
ON THE IMAGERY OF THE 4TH. FOUR CANBERRAS ARRIVED AT GROOTFONTEIN
LATE LAST MONTH, AND TWO DEPARTED BETWEEN 3 AND 5 AUGUST, BUT THE
LOCATION OF THE OTHER TWO IS UNDETERMINED. THE DISPOSITION OF THE
MIRAGES, HOWEVER, WOULD INDICATE THAT THE CANBERRAS HAVE DEPARTED
FROM GROOTFONTEIN.

3. ~~SECRET~~ IN PRETORIA, FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA ANNOUNCED ON THE 7TH
THAT SOUTH AFRICA, CUBA, AND ANGOLA ARE OBSERVING A CEASE-FIRE WHILE
REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE. BOTHA STATED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN
DEFENCE FORCE (SADF) WILL BEGIN WITHDRAWING FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY
ON THE 10TH AND WILL BE COMPLETELY OUT OF THAT COUNTRY BY 1
SEPTEMBER. ACCORDING TO THE JOINT STATEMENT APPROVED BY PRETORIA,
LUANDA, HAVANA, AND WASHINGTON, BY 1 SEPTEMBER THE PARTIES TO THE
TALKS HOPE TO AGREE ON A TIMETABLE FOR TOTAL CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL
FROM ANGOLA. THE NEXT MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE THE WEEK OF 27

PAGE 03 RUENJCC09631 ~~SECRET~~

AUGUST, BUT THE VENUE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

4. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT SUCCESS OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, THE AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT TO GROOTFONTEIN IS PROBABLY
NOT A SIGN OF SOUTH AFRICAN HOSTILITY. THE SADF IS MORE LIKELY
SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN ITS POSITION IF THE TALKS COLLAPSE. ALTHOUGH
THE DISCUSSIONS ARE APPARENTLY GOING WELL, MANY PROBLEMS STILL NEED
TO BE OVERCOME. MOREOVER, THE SADF IS UNLIKELY TO TRUST HAVANA'S
INTENTIONS. THE SADF MAY WISH TO DISPLAY ITS COMMITMENT TO REMAIN
IN NAMIBIA UNTIL AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED THAT PROTECTS PRETORIA'S
INTERESTS.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i),

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SERIAL: DIADIN 190-4A

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA-NAMIBIA-ANGOLA: BORDER SITUATION. (U)

DOI: 7 JUL 88 (AS OF 1932 EDT)

PAGE 02 RUEJCS1392 ~~SECRET~~

TEXT: 1. ~~SECRET~~ PRETORIA HAS MOVED ADDITIONAL ARMORED AND
ARTILLERY UNITS TO NORTHERN NAMIBIA.

2. ~~SECRET~~ (b)(1),1.4(c) FOUR PROBABLE G-6
SELF-PROPELLED 155-MM HOWITZERS HAD ARRIVED AT UTAPI, NAMIBIA, SINCE
THE 5TH IN ADDITION, FOUR POSSIBLE G-6S WERE OBSERVED AT
GROOTFONTEIN ON THE 6TH. THE HOWITZERS AND SOME ELEMENTS OF A RATEL
INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE-EQUIPPED BATTALION HAD ARRIVED AT
GROOTFONTEIN SINCE THE 3D.

3. ~~SECRET~~ ALMOST ALL SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) AND
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA TERRITORIAL FORCE (SWATF) UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN
FROM SOUTHWESTERN ANGOLA IN NAMIBIA, MECHANIZED INFANTRY ELEMENTS
HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO POSITIONS NEAR THE BORDER. THESE ELEMENTS
INCLUDE TANKS, ARTILLERY BATTERIES, AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS.

4. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: THE EQUIPMENT AT GROOTFONTEIN MAY BE PRE-
POSITIONED FOR A MAJOR RESERVE CALLUP REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED FOR THE
10TH. ACCORDING TO THE USDAO, PRETORIA, 10,000 MEN, POSSIBLY FROM
THE 81 ARMORED BRIGADE AND THE 44 PARACHUTE BRIGADE, WILL BE
MOBILIZED FOR 90 TO 120 DAYS. PRETORIA APPEARS READY TO DEFEND THE
HYDROELECTRIC FACILITIES AT RUACANA AND SWAWEI, BUT NO INDICATIONS
POINT TO IMMINENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CUBAN AND FAPLA

PAGE 03 RUEJCS1392 ~~SECRET~~
FORCES IN SOUTHERN CUNENE PROVINCE

(b)(3):10 USC 424

DECL. OADR

EOT

~~SECRET~~

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