

**01120**

**1994/00/00**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	)	
	)	
v.	)	Criminal No. 94- 64 -A
	)	
ALDRICH HAZEN AMES,	)	
a/k/a "Kolokol",	)	
a/k/a "K"	)	

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the event that this matter were to proceed to trial, the government would prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

I. INTRODUCTION

ALDRICH HAZEN AMES is 52 years old, born on May 26, 1941. In June 1962, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, and he has been a full-time CIA employee for more than 31 years. At the time of his arrest, AMES was a GS-14 Operations Officer in the Counternarcotics Center at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

During his employment with the CIA, AMES held a variety of positions including the following: from 1983 through 1985, AMES was the Chief, Soviet Operational Review Branch in the Operational Review and Production Group of the Soviet/East European (SE) Division of the Directorate of Operations (DO) of the CIA; from 1986 through 1989, AMES was assigned to the United States Embassy in Rome, Italy; from September 1989 through December 1989, AMES was Chief, Europe Branch, External Operations Group, SE Division; from December 1989 through August 1990, AMES was Chief, Czechoslovak Operations Branch, East European Operations Group, SE Division; from September 1990 through August 1991, AMES was assigned to the USSR Branch, Analytical Group,

Counterintelligence Center; from September 1991 through November 1991, AMES was Chief, K.G.B.<sup>1</sup> Working Group, Central Eurasia (CE) Division; from December 1991 through August 1993, AMES was a referant for CE Branch, Regional Programs Branch, International Counternarcotics Group, Counternarcotics Center (ICG/CNC) and from August 1993 to February 1994, AMES was Chief, Europe and CE Branch, ICG/CNC. Throughout AMES' employment with the CIA, he held a TOP SECRET security clearance and had regular access to information and documents classified SECRET and TOP SECRET pursuant to Executive Order 12356.

On August 10, 1985, AMES married Maria Del Rosario Casas Dupuy in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Prior to their arrests on February 21, 1994, ALDRICH and ROSARIO AMES resided at 2512 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, with their minor son.

## II. ESPIONAGE RELATED ACTIVITIES

In 1984, as part of his duties as a CIA Operations Officer, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES began meeting with officials of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("U.S.S.R." or "Soviet Union") in Washington, D.C. These meetings were authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and were designed to allow AMES to assess Soviet officials as possible sources for intelligence information and

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<sup>1</sup> In December 1991, the K.G.B. was succeeded by the SVRR. The term K.G.B. will be used throughout this document to describe both the K.G.B. and its successor.

recruitment. AMES was required to report each of his meetings with these Soviet officials to CIA officials.

In approximately April 1985, AMES agreed with Soviet officials to sell classified information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other branches of the United States government to the K.G.B., in return for large sums of money. In May and July 1985, AMES engaged in authorized meetings with Soviet officials, meetings he used as a cover to provide classified information to the K.G.B. in exchange for money. Although Ames stopped regularly reporting these meetings to the CIA in July 1985, over the next year AMES continued to meet with the K.G.B. in Washington, D.C. During many of these meetings, AMES provided classified information relating to the national defense of the United States to the K.G.B. in return for cash payments.<sup>2</sup>

In July 1986, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES was assigned to the United States Embassy in Rome, Italy, where he served until July 1989. During this time, AMES met with his K.G.B. handler, codenamed "SAM." AMES reported a few of these meetings to the CIA, claiming that he was obtaining information from "SAM," a Soviet Embassy official. During these meetings, AMES continued to disclose classified information relating to the national defense

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<sup>2</sup> For example, on February 14, 1986, AMES met with the K.G.B. in Washington, D.C. in an unreported meeting. On the day following that meeting AMES made separate cash deposits totalling approximately \$20,000 to three accounts he controlled in the Washington, D.C. area.

of the United States which AMES obtained through his work for the CIA in Rome.

In the Spring of 1989, as AMES was preparing to return to CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the K.G.B. provided him with two written documents. The first document was a financial accounting which indicated that as of May 1, 1989, AMES had already received approximately \$1.8 million and that some \$900,000 more had been appropriated for him. The second document was a nine-page letter which listed the types of classified information the K.G.B. wanted AMES to obtain for them upon his return to CIA Headquarters<sup>3</sup>, discussed arrangements for cash payments to AMES upon his return to the United States, warned AMES to avoid traps set by the CIA, and detailed a communication plan governing further communications between AMES and the K.G.B. Pursuant to this communication plan, AMES would pass documents to and receive money from the K.G.B. in the Washington, D.C. area at set times throughout the year using signal sites and dead drops. AMES would also meet personally with the K.G.B. at least once yearly in meetings outside the United States. The fixed site for these meetings would be in Bogota, Colombia, on the first Tuesday every December, although additional meetings could be held in other cities, including Vienna, Austria, on an as needed basis.

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<sup>3</sup> Top priority for the K.G.B. was "info about the Soviet agents of the [Central Intelligence] Agency and other [Security Services] of your country (first of all from K.G.B., GRU, MID, MVES, other state, party, scientific, and military organizations." Other priorities included information about double agent operations and leads on other possible recruits for the K.G.B. within the CIA.

In 1990, the K.G.B. provided AMES with a communications plan for 1991 through a dead drop in the Washington, D.C. area. The 1991 communication plan provided for impersonal contacts through signal sites and dead drops, and for personal meetings between AMES and the K.G.B. in Vienna, Austria, in April, and in Bogota, Colombia, in December. On December 17, 1990, AMES obtained valuable intelligence information regarding a K.G.B. officer cooperating with the CIA. AMES prepared a letter for the K.G.B. on his home computer advising the K.G.B. of this information and the cryptonym of the K.G.B. officer.

Pursuant to AMES' communication schedule with the K.G.B., on April 25, 1991, AMES travelled to Vienna, Austria, to meet with his K.G.B. handlers. Although AMES was present in Vienna and prepared to exchange classified information for money, the K.G.B. failed to meet with AMES at that time. Later that year, in December 1991, AMES met personally with the K.G.B. in Bogota, Colombia, where he exchanged classified information for a large amount of cash. At that meeting, the K.G.B. provided AMES a communications plan for 1992, pursuant to which they would communicate through signal sites and dead drops in March and August, and meet personally in Caracas, Venezuela, in October of 1992.

In March 1992, defendant ALDRICH HAZEN AMES communicated with the K.G.B. by placing a signal at signal site SMILE and leaving a message with a package of documents at dead drop BRIDGE. In this message to the K.G.B., AMES requested that they

promptly transmit more money to him through a dead drop. Again in June, 1992, AMES prepared a message on his computer to the K.G.B. in which he complained of their failure to provide him money in response to his previous message, indicated that he was forced to sell stock and a certificate of deposit in Zurich to meet pressing needs, and asked them to deliver to him up to \$100,000 in cash through dead drop PIPE. This message was transmitted to the K.G.B. by placing a signal at signal site SMILE and leaving the message at dead drop BRIDGE.

On August 18, 1992, AMES typed a letter to the K.G.B. on his home computer, at his home in the Eastern District of Virginia, discussing dead drops and his access to classified information, stating:

My lack of access frustrates me, since I would need to work harder to get what I can to you. It was easier to simply hand over cables! Documents are enclosed in this package which should be of interest.

In discussing his possible transfer to a different position within the CIA, AMES stated that, "If this job offer becomes serious during the next week or so, I will surely take it. It would be more interesting and productive for us." In this letter, AMES agreed to a personal meeting with the K.G.B. in Caracas, Venezuela and AMES also provided them with information on the level of CIA operations in Moscow, U.S. conclusions about Russian technical penetrations of our embassy in Moscow, and CIA recruitment plans for Russian officials. The letter also stated

that, "My wife has accomodated [sic] herself to understanding what I am doing in a very supportive way."

AMES attempted to transmit this letter and accompanying classified documents to the K.G.B. on August 19, 1992, by placing a pencil mark at signal site HILL in the morning and thereafter leaving the documents and letter at dead drop GROUND at 4 p.m. that day. Early the next day, however, AMES returned to the signal site and determined that his signal to the K.G.B. had not been erased, signifying that they had not picked up his package from the dead drop. AMES thereafter retrieved his package, and on September 1, 1992, typed a second letter to the K.G.B. on his home computer. This letter advised them that he had been forced to retrieve his earlier drop and would signal them again. This message, along with the earlier package, was retransmitted to the K.G.B. in early September through dead drop GROUND.

On October 2, 1992, pursuant to his communications plan, AMES travelled to Bogota, Colombia, and then on to Caracas, Venezuela, to meet with officers of the K.G.B. During this meeting, AMES provided the K.G.B. with classified information and received in return approximately \$150,000 in cash. The K.G.B. also provided AMES with a communications plan for 1993, pursuant to which AMES would transmit information and messages to them by dead drops in January, April, July, and October, receive money and messages from the K.G.B. in March, June, and September, and would meet with them personally in Bogota, Colombia, in November

or December 1993. Upon his return to the United States, AMES deposited more than \$85,000 of the K.G.B. money received in Caracas into accounts he controlled with his wife in banks in Northern Virginia, all deposits in amounts of less than \$10,000.

On March 9, 1993, AMES typed a message to the K.G.B. on his home computer discussing a variety of topics including the morale of the CIA division concerned with the former U.S.S.R. and Russia, personnel changes and budgetary matters in the CIA, and the fact that he was transmitting to them a "variety" of documents. AMES opened this message telling the K.G.B., "All is well with me -- I have no indications that anything is wrong or suspected." This message, along with a package of classified documents and information, was transmitted to the K.G.B. through a dead drop in March 1993.

On May 26, 1993, AMES transmitted an "urgent" message to the K.G.B., asking for money to be delivered to him immediately through a dead drop in the Washington, D.C. area. Four days later, the K.G.B. transmitted a package containing a substantial amount of cash to AMES through dead drop BRIDGE. In July 1993, the K.G.B. transmitted to AMES additional money through a dead drop, as well as a message discussing an upcoming personal meeting, and their plan to test a dead drop to determine whether it was secure. In this message, the K.G.B. advised AMES that they would provide additional money shortly, unless the money was postponed due to the "diplomatic pouch schedule."

In preparation for his trip to Bogota on September 8, 1993, AMES drafted a message to the K.G.B. stating that he would be available to meet with them on October 1, 1993. On September 9, 1993, AMES left this message for the K.G.B., and that evening drove with his wife into the District of Columbia to determine whether the K.G.B. had received the message. Later that month, the K.G.B. signalled AMES through signal site NORTH, advising him they would be unavailable to meet with him on October 1, 1993, and transmitted a message to him through dead drop PIPE stating they would meet with him between November 1 and November 8, 1993. On October 13, 1993, AMES signalled his willingness to attend this meeting in Bogota by placing a chalk mark at signal site SMILE.

Thereafter, on October 30, 1993, AMES travelled to Bogota, Colombia, where he met with officers of the K.G.B. In Bogota, AMES provided the K.G.B. with classified information in exchange for a substantial amount of cash. In Bogota, AMES also received a communications plan for 1994 which established new signal sites throughout the Washington metropolitan area and provided for dead drops in February, March, May, August, and September, face-to-face meetings in Caracas, Venezuela, or Quito, Ecuador, in November 1994, and a face-to-face meeting in 1995 in either Vienna, Austria, or Paris, France. During this meeting, the K.G.B. also advised AMES that they were holding \$1.9 million for him.

### III. COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

When ALDRICH HAZEN AMES began spying for the K.G.B. in the Spring of 1985, his position within the CIA guaranteed him access to most information relating to penetrations of the Soviet military and intelligence services and intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. AMES disclosed substantial amounts of this information, including the identities of Russian military and intelligence officers who were cooperating with the CIA and friendly foreign intelligence services, including but not limited to, sources codenamed GTACCORD, GTCOWL, GTFITNESS, GTBLIZZARD, GTGENTILE, GTMILLION, GTPROLOGUE, GTWEIGH, GTTICKLE, and others.<sup>4</sup> AMES' disclosures included a substantial amount of TOP SECRET information including signals intelligence. AMES' compromise of these penetrations of the Soviet military and intelligence services deprived the United States of extremely valuable intelligence material for years to come.

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<sup>4</sup> The individuals listed above whose activities on behalf of the CIA were compromised by AMES included a number of high level officials of the Soviet military and intelligence services. GTACCORD, for example, was an official of the GRU (the Soviet military intelligence service) who provided valuable classified information to the CIA. He was arrested by the K.G.B. and thereafter executed. GTCOWL was a K.G.B. officer stationed in Moscow who provided valuable intelligence including the revelation that the K.G.B. used an invisible substance referred to as "spydust" to surveil U.S. officials in Moscow. Eventually President Reagan confronted the Russians on this matter using information provided, in part, by GTCOWL. Following AMES' disclosure of his identity, GTCOWL was arrested and executed. GTTICKLE was the Chief K.G.B. officer in the United Kingdom whose cooperation with the British AMES revealed to the K.G.B. GTFITNESS was a K.G.B. officer and GTMILLION, a Lt. Colonel in the GRU, both of whom cooperated with the CIA. AMES disclosed both to the K.G.B.; both were subsequently arrested and executed. AMES maintains that he was never personally advised by the K.G.B. or anyone else as to the disposition and fate of the sources he compromised.

During his assignment to the U.S. Embassy in Rome from 1986 to 1989, AMES provided the K.G.B. with valuable intelligence information concerning CIA activities against the Soviet Union, including a large number of double agent operations launched against the Soviet Union. AMES compromised a substantial number of double agent operations organized by U.S. intelligence agencies, and also advised the K.G.B. of our knowledge of Soviet double agent operations targeted against the U.S. AMES informed the K.G.B. of important CIA strategies involving double agent operations and answered detailed inquiries regarding past penetrations of the Soviet intelligence services. During this period AMES also disclosed to the K.G.B. the identities of an Eastern European security officer who had begun cooperating with the CIA, code named GTMOTORBOAT, and a Soviet official cooperating with the CIA, codenamed GTPYRRHIC.

Following his return in 1989 to CIA Headquarters, AMES continued to provide the K.G.B. with valuable classified information related and unrelated to his specific CIA job assignments. AMES also provided the K.G.B. with a substantial amount of information regarding CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, including information on budgets, staffing, personnel, morale, strategy, and other issues affecting the Soviet Union and Russia.

#### IV. THE FINANCES AND FALSE TAX RETURNS

During this conspiracy, defendant ALDRICH HAZEN AMES received approximately \$2.5 million from the K.G.B. for his

espionage activities. AMES received this money primarily in face-to-face meetings overseas, but also through dead drops in the Washington, D.C. area. While AMES was stationed in Rome, he deposited the bulk of this cash into two accounts at Credit Suisse Bank in Zurich, Switzerland.<sup>5</sup> For example, on June 29, 1989, prior to departing Rome for the United States, AMES deposited a total of \$450,000 in cash into two accounts he controlled at Credit Suisse.

AMES and his wife, Rosario Casas Ames, used the money received from the K.G.B. to purchase a residence in Arlington, Virginia for \$540,000, property in Colombia, expensive automobiles, extensive wardrobes, and to pay approximately one-half million dollars in credit card bills. A portion of the money was used to support Rosario Casas Ames' family in South America as well. Most of the money deposited in cash into United States banks was deposited in sums less than \$10,000, to avoid having the financial institutions file a Currency Transaction Report.

Of the approximately \$2.5 million paid to AMES by the K.G.B., none of the money was declared on AMES' United States income tax returns. ALDRICH HAZEN AMES subscribed and filed false Joint Income Tax Returns for tax years 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992.

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
<sup>5</sup> One account was in ALDRICH HAZEN AMES' name with a power of attorney in favor of his wife; another account was in his mother-in-law's name, with ALDRICH HAZEN AMES listed as trustee.


In committing the foregoing acts, ALDRICH HAZEN AMES acted knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully, not by accident or mistake.

Respectfully submitted,

HELEN F. FAHEY  
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY


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
  
Mark J. Hulkower  
Assistant United States Attorney

  
Robert C. Chesnut  
Assistant United States Attorney

SEEN AND AGREED

  
ALDRICH HAZEN AMES

  
PLATO CACHERIS  
Counsel for Aldrich Hazen Ames

  
PRESTON BURTON  
Counsel for Aldrich Hazen Ames

~~THAS~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

J. Richelson

April 28, 1994

STATEMENT OF ALDRICH HAZEN AMES

This is my opportunity to say a number of things of very great importance to me. I think they may also be of interest to this Court and to the public.

I bitterly regret the catastrophe which my betrayal of trust has brought upon my wife and son and upon any who have loved or cared for me. No punishment by this Court can balance or ease the profound shame and guilt which I bear.

For those persons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere who may have suffered from my actions, I have the deepest sympathy -- even empathy. We made similar choices and suffer similar consequences.

I would like the Court and the public to understand, in the context of this plea agreement, how it is that my beloved wife has agreed to spend many years in jail. She has been the object of a purposeful, vindictive campaign of vilification by the government, designed to demoralize her, pressure me and to destroy her reputation here and in her native country. The government has used the threat of a life sentence for her to obtain our agreement to this plea. These are the facts:

I successfully concealed my relationship with the KGB and the SVRR from her for seven and a half of the nine years of my criminal activity. When she learned of it through my careless mistake, that knowledge was devastating to her and to our marriage. Frightened nearly to death by the possible consequences to me, to her and to our son, she pleaded with me to

break off the relationship with the Russians. I was able to manipulate her, even to blackmail her, into delaying that action. I argued falsely that we dared not anger the Russians. I argued that her retired mother, whose support we had become, would be injured, as well as our plans for an orderly retirement. I also implied that extravagance on her part had been and continued to be a contributing fact to my espionage, an implication which I believe came to undermine her own sense of self and integrity, making her even more vulnerable to my blackmail. Unable to convince me to take action, she shrank from turning me in, hoping against hope that we would survive detection until my retirement.

Rosario had no knowledge of what information I furnished the KGB and SVRR. She had little or no understanding of what any consequences of my actions could be. While she knew that I had received a great deal of money, she had no way to associate such sums with the gravity of the information I was passing. Rosario understood me to be cooperating with Russia, a country which she had heard extolled by Presidents Bush and Clinton as a friend and potential security partner. She had heard me speak since 1991 of the growing confidence of the CIA and the Russian security services in their evolving liaison relationship. Not indoctrinated by education or experience into the American view of the Cold War, she never saw Russia as a mortal threat to the United States.

Rosario recognized and feared my sloppiness, verging on recklessness. She ultimately found herself cautioning and

counselling me to be careful and precise in my contacts with the Russians. These statements have been used with brutal effect by the government to imply falsely that she supported my espionage activity. Unfortunately, I expect the government to continue its policy of leaking or of tolerating the leaking of selective information to justify its actions. We, of course, are bound to silence, under threat of a much, much heavier sentence for her.

On the day of our arrest, she waived her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present and cooperated with the FBI and the prosecutor. She made a number of statements incriminating herself. Then the government broke off the interview without explanation, dispatched her to jail and when she telephoned the FBI from jail to pursue her cooperation, the FBI refused to talk with her. It is clear that the government, having learned how little she knew of my activities, having elicited incriminating statements from her, and realizing the great value of the evidence being found at that moment in our home, simply decided that she was no longer important to the prosecution's case against me, and ignored her bona fide efforts to assist the government's investigation.

Until last week Rosario had refused to make any public statement in the belief that straightforward talks with the government, uncomplicated by interviews or public statements, would give the best results for both sides. But the government continued, in official and leaked statements, to depict Rosario as an active and scheming participant in my espionage. This

vindictive campaign produced several tragic ironies.

During our negotiations over this plea agreement, it was apparent that the government was uncomfortable with displaying leniency with Rosario in large part because of the public impression create by the government's own statements.

A government press release on the day of our arrest exposed Rosario's past assistance to the U.S. government, lending her apartment for meetings, when she was in Mexico and before our marriage. The CIA had originally contracted to keep that relationship secret and broke that promise to blacken her reputation in her country of birth, an act of gratuitous vindictiveness. The irony arose during our pre-detention hearing when the prosecutor unblushingly asserted that Rosario's assistance to the CIA, provided in good faith and at great risk, actually impeached her character and reliability.

My wife is being punished by the government far beyond her real culpability and even precedent. The government's intention to try us together on extremely serious and significant espionage charges left her with no choice but to accept this excessive and unfair sentence.

The main explanation for the government's treatment of my wife is the ferocity of the government's desire to punish me, both in revenge and to set an example. To punish her beyond her deserts punishes me. To punish my son indirectly also punishes me.

Having spoken of my regrets and anger, I want this Court also to understand how I view the criminal charges to which I have pled guilty. In breaking the law, I have betrayed a serious trust, much as does a corrupt government official receiving a bribe or a stock speculator acting on inside information. I do regret and feel shame for this betrayal of trust, done for the basest of motives.

But I am compelled by my desire to be honest with this Court and with the public to assure you that, as an intelligence officer with more than thirty years experience, I do not believe that our nation's interests have been noticeably damaged by my acts, or, for that matter, those of the Soviet Union or Russia noticeably aided.

In April 1985, seeking money to pay debts, I conceived a kind of confidence game to play on the KGB. In exchange for \$50,000 I provided the KGB with the identities of several Soviet citizens who appeared to be cooperating with the CIA inside the Soviet Union. I suspected that their cooperation was not genuine, that their true loyalty was to the KGB, and, therefore, I could cause them no harm. Then, a few months later, I did something which is still not entirely explicable even to me: without preconditions or any demand for payment, I volunteered to the KGB information identifying virtually all Soviet agents of the CIA and other American and foreign services known to me. To my enduring surprise, the KGB replied that it had set aside for me two million dollars in gratitude for the information. I thir

that two factors operated in complex ways to help shape my sudden decision.

First, I had come to dissent from the decades-long shift to the extreme right in our political spectrum and from our national security and foreign policies.

Second, I had come to believe that the espionage business, as carried out by the CIA and a few other American agencies, was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations of American policymakers and the public about both the necessity and the value of their work.

There is and has been no rational need for thousands of case officers and tens of thousands of agents working around the world, primarily in and against friendly countries.

The information our vast espionage network acquires at considerable human and ethical costs is generally insignificant or irrelevant to our policymakers' needs.

Our espionage establishment differs hardly at all from many other federal bureaucracies, having transformed itself into a self-serving interest group, immeasurably aided by secrecy.

Now that the Cold War is over and the Communist tyrannies largely done for, our country still awaits a real national debate on the means and ends--and costs--of our national security policies. Just as we need to ask why we need even twelve carrier battle groups, new generations of fighters and bombers and thousands of ICBMs and SCBMs, we need to question, as only a few

have done, our real needs for intelligence collection, including the highly suspect tool of espionage. To the extent that public discussions of my case can move from government-inspired hypocrisy and hysteria, to help even indirectly to fuel such a debate, I welcome and support it.

Our teachers in the arts of espionage were Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Both used their traditions of secrecy and ruthless statecraft to sponsor huge and ultimately useless espionage campaigns directed against both friends and foes. The CIA learned well from its teachers and, despite its difficulty in maintaining the requisite secrecy, brought our own American tendency toward bureaucratic gigantism and missionary zeal to the task. But the longer we delay in recognizing the truth -- that espionage is a desperate and limited expedient, not a routine bureaucratic practice -- the more dangerous we will be to ourselves and our friends. Our enemies, as in the past, need not worry.

In interesting contrast to an almost universal silence over the deficiencies of our espionage programs, the putative ups and downs of the "spy wars," or counterintelligence activities, are eagerly discussed by government officials, the press and the public. This is especially indicative because our counterintelligence efforts have had dramatic success since the mid-1950's. Despite decades of scare-mongering by bureaucrats who know better, American counterintelligence, the CIA, the FBI and the military services, have effectively penetrated and

manipulated the Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence services on a massive scale. Though it had been considered important to conceal the scale of our successes from the other side, our counter-intelligence chieftains have routinely gone overboard, violating the truth in preferring to whip up hysteria on this topic. Frankly, these spy wars are a sideshow which have had no real impact on our significant security interests over the years. The government's case against me as represented in the Statement of Facts reflects this basic distinction between intelligence and counterintelligence. The government concentrates upon the counterintelligence compromises, and ignores the huge quantity of information on United States foreign, defense and security policies which I provided the USSR and Russia.

I earnestly hope that an enlightened view of our nation's true and enduring security interests can emerge from a real debate on the issues. Congress and the public have sufficient information to begin this discussion. Many current and past government officials have a realistic view of them. Intelligence collection, including espionage, is too important and costly an undertaking to be left to its traditional, self-serving managers.

Finally, I wish to thank the Court for providing me with attorneys who have helped me and my wife through this ordeal. They have spared no efforts on our behalf.