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NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 70 - HAITI

Approved by the Interdepartmental Group
for Inter-American Affairs
January 8, 1970

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1.

Subject: NSSM 70 - HAITI

Precis:

NSSM 70 directed the preparation of a general study of U.S. policy toward Haiti focusing on whether there is anything that can be done now at an acceptable political cost a) to prepare for or influence the transition to a post-Duvalier Haiti and b) to help Haiti toward modernity and satisfy humanitarian needs. Our experience to date in Haiti and the nature of our interests and objectives there indicate that there is little we can and should do to influence the transition, that a meaningful assistance program to help Haiti toward modernity would not prosper until the demise of Duvalier, and that our efforts to satisfy humanitarian needs should continue to be directed primarily through multilateral and private channels.

Duvalier remains an absolute despot; as long as he lives in control of his mental faculties he will not accept rivals nor groom a successor. In general, retention of the status quo is about the best the U.S. should now seek, for our vital national interests in Haiti are not greatly threatened now nor are they likely to be in the foreseeable future.

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I. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION AND MOST LIKELY
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

A. Haitian Conditions.

"The trouble with Haiti..."

"The trouble with Haiti is that it cannot reasonably be considered a member of the hemispheric community, and yet there it is, right in the middle of the Caribbean. The trouble with Haiti is that its leadership has been a succession of scoundrels, each of whom has driven the country further into darkness and desolation. The trouble with Haiti is that it is barely a country, yet its resident and expatriate would-be elites demand that it be treated like one. The trouble with Haiti is that it won't respond to anybody's therapy. Even if Haiti's trouble should be compounded by violence and an uncertain succession after Duvalier passes from the scene, its hemispheric neighbors would be little tempted to press for intervention. And no matter who succeeds Duvalier, Haiti's troubles are not likely to be relieved." (Introductory statement to recent study by Office of National Estimates)

Haitian political life has been characterized by dictatorships, corruption, violence, and intimidation. Since Haitian independence in 1804, only five chief executives have stepped down peacefully from office after completing their terms--three of these during the occupation by U.S. forces (1915-1934). While political leaders have dedicated themselves to getting and keeping power, the pitifully poor masses, illiterate, superstitious, and beset by malnutrition and disease, then as now, have remained apathetic.

The standard of living of the approximately 4.5 million Haitians, the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, has declined under Duvalier. Estimated per capita gross national product has dwindled from about \$90 in 1955 to between \$60 and

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\$70, less than 20% of the Latin American average. Exports of the principal agricultural product (coffee) are declining, the budget remains in chronic deficit and the government is unable to pay its official debts. Under his leadership, conditions have worsened despite external aid from private and public sources at a current rate of some \$12 million annually. Duvalier has sought to capitalize politically on these conditions by blaming them on foreign (i.e. U.S.) indifference, lack of understanding, and racist discrimination against a black nation.

B. The Current Situation.

Duvalier. For twelve years Francois Duvalier has exercised life and death control over Haiti. After winning the 1957 election, which was rigged by the army but which he would probably have won anyway, "Papa Doc" swiftly moved into the historical mold of Haitian one-man governments and has since exceeded most in ruthlessness. By naked force, by appeals to superstition, through his keen perception of Haitian psychology and clever manipulation of all elements in the society, he has crushed the opposition, including the communists, kept potential rivals under control, cowed the Catholic Church, purged and divided the Army, and crippled Haitian institutions. Duvalier's excesses have included the wanton killing of entire families (e.g. the Francois Benoit family in Port-au-Prince, the Sansaricques, Villedrouins, and others in Jeremie) and wholesale elimination of villages (e.g. in Saltrou area). Many of his acts have seemed deliberately calculated affronts to Western human values: e.g. the stealing of Jumelle's corpse at the funeral; the beating of worshipers inside the Port-au-Prince cathedral; the forced attendance of school children at a public execution in Port-au-Prince; the public display of a rotting corpse on Port-au-Prince's main thoroughfare; the delivery of the severed heads of his enemies to Duvalier; the forcing of his son-in-law Max Dominique to take part in the execution of his friends. Imbued with a sense of destiny, tough-minded, and calculating to the point of fanaticism in the pursuit of power, Duvalier has gathered into his own hands the strings of control over all aspects of life in Haiti. Yet he has

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not used this power to ameliorate economic and social conditions; despite his rhetoric, Duvalier in practice has remained indifferent to the gradual decline in the economy. After 12 years of Duvalierist rule, Haiti still allocates a greater percentage of its budget (24%) to the armed forces than any other Latin American country (except Cuba).

His Popularity. Duvalier's "popularity" with the Haitian people is constantly asserted by his spokesmen but, like Castro, Duvalier has not permitted this to be tested through freedom of speech, association, or press, or held elections worthy of the name since coming to power. (The 2,800,000 votes officially recorded in favor of Duvalier's becoming President for life in 1964 amounted to 70% of all men, women and children in Haiti!) Since 1963, only one political party (Duvalier's) has been officially recognized -- and it exists only in name. The existence of a relatively large (and costly) security apparatus belies protestations of popular support (failure of the peasantry to cooperate with the government against the invaders in 1964 led to the wholesale destruction of peasant villages near Saltrou). Duvalier rarely leaves the palace and, except for one trip to Cap Haitien in 1958 and one to Jacmel in 1959, is believed not to have visited his alleged followers in provincial cities or the countryside in the past 12 years. As he has from the beginning, Duvalier relies on his own repressive security apparatus to ensure his rule, not on popular support for his policies.

The Lot of the People. The lot of the people--the 90% who are illiterate and who subsist as peasant farmers or city slum dwellers--has not changed basically in the past 12 years. Roads have deteriorated, electric generating capacity has become less adequate to meet rising demands leading to longer "blackouts"; telephone service continues non-existent--but to those living largely outside the money economy these shortcomings in the infrastructure have little direct impact. High death rates continue to offset high birthrates, and keep the annual increase of population at what is believed to be a relatively low rate. Nevertheless, there is enormous population pressure on limited arable land, and erosion continues unchecked. The rich soils of the Artibonite valley are threatened by salinization due to lack of upkeep on the

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irrigation works undertaken during the 1950s. Serious malnutrition and undernourishment are endemic problems, although relieved by Public Law 480 food programs. These food relief programs are jeopardized however by the Duvalier regime's unwillingness to bear inland transportation costs. Some new schools have been built, but teachers remain unpaid for months on end (hundreds have gone to teach in the Congo), and the illiteracy rate is believed to be gradually increasing as total population increases. An IDB loan to improve higher education facilities remains largely unused due to Haitian government slowness or disinterest in meeting the conditions precedent. A regressive tax system has been made more regressive (increased export taxes on coffee have been passed on to the peasant who in turn has picked less and less coffee--and Haiti has failed to meet its coffee export quota for the past three years). Charitable groups are forbidden to distribute used clothing in Haiti--and the "concession" to import and sell such articles has been given to regime insiders. Taxes on wheat flour have been raised so high that consumption has declined sharply in the past 12 years. The rice-marketing system developed jointly by US AID and the Haitian Artibonite Valley Authority to benefit both producers and consumers has been abandoned, with the peasant grower again exposed to the traditional "speculateur" system of gouging. Large-scale regional development programs in the Artibonite Valley and in northern Haiti, which were undertaken with substantial US financial and technical assistance in the early years of Duvalier's tenure, ground to a halt in the early 1960s due to the Haitian Government's insistence on unilateral administrative control. Thus, the economic and human benefits of these projects were sacrificed to Duvalier's political imperatives.

His Security Apparatus. Following the chaotic, violent conditions prevailing for nearly a year prior to his election in 1957, Duvalier moved with deliberate speed to restore stability and to consolidate his personal power. Shortly after taking office, Papa Doc neutralized the army by purging its leaders, and by creating the notorious group of political strongarm men known as the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTMs) to carry out "special assignments" on his behalf. Subsequently he created a Civil Militia as a counterweight to the Army,

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and a small secret police unit (Service Duvalier) as special watchdog. By thus assuring his personal power, Duvalier has provided the country with stability--at great economic, political and social cost.

His "President for Life" Constitution. In 1964, having effectively disposed of all challenges to his power--including strong external pressures -- Duvalier had himself proclaimed "President for life". No legal successor to Duvalier was designated and the Constitution contains no provision governing succession. The President has continued to eliminate from his entourage anyone showing signs of personal strength, and political parties -- a normal source of potential leaders in most countries -- do not exist. Duvalier's death or incapacitation will introduce a period of political and constitutional confusion from which some member or group within his present entourage is most likely to emerge as the new power. However, the identities of the new leaders and the shape of the new power structure cannot be predicted with certainty.

Potential Threats to his Rule:

Health. As there is little possibility that Duvalier will voluntarily step down, and most likely will die in office, his health is a crucial factor in any calculation. A diabetic, he suffered a serious heart attack in 1959. Ten years later in May, 1969, Duvalier suffered another heart attack, apparently less serious. However, now in his early 60's (some indications put his age in the late 60's), Duvalier reportedly has other medical problems and his health may be gradually weakening. For six weeks following his latest heart attack, he was confined to the palace and perhaps to his bed. He received no visitors other than his immediate family and closest advisors. For some time it was uncertain whether Duvalier was actually making decisions or others with a monopoly of access to his chamber were ruling in his name. This temporary eclipse in his presence--if not his power--foreshadowed what might occur on his death or total disablement.

Military Plotting. Speculation or reports that Duvalier was ill or dying have appeared before, often accompanied by

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reports of maneuvering by Haitian military officers and/or civilians eager for power and/or jockeying for position within the Presidential family itself. This occurred most recently during the President's illness in May and June 1969; while the degree of his incapacitation could not be determined because of his seclusion, plans reportedly were made by some officers at that time for a military junta to exercise authority immediately upon Duvalier's death. How long such a junta would have expected to hold power, and other details of their plans--if plans did exist--were closely guarded. It is doubtful whether the Army would be able to act as a unit at such a time and the most recent "plans" did not assume this would be the case.

Family Rivalries. Rivalries and personalities within the President's family have also been factors in speculation over who will wield power after his death. Some people believe Duvalier would like to bequeath power to someone in his family. The President's oldest and reportedly favorite daughter, Marie Denise, returned to Haiti in December 1968, after a protracted absence and assumed the position of private secretary to her father. She displaced Mrs. Yvon St. Victor, one of Duvalier's erstwhile intimates who is also the sister of Luc Foucard, the President's ex-son-in-law. Foucard, recently divorced from Nicole Duvalier, was once in ascendancy but his and his ex-wife's influence has apparently waned. Marie Denise was joined in Port-au-Prince by her husband, Max Dominique, who had been sentenced to death for treason by a Military Tribunal in 1967 and had been living in "exile" in Spain. His exoneration and return to favor was engineered by his wife. As a former Presidential Guard Officer, tall, handsome, black Dominique is a possible successor to political power. The Dominiques were unmistakably active in the infighting that accompanied the President's incapacitation in June 1969. It is questionable, however, whether in a bid for power the Dominiques could count on support from various regime insiders such as secret police leaders and key military personnel. Some top military officials have stated that Dominique would not be acceptable to them as President. Marie Denise has retained her position as private secretary to the President. However, her husband is currently Ambassador to France and the couple is often out of Haiti. This has somewhat dampened speculation as to their power potential.

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Other Internal Challengers. The Civil Militia is an additional element to be considered in a post-Duvalier period. The VSN, as the militia is popularly known, lacks a central command structure. It is certainly less cohesive than the military and poorly armed and led. Its power derives almost entirely from Duvalier's presence although some local VSN commanders have achieved independent status in their local areas and might continue to play an important role by joining one faction or another after Duvalier's death. The Ton Ton Macoutes, often thought of as a group, are really a collection of individuals drawn from the security and civilian sectors who enjoy special status and retain certain prerogatives such as the right to carry weapons and terrorize people at will. While many high level Ton Ton Macoutes will undoubtedly participate in the power struggle after Duvalier's demise, they will do so as individuals and not as members of a supposed Ton-Ton Macoute organization. None of these groups or individuals, however, including the military, is likely to act short of Duvalier's death or unmistakable evidence that he has completely lost control.

Exiles. The various Haitian exile groups -- split among themselves by personal rivalries -- do not seem to be sufficiently strong to threaten the regime. Located for the most part in New York, they are disorganized and lack resources. Their strength can be numbered by dozens rather than hundreds. The latest exile attempt against Duvalier on 4 June 1969, an inept bombing attack on the National Palace by ten men led by ex-Haitian Army Colonel Rene Leon, did minimal damage. Politically, the exiles range from the populist Daniel Fignole to the left of center through the moderate Haitian Coalition to traditional conservatives on the right. Some will return in the transition period after Duvalier; most are likely to remain abroad.

Communists. In late 1968 the old-guard, Moscow-oriented Party of Popular Accord and the Cuban-backed United Haitian Democratic Party merged to form the United Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH). PUCH is committed to the violent overthrow of President Duvalier and has the endorsement of both the Soviet Union and Cuba. The merger improved Communist organization and cooperation within the country. Increased

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Communist activity included minor terrorist attacks against U.S. installations, propaganda efforts, and the temporary "occupation" of one or two small villages. PUCH reportedly received financial aid -- about \$70,000 -- from Cuba through the Polish commercial mission in Port-au-Prince. Duvalier's response to the increased Communist activity was quick and thorough. In several successful raids the Haitian Army severely damaged the clandestine apparatus of the PUCH and the party's capability was substantially reduced. Duvalier's crackdown also deprived the party of much of its leadership, and disrupted its organization. Assuming Duvalier's days are numbered it is unlikely that the Communists can regain sufficient strength to attempt a takeover when he dies. A major effort by Castro to support such a takeover is also unlikely given the disarray of the local Communist movement.

A seeming ambivalence in Duvalier's attitude toward Communists has been evident through the years. He has been quick to suppress activities which seemed to pose a direct threat to his control, as most recently demonstrated in early 1969. He has posed publicly and consistently as a staunch foe of Communism elsewhere in the Caribbean and throughout the world. Duvalier likes to recall his early warnings against Castro, but when Haiti had the deciding vote at the Punta del Este Conference in 1961 on imposition of sanctions against Castro's Cuba, Haiti used its vote to extract concessions from the United States. Duvalier continues to tolerate the Polish Commercial Mission in Port-au-Prince despite the low level of trade between the two countries and the obvious illegitimate uses to which that Mission could be put by the international Communist movement. The Duvalier regime will arrest anyone in possession of a Communist fly sheet but it has tolerated the open sale of Communist books and magazines in Port-au-Prince bookstores. Despite the recent crackdown on Communist activities, a number of intellectuals often reputed to be Communist-oriented have been closely associated with Duvalier throughout his tenure (e.g. Herve Boyer, Paul and Jules Blanchet). The avowed Marxist journalist Roger Gaillard, who was permitted to return to Haiti from Rumania following Duvalier's accession to power, continues to work unhindered as one of the principal writers and editors of the daily Le Matin. In sum, Duvalier's public position has

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been consistently hard-line anti-Communist; but his practice has been highly pragmatic.

Financial Squeeze. Haiti continues to face severe fiscal problems, with chronic budgetary deficits, increasing arrearages on domestic and foreign debts, and little prospect for significant economic improvement permitting a higher tax "take". Current annual external aid of some \$12 million from private and public sources (mostly U.S.) mitigates--but has not reversed--these adverse economic and financial trends. Financial crises have beset Duvalier repeatedly during the past 12 years, but they have not brought him down or significantly weakened his power structure. Despite continuing pressure from the IMF and CIAP to do so, Duvalier has refused to make a public accounting of the financial operations of the State Monopoly (Regie du Tabac), estimated at \$10-12 million per year, which are used to support his irregular security apparatus (TTMs and Militia) and for other special political purposes. He has always found sufficient funds to provide a position of relative privilege for the members of his security apparatus and regime insiders. Aside from the secret Regie du Tabac funds, the published budget shows approximately 24% of the total going to the "Armed Forces". He has subordinated the economic well-being of the black masses to his over-riding political interest in preventing the emergence of any person or group which might independently exercise power or influence. The result has been (1) the vitiation of both governmental and private organizations of all types, and (2) economic stagnation--but his personal power has remained undiminished.

C. After Duvalier.

When change does come, available evidence suggests that authority will be exercised initially by individual leaders of the security forces -- perhaps acting singly but more likely in combination among themselves -- and civilian figures. The security forces -- the army, civil militia, and secret police -- are in the strongest position to act because they are armed, and because their men in the palace will be among the first to know if something happens to Duvalier. Of the

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three services, the regular army personnel are probably in the best position to dominate the government after Duvalier's demise because of their edge over the others in weaponry, organizational discipline, and leadership. Although the army has been seriously weakened by Duvalier, its tactical units in Port-au-Prince still retain some esprit de corps, tough leaders, and the best hardware. Whether these army units would act in concert is a critical but unanswerable question, and it is conceivable that the military would seek someone outside their ranks to act as President in the interest of avoiding a violent struggle between units.

Violence on a widespread scale is always possible but is more likely to consist mainly of scattered acts of personal vengeance. The ability of the military to act rapidly and in concert would be a major factor. In any event, a military-backed junta would be unstable from the outset. A struggle for power would almost certainly ensue at some point, possibly leading to open violence between contending factions. Although the probable makeup of a successor regime cannot now be determined with any degree of certainty, it appears unlikely that it will be significantly different from the present regime.

Economic problems in Haiti are too basic and severe for any quick solution. Moreover, the absence of organizations in Haiti capable of managing programs for improvement will make significant progress slow, laborious and frustrating at best -- a matter of decades rather than years. The lack of more than rudimentary government institutions (e.g. agricultural experimentation and extension service, forestry and soil conservation service, road maintenance, irrigation system maintenance and administration, public health, food storage and marketing) is complemented on the non-government side by the lack of labor organizations, student associations, teacher, lawyer and other professional associations, a responsible press, and political parties. In short, the society is as lacking in effective structures as the government itself. In these circumstances, the capacity of Haiti to absorb outside technical and financial assistance is severely limited.

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II. POLICY CONCEPTS HITHERTO PURSUED

A. Before 1963.

The United States has played a crucial role in twentieth century Haiti. Our early involvement, inspired by fears of increasing European influence in Haiti, later took the form of attempts to help Haiti modernize and develop. This has in turn implied certain responsibilities both in our eyes and those of the Haitians.

Tangible results were obtained during the Marine occupation, 1915-1934, when U.S. assistance (services and loans, rather than grants) was solidly backed by U.S. political and military authority. We were able to pacify the country, establish efficient public finances and create essential services in communications, agriculture, transport, rural education, public health, and public works. However, only a few traces of these achievements are visible today.

Since World War II, our involvement has been limited mainly to economic and military assistance programs. Before 1957, these consisted principally of \$30 million in long term Export-Import Bank loans (including \$27 million for the Peligre Dam), a small technical assistance program, military training, and hurricane relief.

Initially, we actively supported and buttressed the Duvalier government, elected in 1957 after over a year of disorder and instability. Duvalier seemed to represent a hope for political stability, constitutionalism, and economic progress as well as a champion for the black majority long subordinated to the dominant mulatto elite. Both U.S. military assistance and economic assistance to Haiti were enlarged considerably. In U.S. fiscal years 1958-62, the Duvalier Government received U.S. grants and loans totaling \$43.2 million, as against \$40.4 million in the preceding ten years. However, this considerable U.S. effort did not produce results significantly greater than had been achieved before, due to Duvalier's lack of real interest in economic development and inherently intractable conditions for development in Haiti. His unwillingness to accept assistance unless it could be

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used to support his political and security apparatus became clear in 1960 when Duvalier systematically undermined major program operations.

In May 1961 Duvalier rigged his own unscheduled and unconstitutional re-election. The following year, we terminated grant military assistance and phased down our aid program. AID was phased down because Duvalier had prevented its use for development, not, as is popularly believed, as a political protest against his repressive policies and unconstitutional re-election. Duvalier's refusal to accept a FY 1963 aid program, including adequate controls over its use, precipitated the final withdrawal of our AID mission in August 1963. Earlier that year, we began to encourage exile and other oppositionist groups in their activities. Duvalier asked our military missions to leave and in late May forebade the return of our Ambassador (then in Washington on consultation).

B. 1963-1968.

In May, 1963, we approached a major confrontation with Duvalier during which we evacuated U.S. official dependents, sent stand-by forces to the area, and tried in various ways to induce Duvalier to step down. Official contacts between our Embassy and the Haitian Government were suspended and, in retaliation for Haiti's ban against our Ambassador's return, we requested that the Haitian Ambassador in Washington be withdrawn. After a six months delay, we named a new Ambassador and embarked on a "cool, correct" policy designed neither to overthrow Duvalier nor to prolong his rule. Since then, we have maintained a small diplomatic mission in Port-au-Prince to retain some degree of contact with the regime and with other Haitians, report on events and be prepared to play a role after Duvalier's demise. We have continued to be liberal in admitting non-Communist anti-Duvalier exiles to the U.S. and in permitting them to organize and carry out activities within the law, but we have also complied with our assurances to the Haitian Government that we would enforce our laws against the use of our territory for military actions against other countries.

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Recognizing the limitations inherent in our cool, correct bilateral relationship with Duvalier, and also looking ahead to the longer-term economic and political problems (including the problem of public order) which will remain after Duvalier, we have sought to stimulate greater Latin American interest and participation in "the problem of Haiti", e.g. by establishing or enlarging their diplomatic missions in Port-au-Prince, by greater efforts through the OAS. Starting in late 1968, an OAS technical mission was established in Haiti, funded by the U.S., manned by Latin Americans.

After our AID Mission withdrew in 1963, we continued to support a few humanitarian assistance projects (principally malaria eradication and PL 480 food distribution) of only marginal political value to Duvalier. Most of the current US assistance is channeled to the Haitian people through multilateral or private charitable institutions. We have avoided bilateral assistance or other support to the Haitian Government, and have concentrated on humanitarian relief of hunger and disease, local community development, and financing some multilateral technical assistance to the Haitian Government. Our \$3-4 million in annual grant assistance is divided as follows:

- (1) \$1-2 million in PL-480 food donations through CARE and church groups;
- (2) About \$1.5 million for malaria eradication (administered by the U.S. Public Health Service, the Pan American Health Organization, UNICEF and the Haitian Government);
- (3) About \$150,000 annually to support OAS technical mission (from the \$475,000 U.S. grant to the OAS in FY 1968 for this purpose);
- (4) About \$120,000 granted to CARE for community development and family planning in northwest Haiti; and
- (5) A \$40,000 special activities project to support local self-help activities.

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For capital assistance, we have suggested that the Haitians turn to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). We have informed the IDB that we would not veto projects of social benefit. However, we have carefully avoided any implication that we would wish IDB to lower its standards.

Disbursements continue from the \$7.2 million loaned by the IDB to Haiti for agricultural and industrial credit (1961), the Port-au-Prince water system (1964), and education (1967). However, except for the water system loans, disbursements have been slowed by the difficulty of obtaining Haitian compliance with terms of the loan agreements, and sheer institutional inadequacies. Haiti is in arrears on its \$30 million debt to the Export-Import Bank and owes nearly \$800,000 to the U.S. Post Office. These factors illustrate the basic organizational incapacities which hinder Haiti from qualifying for or utilizing its share of credit from the IDB and other international financial organizations.

C. Recent Developments.

Hopeful that the Nixon Administration will restore U.S. aid to the Eisenhower Administration level, and encouraged by the Rockefeller visit, the Duvalier regime for tactical reasons has become quite cordial in its relations with the United States during the past 10-12 months. America and things American are lauded in the press; hitherto inaccessible regime figures are now accessible and Haitians generally are more willing to talk to officers of our Embassy. Duvalier views the anti-Communist drive, obviously important in terms of eliminating a threat to his control, as also serving to strengthen his campaign for renewed U.S. capital assistance (which the regime has led the Haitian people to expect). Our Embassy has taken advantage of current good feeling to expand its contacts and improve working relations with the regime, but otherwise our policy remains substantially unchanged. Without some favorable response by us, the current calculated good feeling toward the U.S. is unlikely to last. Meanwhile, the current period of cordiality has not resulted in a solution of outstanding

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substantive problems, e.g. AID investment guaranty claim against Haiti for expropriation of an American investor in 1964; arrearages to Export-Import Bank; payments on steadily rising debt to U.S. Post Office.

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III. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES--PREPARATIONS FOR POST-DUVALIER HAITI--DEGREE TO WHICH WE SHOULD OR NEED BE INVOLVED

A. Interests.

U.S. interest in Haiti is based on:

- (1) its location in the Caribbean, near Florida and Cuba, and bordering Dominican Republic;
- (2) the \$50-60 million in U.S. private investment, the substantial American missionary and charitable activities, and the fact that about 1,000 of our citizens are residents there;
- (3) Haiti's role as a member of the United Nations and the Inter-American system;
- (4) a humanitarian concern about the poverty, illiteracy and ill-health of its people.

B. Objectives.

Our objectives are to:

- (1) Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control threatening the security of the U.S. (e.g., Cuban missile crisis).
- (2) Prevent, to the extent politically feasible, Haiti from becoming a base or haven for subversion, anti-U.S. attitudes, extremism, and racism in the Caribbean.
- (3) Protect U.S. lives.
- (4) Alleviate conditions of misery and deprivation, out of humanitarian concern for the Haitian people.
- (5) Avoid supporting the Duvalier dictatorship.
- (6) Stimulate Inter-American and other multilateral

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interest and involvement in social, economic and other problems of Haiti (including emergency problems of public order and political transition that may arise when Duvalier leaves the scene).

(7) Protect, to the extent feasible, property and other interests of U.S. citizens.

(8) Encourage the establishment of more stable and progressive institutions in the post-Duvalier period.

C. Involvement.

1. Background.

Historically, we have been deeply involved in Haiti: we intervened militarily in 1915, and for many years thereafter controlled public administration and finances, public works and public health, security, and all key aspects of the nation. Even after the withdrawal of the Marines in 1934, we continued to wield a large measure of control over fiscal and monetary operations. In the post World War II period, we committed relatively large amounts of money for economic and social development in Haiti. In addition to Export-Import Bank assistance, P.L. 480 food, and military assistance, A.I.D. (and predecessor agencies) provided \$64 million from 1952 through 1968, with the bulk of this in the early Duvalier period. (TAB 1.)

One indicator of the magnitude of our involvement in Haiti is that the ratio of U.S. Government input to the size of the Haitian national budget was the highest in the hemisphere in the early Duvalier years. The failure of these major U.S. efforts over sustained periods of time to produce lasting, positive results and the shocking continuation of human misery in Haiti have led us to a deep sense of frustration. On the one hand, our failures have tended to produce a psychological compulsion to try again and try harder to solve "the problem of Haiti". On the other, they have brought a realization that the causes of these failures are deeply rooted in Haitian society and cultural attitudes, not susceptible of easy, rapid change from outside.

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2. Do We Need to Get More Involved to Defend Our Interests and Achieve Objectives.

Our experience, and our failures, have also led us to re-examine the question of how deeply our interests are affected by what happens in Haiti, and therefore how deeply we should get involved in helping Haiti solve its problems. The answer to that question is, basically: Our vital national interests in Haiti are not greatly threatened now or in the foreseeable future, and there is no need for more than our present limited involvement to protect those interests.

Most U.S. interests in Haiti are long-term and continuing; they will remain essentially unaltered whether the Duvalier regime stays or disappears. However, our objectives and how we pursue them are more closely linked to the character and duration of the Duvalier regime, which has largely foreclosed progress toward many of them -- particularly in the economic and political fields. Upon Duvalier's disappearance, a potential new USG-GOH relationship will develop with its own set of opportunities and constraints.

Our overriding objective, ensuring that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control, threatening U.S. security, is not in serious jeopardy. Duvalier has reduced the Communist threat to a low level. The unlikely event of an overt attack from Castro Cuba can be countered by other means, and it would not be realistic to expect to strengthen Haiti sufficiently to withstand a serious attack by Castro.

Only one of our objectives -- humanitarian relief -- could clearly be served by greater bilateral involvement at this time. Looking farther ahead at the problems of economic development, our past failures lead to skepticism about the efficacy of bilateral efforts; multilateral assistance seems more likely to achieve the limited economic and social objectives we consider attainable under present conditions, and also in the longer-run. Further, past experience in Haiti suggests that bilateral development efforts are not only of dubious effectiveness in getting economic results, but also bring adverse political effects, tending to sour our relations through mis-

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understandings, pressures and disputes over development projects and their administration. Implicit in any attempt to force-feed development in Haiti is the risk that, because of the extremely narrow base for institution building, change once underway may get out of hand and provoke the instability, violence and anti-Americanism we seek to avoid.

A special short-term factor needs to be weighed in considering the question of involvement. The change in administration in the United States and the ensuing review of U.S. policies in Latin America are viewed by Duvalier as an opportunity to press for an increase in U.S. assistance to levels nearer those of the early years of his regime. Duvalier has encouraged his people to expect a greater aid flow, and these increased expectations were buoyed by the Rockefeller visit. If they are not fulfilled and U.S. assistance remains at current levels, Duvalier may manifest his disappointment in negative, retaliatory actions (e.g. harassment of U.S. citizens and investments, restrictions on U.S. officials' travel and contacts inside Haiti, negative votes in international forums on issues of importance to the U.S., even steps by Duvalier seeking the removal of U.S. officials in Haiti). In short, without some increase in our assistance to Haiti, it may be difficult to keep our relationship at its current low but tolerably cordial and satisfactory level. However, the type of assistance Duvalier wants -- capital inputs -- is the type we have found most difficult to administer effectively through bilateral arrangements. It is also the type of assistance most likely to increase U.S. political involvement with Duvalier.

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IV. JUDGMENTS UNDERLYING OPTIONS

A. Current Situation and its Policy Implications.

1. As long as Duvalier lives, Haiti will remain a one-man dictatorship of the most extreme type.
2. Duvalier will not permit any rival (individual or group) to emerge as long as he is alive and alert.
3. Duvalier's concern for protecting his personal power position dominates all other considerations and makes effective progress toward economic or social development of his country very difficult.
4. The scarcity of qualified skilled personnel and institutional deficiencies combined with the corruption of the government from Duvalier on down point to a very limited economic return on any major bilateral aid commitment and disproportionate political costs of associating ourselves with a repressive dictatorship.
5. Efforts toward economic development, if any, carried out multilaterally avoid a politically sensitive and probably counterproductive bilateral relationship. This is especially true in the current situation but would also apply in the longer term.
6. Humanitarian relief projects, emphasizing direct services to individual Haitians, are less sensitive politically and less vulnerable to distortion of their purposes by Duvalier than capital-intensive development projects -- but humanitarian projects are also likely to be more effective if administered through multilateral or private agencies.
7. Duvalier will not make any kind of reliable "deal" with us with respect to the transition period, and to propose a deal would make the pre-transition period more difficult (by strengthening his suspicions as to our motives and exposing those we favor to his retribution).

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8. There is no serious Communist problem in Haiti at this time.

9. As long as the situation remains substantially as it is today, the United States does not need to become more involved to defend its long-term interests or to achieve its limited objectives.

B. The Situation Immediately After Duvalier Dies.

1. There probably will not be a blood bath and foreign residents will be relatively safe depending, however, on the circumstances of Duvalier's death. Some person or small group in the Duvalier entourage will grasp power initially -- and probably consolidate it after some jockeying and readjustment.

2. Competing power-seekers across the spectrum (except the radical left) will seek U.S. political support followed by pleas for financial/economic aid.

3. Castro will not intervene overtly in Haiti and the weak Communist movement will lie low initially.

C. Longer Term Post-Duvalier Situation.

1. Economic and social development of Haiti cannot be accomplished quickly. Even with optimum support and cooperation from the Haitian Government, lack of institutions and competent Haitian personnel will make significant developmental progress a question of decades, not of years.

2. Multilateral channels will be better suited to achieve long term progress as being less vulnerable to transitory political pressures and more likely to pursue consistent policies regardless of Haitian Government changes.

3. Political authoritarianism, in greater or lesser degree, will continue to characterize Haitian governments after Duvalier. Granting or withholding bilateral assistance as a lever to "improve" such governments will be of dubious effectiveness and, to the extent it is attempted, will undermine the technical developmental criteria which must be applied consistently to achieve lasting progress.

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V. OPTIONS

Note: The options set forth below are based in large measure on the judgments reported on pages 21 and 22 and are directed toward the questions raised in Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of July 22, 1969. Options to assist development have been separated from options to help the population mitigate suffering and disease in view of the differences between these two goals. Certain options have been excluded as either unrealistic or involving unacceptable political costs. These include termination of all U.S. assistance, creation of a major U.S. bilateral aid program, and covert action to change the political structure of the country.

Termination of U.S. assistance would increase human misery in Haiti, probably provoke an unnecessary confrontation with Duvalier, and belie President Nixon's concern about the welfare of the people of the hemisphere. A new major U.S. bilateral aid program, besides being ineffective for its ostensible developmental purposes, would saddle the U.S. in the eyes of hemispheric and Haitian opinion with responsibility for strengthening Duvalier's political grip and, perhaps, prolonging his role. Covert U.S. action to overthrow Duvalier would involve the U.S. in Haiti far beyond the requirements of our interests and objectives there. Also, such action would necessarily represent either (1) a mere gamble (with poor odds) that Duvalier's successor would be significantly better for the U.S., or (2) an illusion that the U.S. is prepared or able to assume long-term responsibility for Haiti's welfare and progress.

A. To Assist Development

1. Continue Present Policy

Note: Under this option there is no significant U.S. bilateral input; multilateral agencies engage in and are willing to consider further limited activities consistent with sound development economics.

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Advantages

-----Would continue to protect U.S. national security interests.

-----Would be consistent with Congressional, press and public acceptance of the policy of not helping Duvalier.

-----Would find general acceptance among Haitian exiles and in Western Hemisphere opinion.

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2. Encourage Greater Multilateral Activity (International Financial Institutions and/or OAS)

Advantages

----Would be consistent with the President's policy as enunciated on October 31, 1969.

----Would hold out better prospects for effective development because of greater policy and administrative continuity (than bilaterally).

----Would be less vulnerable to political manipulation by the Haitian government and less sensitive to political criticism by those opposed to Duvalier.

----Would be more likely to foster a sense of collective responsibility in international community (particularly OAS) toward the "problem of Haiti".

----OAS/CIAP has been reasonably satisfied with the course of the U.S.-financed technical assistance mission and is willing to continue it.

----If reliance for primary development leadership were placed on OAS, the U.S. would symbolize its confidence in the OAS as a responsible, competent organization dealing with hemispheric economic problems. If the OAS were to be successful in this undertaking, the Inter-American system and its institutions would be strengthened.

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Disadvantages

----Would create pressures for lowering of IDB and IBRD standards if Haiti sought to be treated as "special case".

----Would probably stimulate Duvalier to pressure the U.S. to match bilaterally any new efforts by international agencies in the development field.

----Could cause OAS resentment and rejection of a U.S. initiative to invest the OAS with responsibilities which might be construed by many members as a precedent for interfering in the internal affairs of one member.

----Since IDB and IBRD experience with Duvalier's Haiti has on balance been unsuccessful (IDB industrial, agricultural and education loans, IBRD road maintenance loan), there would be no assurance they would want to expand operations significantly.

3. Initiate Small-Scale Bilateral Program

Note: No direct U.S. bilateral developmental assistance has been provided to the Haitian government since 1963 when the A.I.D. Mission

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was withdrawn because of major administrative difficulties we encountered with the Duvalier regime. Under this option one capital project, for example the storm sewer project in Port-au-Prince already requested by the Haitian government, might be negotiated.

Advantages

----Carefully selected projects, particularly those of genuine interest to the Haitian government, might be successfully executed and would contribute to the basic economic development of Haiti.

----Might postpone a confrontation over the issue of how much aid Haiti deserves from the U.S.

Disadvantages

----Would increase U.S. identification with the Duvalier regime, marginally increase Duvalier's power position (which is already overwhelming), and stimulate domestic political criticism in the U.S.

----Would expose U.S. bilateral relationships with Haiti to new problems and irritations such as occurred in the past.

----Would probably not satisfy Duvalier.

----Would diminish incentives for a successor regime to do better than Duvalier in terms of qualifying for bilateral assistance through more effective cooperation and greater political and fiscal responsibility.

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----Would probably require an increased U.S. presence in Haiti with all of the attendant bureaucratic and political difficulties.

----Would increase the risk of OAS hesitation to accept a major role in Haiti because of increased U.S. developmental assistance activities.

B. To Help Population Overcome Poverty and Disease

Note: Humanitarian efforts are somewhat less vulnerable to Duvalierist political exploitation than are capital development projects and they tend to associate us with the Haitian people, as distinct from the government. However, lack of effective institutions is a basic limiting factor even in efforts to carry out humanitarian relief through the Haitian government. The Haitian Army and the parallel security force known as the VSN (militia) have institutional structures reaching into all parts of the country but there are obvious limitations on using these for humanitarian purposes. The only other agency with a national network is SNEM, a multilateral agency specifically created to carry out the malaria eradication program. SNEM has functioned with reasonable effectiveness. In addition, several private agencies are active in this field in Haiti and are permitted to function with relatively little interference (but with distinct financial problems in collecting the Haitian government's local currency commitments). Among these agencies are CARE, Church World Service, and Catholic Relief Service.

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1. Continue to Assist (and Attempt to Increase Assistance) through Multilateral and Private Agency Channels.

Note: Our present aid to Haiti administered through multilateral and private channels has benefited the populace without significantly supporting the Duvalier regime. Such assistance might be expanded, e.g., development of a larger scale family planning effort, expansion of food for work programs, expansion of CARE's community development work.

Advantages

-----Would relieve misery and would fight disease; encourage self-help efforts in some localities and perform limited institution-building function.

-----Would provide assistance to the Haitian people while avoiding U.S. identification with a repressive and retrograde regime.

-----Would encourage maintenance of inter-American interest and involvement in Haiti (through Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and OAS Mission personnel).

Disadvantages

-----Would lose the political benefit of associating the U.S. with the Haitian people.

-----Would incur criticism from some segments of opinion which maintain that such assistance provides marginal support to the Duvalier regime.

-----Private agencies have constantly experienced difficulties in working with the Duvalier regime and might not be willing to expand their activities.

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2. Increase Significantly U.S. Bilateral Activities

Note: The only U.S. assistance currently not channeled through multilateral or private organizations is the Special Activities Project Fund which amounted to only \$35,000 in FY 1969. This could be expanded, although the Embassy last year was unable to obligate all the money authorized. A Peace Corps operation might be established although Duvalier has never asked for one.

"Significant" increase might be considered to mean an additional expenditure of up to \$500,000 annually, in such areas as community development, food for work for highway maintenance and feeder roads, family planning, etc.

Advantages

----Would provide political benefits of associating the U.S. with the Haitian people.

----Would do more to relieve poverty and misery although increased multilateral or private assistance might accomplish the same thing.

----Might induce Duvalier to continue his present posture of cordiality toward the U.S. but probably in the expectation that resumption of bilateral humanitarian assistance would be a precursor to bilateral developmental assistance.

Disadvantages

----Since increased U.S. presence (A.I.D. personnel and/or Peace Corps) would signal abandonment of the aloof policy pursued since 1963 toward the Duvalier regime, there would be criticism from Congress, large segments of the U.S. press and public opinion, as well as from anti-Duvalier Haitians.

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----Would give Duvalier a pretext for claiming U.S. support for his regime.

----Presence of highly motivated, politically conscious Peace Corps volunteers would result inevitably in friction with the Duvalier regime probably entailing a deterioration in bilateral relations.

C. To Prepare for or Influence the Transition to a Post-Duvalier Period

1. Continue on Present Course

Note: This option is based on the judgment previously expressed that the U.S. does not need to get more involved in Haiti now to defend its national interests. This option envisages keeping our involvement minimal and maintaining our relations with Duvalier cool and correct as they have been the past six years.

Advantages

----Would enable the U.S. to maintain a small, reasonably effective official presence in Haiti sufficient for our limited role of observing developments, influencing them to a slight degree and being in readiness for a larger role, if need be, during the transition.

----Would avoid the potential dangers involved in attempting to manipulate an intransigent leader such as Duvalier.

----Would avoid the dangers of negative U.S. Congressional, press, and public opinion.

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Disadvantages

----Would limit our ability to observe and to influence developments.

----Would leave open the possibility that Duvalier might turn in some other direction, i.e., Soviet Bloc, but it is doubtful that he would be acceptable to any major opponent of the U.S.

2. Increased Efforts to Prepare for or Influence the Transition

Note: This option assumes it is desirable for the U.S. to attempt to play a leading role in the transition period, assuming this is close, perhaps even to the point of determining the composition of the successor regime. So long as Duvalier is mentally alert, however, it is extremely doubtful that he will permit any person or group to be groomed for succession. As to "making a deal" with Duvalier which can predetermine succession, it is possible Duvalier might for a price agree to such an arrangement although he is by the nature of his exercise of power probably incapable of living up to any deal. Moreover, the existence of such an agreement would be the kiss of death for his nominally designated successor.

Nor does it seem likely that the other OAS nations would be helpful with the transition problem. The other black nations in the Caribbean have evinced little or no concern with the "Haitian problem". The Latin American nations, which are separated from Haiti by language, race, and tradition, have demonstrated no interest in becoming involved in Haitian affairs.

For these reasons this option is not considered to be a feasible course of action.

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ANNEX TO

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 70 - HAITI

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HAITI

(A.I.D. and Predecessors - FY 1952-FY 1968)
(Total loans and Grants in \$ millions)

<u>Fiscal Years</u> (No Programs Prior to FY 1952)	<u>Total Obligations</u>
1952	0.7
1953	0.6
1954	1.0
1955	2.8
1956	6.2
1957	2.1
1958	3.5
1959	11.3
1960	10.9
1961	10.7
1962	6.8
1963	0.2
1964	-1.4 (deobligation)
1965	1.8
1966	2.6
1967	2.0
1968	2.1
	<hr/>
TOTAL	63.9

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