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NSC Interdepartmental Group/Inter-American Affairs

Contingency Study for Haiti

Reviewed December, 1971

Group 1
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I. The Problem

The constitutional confusion which existed throughout much of Papa Doc's reign over the "succession question" was clarified by the January, 1970 designation of his only son, Jean-Claude, as his "successor". The "Jean-Claude" solution has, in fact, proved a useful vehicle for transition in the months following Francois Duvalier's death in April, 1971. There is still a possibility, however (rather remote at this time), that a period of confusion or even disarray could emerge in Haiti should the collegium currently ruling the country fall apart or should the armed forces, until now unified, split into factions. While the present line-up is clearly not immutable and will not last indefinitely, it has served as a successful interim device. Furthermore, we think that even if the collegium does break up, someone within the "Duvalier" entourage will eventually emerge in the dominant position. Moreover, while the breakdown of the collegium might be marked initially by instability and could even appear chaotic, it is unlikely that widespread violence will occur.

Should a serious or protracted breakdown of law and order occur, of course, the U.S. would be faced with difficult decisions regarding the deployment of U.S. forces to evacuate Americans (and other foreign nationals). The attitude of the OAS towards participating in or sanctioning such actions would be an important factor in such a decision. Another factor, difficult to assess, is the risk that prolonged involvement in the affairs of Haiti, a country whose population is overwhelmingly black, might become entangled with U.S. domestic racial issues. Any unilateral use of U.S. forces would tend to commit us to a longer-term, costly involvement in Haiti's internal situation unless the decision to limit such force strictly to the evacuation of Americans was clearly defined at the outset.

II.A. U.S. Interests and Objectives

Interests (as stated in NSSM-70, approved by NSC on November 13, 1970) U.S. interest in Haiti is based on:

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- (1) Its location in the Caribbean, near Florida and Cuba, and bordering Dominican Republic.
- (2) The \$50-60 million in U.S. private investment, the substantial American missionary and charitable activities, and the fact that about 1,000 of our citizens are residents there;
- (3) Haiti's role as a member of the United Nations and the Inter-American system;
- (4) A humanitarian concern about the poverty, illiteracy and ill health of its people.

Objectives (as stated in NSSM-70)

Our objectives are to:

- (1) Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control threatening the security of the U.S. (e.g., Cuban missile crisis).
- (2) Prevent, to the extent politically feasible, Haiti from becoming a base or haven for subversion, anti-U.S. attitudes, extremism, and racism in the Caribbean.
- (3) Protect U.S. lives.
- (4) Alleviate conditions of misery and deprivation, out of humanitarian concern for the Haitian people.
- (5) Stimulate Inter-American and other multilateral interest and involvement in social, economic and other problems of Haiti.
- (6) Protect, to the extent feasible, property and other interests of U.S. citizens.
- (7) Encourage the establishment of more stable and progressive institutions.

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II.B. Assumptions

(1) Cuba will not intervene openly in a Haitian contingency.

(2) Current Communist strength in Haiti is not sufficient to seize power, or to acquire a controlling influence in the early stages of a breakdown of the collegium.

(3) Should assumptions 1 and 2 prove valid, the U.S. would not be required to take precipitate military action to achieve its objective of ensuring that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.

(4) If (contrary to assumption (1)) Cuba intervenes openly and demonstrably, prospects are reasonably good that the OAS would consider such intervention as falling within the Rio Treaty and would support measures to repel this threat to hemispheric security, including the use of armed force if the aggression were on a scale that required it.

(5) The U.S. will tolerate any Haitian Government that is not Communist-controlled.

II.C. Contingencies

The contingencies addressed in this Plan (discussed in detail in Annex 9) reflect our assessment of the current situation and outlook in Haiti, and are in keeping with the estimates made in the NSSM-70 study, as well as the assessments prepared by our Embassy in Port-au-Prince of the new Jean-Claude regime. Four contingencies (in descending order of likelihood) are analyzed, with contingencies A and B considered substantially more likely in the short run than either C or D:

A. Collegium rule breaks down; an internal struggle for power ensues among the entourage.

B. Collegium rule breaks down; a struggle for power ensues and attempts are made to infiltrate extremists from Cuba to join struggle.

C. Collegium rule breaks down; in power struggle, known left-wing elements with possible ties to and support from Cuba appear to be winning.

D. Collegium rule breaks down; an internal power struggle ensues but fails to produce a winner; the situation degenerates into general disorder, political chaos, widespread bloodshed and destruction of property.

II.D. Optional Courses of Action

(The following optional courses of action are analyzed in detail in Section III)

A. Objective: Protection of American lives.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Commercial evacuation.
- (2) Standby at home or at assembly area in Haiti.
- (3) OAS-endorsed military-assisted evacuation.
- (4) International Red Cross-sponsored evacuation.
- (5) Unilateral U.S. military-assisted evacuation, with minimum equipment and force needed.

B. Objective: Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Surveillance of waters between Cuba and Haiti.
- (2) Through diplomatic channels make clear to Soviet Union that any Cuban or Soviet involvement in Haitian situation would be viewed with deepest concern by USG. Convey same message to Cuban Government through Swiss.
- (3) Intercept and turn back boats bound for Haiti from Cuba.

Mexican

(4) Ask French, and Canadian Governments to prevent return of known Communists to Haiti; ask all third countries to prevent arms shipments to Haiti.

(5) Consider deployment of US naval units as a show of force.

(6) Supply arms to anti-Communist Haitian forces.

(7) Seek OAS sponsorship of Inter-American Force.

(8) Consult with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states.

(9) Unilateral use of US forces in Haiti.

C. Objective: Encourage establishment of more stable and progressive institutions in post-Duvalier period.

Courses of Action:

(1) Consult closely with OAS from the outset and encourage it to be primary source of advice and guidance to Haitians.

(2) Make known US intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist Government and actively exploit all opportunities to exert U.S. influence from outset of contingency situation.

D. Objective: Protection of U.S. Property.

Courses of Action:

(1) Rely upon Haitian police and armed forces to protect major U.S. owned properties.

(2) Seek OAS resolution calling upon Haitian authorities and people to protect safety and property of all non-Haitians and consider deployment of U.S. naval units to areas adjacent to major U.S.-owned property as a show of force.

II.E. Key Issues

A. Unilateral Use of Force. The issue involves questions as to nature, purpose and timing, amount of force (bare minimum or maximum impact?), effect on OAS and other international relationships as well as the future U.S. bilateral relationship with Haiti. Failure to use force in a timely manner could jeopardize achievement of bilateral objectives in Haiti, but premature or excessive reliance on force could seriously damage broader U.S. international interests.

IG-ARA Position. Unilateral use of force should be regarded as a "last resort" course of action, when all other optional courses of action including a multilateral, or OAS endorsed, use of force have been found inadequate. In such an eventuality, unilateral force should be carefully limited in terms of the objective to be accomplished, and in the type and size of force assigned to achieve the objective, and the force should be withdrawn immediately upon accomplishment of the objective.

For example, if American citizens can only be evacuated through unilateral military means, the objective should be clearly limited to evacuation, within a strictly limited time frame, and employing the minimum of equipment and force needed to accomplish that objective. In any case, specific Presidential approval of the use of force would be required.

The most likely requirement, other than for evacuation purposes, for unilateral use of force would involve interdiction of ships bound for Haiti from Cuba. Such a requirement should be met through use of naval and air forces, without involving ground forces.

It should be noted that ground forces, once deployed, are inherently more susceptible of involvement in matters not directly related to the specific objective envisaged, requiring greater logistic support and greater protection for themselves, and presenting greater problems in the withdrawal stage. In any consideration of the use of U.S. ground forces for purposes other than evacuation, it should be clearly recognized that such a use will involve us in responsibility for decision making in a political environment almost totally lacking in stable institutions, traditions, or leadership, and that our involvement in the internal political situation would most probably have to continue for several years.

In none of the contingencies outlined is there envisaged a need for unilateral U.S. military involvement in the immediate period following a breakdown in the collegium.

B. Should the U.S. tolerate any non-Communist Haitian Government? The issue involves such questions as: the relative importance of our objective of encouraging more stable and progressive institutions in Haiti; whether there is a realistic prospect for a "quantum jump" in Haitian institutional development given the inherent limitations of that society; whether it is in the longer-term U.S. interest to "hand-pick" new leaders who would likely be dependent on continuing U.S. support once in power.

IG-ARA Position. Our primary objectives in Haiti, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, are: to ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control threatening U.S. security; to prevent, if politically feasible, Haiti from becoming a base or haven for subversion, anti-U.S. attitudes, extremism and racism; and to protect U.S. lives. While the U.S. is interested in encouraging more stable and progressive institutions, we recognize that such a goal is a long-term one and is clearly subordinate to the above-mentioned goals which are our primary objectives in Haiti. Furthermore, President Nixon, in his Latin American policy address of October 31, 1969, outlined our new policy of accepting LA governments as they are, not necessarily as we would like them to be. NSSM-70 states our vital national interests in Haiti are not greatly threatened now or in the foreseeable future. There is general agreement that (a) we know little about the real views or the governing potential of the various non-Communist factions who might contend for power, and (b) our own past efforts to influence internal Haitian affairs have not been productive. Accordingly, it is believed that any non-Communist Haitian Government can be tolerated by the USG. The above, of course, does not imply our unwillingness to exercise discreet influence over the new government in desirable directions.

C. What is the operational significance for the U.S. of a situation in which some Communists may be in positions of influence in a new government but have not gained control? This issue raises questions as to: the real potential of the

Communist movement in Haiti; the relative costs and benefits of (a) nipping Communist influence in the bud or (b) refraining from action until it becomes clear whether Communists have come into control; the reaction of the Dominican Government (and the problems this could cause for the U.S.) to a rising Communist potential in Haiti which would be perceived by the Dominicans as an immediate threat to themselves; the effect our decision on this issue would have on our relationship with the OAS as an institution, bilaterally with other Latin American governments and generally on our international relations.

IG-ARA Position. Many Haitians, both in the country and in exile, will make liberal use of the term "Communist" in an effort to induce U.S. involvement in a political struggle. These 'charges' must be judged in the light of what we know about the present strength and effectiveness of the Haitian Communist Party. Communists should be defined as persons known to have been actively and wittingly involved in Communist activities, or against whom there is substantial evidence of such activities. Others, who may have been vaguely reported to be "Communists" in the past or are considered "leftists" (e.g. Desinor, the Blanchet brothers, Boyer, Jacques Laroche) should not be considered Communists unless substantial new evidence appears so indicating.

Communist control should be defined as the emergence in positions of dominant power (such as the head of a new government or the chief of the armed forces) of known Communists. The important consideration should be whether Communist individuals are in positions where they can command resources, e.g. the arms and men of the police or armed forces; the money under the control of the Finance Ministry or the Regie du Tabac; the communications media subject to control by the Information Ministry. Consideration of the use of military force by the U.S. to eliminate Communist influence from a coalition-type government should be limited to those situations in which (a) the full use of U.S. resources, both overt and covert, has clearly not been successful; and (b) there is clear and unequivocal evidence that such influence is growing rapidly and will shortly result in control of the government.

As a matter of operational policy, the U.S. should

(1) being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention; (2) risking involvement of the United States in activities not directly related to our objective of protecting American lives; and (3) fueling Haitian Nationalistic feelings and abetting Communist propaganda. Accordingly, this course of action should be regarded as a "last resort" when all other optional courses of action have been found inadequate, and the jeopardy to American lives is so great that it becomes the overriding policy consideration.

B. Objective: Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.

(1) Surveillance of waters between Cuba and Haiti.

This course of action should be undertaken at the outset of any of the four contingency situations discussed in this plan, as a precautionary measure designed (1) to discourage any Cuba-based attempt to interfere before it got started and (2) to increase our capability to detect any movements from Cuba that might be initiated.

(2) Through diplomatic channels make clear to Soviet Union that any Cuban or Soviet involvement in Haitian situation would be viewed with deepest concern by USG. Convey same message to Cuban Government through Swiss.

This course of action should also be considered at the outset of any of the four contingency situations if there is a sound basis for suspecting that Cuban or Soviet involvement in the Haitian situation is in prospect. A decision to implement this course of action would naturally be based on the total context of our relations with the Soviet Union at the time, not merely on the Haitian situation.

(3) Intercept and turn back boats bound for Haiti from Cuba.

This course of action would be a contravention of international law unless it were taken pursuant to an OAS or UN resolution. It would also carry some risk of low-level hostilities on the high seas between intercepting U.S. Navy vessels and Cuban boats. These risks may be reduced (although not eliminated) through careful implementation of the action, i.e. by refraining from use of force (as distinguished from show of force) in halting boats and verifying their business.

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(4) Ask French, and Canadian Governments to prevent return of known Communists to Haiti; ask all third countries to prevent arms shipments to Haiti.

This course of action may be undertaken as a precautionary measure at the inception of a contingency situation in Haiti. In approaching the French and Canadian Governments on prevention of the return of Communists to Haiti, we should be prepared to supply names of individual Communists living in their jurisdiction. Care should be taken to keep this proposed action limited to known Communists or those against whom there is substantial basis for suspicion of Communist activities.

(5) Consider deployment of US naval units as a show of force.

This course of action has proven most effective in the past in situations where, for example, a beleaguered government has derived new confidence from a show of U.S. Naval force, and/or non-Communist forces threatening the status quo have been thus influenced to abandon their disruptive efforts. In the Haitian contingencies envisaged in this plan, a show of U.S. Naval force would be most effective in discouraging intervention by Cuba-based forces which might otherwise be tempted to move into Haiti. The reaction inside Haiti to a show of U.S. naval force might be counterproductive in terms of our objective of preventing Communist control, since such action by the U.S. could be pictured as a prelude to intervention and generate potent Nationalistic feelings which could be exploited by Communists. Accordingly, if US naval units are deployed, the purpose of the deployment should be made public (to prevent external intervention in Haiti) and the units should be kept well out of sight of land. A decision to deploy U.S. naval units close to shore should weigh carefully (1) whether a potentially viable non-Communist regime exists warranting the gamble that a show of force would provide the necessary margin for it to prevail over a potential Communist regime; and/or (2) whether a potential Communist regime might be able to exploit a U.S. show of force to gain the margin of power. In the event a Communist regime has already gained control, other courses of action should be followed to attain our objectives.

(6) Supply arms to anti-Communist Haitian forces.

This course of action should be carried out pursuant to an authorizing OAS resolution, if possible. Otherwise, covert means should be considered. A third alternative, a direct USG transfer of arms to Haitian forces, should be considered in the light of (1) whether the non-Communist forces have sufficient potential for success to warrant USG identification with them and/or (2) whether the Communist influenced factions could gain a decisive margin of popular support by characterizing the U.S.-helped forces as neo-Duvalierists and Yankee puppets. Another factor to be carefully weighed in such a decision is whether the non-Communist forces really lack arms, or whether they lack the will to struggle without U.S. material support, or whether they are using their alleged need for arms as a device to obtain U.S. political identification with themselves.

(7) Seek OAS sponsorship of Inter-American Force.

This course of action should be pursued if Cuba intervenes openly and demonstrably in Haiti. As stated in the Assumptions section of this Plan, prospects are reasonably good that the OAS would consider such intervention as falling within the Rio Treaty and would support measures to repel this threat to hemispheric security, including the use of armed force if the aggression were on a scale that required it. A corollary may be made to this assumption that the OAS is not likely to authorize use of force if the evidence does not clearly and convincingly support the conclusion that Haiti is in danger of becoming a hostile military base under Communist control. The question may arise as to whether OAS authorization for the use of force should be sought if preliminary consultation reveals that not enough votes are in prospect to carry the resolution. The answer to this question may rest on a more basic long term question of whether the U.S. wishes to continue to rely on the OAS for regional security purposes. If the answer is "no", optional courses of action (8) and (9), discussed below, should be considered. If the answer is "yes" and the U.S. feels its longer term security interest in preserving and strengthening the OAS outweighs its immediate security interest in Haiti, course of action (9) involving unilateral U.S. force should not be used, and course of action (8) should not contemplate possible use of force outside the OAS framework.

(8) Consult with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states.

This course of action refers rather narrowly to consultation with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states outside the OAS framework on the problem of ensuring that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control. Course of action (8) would be a fall-back position to be considered after course of action (7) had failed; the purpose of such consultation would be to explore carefully what means, including use of force jointly or unilaterally, might be taken to prevent Haiti's becoming a hostile military base under Communist control. Adopting course of action (8) would imply U.S. willingness to tolerate a further deterioration in OAS prestige and authority as a regional security organization.

(9) Unilateral use of U.S. forces in Haiti.

This course of action is our "last resort" after all other courses of action have failed. It would signal our ultimate willingness to "go it alone" when we consider our vital interests threatened. In implementing course of action (9), the overriding principle should be to use the minimum necessary force to accomplish the objective: for example, use of a close-to-shore show of naval force followed, if necessary, by a small Marine force or a similar sized airborne or air-landed force. Tactics should be governed more by political considerations than by such classic objectives as defeating the opposing forces or occupying key points: for example, general military occupation of the capital city would not be a desirable political objective, and military attacks against Haitian troops should be avoided if at all possible. The concept of the operation might be, instead, to occupy and protect a very few key installations such as the American Embassy, the electric power plant and petroleum tank farms -- all near the waterfront -- and to throw blocking forces across the South Road and the North Road at the outskirts of the city in order to encourage anti-Communist Haitian forces to rally outside the city and then to move against the forces under the nominal control of the Communist regime inside Port-au-Prince. Our objective should be to permit a Haitian "solution" to the politico-military problem of a Communist regime in Haiti -- a solution worked out by Haitians using their own soldiers and arms and political skills. Our military presence would provide encouragement and protection for anti-Communist Haitian forces to organize themselves, (with such encouragement including provision of arms as required), but we would avoid dictating a solution.

C. Objective: Encourage establishment of more stable and progressive institutions.

(1) Consult closely with OAS from the outset and encourage it to be primary source of advice and guidance to Haitians.

This objective ranks at the bottom of our list of objectives because we recognize the practical impossibility of imposing "stable and progressive institutions" in Haiti from the outside. We also recognize that bilateral "encouragement" of such institutions could lead to the type of deep involvement in the internal functioning of the Haitian Government which has proved so irritating, mutually frustrating and counterproductive in the past. In order to avoid such over-involvement, course of action (1) calls for this objective to be pursued multilaterally through the IDB and the IERD as well as the OAS, which has a technical advisory mission in Haiti already. As a corollary, this course of action implies that the U.S. will respond, as appropriate, to Haitian bilateral approaches for advice, guidance and assistance by referring them to the OAS and other multilateral organizations. This does not mean that we will stand completely aloof and apart, but that we will endeavor to enlarge and facilitate the multilateral role in Haitian institutional development.

(2) Make known US intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist Government and actively exploit all opportunities to exert U.S. influence from outset of contingency situation.

This course of action is an alternative to (1), resting on the assumption that U.S. bilateral influence can be effective in the establishment of stable, progressive Haitian institutions. Past experience indicates that U.S. bilateral efforts are sometimes successful in dissuading Haitian officials from actions that would be detrimental to existing institutions, but that bilateral efforts seldom foster lasting and positive institutional development. To an unusual degree, Haitian institutions reflect the men who create or administer them, and the high rate of political attrition of such men results in highly unstable institutions. U.S. inability to preserve institutions (e.g. the Artibonite Valley Authority) by shielding Haitian administrators from political storms was a major cause of the failure of our bilateral assistance program in the early years of the Duvalier government.

D. Objective: Protection of U.S. Property.

(1) Rely upon Haitian police and armed forces to protect major U.S. owned properties.

This course of action is the normal state of affairs. U.S. property in Haiti has not been the target of violence or sabotage in the past, and Haitian popular attitudes toward the U.S. and toward U.S. enterprises in Haiti are not such as to presage special property protection problems in the event of a crisis.

(2) Seek OAS resolution calling upon Haitian authorities and people to protect safety and property of all non-Haitians and consider deployment of U.S. naval units to areas adjacent to major U.S.-owned property as a show of force.

This course of action should be considered in a situation of general breakdown in law and order when an OAS appeal might be heeded but other measures are not warranted. Considering the relative insignificance in terms of value and importance to the U.S. of American-owned property in Haiti, the possible deployment of U.S. naval units as a show of force is not a realistic or warranted course of action to achieve this objective. However, if as a result of violence, jeopardy to American lives is so great that it becomes the overriding policy consideration, unilateral US military-assisted evacuation, with minimum equipment and force, might be warranted.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY PLAN

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Contingency Annex I

Haiti Situation as of December 15, 1971

Since the April 21, 1971 death of Francois Duvalier, the new Haitian Government presided over by his 20-year old son, Jean-Claude, has paid lip service to the policies and memory of "Papa Doc" but has nevertheless moved in a number of new directions. Eight months after the death of Francois Duvalier, the new Government of Haiti still appears firmly in control of the country and committed to considerably more liberal policies than those of its predecessor. The new regime has managed to cope quietly with the minor crises it has confronted to date but continuing stability in Haiti depends largely upon the ability of the collegium of key advisors surrounding the young President to work together.

The collegium currently ruling Haiti consists of several skillful and experienced individuals who will probably play an important role in Haitian politics for some time to come. While the present line-up is clearly not immutable and will not last indefinitely, it has served as a useful vehicle of transition. For all intents and purposes, the Government of Haiti remains a "constitutional monarchy" headed by Papa Doc's only son, who in turn is counseled and guided by a collegium consisting of his mother, Madame Simone Ovide Duvalier, Secstate for Interior and National Defense Luckner Cambronne, Secstate for Foreign Affairs Adrien Raymond, Secstate for Information Fritz Cineas, and the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Claude Raymond, brother of the Foreign Minister. Most of the leaders of the new government are younger, better educated and more competent than their predecessors. Only Cambronne, who began his career in 1957 as secretary and errand boy to Papa Doc, and who parlayed his position as palace favorite into considerable personal power and wealth over the years, lacks reputable

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credentials. By far the most controversial, as well as the most powerful man in the new government, Cambronne still maintains considerable influence with Madame Duvalier.

Among the more important political developments since the death of Duvalier was the apparent eclipse of Marie-Denise Dominique (the President's sister) and her husband, Max Dominique, Haitian Ambassador to France. Apparently Marie-Denise chose to leave the country as a result of a direct confrontation with Luckner Cambronne in which Cambronne was supported both by the President and his mother. Although Marie-Denise was believed by some to be the real "power" in the new regime in the immediate post-Duvalier period, it is now apparent that her political strength and influence (and that of her husband) was overestimated. The young President, together with his mother, provide the thread of legitimacy between the two regimes. Madame Duvalier, to whom her son apparently defers, seems to have played a key role in the decision-making process since the demise of her husband.

Since the installation of the Jean-Claude regime, the change of atmosphere in Haiti has been marked, with "relaxed" being the word most frequently used to compare the present environment to the past. The most dramatic development since the April death of Papa Doc has been the systematic downgrading of the VSN (militia) and the Ton Ton Macoutes. The subordination of the VSN and the disbanding of the Macoutes apparently were undertaken by the new government because these extramilitary forces were no longer required for the regime's security. In addition, the regular army resented such paramilitary rivals, and the government had become concerned about the increasing liability these irregulars and their excesses represented in public relations terms. As a consequence, the role of the regular armed forces has become much more important and there is an obvious openness on the part of senior officers of the armed forces in their relations with foreigners which just did not exist prior to last April. The conventional armed forces remain small in size (probably not more than 5,000, including police) but an attempt is being made to provide them with some new equipment. A new 567-man

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elite unit called "the Leopards" is being formed to serve as a counterinsurgency force; its superior training and equipment should give it added prestige and importance in Haiti's security apparatus. Improved training and expenditures in this area represent some sacrifice to the GOH's developmental program.

The GOH has attempted, sometimes awkwardly, to improve its image both abroad and domestically by such devices as the welcoming of foreign correspondents and the holding of weekly press conferences by the Information Minister at which the work of the Government is reviewed. The regime has continued its much heralded policy of encouraging the return of exiles, with limited success so far, although recently several well-known political exiles did return to Port-au-Prince and have apparently been permitted to re-settle without harassment.

In the field of foreign affairs, the new GOH has made several moves which can be described as positive and forward looking. On a number of occasions, Foreign Minister Raymond has indicated his country's desire to play a more positive role in both the international community (at the UN General Assembly meeting) and the hemispheric organizations. The new regime has demonstrated an eagerness to work closely with the United States, agreeing to support our position on Chinese representation and concluding a long-term cotton textile agreement without any undue problems. Relations with its closest neighbor, the Dominican Republic, are warmer today than in the past decade and the two Foreign Ministers have exchanged visits, symbolizing the improvement in relations. The GOH has recently resumed diplomatic and consular relations with Costa Rica, relations which had been suspended since 1964. The regime has expressed its intention to seek better relations with its other Latin American neighbors and the invitation to Foreign Minister Raymond to attend a Law of the Sea meeting in Caracas indicated a new acceptance of Haiti within the Latin American group, as well as a significant improvement in Haitian-Venezuelan relations.

On the economic side, the GOH has produced a five-year plan for economic development which, while not totally comprehensive, nevertheless is symptomatic of the collegium's

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desire to put the country's economic house in order and build for the future. The regime has also endeavored (at times in a heavy-handed manner) to interest its wealthier citizens and residents in investing in Haiti. In recent months, the government has called on the Middle Eastern merchant community, the Italian colony, and the insurance agents for assistance in capitalizing three new hotel projects in an effort to attract tourists to Haiti. The government has also issued an omnibus decree providing new schedules of duties on imported products as well as a sales tax on domestic goods. This decree, designed to increase the government's income, has had a mixed reception within the business community but most observers consider it a necessary move.

The total economic picture still remains dismal, although some bright spots have emerged. Tourism has noticeably increased in recent years, tourist facilities have been improved, and a number of American and foreign investors have become interested in the further development of the tourist industry. It is expected that this industry will be aided as well by an increase in the number of American airlines flying to Haiti (American Airlines inaugurated in mid-1970 daily service from New York). American businessmen, attracted by Haiti's cheap labor market and proximity to the United States, have invested in export-oriented light industries (transformation industries). These industries, currently manufacturing goods ranging from baseballs to handicrafts to electrical components (using raw materials from the United States), have grown rapidly. At the same time, the Haitian business community, somewhat buoyed by the growth in the tourist and transformation industries has begun to expand its activities modestly after years of quiescence.

The GOH itself has displayed a more businesslike and responsible attitude towards its international financial obligations. It has settled a claim under AID's Investment Guaranty program and rescheduled its obligations to the US Post Office. Haiti has agreed to liquidate accumulated arrearages and adopt more effective measures to prevent theft of PL-480 relief supplies from Haitian customs.

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International lending institutions participating in the June 1971 annual CIAP review held in Washington were very favorably impressed by these and other efforts of the GOH, as well as by the frank exchange that occurred at the session. As the GOH had put its financial house in order in 1970, the IMF reinstituted its stand-by agreement which had been suspended in 1967.

While the economic picture is brighter now, therefore, than at any time in the last decade, it remains true that the general economy is still quite depressed. Haiti is still plagued by the same long-run, seemingly insoluble economic problems; it possesses limited arable land on which erosion is spreading, and few mineral resources; its people are handicapped by widespread illiteracy, disease and a lack of training and skills; and many of its more capable people continue to emigrate. Faced with the necessity of obtaining sufficient foreign exchange to assure essential imports and service existing foreign obligations, as well as the need to raise sufficient monies to finance government services and carry domestic debts, the road to economic development in Haiti remains a long and arduous one although the outlook for such development is more encouraging today than it has been for years.

Clearances: ARA/CAR - Mr. Canney
ARA/CAR - Mr. Broderick

Drafter: ARA/CAR/H:DARoss
x-22115 - 12/6/71

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Contingency Study for Haiti - Annex II

Evaluation of the Strength of the Communists

- In December, 1968, Haiti's two Communist parties, the Moscow-oriented PEP and the Havana-oriented PUDA merged and formed the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH). Militant members of the new party soon commenced a series of small-scale terrorist acts against the Government, which reacted with a vigorous anti-Communist campaign in the spring of 1969. As a consequence of this campaign, the leadership of the party was largely destroyed or driven into exile, while total party membership declined from 200 persons to an estimated 40. In addition, the Government promulgated a law in April, 1969, decreeing the death penalty for those convicted of communist activity. During the past two years, the remnants of the PUCH organization within Haiti appear to have remained inactive.

Most of the exiled Haitian Communists live in Europe, Mexico, and Canada, while smaller groups are found in the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. (There have been a number of Haitian patriotic groups springing up in Europe and North America recently; however, they claim to be non-Marxist and there has been no information available to indicate otherwise.) In early 1971, a new Haitian leftist revolutionary organization by the name of "Coubite," was formed in Europe. Coubite now has a nucleus in Montreal, Canada, and another in the U.S., and it is known to have at least two factions in Europe: one in Brussels, Belgium, and another in Paris, France. This latest effort to unite the exiles, however, is suffering the chronic tendency of other Haitian exile groups to factionalism. Internal frictions already have developed within Coubite between members with Maoist tendencies and those who adhere to a less doctrinaire line. Should its members fail to resolve these differences, it appears likely it will succumb to the fate of its many predecessors, and decline rapidly into ineffectiveness. Other Haitian Communists in exile, such as Gerard Pierre-Charles in Mexico City and Max Chancy in Montreal, also have initiated new organizing efforts in the wake of Francois Duvalier's death, but with little visible result. Also, Moscow and Havana both continue to broadcast to Haiti in Creole.

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Although stimulated to renewed activity by the death of Duvalier pere, the Haitian communists abroad have been unable to find the leadership, organization and popular following necessary to influence events in Haiti under the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier. In fact, the exiles continue to be as weak and internally-divided as ever, despite the continuance of token financial support from their sponsors in Moscow and Havana, and have no present capability to affect the situation in Haiti. Likewise, the PUCH organization within the country appears to be in disarray, lacking the ability to launch demonstrations, strikes, terrorist attacks or any other form of visible opposition to the incumbent government. In the event of a serious internal division within the current ruling group in Haiti, leading to a prolonged power struggle, the communists might attempt some covert maneuvering in an effort to influence the struggle's outcome. But even if significant public disorders and violence should result from such a competition for power, the communists' lack of leaders, arms, effective organization or a popular following would -- in the absence of outside assistance -- probably keep them from playing a significant role in the leadership crisis.

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Prominent Haitian Communists

ALEXANDRE, Guy

ARCELIN, Paul

AUBORG, Gerard

AUGUSTE, Maurepas

BALIN, Alix

BAPTISTE, Fred

BARBOT, Yves

CHANCY, Max

DEPESTRE, Rene

FLAVIEN, Yves

GAILLARD, Fritzler Camille

HECTOR, Michel

JOSEPH, Joan Rene Ulrick

LAFONTANT, Gerard

MONTERO, Camille

MONTERO, Jean Norert

PEAN, Serge

PETIT, Antoine G.

PHELPS, Anthony

PIERRE-CHARLES, Gerard

ROY, Elliott

THERAUD, Fritz Vely

VIEUX, Lionel

Annex IV Denied Under
Section 1.5(d) of E.O. 12958.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX V

Haitian Security Forces

A. FAD'H: The Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H) constitute a single army-like constabulary in which the navy and air corps are subordinate branches. Total strength is about 5,700. The primary mission of the armed forces is to preserve public order and to guard the national boundaries. Additional functions include vehicle registration, administration of national prisons, control of immigration and foreign travel, and staffing and operation of the Port-au-Prince fire departments and the police departments throughout the country. Arms and equipment are obsolete and in poor condition. Further, the lack of spare parts aggravates the deterioration of arms and severely limits the capability of the FAD'H. The Military Department of the Casernes Dessalines is the only force currently capable of action as a tactical battalion. Extensive training and equipping would be necessary, however, to bring it to combat ready status. Meanwhile, a new 567-man counterinsurgency battalion "Les Leopards," under direct command of the President, is being formed and should attain combat ready status by mid-1972. One 187-man company has completed basic training. The position of the armed forces under the rule of Jean-Claude Duvalier has improved. Pay raises have been granted, several promotions have been made, and the political strength that the once powerful VSN enjoyed under "Papa Doc" has been weakened. The FAD'H has the capability to contain and eliminate small raiding or invading forces of revolutionaries. However, if widespread and violent civic disorders occur, it is questionable whether the armed forces could reestablish order.

B. VSN: The National Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia numbering from 5,000 to 7,000 members, was established by President Francois Duvalier in 1957. They are organized into six geographic departments, one district (Port-au-Prince), and a Palace unit. They have no table of organization, are poorly equipped, lack training and discipline, and are scattered throughout the country in strengths

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generally paralleling that of the general population. Since the demise of "Papa Doc", successor Jean-Claude Duvalier has systematically downgraded the VSN by dismissing the most powerful leaders of this organization and reducing the power of individual militia leaders who were feared and hated throughout the country. Although possibly still a force to be reckoned with, the VSN, without strong leadership in the field, and more important, without support from Jean-Claude and the collegium in Port-au-Prince, is unlikely to become again a serious factor in government stability. Another creation of Papa Doc, the Ton Ton Macoutes, a secret police organization of armed thugs who carried out special assignments -- i.e., murder, arson, extortion, and other violence at the direction of the President, has been disbanded.

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Annex VI Denied Under

Section 1.5 (d) of E.O. 12958.

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Haiti Contingency Annex VII

Active Duty USG Personnel with Haitian Experience (as of
December 15, 1971)

STATE (in Washington as of December 15, 1971)

Robert C. Felder	Stuart Lippe
Russell C. Heater	Norman Warner
Glenn A. Munro	Gerald Levesque
Ruth Schimel	Robert B. Hill
Thomas W. Davis, Jr.	
Matthew P. Ward	
Edward S. Little	

OTHERS (assigned abroad as of October 1971)

Lee McCarthy (Bucharest)	David R. Raynolds (Karachi)
Ralph C. Porter (Moscow)	W. Donn Heaney (Seoul)
Harry M. Montgomery (Ottawa)	Jerry Lujan (Santiago)
Everett K. Melby (Quebec)	Gerald McLaughlin (Tijuana)
Robert W. Maule (Vienna)	Mary E. Welch (Rome)
Harry E. Christie (Belgrade)	Richard T. Booth (Tegucigalpa)
Kenneth J. Ruch (Manila)	Ray Alvarez (Santo Domingo)
	Ted Long (Panama)

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Page 2 of AnnexVII

A.I.D.

Leonard D. Brooks (Lahore)

John Mason (Rio de Janeiro)

George L. Moore (London)

Harry Yoe (Retired-Charlestown, W. Va.)

Norman Ward (retired)

Caspar D. Green (Recife)

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US MILITARY

NAVY

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Arehart, Robert C.	LT	670858
Bader, Allen L.	CDR	527079
Barrick, Richard H.	CAPT	587763
Bird, Comer H., Jr.	CAPT	483578
Briand, Rene L.	CDR	444086
Brown, Lawrence	LCDR	607499
Cave, Thomas H.	LCDR	509747
Dick, Joseph L.	CDR	572103
Garbow, Bernard L.	CAPT	125012
Gibson, Richard H.	CAPT	282863
Hahnert, William F., Jr.	CDR	391433
Harris, Melvin W.	CAPT	472536
Johnson, Charles O.	LCDR	631936
Keller, Harry S., Jr.	CAPT	485309
Kelso, Quinten A.	CDR	490828
Kloman, John H.	LCDR	565372
Kuder, Donald L.	CDR	514824
Lyons, Robert F.	CAPT	315385
MacLeod, Wallace F., Jr.	LCDR	618455
McLean, Donald H.	CAPT	237180
McLoughlin, James	CDR	503098
Melissari, James J.	LT	667448

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Nichols, Richard D.	LCDR	621593
Norris, Frederick J.	LCDR	535009
Opgrand, David A.	LCDR	564299
Pelletier, Louis Emery	LCDR	622902
Robinson, Donald G., Jr.	CDR	543137
Rood, George H.	CAPT	096239
Ryan, Paul B.	CAPT	077164
Van Horssen, David A.	CDR	567719
Van Patten, David G.	LCDR	639315

MARINE CORPS

Angelo, Leon N.	LCOL	058025
Babe, George A.	COL	047597
Laporte, Alphonse, Jr.	LCOL	059346
Lillich, Gerald L.	COL	049315
Newtown, Glenford	CWO4	072133
Quint, Frederick A.	COL	019557
Wilder, Gary	COL	
Baker, Gerald K.	SGT	2190347
Bates, Arthur G.	SGT	2357057
Cole, Earl L., Jr.	SGT	2447016
Cosgro, Anthony M.	SGT	2285740
De Fant, Lee R.	SGT	2121458
Dickey, Patrick	SGT	2310833
Dring, John P.	SGT	2345499

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Eckhardt, Gerald P.	SGT	2218659
Erberle, John T.	SGT	2100579
Ewing, Lebus L.	SGT	1586495
Grice, Allen G.	SGT	1485377
Jackson, William R.	SGT	2312964
Kennedy, John J.	SGT	2327411
Louther, Charlie E.	CPL	2246894
Reed, James E.	SGT	2332900
Reimer, Douglas P.	CPL	2496431
Scott, Toiries, Jr.	SGT	2344959
Shultz, Thomas J.	SGT	2289170
Stransky, Daniel C.	SSGT	2033638

AIR FORCE

Hamilton, William A.	LCOL	556-18-2603
Heider, Eugene J.	LCOL	350-12-3023
Kirkpatrick, Herman L.	COL	414-16-2961
Morrision, Carl G.	CAPT	433-52-8526
Stewart, John G.	LCOL	208-18-0128
Cote, Jean M.A.D.	TSGT	002-22-0039
Davis, John W.	SMSGT	262-46-1668
Paulin, Maurice F.	MSGT	

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX VIII

SUMMARY: Mass Communications Media in Haiti

There are six daily newspapers with an estimated total circulation of 7,600. The dailies are: Haiti Journal, Le Jour, Le Matin, Le Nouvellite, Oedipe, Panorama and Le Nouveau Monde.

There is one government-operated television station and 15 radio stations in the capital, 3 of which are inactive. There are about 10 stations located outside the capital. There are an estimated 282,000 radio receivers in Haiti. (There are only 4,450 telephones).

Support from outside Haiti

VOA would be able to initiate a shortwave broadcast in French and creole.

Relays of this broadcast via medium wave to Haiti, one of which could be USIA's 50 KW transmitter at Marathon Key, Florida. Other possibilities would be WKVM - Puerto Rico (810 KC - 25 KW) and any number of clear channel stations at Atlanta and New Orleans in case of great emergency.

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RADIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Call Letters</u>	<u>Medium Wave</u>	<u>Short Wave</u>	<u>Kilocycles</u>	<u>Meters</u>	<u>Kilowatts</u>	<u>Director</u>	<u>Address</u>
Voice de la revolution	4VC 4VB		X X	9485 5985	31.61 50.13	7.5 7.5	Dir. Gen. S. Lesseque Tech. Dir., A. Brown	Box 1143 Port-au-Prince
Duvalieriste	4VA	X		1080	50.13	1.5		
Diffusion Haitienne	4VM 4VYM	X	X	4940 1250		0.5 0.6	Y. Michel	Ruelle Jeanty
Caraibes	4VEB 4VAB	X	X	6015 1150	49.88	.75 1		Ruelle Chavanne
Union	4VG 4VF	X	X	6050 1120	49.59	0.1 0.2		1 Ruelle Louverture Box 737, Port-au-Prince
Haiti	4VUHW 4VW	X	X	6080 1330	49.34	1 1.5	Dir. R. Widmaier, Tech. Dir. H. Widmaier	Box 525, Port-au-Prince
Manrese	4VM		X	*6165	48.66	1		Box 525, Port-au-Prince
Progress	4VLS	X		860		0.2		Boulevard Dessalines 758
Nationale	4V2A	X		*880		.15		Route de Carrefour
Corillon	4VCD	X		960		0.3		Rue Dr. Aubry 157
Cacique	4VCPS	X		990		0.2		Rue Traversiere 3

*inactive

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RADIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Call Letters</u>	<u>Medium Wave</u>	<u>Short Wave</u>	<u>Kilocycles</u>	<u>Meters</u>	<u>Kilowatts</u>	<u>Director</u>	<u>Address</u>
Propiques	4VRD	X		1170		0.25		Ave. John Brown
Port-au-Prince	4VS	X		1385		1		Stade Sylvio Cator
Loire broad-casting circuit	4VGM	X		1430		1	Frank C. Magloire (owns Le Matin)	Rue Americaine
Voix des Antilles	4VPE	X		*1475		0.2		Rue Capois 68
Quisqueya	4VA2F	X		*1530		0.15		Rue des Miracles 8

TELEVISION

De Haiti	4VMR	Channel A5	25.06	Dir. Gen. A.S. Apaid; Tech. Dir. E.C. Gentil	P.O. Box 1126 Port-au-Prince
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*Inactive

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ANNEX IX - OUTLINE OF CONTINGENCIES

CONTINGENCY A: Breakdown of Collegium rule: internal struggle ensues among family and followers

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal

Breakdown of the collegial rule causes increased jockeying for power behind the scenes. Various factions emerge grouped around civilian or military leaders.

There may be little open violence or disorder as various armed groups (the regular military, police, any VSN militia remnants - few civilians are armed) stand fast, cautiously watch and wait to see how the balance of forces and the new structure of power shapes up. Initial power may shift to those, presumably in the Palace, who are immediately aware of the breakdown in the collegium and who are in a position to control ammunition reportedly stored in the Palace. Individuals who threaten to upset this initial delicate balance may be neutralized through arrest or diplomatic exile, but sparingly if at all through assassination.

Reaction in other LA countries: Some concern and uncertainty, particularly in the Dominican Republic -- the only LA country whose national interest is directly affected by events in Haiti. Dominican military can be expected to alert and reinforce border military posts to prevent, inter alia, any mass exodus of Haitians. Some fear (and/or expectations) among LAs that U.S. reflex action will be to intervene.

Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reaction: Propaganda reaction hailing disappearance of "imperialist puppet, Duvalier regime" and calling for popular front political action or similar propaganda themes. Haitians trained in Cuba may (at Castro's bidding) attempt to infiltrate Haiti, as might Haitians from the Dominican Republic, but in the beginning these attempts are likely to involve only a few individuals testing the political waters before deciding on a decisive plunge.

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Potential Dangers: If there is widespread arming of civilian population (e.g. through distribution of GOH arms stocks to civilians, or the clandestine delivery of arms from abroad ahead of time or at the inception of the crisis), this could lead to large scale violence and protracted struggle.

Threats to safety of Americans, arising from potential violence, or from calculated efforts to provoke U.S. intervention through attacks on Americans.

Trouble in Haiti could trigger exaggerated reflex action by the Dominican Government, including an over-reaction by Dominican armed forces along the border.

Splitting or splintering of Haitian armed forces leading to inconclusive fighting between contending armed groups, possibly complicated by indiscriminate arming of civilians by whichever group controls the reserve weapons and ammunition at the Palace.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Emergence of a non-Communist Government, as a minimum (preferably one promising to be responsive to the social and economic needs of the Haitian people, although this is not a primary U.S. objective). Restoration of order and the normal processes of society.

Political-Economic Actions: Consult with OAS Secretary General and LA countries concerning situation. U.S. Embassy maintains close liaison with OAS Mission in Haiti. If the safety of Americans is threatened, implement the E&E plan, using commercial means for evacuation. (Inform LA states and other countries having citizens in Haiti of commercial evacuation and offer our facilitative assistance if desired). Consult closely with the Dominican Republic and if necessary, seek to restrain the D.R. military from impetuous actions.

If situation becomes so violent or chaotic that a commercial evacuation is not feasible, Americans should be instructed to standfast at home or at assembly points designated in E&E plan.

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In such situation, consult OAS regarding safety of foreign nationals in Haiti and press for OAS action to resolve problem.

Consult on bilateral basis with other Caribbean, Central American and North Coast countries regarding developing situation and the possibility Communist groups from outside Haiti may try to exploit situation and introduce men or supplies into Haiti.

If power struggle is prolonged, consult in OAS on what if any OAS assistance might be desirable and feasible in fostering a return to internal stability and responsible government in Haiti.

Military Actions: Institute immediate air and sea surveillance of waters between Haiti and Cuba. Inform OAS of men or supplies from Cuba that may be detected.

Alert CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE to possible need for military means of evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals if commercial means not feasible and if OAS calls upon US for such assistance.

Other Actions: Inform selected members of Congress of situation in Haiti and our views with respect to safety of American citizens, E&E plan, consultation with OAS, etc.

Provide background briefing to US press corps, if necessary, to clarify their understanding of the situation.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: The restrained posture of the U.S. (interest focused on legitimate concern for safety of American with a "hands off" posture towards internal power struggle) could foster a resolution of the struggle as competing individuals and groups realize they must spend their energies on coming to terms among themselves rather than seeking U.S. backing for their pretensions. However, realization that the U.S. does not intend to intervene, could lead to a short-lived intensification of violence and brutality as the contenders engage in a final, no-holds-barred struggle.

"Pro-U.S." elements in emerging new power structure seek U.S. economic (and possibly military) support to maintain their power against what they may term the "Communist" opposition.

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Communist elements inside Haiti lie low in the immediate period, but will actively seek to exploit situation as time goes on.

International: Reaction of Free World generally favorable to restrained U.S. "hands off" attitude, although some observers blame U.S. for permitting another "Duvalier-type" government to take power. Also, some criticism that U.S. inaction and "hands off" attitude has encouraged bloodshed and that U.S. seeming disinterested stems from prejudice against Haiti as a black nation while U.S. was quick to act in the "white Dominican Republic".

OAS appreciated US initiatives in consulting with it from earliest stage on inherent problems in situation and uses OAS Mission already established in Haiti as a continuing source of information on developing situation. OAS supports U.S. proposals for OAS-sponsored evacuation (utilizing U.S. military facilities after non-feasibility of commercial evacuation and continuing danger to foreigners has become evident).

Communist: Communist propaganda deplores newly-emerging power group as another Duvalierist government, representing "U.S. imperialist effort" to replace one "lackey" with another.

No direct, overt involvement in the Haitian situation at that time.

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CONTINGENCY B: Collegium rule breaks down; a struggle for power ensues and attempts are made to infiltrate extremists from Cuba to join struggle

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal

In the jockeying for power between factions in the immediate aftermath of the collegium's breakdown (as envisaged in Contingency A), small groups of infiltrators, or individual agents, are introduced clandestinely into Haiti from Cuba.

Guerrilla-type actions are reported from a number of outlying areas in Haiti, and isolated instances of sabotage and urban terrorism are attributed to Cuban infiltrators and Communists.

The on-going power struggle in Port-au-Prince paralyzes central government counteraction against guerilla activities in the provinces. Local unit commanders stand fast, in a defensive posture, prepared to repel attacks on themselves or their immediate areas, but not to deploy their limited forces into the field to hunt down the intruders (particularly so because they are uncertain as to whether the intruders represent Cuban infiltrators or legitimate Haitian exile groups).

In Port-au-Prince, one or more of the factions seeking power appeals for U.S. help against the Cuban intruders. An appeal may also be made to the OAS but this is less likely.

Reactions in other LA Countries: Mixed alarm and skepticism over reports of Cuban infiltration, and mounting interest in verifying facts of the situation. Some alarm in the Dominican Republic, with the Dominican army alerted and ordered to increase border vigilance.

OAS takes cognizance of these reports, calls upon member states (and the OAS Mission in Haiti) to furnish any additional evidence that may be available and appoints a watchdog group to monitor the situation.

If the reports are substantiated, and especially if there is patent Cuban involvement, the OAS may debate the issue and even possibly approve a resolution under the Rio Pact calling upon member states to assist Haiti to repel aggression. However,

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the current uncertain outlook of the OAS makes the outcome of any such debate very unpredictable.

Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reaction: Standard propaganda campaign is launched (vituperation of "US imperialistic puppets" in Haiti, support for "popular demands" of Haitian people, etc.).

Possible effort to bring Haitian situation before the UN either for propaganda purposes or to lay basis for later effort to forestall or attack OAS action possibly detrimental to Soviet or Cuban policies. (An appeal to the UN is all the more likely if Cuba is in fact involved.)

A protracted struggle could result in breakdown (or sabotage) of essential public services. Prolonged disruption of the daily routine, sharpened by deprivation of necessities, might render general population more susceptible to Communist "solutions".

US or OAS failure to respond in a timely and adequate manner to the Communist threat could result in a new government exposed to Communist influence (given their organizational and numerical weakness, it seems unlikely that a Communist-controlled government could emerge over the short term).

In a moment of panic, or as a deliberate tactic to attract US support while eliminating potential rivals, some of the contending power seekers might carry out large-scale arrests and executions of "Communists", loosely and indiscriminately defined. This could seriously deplete Haiti's small reservoir of potential leadership.

US Military involvement, even for limited purposes, could be difficult to terminate gracefully without exposing ourselves to charges of having imposed whatever new government emerges.

Communists may deliberately push anti-American slogans and actions, thus increasing jeopardy of American citizens and property, in effort to polarize Haitian thinking along nationalistic lines.

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SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Emergence of a non-Communist government

Identification of Cuba as the source and instigator of infiltrators.

Other Actions: . If Haitian exile groups seek contact with or assistance from the U.S. advise them to make parallel approaches to the OAS. Make clear to such exile groups US intention to work through OAS to counter any Cuban-Communist intervention, and US readiness to respect outcome of political struggle.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: Contending Haitian factions will concentrate their efforts against each other in the Port-au-Prince area, letting the problem of infiltrators in the provinces go until later, so far as direct action is concerned, but using reports of provincial infiltrators or disturbances to call for US assistance to stop the Communists. If Haitians do not feel US response is satisfactory, widespread arrests of "Communists" may be carried out and even some "Communist" attacks on US citizens or property may take place.

External: Reaction of Free World generally favorable toward restrained US posture.

OAS attitude becomes more and more disposed to follow U.S. lead as it becomes clear that U.S. is avoiding interventionist actions (concentrating primarily on the safety of Americans) and that Cuba is in fact attempting to intervene. This increasingly favorable OAS attitude becomes of crucial importance if it eventually becomes necessary to use force to prevent a Communist-controlled government from seizing power. OAS understanding and approval is also important if it becomes necessary to use US military means to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals.

Communists: Continuing propaganda campaign along standard lines, as in contingency A. No overt involvement in situation unless it appears that OAS will not support forceful measures to prevent Communist seizure of power.

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Potential Dangers: Generally the same as under Contingency B: distribution of weapons to civilians; left-wing manipulation of mobs; breakdown in public services sharpening popular susceptibility to left-wing "solutions"; emergence of strong left-wing influence over new government which could evolve into Communist control over a period of time; possible arrests and executions of rivals by contending factions under pretexts of being "Communists" or "Duvalierist criminals", i.e. selective use of terror. Americans may be targets of politically-motivated violence.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives: The immediate objective remains as in Contingency B to protect Americans, but the emergence of a non-Communist government demands increasing attention as a policy objective. Priority attention must be given to accurate (and publicly useable) intelligence regarding possible ties between left-wing elements and Cuba.

Political-Economic Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B)
In addition, take US initiative if necessary to ensure OAS consideration of potential threat to hemispheric security if left-wing elements in Haiti have close ties with and support from Cuba. Make abundantly clear to the Soviet Union (and through diplomatic channels to Cuba) the seriousness with which we view the situation in Haiti. Special efforts may be necessary to calm Dominican armed forces.

If OAS fails to act, NSC should consider possible unilateral pre-emptive US action, including military force, to prevent a Communist-controlled Haiti.

Military Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B). If evidence mounts of Cuban involvement, NSC should consider a decision on interdiction of ships.

Other Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B)

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: Generally similar to Contingencies A and B. However, intensive efforts will be made by various Haitian factions to involve the US, claiming for example that such "well-known leftists" as the Blanchet brothers, Herve Boyer, Clovis Desinor, etc. are gaining the upper hand (which indeed may be true) and that they will establish a "socialist state".

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External: Reaction of Free World generally favorable toward restrained US posture, although possible emergence of a left-wing government begins stimulating concern about a possible Cuban-Haitian axis against the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Government is especially apprehensive on this score and may provide assistance to Haitian elements opposed to the "leftists" or even intervene directly if nobody else acts.

The OAS appreciates US initiative to consult with it from the earliest stages of the contingency, and is reassured by the general posture of restraint shown by US. OAS is disposed to give a fair hearing to whatever evidence may be available regarding possible ties between Haitian leftists and Cuba, but it is problematical that a majority of the OAS would support effective action to prevent left-wing elements from coming to power.

Communist: Same as in Contingency B.

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CONTINGENCY C: Collegium rule breaks down; in power struggle, known left-wing elements with possible ties to and support from Cuba appear to be winning.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

✓ Immediate Development - Internal: In the jockeying for power in the aftermath of the breakdown the struggle remains indecisive. Casting about for additional strength to give it the necessary marginal advantage over rivals, one faction accepts left-wing promises that they can get help in the form of clandestine arms, men, money and expert advice from Cuba. This faction begins to gain a decisive advantage and, as a bandwagon effect, erstwhile rivals and fence-sitters make peace with the apparent winner.

"Popular demonstrations" take place in Port-au-Prince and in key provincial cities in favor of the winning combination coupled with nationalist and possibly racist or class struggle slogans. As in Contingency B, local military commanders in the provinces remain in a defensive posture, unwilling to take decisive action against local disturbances because they can not be sure who is winning in Port-au-Prince.

In Port-au-Prince, the factions and individuals who feel themselves to be losing appeal for U.S. assistance against the left-wing "Communist" elements.

Reactions in Other LA Countries: Possible emergence of a left-wing group in power produces mixed reactions but is not unduly alarming to most other LAs in view of leftist-nationalist governments already accepted elsewhere in the hemisphere (notably Peru and Chile). Likewise, possible ties between left-wing Haitian elements and Cuba are accepted with equanimity by some and/or skepticism. The Dominican government, however, is deeply concerned over the possible emergence of a left-wing regime in Haiti and Dominican military elements urge direct intervention. In the OAS, an attitude of watchful waiting prevails, with little disposition to conclude that what is happening in Haiti represents a threat to the security of the hemisphere.

Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reactions: Standard propaganda vituperates U.S. "imperialism", supports "popular will" in Haiti, fosters nationalistic fervor. However, care is taken by Communist countries to avoid words or actions which might lend credence to suspicion that left-wing elements are in fact Communist-controlled. Communist tactics in the UN will depend on how OAS deals with subject.

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Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reaction: Standard propaganda campaign is launched (vituperation of "US imperialistic puppets" in Haiti, support for "popular demands" of Haitian people, etc.)

Possible effort to bring Haitian situation before the UN either for propaganda purposes or to lay basis for later effort to forestall or attack OAS action possibly detrimental to Soviet or Cuban policies. (An appeal to the UN is all the more likely if Cuba is in fact involved.)

Potential Dangers: Distribution of weapons to civilians by Communists, or Communist manipulation of civilian groups who may have been armed by non-Communist contenders for power.

A protracted struggle could result in breakdown (or sabotage) of essential public services. Prolonged disruption of the daily routine, sharpened by deprivation of necessities, might render general population more susceptible to Communist "solutions".

US or OAS failure to respond in a timely and adequate manner to the Communist threat could result in a new government exposed to Communist influence (given their organizational and numerical weakness, it seems unlikely that a Communist-controlled government could emerge over the short term).

In a moment of panic, or as a deliberate tactic to attract US support while eliminating potential rivals, some of the contending power seekers might carry out large-scale arrests and executions of "Communists", loosely and indiscriminately defined. This could seriously deplete Haiti's small reservoir of potential leadership.

US military involvement, even for limited purposes, could be difficult to terminate gracefully without exposing ourselves to charges of having imposed whatever new government emerges.

Communists may deliberately push anti-American slogans and actions, thus increasing jeopardy of American citizens and property, in effort to polarize Haitian thinking along nationalistic lines.

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CONTINGENCY D: Collegium rule breaks down; an internal power struggle ensues but fails to produce a winner; the situation degenerates into general disorder, political chaos, widespread bloodshed and destruction of property.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments: Internal jockeying among various power factions fails to produce any dominant leader or group. Wide disagreement among factions over who occupies positions of power.

Substantial violence, looting and destruction of property as law and order break down. General disorder.

Increasing fighting among followers of contending leaders resulting in widespread bloodshed.

Reaction in other LA countries: Concern and uncertainty, particularly among the Caribbean countries. Particular fear in the Dominican Republic that the widespread chaos and disorder might spill over the border. Concern of other LA nations over safety of their nationals. Some fear (and/or expectations) that U.S. will have to intervene.

Soviet, Cuban and ChilCom Reactions: Propaganda reaction hailing disappearance of "imperialist puppet, Duvalier regime".

As prolonged power struggle fails to produce any clear-cut winner, confusion in propaganda may result since future so uncertain. Increasing "anti-Yankee Imperialism" talk if US or OAS intervention appears likely.

Some infiltration of Haiti by militant Haitians from the Dominican Republic or Haitians trained in Cuba (at Castro's bidding) but confusion and chaos may limit their numbers.

Potential Dangers: If there is widespread arming of civilian population (e.g. through distribution of GCH arms stocks to civilians, or the clandestine delivery of arms from abroad), this could lead to large scale violence and protracted struggle.

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Threats to safety of Americans arising coincidentally from calculated efforts to provoke U.S. intervention through attacks on Americans.

A reflex action by Dominican Armed forces could lead to over reaction along border.

Splintering of Haiti's armed forces leading to inconclusive fighting between contending armed groups, possibly complicated by indiscriminate arming of civilians by whichever groups controls the reserve weapons and ammunition at the Palace. Possible development into full scale military confrontation or civil war between opposing forces.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND SOLUTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Restoration of order and normal processes of society. Emergence of a non-Communist government, as a minimum (hopefully one promising to be responsive to the Haitian people's social-economic needs but this is not a primary U.S. objective).

Political-Economic Actions: Consult with OAS Secretary General concerning situation. U.S. Embassy maintains close liaison with OAS Mission in Haiti.

If the safety of Americans is threatened, implement the E&E plans by commercial means if possible. Inform LA States and other countries of commercial evacuation plans and offer our facilitative assistance if desired.

If situation becomes so chaotic or violent as to preclude commercial evacuation, instruct Americans to standfast at home or at assembly points designated in E&E plan. Consult OAS regarding safety of foreign nationals in Haiti and press for OAS action to resolve problem. Offer US military assistance in a multilateral, OAS-sponsored evacuation. If such action is totally impossible send to Haiti US force capable of evacuating US citizens and withdraw force immediately after evacuation is accomplished.

Close consultation may be necessary with the Dominican Republic to calm their fears over the spreading chaos next door and to prevent any precipitous action on the part of the Dominican Armed Forces.

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Consult in OAS on what OAS assistance might be desirable and feasible in fostering a return to stability and effective government in Haiti. Offer all possible US support for OAS action in this area and press OAS to accept responsibility but carefully limit US bilateral involvement in internal Haitian matters and make known our intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist government. If the situation continues chaotic, with widespread disorder and bloodshed, and the OAS fails to act, the NSC may have to consider some type of unilateral US move to restore law and order in Haiti and to establish some type of stable non-Communist government.

Military Actions: Institute immediate air and sea surveillance of water between Haiti and Cuba. Inform OAS of any movement of men or supplies from Cuba that may be detected. If evidence of Cuban intervention surfaces, NSC should consider interdiction of ships. Alert CINCLANT and CINCSRIKE to possible need of military means of evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals if commercial means not feasible and if OAS calls upon US for such help.

Other Action: Inform selected members of Congress of situation in Haiti and our views with respect to safety of Americans, E&E plan, OAS consultation etc.

If necessary, provide background briefing to US press corps to clarify their understanding of situation.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSE OF ACTION

Internal: The restrained posture of U.S. (interest focused on legitimate concern for safety of Americans combined with a strictly "hand off" posture regarding the internal power struggle) may help to promote some type of resolution of the struggle as the competing groups stop vainly appealing to the US for help and decide they must come to terms with themselves. Growing realization U.S. does not intend to intervene may aid in allowing situation to "bottom out" with some type of coalition coming to power, although short-lived intensification of violence may result as contenders indulge in last-ditch, no-holds-barred attempt to gain power.

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International: OAS image greatly strengthened by US initiative to consult with it from earliest stage of crisis. Using OAS Mission already in Haiti, OAS may call for immediate cease fire and may send additional representatives to Haiti to consult with OAS Mission members. OAS supports US proposals for OAS-sponsored evacuation (utilizing U.S. military facilities after non-feasibility of commercial evacuation and continuing danger to foreigners has become evident). An extremely chaotic and violent situation in Haiti might lead the OAS, after much debate, to authorize the use of an OAS-controlled peacekeeping force to restore order and promote the formation of a provisional government, although the outlook for such an action by the OAS is very uncertain.

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