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NSC Interdepartmental Group/Inter-American Affairs

Contingency Study for Haiti

Completed March, 1971

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I. The Problem

Although President Francois Duvalier has now clarified the constitutional confusion that previously existed on the "succession" issue by formally designating his only son Jean-Claude as "Successor to the Presidency", it is still likely that the death or incapacitation of President Duvalier will introduce a period of political confusion and some disarray. The 20-year old Jean-Claude will most likely be confined to a figurehead role, while jockeying for power behind the scenes continues. Moreover, it is doubtful that Jean-Claude could maintain even this "figurehead" position for more than a short interim period, and it is likely that someone within the "Duvalier" entourage will eventually emerge in a dominant position. It is extremely difficult to predict the exact shape of the new power structure or the identities of the new leaders. While the immediate post-Duvalier situation may be marked with instability and may even appear chaotic for the first few days, it is unlikely that widespread violence will occur.

However, in the event of a serious or protracted breakdown of law and order, we may be faced with difficult decisions regarding the possible deployment of US forces to evacuate Americans (and other foreign nationals). The attitude of the OAS towards participating in or sanctioning such actions would be an important factor in such a decision. Another factor, difficult to assess, is the risk that prolonged involvement in the affairs of Haiti, a country whose population is overwhelmingly black, might entangle this international problem with domestic racial issues. Any unilateral use of U.S. forces would tend to commit us to a longer-term, costly involvement in Haiti's internal situation unless a decision to use such force only to evacuate Americans was clearly defined at the outset and strictly limited in its execution.

II.A. U.S. Interests and Objectives

Interests (as stated in NSSM-70, approved by NSC on November 13, 1970) U.S. interest in Haiti is based on:

- (1) its location in the Caribbean, near Florida and Cuba, and bordering Dominican Republic;

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(2) the \$50-60 million in U.S. private investment, the substantial American missionary and charitable activities, and the fact that about 1,000 of our citizens are residents there;

(3) Haiti's role as a member of the United Nations and the Inter-American system;

(4) a humanitarian concern about the poverty, illiteracy and ill health of its people.

Objectives (as stated in NSSM-70)

Our objectives are to:

(1) Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control threatening the security of the U.S. (e.g., Cuban missile crisis).

(2) Prevent, to the extent politically feasible, Haiti from becoming a base or haven for subversion, anti-U.S. attitudes, extremism, and racism in the Caribbean.

(3) Protect U.S. lives.

(4) Alleviate conditions of misery and deprivation, out of humanitarian concern for the Haitian people.

(5) Avoid supporting the Duvalier dictatorship.

(6) Stimulate Inter-American and other multilateral interest and involvement in social, economic and other problems of Haiti (including emergency problems of public order and political transition that may arise when Duvalier leaves the scene).

(7) Protect, to the extent feasible, property and other interests of U.S. citizens.

(8) Encourage the establishment of more stable and progressive institutions in the post-Duvalier period.

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II.B. Assumptions

- (1) Cuba will not intervene openly in a Haitian contingency.
- (2) Current Communist strength in Haiti is not sufficient to seize power, or to acquire a controlling influence in the early stages of a post-Duvalier regime.
- (3) Should assumptions 1 and 2 prove valid, the U.S. would not be required to take precipitate military action to achieve its objective of ensuring that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.
- (4) If (contrary to assumption no. 1) Cuba intervenes openly and demonstrably, prospects are reasonably good that the OAS would consider such intervention as falling within the Rio Treaty and would support measures to repel this threat to hemispheric security, including the use of armed force if the aggression were on a scale that required it.
- (5) The U.S. will tolerate any Haitian Government that is not Communist-controlled.

II.C. Contingencies

The contingencies addressed in this Plan (discussed in detail in Annex 9) reflect our assessment of the current situation and outlook in Haiti, and are in keeping with the estimates made in the NSSM-70 study (page 22) regarding the situation immediately after Duvalier dies and the longer term post-Duvalier situation. The likelihood of his death from natural causes appears greater than violent death, but the ensuing situation is likely to be similar in either event. Four contingencies (in descending order of likelihood) are analyzed, with Contingencies A and B considered substantially more likely in the short run than either C or D:

A. Duvalier dies; an internal struggle for power ensues among his family and followers.

B. Duvalier dies; a struggle for power ensues and attempts are made to infiltrate extremists from Cuba to join struggle.

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C. Duvalier dies; in power struggle, known left-wing elements with possible ties to and support from Cuba appear to be winning.

D. Duvalier dies; an internal struggle for power ensues but fails to produce a winner; the situation degenerates into general disorder, political chaos, widespread bloodshed and destruction of property.

II.D. Optional Courses of Action

(The following optional courses of action are analyzed in detail in Section III)

A. Objective: Protection of American lives.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Commercial evacuation.
- (2) Standby at home or at assembly area in Haiti.
- (3) OAS-endorsed military-assisted evacuation.
- (4) International Red Cross-sponsored evacuation.
- (5) Unilateral U.S. military-assisted evacuation, with minimum equipment and force needed.

B. Objective: Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Surveillance of waters between Cuba and Haiti.
- (2) Through diplomatic channels make clear to Soviet Union that any Cuban or Soviet involvement in Haitian situation would be viewed with deepest concern by USG. Convey same message to Cuban Government through Swiss.
- (3) Intercept and turn back boats bound for Haiti from Cuba.

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- (4) Ask French, and Canadian Governments to prevent return of known Communists to Haiti; ask all third countries to prevent arms shipments to Haiti.
- (5) Consider deployment of US naval units as a show of force.
- (6) Supply arms to anti-Communist Haitian forces.
- (7) Seek OAS sponsorship of Inter-American Force.
- (8) Consult with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states.
- (9) Unilateral use of US forces in Haiti.

C. Objective: Encourage establishment of more stable and progressive institutions in post-Duvalier period.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Consult closely with OAS from the outset and encourage it to be primary source of advice and guidance to Haitians.
- (2) Make known US intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist Government and actively exploit all opportunities to exert U.S. influence from outset of contingency situation.

D. Objective: Protection of U.S. Property.

Courses of Action:

- (1) Rely upon Haitian police and armed forces to protect major U.S. owned properties.
- (2) Seek OAS resolution calling upon Haitian authorities and people to protect safety and property of all non-Haitians and consider deployment of U.S. naval units to areas adjacent to major U.S.-owned property as a show of force.

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II.E. Key Issues

A. Unilateral Use of Force. The issue involves questions as to nature, purpose and timing, amount of force (bare minimum or maximum impact?), effect on OAS and other international relationships as well as the future U.S. bilateral relationship with Haiti. Failure to use force in a timely manner could jeopardize achievement of bilateral objectives in Haiti, but premature or excessive reliance on force could seriously damage broader U.S. international interests.

IG-ARA Position. Unilateral use of force should be regarded as a "last resort" course of action, when all other optional courses of action including a multilateral, or OAS endorsed, use of force have been found inadequate. In such an eventuality, unilateral force should be carefully limited in terms of the objective to be accomplished, and in the type and size of force assigned to achieve the objective, and the force should be withdrawn immediately upon accomplishment of the objective.

For example, if American citizens can only be evacuated through unilateral military means, the objective should be clearly limited to evacuation, within a strictly limited time frame, and employing the minimum of equipment and force needed to accomplish that objective. In any case, specific Presidential approval of the use of force would be required.

The most likely requirement, other than for evacuation purposes, for unilateral use of force would involve interdiction of ships bound for Haiti from Cuba. Such a requirement should be met through use of naval and air forces, without involving ground forces.

It should be noted that ground forces, once deployed, are inherently more susceptible of involvement in matters not directly related to the specific objective envisaged, requiring greater logistic support and greater protection for themselves, and presenting greater problems in the withdrawal stage. In any consideration of the use of U.S. ground forces for purposes other than evacuation, it should be clearly recognized that such a use will involve us in responsibility for decision making in a political environment almost totally lacking in stable institutions, traditions, or leadership, and that our involvement in the internal political situation would most probably have to continue for several years.

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In none of the contingencies outlined is there envisaged a need for unilateral U.S. military involvement in the immediate period following Duvalier's death.

B. Should the U.S. tolerate any non-Communist Haitian Government? The issue involves such questions as: the relative importance of our objective of encouraging more stable and progressive institutions in Haiti; whether there is a realistic prospect for a "quantum jump" in Haitian institutional development given the inherent limitations of that society; whether it is in the longer-term U.S. interest to "hand-pick" new leaders who would likely be dependent on continuing U.S. support once in power.

IG-ARA Position. Our primary objectives in Haiti, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, are: to ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control threatening U.S. security; to prevent, if politically feasible, Haiti from becoming a base or haven for subversion, anti-U.S. attitudes, extremism and racism; and to protect U.S. lives. While the U.S. is interested in encouraging more stable and progressive institutions, we recognize that such a goal is a long-term one and is clearly subordinate to the above-mentioned goals which are our primary objectives in Haiti. Furthermore, President Nixon, in his Latin American policy address of October 31, 1969, outlined our new policy of accepting LA governments as they are, not necessarily as we would like them to be. NSSM-70 states our vital national interests in Haiti are not greatly threatened now or in the foreseeable future. There is general agreement that (a) we know little about the real views or the governing potential of the various non-Communist factions who might contend for power, and (b) our own past efforts to influence internal Haitian affairs have not been productive. Accordingly, it is believed that any non-Communist Haitian Government can be tolerated by the USG. The above, of course, does not imply our unwillingness to exercise discreet influence over the new government in desirable directions.

C. What is the operational significance for the U.S. of a situation in which some Communists may be in positions of influence in a new government but have not gained control? This issue raises questions as to: the real potential of the

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Communist movement in Haiti; the relative costs and benefits of (a) nipping Communist influence in the bud or (b) refraining from action until it becomes clear whether Communists have come into control; the reaction of the Dominican Government (and the problems this could cause for the U.S.) to a rising Communist potential in Haiti which would be perceived by the Dominicans as an immediate threat to themselves; the effect our decision on this issue would have on our relationship with the OAS as an institution, bilaterally with other Latin American governments and generally on our international relations.

IG-ARA Position. Many Haitians, both in the country and in exile, will make liberal use of the term "Communist" in an effort to induce U.S. involvement in a political struggle. These 'charges' must be judged in the light of what we know about the present strength and effectiveness of the Haitian Communist Party. Communists should be defined as persons known to have been actively and wittingly involved in Communist activities, or against whom there is substantial evidence of such activities. Others, who may have been vaguely reported to be "Communists" in the past or are considered "leftists" (e.g. Desinor, the Blanchet brothers, Boyer, Jacques Laroche) should not be considered Communists unless substantial new evidence appears so indicating.

Communist control should be defined as the emergence in positions of dominant power (such as the head of a new government or the chief of the armed forces) of known Communists. The important consideration should be whether Communist individuals are in positions where they can command resources, e.g. the arms and men of the police or armed forces; the money under the control of the Finance Ministry or the Regie du Tabac; the communications media subject to control by the Information Ministry. Consideration of the use of military force by the U.S. to eliminate Communist influence from a coalition-type government should be limited to those situations in which (a) the full use of U.S. resources, both overt and covert, has clearly not been successful; and (b) there is clear and unequivocal evidence that such influence is growing rapidly and will shortly result in control of the government.

As a matter of operational policy, the U.S. should

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follow the developing situation closely and utilize the full array of U.S. political, economic and psychological resources, but stopping short of military means, to eliminate or minimize Communist influence, as distinguished from Communist control.

III. Analysis of Optional Courses of Action Available to U.S.

A. Objective: Protection of American lives.

- (1) Commercial evacuation, acquired through Military Airlift Command (MAC) if evacuation carried out under USG auspices.
- (2) Standby at home or at assembly area in Haiti.

In achieving this objective, we wish to avoid any basis for speculation that our actions are politically motivated. The need for caution in this respect cannot be over-emphasized in the light of events in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and widespread speculation that the situation in Haiti when Duvalier dies and the US reaction will closely parallel the 1965 Dominican experience. Courses of action (1) and (2) entail little risk of misinterpretation.

(3) OAS-endorsed military-assisted evacuation.

Our success in implementing this course of action will hinge on our ability to convince the OAS (at least a majority, and preferably two-thirds) that the US objective is exclusively one of protecting American and foreign lives through evacuation. This course of action envisages use of U.S. military aircraft or vessels; a possible variant which would be easier to "sell" to the OAS but might be harder to implement would involve OAS chartering of commercial air carriers and OAS arrangements with the Haitian Government to permit safe landing of the aircraft and safe access to it by evacuees.

(4) International Red Cross-sponsored evacuation.

This course of action was followed in the evacuation of foreigners from Amman, Jordan in 1970. It is recommended in the event the first three optional courses of action cannot be implemented.

- (5) Unilateral U.S. military-assisted evacuation, with minimum equipment and force needed.

This course of action has the serious disadvantages of

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(1) being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention;
(2) risking involvement of the United States in activities not directly related to our objective of protecting American lives; and (3) fueling Haitian Nationalistic feelings and abetting Communist propaganda. Accordingly, this course of action should be regarded as a "last resort" when all other optional courses of action have been found inadequate, and the jeopardy to American lives is so great that it becomes the overriding policy consideration.

B. Objective: Ensure that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control.

(1) Surveillance of waters between Cuba and Haiti.

This course of action should be undertaken at the outset of any of the four contingency situations discussed in this plan, as a precautionary measure designed (1) to discourage any Cuba-based attempt to interfere before it got started and (2) to increase our capability to detect any movements from Cuba that might be initiated.

(2) Through diplomatic channels make clear to Soviet Union that any Cuban or Soviet involvement in Haitian situation would be viewed with deepest concern by USG. Convey same message to Cuban Government through Swiss.

This course of action should also be considered at the outset of any of the four contingency situations if there is a sound basis for suspecting that Cuban or Soviet involvement in the Haitian situation is in prospect. A decision to implement this course of action would naturally be based on the total context of our relations with the Soviet Union at the time, not merely on the Haitian situation.

(3) Intercept and turn back boats bound for Haiti from Cuba.

This course of action would be a contravention of international law unless it were taken pursuant to an OAS or UN resolution. It would also carry some risk of low-level hostilities on the high seas between intercepting U.S. Navy vessels and Cuban boats. These risks may be reduced (although not eliminated) through careful implementation of the action, i.e. by refraining from use of force (as distinguished from show of force) in halting boats and verifying their business.

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- (4) Ask French, and Canadian Governments to prevent return of known Communists to Haiti; ask all third countries to prevent arms shipments to Haiti.

This course of action may be undertaken as a precautionary measure at the inception of a contingency situation in Haiti. In approaching the French and Canadian Governments on prevention of the return of Communists to Haiti, we should be prepared to supply names of individual Communists living in their jurisdiction. Care should be taken to keep this proposed action limited to known Communists or those against whom there is substantial basis for suspicion of Communist activities.

- (5) Consider deployment of US naval units as a show of force.

This course of action has proven most effective in the past in situations where, for example, a beleaguered government has derived new confidence from a show of U.S. Naval force, and/or non-Communist forces threatening the status quo have been thus influenced to abandon their disruptive efforts. In the Haitian contingencies envisaged in this plan, a show of U.S. Naval force would be most effective in discouraging intervention by Cuba-based forces which might otherwise be tempted to move into Haiti. The reaction inside Haiti to a show of U.S. naval force might be counterproductive in terms of our objective of preventing Communist control, since such action by the U.S. could be pictured as a prelude to intervention and generate potent Nationalistic feelings which could be exploited by Communists. Accordingly, if US naval units are deployed, the purpose of the deployment should be made public (to prevent external intervention in Haiti) and the units should be kept well out of sight of land. A decision to deploy U.S. naval units close to shore should weigh carefully (1) whether a potentially viable non-Communist regime exists warranting the gamble that a show of force would provide the necessary margin for it to prevail over a potential Communist regime; and/or (2) whether a potential Communist regime might be able to exploit a U.S. show of force to gain the margin of power. In the event a Communist regime has already gained control, other courses of action should be followed to attain our objectives.

(6) Supply arms to anti-Communist Haitian forces.

This course of action should be carried out pursuant to an authorizing OAS resolution, if possible. Otherwise, covert means should be considered. A third alternative, a direct USG transfer of arms to Haitian forces, should be considered in the light of (1) whether the non-Communist forces have sufficient potential for success to warrant USG identification with them and/or (2) whether the Communist influenced factions could gain a decisive margin of popular support by characterizing the U.S.-helped forces as neo-Duvalierists and Yankee puppets. Another factor to be carefully weighed in such a decision is whether the non-Communist forces really lack arms, or whether they lack the will to struggle without U.S. material support, or whether they are using their alleged need for arms as a device to obtain U.S. political identification with themselves (as Duvalier has sought to do on occasion).

(7) Seek OAS sponsorship of Inter-American Force.

This course of action should be pursued if Cuba intervenes openly and demonstrably in Haiti. As stated in the Assumptions section of this Plan, prospects are reasonably good that the OAS would consider such intervention as falling within the Rio Treaty and would support measures to repel this threat to hemispheric security, including the use of armed force if the aggression were on a scale that required it. A corollary may be made to this assumption that the OAS is not likely to authorize use of force if the evidence does not clearly and convincingly support the conclusion that Haiti is in danger of becoming a hostile military base under Communist control. The question may arise as to whether OAS authorization for the use of force should be sought if preliminary consultation reveals that not enough votes are in prospect to carry the resolution. The answer to this question may rest on a more basic long term question of whether the U.S. wishes to continue to rely on the OAS for regional security purposes. If the answer is "no", optional courses of action (8) and (9), discussed below, should be considered. If the answer is "yes" and the U.S. feels its longer term security interest in preserving and strengthening the OAS outweighs its immediate security interest in Haiti, course of action (9) involving unilateral U.S. force should not be used, and course of action (8) should not contemplate possible use of force outside the OAS framework.

(8) Consult with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states.

This course of action refers rather narrowly to consultation with the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean states outside the OAS framework on the problem of ensuring that Haiti does not become a hostile military base under Communist control. Course of action (8) would be a fall-back position to be considered after course of action (7) had failed; the purpose of such consultation would be to explore carefully what means, including use of force jointly or unilaterally, might be taken to prevent Haiti's becoming a hostile military base under Communist control. Adopting course of action (8) would imply U.S. willingness to tolerate a further deterioration in OAS prestige and authority as a regional security organization.

(9) Unilateral use of U.S. forces in Haiti.

This course of action is our "last resort" after all other courses of action have failed. It would signal our ultimate willingness to "go it alone" when we consider our vital interests threatened. In implementing course of action (9), the overriding principle should be to use the minimum necessary force to accomplish the objective: for example, use of a close-to-shore show of naval force followed, if necessary, by a small Marine force or a similar-sized airborne or air-landed force. Tactics should be governed more by political considerations than by such classic objectives as defeating the opposing forces or occupying key points: for example, general military occupation of the capital city would not be a desirable political objective, and military attacks against Haitian troops should be avoided if at all possible. The concept of the operation might be, instead, to occupy and protect a very few key installations such as the American Embassy, the electric power plant and petroleum tank farms -- all near the waterfront -- and to throw blocking forces across the South Road and the North Road at the outskirts of the city in order to encourage anti-Communist Haitian forces to rally outside the city and then to move against the forces under the nominal control of the Communist regime inside Port-au-Prince. Our objective should be to permit a Haitian "solution" to the politico-military problem of a Communist regime in Haiti -- a solution worked out by Haitians using their own soldiers and arms and political skills. Our military presence would provide encouragement and protection for anti-Communist Haitian forces to organize themselves, (with such encouragement including provision of arms as required), but we would avoid dictating a solution.

C. Objective: Encourage establishment of more stable and progressive institutions in post-Duvalier period.

(1) Consult closely with OAS from the outset and encourage it to be primary source of advice and guidance to Haitians.

This objective ranks at the bottom of our list of objectives because we recognize the practical impossibility of imposing "stable and progressive institutions" in Haiti from the outside. We also recognize that bilateral "encouragement" of such institutions could lead to the type of deep involvement in the internal functioning of the Haitian Government which has proved so irritating mutually frustrating and counterproductive in the past. In order to avoid such over-involvement, course of action (1) calls for this objective to be pursued multilaterally through the IDB and the IBRD as well as the OAS, which has a technical advisory mission in Haiti already. As a corollary, this course of action implies that the U.S. will respond, as appropriate, to Haitian bilateral approaches for advice, guidance and assistance by referring them to the OAS and other multilateral organizations. This does not mean that we will stand completely aloof and apart, but that we will endeavor to enlarge and facilitate the multilateral role in Haitian institutional development.

(2) Make known US intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist Government and actively exploit all opportunities to exert U.S. influence from outset of contingency situation.

This course of action is an alternative to (1), resting on the assumption that U.S. bilateral influence can be effective in the establishment of stable, progressive Haitian institutions. Past experience indicates that U.S. bilateral efforts are sometimes successful in dissuading Haitian officials from actions that would be detrimental to existing institutions, but that bilateral efforts seldom foster lasting and positive institutional development. To an unusual degree, Haitian institutions reflect the men who create or administer them, and the high rate of political attrition of such men results in highly unstable institutions. U.S. inability to preserve institutions (e.g. the Artibonite Valley Authority) by shielding Haitian administrators from political storms was a major cause of the failure of our bilateral assistance program in the early years of the Duvalier government.

D. Objective: Protection of U.S. Property.

(1) Rely upon Haitian police and armed forces to protect major U.S. owned properties.

This course of action is the normal state of affairs. U.S. property in Haiti has not been the target of violence or sabotage in the past, and Haitian popular attitudes toward the U.S. and toward U.S. enterprises in Haiti are not such as to presage special property protection problems in the event of a crisis.

(2) Seek OAS resolution calling upon Haitian authorities and people to protect safety and property of all non-Haitians and consider deployment of U.S. naval units to areas adjacent to major U.S.-owned property as a show of force.

This course of action should be considered in a situation of general breakdown in law and order when an OAS appeal might be heeded but other measures are not warranted. Considering the relative insignificance in terms of value and importance to the U.S. of American-owned property in Haiti, the possible deployment of U.S. naval units as a show of force is not a realistic or warranted course of action to achieve this objective. However, if as a result of violence, jeopardy to American lives is so great that it becomes the overriding policy consideration, unilateral US military-assisted evacuation, with minimum equipment and force, might be warranted.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY PLAN

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Contingency Annex I

Haiti Situation as of March 1, 1971

Since coming to power over 13 years ago (October 22, 1957), President Duvalier has throttled political dialogue in Haiti. He has preserved a facade of legality around his regime but in fact has remained in power by destroying or neutralizing all opposition. Government and military leaders have been shuffled and, at times, involuntarily retired or even executed to keep them from developing personal followings or becoming potential rivals to Duvalier's dictatorial leadership. The regime in the past has been marked by venality, nepotism and irresponsibility but recently there has been less evidence of the overt brutality which characterized the early days of the Duvalier leadership. However, there has been no indication that the government is now willing to tolerate dissent in any form.

The Communist party comprises the only organized internal opposition but it was seriously weakened by an extensive anti-Communist campaign, under the directions of Duvalier, in mid-1969. The top leadership of the party was either killed, captured or driven into hiding. Any other elements of opposition which remain after thirteen years of Duvalier's rule are disorganized, non-vocal and ineffective. The vast majority of the population remains illiterate (90%), malnourished, unemployed or under-employed and politically apathetic.

Plotting within the military has occurred several times since Duvalier came to power. Premature disclosure has often led to imprisonment, death or exile for the plotters. Nineteen officers were executed in June of 1967 and sixteen more were exiled in early 1968, all allegedly for plotting against the regime. In April of 1970 the Commander of the Haitian Coast Guard, along with over 100 men, launched an abortive revolt against Duvalier. This Coast Guard rebellion represented the first time in the history of the Duvalier regime that elements of the Haitian military, not already in exile, actually engaged in fighting to overthrow the government. In the aftermath of the struggle, Duvalier appeared stronger than before and, in fact, had managed to eliminate certain elements which represented a potential threat to his regime.

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The failure of the Coast Guard rebellion combined with the fact that no other element of the military -- or civilians -- moved to support the Coast Guard rebels, probably will mean that no other dissident elements of the military establishment will attempt to overthrow the regime as long as Papa Doc is alive.

There have been approximately nine small-scale incursions against Haitian territory by Haitian exiles since 1957. While Castro-Cuban support for such exile activities has been frequently alleged by the Haitian Government, these allegations have remained unsubstantiated (with one exception, in 1959).

Although the power of the Haitian military to repel such invasions and infiltrations is limited, the ineptness of the exiles' invasions efforts has greatly aided Duvalier's efforts to defeat them. The twenty man invasion force which landed at Cap Haitien in May of 1968 was either killed or captured within 72 hours. Likewise, in June 1969, when an air raid mounted by Haitian exiles and American adventures dropped several fifty gallon drums of kerosene on Port-au-Prince (one landed near the Presidential Palace, but failed to ignite) there was no appreciable damage. USG officials have made a concerted effort to prevent violation of our neutrality laws and arms export regulations by either Haitian exiles or the Haitian Government and to prosecute offenders.

Estimates of the 63-year old Duvalier's ability to retain power over the next several years must be very guarded due to the uncertain and unpredictable state of his health. His medical history includes two heart attacks, diabetes, and a genito-urinary condition. He reportedly suffered a stroke (or diabetic seizure) in mid-November 1970 and there have been persistent reports in the last several months of one or more other "seizures". His health can best be described as very precarious. Whatever the exact nature of Duvalier's latest maladies, they apparently frightened him into thinking of the problem of presidential succession, a subject practically taboo in Haiti since the 1964 Constitution made him "President for Life" and failed to provide any succession mechanism. In the past, while his illnesses may have prevented him from appearing in public, they did not diminish his essential control over the government or his ability to suppress any opposition to his regime. While assassination is always a possibility, it is more likely that when Duvalier's demise does finally come, it will be from natural causes.

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On January 22, 1971, President Duvalier formally designated his only son Jean-Claude to succeed him as President for Life. At that time, he called for a popular referendum to ratify his choice of the 19-year old Jean-Claude. The referendum was held on January 31 and the results, not surprisingly, showed an overwhelming vote for Duvalier's choice (only one negative and two blank ballots showed up in the official recapitulation). While there was some speculation that Duvalier intended to gradually transmit his power to his son while he himself went into semi-retirement because of poor health, it now appears that he plans to remain in office as long as he is physically able but will attempt to install his heir in such a firm power position that Jean-Claude will be assured of the Presidency upon his father's demise.

While Duvalier's recent actions, have for the moment, somewhat clarified the succession issue, his ability to transmit power to his young, self-indulgent and corpulent son is questionable. Nor is it certain that Jean-Claude would be a willing heir, since recent reports indicate he is a very reluctant dauphin. His success in this venture would seem to depend on his own ability to stay alive over the next few years, thus giving him time to set up the machinery and people presumably loyal to Jean-Claude (and perhaps to convince his reluctant heir of the attractiveness of the Presidency).

It is also possible that the feckless and presumably malleable Jean-Claude could serve as a banner around which various elements of the Presidential family, the Duvalier confidants and political heirs, as well as the VSN and certain segments of the Armed Forces, could rally to ensure the continuation of the duvalieriste revolution in the days and even months following Papa Doc's death. While Jean-Claude would not constitute an immediate threat to any of these groups, it is doubtful that he would be able to hold onto the presidency for very long, unless he shows more talent and ability than he has till now.

The total economic picture still remains dismal, although some bright spots have appeared recently. Tourism has noticeably increased in the last two years and tourist facilities have been improved while a number of American and other foreign investors have become interested in the development of the tourist industry in Haiti. In addition, it is expected that the tourist industry will be aided by the increasing number of American airlines flying to Haiti. American businessmen, furthermore, attracted by Haiti's cheap labor market and proximity to the United States have invested in export-oriented light industries (transformation industries).

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These industries, currently manufacturing goods ranging from baseballs to handicrafts to electrical components (primarily using raw materials from the United States), have grown rapidly. At the same time, the Haitian business community, somewhat buoyed by the growth in the tourist industry and the transformation industry began to expand their commercial activities, after years of quiescence. By mid-1970, GOH has itself displayed a more businesslike and responsible attitude towards its international and financial obligations. It had settled a claim under IAD's Investment Guaranty program; rescheduled its obligations to the US Post Office Department and began scheduled repayments of arrearages and agreed to liquidate accumulated arrearages and adopt more effective measures to prevent theft of PL-480 relief supplies from Haitian customs. A recent IMF study, as well as the latest CIAP review, noted some increase in the percentage of Haitian revenue channelled to development activities. As the GOH had put its financial house in order, the IMF re-instituted its Standby Agreement in 1970, which had been suspended in 1967.

More sure of his power position than at any other time in his thirteen years of office Duvalier himself has been placing greater emphasis on the theme of economic development, including placing economic technicians in charge of the country's financial and economic policies. While the economic picture is probably brighter now than at any other time in the last five years, the general economy is still quite depressed. The GOH allocates an inordinate percentage of its annual budget (20% or higher) to the maintenance of security forces. The country is still plagued by the same long-run, perhaps insoluble, economic problems: it possesses limited arable land and few mineral resources; its people are handicapped by widespread illiteracy, disease and a lack of training and skills; and many of its most capable people emigrate. Faced with the necessity of obtaining sufficient foreign exchange to assure essential imports and service existing foreign obligations and the need to raise sufficient monies to finance government services and carry domestic debts, the road to economic development in Haiti is still a long and arduous one.

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Evaluation of the Strength of the Communists

In December 1968 the two Communist parties in Haiti, the Moscow-oriented PEP and the Havana-oriented PUDA (an outgrowth of the PPLN), merged and formed the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH). Soon thereafter, militant members of the new party pursued a program of small-scale terrorism which prompted swift and effective government retaliation. The Government's anti-Communist campaign in the spring of 1969 decimated the approximately 200-member party leaving no more than some 40 isolated individuals. Although the loss of its leaders has severely curtailed PUCH's activities, this could, of course, change in the post-Duvalier period.

Most of the exiled Haitian communists are in Europe, Mexico or Canada. Although the group in France has been considered the largest, recent reports indicate that their activities and organization are limited. Haitian communists leaders in exile, such as Gerard Pierre-Charles in Mexico City and Max Chancy in Montreal have tried to inject some life into their organizations but their efforts appear to be as fruitless as those of the few members still in Haiti. Moscow and Havana both broadcast to Haiti in Creole; there are, however, no indications of Chinese involvement.

Because they lack leadership, membership, organization and arms, the communists' role in the immediate post-Duvalier period would be marginal. They probably would find it to their advantage to prolong any indecision over a new government, although their current state of disarray and numerical weakness would require them to seek this objective through covert maneuvering behind the scenes, rather than overt shows of force or crowd manipulation. Furthermore, without some support within the military, VSN or perhaps the Ton Ton Macoutes, the communists would be unable to make significant headway in the early stages of a power struggle. A prolonged power struggle, especially one marked by serious disorder and instability, might however, give PUCH's the time necessary to regroup, reorganize itself and capitalize on such an atmosphere. The potential for such a resurgence would be enhanced, if in the months following President Duvalier's death, a prolonged period of instability and disorder set in.

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ANNEX III

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Prominent Haitian Communists

ALEXANDRE, Guy
ARCELIN, Paul
AUBORG, Gerard
AUGUSTE, Maurepas
BALIN, Alix
BAPTISTE, Fred
BARBOT, Yves
CHANCY, Max
DEPESTRE, Rene
FLAVIEN, Yves
GAILLARD, Fritzler Camille
HECTOR, Michel
JOSEPH, Joan Rene Ulrick
LAFONTANT, Gerard
MONTERO, Camille
MONTERO, Jean Norert
PEAN, Serge
PETIT, Antoine G.
PHELPS, Anthony
PIERRE-CHARLES, Gerard
ROY, Elliott
THEBAUD, Fritz Vely
VIEUX, Lionel

Annex IV Denied Under
Section 1.5(d) of E.O. 12958

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Except for radio operators and technicians, Cuba reportedly has ceased such training. During 1968 Havana reportedly gave about \$70,000 to Haitian revolutionaries. In the spring and fall of 1969 Havana radio broadcasts in Creole exhorted the Haitian workers, students, and peasants to arm, organize, and overthrow the Duvalier regime.

Cuba continues to promote insurgency in Haiti. There is to be increased emphasis on secrecy and upon the utilization of the potential believed to reside in the student and worker sectors of the Haitian population. On 22 September 1970, Havana Radio declared that the Haitian revolutionary movement has not disappeared; that a popular government will originate from an armed struggle of national liberation with the direct participation of the masses.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX V

Haitian Security Forces

A. FAD'H: The Haitian armed forces (FAD'H), including air and coast guard personnel, number approximately 5,500 officers and enlisted men. They perform police, immigration, fire department, commercial air transport, and other service activities in addition to their regular "military" functions. The continuing deterioration of equipment, the removal and transfer of capable officers for political reasons, and the lack of an effective training program have made the armed forces only marginally effective as military organizations. However, the armed forces continue to be a suitable instrument in Duvalier's hands for his special, limited purpose of keeping order inside Haiti and suppressing any small opposition groups that may appear. Sweeping reforms in the military, though needed, are unlikely to be undertaken in Duvalier's time in view of his deliberate policy of keeping the armed forces divided, relatively unorganized, and responsible directly to himself. Changes in the armed forces during the last quarter of 1970 followed Duvalier's policy of keeping the military divided, and appeared to be connected with his plans to designate a successor. Poorly equipped and led, the armed forces could, if united, defeat the even more poorly trained, equipped and led militia in a post Duvalier struggle for power. The secret police (TTM's) have no military capability.

B. VSN: The National Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia of perhaps as many as 7,000 members, was created by Duvalier as a counterforce to the regular armed forces. The VSN is made up of weekend soldiers who are administratively separate from the regular military but assist the army. They are poorly trained and armed--about one third have weapons--and could not cope with a trained and disciplined foe. Many of the VSN leaders have been hand-picked for their personal loyalty to Duvalier and for this reason as well as their personal brutality may become the object of a vendetta by parties injured by them personally or by the regime should Duvalier be toppled from power. The resulting moves and countermoves could lead to a widespread breakdown in law and order. The lack of training, discipline and tight control over such a large group plus the possible fanaticism of some of its leaders could seriously hinder efforts to stabilize the internal situation in Haiti in case of a change in government.

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C. TTM: The secret police (TTM) have no official name or status nor is it an organized cohesive group and little is known about the internal organization of the group. Haitians refer to them as the Ton Ton Macoute, a Creole phrase meaning "bogeyman". Numbering about 1,500 (some are members of the armed forces or the VSN), the TTMs are little more than armed thugs who carry out special assignments--i.e., murder, arson, extortion, and other violence. Occasionally, the TTMs overstep their rather broad authority and Duvalier is forced to curb them temporarily; however, they are too useful to him to limit their power for long. If an anti-Duvalier group took or threatened to take over the government individual or small group TTM's might resort to violence for reasons of self-preservation, striking at members of the former ruling classes out of fear that those groups would seek revenge against them. Many TTM's, however, would fade into the background or go into exile to avoid such revenge. If power were assumed by a Duvalier lieutenant he would probably seek to gain control of the TTM's in order to secure his position.

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Haiti Contingency Annex VII

Active Duty USG Personnel with Haitian Experience (as of February 1971)

STATE (in Washington as of February, 1971)

Robert C. Felder

Russell C. Heater

Glenn A. Munro

Ruth Schimel

Thomas W. Davis, Jr.

Matthew C. Ward

Edward S. Little

OTHERS (assigned abroad as of October 1970)

Lee McCarthy (Bucharest)

Robert B. Hill (Ankara)

Ralph C. Porter (Moscow)

Harry M. Montgomery (Ottawa)

Everett K. Melby (Quebec)

Robert W. Maule (Vienna)

Harry E. Christie (Belgrade)

Kenneth J. Ruch (Manila)

David R. Raynolds (Karachi)

W. Donn Heaney (Seoul)

Jerry Lujan (Santiago)

Mary E. Welch (Rome)

Gerald McLaughlin (Tijuana)

Richard T. Booth (Tegucigalpa)

Ray Alvarez (Santo Domingo)

Ted Long (Vietnam)

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A.I.D.

Leonard D. Brooks (Lahore)

John Mason (Rio de Janeiro)

George L. Moore (London)

Harry Yoe (Retired-Charlestown, W. Va.)

Norman Ward (retired)

Caspar D. Green (Recife)

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- 3 -

US MILITARY

NAVY

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Arehart, Robert C.	LT	670858
Bader, Allen L.	CDR	527079
Barrick, Richard H.	CAPT	587763
Bird, Comer H., Jr.	CAPT	483578
Briand, Rene L.	CDR	444086
Brown, Lawrence	LCDR	607499
Cave, Thomas H.	LCDR	509747
Dick, Joseph L.	CDR	572103
Garbow, Bernard L.	CAPT	125012
Gibson, Richard H.	CAPT	282863
Hahnert, William F., Jr.	CDR	391433
Harris, Melvin W.	CAPT	472536
Johnson, Charles O.	LCDR	631936
Keller, Harry S., Jr.	CAPT	485309
Kelso, Quinten A.	CDR	490828
Kloman, John H.	LCDR	565372
Kuder, Donald L.	CDR	514824
Lyons, Robert F.	CAPT	315385
MacLeod, Wallace F., Jr.	LCDR	618455
McLean, Donald H.	CAPT	237180
McLoughlin, James	CDR	503098
Melissari, James J.	LT	667448

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Nichols, Richard D.	LCDR	621593
Norris, Frederick J.	LCDR	535009
Opgrand, David A.	LCDR	564299
Pelletier, Louis Emery	LCDR	622902
Robinson, Donald G., Jr.	CDR	543137
Rood, George H.	CAPT	096239
Ryan, Paul B.	CAPT	077164
Van Horssen, David A.	CDR	567719
Van Patten, David G.	LCDR	639315

MARINE CORPS

Angelo, Leon N.	LCOL	058025
Babe, George A.	COL	047597
Laporte, Alphonse, Jr.	LCOL	059346
Lillich, Gerald L.	COL	049315
Newtown, Glenford	CWO4	072133
Quint, Frederick A.	COL	019557
Wilder, Gary	COL	
Baker, Gerald K.	SGT	2190347
Bates, Arthur G.	SGT	2357057
Cole, Earl L., Jr.	SGT	2447016
Cosgro, Anthony M.	SGT	2285740
De Fant, Lee R.	SGT	2121458
Dickey, Patrick	SGT	2310833
Dring, John P.	SGT	2345499

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>
Eckhardt, Gerald P.	SGT	2218659
Erberle, John T.	SGT	2100579
Ewing, Lebus L.	SGT	1586495
Grice, Allen G.	SGT	1485377
Jackson, William R.	SGT	2312964
Kennedy, John J.	SGT	2327411
Louther, Charlie E.	CPL	2246894
Reed, James E.	SGT	2332900
Reimer, Douglas P.	CPL	2496431
Scott, Toiries, Jr.	SGT	2344959
Shultz, Thomas J.	SGT	2289170
Stransky, Daniel C.	SSGT	2033638

AIR FORCE

Hamilton, William A.	LCOL	556-18-2603
Heider, Eugene J.	LCOL	350-12-3023
Kirkpatrick, Herman L.	COL	414-16-2961
Morrision, Carl G.	CAPT	433-52-8526
Stewart, John G.	LCOL	208-18-0128
Cote, Jean M.A.D.	TSGT	002-22-0039
Davis, John W.	SMSGT	262-46-1668
Paulin, Maurice F.	MSGT	

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX **VIII**

SUMMARY: Mass Communications Media in Haiti

There are six daily newspapers with an estimated total circulation of 7,600. The dailies are: Haiti Journal, Le Jour, Le Matin, Le Nouvellite, Oedipe, Panorama and Le Nouveau Monde.

There is one government-operated television station and 15 radio stations in the capital, 3 of which are inactive. there are about 10 stations located outside the capital. There are an estimated 282,000 radio receivers in Haiti. (There are only 4,450 telephones).

Support from outside Haiti

VOA would be able to initiate a shortwave broadcast in French and creole.

Relays of this broadcast via medium wave to Haiti, one of which could be USIA's 50 KW transmitter at Marathon Key, Florida. Other possibilities would be WKVM - Puerto Rico (810 KC - 25 KW) and any number of clear channel stations at Atlanta and New Orleans in case of great emergency.

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RADIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Call Letters</u>	<u>Medium Wave</u>	<u>Short Wave</u>	<u>Kilocycles</u>	<u>Meters</u>	<u>Kilowatts</u>	<u>Director</u>	<u>Address</u>
Vox de la revolution	4VC 4VB		X X	9485 5985	31.61 50.13	7.5 7.5	Dir. Gen. S. Lassequé Tech. Dir., A. Brown	Box 1143 Port-au-Prince
Duvalieriste	4VA	X		1080	50.13	1.5		
Diffusion Haitienne	4VM 4VYM	X	X	4940 1250		0.5 0.6	Y. Michel	Ruelle Jeanty
Caraibes	4VEB 4VAB	X	X	6015 1150	49.88	.75 1		Ruelle Chavanne
Union	4VG 4VF	X	X	6050 1120	49.59	0.1 0.2		1 Ruelle Louverture Box 737, Port-au-Prince
Haiti	4VUHM 4VW	X	X	6080 1330	49.34	1 1.5	Dir. R. Widmaier, Tech. Dir. H. Widmaier	Box 525, Port-au-Prince
Manrese	4VM		X	*6165	48.66	1		Boulevard Dessalines 758
Progress	4VLS	X		860		0.2		
Nationale	4V2A	X		*880		.15		Route de Carrefour
Carillon	4VCD	X		960		0.3		Rue Dr. Aubry 157
Cacique	4VCPS	X		990		0.2		Rue Traversiere 3

*Inactive

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RADIO

<u>Station</u>	<u>Call Letters</u>	<u>Medium Wave</u>	<u>Short Wave</u>	<u>Kilocycles</u>	<u>Meters</u>	<u>Kilowatts</u>	<u>Director</u>	<u>Address</u>
Propriques	4VRD	X		1170		0.25		Ave. John Brown
Port-au-Prince	4VS	X		1385		1		Stade Sylvio Cator
Loire broad-casting circuit	4VGM	X		1430		1	Frank C. Magloire (owns Le <u>Matin</u>)	Rue Americaine
Voix des Antilles	4VPE	X		*1475		0.2		Rue Capois 68
Quisqueya	4VA2F	X		*1530		0.15		Rue des Miracles 88
<u>TELEVISION</u>								
De Haiti	4VMR			Channel A5		25.06	Dir. Gen. A.S. Apaid; Tech. Dir. E.C. Gentil	P.O. Box 1126 Port-au-Prince

*Inactive

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ANNEX IX - OUTLINE OF CONTINGENCIES

CONTINGENCY A: Duvalier dies; and internal struggle for power ensues among his family and followers

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal

While immediate power shifts from President Duvalier to his formally-designated successor, his 20-year old only son, Jean-Claude, jockeying for positions of power occurs behind the scenes. Various factions emerge grouped around Jean-Claude (with Marie-Denise Duvalier and Max Dominique) in the background) and other civilian/military leaders e.g. Chief of Staff Gen. Claude Raymond, Clovis Desinor, Adrien Raymond, Luckner Cambronne. While Jean-Claude may remain in a figure-head role for several months, it/^{is} doubtful that he can wield real presidential power.

There may be little open violence or disorder as various armed groups (the regular military, police, V.S.N. militia, and TIMs -- few civilians are armed) stand fast, cautiously watch and wait to see how the balance of forces and the new structure of power shapes up. Initial power may shift to those, presumably in the Palace, who are immediately aware of Duvalier's death and in a position to control ammunition stored in the Palace. Individuals who threaten to upset this initial delicate balance may be neutralized through arrest or diplomatic exile, but sparingly if at all through assassination. "Normal looting" by TIMs of houses whose owners are arrested or killed.

Reaction in other LA countries: Some concern and uncertainty, particularly in the Dominican Republic -- the only LA country whose national interest is directly affected by events in Haiti. Dominican military can be expected to alert and reinforce border military posts to prevent, inter alia, any mass exodus of Haitians. Some fear (and/or expectations) among LAs that U.S. reflex action will be to intervene.

Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reaction: Propaganda reaction hailing disappearance of "imperialist puppet, Duvalier" and calling for popular front political action or similar propaganda themes. Haitians trained in Cuba may (at Castro's bidding) attempt to infiltrate Haiti, as well as militant Haitians from the Dominican Republic, but in the beginning these likely to be limited to individuals testing the political waters before deciding on a decision plunge.

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not automatically declassified.

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Potential Dangers: If there is widespread arming of civilian population (e.g. through distribution of GOH arms stocks to civilians, or the clandestine delivery of arms from abroad ahead of time or at the inception of the crisis), this could lead to large scale violence and protracted struggle.

Threats to safety of Americans, arising from potential violence, or from calculated efforts to provoke U.S. intervention through attacks on Americans.

Trouble in Haiti could trigger exaggerated reflex action by the Dominican Government, including an over-reaction by Dominican armed forces along the border.

Splitting or splintering of Haitian armed forces leading to inconclusive fighting between contending armed groups, possibly complicated by indiscriminate arming of civilians by whichever group controls the reserve weapons and ammunition at the Palace.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Emergence of a non-Communist Government, as a minimum (preferably one promising to be responsive to the social and economic needs of the Haitian people, although this is not a primary U.S. objective). Restoration of order and the normal processes of society.

Political-Economic Actions: Consult with OAS Secretary General and LA countries concerning situation. U.S. Embassy maintains close liaison with OAS Mission in Haiti. If the safety of Americans is threatened, implement the E&E plan, using commercial means for evacuation. (Inform LA states and other countries having citizens in Haiti of commercial evacuation and offer our facilitative assistance if desired). Consult closely with the Dominican Republic and if necessary, seek to restrain the D.R. military from impetuous actions.

If situation becomes so violent or chaotic that a commercial evacuation is not feasible, Americans should be instructed to standfast at home or at assembly points designated in E&E plan.

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In such situation, consult OAS regarding safety of foreign nationals in Haiti and press for OAS action to resolve problem.

Consult on bilateral basis with other Caribbean, Central American and North Coast countries regarding developing situation and the possibility Communist groups from outside Haiti may try to exploit situation and introduce men or supplies into Haiti.

If power struggle is prolonged, consult in OAS on what if any OAS assistance might be desirable and feasible in fostering a return to internal stability and responsible government in Haiti.

Military Actions: Institute immediate air and sea surveillance of waters between Haiti and Cuba. Inform OAS of men or supplies from Cuba that may be detected.

Alert CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE to possible need for military means of evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals if commercial means not feasible and if OAS calls upon US for such assistance.

Other Actions: Inform selected members of Congress of situation in Haiti and our views with respect to safety of American citizens, E&E plan, consultation with OAS, etc.

Provide background briefing to US press corps, if necessary, to clarify their understanding of the situation.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: The restrained posture of the U.S. (interest focused on legitimate concern for safety of American with a "hands off" posture towards internal power struggle) could foster a resolution of the struggle as competing individuals and groups realize they must spend their energies on coming to terms among themselves rather than seeking U.S. backing for their pretensions. However, realization that the U.S. does not intend to intervene, could lead to a short-lived intensification of violence and brutality as the contenders engage in a final, no-holds-barred struggle.

"Pro-U.S." elements in emerging new power structure seek U.S. economic (and possibly military) support to maintain their power against what they may term the "Communist" opposition.

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Communist elements inside Haiti lie low in the immediate post-Duvalier period, but will actively seek to exploit situation as time goes on.

International: Reaction of Free World generally favorable to restrained U.S. "hands off" attitude, although some observers blame U.S. for permitting another "Duvalier-type" government to take power. Also, some criticism that U.S. inaction and "hands off" attitude has encouraged bloodshed and that U.S. seeming disinterested stems from prejudice against Haiti as a black nation while U.S. was quick to act in the "white Dominican Republic".

OAS appreciated US initiatives in consulting with it from earliest stage on inherent problems in situation and uses OAS Mission already established in Haiti as a continuing source of information on developing situation. OAS supports U.S. proposals for OAS-sponsored evacuation (utilizing U.S. military facilities after non-feasibility of commercial evacuation and continuing danger to foreigners has become evident).

Communist: Communist propaganda deplores newly-emerging power group as another Duvalierist government, representing "U.S. imperialist effort" to replace one "lackey" with another.

No direct, overt involvement in the Haitian situation at that time.

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CONTINGENCY B: Duvalier dies; a struggle for power ensues and attempts are made to infiltrate extremists from Cuba to join struggle.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal

In the jockeying for power between factions in the immediate aftermath of Duvalier's death (as envisaged in Contingency A), small groups of infiltrators, or individual agents, are introduced clandestinely into Haiti from Cuba.

Guerilla-type actions are reported from a number of outlying areas in Haiti, and isolated instances of sabotage and urban terrorism are attributed to Cuban infiltrators and Communists.

The on-going power struggle in Port-au-Prince paralyzes central government counter-action against guerilla activities in the provinces. Local unit commanders stand fast, in a defensive posture, prepared to repel attacks on themselves or their immediate areas, but not to deploy their limited forces into the field to hunt down the intruders (particularly so because they are uncertain as to whether the intruder represent Cuban infiltrators or legitimate Haitian exile groups.)

In Port-au-Prince, one or more of the factions seeking power appeals for US help against the Cuban intruders. An appeal may also be made to the OAS but this is less likely.

Reactions in other LA Countries: Mixed alarm and skepticism over reports of Cuban infiltration, and mounting interest in verifying facts of the situation. Some alarm in the Dominican Republic, with the Dominican army alerted and ordered to increase border vigilance.

OAS takes cognizance of these reports, calls upon member states (and the OAS Mission in Haiti) to furnish any additional evidence that may be available and appoints a watch-dog group to monitor the situation.

If the reports are substantiated, and especially if there is patent Cuban involvement, the OAS may debate the issue and even possibly approve a resolution under the Rio Pact calling upon member states to assist Haiti to repel aggression. However, the current uncertain outlook of the OAS makes the outcome of any such debate very unpredictable.

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Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reaction: Standard propaganda campaign is launched (vituperation of "US imperialistic puppets" in Haiti, support for "popular demands" of Haitian people, etc.)

Possible effort to bring Haitian situation before the UN: either for propaganda purposes or to lay basis for later effort to forestall or attack OAS action possibly detrimental to Soviet or Cuban policies. (An appeal to the UN is all the more likely if Cuba is in fact involved.)

Potential Dangers: Distribution of weapons to civilians by Communists, or Communist manipulation of civilian groups who may have been armed by non-Communist contenders for power.

A protracted struggle could result in breakdown (or sabotage) of essential public services. Prolonged disruption of the daily routine, sharpened by deprivation of necessities, might render general population more susceptible to Communist "solutions".

US or OAS failure to respond in a timely and adequate manner to the Communist threat could result in a new government exposed to Communist influence (given their organizational and numerical weakness, it seems unlikely that a Communist-controlled government could emerge over the short term).

In a moment of panic, or as a deliberate tactic to attract US support while eliminating potential rivals, some of the contending power seekers might carry out large-scale arrests and executions of "Communists", loosely and indiscriminately defined. This could seriously deplete Haiti's small reservoir of potential leadership.

US military involvement, even for limited purposes, could be difficult to terminate gracefully without exposing ourselves to charges of having imposed whatever new government emerges.

Communists may deliberately push anti-American slogans and actions, thus increasing jeopardy of American citizens and property, in effort to polarize Haitian thinking along nationalistic lines.

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SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Emergence of a non-Communist government

Identification of Cuba as the source and instigator of infiltrators.

Other Actions: If Haitian exile groups seek contact with or assistance from the U.S. advise them to make parallel approaches to the OAS. Make clear to such exile groups US intention to work through OAS to counter any Cuban-Communist intervention, and US readiness to respect outcome of political struggle.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: Contending Haitian factions will concentrate their efforts against each other in the Port-au-Prince area, letting the problem of infiltrators in the provinces go until later, so far as direct action is concerned, but using reports of provincial infiltrators or disturbances to call for US assistance to stop the Communists. If Haitians do not feel US response is satisfactory, widespread arrests of "Communists" may be carried out and even some "Communist" attacks on US citizens or property may take place.

External: Reaction of Free World generally favorable toward restrained US posture.

OAS attitude becomes more and more disposed to follow U.S. lead as it becomes clear that U.S. is avoiding interventionist actions (concentrating primarily on the safety of Americans) and that Cuba is in fact attempting to intervene. This increasingly favorable OAS attitude becomes of crucial importance if it eventually becomes necessary to use force to prevent a Communist-controlled government from seizing power. OAS understanding and approval is also important if it becomes necessary to use US military means to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals.

Communists: Continuing propaganda campaign along standard lines, as in contingency A. No overt involvement in situation unless it appears that OAS will not support forceful measures to prevent Communist seizure of power.

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Potential Dangers: Generally the same as under Contingency B: distribution of weapons to civilians; left-wing manipulation of mobs; breakdown in public services sharpening popular susceptibility to left-wing "solutions"; emergence of strong left-wing influence over new government which could evolve into Communist control over a period of time; possible arrests and executions of rivals by contending factions under pretexts of being "Communists" or "Duvalierist criminals", i.e. selective use of terror. Americans may be targets of politically-motivated violence.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives: The immediate objective remains as in Contingency B to protect Americans, but the emergence of a non-Communist government demands increasing attention as a policy objective. Priority attention must be given to accurate (and publicly useable) intelligence regarding possible ties between left-wing elements and Cuba.

Political-Economic Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B)
In addition, take US initiative if necessary to ensure OAS consideration of potential threat to hemispheric security if left-wing elements in Haiti have close ties with and support from Cuba. Make abundantly clear to the Soviet Union (and through diplomatic channels to Cuba) the seriousness with which we view the situation in Haiti. Special efforts may be necessary to calm Dominican armed forces.

If OAS fails to act, NSC should consider possible unilateral preemptive US action, including military force, to prevent a Communist-controlled Haiti.

Military Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B). If evidence mounts of Cuban involvement, NSC should consider a decision on interdiction of ships.

Other Actions: (Same as in Contingency A and B)

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal: Generally similar to Contingencies A and B. However, intensive efforts will be made by various Haitian factions to involve the US, claiming for example that such "well-known leftists" as the Blanchet brothers, Herve Boyer, Clovis Desinor, etc. are gaining the upper hand (which indeed may be true) and that they will establish a "socialist state".

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External: Reaction of Free World generally favorable toward restrained US posture, although possible emergence of a left-wing government begins stimulating concern about a possible Cuban-Haitian axis against the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Government is especially apprehensive on this score and may provide assistance to Haitian elements opposed to the "leftists" or even intervene directly if nobody else acts.

The OAS appreciates US initiative to consult with it from the earliest stages of the contingency, and is reassured by the general posture of restraint shown by US. OAS is disposed to give a fair hearing to whatever evidence may be available regarding possible ties between Haitian leftists and Cuba, but it is problematical that a majority of the OAS would support effective action to prevent left-wing elements from coming to power.

Communist: Same as in Contingency B.

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CONTINGENCY C: Duvalier dies; in power struggle, known leftwing elements with possible ties to and support from Cuba appear to be winning.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Development - Internal: In the jockeying for power in the aftermath of Duvalier's death, the struggle remains indecisive. Casting about for additional strength to give it the necessary marginal advantage over rivals, one faction accepts left-wing promises that they can get help in the form of clandestine arms, men, money and expert advice from Cuba. This faction begins to gain a decisive advantage and, as a bandwagon effect, erstwhile rivals and fence-sitters make peace with the apparent winner.

"Popular demonstrations" take place in Port-au-Prince and in key provincial cities in favor of the winning combination coupled with nationalist and possibly racist or class struggle slogans. As in Contingency B, local military commanders in the provinces remain in a defensive posture, unwilling to take decisive action against local disturbances because they can not be sure who is winning in Port-au-Prince.

In Port-au-Prince, the factions and individuals who feel themselves to be losing appeal for U.S. assistance against the left-wing "Communist" elements.

Reactions in Other LA Countries: Possible emergence of a left-wing group in power produces mixed reactions but is not unduly alarming to most other LAs in view of leftist-nationalist governments already accepted elsewhere in the hemisphere (notably Peru and Chile). Likewise, possible ties between left-wing Haitian elements and Cuba are accepted with equanimity by some and/or skepticism. The Dominican government, however, is deeply concerned over the possible emergence of a left-wing regime in Haiti and Dominican military elements urge direct intervention. In the OAS, an attitude of watchful waiting prevails, with little disposition to conclude that what is happening in Haiti represents a threat to the security of the hemisphere.

Soviet, Cuban and ChiCom Reactions: Standard propaganda vituperates U.S. "imperialism", supports "popular will" in Haiti, fosters nationalist fervor. However, care is taken by Communist countries to avoid words or actions which might lend credence to suspicion that left-wing elements are in fact Communist-controlled. Communist tactics in the UN will depend on how OAS deals with subject.

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CONTINGENCY D: Duvalier dies; an internal struggle for power ensues but fails to produce a winner; the situation degenerates into general disorder, political chaos, widespread bloodshed and destruction of property.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments: Internal jockeying among various power factions fails to produce any dominant leader or group. Wide disagreement among factions over who occupies positions of power.

Substantial violence, looting and destruction of property as law and order break down. General disorder.

Increasing fighting among followers of contending leaders resulting in widespread bloodshed.

Reaction in other LA countries: Concern and uncertainty, particularly among the Caribbean countries. Particular fear in the Dominican Republic that the widespread chaos and disorder might spill over the border. Concern of other LA nations over safety of their nationals. Some fear (and/or expectations) that U.S. will have to intervene.

Soviet, Cuban and ChilCom Reactions: Propaganda reaction hailing disappearance of "imperialist puppet, Duvalier" and calling for popular from type regime or similar propaganda themes.

As prolonged power struggle fails to produce any clear-cut winner, confusion in propaganda may result since future so uncertain. Increasing "anti-Yankee Imperialism" talk if US or OAS intervention appears likely.

Some infiltration of Haiti by militant Haitians from the Dominican Republic or Haitians trained in Cuba (at Castro's bidding) but confusion and chaos may limit their numbers.

Potential Dangers: If there is widespread arming of civilian population (e.g. through distribution of GOH arms stocks to civilians, or the clandestine delivery of arms from abroad), this could lead to large scale violence and protracted struggle.

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Threats to safety of Americans arising coincidentally from calculated efforts to provoke U.S. intervention through attacks on Americans.

A reflex action by Dominican Armed forces could lead to over reaction along border.

Splintering of Haiti's armed forces leading to inconclusive fighting between contending armed groups, possibly complicated by indiscriminate arming of civilians by whichever groups controls the reserve weapons and ammunition at the Palace. Possible development into full scale military confrontation or civil war between opposing forces.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND SOLUTIONS

Immediate Objective: Protection of Americans in Haiti.

Other Objectives: Restoration of order and normal processes of society. Emergence of a non-Communist government, as a minimum (hopefully one promising to be responsive to the Haitian people's social-economic needs but this is not a primary U.S. objective).

Political-Economic Actions: Consult with OAS Secretary General concerning situation. U.S. Embassy maintains close liaison with OAS Mission in Haiti.

If the safety of Americans is threatened, implement the E&E plans by commercial means if possible. Inform LA States and other countries of commercial evacuation plans and offer our facilitative assistance if desired.

If situation becomes so chaotic or violent as to preclude commercial evacuation, instruct Americans to standfast at home or at assembly points designated in E&E plan. Consult OAS regarding safety of foreign nationals in Haiti and press for OAS action to resolve problem. Offer US military assistance in a multilateral, OAS-sponsored evacuation. If such action is totally impossible send to Haiti US force capable of evacuating US citizens and withdraw force immediately after evacuation is accomplished.

Close consultation may be necessary with the Dominican Republic to calm their fears over the spreading chaos next door and to prevent any precipitous action on the part of the Dominican Armed Forces.

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Consult in OAS on what OAS assistance might be desirable and feasible in fostering a return to stability and effective government in Haiti. Offer all possible US support for OAS action in this area and press OAS to accept responsibility but carefully limit US bilateral involvement in internal Haitian matters and make known our intention to establish "normal" relations with any non-Communist government. If the situation continues chaotic, with widespread disorder and bloodshed, and the OAS fails to act, the NSC may have to consider some type of unilateral US move to restore law and order in Haiti and to establish some type of stable non-Communist government.

Military Actions: Institute immediate air and sea surveillance of water between Haiti and Cuba. Inform OAS of any movement of men or supplies from Cuba that may be detected. If evidence of Cuban intervention surfaces, NSC should consider interdiction of ships. Alert CINCLANT and CINCSRIKE to possible need of military means of evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals if commercial means not feasible and if OAS calls upon US for such help.

Other Action: Inform selected members of Congress of situation in Haiti and our views with respect to safety of Americans, E&E plan, OAS consultation etc.

If necessary, provide background briefing to US press corps to clarify their understanding of situation.

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSE OF ACTION

Internal: The restrained posture of U.S. (interest focused on legitimate concern for safety of Americans combined with a strictly "hand off" posture regarding the internal power struggle) may help to promote some type of resolution of the struggle as the competing groups stop vainly appealing to the US for help and decide they must come to terms with themselves. Growing realization U.S. does not intend to intervene may aid in allowing situation to "bottom out" with some type of coalition coming to power, although short-lived intensification of violence may result as contenders indulge in last-ditch, no-holds-barred attempt to gain power.

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International: OAS image greatly strengthened by US initiative to consult with it from earliest stage of crisis. Using OAS Mission already in Haiti, OAS may call for immediate cease fire and may send additional representatives to Haiti to consult with OAS Mission members. OAS supports US proposals for OAS-sponsored evacuation (utilizing U.S. military facilities after non-feasibility of commercial evacuation and continuing danger to foreigners has become evident). An extremely chaotic and violent situation in Haiti might lead the OAS, after much debate, to authorize the use of an OAS-controlled peacekeeping force to restore order and promote the formation of a provisional government, although the outlook for such an action by the OAS is very uncertain.

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