

PHOENIX FILE

PHOENIX FACT SHEET

10 August 1968

1. SUBJECT: Status of PHOENIX/PHUNG for Period
January-June 1968 (4)

2. BACKGROUND: At the beginning of the year one of the major goals was to encourage total Government of Vietnam (GVN) involvement in the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG program. Concurrently, more anti-Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) operations were to be mounted to neutralize by midyear at least 3600 VCI (30% of the 1968 goal of 12,000), as well as to expand the number of District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) from 103 to 125.

3. STATUS:

a. By the time President Thieu signed the PHUNG HOANG Decree, effective 1 July 1968, the initiative, assistance and guidance provided by the US PHOENIX effort had strongly influenced the attainment of a viable and substantive field PHUNG HOANG organization. Details of half-year 1968 status are at Inclosure 1.

b. Against the goal of 3,600 (para 2 above) the program has recorded 6078 identified VCI killed, captured or rallied for the first half of 1968. (Incl 2). The majority of neutralizations is at hamlet and village level. However, there is a steady rise in the neutralization of district and province level VCI, not only in numbers but also in percentage of the total. For example, in April 156 or 12%, in May 201 or 16%, and in June 257 or 22% fell in this category. Neutralizations of leadership elements (chiefs) at all echelons were 8% in April, 9% in May and 10% in June. This holds true also for the leadership elements of the Finance and Economy sections, although more than half of all neutralizations of these VCI activists were at hamlet level.

c. The percentage of police participation in apprehensions had been rising steadily each month until June when it dropped 18% from the previous month's 65%. For the half year, police have participated in 53% of all apprehensions (Incl 3).

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Incl 1

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d. One hundred ninety DIOCCs are reported open, 140 of which are operational (against goal of 125, para 2 above). DIOCCs have been activated in 132 of the 149 priority districts, with PHOENIX advisors assigned to 114 of these. There is a total of 155 US advisors in the 190 DIOCCs overall.

e. Other progress indicators are discussed in Incl 1.

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Branch: Reports Management Action Officer: LTC Lemire

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PACIFICATION SUB-PROGRAM REPORT (4)

1. Number I-2

2. Title: Press the Attack on the VC Infrastructure
(Project PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX)

3. Summary: Since the beginning of the year, when the PHUNG HOANG program was slowly emerging from the starting gate, the GVN has shown a new spirit of aggressiveness, purpose and resolution in pressing the attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI). The December 1967 Prime Minister's Letter of Instruction lacked the teeth necessary to reduce confusion in the field and force military and civilian unity of effort in destroying the infrastructure. Until recently the degree to which the PHUNG HOANG program was pursued depended largely on the interest of local officials and the eagerness, training and persuasive abilities of US PHOENIX coordinators. Only in II Corps, where the already formed joint US/GVN Traveling Working Group continued to function, was a concerted effort made at regional level to give proper GVN support and impetus to the program.

The Tet Offensive was probably a blessing in disguise to the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX effort. While anti-infrastructure operations played second fiddle to the military situation, in many areas the DIOCCs were the primary producers of intelligence information. It was then that many GVN and US officials began to recognize that the DIOCC is an effective intelligence mechanism in the district. The very nature of the Tet Offensive also increased GVN awareness at all levels of the necessity for eliminating the VCI. It became apparent that attacks against the urban areas were aided and abetted by the VCI and current local efforts by GVN officials to organize their resources and concentrate on the destruction of the VC were inadequate. A strong national level directive, giving guidance, emphasis, and cohesiveness to the program was clearly necessary.

Plagued by GVN passivity, evasiveness and, in some cases, just plain lethargy, the persistent US efforts to coax promulgation of a meaningful executive decree and implementing instructions finally paid off. On 1 July 1968, President Thieu signed an executive decree prescribing a workable concept and organization and insisting on a cooperative attitude and complete integration of police/military interests and resources in a coordinated nationwide effort to destroy the VCI.

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Meanwhile, other actions were taking place at lower levels that increased and intensified GVN participation in the program. Pending the issuance of a definitive PHUNG HOANG decree, the Assistant Director General for Special Police issued a directive placing police teams at DIOCCs and province centers on a 24-hour basis to coordinate intelligence activities with other agencies. The I CTZ Commander formed a joint PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX working staff to handle day to day coordination and planning and a Corps PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Committee to direct the Corps anti-infrastructure efforts. The II CTZ PHUNG HOANG Committee opened up new DIOCCs, even though US advisors were not available, such as at Phu Bon and Ninh Thuan, and the Traveling Working Group continued its efforts to solidify the program. The IV CTZ Commander established a Regional Intelligence Coordinating Center, ordered all District Chiefs to open DIOCCs, and issued written and oral instructions for cooperation and coordination among GVN military and civilian agencies at all levels. The III CTZ Commander continued to support the DIOCCs but was reluctant to support the police type operations with his military resources. Despite this handicap, local energies and imagination were exploited wherever encountered and some progress was made. For example, there was an encouraging upsurge in VCI neutralization in May and June in Gia Dinh; where the combination of an aggressive Province Chief and a dedicated PHOENIX Coordinator has more than quadrupled the monthly rate of killed, captured and rallied VCI. The other III Corps DIOCCs are now identifying and neutralizing VCI at an increasing rate, and new "PIOCCs" are being set up.

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Thus, when the National Decree was signed there was a broad, substantive and viable organization already in the making. By 30 June, the GVN had opened 190 DIOCCs and 32 PIOCCs. In addition, CIOCCs at Danang, Cam Ranh and Vung Tau were also functioning. When the new Capital Military District (CMD) was formed in June, a PHOENIX organization was organized to assist the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) coordinate the intelligence collection and exploitation for both Gia Dinh and Saigon. The Mayor of Saigon has given his support to the effort and details are being worked out to bring it rapidly to an operational status.

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The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program has accounted for 6078 identified VCI killed, captured, or rallied in the last six months. As the DIOCCs and PIOCCs have refined data bases, gained experience, and mounted more operations against targeted

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individuals, the neutralization rate has been well over 1000 per month for the last four months. One encouraging trend is that anti-VCI operations are killing or capturing an increasing number of VCI at district and province level, as well as the chiefs or deputy chiefs of sections at village and hamlet level. However, the number of ralliers in this category remains low.

The construction of detention facilities progresses very slowly. The only two on schedule are the 5000 man temporary detention camp on Con Son Island and the 1800 man detention camp at Can Tho. The first tent camp at Con Son, with a rated capacity of 2000 men, has been completed and the second camp for 3000 detainees is on schedule. No real progress has been made toward the construction and expansion of National Police detention facilities in the provinces. To keep the VCI out of circulation and thwart other VC attempts to free hard core VCI from mainland detention facilities (2228 were released during Tet) 3600 were extracted from the mainland and moved to Con Son, 1731 from I Corps, 144 from II Corps, 56 from IV Corps and 1669 from Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon.

4. Sub-program elements:

a. Neutralize at least 12000 VCI: Following is a tabulation by Corps, based on the Province Monthly Reports for the period 1 January - 30 June.

CORPS	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	TOTAL
I	130	*	411	449	269	304	1563
II	180	316	531	405	352	217	2001
III	109	101	180	140	417	349	1296
IV	<u>69</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>201</u>	<u>301</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>1218</u>
	488	540	1323	1295	1271	1161	6078

*Not reported, included in March figures.

There has been a slow decrease in the monthly totals since March; however, the trend to neutralize more district and province level VCI continues: Jan 84; Feb 77; Mar 91; Apr 156; May 201; June 257. In addition, the number of captures of VCI in this category continues to rise, reflecting better targeting: Jan 61; Feb 39; Mar 52; Apr 97; May 155; June 206.

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b. Establish PHUNG HOANG Committees: The December 1967 Prime Minister Letter of Instruction prescribed the establishment of PHUNG HOANG Committees at province and district level. The new decree combines the PHUNG HOANG Committee at district level with the DIOCC. The following is a breakdown by Corps of the total number of Province and District PHUNG HOANG Committees established by the end of June.

	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT *</u>
I Corps	5	4
II Corps	12	46
III Corps	8	8
IV Corps	<u>16</u>	<u>53</u>
Totals	41	111

Cordon + Search in I + II Corps

c. Increase the number, space and scope: No one type of operation can be called a typical anti-VCI operation. In I and II Corps, the cordon and search, using PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX black lists appears to get the best results. In III Corps the joint PRU/Police/RF/PF, district operation seems to be most productive. In IV Corps the PRU is still the main action arm. Reports on anti-VCI operations show that coordination and cooperation between agencies is definitely increasing. The PRU mount operations more frequently than hitherto based on another agency's intelligence, especially the Police. (The PRU produce much of their own intelligence.) Combined Police, RF/PF and PRU operations are common. In some areas the PHUNG HOANG program has made the civilian and military agencies combine forces for operations for the first time. This is especially true in IV Corps where some provinces report their very first combined Police/ARVN operations on record. Countrywide, the Police have participated in approximately 53% of the VCI apprehensions for the first six months of the year.

d. Expand the number of DIOCCs: On the first of January, 103 DIOCCs were opened and the program called for a total of 200 by 31 December 1968. Due to the programed influx of additional advisors and to GVN initiative the PHUNG HOANG program had almost reached that goal by 30 June:

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	<u>ACTIVATED</u>	<u>W/ADVISORS</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED</u> <u>31 Dec 68</u>
I Corps	22	21	27
II Corps	43	42	52
III Corps	48	45	53
IV Corps	<u>77</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>68</u>
Totals	190	155	200

In addition, PHOENIX advisors have been inserted into the nine Saigon police precincts to establish DIOCC-type activities as part of the CMAC PHOENIX support. Where the GVN have established DIOCCs and no US advisor is available, the province PHOENIX personnel monitor and advise on a "circuit rider" basis.

e. Improve the performance and capability: As of 30 June, permanent offices (PIOCCs) at province level had been opened in 32 of the 44 provinces: 5 in I Corps; 10 in II Corps; 5 in III Corps; and 12 in IV Corps. In addition, there are three City Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (CIOCCs) functioning, Danang, Cam Ranh and Vung Tau. An indication of the new energetic approach at the GVN national level was the issuance by the DGNP in June of a 31 page document, prepared by the Special Police entitled "The VC Key Organization from Central Level Down to Village and Hamlet Levels." The cover letter enjoins the Region, Province and District Police to study the document and then prepare detailed studies of the VCI in their respective areas for later submission to the DGNP.

f. Establish effective and expeditious procedures: Less satisfactory than other aspects of the PHUNG HOANG program has been the development of effective screening and judicial processing of civil detainees. Only one of the four newly authorized Military Field Courts opened and it heard its first case in III Corps on 6 May. The only other one the GVN plans to open is in IV Corps during the latter half of 1968. The study group investigating the number and types of civilian security cases and the flow of cases through the military courts and security committees had not finished its task by 30 June.

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g. Establish adequate detention facilities: In view of the experience of VC attacks on detention facilities in I Corps in 1967 which freed over 2000 prisoner/detainees, and the loss of 2228 in I, II and IV CTZ during the Tet Offensive, a program for extracting detainees from I CTZ to safer areas, and of transferring hard core VCIs from the mainland was initiated. 1965 were transferred from I Corps, of which 1731 went to Con Son Island. There were a total of 4321 detainees/prisoners moved in the four Corps of which 3600 went to Con Son Island. At Con Son a temporary 5000 space detention camp is being constructed on schedule. By 30 June tent space for 3600 prisoners had been completed. The National Police 1800-man detention camp at Can Tho, IV CTZ is also progressing. The project to construct a 1200-man NP detention camp at An Tuc, II CTZ has run into difficulty. At present, one part of the camp, with a rated capacity of 500 is ready for occupancy. Because of poor local security, the decision to proceed with further expansion is pending. A contract was let by OICC in June for the construction of a 4000-man concrete masonry building complex at Con Son Island to be completed in early 1969. No real progress has been made toward construction or expansion of National Police temporary detention facilities in the provinces. The planning figure is for 12 facilities with top priority and 13 facilities with 2nd priority, with a larger one for Gia Dinh and Precinct #8 in the Cholon area for an estimated total of 10,000 spaces for these 27 facilities.

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1 JANUARY -- 30 JUNE 1968

CONSOLIDATED MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT
 ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE (4)

CORPS	KILLED	CAPTURED	RALLIED	TOTAL
I	179	1,176	208	1,563
II	216	1,674	111	2,001
III	132	1,079	85	1,296
IV	184	850	184	1,218
TOTAL	711	4,779	588	6,078

CORPS	Hamlet			Village			District			Province			TOTAL
	KIA	CIA	RAL	KIA	CIA	RAL	KIA	CIA	RAL	KIA	CIA	RAL	
I	83	619	161	76	475	37	20	75	10	1	6	0	1,563
II	39	1,071	51	100	386	45	53	189	11	24	29	3	2,001
III	19	433	28	69	455	38	42	153	19	3	34	3	1,296
IV	24	383	57	113	343	107	35	96	13	14	28	5	1,218
TOTAL	165	2,506	297	358	1,659	227	150	513	53	42	97	11	6,078

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1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1968

APPREHENDING AGENCIES

COIDS	POLICE	RF/PP	PRU	ARVN	ARVN/NP	JNT SECTOR	US	FMRF	GVN MIL
I	347	41	48	116	0	208	278	3	24
II	850	38	122	103	19	361	43	76	39
III	245	159	89	67	0	315	36	4	79
IV	267	93	129	61	0	181	18	0	61
TOTAL	1,709	331	388	347	19	1,065	375	83	203

- NOTES: 1. Some reports did not identify the apprehending agencies in each case. Therefore this compilation reflects the available information on approximately 95% of the VCI captured.
2. The police participated in approximately 53% of the reported apprehensions.

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 Document of Special Interest
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