

MEMORANDUM

Scowcroft file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Jr., Military
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 22, 1975
7:45 a.m. (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Kissinger: We should have a program in Portugal. There is a 50 percent chance of losing it.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a contingency plan to take over the Azores -- that would be stimulating Azores independence. We're in good shape on Libya. Our flying close brought a protest but they have been making good noises since.

We have been over some of these selective nuclear options -- the Iranian one has gone down hill. I talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff though and I think we are on the right track now.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't think much of it before.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we either have to use Poseidon or have forces in the country.

Secretary Kissinger: It was too slow moving -- it took days to get the F-4's in.

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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Secretary Schlesinger: I think we may have to take the Middle East away from EUCOM. There is something bad about SACEUR running a Middle East war.

Secretary Kissinger: I couldn't agree more. It doesn't make sense.

Secretary Schlesinger: I was thinking about giving it to REDCOM.

[General Scowcroft discussed why it was currently in EUCOM.]

Secretary Schlesinger: Our big problem is Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: There is a leadership meeting next week. Let's get the LIG going again.

Secretary Schlesinger: These new Congressmen are not bad. They seem more reasonable than some of the older ones.

Secretary Kissinger: I am really worried about the CIA thing.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree. I talked to the Rockefeller Committee. I see from the French traffic we are making some progress.

Secretary Kissinger: That is all screwed up. It was proposed to us by the French that we would buy Sihanouk if he would include members of the Lon Nol Government. We said okay but it wouldn't work. Now they can't get a visa for this guy. Our best negotiating chance was in the summer of 1973.

We plan an NSC meeting on both MBFR and SALT. It'll be mostly informational. I don't think there are any real differences.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't think so.

Dean wants to use U.S. planes to resupply. I think this is too early. The President should make that decision.

Secretary Kissinger: The SFRC said we were using spotter aircraft in Cambodia.

General Wickham: No.

General Scowcroft: Is it spotter or is it just passing data from the reconnaissance?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not sure. Is that bad?

Secretary Schlesinger: We may give them some plots. But they explicitly accepted reconnaissance.

Ash crapped on me. He has cut us \$1.6 billion on pay and I told him that Congress would restore it but take it out of our hide.

Secretary Kissinger: We have got to have a better way to do it. If we could have an earlier review of the strategic concepts, we would be better off and the President would be able to make decisions on other than administrative grounds.

On the French, the President agreed in principle to help them with nuclear cooperation. They may send someone with a shopping list and then you and I must talk.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think the only thing we can't do is a statement of [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6)

Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to do something which requires a legal change. What they want is negative guidance.

Secretary Schlesinger: The British have been shits on leaking the Masirah thing.

The F-15 letter of offer . . .

Secretary Kissinger: On LGB, can we give them something?

Secretary Schlesinger: How about five?

General Scowcroft: Maybe five now and more as they become more cooperative.

Secretary Kissinger: MATMON-B: Can you string it out?

Secretary Schlesinger: It will be strung out. LANCE? We are set now for 1 July.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's wait to see how the Sinai talks go. I am not sure whether Israel will go along or if they just want to set me up.

General Scowcroft: We have to sort out the F-15.

Secretary Schlesinger: I will take care of it. I didn't know there was a letter of offer. I have told them that it wouldn't affect the delivery dates.

[There was a discussion of Soviet intervention in the Middle East.]

Secretary Schlesinger: But however small the chances of Soviet intervention, what would we do?

Secretary Kissinger: That is my problem -- I don't know. But I feel they would put troops in before the Syrians were defeated.

Secretary Schlesinger: What would we do if they sent troops in now?

Secretary Kissinger: I would be tempted to let Israel preempt. What I fear is a Soviet move accompanied by a declaration for Israel on the '67 borders, and then they invite Europe and Japanese support.

Secretary Schlesinger: How about Clements going to Saudi Arabia?

Secretary Kissinger: I would agree in sending him as a counter-Soviet move, but my worry is that Clements might play it as a counter-Iranian move.