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**1975/03/10**

MEMORANDUM

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Melih Esenbel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey  
Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Necdet Tezel, Director General for Political Affairs  
Ercument Yavuzalp, Director General for Mutual Security  
Ecmel Barutcu, Director for Cyprus and Greek Aff

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, -----  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
William Macomber, United States Ambassador to Turkey  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

TIME AND DATE: Monday, March 10, 1975  
5:20 - 6:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Foreign Minister's Office  
Ankara, Turkey

SUBJECTS: Aid Cut-off; Cyprus

Esenbel: This used to be a Cabinet room. Now there is a bigger one downstairs.

[Photographers are let in.]

In Ankara there are about six papers.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
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ADDN, MWD 09029  
By TBS NARA Date 8/7/00

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Esenbel: Yes.

Well, I welcome you here to Ankara, Mr. Secretary. It is a long time that we have been planning for this visit. We have long hoped you could make it. It is useful that we exchange views so we know where we stand on these two matters -- the military aid matter in Washington and your exchange of views with Bitsios.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I want to express appreciation that you receive me, first, on short notice, and second in a time that is not easy in our relationship, when the U.S. Congress has taken an action which is totally wrong and with which we totally disagree. I appreciate it.

I wanted to come after all my exchange with Bitsios because there are certain developments which I believe come a little closer to the Turkish point of view. With respect to the aid matter: I am at your disposal if you wish to discuss the subject. I understand you had a talk with my colleagues [Hartman and Macomber] this morning.

Aid Cut-Off

Esenbel: Yes. On aid we said that we face heavy pressure -- not demonstrations or the usual, but you must realize how difficult it is to face up to these pressures -- from the parties and the intelligentsia and the military. We tell them that the U.S. Congress seems to understand their mistake. But you must realize there is a limit to what the Government can do. The time limit is approaching.

We have a government crisis now, so maybe there are some additional days for this, but soon the question will come up again. The press started to criticize me this morning instead of you.

Kissinger: If someone has to be criticized, that is a good solution. [Laughter]

Esenbel: The people want some action. This is what was wrong with the Congressional action -- really they didn't care about Turkish sensitivities. They certainly destroyed something here and they didn't care. This is the crucial point -- that they could do it without caring about the people. It's not a money question.

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Kissinger: No, I understand.

Esenbel: That they say "Make progress and come back in sixty days." This is completely wrong.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I needn't tell you what my sentiments are. I have said publicly that we are giving aid to Turkey not as a favor to Turkey but because it serves our mutual interests. I said this at the airport. I remember, even if the Congressmen don't, that Turkey sent troops to Korea, an area where Turkey had no interest, and whose prisoners -- we had a study made -- were the only ones who never cooperated with the Koreans, and the North Koreans are very brutal. Just as aid to Turkey got us into international affairs, the cutoff can be a way to get us out of international affairs. It wasn't directed against Turkey -- it was an attempt to destroy our foreign policy. It reflects, in my view, deep-seated attitudes, and is not anti-Turkey.

I believe we can change this. But because the people attacking it are attacking our whole foreign policy, it will be more difficult. If we had a secret vote, we could get it reversed. The problem now is how people can admit they were wrong six weeks after the initial vote. It's a problem of political prestige for some.

I hope you will look at it as the sickness of an old friend, not as something directed against Turkey. And show some patience.

Strangely, in America I'm accused of what you are -- that my actions are encouraging you. That if it were not for me, you'd have done what they asked. As Bill Macomber told you, we have introduced legislation and hope to get it passed in a couple of weeks.

Macomber: In the Senate.

Kissinger: I believe if we can give some of the people who feel guilty an excuse to change their minds, we would have a fairly easy task. If we could. As soon as I finish the current negotiation in the Middle East, maybe in two weeks, I'll bring Bill back and we'll make a massive effort.

We have had a legal analysis done, according to which it might be possible to restore spare parts more quickly if the President and leadership cooperate.

Esenbel: A waiver.

Kissinger: No, it's a special authority for MAP, for up to \$50 million. The difficulty is that if we use that waiver, they might not repeal the law. And we can use it only for one year. And next year we may not have the law changed. Therefore the President is very reluctant to do that. The only way to use the waiver is if the President with the tacit approval of the leaders and of the Greek lobby. . . . the Greek lobby may next year go after the waiver. But if you're under a tremendous time pressure, we may want to use the waiver.

Therefore I wanted to explain the choice we have.

Esenbel: You explained that before. You said that is the easiest road maybe, and the legislation would remain. And the Congressmen are reluctant to seem to admit the action was wrong, and then they'll say, "Why the problem? They have the \$50 million." We agree with you; we're against it. And we don't want that.

Kissinger: Thank you. I appreciate it.

Esenbel: Aid is a long-term need. Aid is a substantial part of our relationship. We want this to be restored. We're not interested in aid programs of 40 days, 50 days -- not that kind of relationship.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Esenbel: We want to know where we're standing. So people know they can trust the United States as an ally, and erase all doubts. With these 40-day waivers, we can't do that.

Kissinger: The waiver wouldn't be 40 days but for a year. But you're morally right; aid should be restored. I know the President would prefer to restore aid for many reasons -- one, for the principle, and second, he doesn't want to be dependent on Mr. Brademas, letting Brademas say he's helped and then go back to his original line. He's prepared to just declare that progress has been made, if he's going to bend the law. He wants the principle to be restored, and he's prepared to make an all-out effort.

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Esenbel: We approached the Europeans and Luns and he's supposed to come forward with an answer.

Kissinger: We approached the Germans. Did they start?

Yavuzalp: Not hardware; only subsidiary items. This has nothing to do with the spare parts we need.

Kissinger: [to Hartman] Art, can you go to Bonn and see Genscher and Leber? And see Haig.

Esenbel: You should brief Ecevit.

Kissinger: Ecevit can be very helpful. Art will see the Germans on the way home and also see Haig to see about getting surplus parts out of stocks. And [Ambassador David] Bruce was helpful.

Esenbel: The Europeans should find ways to meet quick needs; for example, the Air Force needs spare parts. For other items that they can't find in the stocks, maybe you could make a deal with the Dutch or others to send it here.

Macomber: That is illegal.

Kissinger: Before the Freedom of Information Act, I used to say at meetings, "The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer." [laughter] But since the Freedom of Information Act, I'm afraid to say things like that.


We'll make a major effort.

Esenbel: Your Ambassador told me the opposite. In Germany they said they delayed it one week so it looks like it happens after your visit.

Kissinger: My understanding is that the aid is now in force. They informed us.

Yavuzalp: The political decision is made, they say, but they're waiting for "appropriate timing" for implementation of the political decision.

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Kissinger: [to Hartman] Talk to Genscher and say I attach enormous importance to that.

Esenbel: The difficulty is they signed an agreement but they don't go ahead and implement it -- they do it piecemeal.

Kissinger: I'm sending Art to Bonn. If there are difficulties, I'll consider stopping in Bonn.

Yavuzalp: Our Ambassador would be aware of the latest.

Hartman: In Bonn.

Yavuzalp: In Bonn.

Kissinger: We have to do it somewhat quietly, so there shouldn't be news stories. [Secretary Kissinger confers with Ambassador Macomber]

One more word about aid. In the nature of things, it will take us some time. It will take us two weeks in the Senate, and then some time to see where we stand in the House.

Macomber: And there is a recess, so if we don't get it in two weeks, it will take two more before they reconvene.

Kissinger: It is not possible before April. If we succeed in the Middle East, it will give me a lot of influence even though it has nothing to do with it. And if the Cyprus thing goes the way it might go, it would be more possible. The law might lapse automatically if there is a settlement. So we might just declare substantial progress and fight rather with the Congress over the finding of substantial progress. That we can consider in April.

[Each side confers]

Esenbel: As the Secretary General reminds me, time is really pressing. We're enjoying a few days when the opposition doesn't want to shake us, but when the Government is formed, it will start. The people feel that the NATO Treaty Article III says that allies should help each other and not embargo each other, which is something done to an enemy. And the US is supplying arms to 100 countries and has put an embargo to Turkey. And if there is too much delay, they will lose their patience.

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By TJS NARA Date 3/7/00

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Elekdag: They see it as a punishment to Turkey for not following the policy line of the United States. This is how public opinion sees it. They are a little lenient now, but when the Government is formed, there will be a burst. How can the US do this to Turkey, a faithful ally? The intelligentsia see it as an unwritten law of NATO that there should not be an embargo on military sales.

Kissinger: I agree with you. I'm not your problem. I fought against it before it was put on, and I'm fighting against it now.

There are three options: One is to apply a waiver, but that would make it harder to change the law. Whenever your political pressures get too great, you can ask us. Second, we can find substantial progress under the existing law. This may be possible because, strangely, the Greeks have been making concessions, not the Turks. The third is to change the law.

If your domestic situation gets too complex, you can tell Bill. To change the law, it requires talking to Congressmen; that will take Bill, Art, and myself. So there is the legislative calendar. And we don't want a negative vote. So these are the complexities. If your situation gets too complex, we can do a waiver.

If we do it, we should do it for less than \$50 million, so it's not seen as a substitute for changing the law. We should limit it to the essential parts.

Esenbel: You say a smaller amount is preferable. Then it won't have any effect here. I'm supposing we won't do it by a waiver.

Kissinger: I haven't thought it through. You can tell us what you need. We don't think it's a good way to proceed. The President doesn't.

Esenbel: We don't like it either. Our military told us they don't like it. You should work on the Senate. Our people tell us to talk to Javits. One of our Senators met him and talked to him. He said, "I'm a friend of Turkey. Are you a politician or a diplomat?" Our Senator said he was a politician. Javits said, "So am I and I have to vote against it."

Kissinger: But we're beginning to turn that around.

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Esenbel: I talked to Rosenthal in his office and lost two hours with Rosenthal. He said he needed to "tilt" toward Caramanlis. He said, "I have to give something."

Kissinger: But that was last fall.

Esenbel: That's worrisome, that they can think so lightly of Turkey.

Kissinger: It has nothing to do with Turkey. It was the result of the unusual conditions of last year -- the result of Watergate, of an unelected President and in an election period, when all were terrified. So I think it's a mistake to take it as against Turkey. What would have happened normally would be a sense of Congress resolution, and we'd ignore it. I think it ran away with him.

Macomber: They didn't think it would pass.

Kissinger: That's another thing. They thought it would pass and we'd veto it and it would stand. But it happened just after the President had pardoned President Nixon. Now we need a way to help them find a way to reverse themselves. The mood as late as January was very bad. The mood now is defensive.

Macomber: You're absolutely right, sir. The mood in the Senate is shifting; you can feel it. In the House, it's not so noticeable. In the House, the leadership is for a change. But the problem is how these people can explain a turnaround.

### CYPRUS

Kissinger: Let's talk a few minutes of Cyprus. Without your making concessions, perhaps we can show progress and they can say they're helping progress.

Let me say this on Cyprus. We have spent our previous discussions of Cyprus perhaps not on the fundamental problems. We talked about Famagusta airport. This was partly because of Congress; we wanted to show progress. But, as you've said, the heart of the problem is the administrative structure of Cyprus, and perhaps in that framework the solution to the other problems can be found.

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My impression -- this is not a Greek message but my impression -- is that we could persuade the Greeks to accept a bizonal solution if your area is reduced in size. They are worried that if the Greek area is so small, it would lead to a massive exodus from the island. Which would lead to ... a political impossibility for the Greek government.

They have not yet said they would accept a bizonal solution, but my impression is they could be convinced to move in that direction if the area could be reduced.

Bitsios talked especially of the Morphou area and of the areas south of the Famagusta-Nicosia road. South of the old road, between the lower and upper road. I didn't press it.

He did point out, however, that while he wants the Morphou area there is a Turkish population west of Kyrenia.

Esenbel: Lefka.

Kissinger: Lefka, which would clearly have to be part of the Turkish zone.

So it's my impression from talking to Bitsios that he wants the negotiation to start again. And he wants the negotiations to start outside of Nicosia -- for reasons we all agree on. That's his interest in the UN -- whether it's New York, Vienna or Geneva. He prefers New York, but that's a secondary question.

For the first time, I detected a willingness to discuss a bizonal rather, that his mind was moving in that direction. But it was related to the reduction of the territory. Our Ambassador has that impression.

With respect to Makarios as President of that new Government, is not out of the question that a proposition could be made to the Greek

If this is possible, then it is in everyone's interest to drop the secondary issues and see whether it can be settled. Then Turkey would get international recognition of your basic position -- a bizonal solution. If the area is reduced -- you're the best judge. And the basic structure of the island. And the other issues could then perhaps more easily be settled.

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This is why I asked to come here. If you ask them flatly now -- "Do you accept a bizonal solution?" they'll say no. But I think it can be moved in that direction. And you should think whether it would be better to remove this from the international agenda. Makarios' strategy is obvious -- he wants the Russians in. We have received a letter from Brezhnev which we have not answered in three weeks, asking for internationalization. If it comes to that, the technique would be impossible.

This isn't my proposal to you; it's my impression of the Greek position. The curious thing is that the aid cutoff has made the Greeks more flexible, not the Turks. [Laughter] It's a paradox but it's the result.

If a negotiation in that framework could get started, rather than waive the law we could just say that substantial progress has been made. It would take a lot of nerve for the Congress to defy us. And the Greeks would have reason to be cautious, because if it's cut off and you walk out, they get nothing.

I talked to Clerides. I can speak of his view more certainly. I believe he would go along with this.

It would be a totally different Congressional situation if the obstacle were Makarios. We would see very early on in the negotiation whether the Greeks would accept a bizonal solution; if the obstacle is Makarios.... I'm having a memorandum prepared -- we're speaking as friends -- of the Greek Cypriot press. If it's Makarios against the US, that we can handle domestically.

You needn't decide now. We're not pressing you.

I have the impression that Caramanlis wants a rapid solution. I told Bitsios that any solution will be worse for Greece. I said, "The longer you wait, the more you make it a domestic issue. The only differences are a little more or a little less; whatever you get, your critics can still accuse you of a bad agreement." He said, "I agree with you." Our Ambassador saw Caramanlis yesterday afternoon, and Caramanlis agreed with this analysis. Therefore what I say to you is in my judgment achievable with the Greek Government. Caramanlis did make the point that beyond a certain point it would be unmanageable for him -- for example, if there was a mass exodus from the island, it would be a disaster for him. So it has to be enough for the Greek population to live in.

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I said I didn't know whether the Turks would accept Makarios as President.

Of course, at one point you asked for his return. [Laughter]

[A map of Cyprus is brought out and placed on the table. Secretary Kissinger indicates on the map:]

Here, below the road, between the old road and the new road, he said he needed something. Below the old road.

He showed me something on the map but I didn't take it down because I didn't think this was for me to negotiate. He didn't say that was all, but he did mention those two areas. Plus if it causes an exodus.

He didn't say the whole area between the roads.

Esenbel: Did he mean negotiations between Clerides and Denktash or between us?

Kissinger: He said he needed an excuse to resume the talks after you declared this [autonomous state]. So he can't go back to the same talks. This is his interest in the UN. So his idea is for you to meet over the Aegean, and of course while you and he meet on the Aegean no one can keep you from talking about something else. But he can't meet on the Aegean until the other talks start.

He agrees it shouldn't be internationalized.

He said the trend toward war, even though it would be disastrous, would be hard to avoid if there is no solution. He didn't want it -- and this was not said in a threatening way. He realizes it would be a disaster for Greece.

Esenbel: That is one point we agree on -- the last point. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I asked our Ambassador to check my analysis with him, and at the end he said....

Esenbel: We hope the talks will be resumed and we checked with your Ambassador and Mr. Hartman.

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Kissinger: What is happening in New York?

Esenbel: They're meeting now. We hope there will be a resolution to ask the Secretary General to convene the talks somewhere. We hope not in New York.

Kissinger: What do you have against New York? I'm not pushing it.

Esenbel: It shouldn't be under the United Nations nor should the UN be involved; it should be something solved by the people of Cyprus. I talked to the Secretary General and he agreed.

Kissinger: What about Vienna?

Esenbel: Yes, we proposed Vienna. His man can attend, as Weckmann did.

Sisco: In light of what the Secretary said, it is all the more important to get something settled in New York.

Kissinger: Given Waldheim's vanity, it will be hard to keep him out of the talks. [Laughter] Given his general level of competence, what damage can he do? [Laughter]

Esenbel: He was jotting down my words.

Kissinger: We have sent a message to Bitsios this morning that we want something worked out on the basis of a consensus with Turkey. We couldn't get directly involved in the drafting because we would be always behind events. But Buffum is instructed to work constructively.

Esenbel: We will meet tomorrow.

Kissinger: The difficulty will be -- [bear this in mind] when you gentlemen consult among yourselves -- the Greeks can't accept a bizonal arrangement unless the area is reduced. If you ask them now if they accept a bizonal solution, they'll say no. But if we can combine them some way so that when they agree to a bizonal arrangement they'll have some assurance of a reduction of the area....

[The meeting ended at 6:30 p.m.]

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