

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES OF PORTUGAL

Thursday, May 29, 1975
3:30 p.m. (45 minutes)
Ambassador Firestone's Residence
Brussels, Belgium

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

Your meeting with the Portuguese Prime Minister will take place immediately prior to the opening session of the NATO Heads of Government meeting.

Your purpose will be to:

- -- stress the importance of a strong Atlantic Alliance with unqualified participation by its member nations;
 - -- underscore the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty;
- -- state your frank concern over formal Communist participation in the Cabinet of a NATO member country as damaging to the integrity of the Alliance.
- -- invite Goncalves' assessment of current developments in Portugal as they bear on the direction of Portuguese foreign policy.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. <u>Background</u>: This will be your first meeting with Goncalves (Gon-SAL-vesh) who is a leading radical in the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) and who reportedly favors eventual Portuguese withdrawal from NATO. Originally, President Costa Gomes (whom you met in Washington last October) was planning to attend the NATO summit, but Goncalves took his place and Costa Gomes is going instead to Paris June 3-4.


SECRET/SENSITIVE

Goncalves is unpredictable. His principal interest in attending the NATO summit is unclear to us. Undoubtedly, he will use the summit as a means of taking the measure of his NATO colleagues and of assessing personally the degree of Western support Portugal can expect. Beyond that, he is likely (at a minimum) to reconfirm Portugal's present commitment to the Western alliance, to indicate that the question of Portuguese NATO membership is subject to future review by an as yet to be elected Parliament, to criticize the Allies for their near-failure to extend economic assistance to Portugal during the past year, and to complain about those governments -- specifically the US -- which have suggested that Portugal is becoming a Communist state.

The Portuguese Cabinet has both Communist and neutralist ministers. This arrangement (which the present Government is not likely to change) poses serious problems for the security of sensitive NATO information. In a broader context, it raises important questions about the possible precedent which might be set for the Italians (who have their own internal problems with the Communists) and others who might find it politically expedient to accept Communists into their cabinets. Such a development would require a fundamental re-examination of the membership and character of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Portuguese say that they are constructing a new social order which is neither Communism nor Western European Social Democrace but something uniquely Portuguese. They believe that their Revolution is totally misunderstood abroad and that foreign governments (without exception) have no business making public comments -- even favorable ones -- about Portugal's internal politics. Portugal's new Foreign Minister Antunes (who will participate in the Brussels meeting) took this position with me during our meeting in Bonn on May 20.

I stated U.S. interest in seeing an independent, democratic and prosperous Portugal, but I expressed very frankly our concern that events could lead to results that no one anticipated or wanted. I also expressed our concern over Portuguese foreign policy stating that if it became constantly anti-American and adopted the radical stance of the third world this had to be a problem for us. I further expressed our concern over the attacks on our Embassy and personne in Lisbon, the allegations of CIA activities and of economic warfare.



Current Developments in Portugal. Since the impressive Socialist returns in the April 25 Constituent Assembly elections, there has been sparring and political turmoil involving the Communists, the Socialists and the Armed Forces Movement.

Portugal's ruling Revolutionary Council, apparently concerned about the deteriorating political situation, called on May 23 for national unity and said it would never permit a dictatorship. The Council appealed to all political parties to cooperate in view of the country's worsening economic situation.

The Council's pronouncement followed a day of tense political activities:

Socialist leader Mario Soares in a press conference strongly criticized the Communist Party and the Armed Forces Movement and said his party would boycott government meetings until the Socialist newspaper is returned, until press freedom is restored and until union and municipal elections are allowed.

Tens of thousands of Socialist demonstrators attended rallies in Lisbon and several other cities in support of Soares.

The Communists accused the Socialists of threatening the Portuguese system with their boycott.

The conciliatory nature of the Council's statement contrasts with its stand in recent days. The Armed Forces Movement on May 23 took what could be the first step toward removing President Costa Gomes because of his sympathies for the Socialists.

The man most frequently mentioned as a potential success or Costa Gomes, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, has been tapped to accompany Prime Minister Goncalves and Foreign Minister Antunes to the NATO summit. Ambassador Carlucci learned of Coutinho's inclusion in the Portuguese delegation from Goncalves during a discussion of issues that might come up at the summit.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister most recently has announced it will bypass the political parties' leadership and deal directly with the people.

Goncalves reaffirmed Portugal's intention to remain in NATO. He said his government's philosophy is not neutralist, but simply reflects a desire to develop close relations with its former colonies

SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE U. HEART A KISSING

DECLASSIFIED

Goncalves said Portugal's foreign policy is not designed to upset' existing arrangements, although his government favors a relaxation of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Prime Minister seemed concerned about efforts to promote closer ties between Spain and NATO, but noted that Portugal has a pact with Spain and therefore is in no position to criticize.


On a matter more critical to the Portuguese, Goncalves asked Ambassador Carlucci if the U.S. could intercede with President Mobutu of Zaire. He said Mobutu had broken his promise not to involve himself in Angola and was sending men and equipment to one of the liberation groups contending for power.

Azores Base Agreement. A key element in US-Portuguese relations has been the Portuguese Base Agreement which plays an important NATO ASW role and which served as a very important staging base for U.S. flights to the Middle East during the 1973 war. Continued use of the Azores is very much in our interests.

Our agreement for use of the facilities at Lajes airfield expired more than a year ago. The Portuguese are allowing us to continue operations in the Azores pending the outcome of negotiations for renewal of the agreement. These negotiations, in fact, have never really gotten underway because of Portuguese preoccupation with internal events since April 1974.

We have proposed to the Portuguese that our talks on fair compensation for the Azores base include a modest level of economic aid for the Azores islands and a larger program of equipment and training for the Portuguese armed forces. They have not responded to this informal offer, although Foreign Minister Antunes recently commented that they would soon be ready to resume talks. Goncalve in public statements, has said that Portugal will honor its NATO commitment including U.S. use of the Azores, but that the United States would never be permitted to use the base for the resupply of Israel.

Azores Independence Movement. Small political groups in the Azores have been seeking international support, primarily in the United States, for Azorean independence. The U.S. Government has not become involved. We have taken a position of strict neutrality, although some of the more radical members of the AFM have suggest that we may be encouraging the independence effort.



- B. <u>Participants</u>: Prime Minister Goncalves, Foreign Minister Antunes, Admiral Coutinho, Henry A. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Hartman.
- C. <u>Press Arrangements</u>: The meeting will be announced as part of your Brussels schedule, and there will be a press photo session at the beginning of your talks.

III. TALKING POINTS

Portuguese/NATO Relations

- It is my firm belief that no cause is of greater importance for our peoples -- and to the prospects for peace and stability throughout the world -- than that of maintaining and demonstrating the strength and solidarity of the West.
- 2. In this afternoon's NATO summit meeting I will state clearly that the United States remains true to our North Atlantic Treaty commitments.
- 3. I look forward to consulting with the other leaders of the Alliance on the need to maintain a strong and credible defense to maintain the integrity of the Alliance, and to improve the process of consultation.
- 4. As you will know from my meeting with President Costa Gomes in Washington last fall, I believe it is important that we consult in a spirit of total candor.
- 5. I frankly find it difficult to reconcile formal participation by Communist ministers in your government as a member government of the Alliance. The Alliance upholds democratic institutions and its members are united against communism.
- 6. These are times of immense challenge for the West politically, economically, and interms of our security. The United States is prepared, working with the other members of the Alliance, to meet these challenges, but this will require the total and dedicated participation of each member.
- 7. How do you see Portugal's policy toward NATO in the coming months and years?

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 6 -

US-Portuguese Relations

- 1. I am equally concerned by the anti-American policy repeatedly being shown by your government -- your government's statement at the time of U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, your attacks on our Embassy and our personnel in Lisbon, your charges of CIA involvement and your charges of economic warfare. These charges are false.
- 2. The United States has supported the Portuguese Government's program of decolonization and its stated goal of restoring democracy.
- 3. Our economic assistance program is an example of that support and, if the Government of Portugal can overcome some of its own bureaucratic obstacles, we are prepared to move ahead.
- 4. We can understand the political motivation behind some of Portugal's nationalization programs, but Portugal must surely understand that this has its costs in terms of investment climate and general economic uncertainty.
- 5. Mr. Prime Minister, it is important to understand clearly that the United States supports an independent, democratic and prosperous Portugal. The friendly ties between our peoples and the ties of alliance between our governments are of longstanding, and they should continue.
- 6. We should explore ways to improve our consultations, to ensure that our two governments work together as effectively and as cooperatively as possible. In this context, I am pleased to know that Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Antunes have agreed to meet again this summer.

Azores Base Negotiations

- We are ready to resume negotiations on renewal of the Azores base agreement whenever you are.
- 2. The base plays a very useful role in the defense of the West, and we look forward to concluding a mutually satisfactory renewal of the agreement.

Azores Independence Movement (If raised by Goncalves)

- 1. I am generally aware of press reports on the subject.
- 2. If political activities such as this do exist, it is strictly an internal Portuguese matter. The United States is in no way involved.

Angolan Independence (if raised by Goncalves)

- 1. It is my understanding that Angolan independence is set for November 1975.
- 2. We welcome Portugal's policy (a neutral stance) which we believe is supportive of a peaceful transition to independence there.
- 3. We believe this transition is for the three liberation forces to work out for themselves.
- 4. Our own policy is one of neutrality. We do not believe it correct for us to suggest positions to Mobutu. We look forward to friendly relations with an independent Angola.

Biographic sketches and additional background information is contained in your bilateral briefing book at the Tab marked Portugal.

SECRET/SENSITIVE